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PETITIONER: THE AHMEDABAD ST.  XAVIERS COLLEGE SOCIETY & ANR.  ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/04/1974

BENCH: RAY, A.N. (CJ) BENCH: RAY, A.N. (CJ) REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN PALEKAR, D.G. KHANNA, HANS RAJ MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH DWIVEDI, S.N. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ALAGIRISWAMI, A.

CITATION:  1974 AIR 1389            1975 SCR  (1) 173  1974 SCC  (1) 717  CITATOR INFO :  D          1975 SC1821  (9,10,19,20,23,25,35,42,43)  RF         1976 SC 490  (88)  APL        1979 SC  52  (24,38,51,53)  R          1979 SC  83  (5)  RF         1979 SC 478  (101)  R          1980 SC1042  (2,41,43,63,64,65,81,93,99,101  R          1984 SC1420  (13)  R          1984 SC1757  (2,6)  E&R        1987 SC 311  (11,13)  RF         1987 SC1210  (9)  D          1988 SC  37  (9,12,13,14,15,18)  D          1988 SC 305  (8,16,17)  RF         1990 SC 695  (5)

ACT: Constitution of India 1950 Arts. 29 and 30--Whether mutually exclusive--Scope of Gujarat  University Act, 1949--ss. 5, 33A (1) (a),  33A  (1) (b),  s.  39,  s. 40(1) and (2), s.  41(1),  s.  51A(1)  and 52A--Gonstitutionality.

HEADNOTE: The  first  petitioner  a  religious  denomination,  runs  a college  to provide higher education to Christian and  other students.  The petitioner’s college was accorded affiliation under  s. 33 of the Gujarat University Act, 1949 as  amended in 1972. The  Senate of the University passed a resolution  that  all instruction, teaching and training in courses of studies  in respect  of  which  the  University  is  competent  to  hold examinations shall, within the University area. be conducted by  the University and shall be imparted by the teachers  of the University. Section   5  of  the  Act  provides  that   no   educational institution situated within the University shall, save  with

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the  sanction of the State Governmrnt be associated  in  any way  with  or seek admission to any privilege of  any  other University established by law.  Section 33A(1)(a) of the Act provides that every College other than a Government  College or  a College maintained by the Government, shall  be  under the  management  of a governing body  which  includes  among others. the Principal of the College and a representative of the  University nominated by the  Vice-Chancellor.   Section 33A(1)  (b) (i) provides that in the case of recruitment  of the  Principal,  a  selection committee is  required  to  be constituted consisting of, among others, a representative of the University nominated by the Vice-Chancellor and (ii)  in the  case of selection of a member of the teaching staff  of the   College  a  selection  committee  consisting  of   the Principal  and a representative of the University  nominated by  the  Vice-Chancellor.   Subsection (3)  of  the  section states that the provisions of subsection (1) of s. 33A shall be deemed to be a condition of affiliation of every  college referred  to in that sub-section.  Section 39 provides  that within  the University area all  post-graduate  instruction, teaching  and training shall be conducted by the  University or  by  such affiliated College or institution and  in  such subjects  as may be prescribed by statutes.   Section  40(1) enacts  that the Court of the University may determine  that all  instructions,  teaching  and  training  in  courses  of studies  in respect of which the University is competent  to hold examinations shall be conducted, by the University  and shall  be imparted by the teachers of the University.   Sub- section (2) of s. 40 states that the State, Government shall issue a notification declaring that the provisions of s.  41 shalt  come into force on such date as may be  specified  in the notification.  Section 41(1) of the Act states that  all colleges  within the University area which are  admitted  to the  privilege  of  the University under  s.  5(3)  and  all colleges  within  the  said  area  which  may  hereafter  be affiliated  to the University shall be constituent  colleges of   the  University.   Sub-section  (4)  states  that   the relations of the constituent colleges and other institutions within the University area shall be governed by statutes  to be made in that behalf. Section  51A(1)  (b) enacts that no member of  the  teaching other  academic  and  non-teaching staff  of  an  affiliated college.  shall be dismissed or removed or reduced  in  rank except  after  an enquiry in accordance with  the  procedure Prescribed in cl. (a) and the penalty to be inflicted on him is  approved by the Vice-Chancellor or any other Officer  of the University authorised by the Vice- 174 Chancellor in this behalf.  Similarly cl. (b) of  subsection (2) requires that such termination should be approved by the Vice-Chancellor or any officer of the University  authorised by  the  Vice-Chancellor  in this  behalf.   Section  52A(1) enacts  that any dispute between the governing body and  any member  of the teaching and other staff shall, on a  request of the governing body or of the member concerned be referred to  a  tribunal  of arbitration  consisting  of  one  member nominated  by the governing body of the college, one  member nominated by the member concerned and an umpire appointed by the Vice-Chancellor. Article 29(1) of the Constitution states that any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part, thereof having a distinct language script or culture of  its own  shall  have the right to conserve  the  same.   Article 30(1)  enacts that all minorities whether based on  religion Dr  language-,  shalt  have  the  right  to  establish   and

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administer educational institutions of their choice. Under   clause   (2)   in  granting   aid   to   educational institutions,  the  state is enjoined  not  to  discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under  the  management  of  A  minority,  whether  based  on religion or language. In a petition under article 32 the petitioner contended that as   religious   and  Linguistic  minorities  they   had   a fundamental  right to establish and  administer  educational institutions   of  their  choice  as  also  the   right   to affiliation.  The petitioners challenged the  constitutional validity of the above sections. The respondent on the other band contended that articles  29 and 30 are mutually exclusive, that there was no fundamental right  to  affiliation  or  recognition,  that  a   minority educational  institution seeking affiliation or  recognition must conform to the conditions prescribed for recognition or affiliation,  that  unless  a law or  regulation  is  wholly destructive of the right of minorities under Art. 30(1)  the same would not be; liable to be struck down and lastly  that the court should not strike down the impugned provisions but should wait till statutes or ordinance are made in pursuance of those sections. HELD: By  Majority : (Ray C.J.. Palekar, Khanna, Mathew,  Beg  and Chandrachud,  JJ.)  Articles,  29 and 30  are  not  mutually exclusive.  (Jaganmohan Reddy and Alagiriswami, JJ. did  not deal with this question.) Dwivedi,  J.  :  The content of right  under  Article  29(1) differs from content of, the right under Article 30(1) By   full  Court  :  There,  is  no  fundamental  right   to affiliation.   But recognition or affiliation  is  necessary for  a  meaningful exercise of the right  to  establish  and administer educational institutions. By  majority:  (Ray,  C.  J.,  Palekar,  Jaganmohan   Reddy. Khanna, Mathew, Chandrachud and Alagiriswami JJ.) Section 35 A cannot apply to minority institutions.  Beg.  J :  Section 33A would not impinge upon the right under Article 30(1). Dwivedi, J.Section  33A(1)(a) is violative  of  minority rights. By majority(Ray C.J., Palekar, Jaganmohan Reddy, Khanna, Mathew, Chandrachud andAlagiriswami.  JJ.) Section 40  and 41   cannot   have  compulsory   application   to   minority institutions.   Beg,  J.  :  Sections 40  and  41  would  be violative  of the right under Article 30(1) and,  therefore, do  not apply to minority institutions unless they  opt  for affiliation. Dwivedi, J.No  legitimate  objection could be  taken  of Sections 40 and 41. By majority(Ray C.J., Palekar, Jaganmohan Reddy, Khanna, Mathew, Chandrachudand  Alagiriswami, JJ.) Section  51  (A) (1)  and  (2)  and Section 52A cannot  have  application  to minority institutions. Beg  J. did not consider it really necessary on the view  he was faking to consider the validity, of Sections 51A(1)  and (2) and Section 52(A) of the Act but, after assuming it  was necessary to do so, held these provisions to be valid. 175 Dwivedi,  J.  Sections  51A and 52A  are  not  violative  of Article 30(1) of the Constitution. Ray C.J. and Palekar, J. It  will  be wrong to read Art. 30 (1)  as  restricting  the right of minorities to establish and administer  educational institutions  of  their  choice only  to  cases  where  such institutions are concerned with language, script or  culture

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of  the  minorities.   If  the scope of  art.  30(1)  is  to establish   and  administer  educational   institutions   to conserve language, script or culture of minorities., it will render  Art. 30 redundant.  If the rights under Arts.  29(1) and  30(1) are the same then the consequences will  be  that any  section  of  citizens, not  necessarily  linguistic  or religious  minorities, will have the right to establish  and administer  educational institutions of their  choice.   The scope of Art. 30 rests on linguistic or religious minorities and no other section of citizens of India has such a  right. If the scope of Art. 30(1) is made an extension of the right under  Art. 29(1) as the right to establish  and  administer educational  institutions for giving religious  construction or  for imparting education in their religious teachings  or tenets, the fundamental right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice will  be taken away. [191CG] The  Kerala Education Bill 1957 [1959] S.C.R. 995  and  Rev. Father Proost v.    State  of  Bihar  [1969]  2  S.C.R.   73 referred to. (2)The  consistent view of this Court has been that  there is  no  fundamental  right  of  a  minority  institution  to affiliation.   The regulatory measures for  affiliation  are for  uniformity,  efficiency and excellence  in  educational courses  and  do not violate any fundamental  right  of  the minority institutions under Art. 30. [193C; 194D] (3)The  right  conferred  on the  religious  and  linguistic minorities  to administer educational institutions of  their choice  is  not an absolute right.  Ibis right is  not  free from regulation.  Just as regulatory measures are  necessary for  maintaining  the educational character and  content  of minority  institutions,  similarly regulatory  measures  are necessary  for  ensuring orderly, efficient  and  sound  ad- ministration. [ 194G-H] The  Kerala Education Bill 1957 [1959] S.C.R.  995  referred to. (4)The  provisions of s. 33A(1)(a) cannot apply to  minority institutions.  Provisions of this section have the effect of displacing  the management and entrusting it to a  different agency.  The right to administer is the right to conduct and manage  the  affairs  of the  institution.   This  right  is exercised through a body ’of persons in whom the founders of the institution have faith and confidence and who have  full autonomy in that sphere.  The right to administer is subject to  permissible regulatory measures.  If the  administration has  to be improved it should be done through the agency  or instrumentality  of  the  existing  management  and  not  by displacing it.  Restrictions on the right of  administration imposed in the interest of the general public alone and  not in  the  interests  of  and  for  the  benefit  of  minority educational institutions concerned will affect the  autonomy in administration. [198G; 198H-199A; 199D-E] (5)  The,  provisions  contained in s. 33A  (1)  (b)  cannot apply to minority institutions.  [ 199H] (6)Section  40  of  the Act  cannot  have  any  compulsory application  to minority institutions because it  will  take away  their fundamental right to administer the  educational institutions  of their choice.  As soon as the court,  which is one of the authorities of the university, determines that the  teaching  and  training  shall  be  conducted  by   the University,  the  provisions of S. 41 of the Act  come  into force.   It is true that no determination has yet been  made by  the court of the University under s. 40, but  the  power can be used in relation to minority institutions.  Once that is  done, the minority institutions will immediately  become

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constituent college$.  The real implication of s. 40 of  the Act is that teaching and training shall be conducted by  the university. [197C-E; G]  (7) Since sections 40 and 41 hang together,s.41 of the Act cannot   have   any  compulsory  application   to   minority institutions.  Section 41 of the Act is a corollary to s. 40 of   the  Act.   Since  an  affiliated  college  becomes   a constituent 176 college  within the meaning of s. 41 of the Act, it  becomes integrated  to the university.  A constituent  college  does not  retain its former individual character any  longer  and its minority character is lost. [198E] (8)Section  51A  of  the  Act  cannot  apply  to  minority institutions.   The approval of the Vice Chancellor  may  be intended   to  be  a  check  on  the  administration.    The provisions  contained in s. 51A (b) cannot be said to  be  a permissive   regulatory  measure  inasmuch  as  it   confers arbitrary  power  on the Vice-Chancellor to  take  away  the right  of  administration  of  the  minority  institutions.. [200C] (9)The  provisions  contained in s. 52A  cannot  apply  to minority   institutions.   Reference  to  arbitration   will introduce  an  area  of  litigious  controversy  inside  the educational  institutions.   The  governing  body  has   its domestic  jurisdiction  which will be displaced  and  a  new jurisdiction will be created in the administration. [200D-E] Jaganmohan Reddv and Alagiriswami, JJ. (1)The  right under Art. 30 cannot-be exercised in  vacuo. Nor would it be right to refer to affiliation or recognition as privileges granted by the State.  Meaningful exercise  of the  right  under  art. 30(1)  would  and  must  necessarily involve recognition of the secular education imparted by the minority institutions without which the right will be a mere husk.  This Court has consistently struck down all  attempts to  make affiliation or recognition on terms  tantamount  to surrender  of  its rights under art. 30(1) as  abridging  or taking  away  those rights.  Again, as  without  affiliation there can be no meaningful exercise of the right under  art. 30(1) the affiliation to be given should be consistent  with that  right  nor can it indirectly try to  achieve  what  it cannot directly do. [211E-G] Re. The Kerala Education Bill 1957 [1959] S.C.R. 995,  State of Kerala Very  Rev.  Mother Provincial etc. [1971] 1 S.C.R. 734 and D.A.V. College etc. v. The Stateof   Punjab   & Ors. [1971] Supp.  S.C.R. 688 followed. (2)The only purpose that the fundamental right under  Art. 30(1)  would serve would be that minorities might  establish their  institutions,  lay down their  own  syllabi,  provide instructions in the subjects of their choice, conduct exami- nations  and award degrees or diplomas.   Such  institutions have  the  right to seek recognition to  their  degrees  and diplomas  and  ask  for  aid where aid  is  given  to  other educational  institutions  giving a like  education  on  the basis  of  the excellence achieved by them.   The  State  is bound to give recognition to their qualifications and to the institutions and they cannot be discriminated except on  the ground of want of excellence in their educational  standards so   far   as   recognition  of   degrees   or   educational qualifications is concerned and want of efficient management so far as aid is concerned. [212E-F] Khanna, J. (1)Clause  (1) of Art. 29 and clause (1) of art.  30  deal with distinct matters. it is not permissible to circumscribe or  restrict  the right conferred by cl. (1) of art.  30  by

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reading in it any limitation imported from cl. (1). of  art. 29.   Article  29(1)  confers  a right  on  any  section  of citizens having distinct language, script or culture of  its own  to conserve the same.  For invoking this clause  it  is not necessary that the section of citizens should constitute a  minority.  As against that, the right conferred  by  art. 30(1)  is  only upon minorities which are  based  either  on religion  or language.  Clause (1) of art. 30  contains  the words   "of  their  choice".   These  words  which   qualify "educational  institutions"  show the  vast  discretion  and option  which the minorities have in selecting the  type  of institutions  which  they  want to establish.   In  case  an educational  institution  is established by  a  minority  to conserve its distinct language, script or culture, the right to establish and administer such institution would fall both under art. 29(1) as well as under art. 30(1).  The right  to establish  and administer such an institution is  guaranteed by art. 30(1) and the fact that such an institution does not conserve  the  distinct  language, script or  culture  of  a minority  would not take it out of the ambit of art.  30(1). [238D-H] (2)   The  object of articles 25 to 30 was Co  preserve  the rights of religious and linguistic minorities, to place them on a secure pedestal and withdraw them from the vicissitudes of political  controversy.  These provisions  enshrined  a befitting 177 pledge to the minorities in the Constitution of the  country Whose greatest son had laid down his life for the protection of the minorities.  As long as the Constitution stands as it is   today,   no  tampering  with  those   rights   can   be countenanced.  Any attempt to do so would be not only an act of breach of faith, it would be constitutionally impermeable and  liable to be struck down by the courts.   Although  the words   secular  state are not expressly  mentioned  in  the Constitution,    there   can   be   no   doubt   that    our Constitution.;makers  wanted establishment of such a  state. The   provisions   of   the   Constitution   were   designed accordingly.  There is no mysticism in the secular character of the state.  Secularism is neither anti-God. nor  pro-God, it  treats alike the devout, the agnostic and  the  atheist. It eliminates God from the matters of the state and  ensures that no one shall, be discriminated against on the ground of religion. [224A-C] The idea of giving some special rights to the minorities  is not  to have a kind of a privileged or pampered  section  of the  population  but to give to the minorities  a  sense  of security and a feeling of confidence.  The great leaders  of India  since time immemorial had preached the  doctrine-  of tolerance  and  catholicize of outlook. "Those  noble  ideas were  enshrined  in the Constitution.   Special  rights  for minorities  were designed not to create  inequality.   Their real  effect  was to bring about equality  by  ensuring  the preservation of the minority institution and by guaranteeing to   the   minorities  autonomy  in  the   matter   of   the administration  of  those  institutions.   The  differential treatment  for the minorities by giving them special  rights is intended to bring about an equilibrium, so that the ideal of  equality may not be reduced to a mere abstract idea  but should  become a living reality and result in true,  genuine equality, an equality not merely in theory but also in fact. The majority in a system of adult franchise hardly needs any protection’.   It  can  look after itself  and  protect  its interests.   Any measure wanted by the majority can  without much  difficulty be brought on the-statute book because  the

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majority  can get that done by giving such a mandate to  the elected representatives.  It is only the minorities who need protection, and Article 30, besides some other articles,  is intended to afford and guarantee that protection. [224F-H] (3)It is permissible for the State to prescribe reasonable regulations  and  make  it  a  condition  precedent  to  the according  of  recognition  or  affiliation  to  a  minority institution.   It is not, however, permissible to  prescribe conditions  for  recognition or affiliation which  have  the effect of impairing the right or the minority to.  establish and administer their educational institutions.   Affiliation and  recognition  are  not mentioned in  Art.  30(1).   The- position all the same remains that refusal to, recognise  or affiliate   minority  institutions  unless  the   minorities surrender the right to. administer those institutions  would have the effect of rendering the right guaranteed by Art. 30 (1) to be wholly illusory and indeed a teasing illusion.  An educational institution can hardly serve any purpose or  put to  any  practical  utility unless it  is  affiliated  to  a University or is otherwise recognised like other educational institutions.  The right conferred by art. 30 is a real  and meaningful right.  Article 30(1) was intended to have a real significance  and it is not permissible to’ construe  it  in such a manner as would rob it of that significance. [240A-C] Re,  The  Kerala  Education Bill  1957,  [1959]  S.C.R.  995 referred to. (4)The  argument that unless law is wholly destructive  of the  right  of minorities under art.30(1) it  would  not  be liable  to be struck down is untenable and runs  counter  to the plain language of art.13. The law which interferes  with the  minorities’  choice of a governing-body  or  management council  would be violative of the right guaranteed by  art. 30(1). [241B-C] Re.   Kerala  Education  Bill,  1957,  [1959]  S.C.R.   995, Sidhajbhai Sarabhai v. State of Bombay [1963] 3 S.C.R.  837; Rt.   Rev Bishop S. K. Patro & Ors. v.’ State of  Bihar  and Ors.  [1970]  1  S.C.R.’172; State of Kerala  v.  Very  Rev. Mother  Provincial  [1971] 1 S.C.R. 734; D.A.Y.  College  v. State of Punjab [1971] Supp.  S.QR. 688 followed. (5)Section 33A which provides for a new governing body for the  management  of  the  college  and  also  for  selection committees  as  well as the constitution thereof  should  be quashed so far as the minority educational institutions  are concerned because of the contravention of Art. 30(1). [242A- B] (6)The  law which interferes with a minority’s  choice  of qualified teachers or its disciplinary control over teachers and other members of the staff of the institution is void as being violative of art. 30(1). [242G]                             178 Rev.  Sidhaibhai.  Sabhai & Ors. v. State of Bombay &  Anr., 119631 3 SCR 837,Rev. Father W.Proof & Ors. v. The State  of Bihar,& Ors. [1969]2 SCR 73 and Rt rev.  Bishop S. K.’ Patro JUDGMENT: (7)It  is  permissible for the State and  its  educational authorities  to  prescribe qualifications of  teachers,  but once   teachers possessing the requisite  qualifications  am selected   by   the   minorities   for   their   educational institutions,  the  State would have no right  to  veto  the selection of those teachers.  The selection and  appointment of  teachers  for an educational institution is one  of  the essential ingredients of the right to manage an  educational institution  and  the minorities can plainly be  not  denied such,   right,   of  selection  and   appointments   without infringing art. 30(1). (242G-H]

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(8)Although  disciplinary control over the teachers  of  a minority educational institution would be with the governing council,  regulations  can  be  made  for  ensuring   proper conditions  of  service of the teachers and for  securing  a fair procedure in the matter of disciplinary action  against the  teachers.   Such  provisions which  are  calculated  to safeguard the interest of teachers would result in  security of tenure and thus inevitably attract competent persons  for the  posts of teachers.  Regulations made for  this  purpose should  be  considered  to be in the  interest  of  minority educational institutions and as such they would not  violate art. 30(1). [243E-F] (9)Clause (a) of sub-sections ( 1) and (2) of S 51A of the Act which make provision for giving a reasonable opportunity of  showing  cause against the penalty to be proposed  on  a member of the staff of an educational institution is  valid. [243G] (10)Clause (b) of each of the sub-sections of s. 51A should be  held  to be violative of art. 30(1) so far  as  minority educational institutions are concerned. [244C] Clause  (b) of those sub-section which gives a power to  the Vice-Chancellor and officer of the University authorised  by him  to  veto  the  action  of  the  managing  body  of   an educational  institution in awarding punishment to a  member of the staff interferes with the disciplinary control of the managing  body  over its teachers.  Ile power  conferred  by this clause is a blanket power.  No guidelines ire laid down for  the exercise of that power and it is not provided  that the  approval is to be withheld only in case  of  dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of service is mala fide  or  by way of victimisation or  other  similar  cause. Conferment  of such blanket power on the Vice-Chancellor  or other officer authorised by him for vetoing the disciplinary action  of the managing body of an’ educational  institution makes a serious inroad on the right of the managing body  to administer an educational institution. [244A-B] (11)Section  52A  should be held to be  violative  of  art. 30(1)  so  far  as  minority  educational  institutions  are concerned.  Section 52A is widely worded and as it stands it would  cover within its ambit every dispute  connected  with the conditions, of service, of a. member of the staff of  an educational institution however trivial or insignificant  it may  be.   The  effect of this section  would  be  that  the managing  committee of, an educational institution would  be embroiled  by  its  employees in  a  series  of  arbitration proceedings.   Provisions  of this section would  act  as  a spoke  in’  the  wheel of  effective  administration  of  an educational  institution.   What  is  objectionable  in  the section is the giving of the power to the Vice-Chancellor to nominate the umpire’ This would cause an inroad in the right of the governing body to administer the institution.  [244E- F] (12)The concept of constituent colleges which is visualised in ss. 40 and 41 of the Act contemplates that the  imparting of  teaching  at the undergraduate level in  the  prescribed course  of  studies  shall be only by the  teachers  of  the university.   The  minority Colleges as such  would  not  be entitled  to  impart education in course  of  study  through their own teachers. [246G] (13)Sections  40  and 41 are void in  respect  of  minority educational institution. [245E] A  provision  which  makes it imperative  that  teaching  in undergraduate   courses  can  be  conducted  only   by   the University  and can be imparted only by the teachers of  the University   plainly  violates  rights  of   minorities   to

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establish  and  administer their  educational  institutions. Such a provision must consequently he held                             179 qua minority institutions to result in contravention of art. 30(1).   Once s. 40 is :,held to be Unconstitutional so  far as minorities are concerned, the same vice Would afflict  a. 41  because  s. 41 can operate only if s.  40  survives  the attack-and is held to be not violative of,art. 30(1). [245C- E.] (14)Abridgment of the right of the minorities to  establish and  administer educational institutions of their choice  is writ large on the face of the impugned provisions.  The fact that no statutes or ordinances have been framed in pursuance of   the  impugned  provisions  would  be  hardly  of   much significance  in determining the constitutional validity  of the impugned provisions.  It would not be a correct approach to  wait till statutes are framed violating the right  under art. 30(1). [247E] Trustees  of Roman Catholic Separate Schools for  Ottawa  v. Ottawa Corporation and Ors. [1917] A.C. 76 referred to. Mathew and Chandrachud.  JJ. (1)A mere look at art. 29(1) and 30(1) would be sufficient to  show  that  art. 29(1) cannot limit the  width  of  art. 30(1).   The right guaranteed to a religious  or  linguistic minority  under  art. 30(1) is the right  to  establish  any educational  institution of its choice.  Whereas art.  29(1) confers the right not only upon a minority as understood  in its technical sense but also upon a section of the  citizens resident  in  the  territory of India, which may  not  be  a minority  in  its technical sense, the  beneficiary  of  the right  under  art.  30 is a minority,  either  religious  or linguistic.   Secondly, whereas art. 29 does not  deal  with education as such. art. 30 deals only with the establishment and administration of educational institutions.  It might be that  in  a  given  case the  two  might  overlap.   When  a linguistic  minority establishes an educational  institution to conserve its language, the linguistic minority can invoke the  protection of both the articles.  When art. 30(1)  says that  a  linguistic minority can  establish  and  administer educational institutions of its choice, it means that it can establish and administer any educational institution.  If  a linguistic  minority  can  establish  only  an   educational institution to conserve its language then the expression "of their  choice"  in art. 30(1) is practically  robbed  of  it meaning. (251C-E; 25OF; 251A-B] In re : TheKerala  Education  Bill, 1957  [1959]  S.C.R. 995, 1053; Rev.  Father W. Proost andothers  v. State  of Bihar  and Ors. [1969] 2 S.C.R. 73; Rev.  Sidhajbhai  Sabhai andOthers  v.  State of Bombay [1963] 3  S.C.R.  837;  Rt. Rev.  Bishop S.K.  Patro and Others v. State  of  Bihar and  Others [1970] 1 S.C.R. 172 and D.A.V. College  etc.  v. State of Punjab & Ors. [1971] Supp.  S.C.R. 683 referred to. Dipendra  Nath  v.  State of Bihar A.I.R.  1962  Patna,  101 approved. (2)(a)  Over  the years this Court has held  that  without recognition  or affiliation there can be no real  meaningful exercise   of   the  right  to  establish   and   administer educational institutions under art. 30(1). [256H) In  re : The Kerala Education Bill 1957, [1959] S.C.R.  995, 1053; Rev.  Sidhajbhai Sabhai and others v. State of  Bombay [1963]  3 S.C.R. 837, 856 and D.A.V. College, etc. v.  State of  Punjab and Ors. [1971] Supp.  S.C.R. 688,  709  referred to. (b)In  The  Kerala Education Bill this Court  pointed  out that  "no educational institution can in actual practice  be

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carried  on without aid from the State and if they will  not get  it  unless they surrender their rights, they  will,  by compulsion of financial necessities. be compelled to give up their rights under art. 30(1)." The condition which involves surrender is as effective a deterrent to the exercise of the right  under  art. 30(1) as a direct prohibition  would  be. Thus  considered it is apparent that the religious  minority does  not voluntarily whether its right-it has been  coerced because  of the basic importance of the privilege  involved, namely, affiliation. [261H; 262A-B] (e)It is doubtful whether the fundamental right under art. 30(1)  can be bartered away or surrendered by any  voluntary act or that it can be waived. 180 The,  reason  is that the fundamental right is vested  in  a plurality  of persons is a, unit. that is in a community  of persons necessarily fluctuating.  Can the present Members of a  minority  community barter away or  surrender  the  right under the article so as to bind its future members as a unit ? The fundamental right is for the living generation.  By  a voluntary  act of affiliation of an educational  institution established  and  administered by a religious  minority  the past members of. the community cannot surrender the right of the future members of that community.  The future members of the  community do not derive the right under art.  30(1)  by succession or inheritance. [262C-D] (d)In fact every one is not being offered the same package since  the condition serves as a significant restriction  on the activities only of those who have the fundamental  right of  the nature guaranteed by art. 30(1), namely,  the  reli- gious  and linguistic minorities who desire to exercise  the right required to be waived as a condition to the receipt of the   privilege.   It  is  contradictory  to  speak   of   a constitutional  right  and  yet to  discriminate  against  a person who exercises that right. [264B-C] (e)The  power  to  withhold  recognition  or   affiliation altogether does not carry with it unlimited power to  impose conditions which have the effect of restraining the exercise of  fundamental  rights.  The normal desire  to  enjoy  pri- vileges  like affiliation or recognition without  which  the educational  institutions  established by the  minority  for imparting  secular education will not effectively serve  the purpose  for which they were established cannot be  made  an instrument   of   suppression  of  the   right   guaranteed. Infringement   of   a  fundamental  right   is   nonetheless infringement  because accomplished through the  conditioning of  a  privilege.   If a legislature attaches  to  a  public benefit  or privilege an addendum, which in no rational  way advances  the  purposes of the scheme of benefits  but  does restrain  the exercise of a fundamental right the  restraint can  draw  no constitutional strength  whatsoever  from  its being attached to benefit or privilege but must be  measured as though it were a wholly separate enactment. [264F-C] (f)But it cannot be said that by the general laws such  as the  law of taxation, law relating to sanitation  etc.,  the State in any way takes away or abridges the right guaranteed under  art.  30(1).   Because  art.  30(1)  is  couched   in absolute,   terms,  it  does  not  follow  that  the   right guaranteed is not subject to regulatory laws which would not amount to its abridgment. [265B-C] Hudson Country Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355, 357 and  Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South-  Wales. [1950] A.C. 23.5, 310 referred to (g)Measures   which  are  directed  at  other   forms   of activities  but  which  have the secondary  or  indirect  or

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incidental  effect upon the right do not  generally  abridge the right unless content of the right is regulated. (26.5G] (h)It   sounds   paradoxical  that  a  right   which   the constitution  makers wanted to be absolute can be  subjected to  regulations  which need only satisfy  the  nebulous  and elastic  test  of  State necessity.   The  very  purpose  of incorporating this right in Part III of the Constitution  in absolute terms in marked contrast with the other fundamental rights  was to withdraw it from the reach of  the  majority. To  subject the right today to regulations dictated  by  the Protean  concept  of  State necessity as  conceived  by  the majority would be to subvert the very purpose for which  the right was given. [266E-F] (i)Recognition  or  affection  is  a  facility  which  the University  grants  to an educational  institution  for  the purpose  of enabling the students to sit for an  examination to be conducted by the University in the prescribed subjects and  to obtain the degree conferred by the  University  and, therefore,  it stands to reason to hold that  no  regulation which  is  unrelated  to the purpose can  be  imposed.   If, beside recognition or affiliation an educational institution conducted  by- a religious minority is granted aid,  further regulations  for ensuring that the and is utilised  for  the purpose  for which it is granted will be  permissible.   The heart  of  the  matter is that  no  educational  institution established by a religious Or linguistic minority can  claim total  immunity from regulations by the legislature  or  the University  if it wants affiliation or recognition; but  the character  of the permissible regulations must  depend  upon their purpose. [267B-D]                             181 (3)In  every case when the reasonableness of a  regulation comes up for consideration before the Court, the question to be   asked  and  answered  is  whether  the  regulation   is calculated  to  subserve  or will  in  effect  subserve  the purpose of recognition or affiliation namely the  excellence of  the  institution  as  a  vehicle  for  general   secular education of the minority community and to other persons who resort  to  it.   The question whether a  regulation  is  in general  interest of the public has no relevance if it  does not  advance the excellence of the institution as a  vehicle for  general  secular  education as  ex-hypothesi  the  only permissible   regulations   are  those  which   secure   the effectiveness  of  the purpose of the  facility  namely  the excellence  of  the educational institutions in  respect  of their educational standards. [267E-F] Sidhajbhai v. State of Bombay, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 837, 856-857; In  re : The Kerala Education Bill 1957 [1959]  S.C.R.  995, 1953  and  State  of Kerala v. Mother  Provincial  [1971]  1 S.C.R. 734 referred to. (4)The provisions of sub-section 1 (a) and 1 (b) of s. 33A abridge  the right of the religious minority  to  administer educational  institutions and therefore their  choice.   The requirement  that the College should have a  governing  body including  persons  other  than  those  who  constitute  the ’governing  body of the society of Jesus has the  effect  of divesting  that  body of its exclusive right to  manage  the educational  institution.   Under the  guise  of  preventing maladministration,  the right of the governing body  of  the College constituted by the religious minority to  administer the  institution  cannot be taken away.  The effect  of  the provision is that the religious minority virtually loses its right to administer the institution it has founded. [269G-H; 270B] Kerala  v, Mother Provincial [1971] 1 S.C.R. 734 at 740,  W.

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Proost  v.  Bihar  [1969] 2. S.C.R. 73 at  77-78  and  Rev., Bishop S. K. Patro v. Bihar [1970] 1 S.C.R172. (5)It is upon the principal and teachers of a college that the tone and temperof  an educational  institution  depend. On  them  would depend its reputation,  the  maintenance  of discipline  and  its efficiency in teaching.  The  right  to choose  a  principal and to have the teaching  conducted  by teachers  appointed  by  the  management  after  an  overall assessment  of their outlook and philosophy is  perhaps  the most   important  fact  of  the  right  to   administer   an educational   institution.   There  is  no  reason   why   a representative  of  the  University nominated  by  the  Vice Chancellor   should  be  on  the  Selection  Committee   for recruiting  the principal or for the insistence of the  head of   the  department  besides  the  representative  of   the University  being on the Selection Committee for  recruiting the members  of the teaching staff.  So long as the  persons chosen have the qualifications prescribed by the University, the choice must be left to the management. [270G-R] (6)On  the  plain wording of s. 40 it is  clear  that  the governing body of the religious minority will be deprived of the  most  vital function which appertains to its  right  to administer  the college, namely, the teaching, training  and instructions  in the course of studies in respect  of  which the  University  is  competent to  hold  examinations.   The fundamental  right of a minority to  administer  educational institutions of its choice comprises with it the  elementary right  to conduct teaching, the training and instruction  in courses  of  studies in the institutions so  established  by teachers  appointed  by  the minority.   If  this  essential component of the right of administration is taken away  from the  minority and vested in the university there can  be  no doubt   that  its  right  to  administer   the   educational institution  guaranteed  under  art. 30(1)  is  taken  away. (271G-H] (7)If s. 40 is ultra vires art. 30(1) s. 41 which, in  the present scheme of legislation is dependent upon s. 40 cannot survive. [272D] (8)The  provisions  contained  in  sub-clause  (1)(b)  and (2)(b)  of s. 51A are violative of the right under art.  30. The  relationship  between the management and a  teacher  is that  of  an  employer and employee,  and  it  passes  one’s understanding  that  the  management  cannot  terminate  the services of a teacher 182 on  the basis’ of. the contract of employment.   To  require that  for  terminating the services of a  teacher  after  an enquiry  has been conducted the management should  have  the approval of an outside agency like the Vice-Chancellor or of his  nominee  would  be  an  abridgement  of  its  right  to administer   the  educational  institution.   There  is   no obligation  under sub-sections 1(b) and 2(b) that the  Vice- Chancellor  or  his  nominee should  give  any  reasons  for disapproval.   A  blanket power without  any  guidelines  to disapprove  the  action of the  management  would  certainly encroach  upon  the right of the management  to  dismiss  or terminate the services of a teacher after an enquiry. [273F; 273C-E] (9)Section  52A is bad in its application  to  minorities. The Provision contained in this section subserves no propose and there is no doubt that it will needlessly interfere with the  day to day management of the institution.  Every  petty dispute  raised by a member of the teaching or  non-teaching staff will be referred ’to arbitration if it seems to  touch the   service  conditions.   Arbitrations,   not   imparting

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education.  will  become  the business  of  the  educational institutions. [274-B] BEG, J. (1) Although articles, 29 and 30 may supplement each other’ so far as certain rights of minorities are  concerned yet,  article 29 of the Constitution does not, in  any  way, impose a limit on the kind or character of education which a minority may chose to impart through its institution to  the children  of its own members or to others who may choose  to send their children to its schools. [274E-F] (2)Even  if article 30(1) of the Constitution is  held  to confer  absolute  and unfettered rights of  management  upon minority  institutions, subject only to :absolutely  minimal and negative controls in the interests of health and law and order, it could not be meant to exclude a greater degree  of regulation  and control when a minority  institution  enters the  wider sphere of general secular and  non-denominational education,  largely employs teachers who are not members  of the particular minority concerned and when it derives  large parts  of  its income from fees paid by those  who  are  not members  of  the  particular  minority  in  question.   Such greater degree of control could be justified by the need  to secure  the  interest  of  those who  are  affected  by  the management of the minority institution and the education  it imparts  but  Who  are  not  members  of  the  minority   in management.   Where a minority institution has, of  its  own free  will,  opted  for affiliation under  the  terms  of  a statute.  it must be deemed to have chosen to give up, as  a price  for  the  benefits resulting  from  affiliation,  the exercise  of  certain rights which may in  another  context, appear  to  be unwarranted impairments  of  its  fundamental rights.   If  the  object of an enactment  is  to  compel  a minority  institution,  even  indirectly,  to  give  up  the exercise of its fundamental rights the provisions which have this  effect will be void or inoperative against a  minority institution.   The  price of affiliation cannot be  a  total abandonment  of  the  right to establish  and  administer  a minority  institution  conferred  by article  30(1)  of  the Constitution. [291H; 275D-E] (3)Affiliation   being   only  a  statutory  and   not   a fundamental right of the minority under article 30(1) of the Constitution the right under this article cannot be said  to be violated unless and until it is shown that application of the  College  for  autonomy  has been  or  is  bound  to  be rejected.   Compelling the college to become  a  constituent part  of  the  University  amounts to  taking  away  of  its separate. identity by the force of law.  But if the  College has  really  attained  such standards  of  organisation  and excellence  as  it  claims  to have done,  it  can  have  an autonomous  status  under  s. 38B of the Act  with  all  its advantages and freedoms practically for the asking. [277H]  (4)  In as much as s. 5 of the Act has a compelling  effect by denying to the petitioning college the option to keep out of the statute altogether, the section would be  inoperative against  it.   Section 5(i) has the effect of  compelling  a college  to  abandon its fundamental  rights  guaranteed  by article   30(1)  of  the  (Constitution  as  a   price   for affiliation  by  the Gujarat University because  it  is  not permitted  to affiliate with any other,  University  without the sanction of the Government. [277A: 276G] (5)The  only  provisions-which  could  have  a  compulsive effect  petitioning college could be s. 5 and then  sections 40 and 41 which would magically convert affiliated  colleges into constituent colleges of the University,                             183 without  the  interposition of an  option,  and,  therefore,

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could  be  said to deprive, the petitioning college  of  the opportunity  to become an autonomous college.  Provisions of s. 40 and the remaining provisions of sec. 41 of the Act are all  parts of the same compulsive scheme or mechanism  which is struck by article 30(1) Section 41(1) operates even  more directly  upon  the  petitioning  college.  which  had  been "admitted to the privileges. of the University" under S.5  ( 3)   by,  affiliation.   This  provision  would   have   the compelling  effect of making it automatically a  constituent unit of the, University. and must, therefore., be held to be inoperative  against  the petitioning college as  it  cannot affect the fundamental rights guaranteed by article 30(1) of the Constitution. [278D-E; 277B] (6)Section  41  of the Act, as it stands, could  have  the effect  of negativating the right conferred by s.38B of  the Act  by transforming, mechanically and by operation  of  the statute  affiliated  colleges into constituent  colleges  so that  no question of autonomy could practically arise  after that. [278E] (7)On the claims put forward by the petitioning college it appears very likely that the college will get the benefit of s.38B  of  the  Act  and  therefore  will  escape  from  the consequences of affiliation found, in the impugned sections. It  is  true  that section 38B of the  Act  imposes  certain conditions  which, the college will have, no  difficulty  in satisfying.    In  any  case  until  its   application   for autonomous  status  is  rejected, it  could  not  reasonably complain  that the other provisions of the Act,  apart  from section 5, 40 and 41, will be used against it. [288D-E] (8)The essence of the right guaranteed by article 30(1) of the  constitution  is  a free exercise of  their  choice  by minority institutions of the pattern of education as well as of  the  administration of their  educational  institutions’ Both  these taken together. determine the kind or  character of  an  educational institution ’which a  minority  has  the right   to  choose.   Where  these  patterns  are   accepted voluntarily   by   a  minority   institution   itself,   the requirement  to  observe  these patterns would  not  a  real violation  of rights protected by article 30(1).  In a  case in  which the pattern is accepted voluntarily by a  minority institution with, a view to taking advantage of the benefits conferred by a statute. it cannot insist upon an  absolutely free exercise of the right of administration.  No doubt, the rights   protected  by  article  30(1)  are  laid  down   in "absolute"  terms without the kind of  express  restrictions found  in articles 19, 25 and 26 of the Constitution.   But, if  a  minority  institution has the option open  to  it  of avoiding  the  statutory  restrictions  altogether,  if   it abandons with it. benefits of a statutory right, there is no reason why the absoluteness of the right under article 30(1) of the Constitution is taken away or abridged. [280B-F] (9)It  is only when the terms of the  statute  necessarily compel  a minority institution to abandon the core  of.  its rights  under article 30(1) that it could amount  to  taking away  or  abridgement  of a  fundamental  right  within  the meaning of article 13(2) of the Constitution. [280-H] (10)The  mere presence of the representatives of the  Vice- Chancellor  the teachers members of the  non-teaching  staff and  the students of the College required by s.  33A,  would not impinge upon the right to administer.  Such a  spelling, is  more  likely to help to make  that  administration  more effective  and  acceptable to everyone affected  by  it.   A minority  institution  can still have its  majority  on  the governing body. [281D-E] (11)The   provisions  of  s.  51A  do  not  constitute   an

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unreasonable  encroachment  on the essence of  rights  of  a minority   institution  protected  by  art.  30(1)  of   the Constitution  which consists of freedom of choice.   Section 52A  does  not  constitute an infringement  of  the  special minority  rights  under article 30(1) of  the  Constitution. [281-H] Re.   Kerala Education Bill, 1957, [1959] S.C.R.  995;  Rev. Sidhrjbhai Sabhai & Ors. v. State of Bombay & Anr.. [1963] 3 S.C.R.  837: Rev.  Father W. Proost & Ors. v. The  state  of Bihar &. Ors, [1969] 2.S.C.R. 73; Rt.  Rev.  Bishop S. K. Patro  & Ors.  V. State of Bihar & Ors. [1970] 1 S.C.R.  172 and State of 184 Kerala  etc. v. Very Rev.  Mother Provincial etc., [1971]  1 S.C.R. 734 referred to DWIVEDI  J.  (1) The content of the right under  art.  29(1) differs  from  the content of the right  under  Art.  30(1). Article  29(1) secures the right of a..section  of  citizens having distinct script, language, or culture to conserve the same.  Article 30(1) on the other hand guarantees the  right of  a  religious  or linguistic minority  to  establish  and administer  educational institutions.  Article  29(1)  gives security to an interest : article 30(1) gives security to an activity. [293 D-E] (2)Article  30(1) does not. in express or  implied  terms, limit   the  right  of  the.  minorities  to  establish   an educational institution of a particular type.  The fight  to establish  an educational institution impliedly  grants  two kinds of choices.  The minorities have a right to  establish or  not  to  establish any particular  type  of  educational institution.  This is the negative choice.  The  minorities, may establish any type of educational institution.  This  is the  positive choice.  Choice is inherent in every  freedom. Freedom  without  choice is no freedom.  So  the  words  "of their  choice"  merely make patent what is  latent  in  art. 30(1).  Those words are not intended to enlarge the area  of choice already implied in the right conferred by art. 30(1). [293 H, 294 A-B] (3) Rightaffiliation  : There is not express grant  of  the right   of  affiliation  in  art.  30).   It  is  also   not necessarily  implied  in  art. 30(1).  if  the  constitution framers intended to elevate the right of affiliation to  the status  of  a  fundamental  right  they  could  have  easily expressed their intention in clear words in art. 30.  As our State is secular in character, affiliation of an institution imparting religious instruction or teaching only theology of a  particular  religious minority may not comport  with  the secular  character  of the State.  As Art.  30(1)  does  not grant right of affiliation to such an institution it  cannot confer  that  right  on  an  institution  imparting  secular general  education.   The content of the  right  under  art. 30(i) must be the same-for both kinds of institutions.  [294 E-H] In  re. The Kerala Education Bill [1959]  S.C.R.995  at pp. 1076-1077. (4) Affiliating University : Since art. 30(1)does not  grant the  right  of  affiliation  the  State  is  not  under   an obligation to have an affiliating university. It is open  to a State to establish only a teaching university. [296A]  (5)  A glance at the context and scheme of Part III of  the constitution would show that the constitution makers did not intend   to  confer  absolute  rights  on  a  religious   or linguistic minority to establish and administer  educational institutions.   It  is true that art 30(1) is  expressed  in spacious  and  unqualified  language.  And so  is  art.  14.

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However,   this   Court   has   read   the   limitation   to classification  in the general and unrestricted language  of art.  14.  The liberty recognised in the First Amendment  to the  U.S.A. Constitution and the freedom of trade,  commerce and intercourse expressed in s. 92 of the Australian Consti- tution,  both of which are expressed in-absolute terms,  are held to be subject to regulation.  These instances should be sufficient  to  explode the argument of  absolute  or  near- absolute  right to establish and administer  an  educational institution  by a religious or linguistic minority from  the absolute words of art. 30(1).  Absolute words do not  confer absolute  rights, for the generality of the words  may  have been  cut down by the context and the scheme of the  statute or the constitution as the case may be. [298 E; 296D; 298C] State  of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [1952] S.C.R.  284 at P. 295, Charanjit Lal v. Union of India [1950] S.C.R. 869 at  p.  890,  Kathi Raning Rawat ’V.   State  of  Saurashtra [1952]  S.C.R. 435 at p. 442, Cantwell v. Connecticut  (310) U.S.  296  at  pp. 303-304 ’ 95 Law Edn. 1137  at  p.  1160, W.S.A. Waynes : Legislative Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia.  2nd Edn : p. 339 and Commonwealth  of  Australia and  others  v. Bank of New South Wales  and  others  [1950] Appeal cases 235. (6)  Articles 29(2), 15(4) and 28(3) place  certain  express limitations  on  the right in art. 30(1).   There  are  also certain implied limitations on this right.  The right should be read subject to those implied limitations. [299C] 185 (7)  Part III of the Constitution confers certain rights  on individuals,  on  groups  and on  certain  minority  groups. Those  rights  constitute a  single  indivisible  ’balancing system  of liberty in our Constitution.  The system  implies order and harmony among the various rights constituting  our liberty   according  to  the  necessities  of   each   case. Obviously, the right’s could never have been intended by the constitution  makers  to be in collision with  one  another. Accordingly, the right in, art. 30(1) cannot be so exercised as to violate a citizens legal or constitutional rights.  It is  impossible for the, liberty of a civilised community  to have   absolute  rights.   Some  regulation  of  rights   is necessary  for due enjoyment by every member of the  society of his own rights. [299D; 300B ; DE] (8)  Extent  of regulatory power : The extent of  regulatory power of the State would vary according to various types  of educational   institutions  established  by  religious   and linguistic  minorities.  It may vary from class to class  as well as within a class.  No minority educational institution can  be singled out for treatment different from  one  meted out  to the majority educational institution.  A  regulation meeting   out  such  a  discriminatory  treatment  will   be obnoxious to art. 30(1). [301 H; 302 D] (9)  The  test of a valid regulation is its necessity.   Any regulation  which does not go beyond what is  necessary  for protecting the interests of the society (which includes  the minorities also) or the rights of the individual members  of the society should be constitutionally valid.  It cannot  be said  that  such  a regulation takes away  or  abridges  the rights conferred by art. 30(1). [302 E-F] (10) No,   hard  and  fast  rule  can  be   prescribed   for determining  what  is  necessary.  The  question  should  be examined  ill the light of the impugned provisions  and  the facts  and circumstances of each case.  What is required  is that the impugned law should seek to establish a  reasonable balance between the right regulated and the social  interest or the individual right protected.  The court should balance

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in the scale the.value of the right regulated and the  value ,of  the social interest or the individual right  protected. While balancing these competing interests, the Court  should give  due  weight  to the legislative  judgment.   Like  the Court, the Legislature has also taken the oath to uphold the Constitution.   It is as much the protector of  the  liberty and welfare of the people as the Court. it is more  informed than  the  Court  about  the  pressing  necessities  of  the Government and the needs of the community. [302 G-H] State  of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [1952] S.C.R.  284 at p. 303 per Das j. (11) It   is  difficult  to  accept  the  argument  that   a regulation.  in order to be constitutional, must  always  be shown  to  be calculated to improve the excellence  ,of  the minority educational institutions.  The State prescribes the curriculum  and syllabus as much from the point of  view  of excellence  of  instruction as from the. point  of  view  of having a uniform standard of instruction. [303 B-C] Nor  should  the  regulatory  power  be  hamstrung  by  such concepts  as  real  and effective exercise  of  the  right", should  not be touched by the regulation or that  regulation should  not "directly and immediately" impinge on the  right conferred  by  art.  30(1).  What is a  real  and  effective exercise  of the right will depend on how far  the  impugned regulation  is necessary in the context of time,  place  and circumstances for safeguarding any competing social interest or  any  ’competing  constitutional or  legal  right  of  an individual. [303 G-H] Rev.  Suthalbhai Sabhai and others v. State of Bombay [1963] 3 S.C.R. 837 at p. 850 referred to. (13) The right under art. 30(1) forms part of a complex  and interdependent  group  of diverse social  interests.   There cannot  be a perpetually fixed adjustment of, the right  and those  social interests.  They would need  adjustment  ,and. readjustment from time to time and in varying circumstances. [305 H] Section 33A (1) (a) is obnoxious to art. 30(1). [307 E] 186 (14) Since  the right of affiliation’ is not  a  fundamental right guaranteed by art. 30(1) there is no difficulty in the University  taking  over  the  teaching  in  tinder-graduate classes.  No legitimate objection can be taken to  sub-s.(1) of s.41.; The mere.. circumstance that an affiliated college is  made a constituent college of the university  would  not necessarily  offend  art.  30(1).   The  definition  of  the expression  ’constituent  college’ by itself  is  innocuous. The  concept of a constituent college is fluid.   If-is  the degree  of  external control over the  administration  of  a minority college and not its statutory name that is relevant for the purposes of art. 30(1). [308 A-C] (15) Sub-section  (3) of s. 41 cannot also be  objected  to. It permits an affiliated college which does not want to be a constituent college to get affiliated to another  university with the permission of the State and the Gujarat University. [308, E] (16) Even  assuming  for the sake of argument  that  clauses (ii) to (vi) of sub-s. 4 of  s.  41 are  violative  of  art. 30(1) the petitioners stand to gain nothing thereby    for no  legitimate objection can be advanced against  the  first part of sub-section (4).  Unless statutes are actually  made the constitutional attack is premature. [309 A] (17) No legitimate objection can be taken to the first  part of sub-sections (1) and  (2)  of s. 51A.  As  the  power  of approval  is confined to checking the abuse of the right  to fire employees, it does not offend art. 30(1).  The power of

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approval by the Vice-Chancellor is necessary in the interest of the security of service of the teaching arid non-teaching staff.    Security  of  service  is  necessary  to   promote efficiency  and honest discharge of duty.  It is  calculated to  improve  the institution in the long run.   Section  51A provides  a cheaper and expeditious remedy to the staff  for the redress of their grievances. [310 F] (18) It is difficult to discover any legitimate objection to s.  52A  on  the basis of art.  30(1).   This  provision  is intended  to check the abuse of power of  administration  by the  managing  body and to provide a cheap  and  expeditious remedy to the small pursed teaching and non-teaching  staff. It is. necessary in the interest of     security of service. [311 C] Arguments for  the petitioners (1) The law’   declared  by the Supreme Court has  been  the law of the land since India   became a Republic.  Minorities and educational institutions have. adapted themselves on the basis  of the law so declared.  The various High  Courts  in India  have also laid down the law on the same  basis.   The question of minority rights is a very sensitive and delicate one  and there are no compelling or coercive  considerations which  would justify this Court in over-ruling its  previous decisions and reducing the content of the right given to the minorities. (2) In the objectives resolutions passed unanimously by  the constituent   assembly   it  was  declared   that   adequate safeguards should be providedfor    minorities    in    the Constitution. The minority communities gave up their  demand for  political rights and were satisfied with the  right  to professand practice their. religion and to establish  and administer   educational  institutions  of   their   choice. Articles  26,  29 and 30 were, therefore,  embodied  in  the Constitution  for guaranteeing these rights  to  minorities. (Re  Kerala  Education Bill 1959 SCR 995).   The  historical genesis  and constitutional background must’ at  all  timer, ’be remembered in construing article 30. (3)Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution confer  separate and  distinct rights. viz. (1) the right of any  section  of the resident citizens to conserve its down language,  script or  culture [article 29(1)1 (2) the right of  all  religious and  linguistic  minorities  to  establish  and   administer educational  institutions of their choice [Article  30(1)]]; (3)  the  right  of an educational  institution  not  to  be discriminated  against  in the matter of State  aid  On  the ground  that it is tinder the management of a religious  or, linguistic  minority [Article 30(2)]; and (4) the  right  of the citizen not to be denied admission 18 7 into   an’  state-maintained  or   state-aided   educational institution  on  the  ground of  religion,  caste,  race  or language [Article 29(2)]. Article,  30(1) cannot be whittled down by reading it  along with,  article 29(1).The differences between  article  30(1) and  29(1) are unmistakable : while article 29  confers  the fundamental  right to "any section. of the  citizens"  which would  include the majority section.  Article 30(1)  confers the  right  only  on  minorities.  While  article  29(1)  is concerned with "Language, script or culture", article  30(1) deals  with divisions of the nation based on  "religion  or. language"; while article 29(1) is concerned with. the  right to conserve language, script or culture article 30(1)  deals with  the  right to establish  and  administer  "educational institutions"  of  the  minorities’ own  choice.   The  word "administer"  is a word of very wide import.  The other  key

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word&  are  "of  their choice".  The  minorities,  right  to administer must necessarily include (i) the right to  choose its  managing  or governing body; (ii) the right not  to  be compelled  to refuse admission to students; (iii) the  right to  choose  its  teachers;  and (4) the  right  to  use  its properties   and   assets  for  the  benefit  of   its   own institution, Although the minority institutions can claim the  protection under  Article 30 there are certain activities which  cannot possibly  be considered educational as for example a  school of  pickpockets or where subversive or  criminal  activities are taught.  Such institutions cannot invoke the  protection of  Article’ 30 because they are not imparting education  at all.  Though the freedom under Article 30 is Unqualified  in terms,  it  is not free from regulations, There  can  be  no absolutes  in a community governed by law.   Accordingly  an educational  institution  must  comply with  the  laws  like municipal  laws  regarding construction and  maintenance  of buildings.  labour laws, tax laws and so on.  Under  article 30  the permissible regulatory measures are those  which  do not  restrict the right of. administration to facilitate  it and  ensure better and more effective exercise of the  right for   the  benefit  of  the  institution  and  through   the instrumentality   of  the  management  of  the   educational institutions, but without displacing the management.  If the administration  has  to be improved it must be  through  the agency or instrumentality of the existing management and not by   displacing   it.    Restrictions  on   the   right   of administration imposed in the interest of the general public alone  and  not in the interest of and for  the  benefit  of minority educational institutions are permissible. There  is a fundamental distinction between  restriction  on the right of administration and a regulation prescribing the manner of administration.  The right of administration means the  right to effectively manage and conduct the affairs  of the institutions.  It postulates autonomy in administration. The right’ of administration means the right to conduct  and manage the affairs of the institution through a Committee or body  of  persons  in whom the  management  have  faith  and confidence and who have full autonomy in that sphere subject to  permissible  regulatory measures, the  right  to  impart education through one’s own teachers having regard to  their compatibility  with  the ideals and  aims,  aspirations  and traditions of the institution.  Educational institutions  do not want a teacher who though brilliant but is  cantankerous or  quarrelsome  or  who is antipathetic to  the  creed  and beliefs and practices of the religious minority.  The  right includes the right to admit students of their choice subject to  reasonable  regulations about  academic  qualifications. The  right  to  select and appoint one’s  own  teachers  and principal  the  right to enforce  discipline  by  exercising -control  and over the teachers.  Any act or  measure  which prevents  the effective and real exercise of  a  fundamental right  amounts  to violation of that  right.   Therefore  to insist  upon  affiliation  on  terms  and  conditions  which restrict the right of administration is violative of Article 30(1). (4)  The  Wording  of  articles. 29(1) and  30(1)  does  not support  the contention that the latter article  will  apply only             to educational institutions established  by a minority community for the sole purpose of conserving its; 188 distinct  language or script or culture.  The words used  in article  29(1)  are "any section of the  citizens  having  a distinct language, script or culture of its own".  The words

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used  in  article 30(1) Are "minorities,  whether  based  on religion or language." There is no reference to religion  in articles  29(1); in article 30 (1) the reference is only  to religion and language and there is no reference to  culture. So far as the Christians in India are concerned they do  not claim to have a culture of their own.  Their culture is  the culture of India.  But they are a minority based on religion to  whom  article  30(1) will apply.   To  insist  that  the minorities  should surrender their fundamental’ right  as  a condition  for getting recognition or aid from the State  is to make the right unreal and illusory.  To give  recognition and  aid  to institutions of the majority community  and  to refuse  them to those of the minorities :on the ground  that they  refuse to surrender their fundamental right under  the Constitution is in effect discrimination within the  meaning of   article  30(2).   Under  the  Constitution   only   the minorities   have  been  given  the  fundamental  right   to establish  and administer educational institution  of  their choice.  The majority community has not got the right. It is the creation of power that is subject to objection and not  its exercise.  Reasonable manner of  administration  of statutes is irrelevant in considering its constitutionality. The  effect  of sections 41 and 42 of the Amendment  Act  is that teaching and training in the colleges will be conducted by   the  University  and  private  ,colleges  will   become constituent colleges of the University which means that  the minority  colleges  will  lose  their  minority    character completely.  The relations of the constituent colleges  will be  governed  by the statutes made by the  University.   The right  to administer means the right to  effectively  manage and  conduct the affairs of the institution.  It  postulates autonomy in administration. Sections  51 and 52 of the Amending Act have the  effect  of destroying  the educational agencies’  disciplinary  control over the teachingandnonteaching  staff of the  college. No punishment can beinflictedbythe   management   on   a member  of  the staff unless it gets approval of  the  Vice- Chancellor or an officer authorised by him.  A provision for compulsory  arbitration of disputes will make  it  difficult for  the management to have effective  disciplinary  control over  the staff. [D.A.V. College v. State of  Punjab  A.I.R. 1971  S.C.  737.] There could be no objection  to  make  the rights of members of the staff justiciable but it will be an infringement  of the right of administration if  an  outside body-is  made  the  final  authority  for  determining   Ali questions relating to disciplinary control over the  members of the staff. Arguments for the respondents Article  30(1) is to be interpreted not in isolation but  in the context of the Constitution, particularly its ideal of a secular State and its object to preserve and strengthen  the integrity  and unity of the country.  Freedom, which may  be expressed  in  absolute terms in the  Constitution,  is  not inconsistent with regulatory measures in an orderly  society in  the  interest  of the society.  In  the  matter  of  any educational institution seeking affiliation to a University. regulatory  measures in the interest of the general  secular education  must  necessarily relate to the management  as  a whole  of  such  educa  tional  institution,  that  is,  the character and composition of the governing body, the quality of  the  teaching  staff  the security  of  its  cenure  and discipline  in the educational institution.  The  regulatory measures  must  necessarily be uniformly applicable  to  all educational institutions and cannot be discriminatory.  "The right  to  administer  educational  institutions  of   their

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choice" in ;article 30(1) which includes the right to impart general  secular. education must, therefore. be  limited  by regulatory measures.  Article 30(1) cannot The invoked where the  education  imparted  is secular and  of  a  general  or special  character., This article does not confer any  right or  privilege greater than or superior to, that  enjoyed  by any linguistic or religious majority.  Article 189 30(1) must be read along with other cognate Provision  Viz., articles 30(2) 25, 26 and 29 and particularly article  30(2) and-s25-(2)(a).   There is no fundamental right of  minority institutions  to  insist an affiliation  by  University.   A minority institution, is ’bound by the general law  relating toaffiliation as any other minority or majority  institution based  on language or religion.  The provisions of  sections 33A, 40, 41, 51A and 52A as also the impugned ordinances are not destructive of any fundamental right of the petitioners. They  are only regulatory in, nature and impose  only,  such restrictions  as  are indicated above.- They are  valid  and effective. No fundamental right is absolute and claims based on any one right  may be subject to qualifications in  accordance  with the claims based on other rights. Due  regard  should  be  had  to  the  Directive  principles contained in articles 41, 45, 46 and 38, for securing  which education  is  an essential and  powerful  instrument.   The right  to administer a minority educational institution  was not conceived to be unfettered and absolute.  Administration can be carried on in accordance with the general law of  the land.    The   object  of  administration  of   a   minority educational institution is two fold. (1) the conservation of culture  including religion, language and so grain (ii)  ’to ensure  that their children receive general  education  also son that they could go into the world well and  sufficiently equipped  with  the qualifications necessary  for  a  useful career in life (Re Kerala Education Bill 1957).   Therefore, a  law  which would impede the achievement of any  of  these twin  objects of the minority would be invalid as  violative of  article  30(1).   Subject to  these  qualification  the, administration can be carried on in accordance with the law. The  provisions of the Gujarat Act were intended to  improve the  general  education  as also to  guarantee  security  of tenure  to  the teachers.  Security of the  service  is  not merely intended to protect the teachers against exploitation but  is  intended to ensure academic  freedom.   Management- teacher  relations have to be understood in  proper  canvass than mere employer employee relationship.

& ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION  : Writ Petition No. 232 and  233  of 1973. (Petitions Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India N.   A.  Palkhiwala,  I. M. Nanavati,  Sudhir  Nanavati,  A. Natrai J. B..  Dadachanji P. C. Bhartari, O. C.  Mathur  and Ravinder Narain for the Petitioners. F.  S. Nariman, Addl.  Sol.  General of India, R  H.  Dhebar and S., P. Nayar for Respondent No. 1. S.   T. Desai, S. N. Shelat and S. R. Agarwal for respondent No. 2. N.   A. Palkhiwala, J. B. Dadachanji, A. G. Menesses, P.  C. Bhartari, S.   Swarup, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain  for Intervener Nos. 1, 9,    and 10. Soli  J.  Sorabjee,  J. B. Dadachanji, P.  C.  Bhartari,  S.

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Swarup, (I. C. Mathur  and  Ravinder Narain  for  Intervener Nos. 2, 6, 7-8. I.   M.  Nanavati,  J.  B.  Dadachanji,  O.  C.  Mathur  and Ravinder Narain and P. C. Bhartari for Intervener Nos. 3 and 5. Frank Anthony, J. B. Dadachanji, P. C. Bhartari, S.  Swarup, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain for Intervener No. 4. Niren  De,  Attorney  General for India,  S.  P.  Nayar  for Intervener No. 11 (In WP No. 232/73). Dr.  V. A. Seiyad Mohammed and K. M. K. Nair for  Intervener No. 12 (In WP 232/73). 190 O.   N.  Tikku, Advocate General for the State of J & K  and Vineet Kumar for Intervener No. 13. M.   C. Setalvad, K. C. Agarwal, A. T. M. Sampath, M. M.  L. Srivastava, E. C. Agarwala for Intervener No. 14. Hardev Singh and R. S. Sodhi for Intervener No. 15. Joseph Vithayathil and E. C. Agarwala for Intervener No. 16. Naunit  Lal and Miss Lalita Kohli for Intervener No. 17  (In WP. 232/73) and Intervener No. 5 (In WP. 233/73). E.   C. Agarwala and Danial A. Latifi for Intervener No. 18, 20, to 43 and 50- Mrs.   Scheherazade Alam, M. Qamaruddin and E.  C.  Agarwala for Intervener No. 19. Haroo Bhai and J. Ramamurthi for Intervener No. 44. M.   K.  Ramamurthi,  Haroo  Bhai  and  J.  Ramamurthi   for Intervener No. 45. B.   P.  Maheshwari,  C.  L. Joseph  and  Suresh  Sethi  for Intervener No. 46. D.   Gobardhan for Intervener No. 47. F.   S.  Nariman Addi.  Sol.  Gen. of India (for  Intervener No.  48) and M. N. Shroff for Intervener Nos. 48-49 (In  WP. No. 233 of 1973). V.   M. Tarkunde, Joseph Vithayathil, K. C. Agarwala, A.T.M. Sampath,  P.  C.  Chandi,  M. M. L.  Srivastava  and  E.  C. Agarwala for the Intervener No. 53 (In WP. 233/73). The following Judgments were delivered by RAY,  C.J.   The question for consideration is  whether  the minorities  based on religion or language have the right  to establish   and  administer  educational  institutions   for imparting  general secular education within the  meaning  of Article 30 of the Constitution. The  minority  institutions which are in truth  and  reality educational  institutions  where education  in  its  various aspects is imparted claim protection of Article 30. This  raises the question at the threshold whether  Articles 30(1) and 29(1) of the Constitution are mutually exclusive. Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution are grouped under the heading  "Cultural and educational rights".   Article  29(1) deals with right of any section of the citizens residing  in India  to  preserve  their  language,  script  or   culture. Article.,  30(1) provides that all religious and  linguistic minorities have the right to establish and administer educa- tional   institutions  of  their  choice.    Article   29(2) prohibits  discrimination  in  matters  of  admission   into educational  institutions of the types mentioned therein  on grounds  only of religion, race, caste, language or  any  of them.   Article  30(2)  prevents  States  from  making   any discrimination   against  any  educational  institution   in granting  aid  on  the  ground that  it  is  managed  by-  a religious or linguistic minority.                             191 Articles  29 and 30 Confer four distinct rights.   First  is the  right  of  any  section of  the  resident  citizens  to conserve  its own language, script culture as  mentioned  in

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Article  29(1).  Second is the right of ’all  religious  and linguistic   minorities   to   establish   and    administer educational  institutions  of their choice as  mentioned  in Article  30(1),.   Third  is the  right  of  an  educational institution not to be discriminated against in the matter of State aid on the ground that it is under the management of a religious  or  linguistic minority as mentioned  in  Article 30(2).  Fourth is the right of the citizen not to be  denied admission   into  any  State  maintained  or   State   aided educational  institution on the ground of  religion,  caste, race or language, as mentioned in Article 29(2). It  will be wrong to read Article 30(1) as  restricting  the right of minorities to establish and administer  educational institutions  of  their  choice only  to  cases  where  such institutions are concerned with language, script or  culture of  the minorities.  The reasons are these.  First,  Article 29  confers  the  fundamental right on any  section  of  the citizens  which  will include the majority  section  whereas Article 30(1) confers the right on all minorities.   Second, Article 29(1) is concerned with language, script or culture, whereas  Article 30(1) deals with minorities of  the  nation based  on  religion or language.  ’third, Article  29(1)  is concerned  with  the right to conserve language,  script  or culture,  where  as Article 30(1) deals with  the  right  to establish  and  administer educational institutions  of  the minorities  of  their choice.  Fourth, the  conservation  of language,  script or culture under Article 29(1) may  be  by means  wholly unconnected with educational institutions  and similarly  establishment and administration  of  educational institutions  by  a  minority under  Article  30(1)  may  be unconnected with any motive to conserve language, script  or culture.   A  minority may administer  an  institution  for. religious  education  which is wholly unconnected  with  any question of conserving a language, script or culture. If  the,  scope  of  Article  30(1)  is  to  establish   and administer  educational institutions to  conserve  language, script  or culture of minorities, it will render Article  30 redundant.  If rights under Articles 29(1) and 30(1) are the same  then  the  consequence will be  that  any  section  of citizens not necessarily linguistic or religious  minorities will have the right to establish and administer  educational institutions of their choice.  The scope of Article 30 rests on  linguistic or religious minorities and no other  section of citizens of India has such a right.  The   right   to  establish  and   administer   educational institutions   of  their  choice  has  been   conferred   on religious:  and linguistic minorities so that  the  majority who  can always have their rights by having proper  legisla- tion  do  not pass a legislation prohibiting  minorities  to establish  and administer educational institutions of  their choice.  If the scope of Article 3 0(1) is made an extension of  the right under Article 29(1) as the right to  establish and administer educational institutions for giving religious instruction  or for imparting education in  their  religious teachings  or tenets the fundamental right of minorities  to establish  and administer educational institution  of  their choice will be taken away. 192 Every  section  of  the public,  the  majority  as  well  as minority. has rights in respect of religion as  contemplated Articles,  25  and 26 and rights in,  respect  of  language, script,  culture  as contemplated in Article 29.  The  whole object  of conferring the right on minorities under  Article 30  is  to ensure that there will be  equality  between  the majority  and the minority.  If the minorities do  not  have

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such special protection they will be denied equality. In  Re.   The Kerala Education Bill 1957 [1959]  S.C.R.  995 this’  Court  said that Article 30(1)  covers  institution-, imparting general secular education.  The object of  Article 30  is  to enable children of minorities to go  out  in  the world  fully equipped.  All persons whether in the  majority or in the minority have the right under Article 25 freely to profess,  practice and propagate religion.  Any  section  of citizens which includes the majority as well as the minority shall  have  under Article 29 the right  to  conserve  their distinct  language,  script  or culture.  That  is  why  the minorities  are  given  a  specific  right  in  respect   of educational  institutions Linder Article 30.  Article  30(1) gives  the right to linguistic minorities as well  where  no question  of religion arises.  It is, therefore, not at  all possible  to  exclude  secular education  from  Article  30. Since  the Kerala Education Bill case (supra) in  1959  this Court  has consistently held that general secular  education is covered by Article 30. This Court in Rev.  Father Proost v. State of Bihar [1969] 2 S.C.R.  73  considered the question whether  the  protection guaranteed. under Article 30.(1) is a corollary to the right guaranteed  under Article 29(1).  A contention was  advanced that  protection to minorities in Article 29(1) was  only  a right to conserve a distinct language, script, or culture of its own, and, therefore, the educational institutions  which imparted general education did not qualify for protection of Article  30.  This Court said that the, width of Article  30 could  not be cut down by, introducing any consideration  on which  Article 29(1) is based.  Article, 29(1) is a  general protection  given to sections of citizens to conserve  their language, script or culture.  Article 30,is a special  right to minorities to establish educational institutions of their choice.   This Court said that the two Articles  create  two separate rights though it is possible that the rights  might meet in a given case. The   real   reason  embodied  in  Article  30(1)   of   the Constitution  is  the  conscience of  the  nation  that  the minorities,  religious  as  well  as  linguistic,  are   not prohibited  from establishing and administering  educational institutions of their choice for the purpose of giving their children  the best general education to make, them  complete men and women of the country.  The minorities are given this protection  under  Article  30  in  order  to  preserve  and strengthen  the,  integrity and unity of the  country.   The sphere  of general secular education is intended to  develop the commonness of boys and girls of our country.  This is in the true spirit of liberty, equality and fraternity  through the  medium  of  education.   If  religious  or   linguistic minorities  are  not given protection under  Article  30  to establish  and administer educational institutions of  their choice,  they  will  feel isolated  and  separate.   General secular  education will open doors of perception and act  as the, natural light of mind for our countrymen to live in the whole. 193 The  second  question  which  arises  for  consideration  is whether  religious  and linguistic minorities who  have  the right  to establish and administer educational  institutions of  their choice, have a fundamental right  to  affiliation. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the  right to establish educational institutions of their- choice  will be  without  any  meaning if  affiliation  is  denied.   The respondents   pose   the   question   whether    educational institutions established and administered by minorities  for

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imparting general secular education have a fundamental right to  be  affiliated  to a statutory University  on  terms  of management   different  from  those  applicable   to   other affiliated colleges. The consistent view of this Court has been that there is  no fundamental right of a minority institution to  affiliation. An explanation has been put upon that statement of law.   It is  that affiliation must be a real and meaningful  exercise for minority institutions in the matter of imparting general secular  education.  Any law which provides for  affiliation on  terms  which will involve abridgement of  the  right  of linguistic  and  religious  minorities  to  administer   and establish  educational  institutions of  their  choice  will offend  Article 30(1).  The educational institutions set  up by  minorities will be robbed of their utility if  boys  and girls cannot be trained in such institutions for  University degrees.   Minorities  will virtually lose  their  right  to equip their children for ordinary careers if affiliation  be on  terms  which would make them surrender  and  lose  their rights to establish and administer educational  institutions of  their choice under Article 30.  The primary  purpose  of affiliation  is  that the students reading in  the  minority institutions  will  have  qualifications  in  the  shape  of degrees  necessary  for  a  useful  career  in  life.    The establishment of a minority institution is not only ineffec- tive  but also unreal unless such institution is  affiliated to a University for the purpose of conferment of degrees  on students. Affiliation  to a University really consists of  two  parts. One   part  relates  to  syllabi,  curricula,   courses   of instruction,   the  qualifications  of  teachers,   library, laboratories,  conditions  regarding health and  hygiene  of students.  This part relates to establishment of educational institutions.   The  second  part  consists  of  terms   and conditions regarding management of institutions.  It relates to administration of educational institutions. With  regard  to  affiliation a  minority  institution  must follow   the  statutory  measures   regulating   educational standards  and efficiency, the prescribed courses of  study, courses  of  instruction and the  principles  regarding  the qualification  of teachers, educational  qualifications  for entry of students into educational institutions etcetera. When  a minority institution applies to a University  to  be affiliated,  it expresses its choice to participate  in  the system  of  general  education and  courses  of  instruction prescribed  by  that University, Affiliation  is  regulating courses  of instruction in institutions for the  purpose  of coordinating  and  harmonizing the standards  of  education. With regard to affiliation to a University, the minority and non-minority  institutions  must agree in  the  pattern  and standards of education.  Regulatory measures of  affiliation enable the minority institutions to share the same 194 courses  of instruction and the same, degrees with the  non- minority institution. This  Court  in  State  of  Kerala  v.  Very  Rev.    Mother Provincial, etc. [1971] 1 S.C.R.734 explained the  necessary and importance of regulatory measures of system and standard of  education in the interest of the county and the  people. When  a  minority institution  applies for  affiliation,  it agrees to follow the uniform courses of study.   Affiliation is  regulating the educational character and content of  the minority  institutions.   These  regulations  are  not  only reasonable in the interest of general secular education  but also conduce to the improvement in the statute and  strength

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of the minority institutions.  All, institutions of  general secular  education whether established by the minorities  or the non-minorities must impart to the students education not only for their intellectual attainment but also for  pursuit of   careers.   Affiliation  of  minority  institutions   is intended  to  ensure  the growth  and  excellence  of  their children   and  other  students  in  the   academic   field. Affiliation mainly pertains to the academic and  educational character  of  the institution.  Therefore,  measures  which will  regulate the courses of study, the qualifications  and appointment  of  teachers, the conditions of  employment  of teachers, the health and hygiene of students, facilities for libraries  and  laboratories are all  comprised  in  matters germane  to  affiliation of  minority  institutions.   These regulatory  measures  for affiliation  are  for  uniformity, efficiency and excellence in educational courses and do  not violate  any fundamental right of the minority  institutions under Article 30. The entire controversy centers round the extent of the right of  the  religious and linguistic minorities  to  administer their educational institutions.  The right to administer  is said  to  consist of four principal matters.  First  is  the right to choose its managing- or governing body.  It is said that the founders of the minority institution have faith and confidence  in  their own committee or  body  consisting  of persons selected by them.  Second is the right to choose its teachers.   It  is  said  that  minority  institutions  want teachers  to  have compatibility with the ideals,  aims  and aspirations  of the institution.  Third is the right not  to be  compelled  to refuse admission to  students.   In  other words,  the minority institutions want to have the right  to admit  students  of  their  choice  subject  to   reasonable regulations  about academic qualifications.  Fourth  is  the right  to use its properties and assets for the  benefit  of its own institution. The   right  conferred  on  the  religious  and   linguistic minorities  to administer educational institutions of  their choice is not in an absolute.right.  This right is not  free from regulation.  Just as regulatory measures are  necessary for  maintaining  the educational character and  content  of minority  institutions  similarly  regulatory  measures  are necessary   for  ensuring  orderly,  efficient   and   sound administration.  Das, C.J. in the Kerala Education Bill case (supra)  summed up in one sentence the true meaning  of  the right  to administer by saying that the right to  administer is not the right to maladminister.                             195 On behalf of, the petitioners, it is said that the right  to administer means authority in       administration  Emphasis is placed on’ the minority’s claim to   the institution  as, it thinks fit.  It is, said that the’ regulatory  should not restrict  the  right of administration but  facilitate  the, same through- the instrumentality of the, management of  the minority  institutions. it is said that the  management:  of the  minority  institution should not be  displaced  because that will amount to violation of the right to administer. The  kerala  Education  Hill  case  (supra)  upheld  certain regulatory  provisions  as  to  administration  of  minority institution  not to infringe the right to  administer.   The manager  of an aided school was to be appointed  subject  to the  approval  of  such  officer  as  the  Government  might authorise.  The Government prescribed the qualifications for appointment  as  teachers.  The  Public  Service  Commission selected  candidates  for  appointment  as  teachers.    The conditions  of service were to be the same as in  Government

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schools.  No teacher was to be dismissed, removed or reduced in  rank or suspended without the previous sanction  of  the officer authorised by the Government in this behalf. The  Kerala Education Bill case (supra) did not  uphold  the validity of clauses 14 and 15 in the Kerala Education  Bill, 1957.  These clauses authorised the Government to take  over any  aided school under certain circumstances.   This  Court found  that those clauses amounted to expropriation  of  the schools.   The  schools were, recognised on  condition  that they  submitted to those clauses.  Such submission  amounted to surrender of the right under Article 30. This Court in Rev.  Father W. Proost case (supra) held  that section  48-A  of the Bihar University Act which  came  into force from 1 March,. 1962 completely took away the  autonomy of the governing body of St. Xaviees College established  by the  Jesuits  of  Ranchi.   Section 48-A  of  the  said  Act provided inter alia that appointments, dismissals, removals, termination of service by the governing body of the  College were  to  be made on the recommendation  of  the  University Service  Commission  and  subject to  the  approval  of  the University.   There were other provisions in  that  section, viz.,  that the Commission would recommend to the  governing body names of persons in order of preference and in no  case could  the  governing  body appoint a  person  who  was  not recommended by the University Service Commission. In RI.  Rev.  Bishop S. K. Patro v. State of Bihar [19701] 1 S.C.R.  172,  the  State  of  Bihar  requested  the   Church Missionary   Society  School,  Bhagalpur  to  constitute   a managing committee of the school in accordance with an order of  the State.  This Court held that the  State  authorities could  not  require  the school  to  constitute  a  managing committee in accordance with their order. In D. A. V. College v. State of Punjab [1971] Suppl.  S.C.R. 688.  clause 17 of the impugned statute in that  case  which provided  that  the  staff  initially  appointed  shall   be approved by the Vice-Chancellor and subsequent changes would be  reported  to the University  for  the  Vice-Chancellor’s approval,  was found to interfere with the right of  manage- ment. 196 This  Court  in  State  of  Kerala  v.  Very  Rev.    Mother Provincial  case(supra)  found  sections 48 and  49  of  the Kerala  University Act ,of 1969 to be infraction of  Article 30.   Those  sections were found by this Court to  have  the effect  of displacing the administration of the college  and giving  it to a distinct corporate body which was in no  way answerable  to the institution.  The minority community  was found  to  lose the right to administer the  institution  it founded.  The governing body contemplated in those  sections was  to  administer  the colleges  in  accordance  with  the provisions  of the Act, statutes,  ordinances,  regulations, bye  laws  and  orders made,  thereunder.   The  powers  and functions of the governing body, the removal of the. members and  the  procedure  to be followed by it  were  all  to  be prescribed  by the statutes.  These provisions  amounted  to vesting the management and administration of the institution in the hands of bodies with mandates from the University. These  rulings of this Court indicate how and when there  is taking away or abridgement of the right of administration of minority  institutions in regard to choice of the  governing body,   appointment  of  teachers  and  in  the   right   to administer. The  decision  of this Court in Rev.  Sidhajbhai  Sabhai  v. State  of Bombay [1963] 3 S.C.R. 837 illustrates as  to  how the  right  of the minority institution is violated  by  the

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State  order requiring the minority institution  to  reserve under  orders  of  Government 80 per cent of  the  seats  on threat  of withholding grant in aid for non-compliance  with the order.  This Court in Kerala Education Bill case (supra) said  that the State cannot do indirectly what it cannot  do directly.   Withholding  aid  on  terms  which  demand   the surrender  of  the right of the minority to  administer  the institution  is an infringement of the right  under  Article 30. Educational  institutions  are  temples  of  learning.   The virtues of human intelligence are mastered and harmonized by education.   Where  there is complete  harmony  between  the teacher  and the taught, where the teacher imparts  and  the student receives, where there is complete dedication of  the teacher   and  the  taught  in  learning,  where  there   is discipline:  between the teacher and the taught, where  both are  worshipers  of learning, no discord or  challenge  will arise.   An educational institution runs smoothly  when  the teacher  and the taught are engaged in the, common ideal  of pursuit  of knowledge.  It is, therefore, manifest that  the appointment of teachers is an important part in  educational institutions.  The, qualifications and the character of  the teachers  are really important.  The  minority  institutions have  the  right  to administer  institutions.   This  right implies   the   obligation   and  duty   of   the   minority institutions,  to render the very best to the students.   In the  right  of administration, checks and  balances  in  the shape  of  regulatory measures are required  to  ensure  the appointment of good teachers d their conditions of  service. The  right to administer is to be tempered  with  regulatory measures  to  facilitate smooth  administration.   The  best administration  will reveal no trace or colour of  minority. A minority institution should shine in exemplary eclectic in the administration of the institution.  The best  compliment that  can be paid to a minority institution is that it  does not rest on or Proclaim its minority character.                             197 Regulations  which will serve the interest of the  students, regulations  which will serve the interests of the  teachers are   of  paramount  importance  in   good   administration. Regulations  in  the  interest of  efficiency  of  teachers, discipline and fairness in administration are necessary  for preserving harmony among affiliated institutions. Education  should be a great cohesive, force  in  developing integrity  of the nation.  Education develops the  ethos  of the  nation.  Regulations are, therefore, necessary  to  see that  there  are no divisive, or  disintegrating  forces  in administration. Three  sets  of regulations are impeached  as  violative  of Article 30.  The first set consists of section 40 and 41  of the Gujarat University Act, 1949 as amended, referred to, as the  Act.   The second set consists of section  33A(1)  (a). The third set consists of sections 51A and 52A. Section  40  of the Act enacts that  teaching  and  training shall  be conducted by the university and shall be  imparted by  teachers of the university.  Teachers of the  university may  be  appointed  or  recognised  by  the  university  for imparting instructions on its behalf.  As soon as the  Court which is one of the authorities of the university determines that  the  teaching and training shall be conducted  by  the university the provisions of section 41 of the Act come into force. Section  41 of the Act consists of four  sub-sections.   The first  subsection  states  that  all  colleges  within   the university area which are admitted to the privileges of  the

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university under subsection (3) of section 5 of the, Act and all  colleges  which  may hereafter  be  affiliated  to  the university shall be constituent colleges of the  university. It  is true that no determination has yet been made  by  the court of the university under section 40 of the Act but  the power exists.  The power may be used in relation to minority institution.   Once that is done the  minority  institutions will  immediately  become constituent colleges.   The  ,real implication  of section 40 of the Act is that  teaching  and training  shall  be conducted by the university.   The  word "conduct"  clearly  indicates  that  the  university  is   a teaching  university.   Under  section 40  of  the  Act  the university takes over teaching of under-graduate classes. Section  41 of the Act is a corollary to section 40  of  the Act.   Section 41 of the Act does not stand  independent  of section 40 of the Act.  Once an affiliated college becomes a constituent college within the meaning of section 41 of  the Act pursuant to a declaration under section 40 of the Act it becomes integrated to the university.  A constituent college does not retain its former individual character any  longer. The  minority  character of the college is  lost.   Minority institutions become part and parcel of the) university.  The result  is  that  section  40 of the  Act  cannot  have  any compulsory  application to minority institutions because  it will  take  away their fundamental right  to  administer  he educational institutions of their choice. Section 41 of the Act contains four sub-sections.  The first subsection  broadly  states  that all  colleges  within  the University  area  shall be the constituent colleges  of  the university.    The  second  sub-section  states   that   all institutions  within the university area shall be  the  con- stituent  institutions  of the university.  The  third  sub- section states that 198 no  educational  institution situate within  the  university area shall, save with the consent of the university and  the sanction  of the State Government be associated in  any  way with  or  seek  admission  to any  privilege  of  any  other university  established  by  law.   The  fourth  sub-section states  that  the relations of the  Consent   colleges   and constituent, recognised or approved institutions within  the university area shall be governed by the statutes to be made in that behalf and such statutes shall provide in particular for the exercise by the university of the powers  enumerated therein  in  respect  of  constituent  degree  colleges  and constituent recognised institutions. Section  41(4)  (ii)  of  the  Act  confers  power  on   the university  to approve the appointment of the teachers  made by  colleges.   Section 41 (4 ) (iii) of  the  Act  requires colleges  to contribute teachers for teaching on  behalf  of the  university.   Section 4 1 (4) (iv) of the  Act  confers power  on  the university to co-ordinate  and  regulate  the facilities provided and expenditure incurred by colleges and institutions in regard to libraries, laboratories and  other equipments  for teaching and research.  Section 41  (4)  (v) confers  power  on the university to  require  colleges  and institutions  when  necessary to confine the  enrollment  of student,,  in certain subjects. Section 41(4)  (vi)  confers power on the university to levy contributions from  colleges and institutions and to make grants to them.  In  view of our conclusion that sections 40 and 41  of  the Act  hang  together’ and that section 40 of the  Act  cannot have any compulsory application to minority institutions, it follows  that section 41 of the Act cannot equally have  any compulsory  application to minority institutions It  is  not

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necessary to express any opinion on the provisions contained in  section 41 of the Act as to whether such provisions  can be   applied  to  minority  institutions  affiliated  to   a university  irrespective  of the  conversion  of  affiliated colleges into constituent colleges. The  provisions contained in section 33A(1) (a) of  the  Act state that every college shall be under the management of  a governing  body which shall include amongst its  members,  a representative  of  the, university nominated by  the  Vice- Chancellor  and  representatives of teachers,  non  teaching staff  and  students of the college.  These  provisions  are challenged  on the ground that this amounts to  invasion  of the  fundamental right of administration.  It is  said  that the  governing  body  of  the  college  is  a  part  of  its administration and therefore that administration should  not be touched.  The right to administer is the right to conduct and  manage the affairs of the institution.  This  right  is exercised through a body of persons in whom the founders  of the institution have faith and confidence and who have  full autonomy  in  that  sphere.  The  right,  to  administer  is subject  to  permissible regulatory  measures.   Permissible regulatory  measures  are those which do  not  restrict  the right of administration but facilitate it and ensure  better and more effective exercise of the right for the benefit  of the  institution  and  through the  instrumentality  of  the management  of  the  educational  institutions  and  without displacing the management.  If the administration has to  be improved   it   should  be  done  through  the   agency   or instrumentality  of  the  existing  management  and  not  by displacing, it.  Restrictions on the right of 199 administration imposed in the interest of the general public alone  and  not in the interests of and for the  benefit  of minority educational institutions concerned will affect  the autonomy in administration. Autonomy   in  administration  means  right  to   administer effectively  and  to manage and conduct the affairs  of  the institutions.   The distinction is between a restriction  on the right of administration and a regulation prescribing the manner  of administration.  The right of  administration  is day  to day administration.  The choice in the personnel  of management is a part of the administration.  The  university will   always  have  a  right  to  see  that  there  is   no maladministration.   If  there  is  maladministration,   the university  will take steps to cure the same.  There may  be control  and  check on administration in order to  find  out whether the minority institutions are engaged in  activities which  are not conducive to the interest of the minority  or to  the requirements of the teachers and the  students.   In State of Kerala v. Very Rev.  Mother Provincial etc. (supra) this Court said that if the administration goes to a body in the  selection  of  whom  the  founders  have  no  say,  the administration  would  be displaced.  This Court  also  said that  situations might be conceived when they might  have  a preponderating  voice.  That would also affect the  autonomy in  administration.  The provisions contained in section  33 A(1)  (a)  of  the Act have the  effect  of  displacing  the management  and  entrusting it to a different  agency.   The autonomy  in  administration is lost.  New elements  in  the shape  of representatives of different type are brought  in. The calm waters of an institution will not only be disturbed but  also  mixed.  These provisions in section 33A  (1)  (a) cannot therefore apply to minority institutions. The  provisions  contained in section 33A(1)(b) of  the  Act were  not  challenged by the petitioners.   The  interveners

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challenged  those provisions.  The settled practice of  this Court  is  that an intervener is not  to  raise  contentions which are not urged by the petitioners.  In view of the fact that  notices were given to minority institutions to  appear and those institutions appeared and made their submissions a special  consideration arises here for expressing the  views on  section 33A(1)(b) of the Act.  The provisions  contained in section 33A(1)(b) of the Act are that for the recruitment of the Principal and the members of the teaching staff of  a college there is a selection committee of the college  which shall  consist.,  in.  the case of  the.  recruitment  of  a Principal,  of a representative of the university  nominated by the Vice-Chancellor and, in the case of recruitment of  a member   of  the  teaching  staff  of  the  college,  of   a representative  of  the university nominated  by  the  Vice- Chancellor  and  the  Head  of the  Department  if  any  for subjects  taught  by such persons.  The  contention  of  the interveners with regard to these provisions is that there is no  indication and guidance in the Act as to what  types  of persons  could be nominated as the representative.   It  was suggested that such matters should not be left to  unlimited power as to choice.  The provisions contained in section 33A (1)(b) cannot therefore apply to minority institutions. The  third  set of provisions impeached by  the  petitioners consists  of sections 51A and 52A.  Section 51A states  that no  member of the teaching, other academic and  non-teaching staff of an affiliated college 200 shall  be  dismissed or removed or reduced  in  rank  except after  an  inquiry  in which he has  been  informed  of  the charges  and given a reasonable opportunity of  being  heard and until (a) he has been given a reasonable ,opportunity of making  representation on any such penalty. proposed  to  be inflicted on him; and (b) the penalty to be inflicted on him is  approved by the Vice-Chancellor or any other officer  of the  university  authorised by the Vice-Chancellor  in  this behalf.   Objection  is  taken by  the  petitioners  to  the approval  of  Penalty by the Vice-Chancellor  or  any  other officer  of the university authorised by him.  First, it  is said  that a blanket power is given to  the  Vice-Chancellor without  any  guidance.  Second, it is said that  the  words "any other officer of the university authorised by him" also confer power on the Vice-Chancellor to authorise any one and no  guidelines are to be found there.  In  short,  unlimited and  undefined  power is conferred on  the  Vice-Chancellor. The Approval by the Vice-Chancellor may be intended to be  a check  on  the administration.  The provision  contained  in section  51A, clause (b) of the Act cannot be said to  be  a permissive  regulatory  measure  inasmuch  as  it   confer-, arbitrary  power  on the Vice-Chancellor to  take  away  the right  of  administration  of  the  minority   institutions. Section 51A of the Act cannot, therefore, apply to  minority institutions. The   provisions  contained  in  section  52A  of  the   Act contemplate  reference of any dispute between the  governing body and any member of the teaching, other academic and non- teaching  staff of an affiliated college which is  connected with the conditions of service of such member to a  Tribunal of  Arbitration  consisting of one member nominated  by  the governing  body of the college, one member nominated by  the member  concerned  and  an Umpire  appointed  by  the  Vice- Chancellor.  These, references to arbitration will introduce an  area  of litigious controversy  inside  the  educational institution.   The  atmosphere of the  institution  will  be vitiated  by such proceedings.  The governing body  has  its

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own  disciplinary  authority.  The governing  body  has  its domestic jurisdiction.  This jurisdiction will be displaced. A  new jurisdiction will be created in administration.   The provisions  contained  in  section 52A of  the  Act  cannot, therefore, apply to minority institutions. For  these reasons the provisions contained in sections  40, 41, 33A(1) (a), 33A(1) (b), 51A and 52A cannot be applied to minority   institutions.   These  provisions   violate   the fundamental rights of the minority institutions. The  ultimate goal of a minority institution  too  imparting general secular education is advancement of learning.   This Court has consistently held that it is not only  permissible but also desirable to regulate everything in educational and academic matters for achieving excellence and uniformity  in standards of education, In the field of administration it is not reasonable to claim that  minority  institutions will  have  complete  autonomy. Checks  on the administration may be necessary in  order  to ensure  that the administration is efficient and  sound  and will serve the academic needs of the institution.  The right of  a  minority to administer  its  educational  institution involves,  as  part  of  it,  a  correlative  duty  of  good administration. 201 The,  teachers  and the, taught form a world  of  their  own where everybody is a votary of learning.  They should not be made  to  know  any distinction.   Their  harmony  rests  on dedicated and disciplined pursuit of learning.  The areas of administration   of   minorities  should  be   adjusted   to concentrate  on  making learning most  excellent.   That  is possible  only when all institutions follow the  motto  that the  institutions are places for worship of learning by  the students  and  the  teachers together  irrespective  of  any denomination and distinction. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, J. This larger Bench has been  constituted to  consider the scope of the fundamental rights under  Art. 30(1), the interrelationship of those rights with the rights under Art. 29(1), the scope of the regulatory powers of  the State  vis-a-vis  the rights under Art. 30(1),  and  in  the light of the view taken on the several aspects aforesaid  to consider the validity of certain impugned provisions of  the amended Gujarat University Act, 1949-hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’.  The contentions raised before us on the scope and ambit of Arts. 29(1) and 30(1) are not new but have been earlier urged before and decided by this Court.  The attempt on  behalf  of the State of Gujarat has been to  once  again raise  the same crucial issues which go to the root  of  the rights conferred on the minorities to establish  educational institutions  of  their choice and whether the  State  could treat  the  majority and minority  educational  institutions equally, an issue upon which this Court has pronounced in no uncertain, terms on earlier occasions.  We  agree  with the judgment of Hon’ble the  Chief  Justice just  pronounced and with his conclusions that ss.  40,  41, 33A(1)  (a), 33A(1) (b) , 5 1 A and 52A of the  Act  violate the fundamental rights of minorities and cannot,  therefore, apply  to the institutions established and  administered  by them.   We would not ordinarily have found it  necessary  to write a separate opinion when the same thing has to be  said as  has  been said so tersely by him, but in trying  to  re- state  what  has  already  been  said,  the  impression   is sometimes created that something new is being stated or some departure  from the principles already adumbrated  is  being made.  In order to avoid giving scope to any such contention being  raised,  we  would  merely  refer  to  some   earlier

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provisions already held to violate the fundamental rights of minorities  guaranteed under Art. 30(1) which are  analogous to the impugned provisions which, in the view this Court has already  taken,  can  be  held  to  be  violative  in  their application  to the minority educational institutions.   The reason for this separate opinion, however, is not so much to point  out the invalidity of the impugned  provisions  which Hon’ble the Chief Justice has held to be inapplicable to the minority institutions but to examine the question as to what extent  the,  right conferred by Art.  30(1)  would  include within  it the right of the minorities to claim  affiliation for  or recognition to educational institutions  established by them. The   right  of  a  linguistic  or  religious  minority   to administer educational institutions of their choice,  though couched in absolute terms has been held by this Court to  be subject to regulatory measures which the State might  impose for furthering the excellence of the standards of education. The  scope  and ambit of the rights under  Arts.  29(1)  and 30(1) were first considered and analysed by this Court while giving  its advice on the Presidential Reference under  Art. 143 of the Constitution in Re. (1) [1959] SCR 995. (2) [1944] F.C.R. 317. 202 The  Kerala Education Bill, 1957(1).  The report  which  was made to the President in that Reference, it is true, is  not binding  on  this Court in any subsequent matter  wherein  a concrete  case  the  infringement of the  rights  under  any analogous provision may be called in question, though it  is entitled  to  great  weight.   Under  Art.  143  this  Court expresses its opinion if it so chooses and in some cases  it might even decline to express its opinion, vide In Re.  Levy of  Estate DUty(2) cited with approval by Das,.  C.J. in  In re.   The  Kerala Education Bill, 1957.  In some  cases  the opinion  may be based on certain stated contingencies or  on some  assumed  or  hypothetical  situations  whereas  in   a concrete  case coming before this Court by way of an  appeal under  Art. 133, or by special leave under Art. 136 or by  a petition under Art. 32, the law declared by it by virtue  of Art.  143 is binding on all courts within the  territory  of India.  Nonetheless the exposition of the various facets  of the  rights  under Art. 29(1) and Art. 30(1) by  Das,  C.J., speaking  for the majority, with the utmost  clarity,  great perspicuity  and  wisdom has been the text from  which  this Court has drawn its sustenance in its subsequent  decisions. To  the extent that this Court has applied these  principles to  concrete cases there can be no question of  there  being any  conflict with what has been observed by Das,  C.J.  The decisions rendered on analogous provisions as those that are under challenge in this case would prima facie govern  these cases, unless this larger Bench chooses to differ from them. In  respect  of certain provisions of the  Kerala  Education Bill, namely, clauses 9, 11 (2) and 12 (4), Das, C.J. stated :               "These  are, no doubt, serious inroads on  the               right of administration and appear  perilously               near  violating that right.   But  considering               that  those provisions are applicable  to  all               educational institutions and that the impugned               parts  of  cls. 9, 11 and 12 are  designed  to               give  protection and security to  the  illpaid               teachers who are engaged in rendering  service               to   the  nation  and  protect  the   backward               classes,  we  are  prepared,  as  at   present               advised, to treat these clauses 9, 11 (2) and 1

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             2  (4)  as permissible regulations  which  the               State  may  impose  on  the  minorities  as  a               condition   for   granting   aid   to    their               educational institutions." It was also observed therein that cls. 7, 10, 11(1),  12(1), (2),  (3)  and  (5) may easily  be  regarded  as  reasonable regulations or conditions for the grant of aid.  But some of the  provisions analogous to cls.  11, 12 (1), (2), (3)  and (5)  have  been held invalid by this Court  when  they  were challenged  as  offending  fundamental  rights  of  minority institutions.   In the State of Kerala v. Very Rev.   Mother Provincial(1)  sub-ss. (1) (2) and (9) of section 53 of  the Kerala University Act, 1969, were held to be invalid.  These provisions are similar in terms and effect as cl. 1.1 of the Kerala  Education Bill, 1957.  Similarly,  sub-sections  (2) and (4) of s. 56 of the Kerala University Act being  similar in  terms  and  effect to sub-clauses (1), (2)  and  (3)  of clause  12  of the Kerala Education Bill, 1957,  which  were held to be reasonable and sub-clause (4) of (1) [1971] 1 S.C.R. 734.    (2) [1971] Supp.  S.C.R. 688. 203 that  clause which was considered to be perilously  near  to violating the fundamental rights in that case, were held  to be  invalid  as  they fall with sections 48 and  49  of  the Kerala  Education Act.  A similar provision in the  Statutes of the Guru Nanak University Act, namely, Statute 17  making a  provision similar to sub cls. (1), (2) and (3) of  clause 12 of the Kerala Education Bill was held invalid in D. A. V. College etc. v. State of Punjab & Ors(2).  Sub-sections  (4) and  (6) of s. 63 of the Kerala University Act, 1969,  which provide  for similar contingencies as those provided  in  s. 52A  of the impugned provisions of the Act dealing with  the disputes  between the governing body and any member  of  the teaching  staff or other academic and non-teaching staff  of minority  institutions  was  held to be  invalid  in  Mother Provincial  case.  The provisions of the  impugned  sections 33A(1)  and (b) and 51A of the Act are similar in nature  to the  provisions  of  ss.  53, 56 48 and  49  of  the  Kerala University  Act.   Statute  2(l)  (a)  of  the  Guru   Nanak University  Act  also corresponds to ss. 48 and  49  of  the Kerala University Act and is similar in nature to s. 33A  of the  Act.   These  have been held to  be  invalid  in  their application  to minority educational institutions in the  D. A.  V.  College case.  Needless to say, in so far  as  these decisions  lay down a principle slightly different  from  or even  contrary to the opinion on the Kerala Education  Bill, they are the law laid down by this Court. The  impugned  provisions, namely, ss. 40, 41,  33A(1)  (a), 33A(1)  (b),  51A  and 52A have already been  given  in  the judgment  of  Hon’ble  the  Chief  Justice.   These  may  be compared  with the provisions of the Kerala Education  Bill, the  Kerala  University Act and the Statutes  of  the  ’Guru Nanak University Act, which have been juxtaposed for an easy appreciation of the nature of the provisions which have been held void by the cases referred to above : 204 Kerala Education Bill cl.  11-Appointment  of  teachers in  Government  and  aided schools- (1)  The  Public Service Commission shall, as  empowered  by this          Act.  select  candidates  for  appointment  as teachers   in   Government  and   aided   schools.    Before Service  Commission shall select candidates with due  regard to  the  probable number of vacancies of teachers  that  may arise  in the course of the year.  The candidates  shall  be

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selected  for  each  district separately  and  the  list  of candidates  so selected shall be published in  the  Gazette. Teachers of aided schools shall be appointed by the  manager only  from  the candidates so selected for the  district  in which  the school is located provided that manager may,  for sufficient reason, with the permission of the Public Service Commission,   appoint  teachers  selected  for   any   other district.   Appointment  of teachers in  Government  schools shall also be made from the list of candidates so published. (2)  In  selecting  candidates  under  subsection  (1).  the Public   Service  Commission  shall  have  regard   to   the provisions  made by the Government under cl. (4) of Art.  16 of the Constitution. Cl. 12--Conditions of service of aided school teachers :- (1)  The   conditions  of  service  relating  to   pensions, provident, fund, insurance and Kerala  University Act Section 53- Appointment of teachers in private colleges- (1)  Posts  of  principal  of  private  colleges  shall’  be selection posts. (2)  Appointment  to  the post of principal  in  _a  private college  shall  be made by the governing  body  or  managing council,  as  the case may be, from among  teachers  of  the college  or of all the colleges. ,is the case may be  or  if there  is  no suitable person in such college  or  colleges, from other persons. (9)  Any  teacher  aggrieved by an  appointment  under  sub- section  (7)  may  within sixty days from the  date  of  the appointment,  appeal to the Syndicate, and the  decision  of the Syndicate thereon shall be final. S.   56-Conditions   of  service  of  teachers  of   private colleges- (1)  The  conditions  of  service  of  teachers  of  private colleges,  including  conditions relating to  pay,  pension, provident  fund, gratuity, insurance and age  of  retirement shall be Such as may be proscribed by the Statutes. (2)  No  teacher  of  private college  shall  be  dismissed, removed, or reduced in Guru Nanak university Statutes Statute  17-The staff initially appointed shall be  approved by  the Vice-Chancellor.  D All subsequent changes shall  be reported, to the University for Vice-Chancellor’s  approval. In the case of training institutions the     teachers, pupil ratio shall not be less  than   1  :   12.    Non-Government Colleges  shall  comply with the requirements laid  down  in the Ordinance governing service and conduct of teachers in F non-Government Colleges as may be framed by the University. 205 age  of  retirement  applicable to  teachers  of  Government schools shall apply to teachers of aided schools- (1)  who are appointed under sec. 11 after the  commencement of this section; and (ii) who have been appointed before the commencement of this section, but who have expressed in writing their willingness to,  be  governed by such conditions, within one  year  from such commencement. (3)  The  Government shall extend to the teachers  of  aided schools  who have been appointed before the commencement  of this  section and who have not expressed  their  willingness under  clause  (ii)  of  subsection  (2)  within  the   time specified  therefore the conditions of service, relating  to pension,  provident  fund, insurance and age  of  retirement applicable  to  teachers  of Government  schools  with  such modifications as the Government may deem fit.

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(4)  No  teacher  of  an aided school  shall  be  dismissed. removed, reduced in rank or suspended by the manager without the  previous  sanction  of the officer  authorised  by  the Government in this behalf. (5)  Subject to the provisions of subsections (1), (2),  (3) and  (4),  the conditions of service of  teachers  of  aided schools shall be such as may be prescribed. rank  by the Governing body or managing council without  the previous  sanction  of the Vice-Chancellor or  placed  under suspension  by the Governing Body or Managing Council for  a continuous  period exceeding fifteen days without such  pre- vious sanction. (4)  A  teacher  against whom disciplinary action  is  taken shall  have  a  right of appeal to the  Syndicate,  and  the Syndicate  shall  have Power to order reinstatement  of  the teacher  in  case of wrongful removal or  dismissal  and  to order such other remedial measures as it deems fit. and  the governing  body  or managing council, as the  case  may  be, shall comply with the order. 206 Section  48-Governing  body for private  college  not  under corporate management- (1)  The educational agency of a private college, other than a   private  college  under                    a   corporate management,   shall  constitute  in  accordance   with   the provisions  of the statutes a governing body  consisting  of following members, namely (a)  the principal of the private college; (b)  the manager of the private college. (c)  a  person--nominated  by the University  in  accordance with  the  provisions  in  that  behalf  contained  in   the statutes. (d)a person nominated by the Government; (e)a person elected in accordance with suchprocedure as  may be prescribed by the Statutes from among  themselves by the permanent teachers of the private college; and (f)  not more than six persons nominated by  the educational agency. (2)  The  governing  body shall be a body  corporate  having perpetual succession and a common seal. (3) The manager of the private college shall be the Chairman of the Governing body. (4)  A member of the governing body shall hold office for  a period of four years from the date of its constitution. Statute 2(1)(a) A  College applying for admission to the privileges  of  the University  shall  send  a  letter  of  application  to  the Registrar and shall satisfy the Senate (a)  That  the  College shall have a  regularly  constituted governing  body  consisting  of not  more  than  20  persons approved  by  the  Senate and  including.  among  others,  2 representatives  of the University and the Principal of  the college ex-officio. Provided that the said condition shall not apply in the case of College maintained by Government which shall however have an  advisory  Committee  consisting  of  among  others   the principal  of the College (Ex-officio) and  two  representa- tives of the University. 207 (5)  It  shall  be  the duty of  the     governing  body  to administer  the  private  college  in  accordance  with  the provisions of this Act and the Statutes, Ordinances, Regula- tions, Rules, Bye-laws, and orders made thereunder. (6)  The  powers  and functions of the governing  body,  the removal of members thereof and the procedure to be followed

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by  it,  including the delegation of its  powers.  shall  be prescribed by the Statutes. (7)  Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section  (6), decisions  of the governing body shall be taken at  meetings on  the basis of simple majority of the members present  and voting. Section  49-  Managing Council for  private  Colleges  under corporate management (a)  one  principal  by rotation in such manner  as  may  be prescribed by the Statutes, (b)  the manager of the private college; (c)  a person nominated by the University in accordance with the provisions in that behalf contained in the Statutes; (d)a person nominated by the Government; (e)two persons elected in accordance withsuch  procedure as  may be prescribed by the Statutes from among  themselves by the permanent teachers of all the private colleges; and 208 (f)  not   more  than  fifteen  persons  nominated  by   the educational agency. (2)  The  managing council shall be a body corporate  having perpetual succession and a common seal. (3)  The  manager  of  the private  colleges  shall  be  the chairman of the managing council. (4)  A member of the managing council shall hold office  for a period of four years from the date of the, constitution. (5)  It  shall  be  the  duty of  the  managing  council  to administer  all  the private colleges  under  the  corporate management in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the  Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations, Bye-laws and  Orders made thereunder. (6)  The  powers and functions of the managing council,  the removal of members thereof and the procedure to be  followed by  it,  including the delegation of its  powers.  shall  be prescribed by the Statutes. (7)  Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section  (6), decisions of the managing council shall be taken at meetings on  the basis of simple majority of the members present  and voting. Section  63-Power  to  regulate the  management  of  private colleges. (4)  If the governing body or managing council, as the  case may be, disapproves 209                             (2) any decision taken by the University in connection with  the management  of  the  private college the  matters  shall  be referred  by the governing body or managing council, as  the case may be, to the Government within one month of the  date of  receipt  of the report under sub-section (3)  who  shall thereupon  pass  such order thereon as they  think  fit  and communicate  the  same  to the governing  body  or  managing council and also to the University. (6)The  manager appointed under subsection (1) of  section 50  shall  be bound to give effect to the decisions  of  the University and if at any time, it appears to the  University that the manager is not  carrying out its decisions   itmay for  reasons to be recorded inwriting and after  giving the manager anopportunity of being heard, by orderremove him from office and appointanother   person  to  be   the manager afterconsulting    the educational agency, 210 In  spite of the consistent and categorical decisions  which have held invalid certain provisions of the University  Acts of  some of the States as interfering with  the  fundamental

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rights  of management of minority in-situations inherent  in the  right  to establish educational institutions  of  their choice   under  Art.  30(1),  the  State  of   Gujarat   has incorporated similar analogous provisions to those that have been declared invalid by this Court.  No doubt education  is a  State  subject,  but in the exercise of  that  right  any transgression  of  the fundamental right guaranteed  to  the minorities  will have its impact beyond the borders of  that State  and  the minorities in the rest of the  country  will feel apprehensive of their rights being invaded in a similar manner  by other States.  A kind of instability in the  body politic  will be created by action of a State which will  be construed  as a deliberate attempt to transgress the  rights of  the  minorities  where  similar  earlier  attempts  were successfully  challenged and the offending  provisions  held invalid. The  Central Government to which notice was  given  probably realising  the  sensitive nature of the issue  did  not  put forward any contentions contrary to those that have  already been considered and decided by this Court, though we had the advantage  of the personal views of the Attorney-General  on some of the aspects of those rights.  Equality of  treatment of  minority and majority or equality before  law  precludes discrimination.   According  to  Advisory  opinion  of   the Permanent Court of International Justice on Minority Schools in Albania (6 April 1935), Publications of the Court, series A/B No. 64, p. 19 :               "whereas  equality  in fact  may  involve  the               necessity  of differential treatment in  order               to  attain  a  result  which  establishes   an               equilibrium between different situations.               or  treatment  of  the  majority  and  of  the               minority whose situation and requirements  are               different, would result in inequality ........               The  equality between members of the  majority               and of the minority must be effective, genuine               equality We  are  of opinion that this view is a sound  one  and  the contentions advanced on behalf of some of the respondents in support of the validity of the impugned provisions cannot be accepted. In  so  far as the Fight of affiliation  or  recognition  is concerned,  no doubt, the observations of Das, C.J., in  Re. The Kerala Education Bill case(1) seem to negative any  such right under Art. 30(1).  He said at p. 1067 :               "There   is,  no  doubt,  no  such  thing   as               fundamental right to recognition by the  State               but  to  deny recognition to  the  educational               institutions  except upon terms tantamount  to               the surrender of their constitutional right of               administration of the educational institutions               of  their choice is in truth and in effect  to               deprive  them  of  their  rights  under   Art.               30(1)." These  observations appear to us to be somewhat at  variance with certain other observations.  But if these  observations are carefully scruti- (1)  [1959] S.C.R. 995.  211 nised,  they can be reconciled and harmonised.   Das,  C.J., had observed earlier at pp. 1066-1067 that               "The minorities, quite understandably,  regard               it  as essential that the education  of  their               children  should  be in  accordance  with  the               teachings  of  their religion and  they  hold,

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             quite honestly, that such an education  cannot               be  obtained in ordinary schools designed  for               all the members of the public but can only  be               secured   in  schools  conducted   under   the               influence  and guidance of people well  versed               in  the  tenets of their religion and  in  the               traditions  of  their  culture..........  They               also desire that scholars of their educational               institutions  should go out in the world  well               and    sufficiently    equipped    with    the               qualifications  necessary for a useful  career               in life.  But according to the Education  Code               now in operation to which it is permissible to               refer  for  ascertaining  the  effect  of  the               impugned  provisions  on  existing  state   of               affairs  the scholars of unrecognised  schools               are  not permitted to avail themselves of  the               opportunities  for  higher  education  in  the               University  and are not eligible for  entering               the  public  services.   Without  recognition,               therefore,   the   educational    institutions               established  or  to  be  established  by   the               minority  communities cannot fulfill the  real               objects  of their choice and the rights  under               Art.  30(1) cannot be  effectively  exercised.               The    right    to    establish    educational               institutions of their choice must,  therefore,               mean the right to establish real  institutions               which  will  effectively serve  the  needs  of               their community and the scholars who resort to               their educational institutions." The  right under Art. 30 cannot be exercised in vacuo.   Nor would it be right to refer to affiliation or recognition  as privileges granted by the State.  In a democratic system  of Government  with emphasis on education and enlightenment  of its  citizens, there must be elements which give  protection to  them.  The meaningful exercise of the tight  under  Art. 30(1) would and must necessarily involve recognition of  the secular  education  imparted by  the  minority  institutions without which the right will be a mere husk.  This Court has so  far  consistently  struck  down  all  attempts  to  make affiliation or recognition on terms tantamount to  surrender of  its rights under Art. 30(1) as abridging or taking  away those rights.  Again as without affiliation there can be  no meaningful  exercise  of the right under Art.  30  (1),  the affiliation  to  be  given should be  consistent  with  that right,  nor can it indirectly try to achieve what it  cannot directly  do.   See  Kerala  Education  Bill  Case(1)   Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai & others v. State of Bombay and Another(2) and D.A.V. College Case(3) at p. 709. If the right of recognition is not a fundamental right,  the logical  result  of this postulate would be that  the  State need  not  recognise  except on general terms  open  to  all institutions.  But if the recognition by a State is  limited in  so far as minority institutions are concerned,  in  that under (1) [1959] S.C.R. 995. at p.1059, 1060, 1067 & 1068. (2) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 837 at 856. (3) [1971] Supp.  S.C.R. 688 at 709. 212 the  guise  of  exercising  this  power,  the  State  cannot prescribe conditions which will make an inroad and take away the  right  guaranteed under Art. 30(1), then  there  is  no meaning  in  saying that the right  to  recognise  vis-a-vis minority  institutions is not a fundamental right.  This  is

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one  conclusion that can possibly be derived from the  above observations  of  Das, C.J. The second conclusion  which  is possible is that these observations will have to be confined to the provisions of law regarding the validity of which the opinion of the Court was sought.  In that case, the Bill had provided  for  giving recognition to schools  for  preparing students for the examinations conducted by the Board, and in so  providing  it  had imposed conditions  which  the  Court construed  as tantamount to the minority institutions  being required  to surrender or denying them the right under  Art. 30(1).  The Court was not concerned with a law which did not deal with the question of affiliation or recognition at  all or where the teaching was confined only to State managed and maintained  schools.  The observations of Das,  C.J.  cannot therefore, strictly speaking, apply to this fact  situation. When  it is so read, they cannot be held to have  laid  down that the State must provide for giving recognition at  least to  the minority institutions or accord recognition  subject to  such  conditions  as would in truth and  in  effect  not amount  to an infringement of their right under Art.  30(1). In  other  words,  where  the  law  does  not  provide   for giving.recognition   or  affiliation  to   any   educational institution  irrespective of whether it is a majority  or  a minority  institution,  can the minority  institution  claim recognition  on  the  ground  that  without-recognition   or affiliation the educational institution established by  them cannot fulfil the real objects of their choice and the mino- rities  cannot effectively exercise their rights under  Art. 30(1) ? If the logical answer flowing from the  observations is that it cannot, then the question would arise as to  what is  the  purpose which clause (1) of Art. 30 serves  ?  The, only  purpose that the fundamental right under Art.  30  (1) would  serve  would  in that case  be  that  minorities  may establish  their institutions, lay down their  own  syllabi, provide  instructions  in  the  subjects  of  their  choice, conduct  examinations and award degrees or  diplomas.   Such institutions have the right to seek recognition to their de- grees  and  diplomas and ask for aid where aid is  given  to other  educational institutions. giving a like education  on the basis of the excellence achieved by them.  The State  is bound to give recognition to their qualifications and to the institutions and they cannot be discriminated except on  the ground of want of excellence in their educational  standards so   far   as   recognition  of   degrees   or   educational qualifications is concerned and want of efficient management so far as aid is concerned. In  the D. A. V. College case(1) the compulsory  affiliation of minority educational institutions to the University which had  prescribed  a  medium of instructions  other  than  the language  of the minority a via media was suggested,  having regard to the formation of the linguistic States  throughout India,  that no compulsory affiliation can be insisted  upon which  offends  the right guaranteed under Arts.  29(1)  and 30(1).   If, as was held, compulsory affiliation is bad,  it will  leave them free to get affiliated to a  University  in that  linguistic  State  which  provides  facility  for  the language  and script of the minorities.   This  pre-supposes that (1)  [1971] Supp.  S. C. R. 688 at 709. 213 there is a right to get recognition or affiliation where  it is  possible in India or minority institutions  to  preserve their language, script and culture. We may in this connection refer to a unanimous resolution of Parliament  dated  September  19, 1956,  on  the  safeguards

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proposed for the linguistic minorities, Vide Part IV of  the States   Reorganisation   Report,  recommending   that   the concerned  States  should provide  necessary  facilities  to safeguard  minority  rights  by  amending  their  University Statutes.  The fifth paragraph of the memorandum as approved by Parliament states :               "5.  Affiliation of schools and colleges using               minority    languages.-Connected   with    the               proposals    contained   in   the    preceding               paragraphs is the question of the  affiliation               of educational institutions located in the new               or    reorganised   States   to    appropriate               Universities or Boards of Education.  It is of               course  desirable that every effort should  be               made    to   evolve    arrangements    whereby               educational  institutions  like  schools   and               colleges  can  be affiliated,  in  respect  of               courses  of  study in  the  mother-tongue,  to               Universities  and other authorities which  are               situated  in the same State.  However, it  may               not   always   be  possible   to   make   such               arrangements; and having regard to the  number               of institutions of this kind, it may sometimes               be convenient, both from the point of view  of               the    Universities   or    the    educational               authorities  concerned, and from the point  of               view of the institutions themselves, that they               should  be  permitted to seek  affiliation  to               appropriate bodies located outside the  State.               This  may be regarded in fact as  a  necessary               corollary  to  the  provisions  contained   in               Article 30 of the Constitution, which gives to               the minorities the right to establish and  ad-               minister  educational  institutions  of  their               choice." But  what would happen if the educational institutions of  a minority find it inconvenient or impossible to secure such a recognition  or affiliation even outside the State in  which they  are  established ? In  such  circumstances,  education including University education being a State subject and the legislative  power of the State also being subject  to  Art. 29(1)  and  Art.  30(1), minorities  able  to  establish  an educational  institution  can insist on  recognition,  where affiliation  is not provided for by the University  Acts  to the  educational  qualifications awarded  by  them,  whether degrees, diploma or other certificates, which conform to the educational  standards  prescribed  by  the  State  for  the recognition   of   such   degrees,   diplomas   and    other certificates. KHANNA,  J.  What is the scope and ambit of  the  rights  of minorities,  whether  based  on  religion  or  language,  to establish  and administer educational institutions of  their choice under clause (1) of article 30 of the Constitution is the  question  which arises for consideration in  this  writ petition filed by the Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society and  another  under  article 32 of  the  Constitution.   The respondents  impleaded  in  the petition are  the  State  of Gujarat and the Gujarat University. The  first  petitioner  (hereinafter  referred  to  as   the petitioner)  is  a Society registered  under  the  Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Act 214 21 of 1860) and a Trust under the Bombay Public Trusts  Act, 1950  (Act  29  of 1950).  The  petitioner  is  running  St. Xavier’s  College  of Arts and Commerce in  Ahmedabad.   The

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said  college  was established in June 1955 by  a  religious denomination  known  as the Society of  Jesus,  a  religious order  of  Catholic priests and  brothers.   The  petitioner society was formed with the object of taking over the  above mentioned college. The petitioner society and the St. Xavier’s College seek  to provide  higher education to Christian students.   Children, however, of all classes and creeds provided they attain  the qualifying  academic  standards  are  admitted  to  the  St. Xavier’s College. Before the bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Bombay into State of Maharashtra and St-ate of Gujarat, the Bombay State legislature   passed  the  Gujarat  University   Act,   1949 (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act).  The  object of  the Act was to establish and incorporate a teaching  and affiliated  university.  St. Xavier’s College  was  accorded affiliation  under  section 33 of the principal  Act  on  or about  June 1955.  Section 2 of the principal Act  contained definitions.  We may set out the relevant definitions               "(1)  ’Affiliated  College’  means  a  college               affiliated under section 5 or 33.               (2)   ’College’  means a degree college or  an               intermediate college.               (2A) ’Constituent College’ means a  University               college or affiliated college made constituent               under section 41.               (3)   ’Degree  College’  means  an  affiliated               college  which  is authorised  to  submit  its               students to an examination qualifying for  any               degree of the University.               (8)   ’Recognized   Institution’   means    an               institution   for  research   or   specialized               studies  other than an affiliated college  and               recognized as such by the University.               (12)  ’Teachers’  means  professors,  readers,               lecturers  and  such other  persons  imparting               instruction  in the University, an  affiliated               college or a recognized institution as may  be               declared to be teachers by the Statutes.               (13)  ’Teachers   of  the  University’   means               teacher   appointed  or  recognized   by   the               University  for imparting instruction  on  its               behalf.               (15A)  ’University  College’ means  a  college               which the University may establish or maintain               under this Act or a college transferred to the               University and maintained by it.               (16)  ’University   Department’   means    any               college, postgraduate or research  institution               or department maintained by the University." 215 Section  39  of the Principal Act provided that  within  the University area, all post-graduate instruction, teaching and training  shall  be conducted by the University or  by  such affiliated colleges or institutions and in such subjects  as may be prescribed by the Statutes.  According to section  40 of ’the Act, within a period of three years from the date on which  section 3 (which dealt with the incorporation of  the University)  comes  into force, the Senate  shall  determine that all instructions teaching and training beyond the stage of  Intermediate Examinations shall, within the area of  the City  of  Ahmedabad and such other contiguous  area  as  the Senate  may  determine, be conducted by the  University  and shall  be imparted by the teachers of the  University.   The Senate  shall  then communicate its decision  to  the  State

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Government  which Government may, after making such  inquiry as  it thinks fit, by notification in the  official  Gazette declare  that the provisions of section 41 would  come  into force on such date as may be specified in the  notification. Section 40 was amended by Bombay Act 30 of 1954, as a result of  which  the words "three years" were substituted  by  the words "seven years".  The effect of that amendment was  that the  Senate could take its decision under section 40 of  the Act within seven years from the date on which section 3 came into  force.   Section 41 of the principal Act  dealt  ,with constituent  colleges and institutions.  The  provisions  of this  section  would  be dealt  with  at  length  hereafter. Suffice  it to say at present that sub-section (2)  of  that section provided that all institutions within the  Ahmedabad area  would be constituent institutions of  the  University. No  educational  institution situate  within  the  Ahmedabad area,  it was specified, would save with the consent of  the University  and  the sanction of the  State  Government,  be associated  in  any  way  with, or  seek  admission  to  any privileges  of,  any other University  established  by  law. Sub-section  (4) of section 41 dealt with the  relations  of the  constituent colleges and the  constituent  institutions within  the Ahmedabad area and provided that the same  would be governed by the Statutes to be made in this behalf.   The matters  in  respect  of which the  Statutes  were  to  make provisions  in  particular regarding the  relations  of  the constituent  colleges and recognized institutions were  also specified. The  Senate of Gujarat University did not take any  decision mentioned  in  section 40 within the  stipulated  period  of seven years.  The said period expired on November 22,  1957. The   colleges   affiliated  to   the   Gujarat   University accordingly  continued to be affiliated colleges after  that date.  On September 28, 1971 the Senate passed a  resolution that  all  instructions, teaching and  training  beyond  the stage  of intermediate examination in the city of  Ahmedabad be conducted by the University and imparted by the  teachers of  the  University.  The Registrar of  the  University  was directed  to communicate the decision of the Senate  to  the State  Government.   The petitioners and  some  others  then filed petitions under article 226 of the Constitution in the Gujarat  High  Court on the ground that the  powers  of  the Senate  and  the State Government under section  40  of  the principal  Act had got exhausted on November 22,  1957  when the  period  of  seven years from the  commencement  of  the principal Act had expired.  In the 216 alternative,  it  was  stated by the  petitioners  that  the provisions of sections 40 and 41 were violative of  articles 14,  19, 26, 29 and 30 of the Constitution.  In view of  the pendency  of these petitions, the State Government  did  not act  upon  the impugned resolution passed by the  Senate  on September 28, 1971. The  Gujarat University (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Act No. 6  of 1973)  (hereinafter  referred to as the  amending  Act)  was thereafter passed by the Gujarat legislature.  The  amending Act  came into force on March 12, 1973.  It substituted  the word "Court" for the word "Senate" and the words  "Executive Council"  for the word "Syndicate".  The Gujarat  University Act  as  amended  by the amending Act may for  the  sake  of convenience be described as the amended Act.  Sections  33A, 39, 40, 41, 51A and 52A of the amended Act read as under :               "  33A.  (1)  Every  college  (other  than   a               Government college or a college maintained  by               the   Government)   affiliated   before    the

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             commencement   of   the   Gujarat   University               (Amendment)  Act,  1972 (hereinafter  in  this               section referred to as ’such commencement’)-               (a)   shall  be  under  the  management  of  a               governing body which shall include amongst its               members  the  Principal  of  the  college,   a               representative of the University, nominated by               the      Vice-Chancellor,,      and      three               representatives of the teachers of the college               and  at least one representative each  of  the               Members  of  the non-teaching staff,  and  the               students   of  the  college,  to  be   elected               respectively   from  amongst  such   teachers,               members   of   the  non-teaching   staff   and               students; and               (b)   that  for recruitment of  the  Principal               and members of the teaching staff of a college               there is a selection committee of the  college               which shall include-               (1)   in  the  case  of  recruitment  of   the               Principal, a representative of the  University               nominated by the Vice Chancellor, and               (2) in the case of recruitment of a member  of               the teaching staff of     the    college,    a               representative of the University nominated  by               the  Vice-Chancellor  and  the  Head  of   the               Department, if any, concerned with the subject               to be taught by such member.               (2)   Every college referred to in sub-section                             (1) shall,               (a)   within a period of six months after such               commencement,  constitute or reconstitute  its               governing body in conformity with  sub-section               (1), and               (b)   as and when occasion first arises  after               such  commencement,  for  recruitment  of  the               Principal and teachers of                             217 the  college,  constitute  or  reconstitute  its   selection committee so   as to be in conformity with sub-section (1). (3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall be deemed to   be a  condition of affiliation of every college referred to  in sub-section (1). 39.   Within   the  University   area,   all   post-graduate instruction, teaching and training shall be conducted by the University  or by such affiliated colleges  or  institutions and in such subjects as may be prescribed by the Statutes. 40.(1)  The  Court may determine  that  all  instructions, teaching  and training in courses of studies in  respect  of which the University is competent to hold examinations shall within  the University area be conducted by  the  University and shall be imparted by the teachers of the University  and the  Court  shall  communicate its  decision  to  the  State Government. (2)On receipt of the communication under sub-section, (1), the  State Government may, after making such inquiry  as  it thinks fit, by notification in the Official Gazette  declare that  the provisions of section 41 shall come into force  on such date as may be specified in the notification. 41.(1)  All colleges within the University area which  are admitted  to  the privileges of the  University  under  sub- section  (3) of section 5 and all colleges within  the  said area  which  may hereafter be affiliated to  the  University shall be constituent colleges of the University. (2)All institutions within the University area  recognized

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under sections 35 and 63 or approved under section 35A shall be the constituent institutions of the University. (3)No   educational   institution   situate   within   the University  area  shall,  save  with  the  consent  of   the University  and  the sanction of the  State  Government,  be associated  in  any  way  with, or  seek  admission  to  any privileges of, any other University established by law. (4)The  relations of the constituent colleges and  consti- tuent,  recognized or approved institutions within the  Uni- versity area shall be governed by the Statutes to be made in that  behalf, and such Statutes shall provide in  particular for  the exercise by the University of the following  powers in   respect   of  the  constituent  degree   colleges   and constituent recognized institutions- (i)to lay down minimum educational qualifications for  the different classes of teachers and tutorial staff employed by such colleges and institutions and. the conditions of  their service; 218 (ii)to approve the appointments of the teachers made by such colleges and institutions; (iii)to  require each such college and  institution  to contribute a prescribed quota of recognized teachers in  any subject for teaching on behalf of the University; (iv)to co-ordinate and regulate the facilities provided and expenditure  incurred by such colleges and  institutions  in regard  to libraries, laboratories and other equipments  for teaching and research; (v)to   require  such  colleges  and  institutions,   when necessary, to confine the enrollment of students to  certain subjects; (vi)to   levy   contributions  from   such   colleges   and institutions and make grants to them; and (vii)to require satisfactory arrangements for  tutorial and similar other work in such colleges and institutions and to inspect such arrangements from time to time; Provided that a constituent degree college or a  constituent recognized  institution  shall supplement such  Leaching  by tutorial  or  other instruction teaching or  training  in  a manner to be prescribed by the Regulation to be made by  the Academic Council. (5)Subject to the provisions of the Statutes the Board  of University  Teaching  and Research shall  organize  and  co- ordinate  the instruction, teaching and training within  the University area. 51A(1)  ’No member of the teaching, other academic and  non- teaching  staff of an affiliated college and  recognized  or approved  institution  shall  be  dismissed  or  removed  or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed  of the charges against him and given a  reasonable opportunity  of being heard in respect of those charges  and until- (a)he  has been given a reasonable opportunity  of  making representation on any such penalty proposed to be  inflicted on him, and (b)the  penalty to be inflicted on him is approved by  the Vice-Chancellor  or  any  other officer  of  the  University authorised by the Vice-Chancellor in this behalf. (2)No termination of service of such member not  amounting to  his  dismissal or removal falling  under  sub-section(1) shall be valid unless- (a)he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showingcause against the proposed termination, and 219 (b)  such termination is approved by the Vice-Chancellor  or

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any  officer  of  the University  authorised  by  the  Vice- Chancellor in this behalf : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any person who is appointed for a temporary period only. 52A.  (1)  Any dispute between the governing  body  and  any member of the teaching, other academic and nonteaching staff of   an  affiliated  college  or  recognized   or   approved institution  which  is  connected  with  the  conditions  of service of such member, shall; on a request of the governing body,  or of the member concerned be referred to  a-Tribunal of Arbitration consisting of one nominated by the  governing body  of the college or, as the case may be, member  of  the recognized or approved institution, one member nominated  by the  member concerned and an Umpire appointed by  the  Vice- Chancellor. (2)  The  provisions of section 52 shall, thereupon  mutatis mutandis apply to such request and the decision that may  be given by such Tribunal." A  meeting of the University Senate was convened  for  March 27. 28 and 29, 1973 wherein resolutions were proposed to  be moved  as  items  Nos. 144 and 145 of the  agenda  that  all instructions, teaching and training in courses of studies in respect  of  which  the University  was  competent  to  hold examinations be conducted by the University and be  imparted by   the  teachers  of  the  University.   The   petitioners thereupon filed the present petition under article 32 of the Constitution.    According  to  the  petitioners,  the   St. Xavier’s  College  Ahmedabad is an  educational  institution established by a minority and them provisions of sections 40 and 41 of the amended Act are violative ,of the  fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under articles 14,  19, 26, 29, 30 and 31 of the Constitution.  The petitioners have also,  questioned the competence of the Gujarat  legislature to pass the amending Act.  The three main reliefs sought  by the petitioners, are : "(1) That sections 40 and 41 of the Gujarat University  Act, 1949  (Bombay Act No. 1 of 1949) as amended by  the  Gujarat University  (Amendment)  Act,  1972 (Gujarat Act  No.  6  of 1973)’are  ultra vires the legislative powers of  the  State Legislature and/or are violative of articles 14, 19 (1)    (a),  (f)  and  (g),  26, 29, 30  and  31  of  the Constitution of     India; (2)  That  sections 51A and 52A as inserted in  the  Gujarat University  Act, 1949 (Bombay Act No. 1 of 1949) as  amended by the Gujarat University (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Gujarat Act No.  6 of 1973) are ultra vires article 14, 19 (1)  (a)  (f) and  (g),  26, 29 and 30 of the Constitution of  India,  and Ordinances 120-D, 120E, 12OF and 120G of the: 220 Ordinances framed by the Gujarat University under the  Guja- rat  University Act, 1949 and saved by sub-section ’(4)  ’of section  55 of the Gujarat University (Amendment) Act,  1972 are ultra vires articles 14, 19(1)(f) and (g), 26, 29 and 30 of the Constitution of India; (3)  That section 33A inserted in the Gujarat University Act 1949  (Bombay Act No. 1 of 1949) as amended by  the  Gujarat University (Amendment) Act, 1972 (Gujarat Act No. 6 of 1973) read  with  section  20 (Clause XXXIX) as  inserted  in  the Gujarat  University  Act,  1949 by  the  Gujarat  University Amendment Act, 1972 are ultra vires articles 14 19(1)(f) and (g), 26, 29 and 301 of the Constitution of India." Prayer was also made by the petitioners for restraining  the University  from considering or passing the  resolutions  at items  Nos.  144  and  145 ,of the  agenda  in  the  meeting proposed to be held on March 27, 28 and 29, 1973.  When  the

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petition  came up for preliminary hearing on March 27,  1973 this Court made an order that the University might pass  the resolutions  in  question on March 27, 28 and 29,  1973  but should not implement the same.  The following resolution was passed  ’by the Senate in the meeting held on March  27  and 28, 1973 .               "It is hereby resolved that all  instructions,               teaching and training in courses of studies in               respect  of which the University is  competent               to  hold  examinations shall within  the  Uni-               versity  area be conducted by  the  University               and  shall be imparted by the teachers of  the               University." In  view  of  the  stay  order  of  this  Court,  the  above resolution has not been implemented. The  petition has been resisted by the two respondents,  and the affidavits of the Under Secretary to the, Government  of Gujarat and the Registrar of the University have been  filed in opposition to the petition. When the petition came up for hearing on November 12,  1973, the ,Court referred the petition to a larger Bench.  It  was directed  that  notice  of  the  matter  be  issued  to  the Advocates  General of the States, Attorney General of  India as  well  as  the Union of India.  Public  notice  was  also issued to the minority institutions to enter appearance,  if so  advised.  The All India University Teachers  Association was also granted permission for being heard in the matter. Lengthy  arguments have thereafter been addressed before  us on  behalf  of the petitioners, the respondents as  well  as others  who have been allowed to intervene.   The  arguments have,  however, been confined to the question as to  whether the   impugned   provision  viol-ate  article  30   of   the Constitution.   No arguments were heard on the point  as  to whether the impugned provisions are liable to be struck down ,on other grounds. 221 We  may now refer to some of the relevant provisions of  the Constitution to which reference has been made.  According to clause (1) of article 25, subject to public order,  morality and  health  and to the other provisions of  Part  111,  all persons  are equally entitled to freedom of  conscience  and the   right  freely  to  profess,  practise  and   propagate religion.   Article  26  gives a right,  subject  to  public order, moraltiy and health, to every religious  denomination or  any  section  thereof  (a)  to  establish  and  maintain institutions  for religious and charitable purposes; (b)  to manage  its own affairs in matters of religion; (c)  to  own and  acquire  movable  and immovable property;  and  (d)  to administer  such property in accordance with law.   Articles 28,   29   and  30  contain   provisions   for   educational institutions and read as under :               "28.  (1)  No religious instruction  shall  be               provider in any educational institution wholly                             maintained out of State funds.               (2)Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to  an               educational institution which is  administered               by  the State but has been  established  under               any  endowment  or trust which  requires  that               religious  instruction  shall be  imparted  in               such institution.               (3)No  person  attending  any   educational               institution   recognized  by  the   State   or               receiving  aid  out of State  funds  shall  be               required   to  take  part  in  any   religious               instruction  that  may  be  imparted  in  such

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             institution or to attend any religious worship               that  may be conducted in such institution  or               in  any premises attached thereto unless  such               person  or,  if such person is  a  minor,  his               guardian has given his consent thereto.               29.(1) Any section of the citizens residing               in the territory of India or any part  thereof               having a distinct language, script or  culture               of  its own shall have the right  to  conserve               the same.               (2)No  citizen  shall be  denied  admission               into any educational institution maintained by               the State or receiving aid out of State  funds               on  grounds  only of  religion,  race,  caste,               language or any of them.               30.(1)  All  minorities, whether  based  on               religion or language, shall have the right  to               establish    and    administer     educational               institutions, of their choice.               (2)The State shall not, in granting aid  to               educational institutions, discriminate against               any educational institution on the ground that               it  is  under the management  of  a  minority,               whether based on religion or language."               Article  28 forbids, subject to the  exception               contained  in  clause (2),  the  imparting  of               religious  instructions  in  any   educational               institution  wholly  maintained out  of  State               funds.   The article also  contains  provision               against  compulsion for persons  attending  an               educational insti-      222 tution recognized by the state or receiving aid out of State funds, to take part in any religious instruction thatmay be  imparted in such institution or to attend any  religious worship that may be        conducted in such institution  or in any premisesattached thereto. Although the marginal note of article 29 mentions protection of  minority rights, the rights actually conferred  by  that article  are  not  restricted  merely  to  the   minorities. According to clause (1) of that article, any section of  the citizens  residing  in the territory of India  or  any  part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same.  In order  to invoke the benefit of this clause, all that is essential  is that a section of the citizens residing in the territory  of India  or any part thereof should have a distinct  language, script  or culture of its own.  Once that is provided  those citizens  shall have the right to conserve  their  language, script or culture irrespective of the fact whether they  are members  of  the majority community or  minority  community. Clause (2) of’ article 29 forbids the denial of admission to citizens into any educational institution maintained by  the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. Clause  (1)  of article 30 gives right  to  all  minorities, whether  based  on religion or language,  to  establish  and administer   educational  institutions  of   their   choice. Analysing  that clause it would follow that the right  which has been conferred by the clause is on two types of  minori- ties.   Those minorities may be based either on religion  or on language. The right conferred   upon the said  minorities is to establish and administer educational   institutions of their choice.  The word establish" indicates the  right   to bring  into  existence,  while the right  to  administer  an

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institution  means  the  right  to  effectively  manage  and conduct  the  affairs of  the  institution.   Administration connotes management of the affairs of the institution.   The management  must be free of control so that the founders  or their  nominees can mould the institution as they think  fit and  in accordance with their ideas of how the  interest  of the  community in general and the institution in  particular will  be best served.  The words "of their  choice"  qualify the  educational institutions and show that the  educational institutions ,established and administered by the minorities need  not be of some particular class; the  minorities  have the  right  and  freedom to establish  and  administer  such educational  institutions  as  they  choose.   Clause  (2)of article 30 prevents the State from making discrimination  in the matter of grant of aid to any educational institution on the  that  the  institution is under  the  management  of  a minority whether based on religion or language. Before  we deal with the contentions advanced before us  and the  scope and ambit of article 30 of the  Constitution,  it may  be  pertinent to refer to  the  historical  background. India  is  the second most ’Populous country of  the  world. The  people  inhabiting  this vast  land  profess  different religions  and  speak  different  languages.   Despite   the diversity  of religion and language, there runs through  the fabric  of  the nation the golden thread of a  basic  innate unity.  It is a mosaic of different religions languages  and cultures.  Each of them has made a 223 mark  on  the  Indian polity and India  today  represents  a synthesis  of  them all.  The closing years of  the  British rule  were marked by communal riots and dissensions.   There was also a feeling of distrust and the demand was made by  a section  of  the  Muslims for  a  separate  homeland.   This ultimately resulted in the partition of the country.   Those who  led  the fight for independence in  India  always  :aid great stress on communal amity and accord.  They wanted  the establishment of a secular State wherein people belonging to the  different  religious  should  all  have  a  feeling  of equality and non-discrimination.  Demand had also been  made before the partition by, sections of people belonging to the minorities   for   reservation   of   seats   and   separate electorates.  In order to bring about integration and fusion of the different sections of the population, the framers  of the  Constitution  did away with  separate  electorates  and introduced  the system of joint electorates, so  that  every candidate in an election should have to lock for support  of all  sections  of  the citizens.   Special  safeguards  were guaranteed  for the minorities and they were made a part  of the  fundamental  rights with a view to instill a  sense  of confidence and security in the minorities.  Those provisions were  a  kind of a Chartor of rights for the  minorities  so that  none  might have the feeling that any section  of  the population consisted of first-class citizens and the  others of  second-class citizens.  The result was  that  minorities gave  up  their  claims for reservation  of  seats.   Sardar Patel,  who  was  the Chairman  of  the  Advisory  Committee dealing with the question of minorities, said in the  course of his speech delivered on February 27, 1947               "This  Committee forms one of the  most  vital               parts  of the Constituent Assembly and one  of               the  most difficult tasks that has to be  done               by  us is the work of this  committee.   Often               you  must  have heard in  various  debates  in               British Parliament that have been held on this               question recently and before when it has  been

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             claimed  in behalf of the  British  Government               that  they  have a  special  responsibility--a               special   obligation-for  protection  of   the               interests  of the minorities.. They  claim  to               have  more special interest than we have.   It               is for us to prove that it is a bogus claim, a               false  claim,  and  that nobody  can  be  more               interested than us in India in the  protection               of our minorities.  Our mission is to  satisfy               every interest and safeguard the interests  of               all  the  minorities to  their  satisfaction."               (The Framing of India’s Constitution B.  Shiva               Rao Select Documents, Vol.  II p. 66). It is in the context of that background that we should  view the provisions of the Constitution contained in articles  25 to  30, The object of articles 25 to 30 was to preserve  the rights of religious and linguistic minorities, to place them on a secure pedestal and withdraw them from the vicissitudes of  political  controversy.  These  provisions  enshrined  a befitting  pledge to the minorities in the  Constitution  of ’the  country whose greatest son had laid down his life  for the   protection  of  the  minorities,.   As  long  as   the Constitution stands as it is today, no tampering with  those rights  can be countenanced.  Any attempt to do so would  be not only an act of breach of faith, it would be constitu- 224 tionally  impermissible and liable to be struck down by  the courts.  Although the words secular state are not  expressly mentioned  in the Constitution, there can be no  doubt  that our  Constitution-makers  wanted  establishment  of  such  a state.   The  provisions of the Constitution  were  designed accordingly.  There is no mysticism in the secular character of the state.  Secularism is neither anti-God, nor  pro-God; it  treats alike the devout, the agnostic and  the  atheist. It eliminates God from the matters of the state and  ensures that no one shall be discriminated against on the ground  of religion.   The  Constitution  at the  same  time  expressly guarantees  freedom  of conscience and the right  freely  to profess, practise and propagate religion.  The Constitution- makers were conscious of the deep attachment the vast masses of  our  country had towards religion, the sway  it  had  on their  minds  and the significant role it  played  in  their lives.   To allay all apprehensions of interference  by  the legislature  and the executive in matters of  religion,  the rights  mentioned in articles 25 to 30 were made a  part  of the  fundamental rights and religious freedom  contained  in those articles was guaranteed by the Constitution. As  in the case of religion so in the case of language,  the importance  of the matter and the sensitivity of the  people on this issue was taken note of by the  Constitution-makers. Language  has a close relationship with culture.   According to  the Royal Commission on Bilingualism  and  Biculturalism (1965),  the  vitality  of  the  language  is  an  essential condition  for the preservation of a culture and an  attempt to provide for cultural equality is primarily an attempt  to make provisions for linguistic equality (quoted on page  590 of Canadian Constitutional Law in a Modern Perspective by J. Noel Lyon and Ronald G. Atkey). The idea of giving some special rights to the minorities  is not  to have a kind of a privileged or pampered  section  of the  population  but to give to the minorities  a  sense  of security and a feeling of confidence.  The great leaders  of India  since  time immemorial had preached the  doctrine  of tolerance  and  catholicity of outlook.  Those  noble  ideas were  enshrined  in the Constitution.   Special  rights  for

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minorities  were designed not to create  inequality.   Their real  effect  was to bring about equality  by  ensuring  the preservation   of   the   minority   institutions   and   by guaranteeing to the minorities autonomy in the matter of the administration  of  these  institutions.   The  differential treatment for the minorities by giving, them special  rights is intended to bring about an equilibrium, so that the ideal of  equality may not be reduced to a mere abstract idea  but should become a living@ reality and result in true,  genuine equality, an equality not merely in theory but also in fact. The majority in a system of adult franchise hardly needs any protection.   It  can  look after  itself  and  protect  its interests.   Any measure wanted by the majority can  without much  difficulty be brought on the statute book because  the majority  can get that done by giving such a mandate to  the elected representatives.  It is only the minorities who need protection, and article 30, besides some other articles,  is intended to afford and guarantee that protection.  It may be apposite in this context to 225 refer  to the observations made by Latham C.J. in  Adelaide. Co.  of,  Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc.  v.  The  Commonwealth(1) while  dealing  with  section 116  of  the  Commonwealth  of Australia (Constitution) Act which provides inter alia  that the Commonwealth shall not make any law for prohibiting  the free  exercise  of  any religion.  Said  the  learned  Chief Justice  : ". . . . it should not be forgotten that  such  a provision as section 116, is not required for the protection of the religion of a majority.  The religion of the majority of  the  people  can  look after  itself.   Section  116  is required to protect the religion (or absence of religion) of minorities, and, in particular, of unpopular minorities." It would in the above context be also pertinent to refer  to the  observations of the majority of the Permanent Court  of International  Justice in a matter relating to the  minority schools in Albania.  On October 2, 1921 Albania,  subsequent to  her  admission  into the League  of  Nations,  signed  a Declaration  relating  to  the  position  of  minorities  in Albania.    The  first  paragraph  of  Article  4  of   that Declaration  ran as follows : "All Albanian nationals  shall be equal before the law, and shall enjoy the same civil  and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion".   Article  5  of  the  Declaration  was  in   the following words "Albanian  nationals  who  belong to  racial,  religious  or linguistic  minorities  will enjoy the  same  treatment  and security in law and in fact as other Albanian nationals.  In particular,  they  shall have an equal  right  to  maintain, manage  and control at their own expense or to establish  in the  future, charitable, religious and social  institutions, school’s  and  other educational  establishments,  with  the right  to  use  their own language  and  to  exercise  their religion  freely therein".  In 1933 the’  Albanian  National Assembly  modified  Articles  206 and 207  of  the  Albanian Constitution  which  permitted  the setting  up  of  private schools.   Henceforth those articles provided as  follows  : "The  instruction  and education of  Albanian  subjects  are reserved  to the, State and will be given in State  schools. Primary  education is compulsory for all Albanian  nationals and  will be given free of charge.  Private schools  of  all categories at present in operation will be closed." Following  upon  the  above change in the  articles  of  the Constitution,  a number of petitions were presented  to  the Council of the League stating that the new provisions of the Constitution  were contrary to the Declaration.  In  January

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1935  the  Council  of  the  League  adopted  a   Resolution requesting  the Permanent Court of International Justice  to give  an Opinion on the question "whether, regard being  had to the above-mentioned Declaration of October 2, 1921, as  a whole,  the  Albanian Government is justified  in  its  plea that,  as  the  abolition  of  private  schools  in  Albania constitutes a general measure applicable to the majority  as well as to the minority, it is in conformity with the letter and the spirit of the stipulation".  It was held by 8  votes to  3 that the plea of the Albanian Government that, as  the abolition  of  private  schools  in  Albania  constitutes  a general measure applicable to the (1) [1943] 67 Ccm.  L. R. 116. 16-L-131 Sup.  CI./75 226 majority  as  well as to the minority, it is  in  conformity with the letter and spirit of the stipulations laid down  in Article 5, first paragraph, of the Declaration of October 2, 1921,  is not well founded.  In the above context the  Court observed.               "1.  The  Object of Minorities  Treaties.  The               idea   underlying   the   treaties   for   the               protection  of  minorities is  to  secure  for               certain elements incorporated in a State,  the               population of which differs from them in race,               language  or  religion,  the  possibility   of               living peaceably alongside that population and               co-operating  amicably with it, while  at  the               same time preserving the characteristics which               distinguish   them  from  the  majority,   and               satisfying the ensuring special needs.               In  order  to attain that object,  two  things               were  regarded as particularly necessary,  and               have formed the subject of provisions in these               treaties.               The   first  is  to  ensure   that   nationals               belonging  to racial, religious or  linguistic               minorities shall be placed in every respect on               a  footing of perfect equality with the  other               nationals  of  the State.  The  second  is  to               ensure  for  the  minority  elements  suitable               means  for  the preservation of  their  racial               peculiarities,  their  traditions  and   their               national characteristics.               These  two  requirements  are  indeed  closely                             interlocked,   for  there  would  be no   true               equality between a majority and a minority  if               the   latter   were  deprived   of   its   own               institutions  and were consequently  compelled               to  renounce that which constitutes  the  very               essence of its being a minority."               It was further observed :               "There  must  be equality in fact as  well  as               ostensible legal equality in the sense of  the               absence of discrimination in the words of  the               law.  Equality in law precludes discrimination               of  any  kind; whereas equality  in  fact  may               involve  the necessity of different  treatment               in order to attain a result which  establishes               an equilibrium between different situations.               It is easy to imagine cases in which  equality               of  treatment  of  the  majority  and  of  the               minority, whose situation and requirements are               different, would result in inequality in fact;

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             treatment   of  this  description  would   run               counter  to the first sentence of paragraph  I               of Article 5. The equality between members  of               the  majority and of the minority must  be  an               effective,  genuine  equality;  that  is   the               meaning of this provision."               The  Court  referred  to  Article  5  of   the               Declaration and observed:               "This  sentence of the paragraph being  linked               to the first by the words ’in particular’,  it               is natural to conclude that it                227               envisages     a     particularly     important               illustration   of  the  application   of   the               principle of identical treatment in law and in               fact that is stipulated in the first  sentence               of   the  paragraph.   For  the   institutions               mentioned   in   the   second   sentence   are               indispensable to enable the minority to  enjoy               the  same treatment as the majority, not  only               in  law  but also in fact.  The  abolition  of               these  institutions, which alone  can  satisfy               the  special  requirements  of  the   minority               groups,  and their replacement  by  government               institutions,  would destroy this equality  of               treatment, for its effect would be to  deprive               the  minority of the institutions  appropriate               to  its  needs,  whereas  the  majority  would               continue   to  have  them  supplied   in   the               institutions created by the State." It would be appropriate to refer at this stage to the  cases wherein  this Court has dealt with the impact of article  30 on   the   educational  institutions  established   by   the minorities.   The first case(1) was a reference made by  the President  under  article  143(1) of  the  Constitution  for obtaining  the opinion of this Court upon certain  questions relating to the constitutional validity of the provisions of tile  Kerala  Education Bill which had been  passed  by  the Kerala  Legislative  Assembly and had been reserved  by  the Governor  for  the  consideration of  the  President.   Four questions were referred to the Court, out of which we are at present concerned with question No. 2 which was as under               "Do sub-clause (5) of clause 3,.sub-clause (3)               of  clause  8 and clauses 9 to  13  of  Kerala               Education  Bill,  or  any  provision  thereof,               offend clause (1) of article 30 of the Consti-               tution in any particulars or to any extent ?" Clause 3(5) of the Bill made the recognition of new  schools subject to other provisions of the Bill and the rules framed by the Government under clause 36.  Clause 15 authorised the Government to acquire any category of schools.  Clause  8(3) made  it  obligatory on all aided schools to hand  over  the fees to the Government.  Clauses 9 to 13 made provisions for the regulation and management of schools, payment of  salary to  the  teachers  and the terms  and  conditions  of  their appointment.  The Bench which heard the reference  consisted of 7 judges.  Six members of the Bench speaking through  Das CJ answered question No. 2 in the following words :               "Question  No. 2 : (i) Yes, so far  as  Anglo-               Indian  educational institutions  entitled  to               grant  under Att. 337/ are concerned. (ii)  As               regards other minorities not entitled to grant               as of right under any express provision of the               Constitution,  but are, in receipt of  aid  or               desire  such  aid and also as  regards  Anglo-

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             Indian  educational institutions in so far  as               they  are receiving aid in excess of what  are               due to them under Art. 337, clauses 8(3),  and               9 to 13 do not offend Art. 30 (1)   but clause               3(5) in so far as it makes such educational (1) [1959] S. C. R. 993. 228               institutions  subject to clauses 14 and 15  do               offend  Art.  30 (1). (iii) Clause  7  (except               sub-cls.  (1)  and (3) which applies  only  to               aided schools), cl. 10 in so far as they apply               to recognized schools to be established  after               the  said Bill comes into force do not  offend               Art.  30(1) but cl. 3(5) in so far as it  makes               the  new  schools established after  the  com-               mencement  of the Bill subject to cl. 20  does               offend Art. 30(1)."               It was held that               "Article  30(1) of. the Constitution  made  no               distinction   between  minority   institutions               existing  from  before  the  Constitution   or               established thereafter and protected both.  It               did  not require that a  minority  institution               should  be  confined  to the  members  of  the               community to which it belonged and a  minority               institutions  could  not  cease to  be  so  by               admitting a non-member to it.               Nor  did  Art.  30(1) in  any  way  limit  the               subject   to   be   taught   in   a   minority               institution,  and its crucial words ’of  their               own choice’, clearly indicated that the  ambit               of the rights it conferred was determinable by               the  nature  of  the  institutions  that   the               minority  communities chose to establish  and,               the   three   categories   into   which   such               institutions could thus be classified were (1)               those that sought neither aid nor  recognition               from the State, (2) those that sought aid, and               (3) those that sought recognition but not aid.               The  impugned  Bill was  concerned  only  with               institutions   of   the   second   and   third               categories."               It was further held               "The  right  of the minorities  to  administer               their  educational  institutions  under   Art.               30(1), was not inconsistent with the right  of               the  State  to  insist  on  proper  safeguards               against    maladministration    by    imposing               reasonable regulations as conditions precedent               to  the grant of aid.  That did not.  however,               mean  that  State Legislature  could,  in  the               exercise  of its powers of  legislation  under               Arts.   245  and  246  of  the   Constitution,               override  the fundamental rights by  employing               indirect methods, for what it had no power  to               do directly, it could not do indirectly."               Dealing with the question of State recognition               of the minority institutions, the Court held               "While  it  was undoubtedly  true  that  there               could   be  no  fundamental  right  to   State               recognition,  denial of recognition except  on               such   terms  as  virtually  amounted   to   a               surrender  of  the  right  to  administer  the               institution.  must,  in substance  and  effect               infringe Art. 30( 1) of the Constitution."

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Venkatarama  Aiyar  J.  in his minority  opinion  held  that article 30(1) of the Constitution did not in terms confer  a right  on the minority institutions to  State,  recognition, nor, properly construed, could it do so by 229 implication,  for such an implication, if raised,  would  be contrary  to  the express provisions of article  45  of  the Constitution.   Article  30(1)  was  primarily  intended  to protect  such  minority  institutions  as  imparted   purely religious  education  and to hold that the State  was  bound thereunder to recognize them would be tantamount not only to rendering   article  45  wholly  infructuous  but  also   to nullifying  the  basic concept of the  Constitution  itself, namely, its secular character. Rev.  Sidhajbltai Sabhai & Ors. v. State of Bombay & Anr.(1) was the next case in which this Court went into the question of  the  right  of minorities to  establish  and  administer educational  institutions.   The petitioners  in  that  case professed  the, Christian faith and belonged to  the  United Church  of Northern India.  They were members of  a  society which maintained educational institutions primarily for  the benefit  of the Christian Community.  The society  conducted forty-two  primary  schools  and  a  Training  College   for teachers.  The teachers trained in the college were absorbed in  the primary schools conducted by the society  and  those not  so  absorbed were employed by other  Christian  Mission Schools  conducted by the United Church of  Northern  India. The,  cost  of  maintaining the  training  college  and  the primary  schools was met out of donations received from  the Irish Presbyterian Mission, fee from scholars and  grant-in- aid  from  the  State  Government.  On  May  28,  1955,  the Government of Bombay issued an order that from the  academic year 1955-56, 80% of the seats in the training colleges  for teachers  in  non-Government  training  colleges  should  be reserved  for  teachers nominated by  the  Government.   The Principal  of the Training College was thereafter  asked  by the  Educational  Inspector nor to  admit  without  specific permission  of the Education Department private students  in excess  of 20% of the total strength in each class.  It  was also mentioned by the Educational Inspector that the refusal to  admit  Government nominated teachers was  irregular  and against Government policy.  Warning was administered. to the petitioners  that disregard of the Government  orders  would result in the stoppage of grant.  The petitioners  thereupon approached  this Court under article 32 of the  Constitution on  the allegation that the directions issued to  them  were violative  of  article  30(1) and other  provisions  of  the Constitution.  It was Held by a Bench of six judges speaking through  Shah  J.  (as  he then  was)  that  the  rules  for recognition  of private training institutions, in so far  as they related to reservation of seats therein under orders of Government  and directions given pursuant thereto  regarding reservation  of 80% of the seats and the threat to  withhold grant-in-aid  and recognition of the college, infringed  the fundamental freedom under article 30(1).      Rev  Father  W. Proost & Ors. v. The State of  Bihar  & Ors.(2) was the next case wherein this Court dealt with  the protection   afforded  by  article  30(1)   to   educational institutions  established  by  the  minorities.   The   case related  to the St. Xavier’s College Ranchi which  had  been established  by the Jesuits of Ranchi and was affiliated  to Patna University.  The object of founding the College. inter alial was to give Catholic (1) [1963] 3 S. C. R. 837. (2) [1969] 2 S. C. R. 73.

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230 youth  a  full  Course of Moral and  liberal  education,  by imparting   a   thorough  religious   instruction   and   by maintaining  a  Catholic  atmosphere,  in  the  Institution. However, the College was open to non-Catholics and all  non- Catholic students received a course of moral science’.   The Bihar Legislature by an amending Act introduced section 48-A in-  the  Bihar Universities Act with effect from  March  1, 1962.   The said section related to the establishment  of  a University  Service Commission for affiliated  colleges  not belonging to the State Government.  According to clause 6 of that  section,  subject to the approval of  the  University, appointments,  dismissals, removals, termination of  service or  reduction in rank of teachers of an  affiliated  college not  belonging to the State Government shall be made by  the governing  body of the college on the recommendation of  the Commission.   Clause 11 of that section inter alia  provided that the Commission shall be consulted by the governing body of a college in all disciplinary matters affecting a teacher of  the  college and no memorials or petitions  relating  to such  matters shall be disposed of nor shall any  action  be taken  against, or any punishment imposed on, a  teacher  of the college otherwise than in conformity with the finding of the Commission.  The petitioners approached this Court under article  32 of the Constitution and contended that  the  St. Xavier’s  College Ranchi was founded by  Christian  minority and  they  had a right to administer it.  According  to  the petitioners,  section 48-A deprived them of the right  under article  30 inasmuch as its provisions required  inter  alia that  appointments, dismissals, reduction in rank, etc.,  of the  staff  must  be  made by  the  governing  body  on  the recommendation  of  the University  Service  Commission  for affiliated  colleges;  in no case could the  governing  body appoint  person  not.  recommended by  the  Commission;  the Commission  had to be consulted in all disciplinary  matters and  any  punishment imposed on a teacher could be  only  in accordance with the findings of the Commission.   Subsequent to the introduction of section 48-A, in view of  differences arising   between  the  University  and  the  college,   the University  withdrew the affiliation of the college.   While the petition was pending, section 48-B was inserted into the Bihar  Universities  Act whereby it was  provided  that  the governing  body  of  affiliated colleges  established  by  a minority based on religion or language would be entitled  to make,  appointments, dismissals, termination of  service  or reduction  in  rank of teachers or take  other  disciplinary measures subject only to the approval of the Commission  and the  Syndicate  of  the  University.   While  allowing   the petition  filed  by  the  petitioners,  it  was  held  by  a Constitution   Bench   of  this   Court   speaking   through Hidayatullah  C.J.  that  the  protection  claimed  by   the petitioners  clearly flowed from the words of article  30(1) of the Constitution.  It was further held that the width  of article  30(1)  could not be cut down by introducing  in  it considerations on which article 29(1) was based. Rt.   Rev.   Bishop S. K. Patro & Ors. v. State of  Bihar  & Ors. (1) was the next case wherein, this Court dealt with  a claim based on article 30(1) of the Constitution.  The  case related  to  a  school founded in 1954  at  Bhagalpur.   The school was being managed by the National. (1)  [1970] 1 S.C.R 172. 231 Christian Council of India.  Two persons were elected as the President and Secretary of the school and their election was approved  by  the  President  of  the  Board  of   Secondary

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Education.   The  order  of the President of  the  Board  of Secondary  Education was set aside by the Secretary  to  the Government,  Education  Department by order  dated  May  22, 1967.   On  June 21, 1967 the Regional  Deputy  Director  of Education  Bhagalpur  addressed a letter to  the  Secretary, Church  Missionary  Society School, Bhagarpur  inviting  his attention to the order dated May 22, 1967 and requesting him to  take  steps to constitute a Managing  Committee  of  the School  in accordance with that order.  A petition was  then filed  in  the High Court of Patna by four  petitioners  for restraining  the  State  of  Bihar  and  its  officers  from interfering with the right of the petitioners to  administer and  manage  the  affairs of the  school.   The  High  Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the school was not an  educational institution established by a minority.   The aforesaid petitioners then came up in appeal to this  Court. Petitions  under  article 32 of the Constitution  were  also filed  by other petitioners in this Court.  This Court  held that the school’ in question was an educational  institution established  by a religious minority.  On the above  finding the  Court speaking through Shah- J. (as he then  was)  held that  the  order  passed  by  the  educational   authorities requiring  the  Secretary  of the School to  take  steps  to constitute a Managing Committee in accordance with the order dated May 22, 1967 was invalid. Question  of the protection of article 30(1) next  arose  in the  case  of  State of Kerala, etc. v.  Very  Rev.   Mother Provincial.(1)  This case related to the  Kerala  University Act,  1969.   The  said Act was  passed  to  reorganise  the University  of Kerala with a view to establish  a  teaching, residential  and  affiliating University  for  the  southern districts  of the State of Kerala.  Some of  its  provisions affected  private  colleges, particularly those  founded  by minority  communities  in  the  State.   The  constitutional validity  of those provisions was challenged by  members  of the minority communities in writ petitions filed in the High Court.   Sections 48 and 49 of the Act dealt with  governing body for private colleges not under corporate management and with. managing council for private colleges under  corporate management.   In  either case the educational  agency  of  a private college was required to set up a governing body  for a private college or a managing council for private colleges under  one corporate management.  The sections provided  for the  composition  of the two bodies so as to  include  Prin- cipals and Managers of the private colleges, nominees of the University    and   Government,   as   well    as    elected representatives  of  teachers.  Sub.. section  (2)  provided that  the  new  bodies  would  be  bodies  corporate  having perpetual  succession  and a common seal.   Sub-section  (4) provided that the members would hold office for four  years. Subsection  (5)  of  each section cast a  duty  on  the  new governing  body  or the managing council to  administer  the private   college  or  colleges  in  accordance   with   the provisions of the Act.  Sub section (6) of each section laid down  that the powers and functions of the new  bodies,  the removal of members thereof and the procedure to be  followed by them, (1)  [1971] 1. S.C.R. 734. 232 would be prescribed by statutes.  The petitioners challenged the  provisions of those two sections as  also  sub-sections (1),  (2), (S) and (9) of section 53 which conferred on  the Syndicate of the University the power to veto the  decisions of the governing council and a right of appeal to any person aggrieved  by  their  action.   Likewise,  the   petitioners

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challenged  section 56, which conferred ultimate  powers  on the University and the Syndicate in disciplinary matters  in respect of teachers, section 58, which removed membership of the Legislative Assembly as a disqualification for  teachers and  section 63(1), which provided that whenever  Government was  satisfied  that  a grave situation had  arisen  in  the working  of a private college, it could inter  alia  appoint the  University  to  manage the  affairs  of  such.  private college for a temporary period.  The High Court on petitions filed by the petitioners declared some of the provisions  of the  Act  to  be invalid.  On  appeal  this  Court  speaking through Hidayatullah CJ. held that the High Court was  right in holding that sub-sections (2) and (4) of sections 48  and 49 were ultra wires article 30(1).  Sub-section (6) of  each of those two sections was also held to be ultra vires.   The High Court, it was further held, was also right in declaring that  sub-sections  (1  ),  (2)  and  (9)  of  section   53, subsections  (2) and (4) of section 56, were ultra vires  as they fell within sections 48 and 49; that section 58 (in  so far as it removed disqualification which. the founders might not  like  to  agree to), and section 63  were  ultra  vires article 30(1) in respect of the minority institutions. The last two cases wherein this Court considered the  impact of article, 30 on minority institutions were D.A.Y.  College Bathinda,  etc.  v. State of Punjab & Ors.(1) and D.  A.  V. College etc. v. State of Punjab & Ors.(2) Judgments in  both these cases were pronounced on May5,1971.  Jaganmohan  Reddy J.spoke for the Court in these two ,cases.  The  petitioners in  the case of D. A. V. College Bathinda  were  educational institutions  founded  by  the  D.A.V.  College  Trust   and Society.   It  was  an association  of  Arya  Samajis.   The institutions were before the reorganization of the State  of Punjab  affiliated  to the Punjab University.   The  Punjabi University    was   constituted   in   1961.    After    the reorganization  of  Punjab,  the  Punjab  Government   under section  5  of  the Act specified the  areas  in  which  the Punjabi University exercised its power and notified the date for  the  purpose  of  the,  section.   The  effect  of  the notification  was  that the petitioners were  deemed  to  be associated  with  and  admitted to  the  privileges  of  the Punjabi  University and ceased to be associated in  any  way with  the Punjab University.  Thereafter by  circular  dated June 15, 1970 the University declared that Punjabi would  be the sole medium of instruction and examination for the  pre- University  even  for science groups, with effect  from  the academic  year 1970-71.  On October 7, 1970  a  modification was made allowing English as an alternative medium of exami- nation.   It was, however, mentioned that qualifying in  the elementary  Punjabi  papers  would  be  obligatory  for  the students offering English medium.  Petitions were thereafter filed in this Court under article 32 of the Constitution  on the ground that the University bad no power (1) [1971] S. C. R. 677.  (2) [1971] 1 S. C. R. 688. 233 to  make Punjabi as the sole medium of instruction.  It  was held  by  this Court that-the circular of June 15,  1970  as amended by the circulars of July 2, 1970 and October 7, 1970 was  invalid  and  ultra vires the  powers.  vested  in  the University.   The  Court further held that  the  petitioners were institutions maintained by a religious minority and  as such  the  directive for the exclusive use  of  the  Punjabi language   in  the  Gurmukhi  script  as  the   medium   for instruction  and  for examination in all  colleges  directly infringed  the petitioners’ right to conserve  their  script and  administer  +,heir institutions.  The  relaxation  made

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subsequently in the earlier directive of the University,  it was observed, made little difference because the  concession did  not  benefit  students with Hindi  as  the  medium  and Devnagri  as  the script.  The right of  the  minorities  to establish  and administer educational institutions of  their choice,  it was further held, included the right to  have  a choice  of  the medium of instruction also.  That  would  be the, result of reading article 30(1) with article 29(1).  No inconvenience or difficulties, administrative or  financial, could justify the infringement of guaranteed rights. The  other case, D.A.V. College v. State of  Punjab  (supra) arose  out of writ petitions filed by the  various  colleges managed  and  administered by the D.A.V. College  Trust  and Managing  Society.   These colleges were before  the  Punjab Reorganization Act affiliated to ’the Punjab University.  As a result of notification issued under section 5 of the  Guru Nanak  University  (Amritsar)  Act (Act 21  of  1969)  those colleges,  which  were in the specified areas ceased  to  be affiliated   to  the  Punjab  University  and  were  to   be associated and admitted to the privileges of the Guru  Nanak University.   By  clause 2 (1 )(a) of  the  statutes  framed under the Act the colleges were required to have a regularly constituted  governing body consisting of not more  than  20 persons  approved by the Senate.  It was also provided  that the governing body would include two representatives of  the University  and the Principal of the College.  Under  clause (1)(3)  if  these requirements were not complied  with,  the affiliation was liable to be withdrawn.  Under clause 17 the staff  initially appointed had to be approved by  the  Vice- Chancellor  and  all  subsequent changes  were  also  to  be reported  to the University for Vice-Chancellor’s  approval. Clause  1.8 required non-Government colleges to comply  with the  requirements  laid  down  in  the  ordinance  governing service  and conduct of teachers in non-Government  colleges as might be framed by the University.  This Court held  that Arya Samaj was a part of the Hindu religious minority in the State of Punjab and that Arya Samajis had a distinct  script of  their  own, namely, Devnagri.  Arya  Samajis  were  held entitled  to  invoke the right guaranteed by  article  29(1) because  they were a section of citizens having  a  distinct script;  they  were also entitled to invoke article  30  (1) because  they were a religious minority.  Clauses 2 (1  )(a) and 17 of Chapter V of the statutes were struck down by  the Court  as  offending article 30(1) because  they  interfered with the right of the religious minority to administer their educational  institutions. Clause 18 was held not to  suffer from-the same vice as clause 17. I  have given above the gist of the different  decisions  of this  Court  dealing with articles 29 and 30.   Having  done that, we should now 234 consider the principle which should be adopted in construing those articles. A liberal, generous an sympathetic approach is reflected  in the  Constitution in the matter of the preservation  of  the right   of   minorities  so  far   as   their   educational. institutions  are concerned.  Although, attempts  have  been made  in  the  past  to  whittle  down  the  rights  of  the minorities  in  this respect, the vigilant sections  of  the minorities  have  resisted  such  attempts.   Disputes  have consequently  arisen  and  come up before)  this  Court  for determining  whether  the  impugned  measures  violate   the provisions  of the Constitution embodied in articles 29  and 30.  This  Court has consistently upheld the rights  of  the minorities  embodied in those articles and has ensured  that

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the  ambit and scope of the minority rights is not  narrowed down.   The broad approach has been to see that  nothing  is done to impair the rights of the minorities in the matter of their educational institutions and that the width and  scope of  the  provisions of the Constitution dealing  with  those rights  are. not circumscribed.  The principle which can  be discerned in the various decisions of this Court is that the catholic   approach  which  led  to  the  drafting  of   the provisions relating to minority rights should not be set  at naught  by narrow judicial interpretation.   The  minorities are  as  much children of the soil as the majority  and  the approach has been to ensure that nothing should be done,  as might  deprive the minorities of a sense of belonging, of  a feeling  of security, of a consciousness of equality and  of the  awareness  that  the conservation  of  their  religion, culture, language and script as also the protection of their educational institutions is a fundamental right enshrined in the   Constitution.    The  same   generous,   liberal   and sympathetic  approach  should  weigh  with  the  courts   in construing articles 29 and 30 as marked the deliberations of the  Constitution-makers  in drafting  those-  articles  and making   them   part  of  the   fundamental   rights.    The safeguarding  of  the  interest of  the  minorities  amongst sections of population is as import-ant as the protection of the  interest amongst individuals of persons who  are  below the  age  of majority or are otherwise suffering  from  some kind  of infirmity.  The Constitution and the laws  made  by civilized  nations, therefore, generally contain  provisions for  the protection of ,those interests. it can, indeed,  be said  to  be  an  index of the  level  of  civilization  and catholicity of a nation as to how far their minorities  feel secure  and  are  not  subject  to  any  discrimination   or suppression. We  may  now  deal with the scope and  ambit  of  the  right guaranteed IV clause (1) of article 30.  The clause  confers a right on all minorities, whether they are  based        on religion   or   language,  to   establish   and   administer educational    institutions  of  their  choice.   The  right conferred by the clause is in absolute  terms  and  is   not subject to restrictions, as in the case of rights  conferred by  article  19  of  the Constitution.   The  right  of  the minorities to administer educational institutions does  not, however,  prevent  the making of reasonable  regulations  in respect  of  those  institutions.   The  regulations   have, necessarily to be made in the interest of the institution as a  minority  educational institution.  They have  to  be  so designed  as to make it an effective vehicle  for  imparting education.  The right to administer educational institutions can plainly 235 not include the right to maladminister.  Regulations can  be made  to, prevent the housing of an educational  institution in unhealthy surroundings as also to prevent the setting up- or  continuation  of  all  educational  institution  without qualified teachers.  The State can prescribe regulations  to ensure  the excellence of the institution.  Prescription  of standards  for  educational institutions does  not  militate against  the  right  of  the  minority  to  administer   the institutions.   Regulations made in the. true  interests  of efficiency  of instruction, discipline, health,  sanitation, morality,  public  order  and the like  may  undoubtedly  be imposed.   Such.  regulations are not  restrictions  on  the substance of the right which is guaranteed : they secure the proper   functioning   of  the   institution,   in   matters educational (Tee observations of Shah J. in Rev.  Sidhajbhai

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Sabhai,   supra,   p.  850).   Further,   as   observed   by Hidayatullah CJ. in the case of Very Rev.  Mother Provincial (supra)  the  standards  concern the body  politic  and  are dictated by considerations of the advancement of the country and  its  people.   Therefore,  if  universities   establish syllabi’  for  examinations they must be  followed,  subject however to special subjects which the institutions may  seek to  teach,  and  to  a certain extent  the  State  may  also regulate  the conditions of employment of teachers  and  the health  and  hygiene of students.  Such regulations  do  not bear  directly  upon management as such  although  they  may indirectly affect it. Yet the right of the State to regulate education,  educational standards and allied matters  cannot be  denied.  The minority institutions cannot be allowed  to fall   below  the  standards  of  excellence   expected   of educational  institutions, or under the guise  of  exclusive right  of  management,  to decline  to  follow  the  general pattern.   While the management must be left to  them,  they may be compelled to keep in step with others. It  is, in my opinion, permissible to make  regulations  for ensuring the regular payment of salaries before a particular date  of the month.  Regulations may well provide  that  the funds of the institution should be spent for the purposes of education  or for the betterment of the institution and  not for  extraneous  purposes.   Regulations  may  also  contain provisions   to   prevent  the,  diversion   of   funds   of institutions to the pockets of those incharge of  management or  their embezzlement in any other manner.  Provisions  for audit   of  the  accounts  of  the  institution   would   be permissible  regulation.  Likewise, regulations may  provide that  no  anti-national activity would be permitted  in  the educational institutions and that those employed as  members of  the staff should not have been guilty of any  activities against the national interest.  Minorities are as much  part of  the nation as the majority, and’ anything that  impinges upon  national  interest must. necessarily in  its  ultimate operation affect the interests of all those who inhibit this vast  land irrespective of the fact whether they  belong  to the majority or minority sections of the population.  It is, therefore, as much in the interest of minorities as that  of the  majority  to  ensure that the  protection  afforded  to minority  institutions  is  not used as a  cloak  for  doing something   which  is  subversive  of  national   interests. Regulations   to   prevent  anti-.national   activities   in educational  institutions can, therefore,. be considered  to be reasonable. 236 A regulation which is designed to prevent  maladministration of  an  educational  institution cannot be  said  to  offend clause  (1)  of article 30. At the same time it  has  to  be ensured  that under the power of making regulations  nothing is  done  as  would  detract  from  the  character  of   the institution  as a minority educational institution or  which would impinge upon the rights of the minorities to establish and  administer  educational institutions of  their  choice. The right conferred by article 30(1) is intended to be  real and  effective and not a more pious and abstract  sentiment; it is a promise of reality and not a teasing illusion.  Such a right cannot be allowed to be whittled down by any measure masquerading as a regulation.  As observed by this Court  in the  case  of Rev.  Sidhajbhai.Sabhai  (supra),  regulations which  may  lawfully  be imposed either  by  legislative  or executive  action  as a condition of receiving grant  or  of recognition must be directed to making the institution while retaining its character as minority institution effective as

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an educational institution.  Such regulation must satisfy  a dual  test the test of reasonableness, and the test that  it is   regulative   of  the  educational  character   of   the institution  and is conducive to  making the institution  an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it. It has been said in the context of the American Constitution and  the  Canadian Bill of Rights  that  the  constitutional protection of religious freedom terminated disabilities,  it did not create new privileges.  It gave religious  equality, not civil immunity.  Its essence is freedom from  conformity to,  religious  dogma, not freedom from  conformity  to  law because  of  religious  dogma  (see  dissenting  opinion  of Frank-furter J. in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette(1) as well ’as the judgment of Ritchie J.  speaking for  the majority of Canadian Supreme Court in  Robertson  & Rosetanni  v.  Queen(-)  As a  broad  proposition  not  much exception  can  be  taken to the above  dictum  and  it  may provide  a  workable yardstick in a large number  of  cases. Difficulty,  however,  arises  in cases  which  are  in  the twilight ,region.  Provisions for prevention of disabilities do  not,  no  doubt, create  positive  privileges,  the  two aspects are sometimes so intermixed ,that the danger is that one  may  not while denying what appears to be  a  privilege impinge  upon  a provision which is designed  to  prevent  a disability  and  thus  set at naught the  guarantee  of  the Constitution.   Apart  from  that  whatever  might  be   the position  in USA and Canada, so far as our  Constitution  is concerned  it contains articles which ire designed not  only to  prevent disabilities of the minorities but  also  create positive  rights  for them.  Article 30(1) belongs  to  that category. If  a request is made for the affiliation or recognition  of an  educational institution, it is implicit in  the  request that   the  educational  institution  would  abide  by   the regulations  which  are  made  by  the  authority   granting affiliation  or recognition.  The said authority can  always prescribe  regulations  and  insist  that  they  should   be complied   with  before,  it  would  grant  affiliation   or recognition  to  an educational institution.   To  deny  the power of making regulations to the authority (1)  319 U. S. 624 (2) [1963] S. C. R. 651; (1964) D. L.  R. 2d 485. 237 concerned would result in robbing the concept of affiliation or recognition until it conforms to a certain standard.  The fact  that  the. institution is of the  prescribed  standard indeed  inheres  in  the  very  concept  of  affiliation  or recognition.    It  is,  therefore,  permissible   for   the authority  concerned to prescribe regulations which must  be complied  with  before an institution can  seek  and  retain affiliation  and recognition.  Question then arises  whether there  is any limitation on the prescription of  regulations for  minority  educational  institutions.  So  far  as  this aspect  is  concerned, the authority prescribing  the  regu- lations  must  bear  in  mind  that  the  Constitution   has guaranteed  a  fundamental  right  to  the  minorities   for establishing    and    administering    their    educational institutions.   Regulations made by the authority  concerned should not impinge upon that right.  Balance has, therefore, to be kept between the two objectives, that of ensuring  the standard  of  excellence  of the  institution  and  that  of preserving  the  right of’ the minorities to  establish  and administer  their  educational  institutions.    Regulations which  embrace  and  reconcile the two  objectives  can  be.

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considered to be reasonable. It  has not been disputed on behalf of the petitioners  that if the, State or other statutory authorities make reasonable regulations for educational institutions, those  regulations would  not  violate the right of a  minority  to  administer educational institutions.  We agree with the stand taken  by the  petitioners  in  this respect.  It would  be  wrong  to assume   that  an  unrestricted  right  as  in  article   30 postulates  absence  of  regulations.   Regulations  can  be prescribed in spite of the unrestricted nature of the right. The unrestricted nature of the right connotes     freedom in the exercise of the right.  Even the words "freedom"   and "free"  have  certain limitations.  In James v.  The  Common wealth(1)  the Privy Council dealt with the meaning  of  the words "absolutely free" in section 92 of the Constitution of Australia  It  was  said : "Free’ in  itself  is  vague  and indeterminate.   It must take its colour from  the  context. Compare  for instance, its use in,, free speech, free  love, free dinner and free trade.  Free speech does not mean  free speech;  it means speech hedged in by all the  law&  against defamation, blasphemy, sedition and so forth; it means free- dom  governed  by  law,.... " The  First  Amendment  of  the American Constitution provides inter alia that the  Congress shall  make no law respecting establishment of  religion  or prohibiting  the free exercise thereof.  Dealing  with  that Amendment, the US Supreme Court held in the case of Reynolds v. United States(’-) that that Amendment did not deprive the Congress  of  the  power to punish  actions  which  were  in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.  The contention advanced on behalf of the appellant in that  case that polygamy was a part of his religious belief and the Act of  the  Congress  prohibiting polygamy  violated  his  free exercise  of religion was repelled. in the case of  Cantwell v.  Connacticut(3)  Roberts J. speaking for the  US  Supreme Court observed in respect of the First Amendment (1) [1936] A.C. 578.   (2) 98 U. S. 145 (1878). (3)  310 U. S. 296 (1940). 38               "Thus  the  Amendment embraces  two  concepts-               freedom  to believe and freedom to  act.   The               first  is  absolute  but,  in  the  nature  of               things, the second cannot be.  Conduct remains               subject  to regulation ’for the protection  of               society.    The  freedom  to  act  must   have               appropriate   definition   to   preserve   the               enforcement of that protection." Similar  view  was expressed by Latham CJ. in  the  case  of Adelaide ,Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc. (supra)  while dealing with section 116 of the Australian Constitution when he  said  that  "obligation to obey  the  laws  which  apply generally  to the community is not regarded as  inconsistent with  freedom"’.   It  would,  therefore,  follow  that  the unrestricted  nature of a right does not prevent the  making of regulations relating to the enforcement of the right. Question  has  been  posed during the  course  of  arguments whether ,the educational institutions referred to in  clause (1) of article 30 must only be those institutions which have been established with a view to conserve language, script or culture  of  a  minority.  To put it  in  other  words,  the question is whether clause (1) of article 30, is subject  to the provisions of clause (1) of article 29.  In this respect I  am of the view that clause (1) of article 29  and  clause (1) of article 30 deal with distinct matters, and it is  not permissible to circumscribe or restrict the right  conferred by clause (1) of article ,30 by reading in it any limitation

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imported  from  clause  (1) of article  29.   Article  29(1) confers a right on any section of citizens having a distinct language, script or culture of its own to conserve the same. It is not necessary, as mentioned earlier, for invoking this clause  that  the, section of citizens should  constitute  a minority.   As against that, the right conferred by  article 30(1)  is  only upon minorities which are  based  either  on religion or language.  The right conferred by article  29(1) is  for  the conservation of language,  script  or  culture, while that guaranteed by article 30(1) is for the establish- ment  and administration of educational institutions of  the choice  of  minorities.  Had it been the  intention  of  the Constitution-makers that the educational institutions  which can be established and administered by minorities should  be only  those  for conservation of their language,  script  or culture,  they  would not have failed to use words  to  that effect in article 30(1).  In the absence of those words,  it is  difficult  to  subscribe to the  view  that  educational institutions mentioned in article 30(1) are only those which are intended to conserve language, script or culture of  the minority.  Clause (1) of article 30 also contains the  words "of  their choice".  These words which qualify  "educational institutions" show the vast discretion and option which  the ,-minorities  have  in selecting the  type  of  institutions which  they  want  to establish.   In  case  an  educational institution  is  established by a minority to  conserve  its distinct language, script or culture, the right to establish and  administer  such  institution  would  fall  both  under article   29(1)  as  well  as  under  article  30(1).    The minorities can, however, choose to establish an  educational institution  which is purely of a general secular  character and  is  not designed to conserve their  distinct  language, script  or culture.  The right to establish  and  administer ,such an institution is guaranteed by article 30(1) and  the fact that                             239 such an institution does not conserve the distinct language, script or culture of a minority would not take it out of the ambit of article 30(1). I  am fortified in the above conclusion by the  observations of Das CJ.     in  Re  Kerala  Education  Bill  (supra)  and Hidayatullah CJ. in the case  of    Rev.    Father    Proost (supra).  Das CJ. observed :               "The right conferred on such minorities is  to               establish  educational. institutions of  their               choice.  It does not say that minorities based               on   religion  should  establish   educational               institutions  for teaching religion  only,  or               that  linguistic  minorities should  have  the               right  to establish  educational  institutions               for  teaching their language only.   What  the               article  says and means is that the  religious               and the linguistic minorities should have  the               right to establish educational institutions of               their  choice.  There is no limitation  placed               on   the  subjects  to  be  taught   in   such               educational institutions.  As such  minorities               will  ordinarily  desire that  their  children               should be brought up property and  efficiently               and   be   eligible  for   higher   university               education  and  go  out  in  the  world  fully               equipped with such intellectual attainments as               will  make  them fit for entering  the  public               services,  educational institutions  of  their               choice will- necessarily include  institutions

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             imparting general secular education also."               Hidayatullah  CJ. expressed  somewhat  similar               view in the following words :               "  In  our opinion, the width  of  Art.  30(1)               cannot  be  cut  down  by  introducing  in  it               considerations  on which Art. 29(1) is  based.               The  latter  article is a  general  protection               which is given to minorities to conserve their               language,  script or culture, The former is  a               special   right   to   establish   educational               institutions of their choice.  This choice  is               not   limited  to  institutions   seeking   to               conserve  language, script or culture and  the               choice  is  not  taken away  if  the  Minority               community  having established  an  educational               institution of its choice also admits  members               of other communities.  That is a  circumstance               irrelevant  for the application of Art.  30(1)               since no such limitation is expressed and none               can  be implied.  The two articles create  two               separate rights, although it is possible  that               they may meet in a given case’ " It  has been argued on behalf of the respondents that  there is  no fundamental right to affiliation or  recognition  and that a minority educational institution seeking  affiliation or  recognition  must conform to the  conditions  which  are prescribed  for recognition or affiliation.  So far as  this aspect is concerned, I am of the view that it is permissible for  the State to prescribe reasonable regulations like  the one to which I have referred earlier and make it a condition precedent to the according of recognition or affiliation  to a minority institution.  It is not, however, permissible  to prescribe  conditions for recognition or  affiliation  which have  the effect of impairing the right of the  minority  to establish  and  administer their  educational  institutions. Affiliation 240 and  recognition  are, no doubt, not  mentioned  in  article 30(1),  the  position all the same remains that  refusal  to recognize  or  affiliate minority institutions  unless  they (the  minorities)  surrender the right to  administer  those institutions  would have the effect of rendering  the  right guaranteed  by  article  30(1) to  be  wholly  illusory  and ’Indeed  a  teasing illusion.  It is, in  our  Opinion,  not permissible  to  exact from the minorities in  lieu  of  the recognition  or  affiliation of their institutions  a  price which would entail. the abridgement or extinguishment of the right  under article 30(1).  An educational institution  can hardly  serve  any purpose or be of  any  practical  utility unless  it  is affiliated to a University  or  is  otherwise recognized  like other Educational institutions.  The  right conferred by article 30 is a real and meaningful right.   It is  neither an abstract right nor is it to be  exercised  in vacuum.    Article  30(1)  was  intended  to  have  a   real significance  and  it is not permissible to construe  it  in such a manner as would rob it of that significance.  It  may be appropriate in this context to refer to the  observations of  Das CJ. in the case of Re Kerala Education Bill  (supra) on pages 1067-68               "Without    recognition,    therefore,     the               educational institutions established or to  be               established by the minority communities cannot               fulfil  the real objects of their  choice  and               the   fights   ’under  Art.30(1)   cannot   be               effectively exercised.  The right to establish

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             educational institutions of their choice must,               therefore,  mean the right to  establish  real               institutions which will effectively serve  the               needs of their community and the scholars  who               resort  to  their  educational   institutions.               There   is,  no  doubt,’  no  such  thing   as               fundamental right to recognition by the  State               but  to  deny recognition to  the  educational               institutions  except upon terms tantamount  to               the surrender of their constitutional right of               administration of the educational institutions               of  their choice is in truth and in effect  to               deprive them of their rights under  Art.30(1).               We  repeat  that  the  legislative  power   is               subject  to  the fundamental  rights  and  the               legislature  cannot  indirectly take  away  or               abridge the fundamental rights which it  could               not  do  directly  and yet that  will  be  the               result   if  the  said  Bill  containing   any               offending clause becomes law."               Similar  view  was expressed in. the  case  of               Rev.  Sidhajbhai Sabhai (supra) wherein it was               observed :               "The  Government also holds  examinations  for               granting certificates to successful candidates               as  trained  primary  teachers,  and  scholars               receiving training in recognized  institutions               alone   are   entitled  to   appear   at   the               examination.   Manifestly, in the  absence  or               recognition by the Government training in  the               College  will have little  practical  utility.               The   College   is   a   non-profit    ’making               institution   and   depends   primarily   upon               donations and Government grant for meeting its               expenses.   Without  such grant, it  would  be               extremely difficult if not impossible for  the               institution to function." 241 What  is  said  above  with regard  to  aid  or  recognition applies,  equally  to  affiliation  of  a  college  to   the University because but for such affiliation the student will not  be  able  to  obtain  a  University.  degree  which  is recognized  as a passport to several professions and  future employment in Public Service. Argument has been advanced on behalf of the respondents that unless  a  law or regulation is wholly  destructive  of  the right of minorities under article 30(1), the same would  not be liable to be struck down.  This argument is untenable and runs counter to the plain language of article 13.  According to  that  article,  a law would be void even  it  it  merely abridge’s  a  fundamental right guaranteed by Part  III  and does  not wholly take away that right.  The argument that  a law  or  regulation could not be deemed to  be  unreasonable unless  it  was  totally destructive of  the  right  of  the minority   to   administer  educational   institutions   was expressly  negatived  by  this Court in  the  case  of  Rev. Sidhajbhai  Sabhai (supra).  After referring to the case  of Re.   Kerala. Education Bill (supra) this Court observed  in the case of Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai               "The Court did not, however, lay down any test               of  reasonableness  of  the  regulation.   The               Court  did not decide that public or  national               interest.was  the  sole  measure  or  test  of               reasonableness: it also did not decide that  a               regulation  would be deemed unreasonable  only

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             if it was totally destructive of the right  of               the   minority   to   administer   educational               institution.   No general principle  on  which               reasonableness  or otherwise of  a  regulation               may  be tested was sought to be laid  down  by               the  Court.  The Kerala Education  Bill  case,               therefore,   is  not  an  authority  for   the               proposition   submitted  by   the   Additional               Solicitor General that all regulative measures               which  are not destructive or annihilative  of               the  character of the institution  established               by the minority, provided the regulations  are               in  the national interest or public  interest,               are valid." It  is,  no  doubt, true that on page 1065 of  the  case  Re Kerala Education Bill Das CJ. while dealing with clauses  14 and  15  of the Bill observed that the provisions  of  those clauses  might  be totally destructive of the  rights  under article 30(1).  These observations were intended to describe the effect of those clauses.  There is, however, nothing  in those  observations to indicate that this Court  would  have upheld  those  clauses  if those  clauses  had  abridged  or partially  destroyed the right under article 30(1)  and  not totally destroyed that right. In the light of the above principles, it can be stated  that a  law  which  interferes with the minorities  choice  of  a governing  body or management council would be violative  of the  right guaranteed by article 30(1).  This view has  been consistently  taken by this Court in the cases of Rt.   Rev. Bishop  S.  K. Patro, Mother Provincial and  D.A.V.  College affiliated to the Guru Nanak University (supra). -131SupCI/75 242 Section 33-A which provides for a now governing body for the management of the college and also for selection  committees as well as the constitution thereof would consequently  have to   be   quashed  so  far-as   the   minority   educational institutions  are concerned because of the contravention  of article  30(1).   The provisions of this section  have  been reproduced earlier and are similar to those of section 48 of the  Kerala University Act,. sub-section (2), (4),  (5)  and (6)  of which were held by this Court in the case of  Mother Provincial (supra) to be violative of article 3o(1).  In the case  of Rt.  Rev.  Bishop S. K. Patro, this Court  declared invalid  the  order passed by  the  educational  authorities requiring  the  Secretary of the Church  Missionary  Society Higher  Secondary  School  to take  steps  to  constitute  a managing  committee  in  accordance with the  order  of  the educational  authorities.  Section 33-A is also  similar  to statute  2(1)(a)  which  was framed  under  the  Guru  Nanak University (Amritsar) Act.  Statute 2(1) (a) was as under               "2(1)(a)  A College applying for admission  to               the privileges of the University shall send  a               letter  of  application to the  Registrar  and               shall satisfy the Senate :-               (a)   that the College shall have a  regularly               constituted  governing body consisting of  not               more  than 20 persons approved by  the  Senate               and including, among others, 2 representatives               of  the  University and the Principal  of  the               College Ex-officio.               Provided  that  the said condition  shall  not               apply  in  the case of College  maintained  by               Government   which  shall  however   have   an               advisory Committee consisting of among  others

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             the principal of the College (Ex-officio)  and               two representatives of the University." The  above  statute  was struck down by this  Court  in  the second D.A.V. College case. Another   conclusion  which  follows  from  what  has   been discussed  above  is  that a law  which  interferes  with  a minority’s choice of qualified, teachers or its disciplinary control over teachers and other members of the staff of  the institution is void as being violative of article 30(1).  it is, of course, permissible for the State and its educational authorities to prescribe the qualifications of teachers, but once  the teachers possessing the, requisite  qualifications are  selected  by  the  minorities  for  their   educational institutions,  the  State would have no right  to  veto  the selection of those teachers.  The selection and  appointment of  teachers for an educational institution is one  of  the. essential ingredients of the right to manage an  educational institution  and  the minorities can plainly be  not  denied such right of selection and appointment without,  infringing article  30(1).   In  the case of  Rev.   Father  W.  Proost (supra),  this Court while dealing with section 48-A of  the ’Bihar Universities Act observed that the said provision 243 completely  took away the autonomy of the governing body  of the college and virtually vested the control of the  college in  the University Service Commission.  The  petitioners  in that  case were, therefore, held entitled to the  protection of  article  30(1) of the Constitution.  The  provisions  of that  section have been referred to earlier.   According  to the   section,  subject  to  the  approval   of   University appointments,  dismissals, removals, termination of  service or  reduction in rank of teachers of an  affiliated  college not belonging to the State Government would have to be  made by  the governing body of the college on the  recommendation of  the University Service Commission.  The section  further provided that the said Commission would be consulted by  the governing  body  of a college in  all  disciplinary  matters affecting  teachers  of the college and no action  would  be taken against or any punishment imposed upon a teacher of  a college  otherwise than in conformity with the  findings  of the Commission. In  the case of D.A.V. College which was affiliated  to  the Guru  Nanak  University, statute 17 framed  under  the  Guru Nanak University (Amritsar) Act inter alia provided that the Staff  initially  appointed shall be approved by  the  Vice- Chancellor and that all subsequent changes shall be reported to  the  University for Vice  Chancellor’s  approval.   This Court  held  that statute 17 interfered with  the  right  of management of the petitioner colleges and, as such, offended article 30(1). Although  disciplinary  control  over  the  teachers  of   a minority educational institution would be with the governing council,  regulations,  in  my  opinion,  can  be  made  for ensuring  proper conditions of service ,of the teachers  and for, securing a fair procedure in the matter of disciplinary action  against  the teachers.  Such  provisions  which  are calculated  to  safeguard  the interest  of  teachers  would result  in  security of tenure and thus  inevitably  attract competent  persons  for  the  posts  of  teachers.   Such  a provision   would  also  eliminate  a  potential  cause   of frustration amount the teachers.  Regulations made for  this purpose  should  be  considered to be  in  the  interest  of minority educational institutions and as such they would not violate article 30(1). Clause (a) of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 51A of the

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impugned  Act which make provision for giving  a  reasonable opportunity  of  showing  cause  against  a  penalty  to  be proposed  on  a  member  of  the  staff  of  an  educational institution would consequently be held to be valid.   Clause (b)  of those sub-sections which gives a power to the  Vice- Chancellor  and officer of the University authorised by  him to  veto the action of the managing body of  an  educational institution in awarding punishment to a member of the staff, in  my opinion, interferes with the disciplinary control  of the managing body over its 244 teachers.   It  is significant that the  power  of  approval conferred  by clause (b) in each of the two sub-sections  of section   51A  on  the  Vice-Chancellor  or  other   officer authorised  by  him is a blanket power.  No  guidelines  are laid  down  for  the exercise of that power and  it  is  not provided  that the approval is to be withheld only  in  case the dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination  of service  is  mala fide or by way of victimisation  or  other similar cause.  The conferment of such blanket power on  the Vice-Chancellor  or  other  officer authorised  by  him  for vetoing  the disciplinary action of the managing body of  an educational institution makes a serious inroad on the  right of   the   managing  body  to  administer   an   educational institution.  Clause (b) of each of the two sub-sections  of section  51A should, therefore, be held to be  violative  of article  30(1) so far as minority  educational  institutions are concerned. Section 52A of the Act relates to the reference of  disputes between  a  governing body and any member of  the  teaching, other  academic  and  non-teaching staff  of  an  affiliated college or recognized or approved institution connected with the  conditions of service of such member to a  Tribunal  of Arbitration,  consisting of one nominated by  the  governing body  of  the  college  or,  as the  case  may  be,  of  the recognised or approved institution, one member nominated  by the  member  of  the staff involved in the  dispute  and  an Umpire  appointed  by the Vice-Chancellor.  Section  52A  is widely  worded, and as it stands it would cover  within  its ambit every dispute connected with the conditions of service of  a  member of the staff of  an  educational  institution, however trivial or insignificant it may be, which may  arise between the governing body of a college and a member of  the staff.   The  effect  of  this section  would  be  that  the managing  committee of an educational institution  would  be embroiled  by  its  employees in  a  series  of  arbitration proceedings.   The provisions of section 52A would thus  act as  a spoke in the wheel of effective administration  of  an educational institution. it may also be stated that there is nothing objectionable to selecting the method of arbitration for  settling  major disputes connected with  conditions  of service of staff of educational institutions.  It may indeed be  a desideratum.  What is objectionable, apart  from  what has been mentioned above, is the giving of the power to  the Vice-Chancellor  to, nominate the Umpire.  Normally in  such disputes  there  would be hardly any agreement  between  the arbitrator   nominated   by  the  governing  body   of   the institution and the one nominated by the concerned member of the  staff.  The result would be that the power  would  vest for  all  intents and purposes in the nominee of  the  Vice- Chancellor to decide all disputes between the governing body and  the  member of the staff connected  with  the  latter’s conditions  of  service.  The governing body would  thus  be hardly  in  a position to take  any  effective  disciplinary action  against a member of the staff.  This must  cause  an

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inroad in the right of the governing body to administer  the institution.   Section 52A should,  therefore       be  held to  be,  violative  of article 30(1)  so,  far  as  minority educational institutions are concerned. 245 In view of what has been mentioned above, sections 40 and 41 of  the Act would also have to be struck down so far as  the minority  colleges  are  concerned  as  being  violative  of article 30(1).  The effect of sections 40 and 41 is that  in case  the University so determines and the State  Government issues  the necessary notification under subsection  (2)  of section  40,  all  instructions, teaching  and  training  in under-graduate  courses shall within the University area  be conducted  by  the University and shall be imparted  by  the teachers  of  the  University.  The, result  would  be  that except  in matters mentioned in the proviso  to  sub-section (4) of section 41 no instructions, teaching and training  in undergraduate courses of study, which has hithertofore  been conducted by the affiliated colleges, would be conducted  by these colleges, because the same would have, to be conducted by  the  University  and would have to be  imparted  by  the teachers  of the University.  The affiliated colleges  would also  as a result of the above become constituent  colleges. A  provision  which  makes it imperative  that  teaching  in under-graduate   courses  can  be  conducted  only  by   the University  and can be imparted only by the teachers of  the University  plainly  violates the rights  of  minorities  to establish  and  administer their  educational  institutions, Such  a  provision must consequently be  held  qua  minority institutions to result in contravention of article 30(1).  I would, therefore, strike down section 40 so far as  minority educational institutions are concerned as being violative of Art.30(1)   Further,   once  section  40  is  held   to   be unconstitutional so far as minority educational institutions are  concerned,  the  same vice  would  afflict  section  41 because  section 41 can operate only if section 40  survives the attack and is held to be not violative of article 30(1). 1  would  therefore, hold section 40 and 41 to  be  void  in respect of minority educational institutions. It has been argued on behalf of the respondents that in  the case  of Re Kerala Education Bill (supra) this Court  upheld clauses  11  and 12.  Clause 11 made it obligatory  for  all aided schools to select teachers from a. panel of candidates selected for each district by the Public Service Commission. Clause  12  related to the’ conditions of service  of  aided teachers.   According  to sub-clause (4) of  clause  12,  no teacher  of an aided school could be dismissed,  removed  or reduced  in  rank or suspended by the  manager  without  the previous  sanction  of  the  authorized  officer.   Das  CJ. observed  that the above provisions were serious inroads  on the  right of administration and appeared  perilously.  near violating  that right.  All the same, he observed that  this Court  "as at present advised" was prepared to  treat  those regulations  as  permissible regulations.   I  have  already mentioned  above  that in subsequent cases this  Court  held similar  provisions to be violative of article 30(1) in  the case  of  minority institutions.  The opinion  expressed  by this  Court  in Re Kerala Education Bill (supra) was  of  an advisory  character  and  though  great  weight  should   be attached  to  it because of its persuasive value,  the  said opinion  cannot override the opinion subsequently  expressed by this Court in contested cases.  It is the law declared by this Court in the subsequent contested cases 246 which would have a binding effect.  The words "as at present

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advised"  as well as the preceding sentence  indicate  that. the view expressed by this Court in Re Kerala Education Bill in  this respect was hesitant and tentative and not a  final view in the matter.  It has been pointed out that in Re Levy of Estate Duty(1) Spens CJ. referred-to an observation  made in  the  case of Attorney-General for Ontaric  v.  Attorney- General for Canada(2) that the advisory opinion of the Court would  have  no  more effect than the  opinion  of  the  law officers.  I need not dilate upon this aspect of the  matter because I am of the opinion that the view expressed by  this Court in subsequent cases referred to above by applying  the general principles laid down in the Re Kerala Education Bill is correct and calls for no interference. Reference has been made on behalf of the respondents to  the recommendation of Dr. Radhakrishnan Commission made in 1948- 49  wherein preference was shown for  constituent  colleges. So  far as this aspect is concerned, I may observe  that  if any statutory provision is found to be violative of  article 30(1) of the Constitution, the fact that it has been enacted in  pursuance of the recommendation of an expert body  would not prevent the Court from striking down that provision.  It may also be mentioned that in the case of Mother  Provincial (supra) reliance was placed upon the report of the Education Commission.   This Court in that context remarked that  that fact  as well as the fact that the provisions were  salutary could not stand in the face of the constitutional guarantee. Reference  to the said report was, therefore, considered  to be not necessary.  I may further mention that subsequent  to the  report  of Dr. Radhakrishnan  Commission,  three  other bodies  submitted  their reports.  One of  the  reports  was given  by  Kothari  Committee in 1965.  The  other  was  the report  of  the Education Commission presided  over  by  Dr. Kothari  in  1966.  The third was the report  of  Dongerkery Commission submitted in 1972.  There was no reference to the conversion of affiliated colleges into constituent  colleges in any of these three reports.  No observation was also made in  any of the reports that the provisions of article  30(1) and  the construction placed upon that had in any way  stood in  the  way  of  raising  the  standards  of  education  or improving  the excellence of educational  institutions.   It may  also  be  mentioned that  the  concept  of  constituent colleges is not a rigid concept and can vary from university ’to  university.- The concept of constituent colleges  which is visualized in the impugned provisions of sections 40  and 41 of the Act contemplates that the imparting of teaching at the under-graduate level in the prescribed course of studies shall  be  only  by the teachers  of  the  University.   The minority  colleges as such would not be entitled  to  impart education  in courses of study through their  own  teachers. Sections 40 and 41 would, therefore be as already  mentioned violative of article 30(1).  In  a matter like this, one may perhaps have also  to  take into  account  the  accepted  norms  for  the  imparting  of education.   So far as post-graduate teaching is  concerned, the general pattern which prevails and has been accepted  so far is that the education is imparted by the University.  As against that, the mode for under- (1) [1944] F. C. R. 317. (2) [1912] A. C.  571. 247 graduate  teaching  has  been that it  is  imparted  by  the individual  colleges.   A  very large  number  of  colleges, including minority. colleges, have been established and  are in  existence  for the purpose of  imparting  under-graduate education.   The  impugned provisions are calculated  to  do

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away with the present system and in the process they impinge upon the rights of minorities under article 30(1).  It would not  be  a  correct approach to the  problem  to  hold  that because  the  imparting  of post-graduate  teaching  by  the Universities  has been accepted without objection, the  same rule  should also hold good for the  undergraduate  teaching and the same should not be impermissible.  Such a process of extension,  in  my opinion, is not very helpful.  If  it  is permissible  for  the  State to  prevent  the  imparting  of education by I colleges at under-graduate level because such a  course  has been accepted at post-graduate  level,  there would  be  no  reason why this  principle  be  not  extended further  to the school education.  The process of  extension can thus totally annihilate the right guaranteed by  article 30(1). It has also been argued on behalf of the respondents that we should not strike down the impugned sections but should wait till  statutes or ordinances are made in pursuance of  those sections.   In this respect I am of the view that since  the impugned  sections  confer the power to  frame  statutes  or regulations violative of the fundamental right under article 30(1), the very provisions of the Act conferring such  power are void so far as minority institutions are concerned.  The abridgement of the right of the minorities to establish and. administer educational institutions of their choice is  writ large on the face of the impugned provisions.  The fact that no  statutes or ordinances have been framed in pursuance  of the impugned provisions would consequently be hardly of much significance  in determining the constitutional validity  of the  impugned  provisions.  It would not,  therefore,  be  a correct approach to wait till statutes are framed  violating the  right  under article 30(1).  No rules  or  statutes  or ordinances  framed under the provisions of the Act can  take away  the constitutional infirmity of those provisions.   It is,  as  observed  by the Judicial  Committee  in  the  case Trustees of, the Roman Catholic Separate Schools for  Ottawa v.  Ottawa Corporation & Ors.,(1) the creation of the  power and  not its exercise that is subject to objection  and  the objection  would  not  be removed  even  though  the  powers conferred  were  never exercised at all.  Similar  view  was expressed  in the case of Re Kerala Education  Bill  (supra) wherein  Das  CJ. while dealing with clause 3(5)  read  with clause 20 observed :               "It  is true that cl. 36(2) (c)  empowers  the               Government  to  make rules providing  for  the               grant of recognition to private schools and we               are  asked  to suspend our opinion  until  the               said  Bill  comes  into force  and  rules  are               actually made.  But no rule to be framed under               cl.  36(2) (c) can nullify the  constitutional               infirmity  of cl. 3(5) read with cl. 20  which               is  calculated  to  infringe  the  fundamental               rights of (1)  [1917]  A.  C. 76. 248 minority communities in respect of recognized schools to  be established after the commencement of the said Bill." Reference,  has also been made on behalf of the  respondents to  the provision of Chapter VIA containing sections 38B  to 38E which has been inserted by     the amending Act.   These provisions relate to autonomous colleges,    autonomous- institutions   and   autonomous   University    departments. According to section 38B,        the University  authorities may  allow  an affiliated college, a University  college,  a recognized  institution or a University department to  enjoy

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autonomy   in   the  matter  of  admissions   of   students, prescribing  the courses of studies, imparting  instructions and training, holding of examinations and the powers to make necessary  rules  for  the purpose in  case  the  University authorities are satisfied that the standard of education  in such college, institution or department is so developed that it  would  be  in the interest of  education  to  allow  the college, institution or department to enjoy autonomy.  It is urged  that the provision for the conversion  of  affiliated colleges into constituent colleges is part of a scheme which covers  within its ambit autonomous colleges on the one  end and  constituent colleges on the other.  This  circumstance, in  my  opinion,  is hardly of  any  significance.   If  the conversion  of  affiliated colleges of the  minorities  into constituent  colleges  contravenes article 30(1),  the  fact that  such  conversion  is in pursuance of  a  scheme  which permits the grant of autonomy to an individual college would not prevent the striking down of the impugned provision. As a result of the above, I hold that sections 33A,  section 40,  section  41 and section 52A of the  Gujarat  University Act,  1949 as amended by the Gujarat University  (Amendment) Act,  1972  are violative of article 30(1) and as  such  are void  in respect of minority educational  institutions.   As regards  section  51A of the Act, I uphold the  validity  of clause  (a)  of sub-sections (1) and (2)  of  that  section. Clause (b) of each of those two sub-section is violative  of article  30(1)  and  as  such is void  so  far  as  minority educational institutions are concerned. MATHEW,  J.  (on behalf of himself and Chandrachud,  J.)  We agree respectfully with the conclusions of the learned Chief Justice, but we propose to state our reasons separately. The  first  question that arises for-consideration  in  writ petition  No.  232/1973  is whether  article  30(1)  of  the Constitution   confers  on  the  religious  and   linguistic minorities,  only  the  right to  establish  and  administer educational  institutions  for  conserving  their  language, script  or culture, or, whether the scope of  the  guarantee under  that  article  is  wide  enough  to  enable  them  to establish and administer any other educational  institutions of their choice. Article 30(1) reads :- "All  minorities,  whether based on  religion  or  language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice."                             249 The respondents submitted that article 29(1) which  provides that  any section of the citizens residing in the  territory of  India  or any part thereof having a  distinct  language, script  or  culture  of  its own shall  have  the  right  to conserve  the  same" should determine the scope  of  article 30(1).  They say that when article 30(1) talks of the  right of  religious  or  linguistic minorities  to  establish  and administer  educational institutions of their  choice,  that can only mean educational institutions for conserving  their language,  script or culture, or, at the  most,  educational institutions  for  imparting general  secular  education  in order to conserve their language, script or culture and  not institutions   for  imparting  general   secular   education divorced from the above purposes. In  In  re : The Kerala Education Bill,  1957(1)  Das,  C.J. speaking  for the majority of 6 to 1 said in a  Presidential reference   under  article  143(1)  that  the  key  to   the understanding of the true meaning and implication of article 30(1) is,the words "of their own choice" in the article  and that the article leaves it to the choice of those minorities

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to  establish  such educational institutions as  will  serve both  purposes,  namely,  the purpose  of  conserving  their religion,  language or culture, and the purpose of giving  a thorough, good general education to their children. The inter-relation of articles 29(1) and 30(1) was  examined by  a  bench of five judges of this Court presided  over  by Hidayatullah,  C.J. in Rev.  Father W. Proost and Others  v. State  of Bihar and Others(2).  The learned  Chief  Justice, speaking for the Court, said that the width of article 30(1) cannot  be cut down by introducing in it  considerations  on which  article  29(1)  is based;  that  whereas  the  latter article is a general protection which is given to minorities to conserve their language, script or culture, the former is a  special  right to minorities  to  establish  educational, institutions  of  their choice and that this choice  is  not limited to institutions seeking to conserve language, script or  culture.  He further said that this choice is not  taken away  if  the  minority  community,  having  established  an educational  institution of its choice, also admits  members of other communities, and, that the two articles create  two separate rights, although it is possible that they may  meet in a given case. In Rev.  Sidhajbhai Sabhai and Others v. State of  Bombay(3) the  Court  overruled the contention that article  30(1)  is limited to conserve only the language, script or culture  of religious and linguistic minorities. The  question was examined again by this Court in Rt.   Rev. Bishop  S.  K.  Patro  and Others  v.  State  of  Bihar  and Others(4)  where,  Shah,, J., speaking for a bench  of  five judges   quoted   with   approval   the   observations    of Hidayatullah,  C.J. in Rev.  Father W. Proost’s case(2)  and held  that articles 29(1) and 30(1) confer separate  rights, though in a given case, these rights may overlap. (1)  [1959] S.C. R. 995-1053. (3)  [1963] 3 S. C. R. 837. (2)  [1969] 2 S. C. R. 73. (4)  [1970] S. C. R. 172. 250 In  D.A.  V. College, etc. v. State of Punjab  &  Ors.  (1), Reddy,  J., speaking on behalf of the Court,  observed  that article  29(1) is wider than article 30(1), in  that,  while any  section  of the citizens including the  minorities  can invoke the rights guaranteed under article 29(1), the  right guaranteed  under  article 30(1) is only  available  to  the minorities  based on religion or language.  He then went  on to  say that a reading of these two articles together  would lead  to  the  conclusion that  a  religious  or  linguistic minority   has  the  right  to  establish   and   administer educational  institutions;  of its  choice  for  effectively conserving  its  distinctive language,  script  or  culture, which right, however, is subject to the regulatory power  of the State for maintaining and facilitating the excellence of its standards and that while this is so, these two  articles are  not  inter-linked  nor do they permit  of  their  being always   read  together.   He  quoted  with   approval   the observations  of  Hidayatullah,  C.J.  in  Rev.   Father  W. Proost’s  case (2 ) to the effect that the width of  article 30(1)   cannot   be  cut  down  by   introducing   into   it considerations  on which article 29(1) is based,  and  that, the expression "educational institutions of their choice" in article  30(1)  is not limited to, institutions  seeking  to conserve language, script or culture. Ramaswami,  C.J. said in Dipendra Nath v. State of  Bihar(3) that  the  crucial  phrase in article  30(1)  is  "of  their choice",  that the ambit of the freedom of choice  conferred

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by  the  article is therefore as wide as the choice  of  the particular  community may make it and that it is open  to  a religious minority to establish educational institutions for the purpose of conserving its religion, language or culture, and  also for the purpose of giving a thorough good  secular education  to their children as the article applies to  both these classes of institutions. Article 29(1) confers on any section of citizens resident in the territory of India, the right to conserve its  language, script  or  culture.   It does not speak  of  any  minority, religious  or otherwise.  Whereas article 29(1) confers  the right  not  only  upon  a  minority  as  understood  in  its technical  sense  but also upon a section  of  the  citizens resident  in  the  territory of India which  may  not  be  a minority  in  "its technical sense, the beneficiary  of  the right  under article 30 is a minority, either  religious  or linguistic.   That is one distinction between article  29(1) and article 30(1). The  second distinction to be noted is that whereas  article 29(1)  confers in respect of three subjects viz.,  language, script  or culture, article 30(1) deals only with the  right to establish and administer educational institutions.  It is true  that-under  article 29(1) a section  of  the  citizens having  a  distinct  language,  script  or  culture,   might establish  an  educational institution  for  conserving  the same.  But, under article 30(1), the right conferred on  the religious  or linguistic minority is not only the  right  to establish an educational institution for (1)  [1971] Supp. 2 S. C. R. 688. (3)  A. 1. R. 1962 Patna, 101. (2) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 73.                             251 the  purpose of conserving its language, script or  culture, but  any  educational institution of  its  choice.   Whereas article  29 does not deal with. education as. such,  article 30 deals only with the establishment and administration  of- educational  institutions.   It might be that  in  a  given, case,  the  two articles might overlap.  When  a  linguistic minority establishes an educational institution to  conserve its  language,  the  linguistic  minority  can  invoke   the protection  of both the articles.  When article  30(1)  says that  a  linguistic minority can  establish  and  administer educational institutions of its choice, it means that it can establish and-, administer any educational institution.   If a  linguistic  minority can establish  only  an  educational institution to conserve its language, then the expression of their  choice in article 30(1) is practically robbed of  its meaning. A mere look at the two articles would be sufficient to  show that article 29(1) cannot limit the width of article  30(1). There are religious minorities in this country which have no distinct  language,  script  or  culture,  as  envisaged  in article  29(1).   For these  religious  minorities,  article 29(1)  guarantees no right.  Yet, article 30(1)  gives  them the   right   to  establish   and   administer   educational institutions  of  their choice.  That article does  not  say that  only religious minorities having a distinct  language, script or culture can establish educational institutions  of their  choice.  What then are the  educational  institutions which  they are entitled to establish and  administer  under the  article ? Exhypothesi, these religious minorities  have no   distinct   language,  script  or  culture.    So,   the educational   institutions  which  they  are  entitled   to, establish and administer cannot be, those to conserve  their language,  script or culture.  Therefore, it is  clear  that

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the  right guaranteed to a religious or linguistic  minority under   article  30(1)  is  the  right  to   establish   any educational institution of its choice. The  question  whether  such  educational  institutions  can include a military academy or a police training school  need not  be considered in the context of the facts of this  writ petition,   for,  here,  we  are  only  concerned  with   an institution  imparting  general secular education  as  ordi- narily understood. The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of  the State of Gujarat submitted that  although  religious and  linguistic  minorities have the  fundamental  right  to establish  and administer educational institutions of  their choice, they have no right, fundamental or otherwise, to get recognition  or  affiliation  as the case may  be.  for  the educational  institutions established by them,  unless  they submit to the regulations made by the appropriate  authority and applicable alike to educational institutions established and  administered  by  the  majority as  well  as  to  those established  and  administered by religious  and  linguistic minorities.   The argument was that article 30(1)  does  not confer  any  right  to  recognition  or  affiliation,   that recognition  or  affiliation is a privilege which  might  be granted or withheld as the legislature might think fit. We  think that the point raised by the Additional  Solicitor General  is  of far reaching constitutional  importance  not only in the sphere of 252 the  right  of the religious and  linguistic  minorities  to impart  general  secular education but also in  other  areas and  merits an examination of its juristic basis.   And,  we also  think, that the question has to be disposed of  within the  strict confines of legal reasoning which  laymen  might too  often deem to be invidiously technical.  As judges,  we are  neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor  agnostic and  we  would  not  be justified  in  writing  our  private opinions  no matter how deeply we might cherish  them.   And what  is said in support of the decision should insulate  us as  far  as  rationally  possible  from  the  political   or religious  conflict  beneath  the  issues.   We  owe   equal allegiance  to  the ,Constitution and are equally  bound  by judicial obligation to support it. (1) It  is  necessary in the interest of clarity of  thought  to begin   with  an  understanding  of  the  real  reason   for protection of minorities in a democratic polity. "Protection of minorities is the protection of  non-dominant groups,  which,  while wishing in general  for  equality  of treatment   with  the  majority,  wish  for  a  measure   of differential   treatment   in  order   to   preserve   basic characteristics  which  they possess and  which  distinguish them  from the majority of the population.   The  protection applies equally to individuals belonging to such groups  and wishing  the same protection.  It follows that  differential treatment of such groups or of individuals belonging to such groups is justified when it is exercised in the interest  of their  contentment  and the welfare of the  community  as  a whole".(2) "The  problem of the minorities if, not really a problem  of the  establishment of equality because if  taken  literally, such  equality  would mean absolute identical  treatment  of both  the minorities and the majorities.  This would  result only  in  equality  in  law but  inequality  in  fact.   The distinction  need not be elaborated for it is  obvious  that "equality  in  law  precludes discrimination  of  any  kind; whereas  equality  in  fact may, involve  the  necessity  of

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differential  treatment  in order to attain a  result  which establishes an equilibrium between different situations (3 ) " It  may sound paradoxical but it is nevertheless  true  that minorities  can be protected not only if they have  equality but also, in certain circumstances, differential treatment. Over one and a half decades ago, Chief Justice Das led  this Court  in holding that without recognition, the  educational institutions  established  or  to  be  established.  by  the minority communities cannot fulfil the real objects of their choice  and  that the right under article 30(1)  ,cannot  be effectively exercised.  He said that the right to  establish educational institutions of their choice means the right  to establish real institutions which will effectively-serve the needs of their com- (1)  See  the  observations of Justice Frankfurter  in  West Virginia  State  Board of Education v. Bernette, 319  U.  S. 624. (2)  The recommendation by the Sub-Commission in its  report to  the  Commission  on Human Rights-quoted at  page  27  of "Minority protection and international Bill of Human Rights" by Urmila Haksar. (3)  The Advisory opinion on Minority Schools in Albania 6th April,  1935 publications of the Court series A/B No. 64  p. 19. 253 munity  and  the scholars who resort  to  their  educational institutions  and  that though there is no such thing  as  a fundamental  right to recognition by the State, yet to  deny recognition  to  the educational  institutions  except  upon terms  tantamount to the surrender of  their  constitutional right  of administration of the educational institutions  of their  choice is in truth and in effect to deprive  them  of their  rights  under article 30(1) [see In re :  The  Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (supra)]. The  reason  why the Constitution-makers were  at  pains  to grant   religious  minorities  the  fundamental   right   to establish  and administer educational institutions of  their choice  is  to  give the parents  in  those  communities  an opportunity to educate their children in institutions having an   atmosphere  which  is  congenial  to  their   religion. Whatever be one’s own predilection those who think that  man does not live by bread alone but also by the word that comes from  God  cannot  remain  indifferent  to  the  problem  of religion in relation to and as part of education. As  a  matter  of  fact,  according  to  several   religious minorities,  the  State maintains a system  of  schools  and colleges  which  is  not completely  satisfactory  to  them, inasmuch as no place is given to religion and morality.  The sheer  omission  of  religion from curriculum  is  itself  a pressure  against  religion.  Since they  realize  that  the teaching of religion and instruction in the secular branches cannot rightfully or successfully be separated one from  the other, they are compelled to,, maintain their own system  of schools  and colleges for general education as well  as  for religious instruction.               "It is important to examine the raison  d’etre               of  educational institutions  administered  by               religious     groups.      Clearly,      their               establishment does not come about because of a               deep,  conviction that such institutions  will               be  able  to reach the  facts  of  literature,               geography  or  mathematics better  than  state               schools.   Rather,  such schools  are  started               with a primarily religious objective-to secure

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             the    opportunity   for   direct    religious               instruction   and  to  develop   a   religious               atmosphere and viewpoint even for the study of               literature,  geography  and  mathematics.   In               other words, a religious body establishes  and               maintains  schools in order to create a  total               environment  which will be favourable  to  the               promotion   of   its   particular    religious               values".(1)               It is perhaps, possible to secularize subjects               such  as mathematics,, physics  or  chemistry,               but as Justice Jackson said               "Music  without  sacred  music,   architecture                             minus  the cathedral, or painting  wit hout  the               scriptural  themes  would  be  accentric   and               incomplete, even-from a secular point of view.               Yet  the inspirational appeal of  religion  in               these   guises  is  often  stronger  than   in               forthright  sermon.  Even such a  science’  as               biology raises the issue between evolution and               creation as an explanation of our presence  on               this planet. 1see  "India  as a Secular State" by  Donald  Eugene  Smith, p.361. 254 .lm15 But  how  one  can teach, with  satisfaction  or  even  with justice  to  all faiths, such subjects as the story  of  the Reformation,   ,the  Inquisition  is  more  than   one   can understand.   It  is too much to expect  that  mortals  will teach   subject&  about  which  their  contemporaries   have passionate  controversies  with  the  ,detachment  they  may summon  to teaching about remote subjects such as  Confucius or Mohamet".(1) The  State cannot insist that the children belonging to  the religious  minority community should be educated  in  State- maintained   educational  institutions  or  in   educational institutions   conducted  by  the  majority.   The   State’s interest  in education, so far as religious minorities  ,are concerned,  would  be served sufficiently,  by  reliance  on secular education accompanied by optional religious training in  minority schools and colleges, if the secular  education is  conducted there according to the  prescribed  curriculum and  standard.   Article  28(3)  implies  that  a  religious minority administering an educational institution  imparting general  secular  education has the liberty to  provide  for religious  education  in  the  institution.   The  continued willingness  to rely on colleges ,conducted by religious  or linguistic   minorities  for  imparting  secular   education strongly  suggests that a wide segment of  informed  opinion has  found  that  these colleges do  an  acceptable  job  of providing  secular ,education.  The State,  concededly,  has power to regulate and control the education of its children, but  it  cannot, by a general law compelling  attendance  at public school or college, preclude attendance at the  school or  college established by the religious minority, when  the parents seek to secure the benefit of religious  instruction not provided in public schools.  The parents have, the right to  determine  to  which school or  college  their  children should be sent for education. We  fail to see how affiliation of an education  institution imparting  ,religious  instruction in  addition  to  secular education  to  pupils as visualized in Article  28(3)  would derogate  from  the secular character ,of  the  state.   Our

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Constitution  has  not erected a rigid  wall  of  separation between church and state,.  We have grave doubts whether the expression "secular state" as it denotes a definite  pattern of  church  and  state relationship can  with  propriety  be applied  to India.  It is only in ::a qualified  sense  that India  can  be  said  to be  a  secular  state.   There  are provisions  in  the Constitution which make me  hesitate  to characterize  our state as secular.  Dr.  Radhakrishnan  has said :-               "The  religious  impartiality  of  the  Indian               State is not to be confused with secularism or               atheism.   ’Secularism as here ,defined is  in               accordance   with   the   ancient    religious               tradition  ,of India.  It tries to build up  a               fellowship of believers, not by  subordinating               individual qualities to the group mind but  by               ’bringing  them into harmony with each  other.               This  dynamic  fellowship  is  based  on   the               principle  of diversity in unity which  ’alone               has    the   quality    of    creativenesS(2).               Secularism  here does not mean  irreligion  or               atheism or even stress on (1)  See the opinion of Justice Jackson in McCollum v  Board o Education, 333, US. 303. (2) Recovery of Faith p. 202 255 material comforts.  It proclaims that it lays Stress on  the universality  of spirtual values which may be attained by  a variety of ways’(1)". In short secularism in the context of our Constitution means only  an attitude of live and let live developing  into  the attitude of live and help live."(2) The  fundamental postulate of personal liberty excludes  any power of the State to standardize and socialize its children by  forcing them to attend public schools only.  A child  is not a mere creature of the State.  Those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right coupled with high duty  to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. (3) The parental right in education is the very pivotal point of a  democratic  system.  It is the touchstone  of  difference between  democratic  education  and  monolithic  system   of cultural  totalitarianism.  When the modern State  with  its immense  power  embarks upon the mission  of  educating  its children, the whole tendency is towards state monopoly.  The fundamental right of the religious and linguistic minorities to  establish  and administer  educational  institutions  of their  choice  is  the only legal  barrier  to  confine  the bursting  expansionism  of the  new  Educational  Leviathan. Great  diversity of opinion exists among the people of  this country concerning the best way to train children for  their place in society.  Because of these differences and  because of  reluctance  to  permit  a single  iron  cast  system  of education to be imposed upon a nation compounded of  several strains,  the  Constitution  has  provided  this  right   to religious and linguistic minorities. ’Today,  education  is an important function  cf  State  and local governments.  Compulsory-- school attendance laws  and the  mounting expenditure for education both  demonstrate  a recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society.   It  is required in the performance  of  our  most basic public responsibilities.  If is the very foundation of good  citizenship.   Today it is a principal  instrument  in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later  professional  training and in helping him  to  adjust normally   to  his  environment  [see  Brown  v.  Board   of

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Education(4)]. If  there is a symbol of democracy in education, it  is  not the  public school as the single democratic school.   Rather it  is  the  co-existence of several types  of  schools  and colleges  including  affiliated  colleges on  a  tooting  of judicial  equality with a consequent  proportionately  equal measure of State encouragement and support.  And,  juridical equality postulates that the religious minority should  have a  guaranteed  right  to establish and  administer  its  own educational  institutions  where  it  can  imp-art   secular education in a religious atmosphere. (1)  Dr. Radhakrishnan’s Foreword to Dr. S. Abid  Hussain’s, National Culture of India, p. vii. (2)  Hoarace  M. Kallen, Secularism is the Will of God,  pp. 11, 12 and 13 (3)  See Pierce v. Society of Sisters of Holy Names, 268 US. 510, 535. (4)  349 U.S. 294. 256 The  State’s  interest in secular education may  be  defined broadly as an interest in ensuring that children within  its boundaries acquire a minimum level of competency in  skills, as well as a minimum amount of information and knowledge  in certain  subjects.   Without such skill  and  knowledge,  an individual  will  be  at  a  severe  disadvantage  both   in participating in democratic self-government and in earning a living.   No  one can question the constitutional  right  of parents to satisfy their State-imposed obligation to educate their  children  by  sending them  to  schools  or  colleges established and administered by their own religious minority so  long as these, schools and colleges meet  the  standards established for secular education. The  concept  of, the common pattern  of  secular  education needs  to  be  brought  down to the  earth  of  reality  and divested  of  its  fuzzy  mystification.   The  concept  has nothing   to  do  with  an  artificial   government-promoted levelling  of all differences.  The public school is  not  a temple  in which all children are to be baptized into  unity of  secular democratic faith, while those who stand  without are faintly heretical. "In  democratic countries therefore the freedom of  offering education  of different types with different  values  within the  framework of the constitution should not be  needlessly circumscribed.   This  is  intimately  connected  with   the freedom  of  thought.  The control over  colleges  suggested above  should be such as to secure ultimately observance  of these  high principles by colleges of their own  accord  and not through fear of action by the, university".(1). Whatever spiritual mission of promoting unity the government may have, it is conditioned by its primal duty of  promoting justice, respecting guaranteed rights and ensuring  equality of differences. The framers of the Constitution were not unaware that  under the  system which they created, most of the  legislative  or governmental  curtailments  of  the  guaranteed  fundamental rights  will have the support of legislative  judgment  that public  interest will be served by its curtailment  than  by its constitutional protection.  There can be no surrender of constitutional  protection,  of the right of  minorities  to popular   will  masquerading  as  the  common  ’pattern   of education.  This is the reason why this Court has, time  and again  pointed  to the importance of  a  searching  judicial enquiry  into  legislative  judgment  in  situations   where prejudice against discrete and insular minorities : may tend to  curtail  rights  intended to  protect  them.   That  the

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minorities  might be unable to find protection in  political process and, therefore, the Court might appropriately regard their  interest  with special solicitude  was  suggested  by Stone,  J.  in  his famous foot-note  to  United  States  v. Carolene Prod., Co. (2) Over the years, this Court has held that without recognition or affiliation, there can be no real or meaningful  exercise of  the  right  to  establish  and  administer   educational institutions  under  Article  30(1) (see In  re  The  Kerala Education Bill, 1957(1) (at 1067-68); Rev. (1)  See   Report  of  the  Committee  on  ’Model  Act   for Universities’, Chapter V:     Colleges     and     Students’ Welfare, p 28. (2) 304, U. S. 144. 257 Sidhajbhai  Sabhai and    others v., State     of  Bombay(2) and                D.A.V. College, etc. v State   of  punjab and Others(3).               Let  us  now  examine  the  validity  of,  the               argument   that   as  there   is   no   right,               fundamental  or otherwise, to  recognition  or               affiliation   the  government   may   withhold               recognition or affiliation, for any reason  or               impose   any  condition  for  the  same,   and               consequently,  it  may withhold or  revoke  it               even though the reason for doing so may be the               minority’s    refusal   to    surrender    its               constitutional   rights  to   administer   the               institution.   This  argument  is  phrased  in               syllogistic  terms  Article  30(1)  does   not               confer a fundamental right upon a religious or               linguistic  minority to obtain recognition  or               affiliation;  a State Legislature has no  duty               or  obligation  to  set  up  or  establish   a               university with facilities for affiliation  of               educational  institutions,  let  alone   those               established and administered by the  religious               or  linguistic minorities; in fact, there  are               many  universities  which  are  only  teaching               universities and which do not provide for  any               facility  for affiliation; if the  legislature               is competent to establish universities without               providing  any  facility  for  affiliation  or               recognition and thereby withhold  affiliation,               it  may grant it in a limited form  since  the               greater  power of withholding absolutely  must               necessarily   include  the  lesser  power   of               granting  it with restrictions and  conditions               and,  therefore, the legislature has power  to               impose   conditions  on  affiliated   colleges               established and administered by the  religious               or linguistic minorities which result in their               becoming  constituent  colleges,  And,  as   a               corollary  to this argument, it  is  submitted               that the recipient of the benefit or facility,               namely, the. religious or linguistic minority,               is not deprived of its fundamental right since               it may retain its fundamental right simply  by               rejecting the preferred benefit or facility. We  think  that dangerous consequences will  follow  if  the logic of the argument. is accepted in all cases.  The  rapid rise  in the, number of government regulatory  and’  welfare programmes,  coupled with the multiplication of  government, contracts  resulting  from expanded’  budgets,  has  greatly increased  the total number of benefits or privileges  which

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can   be  conferred  by  government.  thus   affording   the government  countless new opportunities to bargain’ for  the surrender  of  constitutional rights.  With  the  growth  of spending power of the State-& necessary accompaniment of the modern welfare State-the potentiality of control through the power of purse has grown apace. (4) (1)  (1959) 1 S. C. R. 995 (2)  [1963] 3 S.C.R. a37, 856 (4)  See "The New Property’- by Charlesl A Reich,  yrde  Law journal 733- (3) [1971] Supp, S. C. A. 688, 709 258 Though the courts have recognized that article 14 applies to public  benefits and public employment as fully as to  other acts of State, they are less quick to demand  constitutional justification when a benefit or privilege like  recognition, affiliation  or aid is so conditioned that, to get  it,  one must surrender some part of one’s basic freedoms. The  story  begins with the judgment of  Justice  Holmes  in McAuliffe v. New Bedford(1) where he despatched the petition of a policeman who had been discharged from his service  for violating  a  regulation  which  restricted  his   political activities  by  saying  that  "the  petitioner  may  have  a constitutional  right  to  talk  politics:  but  he  has  no constitutional  right to be a policeman. The servant  cannot complain  as  he  takes the employment on  terms  which  are offered to him." The notion that "the petitioner has no constitutional  right to be a policeman although he has a constitutional right  to talk politics" is a specific application of the larger  view that no one has a constitutional right to government largess or privilege and is much the same as the argument here  that a   religious  or  linguistic  minority   administering   as educational  institution  has  no right  to  recognition  or affiliation, though it has a fundamental right to  establish or  administer it.  This aphorism of Mr. Justice Holmes  has had a seductive influence in the development of this  branch of the law. In  Davis  v.  Massachusetts(2)  the  appellant  had   be-en convicted  of  making  a speech on  the  Boston  Common,  in violation  of a city ordinance forbidding, inter  alia,  the making  of any public address upon public grounds without  a permit from the mayor.  The conviction bad been affirmed  by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in an opinion by  Justice Holmes, in which he said               "The   argument   that   the   ordinance   was               unconstitutional  involves  the same  kind  of               fallacy  that was dealt with in  McAuliffe  v.               New Bedford.(1) It assumes that the  ordinance               is directed against free speech  generally....               whereas  in  fact it is  directed  toward  the                             modes in which Boston Common may be us ed."               He continued, in language quoted by the United               States   Supreme   Court  in   affirming   the               judgment:               "For    the    legislature    absolutely    or               conditionally  to forbid public speaking in  a               highway   or  public  park  is  no   more   an               infringement of the rights of a member of  the               public  than for the owner of a private  house               to   forbid   it  in  his  house.    When   no               proprietary right interferes, the  legislature               may end the right of the public to enter  upon               the  public  place by putting an  end  to  the

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             dedication to public uses.  So it may take the               lesser  step  of limiting the  public  use  to               certain purposes."               The Supreme Court then said: (1)  155 Mass., 216. (2) 167 U. S. 43. 259               "The right to absolutely exclude all right  to               use,  necessarily  includes the  authority  to               determine  under what circumstances  such  use               may  be  availed  of,  as  the  greater  power               contains the lesser (at 48)." When he took his seat in the United States Supreme Court  in 1902,  Justice  Holmes  still adhered  to  the  views  about conditional  privileges which he had expressed in  McAuliffe v.  New  Bedford(supra) and Davis  v.  Massachusetts.(supra) Writing for the court in Pullman Co. v. Adams(1) he disposed summarily  of a contention that a tax on local business  was so  heavy  as to burden the inter-state  operations  of  the Pullman Company saying: "The  Company  cannot  complain  of  being  taxed  for   the privilege of doing a local business which it is free to  re- nounce. And,  when in 1910, the majority of the Court swung  to  the Opposite  position  in Western Union Co.  v.  Kansas,(2)  he dissented saying               "Even in the law the whole generally  includes               its parts.  If the State may prohibit, it  may               prohibit  with the privilege of  avoiding  the                             prohibition in a certain way."               A very perceptive critic has written               "The  pith  of  his  (Holmes’)  argument   was               expressed  in the aphorism: ’Even in  the  law               the  whole generally includes its parts’.   He               thus   implies  that  the  ’power   of   total               exclusion is a ’whole’, of which the power  to               impose   any  burdens  whatsoever   on   these               admitted is a ’part’               He went on to say               "Logically  a  thing which may  be  absolutely               excluded is not the same as a thing which  may               be  subjected to burdens of a different  kind,               even though such burdens would be regarded  by               all  as  less  onerous  than  the  burden   of               absolute  exclusion.  The ’power  of  absolute               exclusion’ is a term not indentical with  the,               power of relative exclusion’ or the ’power  to               impose any burdens whatsoever’ ". When  Justice Holmes was out-voted in the case  referred  to above  and  its  companion cases, he  accepted  the  result. Eight  years later we find him saying for a unanimous  court in  Western Union Tel.  Co. v. Foster(4), which struck  down an interference with inter-state commerce :               "It is suggested that the State gets the power               from  its power over the streets which  it  is               necessary for the telegraph  (1) 189 U. S. 420.       (2) 216 U. S. 1. (3)  See  Thomas  Read Powell: 16 Columbia Law Rev.  99,  at 110-111. (4)  247 U. S. 105. 260               to   cross.   But  if  we  assume   that   the               plaintiffs   in  error  under  their   present               characters could be excluded from the streets,               the   consequence  would  not  follow.    Acts

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             generally lawful may become unlawful when done               to accomplish an unlawful end...... and      a               constitutional power cannot be used by way  of               condition  to   attain   an   unconstitutional               result" (at 114).                                        (emphasis added) The  orthodox  American  doctrine was that the  right  of  a foreign   corporation  to  transact  business   within   the boundaries  of  a state depends entirely  upon  the  state’s permission.   That seemed to offer a means of  accomplishing the  desired  result.   If the states had  power  to  refuse admittance to foreign corporations entirely, with or without cause,  surely  they  might exact in  return  for  admission whatever they wished.  If so, a promise, prior to admission, not  to  resort  to the federal courts, or  a  liability  to expulsion in case of such a resort, required as the price of admission, would seem to be a legitimate and effective means of attaining the desired end.  In the case of Insurance  Co. v.  Morse(1)  the  Supreme Court of the United  States  held void a statute requiring an agreement not to remove suits to the federal courts as a condition ,precedent to,  admission. This decision was based upon the ground, supported by  dicta expressed in the two earlier cases, that the exaction of the agreement was an attempt to interfere with the exercise of a right  derived  from the Constitution and the  laws  of  the United States.  While the term "unconstitutional  condition" was not specifically employed in the opinion, the case seems clearly  to  be the fountainhead of the doctrine  which  now goes by that name(2). The  doctrine  of  "unconstitutional  condition"  means  any stipulation  imposed  upon  the  grant  of  a   governmental privilege  which  in effect requires the  recipient  of  the privilege  to  relinquish some constitutional  right.   This doctrine takes for granted that ’the petitioner has no right to  be  a  policeman’  but it emphasizes  the  right  he  is conceded  to possess by reason of an explicit  provision  of the Constitution, namely, his right "to talk politics".  The major  requirement  of  the  doctrine  is  that  the  person complaining of the condition must demonstrate that it is un- reasonable  in  the  special sense that  it  takes  away  or abridges  the exercise of a right protected by  an  explicit provision of the Constitution (see William W. Van Alstyne  : "The   Demise   of  the   Right-Privilege   Distinction   in Constitution Law").(3) In  Frost  and Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad  Comm.(4)  the Supreme  Court  of  United States  was  concerned  with  the question  of  the  validity  of  a  statute  of   California requiring a certificate of public convenience and  necessity to  be secured by carrirs, whether common or private,  as  a prerequisite  to carying on their business over  the  public highways  of  the  state.  The Act was  interpreted  by  the Supreme Court as imposing upon the applicant the  obligation to assume the duties and (1)  20 Wall. 445, 447 (U.  S. 1874). (2)  See   "Unconstitutional  Conditions"  by   Maurice   H. Merrill, 77 University of Pennsylvania Law Rev., 879, 880. (3) 81 Hary.  Law Rev., 1439.  (4) 271 U. S. 583. 261 liabilities of a common carrier as a condition precedent  to the  issuance  of the certificate It held  the  statute,  so construed, unconstitutional, primarily on the ground that to force the ’status of a common carrier upon a private carrier against his will amounts to deprivation of property  without due  process of law.  To the suggestion that, as  the  state might  deny the use of its highways altogether as  carriers,

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it might make its permission conditional upon assumption  of the public utility status, the Court responded that to do so would  be  using the power of refusal to reach  a  forbidden result,  and  hence would itself be  unconstitutional.   Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the majority observed :               "It   is  not  necessary  to   challenge   the               proposition  that,  as  a  general  rule,  the               state,  having power to deny as  a.  privilege               altogether, may grant it upon such  conditions               as it sees fit to impose; but the power of the               state  in that respect is not  unlimited,  and               one  of  the limitations is that  it  may  not               impose    conditions   which    require    the               relinquishment of constitutional rights.  If               the  state  may compel the  surrender  of  one               constitutional  right  as a condition  of  its               favour, it may, in like manner, compel   a               surrender  of all.  It is  inconceivable  that               guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the               United  States may thus be manipulated out  of               existence." (at p. 593). This  decision clearly declares that, though the  state  may have privileges within its control which it may withhold, it cannot  use I a grant of those privileges to secure a  valid consent  to  acts  which, if imposed  upon  the  grantee  in invitum would be beyond its constitutional power. The  argument of Mr. Justice Sutherland was, that there  was involved  in  cases like this, not a single power,  but  two distinct powers and one of these, the power to prohibit  the use  of  the  public highways in  proper  cases,  the  state possesses;  and  the other, the power to  compel  a  private carrier to assume against his will the duties and burdens of a common carrier, the state does not possess.  According  to him,  it  is  clear that any attempt to  exert  the  latter, separately and substantively must fall before the  paramount authority of the Constitution.  Then the question is,  could it  stand in the conditional form in which it is made ?  The learned   judge   said   that  if  this   could   be   done, constitutional guarantees,    so    carefully    safeguarded against direct assault, areopen  to  destruction  by  the indirect, but no less effective, process of requiringa surrender,     which,  though  in form  voluntary,  in  fact lacks non of  the elements of compulsion.  In  reality, the carrier is given no choice,except  a choice  between the rock and the whirlpool--an option toforego        a privilege which may be vital to his livelihood or submit  to arequirement which   may   constitute   an   intolerable burden. This is much the same as what Das, C.J. said inIn  re   : The Kerala     Education Bill(1) :               "No  educational  institutions can  in  actual               practice  be carried on without aid  from  the               State and if they will not get it unless  they               surrender their rights, they will, by com- (1)[1959] S. C. R. 99 262 pulsion  of financial necessities, be compelled to  give  up their rights under Article 30(1)". In this situation, the condition which involves surrender is as effective a deterrent to the exercise of the right  under Article  30  ( 1 ) as a direct prohibition would  be.   Thus considered, it is apparent that the religious, minority does not voluntarily waive its right-it has been coerced  because of  the basic importance of the privilege involved,  namely, affiliation.

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It  is doubtful whether the fundamental right under  Article 30(1)  can be bartered away or surrendered by any  voluntary act  or  that  it can be waived.  The  reason  is  that  the fundamental  right is vested in a plurality of persons as  a unit  or  if  we  may say so,  in  a  community  of  persons necessarily  fluctuating.   Can  the present  members  of  a minority community barter away or surrender the right  under the article so as to bind its future members as a unit ? The fundamental  right  is  for the  living  generation.   By  a voluntary  act of affiliation of an educational  institution established  and  administered by a religious  minority  the past members of the community cannot surrender the right  of the future members of that community.  The future members of the community do not derive the right under Article 30(1) by succession or inheritance. The   demise  of  the  unconstitutional  condition  in   the corporation  field, however, did not result  in  terminating the  use of the same reasoning in other areas.  The  courts, faced  with laws requiring the surrender  of  constitutional rights  in connection with other activities,  have  borrowed phrases  and  reasoning from the cases  dealing  with  state control  of  corporations  and  have  transplanted  them  to contemporary  decisions involving numerous  and  diversified subjects.(1) "Congress may withhold all sorts of facilities for a  better life"  wrote  Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the  Douds  case(2) "but if it affords them it cannot make them available in  an obviously  arbitrary  way  or exact  surrender  of  freedoms unrelated to the purpose of the facilities,". Professor  Hale  said that a state may not, by  attaching  a condition  to  a privilege, bring about  undue  interference with  the workings of the federal system; and also, that  it may   not   in  this  fashion  require  the   surrender   of constitutional rights unless the surrender ’serves a purpose germane to that for which the power can normally be  exerted without  conditions.(3)  The latter limitation, it  will  be noted,  is  essentially the same as that voiced  by  Justice Frankfurter  in  the Douds Case (2) that  Congress  may  not ’exact surrender of freedoms unrelated to the purpose of the facilities’. The most significant characteristic of the power to impose a condition in this area is the relevancy of the condition  to the attainment of the objective involved in the grant of the privilege or benefit. (1)  See 28 Indian Law Jornal, Notes: "Judicial Acquiescence in   the  For-feiture  of  Constitutional   Rights   through Expansion of the Conditioned Privilege Doctrine", 520, 525. (2)American  Communications Assoc. v. Douds. 339 U. S.  382, 417. (3)  See  "Unconstitutional  Conditions  and  Constitutional Rights", 35 Columbia ’Law Rev., 321 357. 263 A condition may be invalidated onthe ground that denying a benefit or privilege because of the exercise of a right in effect  penalizes  its  exercise (see  Steinberg  v.  United States  (1). in Sherbert v. Verner(2), the  doctrine  of "Unconstitutional condition" has been applied by the  United States  Supreme  Court  to forbid a  state,  to  discontinue unemployment  benefits to a Seventh Day  Adventist  refusing Saturday employment on account of the day being the  Sabbath day of her faith.  ’the-Court said :               "Nor   may   the   South   Carolina    Court’s               construction  of  the statute  be  saved  from               constitutional  infirmity on the  ground  that               unemployment  compensation  benefits  are  not

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             appellants, ’right’ but merely a  ’privilege’.               It  is too late in the day to doubt  that  the               liberties of religion , and expression may  be               infringed  by  the  denial of  or  placing  of               conditions   upon  a  benefit  or   privilege.               American Communications Asso v. Douds  (supra)               Wieman  v. Undegraff,(3) Hannegan v.  Esquire,               Inc(4)". A  state  refused  to grant subsidies in  the  form  of  tax exemptions  to,  veterans of Church groups who  declined  to sign loyalty oaths.  That was held unconstitutional  because it  implied  the  use- of subsidies as  a  to  curtail  non- criminal speech (see Speiser v. Randall(5). in that case the Court said :               "To deny an exemption to claimants who  engage               in  certain  forms of speech is in  effect  to               penalize them for such speech.  Its  deterrent               effect  is  the same as if the State  were  to               fine them for their speech.  The appellees are               plainly  mistaken  in  their  argument   that,               because  a tax exemption is a ’privilege,’  or               ’bounty’, its denial may not infringe  speech.               This  contention  did not prevail  before  the               California   Courts,  which  recognized   that               conditions   imposed  upon  the  granting   of               privileges or gratuities must be ’reasonable’                "So  here, the denial of a tax exemption  for               engaging  in certain speech necessarily,  will               have  the effect of coercing the claimants  to               refrain from the prescribed speech.... A  condition  may  be invalidated on yet  another  ground  : precluding,  from   participation  in  the  enjoyment  of  a privilege  or benefit those who Wish to retain their  rights would  seem  an  unreasonable  classification  violative  of article 14.  The discriminatory nature-of the imposition of’ the   conditions  has  been  alluded  to  by   Mr.   Justice Frankfurter   in   his  concurring   opinion   in   American Communications.    Association   v.  Douds   (supra).    The Additional  Solicitor General argued that the State  is  not denying  equality before the law because the burden  of  the condition (1)  163 F. Supp. 590. 592. (3)  344 US 183, 191, 192. (2)  374 U. S. 398, 404-405. (4)  327 US 146, 155, 156. (5) 357 U. S. 513, 518-9. 264 applies  to  all recipients, namely, all who  establish  and administer   educational  institutions   imparting   secular education  and seek recognition or affiliation whether  they be religious or linguistic minorities or not.  The  Argument is  that  a benefit-burden package viz.,  the  privilege  of affiliation  with  all  the  conditions,  is  being  offered without  discrimination; that the, State or university  does not withhold the privilege from any persons or entities, but that the person or entity himself or itself decides  whether to  accept  or reject it.  We are of the  opinion  that,  in fact,  everyone is not being offered the same package  since the  condition  serves as a significant restriction  on  the activities  only of those who have the fundamental right  of the   nature  guaranteed  by  article  30(1),  namely,   the religious  and  linguistic  minorities, and  who  desire  to exercise  the right required to be waived as a condition  to the receipt of the privilege.  It is contradictory to  speak of a constitutional right and yet to discriminate against  a

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person who exercises that right. To  avoid  invalidation  of  a condition  on  any  of  these grounds,  it would seem necessary to show that the  granting of  the  benefit  or privilege places  the  recipient  in  a position   which  gives  the  State  or  the  university   a legitimate  interest in regulating his rights.   It  appears that  there are two legitimate interests which  may  justify such regulation.  First is the interest in ensuring that the benefit or facility given or granted, namely, recognition or affiliation  is  maintained for the  purposes  intended,  in order  to  protect the effectiveness of the benefit  or  the facility itself.  Second, social interests must be protected against   those  whose  capacity  for  inflicting  harm   is increased by possession of the benefit or facility(1). An  examination  of the traditional bases of  the  power  to impose  conditions upon governmental benefits or  privileges would  reveal that the power to impose conditions is  not  a lesser part of the greater power to withhold, but instead is a  distinct  exercise  of  power which  must  find  its  own justification, and that the power to withhold recognition or affiliation  altogether  does not carry  with  it  unlimited power  to  impose  conditions  which  have  the  effect   of restraining the exercise of fundamental rights.  The  normal desire  to enjoy privileges like affiliation or  recognition without  which the educational institutions  established  by the minority for imparting secular education will not effec- tively  serve the purpose for which they  were  established, cannot  be  made an instrument of suppression of  the  right guaranteed.    Infringement  of  a  fundamental   right   is nonetheless  infringement because accomplished  through  the conditioning of a privilege.  If a legislature attaches to a public  benefit  or  privilege  an  addendum,  which  in  no rational way advances the purposes of the scheme of benefits but  does restrain the exercise of a fundamental right,  the restraint  can  draw no constitutional  strength  whatsoever from its being attached to benefit or privilege, but must be measured as though it were a wholly separate enactment. In considering the question whether a regulation imposing  a condition  subserves  the purpose for which  recognition  or affiliation  is  granted it is necessary to have  regard  to what regulation the appropriate autho- (1)  See notes: "Unconstitutional Conditions". 74 Harv.  Law Rev. 1595. 26 5 rity  may  make  and impose in  respect  of  an  educational institution  established  and administered  by  a  religious minority  and  receiving  no recognition or  aid.   Such  an institution will, of course, be subject to the general  laws of  the  land  like the law of  taxation,  law  relating  to sanitation,   transfer  of  property,  or  registration   of documents,  etc., because they are laws affecting  not  only educational institutions established by religious minorities but  also all other persons and institutions.  It cannot  be said that by these general laws, the State in any way  takes away  or abridges the right guaranteed under article  30(1). Because article 30(1) is couched in absolute terms, it  does not  follow  that  the right guaranteed is  not  subject  to regulatory  laws which would not amount to  is  abridgement. It is a total misconception to say that because the right is couched in absolute terms, the exercise of the right  cannot be regulated or that every regulation of that right would be an abridgement of the, right.  Justice Holmes said in Hudson Country Wafer Co. v. McCarter(1)               All rights tend to declare themselves absolute               to their logical extreme.  Yet all in fact are

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             limited by the neighbourhood of principles  of               policy which are other than those on which the               particular  right is funded, and which  become               strong enough to hold their own when a certain               point is reached". No    right, however absolute, can be free from  regulation. The Privy  Council said in Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of  New South Wales(2) that regulation of freedom of  trade- and commerce is compatible with their absolute freedom; that s.  92 of the Australian Common wealth Act is violated  only when  an Act restricts commerce directly and immediately  as distinct  from  creating  some  indirect  or   consequential impediment which may fairly be regarded as remote. Likewise, the  fact that trade and commerce are absolutely free  under article  301  of the Constitution is compatible  with  their regulation which will not amount to restriction(3). The  application of the term ’abridge’ may not be  difficult in many   oases  but the problem arises acutely  in  certain types  of situations. The important ones are where a law  is not  a  direct restriction or the right but is  designed  to accomplish  another objective and the impact upon the  right is secondary or indirect. Measure- which are directed  other forms  of activities but which have a secondary or  indirect or incidental effect upon the right do not generally abridge a right unless the content    of the right is regulated.  As we  have already said, such measures would  include  various types  of taxes, economic regulations, laws regulating  tile wages,  measures to promote health and to  preserve  hygiene and  other laws of general application.  By hypothesis,  the law, taken by itself, is a legitimate one, aimed directly at the  control of some other activity. The question  is  about its   secondary   impact   upon   the   admitted   area   of administration   of   educational  institutions.   This   is especially a problem (1) 209 U. S. 349, 355, 357    (2) [1950] A.C. 235, 310. (3)The Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd., v. State  of Rajasthan and others [1963] 1 S. C. R. 491. 266 of  determining when the regulation in issue has  an  effect which constitutes an abridgement of the constitutional right within  the  meaning of Article 13(2). in  other  words,  in every  case,  the court must undertake to  define  and  give content  to  the word ’bridge’ in article 13 (2)  (1).   The question to be asked and answered is whether the  particular measure  is  regulatory or whether it crosses  the  zone  of permissible regulation and enters the forbidden territory of restrictions  or  abridgement.  So, even if  an  educational institution   established  by  a  religious  or   linguistic minority does not seek recognition, affiliation or aid,  its activity  can  be  regulated in various  ways  provided  the regulations  do  not  take away or  abridge  the  guaranteed right.   Regular tax measures, economic regulations,  social welfare  legislation, wage and hour legislation and  similar measures  may,  of course have some effect  upon  the  right under  article 30(1).  But where the burden is the  same  as that borne by others engaged in different forms of activity, the  similar impact on the right seems clearly  insufficient to constitute an abridgement, if an educational  institution established  by a religious minority seeks  no  recognition, affiliation or aid, the state may have no right to prescribe the   curriculum,  syllabi  or  the  qualification  of   the teachers. We  find it impossible to subscribe to the proposition  that State  necessity  is the criterion for  deciding  whether  a regulation imposed on an educational institution takes  away

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or abridges the right under Article 30(1).  If a legislature can  impose  any  regulation which it  thinks  necessary  to protect what in its view is in the interest of the state  or society,  the right under Article 30(1) will cease to  be  a fundamental right.  It sounds paradoxical that a right which the  Constitution  makers  wanted  to  be  absolute  can  be subjected  to  regulations  which  need  only  satisfy   the nebulous  and  elastic test of state  necessity.   The  very purpose  of  incorporating  this right in Part  III  of  the Constitution  in absolute terms in marked contrast with  the other  fundamental rights was to withdraw it from the  reach of the majority.  To subject the right today to  regulations dictated  by  the  protean concept  of  state  necessity  as conceived  by  the  majority would be to  subvert  the  very purpose for which the right was given. What   then  are  the  additional  regulations   which   can legitimately  be  imposed upon  an  educational  institution established  and administered by a religious  or  linguistic minority  which imparts general secular education and  seeks recognition or affiliation ? Recognition  or affiliation is granted on the basis  of  the excellence  of an educational institution, namely,  that  it has   reached  the  educational  standard  set  up  by   the university.   Recognition or affiliation is sought  for  the purpose   of  enabling  the  students  in   an   educational institution to sit for an examination to be conducted by the university  and  to  obtain  a,.  degree  conferred  by  the university.   For that purpose, the students should have  to be coached in such a manner so as to attain the standard  of education  prescribed  by the  university.   Recognition  or affiliation creates. an interest in the university to ensure that the educational institu- 1)  See generally the judgment of one of us (Mathew, J.)  in Bennett  Coleman & Co. etc. etc. v. Union of India &  Others [1972] 2 S. C. C. 788. 267 tion  is  maintained  for  the  purpose  intended  and   any regulation which will subserve or advance that purpose  will be reasonable and no educational institution established and administered by a religious or linguistic minority can claim recognition  or  affiliation  without  submitting  to   hose regulations.    That   is  the  price  of   recognition   or affiliation; but this does not mean that it should submit to a regulation stipulating for surrender of a right or freedom guaranteed  by the Constitution, which is unrelated  to  the purpose  of  recognition or affiliation.   In  other  words, recognition   or  affiliation  is  a,  facility  which   the university  grants  to an educational institution,  for  the purpose  of  enabling  the  students there  to  sit  for  an examination  to  be  conducted  by  the  university  in  the prescribed  subjects and to obtain the degree  conferred  by the  university, and therefore, it stands to reason to  hold that no regulation which is unrelated to the purpose can  be imposed.    If,  besides  recognition  or  affiliation,   an educational institution conducted by a religious minority is granted  aid, further regulations for ensuring that the  aid is utilized for the purpose for which it is granted will  be permissible.  The heart of the matter is that no educational institution   established  by  a  religious  or   linguistic minority  can claim total immunity from regulations  by  the legislature  or  the university if it wants  affiliation  or recognition;   but   the  character   of   the   permissible regulations  must  depend upon their purpose.  As  we  said, such regulations will be permissible if they are relevant to the  purpose  of’  securing  or  promoting  the  object   of

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recognition or affiliation.  There will be borderline  cases where it is difficult to decide whether a regulation  really subserves  the purpose of recognition or  affiliation.   But that  does not affect the question of principle.   In  every case,  when the reasonableness of a regulation comes up  for consideration before the court, the question to be asked and answered is whether the regulation is calculated to subserve or  will  in effect subserve the purpose of  recognition  or affiliation, namely, the excellence of the institution as  a vehicle’  for  general  secular education  to  the  minority community  and  to  other persons who  resort  to  it.   The question whether a regulation is in the general interest  of the  public  has no relevance, if it does  not  advance  the excellence  of  the  institution as a  vehicle  for  general secular  education  as, ex-hypothesi, the  only  permissible regulations are impose which secure the effectiveness of the purpose  of  the  facility, namely, the  excellence  of  the educational  institutions  in respect of  their  educational standards.   This is the reason why this Court has time  and again said that the question whether a particular regulation is calculated t.o advance the general public interest is  of no  consequence if it is not conducive to the  interests  of the minority community and those persons who, resort to it. In Sidhajbhai v. State of Bombay(1), the Court said that  no general principle on which reasonableness or otherwise of  a regulation  may be tested was sought to be laid down by  the court  in  In re : The Kerala Education Bill,  1957(2)  and, therefore, the case is not an authority for the  proposition that  all regulative measure-, which are not destructive  or annihilative of the character of the institution established by the minority can be imposed if the regulations are in the national  or public interest.  The Court further  said  that unlike the fundamental freedoms guaran- (2)  [1959] S.C.R. 995. (1) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 837, 856-857. 268 teed by article 19, the right guaranteed under article 30(1) is not subject to reasonable restrictions and that the right is  intended to be errective and is not to be whittled  down by  so-called regulative measures conceived in the  interest not  of  the minority educational institution,  but  of  the public  or  the nation as a whole.  It was the view  of  the Court that regulations which may lawfully be imposed  either by  legislature  or  executive  action  as  a  condition  of receiving  grant  or of recognition must  be  ,,directed  to making  the institution, while retaining its character as  a minority institution effective as an educational institution and that suck regulation must satisfy a dual tes the test of reasonableness, namely the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution and is conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it. In  State  of  Kerala  v.  Mother  Provincial(1)  the  Court said--we  think  in relation to an  educational  institution which  seeks  recognition  or  aid  that  the  standards  of education  are  not a part of management as such,  that  the standards  of  education concern the body  politic  and  are dictated by considerations of the advancement of the country and  its  people and, therefore, if  universities  establish syllabi  for examinations, they must be  followed,  subject, however, to special subjects which the institutions may seek to  teach,  and  to  a certain extent  the  State  may  also regulate  the conditions of employment of teachers  and  the health and hygiene of students and that these regulations do not bear directly upon management as such although they  may

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indirectly affect it.  The Court said further that the right of  the state to regulate education,  educational  standards and  allied  matters  cannot be denied  since  the  minority institutions cannot be allowed to fall below the  standards, or  under  the guise of exclusive right  of  management,  to decline  to  follow the general pattern and that  while  the management  must be left to them, they may be  compelled  to keep in step with others.  What the Court said in answer  to the   contention  of  Mr.  Mohan  Kumaramangalam  that   the provisions  in the Kerala University Act which  were  struck down were conceived in the interest of general education  is instructive in this context               "  Mr.  Mohan Kumaramangalam  brought  to  our               notice   passages  from  the  Report  of   the               Education  Commission in which the  Commission               bad made suggestions regarding the  conditions               of  service  of  the  teaching  staff  in  the               universities and the colleges and standards of               teaching.   He also referred to the Report  of               the  Education  Commission on  the  status  of               teachers,   suggestions  for   improving   the               teaching  methods and standard-,.   He  argued               that   what  has  been  done  by  the   Kerala               University   Act   is   to   implement   these               suggestions  in  Chapters  VIII  and  IX   and               particularly  the impugned sections.  We  have               no  doubt that the provisions of the Act  were               made   bona  fide  and  in  the  interest   of               education but unfortunately they do affect the               administration  of these institutions and  rob               the   founders   of  that  right   which   the               Constitution desires should (1)  [1971] 1 S.C.R. 734.                             269               be theirs.  The provisions, even if  salutary,               cannot stand in the face of the constitutional               guarantee.   We  do not,  therefore,  find  it               necessary to refer to the two reports." In  the  light of the above discussion let  us  examine  the validity   of  the  impugned  provisions  of   the   Gujarat University Act, 1949, as subsequently amended. Section 33A(1) (a) provides "33A(1) Every College (other than a Government college, or a college maintained by the Government) affiliated before  the commencement of the Gujarat University (Amendment) Act, 1972 (hereinafter   in   this  section  referred  to   as   "such commencement")-               (a)   shall  be  under  the  management  of  a               governing  body  which shall  include  amongst               its.  members the Principal of the College,  a               representative of the University nominated  by               the Vice Chancellor, and three representatives               of  the teachers of the college and  at  least               one representative each of the members of  the               non-teaching  staff  and the students  of  the               college,  to  be  elected  respectively   from               amongst  such  teachers, members of  the  non-               teaching staff and students; and               (b)   that  for recruitment of  the  Principal               and members of the teaching staff of a college               there is a selection committee of the  college               which shall include-               (1)   in  the  case  of  recruitment  of   the               Principal, a representative of the  University               nominated by the Vice-Chancellor, and

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             (2)   in  the case of recruitment of a  member               of  the  teaching  staff  of  the  college,  a               representative of the University nominated  by               the  Vice  Chancellor  and  the  Head  of  the               Department if any, concerned with the  subject               to be taught by such member." We think that the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (1) (b) of  s.  33A abridge the right of the religious  minority  to administer  educational institutions of their  choice.   The requirement  that the college should have a  governing  body which shall include persons other than those who are members of  the  governing body of the Society of Jesus  would  take away  the management of the college from the governing  body constituted  by  the  Society  of Jesus and  vast  it  in  a different  body.   The right to administer  the  educational institution established by a religious minority is vested in it.   It  is in the governing body of the Society  of  Jesus that he religious minority which established the college has vested the right to administer the institution and that body alone has the right to administer the same.  The requirement that  the  college should have a  governing  body  including persons  other than those who constitute the governing  body of  the  Society of Jesus has the effect of  divesting  that body of its 270 -exclusive  right  to manage  the  educational  institution. That  it is desirable in the opinion of the  legislature  to associate the Principal of the college or the other  persons referred to in s. 33A(1)(a) in the management of the college is  not a relevant consideration.  The question  is  whether the provision has the effect of divesting the governing body as  constituted by the religious minority of  its  exclusive right  to  administer the institution.  Under the  guise  of preventing  maladministration,  the right of  the  governing body of the college constituted by the religious minority to administer the institution cannot be taken away.  The effect of  the provision is that the religious  minority  virtually loses  its  right  to  administer  the  institution  it  has founded.  "Administration means ’management of the  affairs’ of the institution.  This management must be free of control so  that  the  founders  or their  nominees  can  mould  the institution  according  to  their way  of  thinking  and  in accordance  with  their ideas of how the  interests  of  the community in general and the institution in particular  will be  best  served.  No part of this management can  be  taken away  and  ,vested in another body without  an  encroachment upon  the guaranteed right (1)".  Sections 48 and 49 of  the Kerala University Act, 1969, which came up for consideration in that case respectively dealt with ,the governing body for private  colleges  not under corporate  management  and  the managing  council  for  private  colleges  under   corporate management.   Under  the provisions of these  sections,  the educational  agency  or  the  corporate  management  was  to establish   a   governing  body  or   a   managing   council respectively.  The sections provided for the composition  of the  two  bodies.   It was held that the  sections  had  the effect of abridging the right to administer the  educational institution  of  the religious minority in  question  there. One  of the grounds given in the judgment for upholding  the decision  of  the High Court striking down the  sections  is that  these  bodies had a legal  personality  distinct  from governing bodies set up by the educational agency or the -corporate  management and that they were not answerable  to the  founders  in  the  matter  of  administration  of   the educational  institution.  The Court said that a  law  which

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interferes with the composition of the governing body or the managing.  council  as  constituted  by  the  religious   or linguistic  minority is an abridgement of the right  of  the religious   minorities   to   administer   the   educational institution  established  by  it  (see  also  W.  Proost  v. Bihar(2) and Rev.  Bishop S. K. Parto v. Bihar(3). It is upon the principal and teachers of a college that  the tone  and temper of an educational institution  depend.   On them would its reputation, the maintenance of discipline and its  efficiency  in  teaching.   The  right  to  choose  the principal  and  to have the teaching conducted  by  teachers appointed by the management after ,an overall assessment  of their  outlook and philosophy is perhaps the most  important facet of the right to administer an educational institution. We  can  perceive  no reason why  a  representative  of  the University nominated by the Vice Chancellor should be on the (1)See  Kerala v.  Mother Provincial, [1971] 1 S.C.R.  734 at 740. (2) [1969] 2 S. C. R. 73 at 77-78. (3) [197] 1 S. C. R. 172. 271 Selection Committee for recruiting the Principal or for  the insistence   ,of   head  of  the  department   besides   the representative  of  the University being  on  the  Selection Committee for recruiting the members of the teaching  staff. So  long  as  the persons  chosen  have  the  qualifications prescribed by the University, the choice must be left to the management.   That is part of the fundamental right  of  the minorities   to  administer  the   educational   institution established by them. Section 40(1) provides that the Court (senate) may determine that  all instructions, teaching and training in courses  of studies  in respect of which the university is competent  to hold  examination  shall,  within  the  university  area  be conducted  by  the university and shall be imparted  by  the teachers  of the university and the Court shall  communicate its decision to the State Government.  Sub-section (2) of s. 40   says  that  on  receipt  of  the  communication   under subsection  (1),  the  Government  may,  after  making  such inquiry  as it thinks ,fit, by notification in the  Official Gazette declare that the provisions of s. 41 shall come into force on such date as may be specified. The  petitioner contends that this section  virtually  takes away the very essence of the night of the religious minority to administer the college in question. To decide this question, it is necessary to read some of the other provisions. Section  2(2) defines a ’college’ as a degree college or  an intermediate   college.    Section  2(2A)  states   that   a ’constituent  college’  means  a university  college  or  an affiliated college made constituent under s. 41.  A  ’degree college’  has  been  defined by s.  2(3)  as  an  affiliated college  which  is authorized to submit its students  to  an examination  qualifying  for any degree of  the  university. Section 2(13) provides               "Teachers  of  the University"  means  teacher               appointed  by  the  University  for  imparting               instruction on its behalf". Section  2(15A) states that a "University college"  means  a college which the University may establish or maintain under the  Act  or  a college transferred to  the  University  and maintained by it. On the plain wording of s. 40 it is clear that the governing body of the religious minority will be deprived of the  most vital  function which appertains to its right to  administer

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the college namely, the teaching, training and  instructions in  the  courses  of  studies,  in  respect  of  which   the university   is   competent  to   hold   examination.    The fundamental  right of a minority to  administer  educational institutions   of  its  choice  comprises  within   it   the elementary   right   to  conduct   teaching   training   and instruction  in  courses of studies in the  institutions  so established by teachers appointed by the minority.  If  this essential component of the right of administration is  taken away from the 272 minority and vested in the university, there can be no doubt that  its  right to administer the  educational  institution guaranteed under article 30(1) is taken away. Section 39 provides that the university shall conduct  post- graduate  instructions.  That means that teaching,  training and  instruction in post-graduate courses will be  conducted by  the  university.  The word conduct occurring  in  s.  40 cannot have a meaning different from what it has in s.39. If in  s.  39  it means that the university  is  the  exclusive teaching  and training agency in post-graduate  instruction, there is no reason to think that any vestige of the right to teach, trait or instruct will be left to the minority  after these  matters  are  taken  over  by  the  university.   The teaching and training in the college will thereafter be done by  the teachers of the university for and on behalf of  the university.   The  definition of the term ’teachers  of  the university’  given in s. 2(13) would indicate that they  are teachers   appointed   by  the  university   for   imparting instruction on its behalf. If  this  section is ultra vires article 30(1),  we  do  not think that s.  41 which in the present scheme of legislation is dependent upon s.     40 can survive and therefore it  is unnecessary  to express any view upon the  constitutionality of its provisions. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of s. 51A read "51A(1)  No member of the teaching, other academic and  non- teaching  staff of an affiliated college and  recognized  or approved  institution  shall  be  dismissed  or  removed  or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed  of the charges against him and given a  reasonable opportunity  or being heard in respect of those charges  and until-               (a)   he   has   been   given   a   reasonable               opportunity  of making representation  on  any               such penality proposed to be inflicted on him,               and               (b)   the  penalty to be inflicted on  him  is               approved  by the Vice Chancellor or any  other               officer  of the university authorised  by  the               Vice Chancellor in this behalf.               (2) No     termination  of  Service,  of  such               member  not  amounting  to  his  dismissal  or               removal falling under sub-section (1) shall be               valid unless-               (a)   he   has   been   given   a   reasonable               opportunity   of  showing  caus  against   the               proposed termination, and               (b)   such termination is approved by the Vice               Chancellor  or any officer of  the  University               authorised  by  the Vice  Chancellor  in  this               behalf : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any person who is appointed for a temporary period only.," It was argued for the, petitioners that clause (1)(b) of  s.

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51A  has  the  effect of vesting in the  Vice  Chancellor  a general power of                             273 veto  on the right of the management to dismiss  a  teacher. The  exact scope of the power of the Vice-Chancellor  or  of the officer of the University authorized by him in this sub- section is not clear.  If the purpose of the approval is  to see  that  the  provisions  of  sub-section  51A(1)(a)   are complied with, there can possibly be no objection in lodging the  power  of  approval  even in a  nominee  of  the  Vice- Chancellor.  But an uncanalised power without any  guideline to  withhold approval would be a direct abridgement  of  the right  of the management to dismiss or remove a  teacher  or inflict any other penalty after conducting an enquiry. The  relationship  between the management and a  teacher  is that  of  an  employer  and employee  and  it  passes  one’s understanding  why  the  management  cannot  terminate   the services  of  a  teacher on the basis  of  the  contract  of employment.   of  course,  it is open to the  State  in  the exercise of its regulatory power to require that before  the services of a teacher are terminated, he should be given  an opportunity  of being heard in his defence.  But to  require that  for  terminating the services of a  teacher  after  an inquiry  has been conducted, the management should have  the approval of an outside agency like the Vice-Chancellor or of his  nominee  would  be  an  abridgement  of  its  right  to administer  the educational institution.  No guidelines  are provided  by the legislature to the Vice-Chancellor for  the exercise  of  his  power.  The fact that  the  power  on  be delegated  by  the  ViceChancellor to  any  officer  of  the university means that any petty officer to whom the power is delegated can exercise a general power of veto.  There is no obligation under the sub-sections (1)(b) and (2)(b) that the Vice  Chancellor or his nominee should give any  reason  for disapproval.   As  we  said  a  blanket  power  without  any guideline  to disapprove the action of the management  would certainly  encroach  upon  the right of  the  management  to dismiss  or  terminate the services of a  teacher  after  an enquiry.   While  we uphold the  provisions  of  sub-clauses (1)(a)  and  (2)  (a) of s. 51A we  think  that  sub-clauses (1)(b)  and  (2)(b) of, s. 51A are violative  of  the  right under article 30 of the religious minority in question here. In  In. re : The Kerala Education Bill, 1957, this Court  no doubt,  upheld provisions similar to those in  s.  51A(1)(b) and 5 1 A (2) (b) But the subsequent decisions of this Court leave  no doubt that the requirement of subsequent  approval for  dismissing  or terminating the services  of  a  teacher would  be bad as offending article 30(1). In D.A.V.  College v.  State  of  Punjab, clause 17 of  the  impugned’  statute related to the requirement of subsequent approval for termi- nation of the services of teachers.- This Court struck  down the  provision as an abridgement of the night to  administer the  educational institution established by the minority  in question there. Section  52A states that any dispute between  the  governing body and any member of the teaching, other academic and non- teaching  staff  of an affiliated college or  recognized  or approved institution, which is connected with the conditions of  service  of  such member, shall, on  a  request  of  the governing body, or of the member concerned be referred to  a Tribunal of Arbitration consisting of one -131Sup.  C.T./75 274 member  nominated by the governing body of the college,  or, as the case may be, the recognized or approved  institution,

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one  member nominated by the member concerned and an  umpire appointed by the Vice-Chancellor and that the provisions  of the   Arbitration  Act  would  apply  to  such   arbitration proceeding. This  provision sub-serves no purpose and we feel  no  doubt that  it  will  needlessly  interfere  with  the  day-to-day management of the institution.  Any and every petty  dispute raised  by  a member of the teaching or  non-teaching  staff will have to be referred to arbitration if it seems to touch the   service  conditions.   Arbitrations,   not   imparting education,  will become the business of  educational  insti- tutions.   This  section  is  in  our  opinion  bad  in  its application to minorities. In the result, we hold that the provisions of S. 33A, s. 40, subclauses  (1)(b)  and  (2)(b) of S. 51A  and  S.  52A  are violative   of  article  30(1)  of  the  Constitution   and, therefore,  they  can  have no  application  to  educational institutions  established and administered by  religious  or linguistic minorities. BEG, J. The two, questions to be answered by us are (1)Whether the impact of Article 30(1) of the Constitution upon any of the provisions of the Act before us, or, to  put it  conversely, whether the effect of any of the  provisions of  the  Act  upon  the  fundamental  rights  guaranteed  to minorities  by  Art. 30(1) is such as  to  invalidate  these provisions ? (2)Whether the rights guaranteed by Article 30 are in  any way circumscribed by Article 29 ? On the second question, I have nothing significant to add to what  has  fallen from My Lord the Chief Justice.  I  am  in entire  agreement with the view that, although, Articles  29 and 30 may supplement each other so far as certain rights of minorities   are   concerned,  yet,  Article   29   of   the Constitution  does  not, in any way, impose a limit  on  the kind  or character of education which a minority may  choose to impart through its Institution to the children of its own members  or to those of others who may choose to send  their children to its schools.  In other words, it has a right  to impart a general secular education.  I would, however,  like to point out that, as rights and duties are correlative,  it follows,  from the extent of this wider right of a  minority under   Art.   30(1)  to  impart  even   general   or   non- denominational secular education to those who may not follow its  culture  or  subscribe to its  beliefs,  that,  when  a minority Institution decides to enter this wider educational sphere  of  national education, it, by reason of  this  free choice itself, could be deemed to opt to adhere to the needs of the general pattern of such education in the country,  at least  whenever  that  choice is  made  in  accordance  with statutory  provisions.   Its choice to impart  an  education intended  to give a secular orientation or character to  its education  necessarily entails its assent to the  imperative needs  of  the choice made by the State about  the  kind  of "secular" education 275 which  promotes  national  integration  or  the,   elevating objectives set out in the preamble to our Constitution,  and the  best way of giving it.  If it is part of  a  minority’s rights  to make such a choice it should also be part of  its obligations,  which necessarily follow from the  choice,  to adhere to the general pattern.  The logical basis of such  a choice  is that the particular minority  Institution,  which chooses  to impart such general secular  education,  prefers that  higher range of freedom where, according to  the  poet Rabindranath  Tagore,  "the  narrow  domestic  walls"  which

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constitute  barriers between various sections of the  nation will  crumble and fall.  It may refuse to accept the  choice made by the State of the kind of secular education the State wants  or of the way in which it should be given.   But,  in that event, should it not be prepared to forego the benefits of  recognition by the State ? The State is bound to  permit and protect the choice of the minority Institution  whatever that  might  be.   But, can it be compelled  to  give  it  a treatment  different from that given to  other  Institutions making such a choice ? Turning to the first and the more complex question, I  think it  is  difficult to answer the argument of  the  Additional Solicitor  General,  appearing  on behalf of  the  State  of Gujarat, that, where a minority Institution has, of its  own free  will,  opted  for affiliation under  the  terms  of  a statute,  it must be deemed to have chosen to give up, as  a price  for  the  benefits resulting  from  affiliation,  the exercise  of certain rights which may, in  another  context, appear  to  be unwarranted impairments  of  its  fundamental rights. It is true that, if the object of an enactment is to  compel a  minority  Institution, even indirectly, to  give  up  the exercise  of  its fundamental rights, the  provisions  which have  this  effect will be void or inoperative  against  the minority Institution.  The price of affiliation cannot be  a total abandonment of the right to establish and administer a minority   Institution  conferred  by  Art.  30(1)  of   the Constitution.  This aspect of the matter, therefore,  raises the  question whether any of the provisions of the  Act  are intended  to have that effect upon a  minority  institution. Even  if  that intention is not manifest  from  the  express terms  of  statutory  provisions,  the  provisions  may   be vitiated  if that is their necessary consequence or  effect. I shall endeavour to show that the view which this Court has taken whenever questions of this kind have arisen before  it on  the  effect  of  the provisions  of  a  statute,  though theoretically  and  logically perhaps not  quite  consistent always  on propositions accepted, has the virtue of  leaving the result to the balancing of conflicting considerations to be  carried  out  on the  particular  provisions  and  facts involved in each case. When  we examine either the Act as a whole or  the  impugned provisions  of  the  Act  before  us,  we  find  no  mention whatsoever of anything which is directed against a  minority or its educational Institutions.  The impugned provisions of the Gujarat University Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as ’the  Act’) are : Section 20 (Clause XXXIX) inserted in  the Gujarat  University  Act, 1949, as amended  by  the  Gujarat University  (Amendment) Act, 1972; Section 33A  inserted  in the Gujarat University Act, 1949, as amended by the  Gujarat Univer- 276 sity  (Amendment)  Act, 1972, (Gujarat Act No. 6  of  1973); Sections  40 and 41 of the Gujarat University Act  1949,  as amended  by  the Gujarat University  (Amendment)  Act,  1972 (Gujarat  Act No. 6 of 1973); Sections 51A and 52A  inserted in  the  Gujarat  University Act 1949,  as  amended  by  the Gujarat University (Amendment) Act 1972, (Gujarat Act No.  6 of  1973).  If we accept the argument that. before  enacting the  amendments  which are assailed, the  State  Legislature must be deemed to be aware of the fact that the  petitioning minority  Institution before us, the Ahmedabad St.  Xavier’s College, is an affiliated College of the University, it  may be possible to say that the amendments must be deemed to  be directed  against  it also.  When the  minority  Institution

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exercised its choice, by applying for affiliation’ under the provisions  of the Act, there were no amendments before  it. On  the  other  hand,  it may be  contended  that,  where  a statutory  right  is  availed of by any party,  it  must  be deemed  to have chosen it subject to the condition that  the Legislature  may change its terms at any time.  But, can  it be  deemed to have opted to submit to any and  every  future amendment  ?  Perhaps it will be carrying  the  doctrine  of imputed knowledge and consent too far to say that a minority Institution  opting for a statutory right must be deemed  to have  signed  a  blank cheque to assent  to  any  and  every conceivable  amendment of any kind whatsoever in  future  as the  price to be paid by it of its choice.  No one could  be deemed  to  assent  to  what  is  not  before  him  at  all. Moreover, can a minority, even by its assent, be barred from the,  exercise of a fundamental right ? It may be  that  the bar  may  be  only a conditional one so  that  it  could  be removed by the institution concerned whenever it is prepared to  pay  the  price  of its removal  by  giving  up  certain advantages  which  are not parts of its  fundamental  right. Such   a  conditional  bar  may  be  construed  only  as   a permissible regulatory restriction. The  first  provision  which  has  a  compulsive  effect  on Ahmedabad  St. Xavier’s College Society is Sec. 5(1) of  the Act which says :               "5(1).   No  educational  Institution  situate               within  the University area shall,  save  with               the  sanction  of  the  State  Government   be               associated in any way with, or seek  admission               to  any  privileges of, any  other  University               established by law". As  St. Xavier’s College is apparently situated  within  the University area, it is prevented from seeking affiliation to any other University established by law.  This would, in  my opinion,  have  the effect of compelling it to  abandon  its fundamental  rights  guaranteed  by  Article  30(1)  of  the Constitution  as  a  price for affiliation  by  the  Gujarat University because it is not permitted to affiliate with any other  University  without the sanction of  the  Govt.   The petitioner  has not, however, in the reliefs prayed  for  by the  petition,  asked for a declaration that  Section  5  is invalid.   But, the compulsive effect of Sec. 5 was  one  of the  arguments advanced by Mr. Nanavati for the  petitioner. The Additional Solicitor General, arguing for the State, had practically conceded that Sec. 5 of the Act will be  invalid against  the petitioner.  He, however, hoped to save  it  in case  we  could so interpret it as to impose  an  obligation upon the, State Govt. to give its sanction in every 277 case  where a minority Institution applies  for  affiliation with  another University.  Inasmuch as Section 5 of the  Act has  a  compulsive  effect by  denying  to  the  petitioning college the option to keep out of the statute altogether, it would, in my opinion, be in operative against it. Section 41 ( 1 ), however, operates even more directly  upon the  petitioning  College, which had been "admitted  to  the privileges   of  the  University"  under  Section  5(3)   by affiliation.   This  provision  would  have  the  compelling effect of making it automatically a constituent unit of  the University,  and must, therefore, be held to be  inoperative against  the  petitioning College as it  cannot  affect  the fundamental   rights  guaranteed  by  Art.  30(1)   of   the Constitution.   Provisions  of  Sec. 40  and  the  remaining provisions  of Sec. 41 of the Act are all parts of the  same compulsive  scheme  or  mechanism which is  struck  by  Art.

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30(1). If  we  hold,  as  I think we must,  having  regard  to  the provisions of Art. 30(1) of the Constitution, that the words "  shall be constituent college of the University",  used in Sec.  41  (1)  of  the Act only mean that,  so  far  as  the petitioning   college  is  concerned,  it  "may"  become   a constituent   college  of  the  University,  even  after   a notification under Sec. 40(2) of the Act, the statute,  read as  a  whole,  places before  the  Petitioning  college  the following four alternatives :               (1)   To  become  a constituent  unit  of  the               University.               (2)   To continue as an affiliated college  on               new  terms  embodied  in  amended   provisions               contained in Sections 20, 33A, 51A and 52A  of               the Act.               (3)   To face the consequence of withdrawal of               affiliation  under Sec. 37 of the Act and  the               resulting  disadvantages of disaffiliation  by               failing  to comply with the conditions of  its               affiliation,  or,  in  other  words,  to  step               outside the statute altogether.               (4)   To  get  the status of  an  "autonomous"                             college under Sec. 38B of the Act for which the               petitioning college has already applied. The range of choices open is thus wide.  A minority is  left absolutely  free  to  make  any choice  it  likes.   It  has necessarily to pay the price of each choice it makes knowing what it entails. If the combined effect of provisions of the statute is  that four alternative courses are open to the College due to  its initial option to apply for "affiliation" which is, strictly speaking, only a statutory and not a fundamental right,  can its  rights under Art  30(1) of the Constitution be said  to be   violated  unless  and  until  it  is  shown  that   its application for autonomy has been or is bound to be rejected ? Compelling the College to become a constituent part of the University  amounts to taking away of its separate  identity by  the  force  of  law.  But, if  the  College  has  really attained such standards of Organisation and excellence as it claims to have done, it can have an autonomous status 278 under  Section  38B of the Act with all its  advantages  and freedoms  practically  for the asking.  Could it,  in  these circumstances,  be  said that loss of the  identity  of  the College is a necessary consequence of the Provisions of  the statute  before  us  ? No  other  statute  with  identically similar  provisions and effect was interpreted in  any  case which has so far come to this Court. If the petitioning College, which has applied for the status of  an  autonomous College under Section 38B of the  Act  as amended in 1972, is provided with an avenue of escape by the amended provisions themselves, it seems quite unnecessary to consider  the impact of Sec. 20, Sec. 33A and Sec.  51A  and 52A  of  the Act which have been introduced by  the  Act  of 1972,  on fundamental rights protected by Art. 30.   Section 20  does not lay down any function of the Executive  Council of  the  University  with regard to  an  autonomous  College governed by the provisions of Chap.  VIA of the Act  Section 33A also applies only to a "College" which is not covered by the  provisions of Chap.VIA. Autonomous Colleges have  their own standing Committees under Sec. 38C of the Act instead of the  Governing Bodies mentioned in Section 33A of  the  Act. Again, Sec. 51A and 52A apply only to an "affiliated College

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or recognised or approved Institution" so that an autonomous College, functioning under the provisions of Chap.  VIA,  is outside their purview.  The only provision which could  have a  compulsive  effect, in their present  form,  against  the petitioning College could be sec. 5 and then Sections 40 and 41  of the Act which would automatically convert  affiliated Colleges  into  constituent  Colleges  of  the   University, without  the  interposition of an  option,  and,  therefore, could  be  said to deprive the petitioning  college  of  the opportunity to become an autonomous college.  In fact,  Sec. 41  of  the  Act, as it stands, could  have  the  effect  of negativing  the  right conferred by Sec. 38B of the  Act  by transforming, mechanically and by operation of the  statute, affiliated  Colleges  into constituent colleges so  that  no question  of  autonomy could practically  arise  after  that Hence, if we confine the operation of Sections 5, 40 and  41 of  the Act as we can, to Institutions other  than  minority Institutions  protected  by Art. 30(1) of  the  Constitution because  they would compel the petitioning college  to  lose its identity, it may not be necessary, in the instant  case, to  consider  the  impact of any other  provision  upon  the fundamental  rights of the petitioning college.  It is  only if the petitioning college fails in its attempt to become an autonomous  college  that  the question  of  the  impact  of Sections  20,  33A,  51A  and 52A  could  arise.   The  only Sections  which  could stand in the way of its  becoming  an autonomous institution could be sections 5, 40 and 41 of the Act.  Therefore, it seems unnecessary in the case before us, to consider the impact of provisions other than sections  5, 40  and  41 of the Act upon’ the rights of  the  petitioning college  at  present.  These questions could  be  considered premature here. Assuming,  however,  that  we must consider  the  impact  of sections  20, 33A, 51A, 52A upon the fundamental  rights  of the petitioning college as it would, at least until it  gets an  autonomous status, be affected and governed by  them  if they are valid, questions arise as to the 279 source  or  basis and extent of  permissible  regulation  or restriction  upon the rights conferred upon the  petitioning college  by Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.  Each and  every learned  counsel  appearing for a minority  institution  has conceded  that, despite the "absoluteness" of the  terms  in which  rights under Art. 30(1) may be expressed, there is  a power  in the State to regulate their exercise.  This  Court has   also  repeatedly  recognised  the  validity   of   the regulation  of the rights under Art. 30 on  various  grounds without explicitly stating the actual basis of such power to regulate.   I  venture  to  think that if  we  are  able  to formulate  the  exact  basis  or  source  of  the  power  of regulation  or  restriction  upon  the  fundamental   rights contained in Art. 30(1) of the Constitution we will be  able to lay down with less indefiniteness and more precision  and certitude the extent to which the State can regulate or res- trict  fundamental  rights protected by Art.  30(1)  of  the Constitution. Provision  for  and  regulation by the  State  of  the  very conditions which secure to minority institutions the freedom to establish and administer its educational institutions is, obviously,  inevitable  and undeniable.   Thus,  unless  the State  could  punish lawlessness within  an  institution  or misappropriation  of funds by its trustees or prevent  abuse of its powers over teachers or other employees by a managing body of an Educational Institution, whether the  institution is  a  minority  or  a  majority  institution,  neither  the

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attainment  of  the  purposes of education  nor  proper  and effective   administration  of  the  institution  would   be possible.   In other words, existence of some, power to  lay down  necessary conditions or prerequisites for  maintaining the right to establish and administer an institution  itself in  a  sound  state is inherent in  the  very  existence  of organised society which the State represents. Laws  made for sustaining the very conditions  of  organised society and civilised existence, so that the rights of  all, including  fundamental  rights  of the  minorities,  may  be maintained  and  enforced do not rest on  mere  implication. The  specific  provisions of Art. 245 to 254 read  with  the three  Legislative  lists  in the Seventh  Schedule  of  the Constitution confer a host of legislative powers upon  State Legislatures and the Parliament to regulate various kinds of activities  including  those of minority  institutions.   No doubt  Art.  30(1), like  other  fundamental  Constitutional rights, is meant to limit the scope of ordinary  legislative power.  But, it was submitted, on behalf of the State,  that it  is only a "law which takes away or abridges  the  rights conferred"  by Part III of the Constitution, containing  the fundamental rights of citizens, which is "void" and that too only  "to  the extent of the contravention".  Thus,  a  mere incidental regulation of or restriction upon the exercise of a fundamental right intended to secure and actually ensuring its more effective enjoyment could not be said to be  really directed   at  an  a  bridgement  or  taking  away  of   the fundamental  right  at all or to have that effect.   Such  a law, when analysed, will be found to aim at something  quite different  from the abridgement of a minority’s  fundamental rights  under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.  It would  not really  take  away or abridge the  fundamental  rights  even though it regulates their exercise.  If, on the other  hand, a law necessarily has the compelling effect of a substantial abridgement or taking away of the fundamental 280 right  from  a minority institution, it would not  be  saved simply  because it does not say so but produces that  effect indirectly.  For the purposes of applying Art. 13(2) of  the Constitution  we  have  to  look  at  the  total  effect  of statutory  provisions and not merely intention behind  them. This  is how I understand the majority view in  Re.   Kerala Education Bill, 1957. (1) The  essence  of the right guaranteed by Art. 30(1)  of  the Constitution is a free exercise of their choice by  minority institutions  of the pattern of education as well as of  the administration  of  their  educational  institutions.   Both these, taken together, determine the kind or character of an educational  institution which a minority has the  right  to choose.  Where these patterns are accepted voluntarily by  a minority  institution itself, even though the object may  be to   secure  certain  advantages  for  itself   from   their acceptance, the requirement to observe these patterns  would not  be a real violation of rights protected by Art.  30(1). Indeed,  the acceptance could be more properly viewed as  an assertion  of the right to choose which may be described  as the "core" of the right protected by Art. 30(1).  In a  case in  which the pattern is accepted voluntarily by a  minority institution, with a view to taking advantage of the benefits conferred by a statute, it seems to me that it cannot insist upon   an   absolutely  free  exercise  of  the   right   of administration.   Here, the incidental fetters on the  right to  manage  the  institution, which is only a  part  of  the fundamental  right, would be consequences of an exercise  of the substance or essence of the right which. as I see it, is

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freedom  of choice.  No doubt, the rights protected by  Art. 30(1) are laid down in "absolute" terms without the kind  of express restrictions found in Articles 19, 25 and 26 of  the Constitution.  But, if a minority institution has the option open   to   it  of  avoiding  the   statutory   restrictions altogether,  if  it  abandons, with it, the  benefits  of  a statutory  right, I fail to see how the absoluteness of  the right under Art. 30(t) of the Constitution is taken away  or abridged.   All  that happens is that the statute  exacts  a price  in general interest for conferring its benefits.   It is open to the minority institution concerned to free itself from  any statutory control or fetters if freedom from  them is considered by it to be essential for the full exercise of its fundamental rights under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution. This  article,  meant  to  serve as  a  shield  of  minority educational  institutions  against the invasion  of  certain rights protected by it and declared fundamental so that they are  not discriminated against, cannot be converted by  them into  a  weapon  to  exact  unjustifiable  preferential   or discriminatory treatment for minority institutions so as  to obtain  the  benefits  but  to  reject  the  obligations  of statutory rights.  It is only when the terms of the  statute necessarily  compel  a minority institution to  abandon  the core  of  its fundamental rights under Art. 30 (1)  that  it could amount to taking away or abridgement of a  fundamental right within the meaning of Art. 13(2) of the  Constitution. It  is  only then that the Principle could apply  that  what cannot  be  done  directly cannot be  achieved  by  indirect means.  Having stated my approach to the (1) [1959] S. C. R. 995. 281 interpretation of Art. 30 (1) of the Constitution, I proceed now  to consider the effect of this article on the  impugned provisions. It  appears to me that Sec. 20 of the Act, which deals  with the   powers  of  the  Executive  Council  of  the   Gujarat University, does not directly or indirectly touch a minority institution’s  rights under Art. 30(1) of  the  Constitution merely  because  the Executive Council  may  take  decisions which may have that effect.  Indeed, if Art. 30(1)  operates as a fetter on the powers of the Executive Council as  well, the  Council is powerless to take such decisions under  Sec. 20 of the Act which take away or abridge fundamental  rights so as to be struck by Art. 13.  In any case, it is only when specific decisions and actions said to have that effect  are brought before the Courts that their validity, in  purported exercise of powers conferred by Sec. 20 of the Act, could be determined because the section itself gives a general  power not specifically directed against minority institutions. Sec.  33A  of the Act requires the observance of  a  general pattern  with  regard to the constitution of  the  governing body of an affiliated college irrespective, of whether it is a minority or a majority institution.  The mere presence  of the  representatives of the Vice-Chancellor,  the  Teachers, the  Members of the Non-teaching staff, and the students  of the College would not impinge upon the right to  administer. In  my opinion, such a "sprinkling" is more Rely to help  to make  that administration more effective and  acceptable  to everyone  affected by it.  A minority institution can  still have  its majority on the governing body.  And, we  are  not concerned  here  with the wisdom or acceptability to  us  of this kind of provision.  We have only to decide, I  presume, how it affects the substance of the right conferred by  Art. 30(1) of the Constitution. Section  51A  of the Act appears to me to lay  down  general

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conditions for the dismissal, removal, reduction in rank and termination  of  services  of members of the  staff  of  all colleges  to  which  it  applies.  Again,  we  have  not  to consider  here  either  the wisdom or  unwisdom  of  such  a provision or the validity of any part of Sec. 51A of the Act on  the ground that it violates any fundamental right  other than the. ones conferred by Art. 30(1) of the  Constitution. If,   as   have  indicated  above,  a  greater   degree   of interference  with  the right to administer  or  man-age  an institution  can  be  held to be permissible  as  a  logical consequence  of the exercise of an option of a minority  for an institution governed by a statute, with all its  benefits as well as disadvantages. it seems to me that provisions  of Sec.  51A do not constitute an unreasonable encroachment  on the essence of rights of a minority institution protected by Art. 30(1) of the Constitution which consists of freedom  of choice.   For similar reasons, I do not think that Sec.  52A of  the  Act  constitutes an  infringement  of  the  special minority  rights under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution.  when the institution opts for a statutory right which necessarily involves  statutory  restrictions.   Of  course,  if   these provisions,  could be held to be invalid on any  grounds  as against all affiliated colleges, 282 whether they are administered by minorities or majorities in a  State,  they  could be held to  be  invalid  against  the petitioning  college too on those grounds.  But, as  I  have already said, we are not concerned here with such grounds or questions at all. In Re.  The Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (supra), this  Court rejected  the  argument that minority institutions  have  an absolute right to be free from all control in managing their institutions.   The majority of the learned Judges held  (at p. 1062):               "The  right  to  administer  cannot  obviously               include  the  right  to  maladminister.    The               minority   cannot  surely  ask  for   aid   or               recognition for an educational institution run               by them in unhealthy surroundings, without any               competent  teachers, possessing any  semblance               of qualification, and which does not  maintain               even  a  fair standard of  teaching  or  which               teaches  matters subversive of the welfare  of               the scholars. It stands to reason, then that               the constitutional right toadminister   an               educational  institution of their choice  does               notnecessarily  militate against the  claim               of the State to insist that in order to  grant               aid   the  State  may   prescribe   reasonable               regulations  to ensure the excellence  of  the               institutions  to be aided.  Learned  Attorney-               General  concedes that reasonable  regulations               may  certainly  be imposed by the State  as  a               condition for aid or even for recognition".               The function of education was set out there as               follows (at page 1019)               "One  of  the most cherished  objects  of  our               Constitution  is. thus, to secure to  all  its               citizens  the liberty of thought,  expression,               belief;  faith and worship.  Nothing  provokes               and  stimulates  thought  and  expression   in               people  more than education.  It is  education               that clarifies our belief and faith and  helps               to strengthen our spirit of worship. A person of secular outlook may consider good works or  per-

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formance  of one’s moral obligations and duties as the  best form of’ worship.  People may differ in their opinions about what  is worthy of worship.  But, there is little  room  for differences  of opinion when it is asserted that the  spirit which  the State is bound to foster is that of  pursuit  and worship  of  the  ideals  set out in  the  preamble  to  our Constitution. Explaining-  Art.  30 of the Constitution, Das,  C.J.,  said (ibid-at p. 1053) :               "The  key  to the understanding  of  the  true               meaning  and implication of the Article  under               consideration  are  the words  ’of  their  own               choice’.  It is said that the dominant word is               ’choice’ and the content of that Article is as               wide as the choice of the particular  minority                             community may make it.  The ambit of t he rights               conferred by Art. 30(1) has, therefore, to  be               determined on a consideration of the                             283               matter   from  the  points  of  view  of   the               educational institutions themselves".               He also said (ibid at p. 1052)               "The real import of Art. 29(2) and Art.  30(1)               seems   to   us  to  be  that   they   clearly               contemplate  a  minority  institution  with  a               sprinkling of outsiders admitted into it.   By               admitting  a non-member into it  the  minority               institution  does not shed its  character  and               cease to be a minority institution". To  my  mind, the majority opinion in the  Kerala  Education Bill case (supra) only lays down certain general principles. It does not declare anything more to be unconstitutional and invalid  than  that which has a compelling effect so  as  to practically leave no choice  open before     a      minority institution except to  submit  to  statutory     regulations as   the price to  be  paid for its existence at all  as  an educational  institution.  It did not deal with the case  in which a minority institution had the option of choosing more or  less autonomy, under the terms of a  statute,  depending upon the state of efficiency and excellency achieved by  it, as  is  the  position in the statute before  us.   Both  the majority  and  minority view expressed there  was  that  the recognition  by  the State was not part  of  the  guaranteed fundamental right under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution,  and also that such recognition by the State could entail payment of  a  price for it.  The majority and  the  minority  views differed  only  with regard to  the  reasonably  permissible amount  of  statutory  compulsion as a  price  for  aid  and recognition.   If the price to be paid is a fetter upon  the exercise of a fundamental right, the very essence or core of the  fundamental right being an exercise of choice, what  is reasonable  or not must, necessarily, depend upon the  total effect of all the provisions considered together and not  of particular  provisions  viewed in isolation from  the  rest. And, we should, I venture to think, remind ourselves that we cannot,   lightly  substitute  our  own  opinions  for   the legislative verdict on such a question. It   seems  to  me,  with  great  respect,  that,  in   Rev. Sidhrajbhai Sabha & Ors. v. State of Bombay & Anr., (1) this Court went somewhat beyond the majority view in Re.   Kerala Education  Bill  case  (supra) after pointing  out  that  no "general principle on which reasonableness or otherwise of a regulation  may be tested was sought to be laid down by  the Court"  in  that case.  It was held there that  it  was  not

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necessary   that  a  regulation  should  be  deemed  to   be unreasonable  "only  if it was totally  destructive  of  the right"   under  Art.  30(1).   Here,  the  question   really considered was whether threats of withdrawal of  recognition and  of the grant to the college could be used to  compel  a minority  educational institution to admit nominees  of  the Govt. into it.  The use of such coercive methods was held to be unconstitutional.  A test (1)  [1963] 3 S. C. R. 137. 294 of  validity  of  a regulatory  measure  was  propounded  as follows (at p. 857):               "Such regulation must satisfy a dual  test-the               test  of reasonableness, and the test that  it               is regulative of the educational character  of               the institution and is conducive to making the               institution an effective vehicle of  education               for  the minority community or  other  persons               who resort to it". It  was,  however,  pointed out, after  observing  that  the fundamental freedom under cl. (1) of Art. 30 is expressed in absolute terms (at p. 850):               "This,  however, is not to say that it is  not               open  to the State to impose regulations  upon               the  exercise of this right.  The  fundamental               freedom  is  to establish  and  to  administer               educational  institutions : it is a  right  to               establish  and  administer what are  in  truth               educational institutions, institutions,  which               cater   to  the  educational  needs   of   the               citizens,  or  sections  thereof.   Regulation               made  in the true interests of  efficiency  of               instruction,  discipline, health,  sanitation,               morality,  public  order  and  the  like   may               undoubtedly be imposed.  Such regulations  are               not restrictions on the substance of the right               which  is guaranteed : they secure the  proper               functioning  of  the institution,  in  matters               educational". Thus, here also a distinction was made between impairment of the  substance  of the fundamental right and  an  incidental encroachment upon the right to administer for the purpose of ensuring  essential  conditions of good  education  and  the health and well being of those, connected with imparting  of education at an institution. In  Rev.   Father W. Proost & Ors. v. The State of  Bihar  & Ors.,(1)  the  right of St. Xavier’s College  at  Ranchi  to impart   general   education,  not  circumscribed   by   the requirements   of  Art.  29(1)  of  the  Constitution,   was recognised in view of the width of Art. 30(1).  No doubt  it was held here that a provision for subjecting the managerial functions  of  the  governing body of  the  college  to  the supervision of a statutory University Service Commission was unconstitutional.  This, however, was not a decision in  the context  of a provision, such as Sec. 38B of the Act  before us,  which  offers the right to the petitioning  college  to become  quite independent and free from  the  administrative control  of the University beyond a  "general  supervision". The effect of that decision must, in my opinion, be confined to  the situation which emerged from a consideration of  the terms of the statute before this Court for interpretation on that occasion. In Rt.  Rev.  Bishop S. K. Patro & Ors. v. State of Bihar  & Ors.,(2)  an order passed by the Education Secretary to  the Govt. of Bihar, setting aside the elections of the President

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and  Secretary  of  the  Church  Missionary  Society  Higher Secondary School and directing the institution to take steps to  constitute a managing Committee in accordance  with  the terms of the orders sent to it was challenged.  The legal (1) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 73. (2) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 1721 285 sanction  for such an order itself was not clear.   It  was, therefore, after references to the provisions of Art.  30(1) of  the  Constitution and theearlier cases decided  by  this Court, set side.  Apart from the question that it was a case on  the  ambit  of  the  right  under  Art.  30(1)  of   the (constitution,  it  does not appear to me to be  helpful  in resolving the difficulties of the case before us. In  State  of Kerala etc. v. Very Rev.   Mother  Provincial, etc.(1) this Court had occasion to consider again the  ambit of  Art. 30(1) of The Constitution and its impact  upon  the provisions  of the Kerala University Act 9 of 1969.  It  was pointed  out  that Art. 30(1) has two  distinct  spheres  of protection separated in point of time from each other :  the first  relating to the initial right of  establishment,  and the  second  embracing the right of  administration  of  the institution which has been established.  Administration  was equated with management of affairs of the institution and it was observed (at page 740) :               "This  management must be free of  control  so                             that  the founders or their nominees c an  mould               the  institution  as they think  fit,  and  in               accordance  with their ideas of how the  inte-               rests  of  the community in  general  and  the               institution in particular will be best served.               No  part of this management can be taken  away               and   vested  in  another  body   without   an               encroachment upon the guaranteed right". Immediately after that, however, followed a paragraph which, with  great  respect, I find some difficulty  in  completely reconciling  with any " absolute" freedom of the  management of the institution from control :               " There is, however, an exception to this  and               it is that the standards of education are  not               a part of management as such.  These standards               concern  the body politic and are dictated  by               considerations  of  the  advancement  of   the               country   and  its  people.    Therefore,   if               universities     establish     syllabi     for               examinations  they must be  followed,  subject               however   to   special  subjects   which   the               institutions  may  seek  to teach,  and  to  a               certain extent the State may also regulate the               conditions  of employment of teachers and  the               health   and   hygiene  of   students.    Such               regulations do not bear directly upon  manage-               ment  as  such although  they  may  indirectly               affect  it.   Yet the right of  the  State  to               regulate education, educational standards  and               allied matters cannot be denied.  The minority               institutions  cannot be allowed to fall  below               the   standards  of  excellence  expected   of               educational  institutions, or under the  guise               of  exclusive right of management, to  decline               to  follow  the general  pattern.   While  the               management  must be left to them, they may  be               compelled to keep in step with others". Evidently,  what was meant was that the right  to  exclusive

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management of the institution is separable from the right to determine  the  character of education  and  its  standards. This  may explain why " standards" of education were  spoken of  as  "not part of management"at all.  It meant  that  the right to manage, having been conferred in (1)[1971] 1 S.C.R. 734. 286 -absolute  terms,  could  not  be  interfered  with  at  all although  the object of that management could be  determined by  a  general pattern to be, laid down by the  State  which could  prescribe,  the syllabi and standards  of  education. Speaking  for myself, I find it very difficult  to  separate the  objects  and  standards of teaching  from  a  right  to determine  who  should teach and what  their  qualifications should  be.  Moreover, if the "standards of  education"  are not part of management, it is difficult to see how they  are exceptions  to the principle of freedom of  management  from control.   Again,  if  what is aimed at directly  is  to  be distinguished from an indirect effect of it, the security of tenure  of teachers and provisions intended to  ensure  fair and  equitable  treatment for them by the management  of  an institution   would   also  not  be   ,directly   aimed   at interference with its management.  They could more  properly be viewed as designed to improve and ensure the  excellence, ,of  teachers available at the institution, and,  therefore, to raise the general standard of education.  I think that it is enough for us to distinguish this case on the ground that the  provisions  to  be interpreted  by  us  are  different, although,  speaking  for myself, I feel bound to  say,  with great respect, that I am unable to accept every  proposition found stated there as correct.  In that case, the provisions of  the  Kerala University Act 9 of 1969,  considered  there were inescapable for the minority institutions which claimed the  right  to  be free from their  operation.   As  I  have already observed, in the case before us, Sec. 38B of the Act provides   the   petitioning  College  before  us   with   a practically  certain mode of escape from the  compulsiveness of provisions other than Sections 5, 40 and 41 of the Act if claims made on its behalf are correct. In  D.A.V.  College,  Bathinda, etc. v. State  of  Punjab  & Ors.,(1) this Court considered the effect of a  notification of  the Punjab Govt. and the constitutionality  of  sections 4(2)  and  5 of the Punjabi University Act 35 of  1961,  the result  of  which  was that the  petitioning  college  there ceased to be affiliated to the University constituted  under the  Punjab  University  Act of 1947 and  was  compelled  to become   affiliated  to  another  University,  the   Punjabi University under the Act of 1961.  The consequence was that, if this compulsory affiliation was valid, a notification  of the Punjabi University, declaring that Punjabi " will be the sole  medium of instructions and examinations for  the  pre- university  even for science group from the  year  1970-71", became   applicable  to  it.   Apparently,  there   was   no reasonable means of escape from these provisions so that the affected  institution was compelled to change its  character and  medium  of  instruction in order  to  comply  with  the provisions of the Act.  In such a situation, its rights pro- tected  both  by  Arts.  29(1) and 30(1)  were  held  to  be infringed by the offending provisions. In  D.A.V.  College etc. v. State of Punjab  &  ors.(2)  the validity  of  certain  sections  of  Guru  Nanak  University (Amritsar)  Act  21  of 1969, and of some  statutes  of  the University  made under it, was considered by this  Court  in the  light of fundamental rights guaranteed by  Articles  29 (1) & 30 (1) as well as Art. 19 (1) (c) of the Constitution.

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(1)  [1971] Supp.  S.C.R. 677. (2) [1971] Supp.  S.C.R. 688. 2 87 The  attacks on sections 4 & 5 of the Guru Nanak  University Act as well as on clause 18 under Chap.  V of the University statutes failed but clauses 2(1) (a) and 17 were struck down for conflict with the rights guaranteed by Art. 30(1) of the Constitution  since their effect was to-  compel  compliance with  their provisions as "conditions of  affiliation".   It was held there (at p. 709 ):               "Clause 18 however in our view does not suffer               from  the same vice as clause 17 because  that               provision in so far as it is applicable to the               minority institutions empowers the  University               to  prescribe  by  regulations  governing  the               service  and  conduct  of  teachers  which  is               enacted   in  the  larger  interests  of   the               institutions  to ensure their  efficiency  and               excellence.   It  may for  instance  issue  an               ordinance in respect of age of  superannuation               or   prescribe  minimum   qualifications   for               teachers  to be employed by such  institutions               either  generally or in  particular  subjects.               Uniformity  in the conditions of  service  and               conduct of teachers in all non-Government Col-               leges   would  make  for  harmony  and   avoid               frustration.   Of  course while the  power  to               make  ordinances  in respect  of  the  matters               referred to is unexceptional the nature of the               infringement  of  the  right,  if  any,  under               Article  30(1)  will  depend  on  the   actual               purpose and import of the ordinance when  made               and the manner in which it is likely to affect               the   administration   of   the    educational               institution,  about which it is  not  possible               now to predicate". It was urged on behalf of the petitioning college that if it could  get the advantages of affiliation or  recognition  by the  University only under the terms of an  enactment  which requires  it  to adhere to a pattern or scheme  under  which substantial powers relating to management of the institution have  to be surrendered, it really amounts to compelling  it to  abandon  the  exercise  of  its  fundamental  right   of management  guaranteed by Art. 30(1) of the Constitution  be cause,   without  recognition,  the,  guarantee   would   be illusory.  It is submitted that the situation which  emerges is that there is, practically speaking, no alternative  left before  the college other than compliance with the terms  of affiliation or recognition without which its students  could not get degrees.  The result of non-compliance would be,  it is  submitted, that education by it will not help  those  to whom  it  is imparted to get on in life and thus  will  have little  practical  value.  This means,, the  argument  runs. that  the  minority  institutions  would  be,  discriminated against and denied equality before the law which Art.  30(1) of the Constitution is meant to confer upon, it. The  answer given is that such arguments could  be  advanced only  to urge that there must be some alternative  provision for minority colleges, which do not want to Pay the price of the same statutory controls as majority managed colleges for affiliation  and  recognition, but  provisions  which  apply uniformly to minority as well as majority colleges could not managed colleges could not be invalidated on such a  ground. In   other  words,  it  may  be  that  Art.  30(1)  of   the Constitution enables a mino-

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288 rity to contend that, in order to secure an equal protection of  laws, the State should make some statutory provision  so that  minority institutions may obtain recognition or  teach for degrees recognised by the State without sacrificing  any part of it rights of management guaranteed by Art. 30(1)  of the Constitution.  No claim for an order directing the State to  make  such  alternative provision  for  the  petitioning minority institution is made before us. What  is  really claimed is that the  minority  institutions must  get affiliation on terms other than  those  prescribed for majority managed institutions when the statute before us has  no  provisions  for affiliation  on  any  such  special alternative  terms  for  minority  colleges.   The  impugned provisions   applicable  to  affiliated  colleges,   whether majority or minority managed, apart from sections 5, 40  and 41  which are separable, are contained in sections 20,  33A, 51A and 52A of the Act.  If we were to hold that affiliation is  open to a minority institution on some other  terms  not found in the statutory provisions at all it would, it  seems to  me, really amount to nothing short of legislation  which is  really not our function.  Moreover, in the  case  before us,  on the claims put forward on behalf of the  petitioning college,  it appears very likely that the college  will  get the benefit of section 38B of the Act, and, therefore,  will escape  from  the consequences of affiliation found  in  the impugned sections. It  is  true  that section 38B of the  Act  imposes  certain conditions  which,  if  the claims made  on  behalf  of  the petitioning  college are correct, the college will  have  no difficulty   in   satisfying.   In  any  case,   until   its application  for an autonomous status is rejected, it  could not  reasonably  complain that the other provisions  of  the Act,  apart from sections 5, 40 and 41 of the Act,  will  be used against it.  For this reason also, it appears to me  to be   unnecessary,  at  least  at  this  stage,  to  make   a declaration about the effect of sections 20 and 33A and  51A and  52A  upon  the fundamental  rights  of  the  petitioner protected by Art. 30(1) of the Constitution. Section  38B, to which I attach considerable importance  for the purposes of this case, reads as follows :               "38B. (1) Any affiliated college or University               college  or  a  recognised  institution  or  a               University   Department  may,  by   a   letter               addressed  to  the  Registrar,  apply  to  the               Executive   Council  to  allow  the   college,               institution or, as the case may be, Department               to enjoy autonomy in the matters of  admission               of   students,  prescribing  the  courses   of               studies, imparting instructions and  training,               holding of examinations and the powers to make               necessary  rules for the purpose  (hereinafter               referred to as "the specified matters").               (2)Either   on  receipt  of  a  letter   or               application under sub-section (1) or where  it               appears  to  the Executive  Council  that  the               standards  of  education  in  any   affiliated               college  or University college  or  recognised               institution  or University Department  are  so               developed that it would be in the interest               289               of education to allow the college, institution               or   Department  to  enjoy  autonomy  in   the               specified  matters,  on its  own  motion,  the               Executive Council, shall-

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             (a)for  the  purpose of  satisfying  itself               whether  the  standards of education  in  such               college,  institution  or  Department  are  so               developed that it would be in the interest  of               education to allow the college, institution or               Department to enjoy autonomy in the  specified               matters-               (i)direct  a local inquiry to be made by  a               competent person or persons authorised by  the               Executive Council in this behalf, and               (ii)make such further inquiry as may  appear               to it to be necessary;               (b)after consulting the Academic Council on               the question whether the college, institution,               or  Department  should  be  allowed  to  enjoy               autonomy in the specified matters and statingthe               result of the inquiry under clause (a)  record               its opinions that question; and               (c)   make  a  report  to the  Court  on  that               question  embodying in such report the  result               of the inquiries, the opinion of the  Academic               Council and the opinion recorded by it.               (3)On  receipt  of the  report  under  sub-               section  (2),  the  Court  shall,  after  such               further  inquiry, if any, as may appear to  it               to  be  necessary record its  opinion  on  the               question  whether the college, institution  or                             Department  should be allowed autonomy   in  the               specified matters.               (4)The Registrar shall thereupon submit the               proposals for conferring such autonomy on such               college,  institution  or Department  and  all               proceedings, if any, of the Academic  Council,               the  Executive Council and the Court  relating               thereto, to the State Government.               (5)On   receipt   of  the   proposals   and               proceedings  under sub-section (4), the  State               Government,  after such inquiry as may  appear               to it to be necessary, may sanction the propo-               sals or reject the proposals.               (6)Where the State Government sanctions the               proposals  it shall by an order  published  in               the  Official Gazette confer on  the  college,               institution  or  Department specified  in  the               proposals, power to regulate the admission  of               students  to the college, institution  or,  as               the  case may be, the Department,  prescribing               the   course  of  studies  in   the   college,               institution  or Department, the  imparting  if               instructions,  teaching  and training  in  the               course of studies, the holding of examinations               and powers to make the necessary rules for the               purpose after consulting the Executive Council               and  such  other  powers  as  may  have   been               specified in the proposals. 131SupCI/75 290               (7)A  college,  recognised  institution  or               University  Department exercising  the  powers               under  sub-section  (6)  shall  be  called  an               autonomous   college,  autonomous   recognized               institution or, as the case may be, autonomous               University.  Department.               (8)In  the case of an  autonomous  college,

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             autonomous    recognized    institution     or               autonomous    University    Department,    the               University shall continue to exercise  general               supervision over such college, institution  or               Department  and  to  confer  degrees  on   the               students  of the college, institution or  De-,                             apartment  passing any  examination  q ualifying               for any degree of the University". The effect of an enactment upon the fundamental rights of  a minority educational institution, as I have already tried to indicate   above,  depends  upon  the  totality  of   actual provisions, and, indeed, also upon the actual facts relating to a particular institution.- Is it possible for us to gauge the total effect without taking all these factors into  con- sideration ? I venture to think, with great respect, that we cannot  determine  the  effect  of  each  provision  in  the abstract or in isolation from other provisions and the facts relating  to the particular petitioning college put  forward before us. It  may be that Art. 30(1) of the Constitution is a  natural result  of  the  feeling of insecurity  entertained  by  the minorities  which had to be dispelled by a  guarantee  which could  not be reduced to a "teasing illusion".  But,  is  it anything  more  than  an illusion to view the  choice  of  a minority as to what it does with its educational institution as  a  matter  of unconcern and indifference  to  the  whole organised society which the State represents ? The  Nineteenth  Century  "liberal",  view  of  freedom   as "absence  of  constraints, which was largely  negative,  was voiced  by J. S. Mill in his "Essay on Liberty".(1)  In  the introduction, the learned author set out the purpose of  his essay  as follows (See: "Great Books of the Western  World", J. S. Mill at page 271)               The object of this Essay is to assert one very               simple   principle,  as  entitled  to   govern               absolutely  the dealings of society  with  the               individual  in  the  way  of  compulsion   and               control,  whether the means used  be  physical               force  in the form of legal penalties, or  the               moral   coercion  of  public  opinion.    That               principle  is,  that the sole  end  for  which               mankind   are   warranted,   individually   or               collectively, in interfering with the  liberty               of  action of, any of their number.  is  self-               protection.   That the only purpose for  which               power  can  be rightfully exercised  over  any               member  of a civilized community, against  his               will,  is to prevent harm to others.  His  own               good,  either  physical Or mortal,  is  not  a               sufficient  warrant.  He cannot rightfully  be               compelled to do or forbear because it will be (1)  American  State Papers-Federalist-J.S. Mill, p.  267  @ 271 and 305.                             291               better for him to do so, because it will  make               him  happier,  because,  in  the  opinions  of               others, to do so would be wise, or even right.               These are good reasons for remonstrating  with               him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him,               or entreating him, but not for compelling him,               or  visiting him with any evil in case  he  do               otherwise.  To justify that, the conduct  from               which  it  is  desired to deter  him  must  be               calculated  to produce evil to some one  else.

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             The  only part of the conduct of any one,  for               which he is amenable to society, is that which               concerns  others.   In the part  which  merely               concerns  himself,  his  independence  is,  of               right,  absolute.  Over himself, over his  own               body and mind, the individual is sovereign". Is Art. 30 of the Constitution meant to reflect a philosophy such  as that of Herbert Spencer in "Man versus  State",  as extended to minority groups assumed to be pitted against the State,  or,  is the philosophy underlying it  not  the  more generous  one  animating the whole of our  Constitution  and found  stated  in  the preamble which,  according  to  Chief Justice  Das,  in the Kerala Education  Bill  case  (supra), embraces also the purpose of education?  Indeed, tile diffi- culty  of separating the good of the individual, or,  by  an extension, the good of a group constituting a minority  from the  good of the whole society, was thus expressed  by  J.S. Mill himself (at p. 305):               "No  person is an entirely isolated being;  it               is  impossible  for a person  to  do  anything               seriously  or permanently hurtful to  himself,               without mischief reaching at least to his near               connections, and often far beyond them.  If he               injures  his property, he does harm  to  those               who  directly  or indirectly  derived  support               from it, and usually diminishes, by a  greater               or  less amount, the general resources of  the               community.  If lie deteriorates his bodily  or               mental faculties, he not only brings evil upon               all  who  depended on him for any  portion  of               their happiness, but disqualifies himself  for               rendering  the services which he owes  to  his               fellow creatures generally; perhaps becomes  a               burthen on their affection or benevolence; and               if such conduct were very frequent, hardly any               offence  that is committed would detract  more               from the the general sum of good.  Finally, if               by  his  vices  or follies a  person  does  no               direct harm to others, he is nevertheless  (it               may  be  said) injurious by his  example;  and               ought  to be compelled to control himself  for               the sake of those whom the sight or  knowledge               of his conduct might corrupt or mislead". Even  if  Art. 30(1) of the Constitution is held  to  confer absolute  and unfettered rights of management upon  minority institutions,   subject  only  to  absolutely  minimal   and negative  controls  in the interests of health and  law  and order, it could not be meant to exclude a greater degree  of regulation  and control when a minority  institution  enters the  wider sphere of general secular and  non-denominational education,  largely employs teachers who are not members  of the particular minority concerned, and when it derives large parts of its income 292 from  the  fees  paid by those who are not  members  of  the particular  minority  in question.  Such greater  degree  of control  could  be  justified  by the  need  to  secure  the interests of those who are affected by the management of the minority  institution and the education it imparts  but  who are  not  members of the minority in management.   In  other words,  the  degree of reasonably permissible  Control  must vary  from situation to situation.  For the reasons  already given  above,  I think ’that, sections 5, 40 and 41  of  the Act,  directly and unreasonably impinge upon the  rights  of the petitioning minority managed college, protected by  Art.

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30(1)  of the Constitution, but the other provisions do  not have  that  effect.  On the  situation  under  consideration before   us,  the  minority  institution  affected  by   the enactment  has, upon the claims put forward on  its  behalf, also  a means of escape from the impugned  provisions  other than  sections 5, 40 and 41 of the Act by resorting to  Sec. 38B of the Act. Consequently, I hold that sections 5, 40 and 41. of the  Act are,  restricted in their operation to colleges  other  than those   which   are  protected,  as   minority   educational institutions,   by   Art.   30(1)   of   the   Constitution. Appropriate   directions  must,  therefore,  issue  to   the opposite parties not to enforce these provisions against the petitioning  college.   But, I am of opinion  that  no  such declaration  or  directions  are  required  as  regards  the remaining provisions of the Act. DWIVEDI, J. Since I partly agree and partly degree, with the plurality-opiniotis, it has become necessary for me to write a separate judgment. Contrast   between  Arts.  25  and  26  and  30(1)  of   the Constitution In a broad sense, all fundamental rights may be traced to  a single central idea of ’Liberty’.  ’Liberty’ has its various phases.    The  rights  safeguarded  by  Arts.  25  and   26 constitute  one of those phases : the rights safeguarded  by Art.  30(1)  constitute another phase.  Articles 25  and  26 guarantee  religious liberty; Art. 30(1)  guarantees  educa- tional  liberty.  To be more precise, Art. 30(1)  safeguards the  freedom of establishing and  administering  educational institutions.   It is true that an  educational  institution may also impart religious instruction and may thus serve  as a means to the exercise of religious freedom, But Art. 30(1) elevates  the  right of establishing  and  administering  an educational  institution  to  the plane  of  an  independent right.  It is a case of a means becoming an end by itself. Again,  the beneficiaries of the rights under Arts.  25  and 26,  and  30(1) are different.  Article  25  safeguards  the religious  freedom of an individual.  Article 26  safeguards the  religious freedom of a group of persons in  respect  of certain specified matters.  The individual and the group may belong  to a minority community as well as to  the  majority community.  In contrast, Art. 30(1) safeguards the right  of the  minority  community.   It has nothing to  do  with  the majority community.  Thus, although Art. 30(1) safeguards  a group-right like Art. 26, is 293 is  radically different from Art. 26 as it is confined  only to the minority community. While Arts. 25 and 26 are concerned with religious  freedom, Art.   30(1)   extends  the  right   of   establishing   and administering  an  educational  institution not  only  to  a religious minority but also to a linguistic minority who may be  even atheists.  So the scope of Art. 30(1),  as  regards both  the content of the right and the beneficiaries of  the right, is wider than that of Arts. 25 and 26. Article  25(2)  disentangles certain  activities,  including secular  activity, from religious practices and  makes  them subject to legal regulation or restrictions.  But Art. 30(1) secures  the right to a secular activity to a  religious  or linguistic  minority.   Such a minority  may  establish  and administer   institutions  for  imparting  secular   general education.    The   right  to   establish   and   administer educational  institutions  for  imparting  secular   general education  cannot be disentangled from the whole  plexus  of rights  under  Art. 30(1), and the right  under  Art.  30(1)

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cannot  be  confined to the mere imparting of  religious  or linguistic education. Contrast between Art. 29(1) and Art. 30(1) The  content of the right under Art. 29(1) differs from  the content  of  the  right under  Art.  30(1).   Article  29(1) secures  the right of a section of citizens having  distinct script,  language or culture to conserve the same.   Article 30(1),  on  the  other  hand,  guarantees  the  right  of  a religious or linguistic minority to establish and administer educational  institutions.  Article 29(1) gives security  to an  interest : Article 30(1) gives security to an  activity. (Compare the marginal note to Art. 29(1). It  is true that an educational institution may serve  as  a means  for conserving script, language and culture But  this is  not  the  sole object of Art.  30(1).   A  religious  or linguistic  minority,  in exercise of its right  under  Art. 30(1),  may establish an educational institution  which  may have  no concern with the object of conserving  its  script, language and culture.  The minority community may  establish an  educational  institution  also  for  imparting   secular general  education  with the object of  making  its  members worthy  of  serving the Nation and making  them  capable  of enriching  their  own  life  ethically,  intellectually  and financially. Article  30(1) does not, in express or implied terms,  limit the  right  of the minorities to  establish  an  educational institution of a particular type.  The right to establish an educational  institution  impliedly  grants  two  kinds   of choices.  The minorities have a right to establish or not to establish  any particular type of  educational  institution. This  is the negative choice.  The minorities may  establish any  type of educational institution.  This is the  positive choice. Choice  is  inherent in every freedom.  The  right  to  form associations  and  unions under Art. 19(1)  (c)  extends  to every kind of asso- 294 ciations and unions.  Similarly, the choice of a citizen  in respect  of  property under Art. 19(1)(f)  or  business  and profession  under  Art.  19(1)(g)  is  not  limited  to  any specific  type  of property or business  or  profession.   A citizen  may acquire, hold and sell any kind of property  or carry on any business or profession.  Of course, these free- doms  are subject to State regulation under  Art.  19(3),(5) and  (6).  But freedom without choice is no freedom.  So  it seems  to  me that the words ’of their choice’  merely  make patent  what is latent in Art. 30(1).  Those words  are  not intended  to enlarge the area of choice already  implied  in the right conferred by Art. 30(1). The  Court has already held that the right to  establish  an educational institution under Art. 30(1) is not confined  to the  purposes  specified in Art. 29(1). [See  the  State  of Bombay  v.  Bombay  Education  Society;(1)  In  Re.   Kerala Education  Bill; (2 ) Rev.  Father W. Proost and  others  v. State of Bihar(3) and D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab (4 ) 1. The Right of Affiliation Three different arguments have been urged before us on  this issue (1) The  right is necessarily implied in  Art.  30(1). Accordingly  the right of affiliation is also a  fundamental right. (2) It is neither expressly nor impliedly granted  by Art. 30(1).  Accordingly it is not a fundamental right.   On the contrary, affiliation is a statutory concept and may  be obtained  on  the fulfilment of  the  conditions  prescribed therefore by a statute. (3) Although it is not a fundamental

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right,  it  is  necessarily  implicit  in  Art.  30(1)  that affiliation  cannot  be  denied for refusal  of  a  minority institution to give us totally or partially its right  under Art. 30(1). Evidently,  there  is  no  express grant  of  the  right  of affiliation  in  Art.  30(1).  In my view, it  is  also  not necessarily  implied in Art. 30(1).  My reasons are these  : (1)  The context does not favour the  asserted  implication. The  framers of the Constitution have taken special care  to dissipate  doubts as regards choice by the words  ’of  their choice’.   They  have also taken special care  to  extend  a guarantee  to  a minority  educational  institution  against discrimination  in the matter of aid from the State  on  the ground  that it is under management of a minority  based  on religion  or  language.  [See  Art.  30(2)].   If  they  had intended  to elevate the right of affiliation to the  status of  a  fundamental right, they could have  easily  expressed their  intention in clear words in Art. 30.  It  is  obvious that   a  minority  institution  imparting  only   religious instruction or teaching its own theology would neither  need nor seek affiliation.  It would not seek affiliation because affiliation is bound to reduce its liberty at least to  some extent.   Again  as  our  State  is  secular  in  character, affiliation   of   an   institution   imparting    religious instruction or teaching only theology of a particular  reli- gious minority may not comport with the secular character of the  State.   As  Art. 30(1) does not  grant  the  right  of affiliation  to such an institution, it cannot  confer  that right on an institution imparting (1)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 568, 578, 582. (3)  [1969] 2 S.C.R. 73 at 180. (2)  [1959] S.C.R. 995, 1047, 1052-53. (4)  [1971] Supp.  S.C.R. 688, 695. 2 95 secular  general education.  The content of the right  under Art. 30(1) must be the same for both kinds of  institutions. [See  Kerala  Education Bill (supra) at  pp.  1076-1077  per Vekatarama lyer J.]. In  Romesh  Thapper v. The       State  of  Madras(,’)  this Court said               "[T]here  can be no doubt that the freedom  of               ideas;  and  expression  includes  freedom  of               propagation  of  ideas; and  that  freedom  is               ensured   by  the  freedom   of   circulation.               Liberty  of  circulation is  as  essential  as               liberty  of  propagation.   No  doubt  without               circulation the propagation would be of little               value." It  is  urged that as freedom of circulation is held  to  be implied in freedom of speech and expression, so the right of affiliation  should  be implied in the  right  to  establish educational  institutions.  The argument is  plausible  but, fallacious.   There  is  a distinction  between  freedom  of thought  and freedom of speech and expression.   The  former gives  freedom  to  a man to think whatever  he  likes;  the latter  gives him freedom to communicate what he  thinks  to one  or more persons.  Consequently, the latter  necessarily implies freedom of propagation or circulation of ideas.  But the right of affiliation is not necessarily implied in  that sense in the right of establishing educational institutions. History  shows that educational institutions  have  existed. with  vigour  and excellence without  State  recognition  or affiliation.   In  Europe unaffiliated academies  have  made great  contribution  to  the  development  of  science   and humanities.  In pro-independent India there were a number of

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unaffiliated,  and unrecognised educational institutions  of good repute.  One of our late Prime Ministers was a  product of  one  of those institutions.  The vast  area  of  private sector  employment would be open to students coming  out  of unaffiliated educational institutions, if they are otherwise merited.   The  mere accident of recruitment  to  the  State services  being made on the basis of recognised degrees  and diplomas should not be a sufficient reason to read the right ,of  affiliation  in Art.30(1). The State may  at  any  time abandon this facile and mechanical suitability test and  may make  selections  by competitive examinations open  to  all, whether possessing or not possessing a recognised degree  or diplomas However,  in case of an affiliating, University  affiliation cannot  be  denied  to a minority institution  on  the  sole ground  that  it is managed by a minority whether  based  on religion  or language or on arbitrary or  irrational  basis. Such a denial would be violative of Arts. 14 and 15 (1)  and will be struck down by courts.  Again, Art. 13 (2) prohibits the State from taking away or abridging the right under Art. 30 (1). Since the State cannot directly take away or abridge a  right conferred under Art. 30 (1), the State cannot  also indirectly take away or abridge that right by subjecting the grant  of affiliation to conditions which would  entail  the forbidden result [See In Re.  Kerala education Bill  (supra) at pp-1063-1964]. Affiliating University Sri Palkhiwala has submitted in the course of his reply that Art.  30(1)  obligates  every State to  have  at  least  one affiliating university. (1)  [1950] S.C.R. 594 at 597. 296 I am wholly unable to accept this submission.  As Art. 30(1) does  not grant the right of affiliation, the State  is  not under  an obligation to have an affiliating university.   It is open to a State to establish only a teaching university. Illusory Absoluteness of Art. 30(1). Some  counsel  supporting  the petitioners  have,  I  think, wrongly  over  emphasised the verbal  absoluteness  of  Art. 30(1).   According to Sri Tarkunde, while Art. 19 (1  )  (g) gives  a  right to the majority community to  establish  and administer  educational institutions subject  to  reasonable restrictions  in  the  public interest,  Art.  30(1)  gives, similar  right  to  a religious or  linguistic  minority  in absolute  terms.   According to him, Art.  30(1)  should  be construed to confer a higher right on the minority than  the one conferred on the, majority by Art. 19(1) (g).  According to  Sri Palkbiwala, the right under Art. 30(1) is  conferred in  absolute  language  and can neither be  taken  away  nor abridged  by the State on account of the injunction of  Art. 13(2). It  is  true that Art. 30(1) is expressed  in  spacious  and unqualified language.  And so is Art. 14 : "The State  shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the  equal protection  of  the  laws within the  territory  of  India." However,   this   Court   has   read   the   limitation   of classification  in the general and unrestricted language  of Art. 14.               "[The general language of Art. 14.... has been               greatly  qualified by the recognition  of  the               State’s   regulating   power  to   make   laws               operating differently on different classes  of               persons  in  the governance of  its  subjects,               with the result that the principle of equality               of.  civil rights and of equal  protection  of

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             the  laws  is  only  given  effect  to  as   a               safeguard  against  arbitrary  State  action."               (State  of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali  Sarkar(1)               per Patanali Sastri C.J.). "Article 14 confers a right by enacting a prohibition  which in  form,  at  least is absolute... but... Art.  14  is  not really absolute, for the doctrine of classification has been incorporated  in it by judicial decisions.  Article  14,  as interpreted  by the courts would run in some such  words  as these : The State shall not deny to any person equality  be- fore  the law or equal protection of the law  provided  that nothing herein contained shall prevent the State from making a  law based on or involving a classification founded on  an intelligible  differentia having a rational relation to  the object  sought to be achieved by the  law."  (Constitutional Law of India by H. M. Seervai, 1967 Edn.p. 188).   According to  Patanjali Sastri C.J., the necessity of  making  special laws  to  attend particular ends obliged the Court  to  read down  the wide language of Art. 14. (Charanjit La] v.  Union of   India(2)   and.   Kathi  Raning  Rawat  v.   State   of Saurashtra.(3) Like Art. 30(1), the I Amendment of the U.S.A.  Constitution is  also expressed in absolute terms : "Congress shall  make no law (1)  [1952] S. C. R. 284, 295. (3)  [1952] S. C. R. 435, 442. (2) [1950] S. C. R. 869 890. 297 respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting  the free exercise thereof; or abridging freedom of speech, or of the Press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and   to  petition  the  government  for  the   redress   of grievances."  Nevertheless  it has been held by  the  U.S.A. Supreme Court that the liberty recognised in the I Amendment is  not absolute and is subject to regulation.  "Freedom  of religion)  embraces  two concepts, freedom  to  believe  and freedom to act.  The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be." (Cantwell v. Connecticut).(1) As regards freedom of speech, Justice Frankfurter has said                "(T)he   first   ten   amendments   to    the               Constitution,  commonly  known  as  "Bill   of               Rights"  were  not intended to  lay  down  any               novel principles of government, but simply  to               embody certain guarantees and immunities which               we  had inherited from our  English  ancestors               and  which  bad  from  time  immemorial   been               subject to certain well recognised  exceptions               arising from the necessities of the case.   In               incorporating   these  principles   into   the               fundamental  law  there was  no  intention  of               disregarding  the exceptions, which  continued               to be, recognised as if they had been formally               expressed."(2) Like  Art. 30(1), section 92 of the Australian  Constitution is also expressed in absolute terms : "On the imposition  of uniform  duties of customs, trade, commerce and  intercourse amongst the States, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation shall be absolutely free." (emphasis added) Nevertheless, it has been held that this ’absolute’  freedom is subject to regulation.  The words "absolutely free" "have occasioned the greatest problems in relation to section  92. It was early settled that they were not limited to pecuniary burdens,  but while it is clear that the nature  of  freedom predicated  does  not involve an abnegations  of  all  legal restrictions  upon  trade, commerce,  and  intercourse,  the

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precise  extent  of permitted interference is  not  easy  to formulate...  The  difficulty  of  stating  a  general  rule applicable  to  all cases arises from the  impossibility  of reducing   an  essentially  practical  subject  to   general abstract  terms.  The precise nature of trade, commerce  and intercourse, exactly what it comprehends for the purpose  of sec. 92, no more, and no less and the quality of the freedom prescribed   are  questions  which  have  been   differently answered arid with differing results."(3) The  Privy Council has recently held that the regulation  of trade,  commerce  and  intercourse  amongst  the  State   is compatible  with  its  absolute  freedom.  (Commonwealth  of Australia  and  others  v.  Bank  of  New  South  Wales  and others).(4)  As  to  the extent  of  regulation,  the  Privy Council said (2)  95 Law Edn. 1137 at p. 1160. (3)  W.  S. A. Waynes : Lagislative, Executive and  judicial Powers in Australia, 2nd Edn. p. 339). (4)  [1950] A.C. 235. (1) 310 U. S. 296 at pp. 303-304. 298               "[T]heir  Lordships  do not intend to  lay  it               down  that  in  no  circumstances  could   the               exclusion  of  competition so as to  create  a               monopoly  either  in a State  or  Commonwealth               agency  or  in some other body  be  justified.               Every case must be judged on its own facts and               in its own setting of time and  circumstances,               and it may be that in regard to some  economic               activities   and  at  some  stage  of   social               development   it  might  be  maintained   that               prohibition with a view to State monopoly  was               the  only practical and reasonable  manner  of               regulation   and   that   inter-State   trade,               commerce  and intercourse thus prohibited  and               thus monopolized remained absolutely free."(1) This survey should be sufficient to explode the argument  of absolute or near-absolute right to establish and  administer an  educational  institution by a  religious  or  linguistic minority  from the absolute words of Art.  30(1).   Absolute words  do not confer absolute rights, for the generality  of the  words  may have been cut down by the  context  and  the scheme  of the statute or the Constitution, as the case  may be.   Thus  while  restricting the generality  of  the  word ’arrest’  in Art. 22(1) and (2) of the Constitution, Das  J. said:               "If,  however, two constructions are  possible               then  the  court must adopt  that  which  will               ensure  smooth and harmonious working  of  the               Constitution  and eschew the other which  will               lead  to absurdity or give rise  to  practical               inconvenience   or.  make   well   established               provisions  of existing law nugatory."  (State               of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh ) (2) A  glance  at  the context and scheme of  Part  III  of  the Constitution would show that the Constitution makers did not intend   to  confer  absolute  rights  on  a  religious   or linguistic minority to establish and administer  educational institutions.    The  associate  Art.  29(2)   imposes   one restriction  on  the right in Art. 30(1).  No  religious  or linguistic   minority  establishing  and  administering   an educational  institution which receives aid from  the  State funds shall deny admission to any citizen to the institution on grounds only of religion, race,caste, language or any  of them. The right to admita   student   to   an   educational

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institution   is  admittedly  comprised  in  the  right   to administer  it.  This right is partly curtailed by  Art.  29 (2). The  right of admission is further curtailed by  Art.  15(4) which  provides an exception to Art. 29(2).   Article  15(4) enables  the  State to make any special  provision  for  the advancement of any socially and educationally backward class of citizens or for the scheduled caste and scheduled  tribes in  the matter of admission in the educational  institutions maintained by the State or receiving aid from the State. Article  28(3) imposes a third restriction on the  right  in Art.  30(1).   It  provides that  no  person  attending  any educational  institution recognised or receiving aid by  the State  shall  be  required to take  part  in  any  religious instruction that may be imparted in such institution or (1) [1950] A.C. 235, 311. (2) [1953] S.C.R. 254, 264. 299 to  attend  any religious worship that may be  conducted  in such institution or in any premises attached thereto  unless such person or, if such person is a minor, his guardian  has given his consent thereto.  Obviously, Art. 28(3)  prohibits a  religious  minority  establishing  and  administering  an educational institution which receives aid or is  recognised by  the  State from compelling any citizen  reading  in  the institution  to  receive religious instruction  against  his wishes  or if minor against the wishes of his guardian.   It cannot be disputed that the right of a religious minority to impart  religious instruction in an educational  institution forms part of the right to administer the institution.   And yet Art. 28(3) curtails that right to a certain extent. To  sum-up,  Arts.  29(2), 15(4)  and  28(3)  place  certain express  limitations on the right in Art. 30(1).  There  are also  certain implied limitations on this right.  The  right should be read subject to those implied limitations. Part  III  of  the Constitution confers  certain  rights  on individuals,  on  groups  and on  certain  minority  groups. Those  rights  constitute  a  single  indivisible  balancing system  of Liberty in our Constitution.  The system  implies order and harmony among the various rights constituting, our Liberty   according  to  the  necessities  of   each   case. Obviously, the rights could never have been intended by  the Constitution  makers  to be in collision with  one  another. For instance, a citizen cannot exercise his right of freedom of  speech and expression on another man’s property  without his  leave,  for such exercise of right  would  violate  the latter’s right to hold property conferred on him under  Art. 19(1)(g).   Although the right of a  religious  denomination under  Art.  26 to manage its own affairs is  not  expressly made subject to Art. 25(2)(b) which-protects a law  throwing open  Hindu religious institutions of a public character  to all  classes of Hindus, this Court upheld the validity of  a law  throwing  open  public temples  to  excluded  class  of Hindus.  Speaking for the Court, Venkatarama Aiyar J. said               "The  result  then  is  that  there  are   two               provisions of equal authority, neither of them               being  subject to the other.  The question  is               how  the apparent conflict between them is  to               be resolved.  The rule of construction is well               settled  that when there are in  an  enactment               two provisions which cannot be reconciled with               each  other,  they should  be  so  interpreted               that,  if possible, effect could be  given  to               both.   This is what is known as the  rule  of               harmonious construction.  Applying this  rule,

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             if  the contention of the appellants is to  be               accepted,  then  Art. 25 (2) (b)  will  become               wholly   nugatory   in  its   application   to               denominational  temples,  though,  as   stated               above,  the language of that Article  includes               them.  On the other hand, if the contention of               the respondents is accepted. then full  effect               can  be given to art. 26(b) in all matters  of               religion,  subject,  only  to  this  that   as               regards  one  aspect  of them,  entry  into  a               temple for worship, the rights declared  under               Art.  25 (2) (b) will prevail.  While, in  the               former  case,  Art.  25 (2) (b)  will  be  put               wholly out of operation, in the latter, effect               can be given to both that provision and               300               Art.  25 (b).  We must accordingly  hold  that               Art.  26(b)  must  be  read  subject  to  Art.               25(2)(b)."   (Sri  Venkataramana  Devaru   and               others vs.  State of Mysore.(1) Accordingly  the right in Art. 30(1) cannot, in my view,  be so   exercised   as  to  violate  a   citizen’s   legal   or constitutional rights.  Thus the management cannot punish  a member  of the teaching or non-teaching staff or  a  student for  legitimate  exercise  of  his  freedom  of  speech  and expression or of forming associations or unions. The Constitution makers have endeavoured to unite the people of  our  country in a democratic Republic.   The  democratic Republic would not last long if its members were in constant war  among themselves for the ascendancy of  their  separate rights.   It will soon drift into Absolutism of one kind  or another.   European history demonstrates that  whenever  one group has attempted to deny liberty to another group, it has lost its own liberty.  Pagans persecuted Christians and lost their  own  liberty.   Christians,  in  their  turn,  denied religious  freedom  to  pagans  and  surrendered  their  own freedom  either to an Absolute Emperor or to  an  Infallible Pope.  Catholics and Protestants denied religious freedom to one another and strengthened the absolutism of the monarchy. Absolute  rights  are  _possible only in the  moon.   It  is impossible  or  a member of a civilized  community  to  have absolute rights.  Some regulation of rights is necessary for due,  enjoyment  by every member of the society of  his  own rights. It  cannot  be disputed that the right under Art.  30(1)  is also  subject  to regulation for the protection  of  various social  interests  such  as health,  morality,  security  of State, public order and the like, for the good of the people is the supreme law.  Today, education, specially Science and Technology,  is a preemptive social interest for  our  deve- loping  Nation.  "It is now evident that the real source  of wealth  ties no longer in raw material, the labour force  or machines, but in having scientific, educated,  technological man-power base.  The education has become the real wealth of the  new age."(2) The attack on complex and urgent  problems of the country has to be made "through two main programmes : (1)  The  development  of  physical  resources  through  the modernisation  of agriculture and  rapid  industrialisation. This   requires  a  science-based  technology....  (2)   The development of human resources through a properly  organised programme of education." It is the latter programme.... which is the more crucial  of the two.  While the development of the physical resources is a  means  to an end, that of human resources is  an  end  in itself,  and  without it, even the adequate  development  of

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physical  resources is not possible."(3)  Obviously  secular general education, more, especially science and  technology, should play decisive role in the development and  prosperity of our Nation.  Accordingly our State should be as much (1)  [1958] 2 S. C. R. 895, 918. (2)  J.  D. -Bernal, Science in History, Pelican Book,  Vol. I p. 117. (3)  Kothari Education Commission Report, paral.12. 301 interested  as,  nay more than the religious  or  linguistic minorities  in the right and socially needful  education  of students of the minorities.  The students do not belong only to  the  minorities; they belong also to  the  Nation.   The over-accentuated  argument  of  imparting  secular   general education  a  religious atmosphere seems to me  to  overlook this  important national aspect.  Secular general  education should  be the Nation’s first concern.  It may  legitimately be  assumed that the Constitution makers were alive  to  the priority which education should receive in the programme  of our  Republic.  (See Arts. 41, 45 and 46).  How  could  they then intend to confer an absolute or near-absolute right  on a   religious  or  linguistic  minority  to  establish   and administer an educational institution for imparting  secular general education ? It is well to remember that it is the Constitution which  we are  expounding.   A statute is a specific  contrivance  for dealing  with  the  specific  needs  of  the  people  at   a particular  time  and  place.  But  the  Constitution  is  a general contrivance for the good government and happiness of all  the people of our developing Republic.  It is made  for the  present  as  well as for the future.   Like  all  great organic  texts,  it is written in  broad  and  accommodating language.   (The  words  of the  Veda  are  commodious-M.B., Shanti  Parwa, XIX, 1).  Far from implying  state  inaction, the general language of Art. 30(1) is, to my mind, de-signed to give due flexibility to the legislature and to the courts in adjusting the rights in Art. 30(1) to the necessities  of each case. Bose J. has observed : "(The) true content (of the words  of the Constitution) is not to be gathered by simply taking the words  in  one hand and a dictionary in the other,  for  the provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas which  have their essence in mere form.  They  constitute  a framework  of  government written for men  of  fundamentally differing opinions and written as much for the future as for the  present.  They are not just pages from a  textbook  but from  the  means  of  ordering the  life  of  a  progressive people." State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (Supra) at p.  359].  The learned Judge further said : "(The  words  of the  Constitution) are not just dull, lifeless words  static and hide-bound as in some mummified manuscript, but,  living flames intended to give life to a great nation and order its being,  tongues of dynamic fire, potent to mould the  future as well as guide the present.  The Constitution must, in  my judgment,  be left elastic enough to meet from time to  time the altering conditions of a changing world with is shifting emphasis and differing needs. (Supra at p. 363) Extent of regulatory power The  extent  of  regulatory power of the  State  would  vary according  to  various  types  of  educational  institutions established   by   religious  and   linguistic   minorities. Educational institutions may be classified in several  ways: (1)  According to the nature of instruction which  is  being imparted  by the minorities.  It may be religious,  cultural and  linguistic instruction or secular general education  or

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mixed; (2) According to grant of aid and recognition by  the State.  Some institu- 302 tions may receive aid; the others may not.  Similarly,  some institutions  may receive recognition; the others  may  not. There  may  be some others which may receive  both  aid  and recognition;  some  others  may  receive  neither  aid   nor recognition.  (3)  According  to  the  standard  of  secular general   education   which  is  being   imparted   in   the institutions primary, secondary and higher. (4) According to the  nature of education such as military,  academy,  marine engineering,  in which the State is vitally  interested  for various reasons. The extent of regulatory power may vary from class to  class as  well  as  within a class.   For  instance,  institutions receiving  aid  and recognition may be  subject  to  greater regulation  than  those which receive  neither.   Similarly, institutions  imparting  secular general  education  may  be subject to greater regulation than those which are imparting religious, cultural and linguistic instruction solely. An  educational  institution  would consist  of  :  (1)  the managing  body of the institution, (2) teaching  staff,  (3) non-teaching staff, (4) students and (5) property of various kinds.   Here again, the extent of the regulatory power  may vary  from  one constituent to another.  For  instance,  the teaching  staff  and  property may  be  subject  to  greater regulation  than  the  composition  of  the  managing  body. Plainly, no minority educational institution can be  singled out  for  treatment  different from one  meted  out  to  the majority  educational institution.  A regulation meting  out such a discriminatory treatment will be obnoxious to Art. 30 (1) Subject to these preliminary remarks, it is now necessary to consider  how  far  a regulation may touch  upon  the  right conferred by Art. 30(1) without incurring the wrath of  Art. 13(2).   In  other  words, what is  the  test  for  deciding whether  a  regulation  imposed on  a  minority  educational institution  takes away or abridges the right  conferred  by Art. 30(1) ? It has already been discussed earlier that  the test of a valid regulation is its necessity.  Any regulation which  does not go beyond what is necessary  for  protecting the interests of the society (which includes the  minorities also) or the rights of the individual members of the society should  be  constitutional.  It cannot be said that  such  a regulation  takes away or abridges the rights  conferred  by Art. 30(1). No hard and fast rule can be prescribed for determining what is. necessary.  The question should be examined in the light of  the impugned provisions and the facts and  circumstances of  each  case.  What is required is that the  impugned  law should  seek to establish a reasonable balance  between  the right  regulated and the social interest or  the  individual right protected.  The court should balance in the scale  the value  of  the right regulated and the value of  the  social interest or the individual right protected.  While balancing these competing interests, the Court should give due  weight to   the   legislative  judgment.   Like  the   Court,   the Legislature   has  also  taken  the  oath  to   uphold   the Constitution.   It is as much the protector of  the  liberty and welfare of the people as the Court.  It is more informed than the Court about                             303 the pressing necessities of the government and the needs  of the community. (See State of West Bengal v. Anwer Ali Sarkar (supra) at P.  303 per Das J.)

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I   find  it  difficult  to  accept  the  argument  that   a regulation,  in order to be constitutional, must  always  be shown  to  be calculated to improve the  excellence  of  the minority  educational  institutions.   It  is  conceded   by counsel  supporting  the  petitioners  that  the  State  may prescribe  the  curriculum  and syllabus  for  the  minority educational  institutions which are aided or  recognised  by it.   Now a regulation prescribing curriculum  and  syllabus may not necessarily be calculated to improve the  excellence of  a particular minority educational institution.  Left  to itself,  a  minority educational institution may opt  for  a higher  standard of instruction than the one  prescribed  by the  State in its curriculum or syllabus.  It appears to  me that  the  State prescribes the curriculum and  syllabus  as much from the point of view of excellence of instruction  as from  the  point  of view of having a  uniform  standard  of instruction.  A uniform standard is perhaps necessary  owing to  the different calibre of students coming from  different developed  and  undeveloped  strata  of  society  and   from different developed and undeveloped geographical regions  of the country. But it is pressed upon us that the prescribing a  curriculum and  syllabus  is  not a part of the  administration  of  an educational  institution.   With  profound  respect  to  the learned Judges who decided the Mother Provincial case(1),  I find   it  difficult  to  accept  this  argument.    Counsel supporting  the petitioners have maintained that  the  State could  not prescribe curriculum and syllabus for  religious, cultural  or linguistic instruction which is being  imparted in   a   religious  or  linguistic  minority   unaided   and unrecognised educational institution.  The reason  obviously is  that  curriculum  and syllabus is a vital  part  of  the administration of an educational institution. As  far as Catholic educational institutions are  concerned. Catholics believe that education belongs preeminently to the Church..  Catholic  dogma categorically denies  the  premise that   secular  general  education  can  be  isolated   from religious  teaching.   In  the  1930  encyclical  ’Christian Education  of Youth’ Pope Pius XI has commended : "The  only school  approved by the Church is one (where)  the  Catholic religion  permeates  the entire atmosphere (and  where)  all teaching  and the whole Organisation of the school  and  its teachers,  syllabus  and  textbooks  in  every  branch  (is) regulated by the Christian spirit." (Pfeffer, Church,  State and Freedom, 1953 Edn. p. 294). Nor  should  the  regulatory  power  be  hamstrung  by  such concepts  as  "real  and effective exercise  of  the  right" should  not be touched by the regulation or that  regulation should  not "directly and immediately" impinge on the  right conferred  by  Art.  30(1).  What is a  real  and  effective exercise  of the right will depend on how far  the  impugned regulation  is necessary in the context of time,  place  and circumstances for safeguarding any competing social interest of  any  competing  constitutional  or  legal  right  of  an individual. (1)  [1971] 1 S.C.R. 734. 3 04 The  majority opinion in Re : Kerala Education Bill  (supra) supports the construction which I am seeking to put on  Art. 30(1), Speaking for the majority, Das J. said               "We   are  thus  faced  with  a   problem   of               considerable  complexity apparently  difficult               of  solution.   There is on the one  hand  the               minority rights under Art. 30(1) to  establish               and  administer  educational  institutions  of

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             their choice and the duty of the Government to               promote  education,  there is,  on  the  other               side.  the obligation of the State under  Art.               45   to  endeavour  to  introduce   free   and               compulsory  education.  We have  to  reconcile               between these two conflicting interests and to               give  effect to both if that is  possible  and               bring  about  a synthesis  between  the  two."               (emphasis added) (supra at page 1062).               Holding  that  cls. 9, 11(2)  and  12(4)  were               permissible  regulations,  the  teamed  Chief,               Justice said               "Clauses  9,  11(2) and  12(4)  are,  however,               objected   to   as  going  much   beyond   the               permissible limit... It is said that by taking               over  the collections of fees... etc.  and  by               undertaking   to  pay  the  salaries  of   the               teachers and other staff the Government is  in               reality confiscating the school, for none will               care  for the school authority.  Likewise  cl.               1 1 takes away an obvious item of  management,               for the manager cannot appoint any teacher  at                             all except out of the panel to be prep ared  by               the  Public Service Commission,  which,  apart               from  the question of its power of  taking  up               such  duties  may not be qualified at  all  to               select  teachers  who will  be  acceptable  to               religious denominations and in particular sub-               cl. (2) of that clause is objectionable for it               thrusts   upon  educational  institutions   of               religious  minorities  teachers  of  Scheduled               Castes  who  may  have  no  knowledge  of  the               tenants of their religion and may be otherwise               weak   educationally.   Power  of   dismissal,               removal, reduction in rank or suspension is an               index, of the right of management and that  is               taken  away  by clause 12(4).  These  are,  no               doubt,   serious  inroads  on  the  right   of               administration  and  appear  perilously   near               violating  that right.  But  considering  that               those   provisions  are  applicable   to   all               educational institutions and that the impugned               parts  of  cls. 9, 11 and 12 are  designed  to               give  protection and security to the ill  paid               teachers who are engaged in rendering  service               to   the  nation  and  protect  the   backward               classes,  we  are  prepared,  as  at   present               advised,  to treat these clauses 9, 11(2)  and               12(4)  as  permissible regulations  which  the               State  may  impose  on  the  minorities  as  a               condition   for   granting   aid   to    their               educational institutions." (Supra at p. 1064) At  the  moment I am not concerned with the  correctness  or incorrectness  of the view that cls. 9. 11 (2), 12  (4)  are constitutional.  have quoted this passage in order to  bring out  the technique of adjudging the constitutionality  of  a statute  which has commended itself to the majority  of  the Court, That technique, requires the Court to balance 305 the  right  conferred  by  Art. 30(1)  and  the  social  and individual interests which it is necessary to protect. In Rev.  Sidhajbhai Sabhai and others v. State of Bombay(,’) Shah J. said               "Regulations  made  in the true  interests  of

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             efficiency of instruction, discipline,  health               sanitation,  morality,  public order  and  the               like  may undoubtedly be imposed.  Such  regu-               lations are not restrictions on the  substance               of the right which is guaranteed; they  secure               the proper functioning of the institution,  in               matters of education." (emphasis added). This  passage also shows that the Court has adhered  to  the view  taken by Das C.J. in Re Kerala Education Bill  (supra) to  the effect that the State has power to make  regulations for protecting certain social interests. The  decision  in  this case does not seem to me  to  be  in conflict with the construction suggested by me, because  the Court  took the view that the right of the Private  Training Colleges to admit students of their own choice was "severely restricted"  by the Government order.  In other  words,  the impugned  order went much beyond what was necessary  in  the circumstances of the case. In  the State of Kerala v. Very Rev.  Mother  Provincial(2). Hidayatullah   C.J.,  speaking  for  the  unanimous   Court, observed:"   "Administration"  means  ’management   of   the affairs’  of the institution.  This management must be  free of control so that the founders or their nominees can  mould the  institution as they think fit, and in  accordance  with their ideas of how the interests of the community in general and  the institution in particular will be best served.   No part  of  this management can be taken away  and  vested  in another  body  without an encroachment upon  the  guaranteed right."  With great respect, I find it difficult to go  that far.  Take for instance the right of any citizen,  including a   religious  or  linguistic  minority  to  establish   and administer  a military academy for imparting theoretical  as well  as practical training to the students admitted to  it. Sri  Nanavatty, counsel for the petitioners,  conceded  that this  right may be restricted and regulated in the  interest of  the  security  of  the State.   The  State  may  make  a regulation for effective control and supervision of the arms and  ammunition belonging to the academy by the officers  of its own choice and confidence.  The State may, I believe, go to  the  length  of  even  prescribing  that  the  arms  and ammunition  should  be kept in the  government  armoury  and should  be issued by a State officer holding charge  of  the armoury.  The right under Art. 30(1) forms part of a complex and  inter-dependent  group  of  diverse  social  interests. There cannot be a perpetually fixed adjustment of the  right and those social interests.  They would need adjustment  and readjustment from time to time and in varying circumstances. (1) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 837 at p. 850.      (2) [1971] 1  S.C.R. 734 at p. 740. 3 06 In   D.  A.  Y. College vs. State of Punjab,(1)  this  Court struck down    cl.  17 of the statutes which  provided  that the  staff  initially appointed should be  approved  by  the Vice-Chancellor  and that all subsequent changes  should  be referred  to  the  University  for  the  Vice   Chancellor’s approval.   However,  Reddy J., speaking for  the  unanimous Court, observed :               "In   our   view   there   is   no    possible               justification for the provisions contained  in               clause  17 of Chapter V of the statutes  which                             decidedly  interfere(s)  with  the  ri ghts  of               management of the Petitioners College.   These               provisions   cannot  therefore  be   made   as               conditions of affiliation, the  non-compliance

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             of  which  would  involve  disaffiliation  and               consequently they will have to be struck  down               as offending Art. 30(1)." The words "no possible justification" in the passage seem to me to suggest that the Court would have upheld cl. 17 if the State  of Punjab could have satisfied the Court that it  was necessary  to  subject  the power  of  appointment  etc.  of teachers  to  the approval of  the  Vice-Chancellor.   There seems  to be, nothing in Rev.  Father W. Proost  and  others vs.   The  State  of  Bihar ( 2 )  and  D.  A,  V.  College, Bhathinda  vs.  State of Punjab (3 )  which  would  militate against the construction of Art. 30(1) suggested by me. No  new principle is expounded in the decisions  of  various High  Courts in A1do Meria Patroni v. V. E.  C.  Kesavan,(4) Dipendra  Nath  Sarkar  v. State  of  Bihar,(5)  The  Muslim Anjuman-e-Taleem,  Dharbhanga vs.  The Bihar  University,(6) Varkey  vs.   State of Kerala,(-) State of Kerala  vs.   The Corporate  Management  of  Schools  of  the  Archdiocese  of Chanancherry,(8)  and Director  of School  Education,  Tamil Nadu   vs.   Rev.   Father  G.  Irogiaswamy.(9)  All   these decisions,  follow one or the other decisions of this  Court as  they should have done.  Accordingly it is not  necessary to refer to them in any detail. Sri Nanavatty has also relied on a decision of the Permanent Court  of International Justice in Case No. 182 referred  to in  the Annual Digest of Report of Public International  Law Cases  (years  1935-37) by Lauterpacht.  Article  4  of  the Declaration  relating  to  the  position  of  minorities  in Albania  provided  that " all Albanian  nationals  shall  be equal  before  the law and shall enjoy the  same  civil  and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion."  Article  5 of the Declaration ran as  follows  : "Albanian  nationals  who  belong to  racial,  religious  or linguistic  minorities  will enjoy the  same  treatment  and security in law and in fact as other Albanian nationals.  In particular  they  shall  have an equal  right  to  maintain, manage  and control at their own expense or to establish  in the  future, charitable, religious and social  institutions, schools and other educational establish- (1)  [1971] Supp. 1 S. C. R. 688. (3)  [1971] Suppl.  S. C. R. 677. (5)  A. 1. R. 1962 Patna 101. (7)  I. L. R. 1969, 1 Kerala 48. (2)  [1969] 2 S. C. R. 73. (4)  A. 1. R. 1965 Kerala 75. (6)  A. 1. R. 1967 Patna 148. (8)  1970 K. L. T. 232. (9) A. 1. R. 1971 Mad 440.                             307 ments, with the right to use their language and to  exercise their religion freely therein." In 1933 the Albania National Assembly  amended  the  Albanian Constitution  thus  :  "The instruction and education of Albanian subjects are  reserved to  the State and will be given in State  schools.   Primary education is compulsory for all Albanian nationals and  will be given free of charge.  Private schools of all  categories at  present  in operation will be  closed.   Following  this amendment  certain Albanian minorities, presumably of  Greek origin,  complained to the League of Nations  regarding  the violation  of  their  right  guaranteed by  Art.  5  of  the Declaration.   The  matter went to the  Permanent  Court  of International  Justice for consideration.  The  majority  of the  Court  (with three dissents) was of  opinion  that  the constitutional   amendment  violated  the  rights   of   the minorities guaranteed by Art. 5 of the Declaration.

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It is difficult to appreciate how the majority opinion would shed  any useful light on the nature and scope of the  right guaranteed  by Art. 30(1).  Obviously, the context  of  Art. 30(1), both notional as well as textual, bears no comparison with  the context of the Albanian  Constitutional  Amendment and Art. 5 of the Declaration. It  is  now  necessary  to  examine  the  various   impugned provisions in the light of the construction of Art. 30( 1  ) suggested earlier in this judgment. Section 3 3A     (a) I agree with the plurality view that it is obnoxious to Art. 30(1), and I have nothing further to add. Counsel  for the petitioners, Sri Nanavatty,  abandoned  the attack  against this provision.  Counsel for the  State  and the  Gujarat  University  accordingly gave  no  reply.   Sri Nanavatty did not attack the provision even in his reply. so I should not express any opinion on this provision. Section 40 Section 39(1) provides that within the University area,  all postgraduate  instruction,  teaching and training  shall  be conducted  by the University or by such affiliated  colleges or institutions and in such subjects as may be prescribed by the  Statutes.   The  petitioners  do  not  challenge   this provision.  But they seek to question s. 40 which is similar to  s.39(1). Section 40(1) provides that the Court  may  de- termine  that  all instructions, teaching  and  training  in courses  of  studies in respect of which the  University  is competent  to hold examinations shall within the  University area  be  conducted by the University and  the  Court  shall communicate  its decision to the State Government.  ,Section 40(2)  provides  that on receipt of  the  communication  the State Government may after making such inquiry as it  thinks fit,  by notification in the Official Gazette  declare  that the provisions of s.41 shall come into force on such date as may be specified in the notifi- 308 It  has  already  been  held  earlier  that  the  right   of affiliation  is  not  a  fundamental  right  guaranteed   by Art.30(1). Accordingly I see no difficulty in the University take over of the teaching in under-graduate classes. Section  41 consists of five sub-sections.  Sub-section  (1) provides   that   all  affiliated   colleges   will   become constituent   colleges  of  the  University.   We  are   not concerned  with sub-s.(2). Sub-Section (2) provides that  no educational institution shall, save, with the consent of the University  and  the  sanction of the  State  Government  be associated with or seek permission to any privileges of  any other University. I  do not think that any legitimate objection can  be  taken to, subs.(1). Merely because an affiliated college is made a constituent college of the University, would not necessarily offend  Art.  30(1).   The  definition  of  the   expression ’constituent  college’ by itself is innocuous.   After  all, someone has said: "What is there in a name" The concept of a constituent college is fluid.  It is the degree of  external control  exercised  over the administration  of  a  minority college,  and not its statutory name, that is  relevant  for the  purposes  of  Art.30(1). For  instance,  the  associate colleges  (which are similar to affiliated colleges) of  the Allahabad  University are subject to University  control  in the  matter  of appointment of teachers.   But  the  Motilal Nehru  Medical  College, Allahabad, which is  A  constituent college of that University, is not subject to such  control. While  the  Selection Committee selecting  teachers  to  the associate   colleges   consists   of   certain    University

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authorities,  the selection of teachers to  the  constituent colleges   is  made  wholly  by  the  U.P.  Public   Service Commission and the University has no voice whatsoever in the selection   of  the  teachers.  (See  Allahabad   University Calendar 1968).  Sub-section (3) cannot also be objected to. It permits an affiliated college which does not want to be a constituent college to get affiliated to another  University with the permission of the State and the Gujarat University. Serious objection on behalf of the petitioner has,  however, been taken to clauses (ii) to (vi) of sub-section (4).   Sub Section  (4) may be divided in two parts.  According to  the first part the relations of the constituent colleges and the University  shall be governed by the statutes to be made  in that  behalf.   The  second  part  provides  that  any  such statutes  may provide in particular for the exercise by  the University of the powers in respect of the constituent  col- leges specified in cls. (ii) to (vi) of sub section (4). Obviously,  the  first  part of sub-section  (4)  confers  a general  power of making statutes. The second  part  thereof specified  certain matters on which the statutes  should  be made.   The two parts of sub-section (4) follow  the  normal pattern  of provisions in modem statutes providing for  rule making.   The  second  part  of  sub-section(4)  is   merely illustrative of the generality of the power conferred by the first  part.  While counsel for petitioners have urged  that clauses (ii) to (vi) clearly violate rights under Art.30(1), the  Additional  Solicitor General has urged that  the  wide language of those clauses may be so 309 read down as to make them constitutional.  I do not think it is necessary to enter into this controversy at all.  It  may be  presumed for the sake of argument that clauses  (ii)  to (vi)  of sub section (4) are violative of Art. 30(1 ).  Even so,  the petitioners stand to gain nothing thereby,  for  no legitimate objection can be advanced against the first  part of  sub-section  (4).   Then it comes to  this  that  unless statutes  are  actually made, the constitutional  attack  is premature. Section 51 (A) Section 51 (A) consists of two sub-sections.  The first sub- section  provides  that no member of the teaching  and  non- teaching  staff of an affiliated college shall be  dismissed or  removed or reduced in rank except after an  inquiry,  in which  he has been informed of the charges against  him  and given a reason-able opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges.  Until he has been given a reasonable  oppor- tunity   of  making  representation  against   the   penalty proposed,  he cannot be punished.  This part of  sub-section (1)  is similar to Art.311 (2) of the Constitution,  and  no legitimate  objection  can be taken to it.  Sub-section  (1) also   contains   another  rider  on  the   power   of   the administration to fire its staff.  According to this  rider, the  penalty  inflicted  by the management  shall  not  take effect  until it is approved by the Vice-Chancellor  or  any other  officer  of the University authorised  by  the  Vice- Chancellor in this behalf. Sub-section  (2) provides that the services of no member  of the  teaching  and non-teaching staff  shall  be  terminated unless he had been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed termination. It is clarified that this provision shall not apply to a person who is  appointed for  a  temporary period.  Like sub-s. (1)., this  power  is also made subject to the approval of the Vice-chancellor or any other officer of the University authorised by the  Vice- chancellor.   No  legitimate objection can be taken  to  the

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first  part  of  sub-sections  (1)  and  (2).   But  serious objection is taken to the provision for the approval of  the Vice-Chancellor  or  any  other officer  of  the  University authorised by the Vice-Chancellor in this behalf. It is true that the right to fire an employee belongs to the employer  under  the contract of service.  It is  also  true that  the  right to fire is a management  right  safeguarded under Art.30(1). But this right cannot include the right  to take away or abridge the employee’s constitutional right  to form  associations,  to carry on his  profession  and  other constitutional and legal rights.  The purpose of s.51A is to check this kind of misuse of the right to fire an  employee. So  the Vice-Chancellor’s power of approval is not  unguided and unreasonable.  After the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor is the next highest officer of the University.  It should be presumed  that in granting or withholding approval he  would act according to reason and justice. When   the  matter  goes  before  the  Vice-Chancellor   for approval, both the management and the teacher or the  member of  the nonteaching staff should be heard by  him.   Hearing both parties is necessarily implied, because without hearing either of them it will be diffi- 310 cult for him to make up his mind whether he should grant  or withhold  approval  to the action proposed by  the  managing body  of the educational institution.  It would also  follow that  while  granting  approval or  disapproval,  the  Vice- Chancellor  should record reasons, for the exercise  of  his power is subject to control by courts.  The statute does not make  his order final, and courts would surely  nullify  his order if  it is arbitrary, mala fide or illegal. If the managing body exercise the right to fire mala fide or as  a  measure of victimization, it will be proper  for  the Vice-Chancellor  to withhold approval.  The  Vice-Chancellor may  also withhold approval where fair hearing has not  been given  or  where  the  record  of  the  inquiry  contains-no evidence to establish the guilt for which the teacher or the member of the non-teaching staff has been punished.  On  the other hand, if the Vice-Chancellor finds that the punishment is  imposed after due hearing and is supported by  evidence, and   is  not  imposed  mala  fide  or  as  a   measure   of victimization, he cannot withhold approval. It  is also urged that the power of giving approval  is  not conferred exclusively on the Vice-Chancellor.  It is open to him to nominate any other officer of the University for this purpose.   Section 8 of the Act enumerates the  officers  of the University.  They are: (1) the Chancellor; (2) the  Vice Chancellor;  (3) the Pro-Vice-Chancellor; (4) the  Deans  of Faculties; (5) the Registrar; (6) the University  Librarian; and  (7)  such other officers of the University  as  may  be declared  by  the  statutes  to  be  the  officers  of   the University.   The first six officers are all  important  and responsible officers of the University.  They can be trusted to  exercise the power of approval in a  reasonable  manner. It has not been pointed out to us whether statutes have made any  other officer an officer of the University.  So we  are not concerned with the last clause. It  seems  to  me that the power of approval  by  the  Vice- Chancellor  is necessary in the interest of the security  of service of the teaching and non-teaching staff.  Security of service  is  necessary  to  promote  efficiency  and  honest discharge  of  duty.   It  is  calculated  to  improve   the institution  in the long run.  The members of  the  teaching and  nonteaching  staff cannot ordinarily afford  to  go  to courts  for  redress  of  their  grievances.   Section   51A

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provides  a cheaper and more expeditious remedy to them  for the redress of their grievances.  The impugned provision  is identical to s.33, Industrial Disputes Act which this  Court has held to be valid. It may be stated that this aspect of the matter which I have considered  in  regard to s.51A was not  placed  before  the Court  in  the earlier cases.  As the power of  approval  is confined  to  checking  the  abuse  of  the  right  to  fire employees,  I  am  of  opinion  that  it  does  not   offend Art.30(1). Section 52A. It  consists of two subsections.  Sub-sec.(1) provides  that any dispute between the governing body and any member of the teaching and                             311 non-teaching  staff  of  an  affiliated  college  Which   is connected  with  the conditions of service  of  such  member shall,  on a request of the governing body or of the  member concerned   be  referred  to  a  Tribunal   of   Arbitration consisting of one arbitrator nominated by the governing body and the other by the member of the teaching and non-teaching staff and an Umpire appointed by the Vice-Chancellor.   Sub- section  (2) in effect provides that the provisions  of  the Arbitration  Act, 1940 shall apply to the arbitration  under sub-section (1). Counsel  supporting  the petitioners have  urged  that  this amounts to external interference with the management of  the affairs of the college.  This provision is also intended  to check  the abuse of power of administration by the  managing body  and to provide a cheap and expeditious remedy  to  the small-pursed   teaching  and  non-teaching  staff.   It   is necessary in the interest of security of service.  I am  un- able to discover any legitimate objection to it on the basis of Art. 30(1). P. B. R. 2-L177 Sup CI/75 312