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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 6962 2000

PETITIONER: TATA IRON & STEEL CO.  LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       30/11/2000

BENCH: M.J.Rao, Umesh C Banerjee

JUDGMENT:

BANERJEE, J.

Leave granted. L.....I.........T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J

     This  appeal against the judgment of the High Court at Calcutta  is  addressed on two counts:  The first  involving the true purport of International Price Reimbursement Scheme (IPRS)  as  introduced  by the Government of India  and  the second  pertains  to  the doctrine of estoppel  by  conduct. Background  Facts:   By the Government Notification No.   SC (A)24  (113)/63 Dated 29.2.1964 issued by the Department of Iron  &  Steel  in the Ministry of Steel,  Mines  and  Heavy Engineering,  the Government of India to give effect to  the proposal  for  fixation  of steel prices  for  de-controlled categories, constituted the Joint Plant Committee consisting of  representatives  of all major producers of  steel  along with  Government  representative.   It is  the  Joint  Plant Committee  (hereinafter  referred  to as JPC)  with  whose concurrence,  the main producers, being its members  control the  prices of similar categories of steel, though  however, the  same  is  restrictive in its application  and  is  made applicable  to supplies effected by the main steel producers only, viz.  Tata Iron & Steel Co.  Ltd., Indian Iron & Steel Co.   Ltd.   and  Hindustan Steel Ltd.    (Presently  Steel Authority  of India Ltd.) The records depict that consequent on  the  increase  in excise duty in steel  materials  under Government of India Notification dated 17th March, 1972, the prices  of steel materials were directed to be inclusive  of JPC contribution to the re-roller Freight Differential Fund, Equalised  Freight Element and provision for JPC Engineering Goods  Export  Assistance Fund.  The inclusion of the  above were  made  applicable  to various categories  of  materials including  Bar,  Rods, Slabs Blooms, Coil, Billets etc.   as appears  from  JPC announcement No.81 dated March 20,  1972. It  is,  however, significant to note that by reason of  the inclusion  of the JPC price elements as above, the  domestic price  for  iron and steel materials has always been  higher than the international price of steel and resultantly demand for  imported  steel rather than the indigenous  manufacture was  on an ascending trend and it is to combat and curb such

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a  trend  and  having regard to the  higher  domestic  price structure,   the   Government  of   India   introduced   the International   Price  Reimbursement   Scheme   (hereinafter referred  to  as  the  Scheme)  so  as  to  provide   some protection  to  exporters  of engineering  goods  who  would otherwise  by  reason  of user of domestic steel,  would  be exposed  to an additional expenditure and thus suffer a loss for the price difference as noticed above.  Incidentally, be it  noted  that  the protection scheme came  into  force  by reason  of  the price increase effected on 9.2.1981  by  the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce Notification dated 23rd  July,  1981.   One  redeeming feature  of  the  Scheme however,  is  reimbursement (emphasised) and it is  in  this context that Clauses 2.4, 2.5, 2.7 and 2.8 of the Scheme are relevant  and  thus  ought  to be  noticed  in  extenso  and relevant  extracts  of which are as below:  2.4 Supplies  of Steel  made  under  release orders issued by  Iron  &  Steel Controller  will  be made at the prevailing  plant/stockyard price.   After  the  export are effected,  price  difference between its domestic price and the relevant international price  will  be  reimbursed  to  the  exporter.   Contracts eligible  for  reimbursement  under this  scheme  (including fresh  contracts)  would have to be got registered with  the concerned  Regional  Office of the EEPC within 45 days  from the date of the contract.

     2.5  For reimbursement purposes, the domestic  price for these categories would be the JPC plant price for those categories where JPC price control exists and SAIL price for other items prevailing on the date of exports.  The domestic price  will  be exclusive of taxes like sales  tax,  octroi, etc.

     2.7 Procedure for Reimbursement:

     A)  The application for reimbursement will be made  to the  Regional Offices of the EEPC, with whom the exporter is registered;

     B)  The  following documents will be submitted by  the exporter  for claiming the reimbursement of price difference between domestic and international prices of steel;

     (i) Application in the prescribed form marked Annexure  VI in triplicate;

     (vi)  A claim bill indicating categorywise consumption of  steel and the price difference payable based on domestic price  prevalent on the date of export and the international prices  for  the  second  preceding month  as  explained  in paragraphs .(Emphasis supplied).

     (vii) Sale voucher for purchase of steel/pig iron from Main Producers in original or the following documents:

     1.   Auditor/chartered Accountants Certificate in the prescribed  format to the effect that no imported  steel/pig iron has been utilised in the goods exported by the company.

     2.    An   indemnity  Bond    in   prescribed   format indemnifying Government against any wrong payment on account of  wrong  calculation  and / or for use of  imported  steel

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materials.

     C)  .the reimbursement benefit may be claimed  by any  one  of  the  two parties provided the  claimant  is  a registered   exporter   and  otherwise   eligible   to   get reimbursement benefit under this scheme;  (Emphasised)

     2.8 .

     v)  The claim for reimbursement would be made only  in respect  of  consumption  of indigenous steel and  pig  iron procured  from  the main producer or other sources.   Claims for  reimbursement would not be admitted against consumption of  Steel / pig iron imported against Advance License  under the  Duty Exemption Scheme and against imprest / REP license or  under  OGL.  No claims will be admitted in case  Customs duty  refund has been claimed / will be claimed under  brand rate   of  duty  drawback  for   such  steel  /  pig   iron. (Emphasised)

     Further facts are as below:

     (a)  Application paper being Annexure VI to the Scheme pertaining  to  reimbursement  of   difference  between  the domestic  and  international price of steel contain  details pertaining  to  total  quantity of steel  consumed  for  the manufacture  of  the product for export during a  particular month together with a statement of the amount of claim.  (b) Annexure  VI to the Scheme itself provides for furnishing of an undertaking recording therein an obligation to refund the amount  of  Bill  in full or part  against  application  for reimbursement  of  price  difference  between  domestic  and international  prices  in case  the  declaration/certificate furnished by the appellant against the claim are found to be incorrect  at  any time.  The undertaking  further  recorded that the refund would be effected within a period of 10 days from  the  date of receipt of notice asking for  the  refund failing which the amount paid erroneously or in excess shall be  recovered  from the appellant or to be adjusted  against any   other  claim.   (a)   Incidentally  Annexure  VI  also contained  an Indemnity Bond as well which records as below: ..Such  payments  are to be made on demand  and without  demur.   Our liability for payment under  the  bond being irrevocable and unconditional.  (Emphasized).

     The Indemnity Bond further provides

     Now  the  condition of this bond is such that if as  a result of the details scrutiny of the above said application (s)  the amount finally payable to obliger is determined  to be  (the decision of the government being final and binding) nil/less  because  the  obliger has been paid in  excess  on wrong  calculations  or has used imported steel/pig iron  in the manufacture of items thus exported and also received the price  difference  claim from the Disbursing Authority,  the eligibility   of  receiving  further   amounts  by  way   of difference   in   the  price   between  the   domestic   and international   prices  for  steel/pig   iron  used  in  the manufacture   of  items  exports,   will  be  withdrawn  and Government  shall be at liberty to claim upon the obliger to return  back  the  amount  already paid  by  the  disbursing

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authority within seven (7) days of the receipt of the notice from  the disbursing authority failing which the  government shall be free to take any action against the obliger without prejudice  to  the  Government   claim  including   security deposits  and  earnest money deposits lying with  any  other department of the Government or by attachment of our assets, shareholding  and  goodwill  as  also to  stop  all  further payment/assistance  to  the  obliger  as  available  to  the exporters.

     The facts in issue:  The factual score depicts that in terms of the Scheme as above, the appellant claimed benefits on the basis thereof and payments have also been made to the extent  of  differential  element   involved  in  the  price structure.   The  factual  score however disclose  that  the appellant  while exporting engineering goods did use its own manufactured  steel items without involvement of any of  the price  elements as declared by JPC and as noticed above.  It is  on this score however, the Engineering Export  Promotion Council subsequently by its letter dated 23rd November, 1992 refused to recognise the appellants entitlement to avail of the   benefit   of  the   Scheme.   The  Council   expressly communicated  that  a sum of Rs.10,37,96,604/- was  paid  in excess  under  a bona fide mistake being  discovered  later. The Council in addition to the claim above-said also claimed interest  at  the  rate  of 18% per  annum.   The  appellant however,  in  turn  by its letter dated 19th  January,  1993 while  recording  acceptance of the factum of user  of  own materials  placed on record that the JPC guidelines  exempt main  producers from having levies on steel manufactured  by them  but  used  for  either   captive  consumption  or  for manufacture of down stream products and this proves that the JPC  had accepted the unique position of an integrated steel producer  who  also manufactures other down stream  products and  by  reason of such an acceptance, the appellant is  not precluded from deriving the benefits under the Scheme.

     It  has been the specific stand of the appellant  that the  Scheme  for  Price Reimbursement from the time  of  its introduction  is  applicable  universally to  all  exporters since  the  export  would not have been viable  without  the benefits  under the Scheme.  Further the appellant contended that  the EEP Council did not find any fault with the claims lodged  for  all these years, evidently because the  Council was also satisfied about the eligibility of the company, nor there  was  any  violation or circumvention of  any  of  the provisions of the Scheme.

     Subsequently,  however, the Council by a letter  dated 19th   May,  1994  directed  an   adjustment  of  a  sum  of Rs.10,37,96,604/-  being the excess IPR - Scheme payment  to the  Appellant herein and hence the Writ Petition before the High  Court  which  was ordered in favour of  the  Appellant herein  by the learned Single Judge though however, reversed in  Letters Patent Appeal by the Appellate Bench of the High Court  and hence the appeal before this Court.   Contentions in  support:   In support of the Appeal, the learned  senior counsel,  Mr.   Andhiyarujina contended that the  scheme  by itself  if  read  in its entirety does  not  require  actual payment of domestic price and in support thereof it has been contended:  (1) The Scheme does not require the applicant to state  the  actual  domestic price paid by it  to  make  the claim,  after  the  1985  amendment.   (2)  After  the  1985 amendment  it  was not necessary, nor a requirement  in  the matter  of submission of sales voucher.  (3) A claimant  has

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only  to  state  the price difference  payable  between  the domestic  price  prevalent  on the date of  export  and  the international  price  of the preceding month.  (4)  The  JPC price  is  not  applicable  to   the  steel  purchased  from producers  other  than  the   main  producers  i.e.   other sources.   Exporters who obtain steel from other  sources do  not  have to pay JPC price or JPC levies.   Nevertheless the  price difference is payable between the JPC prices  and the  international prices.  (5) There is no provision in the Scheme for diminishing or altering the JPC prices to conform to  a price actually paid by the manufacturers/exporters for the  steel.  (6) For non-JPC categories of steel to be  used in  the  manufacture, the domestic price would be  the  SAIL price.   SAIL  prices  do not include JPC levies.   (7)  The Scheme   disregards   the   actual   price   paid   by   the manufacturer/exporter  for the domestic steel.  He may  have paid  to the producer of steel a higher or lower price  than the  JPC  price.   This  is ignored by the  Scheme  and  the uniform  JPC price is taken.  (8) Though the Scheme uses the word reimbursement, in the context of the Scheme, there is no repayment to the exporter.  The word reimbursement here truly  means  the  payment  to the  exporter  of  the  price difference  between the higher domestic price and the  lower international price, i.e.  to say a subsidy for exports.

     Mr.    Andhyarujina,  learned   senior  counsel,  very strongly  commented  that  after  the  commencement  of  the Amendment  on  17th  of October, 1985 the exporters  of  the engineering steel product could procure the indigenous steel and  pig iron from any source in the country since there was existing  no  obligation to procure materials from only  the main  producers but from other sources as well and it is  in this  context, strong reliance was placed on clause 2.8  (v) of  the  Scheme.  Mr.  Andhyarujina contended that the  very use  of the words other sources being an alternate to  the main  producer  depicts  the intent of the  framers  of  the Scheme that though primarily reimbursement would be effected in  respect of consumption of indigenous steel and pig  iron procured  from the main producer but this procurement may be had from other sources as well, such as Mukand Iron, Jindal, Orient  etc..   It has been contended rather  strongly  that other  sources cannot but mean other manufacturers producing indigenous  steel  and contra view would run counter to  the intent  of the framers of the Scheme.  It has been contended that the words procured fromother sources, as a matter of fact,  cannot but mean other sources than the main producer. The word procure in common English parlance mean and imply to  obtain or to get possession from someone else.  It is, as  a  matter of fact, obtaining the possession  of  someone which  one  has not already got.  This  attribution  however stands  accepted  by Lord Parker, C.J.  in R v.   Mills(1963 1All  ER202:   204).  Old English however, referred  to  the word  as  a sinister move but having regard to the  common acceptation  of the word, the submission of Mr.  Andhyaujina seem  to be rather attractive.  Incidentally, prior to  17th October,   1985  the  price   protection  was  available  to exporters who used indigenous raw material procured from the main  producers.   On  17th  October, 1985  the  Scheme  was amended  so  as  to  record  that  the  production  of  sale vouchers,  for the purchase of steel, pig iron from the main producers,  ceased  to be a requirement though, however,  in lieu  thereof an Audit Certificate has been demanded by  the Union  of India for certification that no foreign steel  has been  used  in the concerned manufactured item.  During  the course  of  submissions  Mr.  Andhyarujina in  no  uncertain

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terms  contended  that JPC prices are the prices  which  are announced  by  the JPC from time to time for  supplies  from member  steel  plants, namely, the main producers (SAIL  and TISCO)  and  the JPC prices applied for purchases  from  the main  producers  but not to purchases from other sources  or other  producers  as noted above.  TISCO, admittedly,  is  a main producer of steel in the country and admittedly further TISCO  was  captively consuming steel manufactured by it  in the export product being steel tubes and it is on this score that they claimed the benefits of the IPRS from 1985 onwards and  allowed  till  1992 when the respondents said  to  have illegally  denied  the  appellant the full benefits  on  the ground  that  it has not paid the special levies in the  JPC price  structure.   Contentions  raised  on  behalf  of  the Respondents:   It  is  in   this  perspective  that  learned Attorney  General  contended that IPRS was evolved to  avoid financial  sufferance to the Indian manufacturer of iron and steel  products from out of indigenous steel having the four basic price elements known in common English parlance as the JPC  price  namely, (i) Engineering Goods  Export  Assistant Fund (EGEAF) (ii) Steel Development Fund (SDF) (iii) Freight Equalisation  Fund (FEF) and (iv) JPC Cess.  Admittedly, JPC pricing is higher than international pricing as is available in the steel market in the country but in order to make sure utilisation of the indigenous steel from the main producers, the  quality of which stands tested , and to curb and combat the  financial  stress  on the manufacturers, the  IPRS  was brought  into  existence as otherwise  Indian  manufacturers would   be  completely  out  of   the  trade  by  reason  of availability  of international steel at a lesser rate.   The IPRS  leaves  no  manner  of   doubt  stands  attracted  for reimbursement  only.   The  issue therefore,  arises  having regard to the meaning attributed to the word reimbursement as  to  whether there is any entitlement for  the  appellant herein.     It    needs   to    be   adverted    that    the appellant-petitioner  in fact have been receiving the  money in  the past and the entitlement thereof is challenged  only since  1992  and  this payment as stated  by  Mr.   Attorney General  has  been  effected by mistake and  immediately  on detection  thereof  and in order to rectify the  mistake,  a notice was sent as to the excess payment on account of price difference  between  the  domestic   and  the  international prices.    Observations:   Under   the  International  Price Reimbursement  Scheme (IPRS) supplies of steel raw materials required by the Engineering exporters were made available at the  International  prices  by  reimbursing  the  difference between  the  JPC  prices  and  the  relevant  international prices.   The expression used is reimbursement to the extent of  the  difference between the domestic  and  international prices  and in the event of non-payment thereof question  of thus  claiming  any  price  difference would  not  arise  as otherwise it would amount to obtaining double benefit  This has been the contention of both Attorney General of India as also  the  Additional- Solicitor General of India  appearing for the respondents.  Admittedly, Tata Iron has not paid the JPC  price  which includes a number of levies  rendering  it more  than  the  international  prices  but  the  factum  of non-payment  of the levies, since the materials in  question have  been consumed at the factory itself without payment of any  duty,  the submissions of the respondent seems to  have been  placed  at  a  rather  stronger  footing.   In  common acceptation the word reimburse mean and imply to pay back or  refund:  As a matter of fact it denotes restoration  of something  paid in excess:  as regards the respondent  Union of  India  it cannot but mean to indemnify having regard  to

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the  common grammatical meaning of the word reimbursement. Reimbursement  has  to  mean  and imply  restoration  of  an equivalent  for  something paid or expended.   Reimbursement pre-supposes  previous payment.  The contextual facts depict that  the intention of the Government while framing the IPRS was  to protect the interest of exporters of the engineering goods  where the JPC or the domestic price (which includes a number  of levies) was more than the international  pricing. The  appellant  TISCO admittedly has not paid the JPC  price which  includes various levies of the raw materials used for the  product.   As  a matter of fact they  cannot  have  any reimbursement  for expenses which they have never  incurred. As  per the calculation made by the respondents an amount of Rs.10,37,96,604/-  is  recoverable from TISCO on account  of over  payment  of  which a sum  of  Rs.6,75,00,298/-  stands adjusted  by  the  Union  of   India  against  the  payments respectively  and a balance amount of Rs.  3,62,96,306/-  is yet  to be recovered as contended by the respondents.  On  a true  reading  of the Scheme and various clauses  thereunder together  with  the  available meaning on the basis  of  the language  used,  the  IPRS Scheme cannot  possibly  cover  a situation  as is in the present context.  We are afraid that in the event the appellant is permitted and allowed to enjoy the  benefits in terms of the scheme, the situation would be rather  not only of unjust enrichment but entertainment of a totally  wrong  claim.   Second Count:  In  support  of  the Appeal, the learned senior counsel Mr.  Andhiyarujina by way of  an  alternative submission contended that conferment  of benefit  in  terms  of IPRS and continuance thereof  in  the matter  of payment of price difference in terms of the  IPRS the  conduct  of  the respondent is hit by the  doctrine  of estoppel.   by conduct.  Estoppel by conduct in modern times stands  elucidated with the decisions of the English  Courts in  Pickard  v.   Sears (1837:  6Ad.  & El.   469)  and  its gradual  elaboration until placement of its true  principles by  the  Privy Council in the case of Sarat Chunder  Dey  v. Gopal  Chunder Laha (1898 L.R.  19 I.A.203) whereas  earlier Lord  Esher  in  the case of Seton, Laing  Co.   v.   Lafone (1887:   19,  Q.B.D.68) evolved three basic elements of  the doctrine  of Estoppel to wit:  Firstly, where a man makes  a fraudulent misrepresentation and another man acts upon it to its  true  detriment:  Secondly, another may be where a  man makes a false statement negligently though without fraud and another  person  acts  upon it:  And thirdly  there  may  be circumstances  under  which, where a  mis-representation  is made  without fraud and without negligence, there may be  an Estoppel:   Lord  Shand,  however, was pleased  to  add  one further  element to the effect that there may be  statements made,  which have induced other party to do that from  which otherwise  he would have abstained and which cannot properly be  characterised as mis- representation.  In this  context, reference  may be made to the decisions of the High Court of Australia  in  the case of Craine v.  Colonial  Mutual  Fire Insurance  Co.  Ltd.(1920:  28 C.L.R.  305).  Dixon, J.   in his  judgment  in  Grundt v.  The Great Boulder  Pty.   Gold Mines  Ltd.   (1938:   59  C.L.R.  641)  stated  that:   in measuring the detriment, or demonstrating its existence, one does not compare the position of the representee, before and after  acting  upon the representation, upon the  assumption that  the  representation  is to be regarded  as  true,  the question  of  estoppel does not arise.  It is only when  the representor  wishes  to disavow the assumption contained  in his representation that an estoppel arises, and the question of detriment is considered, accordingly, in the light of the position   which  the  representee  would   be  in  if   the

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representor  were  allowed  to  disavow  the  truth  of  the representation.  (In  this  context see Spencer  Bower  and Turner:   Estoppel by Representation 3rd Ed.).  Lord Denning also  in  the case of Central Newbury Car Auctions Ltd.   v. Unity  Finance  Ltd.  (1956 (3) All ER 905) appears to  have subscribed  to the view of Lord Dixon, J.  pertaining to the test  of detriment to the effect as to whether it  appears unjust  or  unequitable that the reprsentator should now  be allowed  to resile from his representation, having regard to what  the  representee has done or refrained from  doing  in reliance   on  the  representation,  in  short,  the   party asserting  the Estoppel must have been induced to act to his detriment.   So  long as the assumption is adhered  to,  the party  who altered the situation upon the faith of it cannot complain.   His complaint is that when afterwards the  other party  makes  a different state of affairs, the basis of  an assertion  of right against him then, if it is allowed,  his own   original  change  of  position   will  operate  as   a detriment.(vide Grundts:  High Court of Australia (supra)).

     Phipson   on  Evidence  (Fourteenth   Edn.)  has   the following   to  state  as   regards  estoppels  by  conduct. Estoppels  by  conduct,  or, as they  are  still  sometimes called,  estoppels by matter in pais, were anciently acts of notoriety not less solemn and formal than the execution of a deed,  such  as  livery of seisin, entry, acceptance  of  an estate  and  the like;  and whether a party had or  had  not concurred  in an act of this sort was deemed a matter  which there  could be no difficulty in ascertaining, and then  the legal  consequences followed.  [Lyon v.  Reed (1844) 13 M  & W.   285,  309] The doctrine has, however, in modern  times, been  extended  so  as  to embrace practically  any  act  or statement  by  a party which it would be  unconscionable  to permit  him  to  deny.  The rule  has  been  authoritatively stated  as  follows:   Where one by his  words  or  conduct willfully  causes  another  to believe the  existence  of  a certain  state  of  things and induces him to  act  on  that belief  so as to alter his own previous position, the former is  concluded  from averring against the latter a  different state  of things as existing at the same time. [Pickard  v. Sears  (1837)  6 A.& E.  469,474] And whatever a mans  real intention  may  be, he is deemed to act willfully if he  so conducts  himself  that  a  reasonable man  would  take  the representation to be true and believe that it was meant that he  should act upon it.  (Freeman v.  Cooke:  1848 (2) Exch. 654, 663).

     Where  the conduct is negligent or consists wholly  of omission,  there  must  be  a duty  to  the  person  misled. {Mercantile  Bank  v.   Central Bank (1938 AC 287,  304  and National  Westminster  Bank v.  Barclays Bank  International (1975  Q.B.  654] This principle sits oddly with the rest of the law of estoppel, but it appears to have been reaffirmed, at least by implication, by the House of Lords comparatively recently.   [Moorgate  Mercantile Co.  Ltd.  v.   Twitchings (1977)  AC 890 (H.L.)] The explanation is no doubt that this aspect  of  estoppel is properly to be considered a part  of the  law relating to negligent representations, rather  than estoppel  properly  so-called.  If two people with the  same source  of  information  assert the same truth or  agree  to assert  the same falsehood at the same time, neither can  be estopped  as against the other from asserting differently at another time.  [Square v.  Square (1935) P.120]

     A  bare perusal of the same would go to show that  the

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issue  of  an  estoppel by conduct can only be  said  to  be available  in  the  event  of  there  being  a  precise  and unambiguous  representation  and  on that  score  a  further question  arises  as  to whether there was  any  unequivocal assurance  prompting  the assured to alter his  position  or status..   The  contextual facts however, depict  otherwise. Annexure  2  to  the application form for benefit  of  price protection contains an undertaking to the following effect:- We  hereby  undertake to refund to EEPC Rs.---- the  amount paid  to us in full or part thereof against our  application for  price  protection.  In terms of our  application  dated against   exports  made  during  In  case   any   particular declaration/certificate  furnished  by us against our  above referred  to claims are found to be incorrect or any  excess payment   is   determine   to  have   been   made   due   to oversight/wrong  calculation  etc.   at any time.   We  also undertake  to refund the amount within 10 days of receipt of the  notice asking for the refund, failing which the  amount erroneously  paid or paid in excess shall be recovered  from or  adjusted against any other claim for export benefits  by EEPC or by the licensing authorities of CCI & C.

     and  it  is on this score it may be noted that in  the event  of  there being a specific undertaking to refund  for any  amount  erroneously  paid or paid in  excess  (emphasis supplied),  question of there being any estoppel in our view would  not arise.  In this context correspondence  exchanged between  the parties are rather significant.  In  particular letter   dated  30th  November,   1990  from  the  Assistant Development  Commissioner  for  Iron & Steel and  the  reply thereto  dated  March 8, 1991 which unmistakably record  the factum of non-payment of JPC price.

     Opinion  of the Court:  The contextual facts therefore in  no  unambiguous language depict that the four JPC  price elements  have  not  been  paid  by  the  appellant  herein. Further factual score depicts recording of an undertaking to repay in the event of excess payments and on the wake of the findings  as noticed hereinbefore, it would neither be  fair nor reasonable or in consonance with the concept of justice, equity  and  good  conscience directing entitlement  of  the appellant as is being claimed.  Doctrine of fairness and the duty   to  act  fairly  is  a  doctrine  developed  in   the administrative  law  field to ensure the rule of law and  to prevent  failure  of  justice.  It is a  principle  of  good conscience and equity since the law courts are to act fairly and   reasonably   in   accordance   with  the   law.    The correspondence  unmistakably  divulge an obligation  to  pay certain  compensation  in  the event there is a  payment  of certain  levy  by  the   appellant  herein:   The  appellant admittedly  has  not  made  the   payment  :   Doctrine   of unreasonableness  is  opposed  to doctrine of  fairness  and reasonableness   will  have  its   play,  if  allowed.   The happening  of  an event has not taken place, can it be  said irrespective  of  such  an  event  reimbursement  is  to  be allowed?   The  answer,  however,  cannot   but  be  in  the negative.   In  that  view  of the  matter,  we  record  our concurrence  with  the Judgment of the Calcutta High  Court. The  appeal therefore, fails and is dismissed.  No order  as to costs.