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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  66 of 1998

PETITIONER: Tej Kaur & Ors., etc.

RESPONDENT: State of Punjab & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/03/2003

BENCH: K.G. Balakrishnan & P. Venkatarama Reddi.

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, J.

       The appellants in these two appeals  are land-owners  whose land was acquired for the purpose of  starting an "Industrial Focal Point" by  the State of Punjab.    Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was published on 7.5.1991.   Appellants in Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1998 filed objections on 13.6.1991.   Section 6 declaration was made on 18.3.1992 and the award was passed on 15.3.1994.    The  appellants  filed   writ petitions  before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, challenging the acquisition proceedings.  The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ petitions and aggrieved by the same, the present appeals are filed.

       Though the appellants had raised several grounds in the writ petitions, those grounds were not urged before us.   The appellants  urged only two grounds,    namely :     there was no Section 5A inquiry and the appellants were not given personal hearing regarding the objections filed by them;   and secondly, the lands owned by them were liable to be  exempted  as the acquired lands were agricultural lands.

       In   Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1998,     the counsel for the appellants contended that   though  Section 5A   inquiry was mandatory, no such inquiry was conducted in the instant case and that after the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act  was  made,     the award was passed within a short period and, therefore, the subsequent proceedings are illegal.          In      support of his contention, learned counsel relied on     the decision in  Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad & Anr. Vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad  & Anr.    (1976) 3 SCC 719     wherein   this Court   held   that     personal hearing under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act  is   mandatory and does not rest on person’s demand for personal   hearing.

Another decision relied on is Shri Mandir Sita Ramji vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors.  (1975) 4 SCC 298.   In that case,      this Court held that the duty of the Land Acquisition Officer to afford opportunity of being heard under Section 5A of the Act is mandatory and that a decision by Government on the objection, when the Collector afforded no opportunity of being  heard to the objector, would  not be proper.       The power to hear the objection under Section 5A is that    of the Collector and not of the appropriate Government.   Merely because the Government may not choose to accept the recommendation of the Land Acquisition Collector, even when he makes one, it can not be said that he need not make the recommendation at all but leave it to the Government to decide the matter.

Similarly,    in  the   decision in    Shyam  Nandan Prasad & Ors. vs.

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State of Bihar & Ors.  (1993) 4 SCC 255,   this Court observed that affording of opportunity of being heard to the objector during inquiry under Section 5A is a must and that this provision embodies  a just and wholesome principle that a person whose property is being, or is intended to be, acquired, should have the occasion to persuade  the authorities concerned that his property be not touched for acquisition.

It    is    true that Section 5A inquiry    is an important stage in the acquisition proceedings and a person who is aware of Section 4(1) Notification can raise objection to the effect that his property is not required for acquisition and he is also at liberty to raise the contention that  the property is not required for any public purpose.  It is also true,    that the objector must also be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard  and any violation of the procedure prescribed under Section 5A  would seriously  prejudice the rights of the owner of the property whose land is sought to be acquired.         In the instant case, however,  it is pertinent to note that the Collector had, in fact,  conducted the Section 5A inquiry,     though there is no   material on record to show that the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1998 were  heard in person.    The facts and circumstances     of    Civil   Appeal  No. 66/1998   clearly   show   that   the objection raised by the appellants  was considered and partly allowed by the Collector.    About  eight acres of land was sought to be  acquired from the appellants as per  the  Notification,      but out of that,    an extent of six acres was excluded   from  acquisition   and only one and half acre of land was actually  acquired by the authorities.   This would clearly show that the objection filed by the appellants  was considered by the Collector.   Moreover,  Section 6 Declaration was made on 18.3.1992 and the award  was passed on 15.3.1994. The  appellants   filed the writ petition only on 12.4.1994.     In spite of the Section 6 Declaration having been made on 18.3.1992, the appellants    allowed the acquisition proceedings to go on until the  award was passed.   This fact clearly indicates that the appellants   did not have a genuine grievance against Section 5A  inquiry held by the Collector.   Therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment on the grounds  now advanced by the appellants.

As regards Civil Appeal No. 67 of 1998,   the appellants   did not raise any objection   within   a reasonable time after Section 6 Declaration was made. The  possession   of  the  land   itself   was given     to  the   third parties for the purpose of starting the industry.    Moreover,   the land  of the appellants is surrounded    completely   by other plots   which  are  acquired and sought to be used for industrial purposes.    We do not find any justifiable ground to exclude the appellants’    lands   from acquisition.    The Division Bench has correctly held that the appellants  were  not  entitled   to  any   of   the   reliefs  prayed  for  in the writ petition.

In view of the above, we see no merit    in these appeals  which  are dismissed  accordingly.     There will be no order as to costs.