REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs.     723-724     OF 2009  [Arising out of Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) Nos.9052-9053 of 2008]

Thahira Haris etc.             ... Appellants

Versus

Government of Karnataka & Others                ... Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dalveer Bhandari,   J.   

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals are directed against the judgment dated

8th November, 2008 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at

Bangalore in Writ Petition (Habeas Corpus) Nos.79-80 of 2008

by which both the writ petitions were dismissed.  We propose

to dispose of both the appeals by this judgment.

3. These writ petitions (Habeas Corpus) were filed by Mrs.

Thahira  Haris,  wife  of  the  detenu  B.  Mohammed  Haris

challenging  the  order  of  detention  dated  24th May,  2008

passed by the Additional  Secretary  & Principal  Secretary to

the  Government  of  Karnataka,  Home  Department,  Vidhana

Soudha, Bangalore on a number of grounds.  Grounds 15 and

17  relate  to  the  detenu.    The  main  allegation  against  the

detenu  is  abetting  in  smuggling  of  red  sanders  out  of  the

country.  

4. In  pursuance  to  the  show cause  notice  issued  by  the

Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka, statement of

objections  (counter  affidavit)  was  filed  by  the  detaining

authority.   According to the appellants, the High Court did

not  consider  the  case  in  proper  perspective  and  dismissed

both  the  writ  petitions  filed  by  the  detenu.   The  detenu,

aggrieved by the impugned judgment of the High Court, has

preferred  these  appeals  before  this  Court  on  the  following

grounds:

(i) non-supply  of  relied  upon  and  relevant documents vitiates the detention order;

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(ii) the detention order is vitiated on the ground of non-application of mind;

(iii) the  detention  order  is  liable  to  be  quashed because  of  failure  to  place  all  relevant documents before the detaining authority; and

(iv) the  prejudice  cannot  be  urged  in  detention matters.

5. We  propose  to  deal  with  the  impact  of  non-supply  of

relied upon and relevant documents on the detention order.    

6. In  ground  no.15  of  detention,  it  is  categorically

mentioned that the detenu was abetting in smuggling of red

sanders. Again, in ground no.17, the detaining authority while

recording  its  satisfaction  has  again  reiterated  that  “I  am

satisfied  that you are abetting in smuggling red sanders as

described above”.   In this light, we would examine whether it

was imperative for the detaining authority to supply document

at Sl. No. 90 i.e. detention order of Anil  Kumar, the master

mind.   It  may  be  pertinent  to  mention  that  the  order  of

detention  was  passed  against  Anil  Kumar  on  13.9.2004.

According to the detaining authority, Anil Kumar is the master

mind in the entire operation and allegation against the detenu

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is  of  abetting  him  in  smuggling,  therefore,  any  order  of

detention  passed  against  Anil  Kumar  assumes  great

significance  and  the  same  would  weigh  heavily  with  the

detaining authority while passing the detention order.

7. Admittedly, the order of detention of Anil Kumar dated

13.9.2004  was  not  supplied  to  the  detenu.   The  document

mentioned at serial number 90 is the detention order dated

13.9.2004  of  Anil  Kumar,  the  master  mind,  whereas  the

document supplied to the detenu was only the confirmation

order  dated  29.1.2005  passed  under  section  8  of  the

COFEPOSA  Act.   Both  are  different  and  distinct  and,

therefore,  the  High  Court  was  wrong  in  holding  that  the

detention order and confirmation order was one and the same.

The period of detention in such case would be reckoned from

13.9.2004 and not from 29.1.2005.

8. It is interesting to note that even according to the learned

Additional  Government  Advocate,  who  has  represented  the

detaining authority before the High Court, the detention order

of Anil Kumar and Kannan was relevant.  The Division Bench

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noted  the  submission  of  the  detaining  authority,  which  is

reflected in para 14 of the judgment and reads as under:

“….The role of Anil Kumar and Kannan being clear in  the  instant  case,  their  past  activities  and detention orders were relevant……”

9. According  to  the  detaining  authority,  copy  of  the

detention  order  issued  under  COFEPOSA  is  a  relied  upon

document.  This document was admittedly not supplied to the

detenu.  Now it has become imperative to examine the settled

law crystallized by a catena of judgments of this Court.  Some

of the ratios of those judgments are recapitulated as under.  

10. More than half a century ago, the Constitution Bench of

this Court has interpreted Article 22(5) of the Constitution in

Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi and Ors.

1953 SCR 708 observed as under:

“…….Preventive  detention is  a serious  invasion of personal liberty and such meager safeguards as the Constitution  has  provided  against  the  improper exercise  of  the  power  must  be  jealously  watched and  enforced  by  the  Court.  In  this  case,  the petitioner  has  the  right,  under  article  22(5),  as interpreted  by  this  Court  by  majority,  to  be furnished  with  particulars  of  the  grounds  of  his detention  "sufficient  to  enable  him  to  make  a representation which on being considered may give

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relief  to  him."  We  are  of  opinion  that  this constitutional  requirement  must  be  satisfied  with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person  detained,  subject  of  course  to  a  claim  of privilege  under  clause  (6)  of  article  22.  That  not having  been  done  in  regard  to  the  ground mentioned in sub-paragraph (e)  of  paragraph 2 of the statement of grounds, the petitioner's detention cannot  be  held  to  be  in  accordance  with  the procedure established by law within the meaning of article 21. The petitioner is therefore entitled to be released and we accordingly direct him to be set at liberty forthwith.”

11. The right which the detenu enjoys under Article 22(5) is

of immense importance.  In order to properly comprehend the

submissions  of  the  detenu,  Article  22(5)  is  reproduced  as

under:

“22(5).  When  any  person  is  detained  in pursuance  of  an  order  made  under  any  law providing  for  preventive  detention,  the  authority making  the  order  shall,  as  soon  as  may  be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest  opportunity  of  making  a  representation against the order.”

This Article of the Constitution can be broadly classified into

two categories:  (i) the grounds on which the detention order is

passed must be communicated to the detenu as expeditiously

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as  possible  and  (ii)  proper  opportunity  of  making

representation against the detention order be provided.  

12. In Shalini Soni (Smt.) & Others v. Union of India and

Others (1980) 4 SCC 544, this Court aptly observed that the

accused must have proper opportunity of making an effective

representation. The Court observed thus:

“….Communication of the grounds presupposes the formulation of the grounds and formulation of the grounds requires and ensures the application of the mind  of  the  detaining  authority  to  the  facts  and materials before it, that is to say to pertinent and proximate matters in regard to each individual case and  excludes  the  elements  of  arbitrariness  and automatism  (if  one  may  be  permitted  to  use  the word to describe  a mechanical  reaction without a conscious  application  of  the  mind).  It  is  an unwritten  rule  of  the  law,  constitutional  and administrative,  that  whenever  a  decision  making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of  a  statutory  functionary,  there  is  an  implicit obligation  to  apply  his  mind  to  pertinent  and proximate  matters  only  eschewing  the  irrelevant and the remote. Where there is further an express statutory obligation to communicate not merely the decision but the grounds on which the decision is founded,  It  is  a  necessary  corollary  that  the grounds  communicated,  that  is,  the  grounds  so made known, should be seen to pertain to pertinent and proximate matters and should comprise all the constituent  facts  and  materials  that  went  in  to make up the mind of the statutory functionary and not  merely  the  inferential  conclusions.  Now,  the decision  to  detain  a  person  depends  on  the

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subjective  satisfaction  of  the  detaining  authority. The Constitution and the statute cast a duty on the detaining authority to communicate the grounds of detention to the detenu.  From what we have said above, it follows that the grounds communicated to the  detenu  must  reveal  the  whole  of  the  factual material considered by the detaining authority and not merely the inferences of fact arrived at by the detaining authority. The matter may also be looked at  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  second  facet  of Article  22(5).  An  opportunity  to  make  a representation  against  the  order  of  detention necessarily implies that the detenu is informed of all that has been taken into account against him in arriving at the decision to detain him. It means that the detenu is to be informed not merely, as we said, of  the  inferences  of  fact  but  of  all  the  factual material which have led to the inferences of fact. If the detenu is not to be so informed the opportunity so  solemnly  guaranteed  by  the  Constitution becomes reduced to an exercise in futility. Whatever angle  from which  the  question  is  looked  at,  it  is dear  that  "grounds"  in  Article  22(5)  do  not  mean mere factual inferences but mean factual inferences plus  factual  material  which  led  to  such  factual inferences. The 'grounds' must be self-sufficient and self-explanatory. In our view copies of documents to which reference is made in the 'grounds'  must be supplied to the detenu as part of the 'grounds'.

13. This Court in  Icchu Devi Choraria (Smt.)   v.  Union of

India & Others (1980) 4 SCC 531 in para 6, dealt with in

great detail the significance of clause (5) of Article 22 and sub-

section  3  of  section  3  of  the  COFEPOSA  Act.   The  court

observed as under:

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“Now it is obvious that when Clause (5) of Article 22 and Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act provide that the grounds of detention should be communicated to the detenu within five  or fifteen days, as the case may be, what is meant is that the grounds  of  detention  in  their  entirety  must  be furnished  to  the  detenu.  If  there  are  any documents,  statements  or  other  materials  relied upon in the grounds of detention, they must also be communicated  to  the  detenu,  because  being incorporated, in the grounds of detention, they form part of the grounds and the grounds furnished to the detenu cannot be said to be complete without them.  It  would  not  therefore  be  sufficient  to communicate  to  the  detenu  a  bare  recital  of  the grounds of detention, but copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention must also be furnished to the detenu within the prescribed time subject of course to  Clause  (6)  of  Article  22  in  order  to  constitute compliance with Clause (5) of Article 22 and Section 3, Sub-section (3) of the COFEPOSA Act. One of the primary objects  of  communicating  the  grounds  of detention to the detenu is to enable the detenu, at the earliest  opportunity,  to make a representation against his detention and it is difficult to see how the  detenu  can  possibly  make  an  effective representation unless he is also furnished copies of the  documents,  statements  and  other  materials relied upon in the grounds of detention. There can therefore be no doubt that on a proper construction of Clause (5) of Article 22 read with Section 3, Sub- section (3) of the COFEPOSA Act, it is necessary for the valid  continuance of detention that subject  to Clause  (6)  of  Article  22 copies  of  the  documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds  of  detention  should  be  furnished  to  the detenu alongwith the grounds of detention or in any event  not  later  than five  days  and in  exceptional circumstances  and  for  reasons  to  be  recorded  in writing, not later than fifteen days from the date of detention. If this requirement of Clause (5) of Article

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22  read  with  Section  3,  Sub-section  (3)  is  not satisfied,  the  continued  detention  of  the  detenu would be illegal and void.”

14. In  Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal & Others

(1975) 2 SCC 81, the Court observed that Article 22(5) insists

that  all  basic  facts  and  particulars  which  influenced  the

detaining  authority  in  arriving  at  the  requisite  satisfaction

leading  to  the  making  of  the  order  of  detention  must  be

communicated to the detenu.  Para 13 of this case reads as

under:

“…….  Section  8(1)  of  the  Act,  which  merely  re- enacts the constitutional requirements of Article 22 (5), insists that all basic facts and particulars which influenced the detaining authority in arriving at the requisite  satisfaction leading to the making of the order  of  detention  must  be  communicated  to  the detenu, so that the detenu may have an opportunity of  making  an  effective  representation  against  the order of detention. It is, therefore, not only the right of the Court, but also its duty as well, to examine what  are  the  basic  facts  and  materials  which actually  and  in  fact  weighed  with  the  detaining authority in reaching the requisite satisfaction. The judicial  scrutiny  cannot  be  foreclosed  by  a  mere statement  of  the  detaining  authority  that  it  has taken  into  account  only  certain  basic  facts  and materials  and  though  other  basic  facts  and materials were before it, it has not allowed them to influence  its  satisfaction.  The  Court  is  entitled  to examine  the  correctness  of  this  statement  and determine  for  itself  whether  there  were  any other basic facts or materials, apart from those admitted

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by it, which could have reasonably influenced the decision  of  the  detaining  authority  and  for  that purpose,  the  Court  can  certainly  require  the detaining authority to produce and make available to the Court the entire record of the case which was before  it.  That  is  the  least  the  Court  can  do  to ensure observance of the requirements of law by the detaining authority.”

15. In Vakil Singh v.  State of J & K & Another (1975) 3

SCC 545, the court clarified that grounds meant materials on

which the order of detention was primarily based, that is to

say, all primary facts though not subsidiary facts or evidential

details.   

16. In Ganga Ramchand Bharvani  v. Under Secretary to

the Government of Maharashtra & Others (1980)  4 SCC

624, the court in para 16 observed as under:

“The mere fact that the grounds of detention served on the detenu are elaborate,  does not absolve the detaining  authority  from  its  constitutional responsibility  to  supply  all  the  basic  facts  and materials relied upon in the grounds to the detenu. In the instant case,  the grounds contain only the substance of the statements, while the detenu had asked for copies of the full text of those statements. It  is  submitted  by  the  learned  Counsel  for  the petitioner  that  in  the  absence  of  the  full  texts  of these  statements which had been referred to  and relied  upon  in  the  grounds  'of  detention',  the detenus could not make an effective representation

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and  there  is  disobedience  of  the  second constitutional imperative pointed out in Khudiram's case. There is merit in this submission.”

17. In S. Gurdip Singh v. Union of India & Others (1981)

1  SCC 419,  this  court,  while  reiterating  the  legal  position,

observed that failure to furnish documents or materials which

formed  the  basis  of  detention  order  along  with  grounds  of

detention  and  even  on  demand  subsequently  made  by  the

detenu would amount to failure to serve grounds of detention

and, therefore, would vitiate the detention order and make it

void ab initio.    

18. In  Khudiram Das’s  case (supra),  Article  22 has been

succinctly analyzed by this court.   It  was observed that the

detaining authority cannot whisk away a person and put him

behind bar at its own sweet will.    It must have grounds for

doing  so  and those  grounds must  be  communicated  to  the

detenu  as  expeditiously  as  possible,  so  that  he  can  make

effective  representation against  the  order  of  detention.   The

court  further  observed  that  Article  22  provides  various

safeguards  calculated  to  protect  personal  liberty  against

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arbitrary  restraint  without  trial.   These  safeguards  are

essentially procedural in character and their efficacy depends

on the care and caution and the sense of responsibility with

which they are regarded by the detaining authority. These are

barest minimum safeguards which must be strictly observed

by an executive authority.

19. In  Golam  alias  Golam  Mallick v.  State  of  West

Bengal (1975) 2 SCC 4, a four-Judge Bench of this court has

reiterated the legal position. The court observed as under:

“No  doubt,  Clause  (5)  of  Article  22  of  the Constitution  and  Section  8  of  the  Act  do  not,  in terms, speak of  'particulars'  or  'facts',  but  only of 'grounds'  to  be  communicated  to the detenu. But this requirement is to be read in conjunction with and subservient to the primary mandate: "and shall afford  him  the  earliest  opportunity  of  making  a representation against the order",  in the aforesaid Clause (5).  Thus construed, it is clear that in the context, 'grounds' does not merely mean a recital or reproduction  of  a  ground  of  satisfaction  of  the authority in the language of Section 3 of the Act; nor is its connotation restricted to a bare statement of  conclusions  of  fact.  It  means  something  more. That  'something'  is  the  factual  constituent  of  the 'grounds' on which the subjective satisfaction of the authority is based. All the basic facts and material particulars,  therefore,  which  have  influenced  the detaining  authority  in  making  the  order  of detention, will  be covered by "grounds" within the contemplation of  Article  22(5)  and Section 8,  and are  required  to  be  communicated  to  the  detenu

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unless  their  disclosure  is  considered  by  the authority to be against public interest.”

20. This  Court  in  Mohd.  Alam v.  State  of  West  Bengal

(1974)  4  SCC  463  in  para  19  observed  that  the  non-

communication of that material was violative of Article 22(5) of

the Constitution and the Act inasmuch as it did not intimate

to the detenu the full  grounds or material to enable him to

make an effective representation.  

21. This Court in  Kirit Kumar Chaman Lal Kundaliya v.

Union  of  India  &  Others (1981)  2  SCC  436  (para  12)

observed  that  once  the  documents  are  referred  to  in  the

grounds  of  detention  it  becomes  the  bounden  duty  of  the

detaining authority to supply the same to the detenu as part

of the grounds or pari passu the grounds of detention.

22. In  the  case  of  Ramchandra  A.  Kamat v. Union  of

India & Others  (1980)  2 SCC 270, this Court clearly held

that  even  the  documents  referred  to  in  the  grounds  of

detention have to be furnished to the detenu.

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23. In Tushar Thakker (Shri) v. Union of India & Others

(1980) 4 SCC 499, this Court mentioned that the detenu has a

constitutional  right under Article 22(5) to be furnished with

copies  of all  the materials  relied  upon or referred to in the

grounds of detention, with reasonable expedition.

24. In Ram Baochan Dubey v. State of Maharashtra and

Another  (1982)  3  SCC 383,  this  Court  reiterated  the  legal

position  and  observed  that  mere  service  of  the  grounds  of

detention is not a compliance of the mandatory provisions of

Article  22(5)  unless  the  grounds  are  accompanied  with  the

documents which are referred to or relied on in the grounds of

detention.  Any lapse would render the detention order void.    

25. This Court in  Sophia Gulam Mohd. Bham v.  State of

Maharashtra & Others (1999) 6 SCC 593 para 11 observed

that effective representation by the detenu can be made only

when copies of the material documents which were considered

and  relied  upon  by  the  Detaining  Authority  in  forming  his

opinion were supplied to him.

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26. In  District  Collector,  Ananthapur  &  Another v. V.

Laxmanna (2005) 3 SCC 663, this Court again reiterated that

the  documents  and  materials  relied  upon  by  the  detaining

authority  must be  supplied  to the detenu for  affording him

opportunity to make effective representation.

27. There were several grounds on which the detention of the

detenu was challenged in these appeals but it is not necessary

to  refer  to  all  the  grounds  since  on  the  ground  of  not

supplying the relied upon document, continued detention of

the  detenu  becomes  illegal  and  detention  order  has  to  be

quashed on that ground alone.

28. Our  Constitution  provides  adequate  safeguards  under

clauses (5) and (6) of Article 22 to the detenu who has been

detained  in  pursuance  of  the  order  made  under  any  law

providing for preventive detention.  He has right to be supplied

copies of all documents, statements and other materials relied

upon  in  the  grounds  of  detention  without  any  delay.   The

predominant  object  of  communicating  the  grounds  of

detention is to enable the detenu at the earliest opportunity to

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make  effective  and  meaningful  representation  against  his

detention.   

29. On proper construction of clause (5)  of Article 22 read

with section 3(3) of COFEPOSA Act, it is imperative for valid

continuance of detention that the detenu must be supplied all

documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the

grounds  of  detention.   In  the  instant  case,  admittedly,  the

relied upon document, the detention order of Anil Kumar was

not supplied to the detenu and the detenu was prevented from

making  effective  representation  which  has  violated  his

constitutional  right  under  clause  (5)  of  Article  22  of  the

Constitution.

30. Consequently, we accept these appeals.  The impugned

detention order is quashed and the detenu is directed to be

released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

31. The appeals are disposed of accordingly

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…….……………………..J. (Dalveer Bhandari)

…….……………………..J. (Asok Kumar Ganguly)

New Delhi; April 15, 2009.

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