http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 6  

PETITIONER: TARAPORE & CO.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M/S. V/O TRACTORS EXPORT,  MOSCOW  & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/11/1968

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. RAMASWAMI, V. MITTER, G.K. HEGDE, K.S. GROVER, A.N.

CITATION:  1970 AIR 1168            1969 SCR  (2) 699  1969 SCC  (1) 233  CITATOR INFO :  R          1971 SC2337  (6)  R          1972 SC1598  (12)

ACT: Constitution   of  India,  Art.   133--Interim    injunction granted  In      suit whether a ’final order’ for purpose of Article.

HEADNOTE: M/s   Tarapore  &  Co.  who  were  plaintiffs  in  a    suit applied  for     an interim injunction restraining the first defendant in the suit from taking any steps in pursuance  of a letter of credit opened in favour of the second defendant. A  single  judge  of  the  High  Court  granted  an  interim injunction  restraining encashment of the letters of  credit pending disposal of the suit.  In appeals under the  Letters Patent preferred by the second dependent, the High Court  of Madras  set aside that order.  Against the orders passed  in the two appeals, the  plaintiffs  applied  for   certificate under  Arts. 133(1) (a) and 133(1)(b) of  the  Constitution. The  High  Court observed that an  order   granting  interim injunction  "is  a  final order, as far  as  this  Court  is concerned, determining the rights of parties within this his or proceeding, which is independent though ancillary to  the suit", and they were competent to grant certificate. In this Court   the  defendants  applied  for   revocation  of   the certificate. HELD: The certificate must be revoked. An order passed by the, High Court in appeal which does  not finally  dispose  of  a suit or proceeding  and  leaves  the rights and  obligations  of the parties for determination in the suit or proceeding from which the appeal has arisen,  is not final within the meaning of Art. 133(1)(a) and (h).  The order  refusing  to  grant an  interim  injunction  did  not determine  the  rights and obligations of   the  parties  in relation  to        the matter in dispute in the  suit.   It could  not be held that because         the plaintiffs  suit as  a  result  of the order of the  High  Court  may  become

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 6  

infructuous  as framed and the plaintiff may have  to  amend his  plaint  to obtain effective relief an  order  which  is essentially  an interlocutory order may be deemed final  for the purpose of Art. 133(1) of the  Constitution. [704 H] Mohanlal Maganlal Thakkar’s case makes no departure from the earlier  judgments  of the judicial Committee,  the  Federal Court and this Court.     Ramchand Manjimal v.  Goverdhandas Vishindas Ratanchand, L.R.  47  I.A. 124; Salaman v. Warner, [1891]  1  Q.B.  734; Bazson  v. Altrincham Urban District Council, [1903] 1  K.B. 547;   Isaacs   v.   Selbstein,  [1916] 2  K.B.  139,  Abdul Rahrnan v.D.K. Cassim & Sons, L.R. 60 I.A. 76; S.  Kuppusami Rao  v. The King, [1947] F.C.R. 180; Mohammad Amin  Brothers Ltd,  and Others v. Dominion of India and Others,  [1949-50] F.C.R.  842;  Sardar Syedna Taher  Saifuddin  Saheb  v.  The State of Bombay, [1958] S.C.R. 1007; Srinivasa Prasad  Singh v. Kesho  Prasad  Singh 13 C.L.J. 681 and Druva Coal Company v. Benaras Bank, 21 Cal. L.J. 281, referred to.     Mohanlal  Maganlal Thakkar v. State of Gujarat.   A.I.R. 1968  S.C. 733, explained. 700

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Misc.  Petitions  Nos. 401/and 4012 of 1968.     Applications  by respondent no. 1 for revocation of  the certificate  granted  by  the  Madras  High  Court  on  15th October, 1968 under Art. 133(1)(a) & (b) of the Constitution of India.                 AND Civil Appeals Nos. 2183 and 2184 of 1968.     Appeals  from the judgment and order elated  October  9, 1968  of  the Madras High Court in O.S.A. No. 25 and  27  of 1968.     M.C.  Setalvad.  V.P.  Raman,  D.N.  Mishra,  and   J.B. Dadachanji, for the appellant.     S. Mohan Kumaramangalam. M.K. Ramamurthi, Shyamala Pappu and Vineet Kumar, for respondent No. 1. Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for respondent No. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah,  J.  M/s. Tarapore & Company--hereinafter  called  the plaintiffs--applied  in Suit No. 118 of 1967 for an  interim injunction  restraining  the Bank of India  Ltd.--the  first defendant  in the suit  from taking any steps  in  pursuance of a letter of credit opened in favour of M/s. V/O  Tractors Export,  Moscow, the second defendant.  Ramamurthi,  J.,  by order  dated April  12, 1968, granted an interim  injunction restraining  encashment  of the letters  of  credit  pending disposal  of the suit.  In appeals under the Letters  Patent preferred by the second defendant,. the High Court of Madras set aside that order.  Against the orders passed in the  two appeals,  the  plaintiffs  applied  for  certificate   under Arts.133(1)(a) and 133(1)(b) of the Constitution.  The  High Court  observed  that an order granting  interim  injunction "is   a  final  order, as far as this  Court  is  concerned, determining  the  rights  of  parties  within  this  lit  or proceeding,  which is independent though  ancillary  to  the suit", and they were competent to grant the certificate. By  our  order dated October 28, 1968, we ordered  that  the certificate granted by the High Court do stand revoked.   We set  out the reasons in support of that order.  Article  133 (1) provides, insofar as it is material:                "(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 6  

             from any judgment, decree or final order in  a               civil  proceeding  of  a  High  Court  in  the               territory   of   India  if  the   High   Court               certifies-                        (a)  that the amount or value of  the               subject matter of the dispute in the court  of               first instance and still in dispute on  appeal               was  and  is not less  than  twenty  thou-sand               rupees  or such other sum as may be  specified               in that behalf by Parliament by law; or               701                     (b)  that the judgment, decree or  final               order  involves  directly or  indirectly  some               claim or  question respecting property of  the               like amount or value; or                     "(c)   ........   where  the.  judgment,               decree  or final order appealed  from  affirms               the decision of the Court immediately below in               any case other than a case referred to in sub-               clause   (c),  if  the  High   Court   further               certifies   that  the  appeal  involves   some               substantial question of law." The suit filed by the plaintiffs is a civil proceeding,  and the suit involves some claim or question respecting property of  not less than twenty thousand rupees.  That is a  matter not in dispute.     The  expression  "judgment"  in Art. 133 ( 1  )  in  the context in which it occurs means a final adjudication by the Court   of  the  rights  of  the  parties,  ’and   that   an interlocutory  judgment  even  if it decides   an  issue  or issues   without   finally  determining   the   rights   and liabilities  of  the  parties is  not  a  judgment,  however cardinal the issue may be.  In the present case not even  an issue  has  been decided, and it is not contended  that  the order of the High Court amounts to a judgment or ’a  decree. The  expression  "final order" it has been held  by  a  long course of authorities, occurring in s. 205 of the Government of  India Act, 1935, s. 109 of the Code of  Civil  Procedure and Art. 133(1) of the Constitution  means  a final decision on  the  rights  of  the parties in dispute  in  a  suit  or proceeding;  if the rights of the parties in dispute in  the suit or proceeding remain to be tried, after the order,  the order is not final.     In   Ramchand   Manjimal   v.   Goverdhandas   Vishindas RatanChand(1), it was held by the Judicial Committee that an order of the Judicial Commissioner of Sind vacating an order of stay granted under s. 19 o,f the Indian Arbitration  Act, 1899,  and  refusing to stay a proceeding was  not  a  final order  within the meaning of s. 109(a) of the Code of  Civil Procedure.  Viscount Cave referred to Salaman v.  Warner(2); Bozson  Altrincham Urban District Council(a) and  Issacs  v. Salbstein(4) and observed:                      "The   effect   of  those   and   other               judgments  is  that an order is  final  if  it               finally   disposes  of  the  rights   of   the               parties.   The orders now under appeal do  not               finally  dispose  of those rights,  but  leave               them  to  be determined by the Courts  in  the               ordinary way."     In  Abdul Rahman v.D.K. Cassim & Sons(5)  the   Judicial Committee observed that the expression "final order"  within the  meaning  of s. 109(a) of the Code of  Civil  Procedure, 1908, is an (1) L.R. 47 I.A. 124. (2) [1891] 1 Q.B. 734.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 6  

(3)  [1903] 1 K.B. 547. (4) [1916] 2 K.B. 139. (5) L.R. 60 I.A. 76. Sup. C.I./69--12 702 order which finally disposes of the rights of the parties in relation  to  the whole suit.  In Abdul Rahman’s  case(1)  a suit was instituted by D.K. Cassim and Sons claiming damages against the appellant Abdul Rahman.  Soon after the suit was instituted the plaintiff firm was adjudicated insolvent  and the  official  assignee  was  impleaded  as  an   additional plaintiff.   The official assignee declined to proceed  with the suit, and the suit was dismissed by the trial court.  In appeal  it was held by the High Court of Calcutta  that  the cause  of action was personal to the insolvents and did  not vest  in  the assignee, and accordingly they set  aside  the decree  and remanded the suit for trial. Against that  order an appeal was preferred to the Judicial Committee which  was held not maintainable.     In  8.  Kuppusami Rao v. The King(2) The  Federal  Court held that the expression "final order" in s. 205 (1 ) of the Government of India Act, 1935, means an order which  finally determines  the points in dispute and brings the case to  an end.   The  test  of finality, according to  the  court,  is whether  the  order finally disposes of the  rights  of  the parties,  and  not whether the order  decides  an  important point or even a vital issue in the case.     Mukherjea,   J.,   in  interpreting    the    expression "judgment,  decree  or  final  order"  in   s.  205  of  the Government  of  India Act, 1935, in Mohammad  Amin  Brothers Ltd. and others v. Dominion India and others ( 3 ) observed:                      "The expression "final order" has  been               used in contradistinction to what is known  as               "interlocutory   order"   ........    If   the               decision on an issue puts an end to the  suit,               the order will undoubtedly be a final one, but               if  the suit is still  left alive and has  got               to  be tried in the ordinary way, no  finality               could attach to the order." In  Mohammad Amin Brothers’ case(3) an issue was decided  by the trial court in a petition for winding up of a Company as to the maintainability of a claim for recovery of income-tax dues.  In  appeal  the High Court  overruled  the  objection raised   by   the Company about the maintainability  of  the claim,  and  finding that a bona fide  dispute  was  pending before the Income-tax authorities relating to a  substantial part of the debt on which the application for winding up was made  and  that  the solvency of the Company  could  not  be determined  before that dispute was decided, set  aside  the order  of the Trial Judge and remanded the case to him.  The Federal Court held that the order appealed against was not a "final order".      In Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State  of Bombay(4) a suit was filed for a declaration that the  order of ex- (1) L.R. 60LA. 76 (2) [1947] F.C.R. 180.  (3) [1949-502] F.C.R. 842. (4) [1958] S.C.R. 1007.   703 communication  passed by the appellant--religious head of  a community--was  invalid.   During the pendency of  the  suit them  Bombay Prevention of Ex-communication Act 42  of  1949 was  enacted  and one of the issues raised in the  suit  was whether  the  order of ex-communication was  invalid.   This

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 6  

issue was tried as a preliminary issue and as it raised  the question  of  the  vires of the Bombay  prevention  ’of  Ex- communication  Act, 1949, the State of Bombay was  impleaded as  a party-defendant in the suit.  The trial court  decided the issue against the appellant and the order was  confirmed in  appeal by the High Court of Bombay.  Against  the  order deciding  the issue, an appeal was preferred  to this  Court with  certificate granted by the High Court under Art.   132 and  Art. 133 of the Constitution, and it was held that  the appeal was not maintainable since the decision on the  issue did not finally dispose of the dispute between the parties.     In  Srinivasa Prasad Singh v. Kesho Prasad  Singh(1)  an order  deciding that circumstances had not been  established such  as would justify an order for stay of execution  of  a decree under appeal was not a ’final order" and was on  that account not appealable to the judicial Committee.  Similarly in Druva Coal Company v. Benaras Bank(2) it was held that an order by the High Court reversing the order of the Court  of First  Instance  granting a temporary injunction was  not  a final  order  within the meaning of s. 109 of  the  Code  of Civil Procedure.     There  is, therefore, ’abundant authority in support  of the  view that an order is final within the meaning of  Art. 133  of  the  Constitution,  under  s.  109  Code  of  Civil Procedure or s. 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935, if it amounts to final decision on the rights of the parties in dispute  in  the suit or proceeding; if after the  order  is made, the suit or proceeding still remains to be   tried, and the rights in disputes have to be determined, the order is interlocutory.     Counsel for the appellant strongly relied upon a  recent judgment  of  this Court in Mohanlal  Maganlal  Thakkar   v. State of Gujarat(3) and contended that the view expressed in the  earlier  cases is superseded.   In  Mohanlal  Thakkar’s case(a)  after  an  enquiry under s. 476  Code  of  Criminal Procedure,  1898, a Magistrate ordered that a  complaint  be filed against a person in respect of offences under ss. 205, 467  and  468 read with s. 114 I.P. Code.    In  appeal  the Additional  Sessions  Judge  held  that  the  complaint  was competent  only in respect of the offence under s. 205  read with    s.    114.     The   High    Court    dismissed    a revision  application  against  the order of  the  Court  of Session.  Certificate was there- (1) 13 C.L.J. 681.  (2) 21 Cal. L.J. 281. (3) A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 733. 704 after  issued by the High Court under Art. 134(1)(c) of  the Con  stitution for leave to appeal against the  order.   The competence  of the High Court to grant the  certificate  was challenged  at the hearing of the appeal.  This  Court  held (Bachawat  & Mitter JJ., dissenting) that the  order  passed was  a  final order within the meaning of  Art.  134(1)  (c) since  the  controversy  between the parties  when  the  the complaint in respect of offences under ss. 467 and 468  read with  s.  114  I.P. Code was disposed of  by  the  order  of dismissal  and  the proceeding regarding that  question  was finally  decided It was observed that the finality  of  that order  was  not  to be judged by  co-relating  it  with  the controversy in the complaint, viz., when then the  appellant had  committed  the offence charged  ,against  him  therein. There  is  nothing  in  that  judgment  which  supports  the contention  that this Court has departed from the  principle of  the earlier decisions or has suggested a different  test for determining the finality of orders.  The Court  in  that case  was concerned merely with an order passed by the  High

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 6  

Court which maintained the order of the Additional  Sessions Judge  that a complaint under s. 205 read with s.  114  I.P. Code could be filed against the appellant.  The order of the High  Court  finally  disposed  of  the  proceeding  in  the Magistrate’s   court   relating  to  the    expediency    of instituting criminal proceedings against the appellant.   It was thereafter for the court trying the complaint to  decide whether  the  offence  complained of was  committed  by  the appellant.   The proceeding for filing a complaint under  s. 476 of the  Code  of Criminal Procedure was a self-contained proceeding   and   was  finally disposed  of  by  the  order directing the filing of a complain under s. 205 read with s. 114  I.P. Code.  The proceeding instituted on the  complaint was  not  part  of or incidental to the  proceeding  for  an enquiry whether a complaint should be filed.   The Court  in that  case expressly approved of the earlier view at p.  736 where  after referring to Kuppusami Rao’s case(1)  observed: Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb’s case(") observed:                       "  ......  these were cases where  the               impugned  orders  were passed  in  appeals  or               revisions and since an appeal or a revision in               continuation   of   the   original   suit   or               proceeding  the test applied was  whether  the               order   disposed  of  the  original  suit   or               proceeding.  If  it did not, and the  suit  or               proceeding  was a live one, yet to  be  tried,               the order was held not to be final.  Different               tests  have been applied, however,  to  orders               made   in   proceeding  independent   of   the               original or the main proceeding."      In  our judgment an order passed by the High  Court  in appeal  which  does  not  finally  dispose  of  a  suit   or proceeding  and  leave  the rights and  obligations  of  the parties  for  determination in the suit or  proceeding  from which appeal has arisen, is not final within (1) [1947] F.C.R. 180.                    (2) E[1958] S.C.R. 1007. 705 he meaning of Art. 133(1)(a) and (b).  The order refusing to grant an interim injunction did not determine the rights and obligations  of  the parties in relation to  the  matter  in dispute  in the suit.  We are unable  to hold that,  because the  plaintiff’s suit as a result of the order of  the  High Court  may become infructuous as framed and  the  plaintiffs may  have to seek amendment of the plaint to  get  effective relief, an order which is essentially an interlocutory order may  be deemed final for the  purposes of  Art. 133  (1)  of the   Constitution.  In  our  judgment,  Mohanlal   Maganlal ThakKar’s  case(1)  makes  no departure  from  the   earlier judgments of the Judicial Committee, the Federal  Court  and this  Court.   The  plaintiffs will pay  the  costs  of  the petitioners  of  the  application  for  revocation  of   the certificate. G.C.                                             Certificate revoked. (1) A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 733. 706