http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 17  

PETITIONER: T. VENKATA REDDY ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/03/1985

BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) MISRA RANGNATH CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) DESAI, D.A. REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

CITATION:  1985 AIR  724            1985 SCR  (3) 509  1985 SCC  (3) 198        1985 SCALE  (1)613  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1987 SC1467  (2,3)

ACT:         E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.1      Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 123 and 213      Ordinance   issuance   of-Propriety,   expediency   and necessity  not   of  courts-Governor  issuing  an  ordinance abolishing certain  posts-Ordinance lapsing and not replaced by Act-Posts  abolished by  Ordinance- Whether  deemed to be revived.      Andhra Pradesh  Abolition of  Post of Part-time Village Officers  Ordinance   1984,  constitutional   validity   of- Ordinance lapsing-Not  replaced by  Act-Posts  abolished  by Ordinance Whether revived.

HEADNOTE:      The, State  of Andhra Pradesh was constituted under the States Reorganisation  Act. 1956  consisting  of  two  areas known as  the ’Andhra Area’, and the ’Telangana Area’. There were different  laws governing the village administration in the two  areas. The village establishment in the Andhra Area which  previously   formed  part  of  the  State  of  Madras consisted of  headmen and karnams who  were village officers and  talyaris,   vettis  and  neergantis  who  were  village servants. Their  appointment and  conditions of service were governed by the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, 1895.      In  the   Telangana  Area,  the  village  establishment consisted of  the posts of patwaris, mali, patels and police patels  who   were  village  officers  and  sethsindhis  and neeradis who were village servants      The State  Government appointed  a Committee called the Village Officers  Enquiry Committee  to review  the existing system of  part-time officers  working at the village level. The Committee  submitted its  report in  1961  that  it  was necessary  to   reorganise  the   village  establishment  by appointment of  full-time officers  with  larger  volume  of work. It  also recommended  that steps  should be  taken  to reduce the  number of  posts  by  merger  of  functions  and increasing the  area over  which the  village officers could

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 17  

exercise jurisdiction.      In course  of time,  the  Governor  of  Andhra  Pradesh promulgated rules  under the  proviso to  Article 309 of the Constitution called the Andhra pradesh 510 (Andhra Area)  Village Offices Service Rules, 1969 providing for the  regulation of  the recruitment  and  conditions  of service of  holders of village offices in the Andhra Area of the State  of Andhra  Pradesh with effect from May 22, 1969, The State  Legislature  passed  the  Andhra  Pradesh  Watans (Abolition) Act, 1978 which came into force with effect from December 8,  1977 abolishing  all the watans-village offices in the  Telangana Area  of  the  State.  Simultaneously  the Andhra Pradesh  (Telangana  Area)  Village  Offices  Service Rules, 1978  were promulgated  by the  Governor with  effect from 7th  December 1977  providing for  the recruitment  and conditions  of  service  of  the  village  officers  in  the Telangana Area.  The village officers in both the areas were however still part-time officers.      On January  6, 1984  on the recommendation of the State Government. the  Governor  promulgated  the  Andhra  Pradesh Abolition of  Posts of part-time Village Officers Ordinance, 1984 (Ordinance No. 1 of 1984).      Section 2(d)  of the  Ordinance defined  the expression ’part-time village  officer’ as a person who held any of the village  offices   of  headman,   munsiff,  reddy,  monigar, peddakapu, patel,  karnam or  patwari or  triune officer  or holder of any such village office by whatever designation it may be locally known including their assistants.      Section 3  of the  Ordinance declared that the posts of part-time village officers in the State of Andhra Pradesh as defined in  section 2(d) thereof stood abolished with effect on and  from the  date of  the commencement of the Ordinance which came into force at once, and every person who held the post of  part time  village officer  in any art of the State would with  effect on  and from that date cease to hold such posts. By  virtue of  this provisions the posts of part-time village officers  ceased to  be in  existence on  January 6, 1984  and  the  incumbents  of  those  posts  ceased  to  he employees of the Government on and from that date.      The Ordinance  was not  replaced by an Act of the State Legislature but  it was  succeeded by four ordinances namely Ordinance No.  7 of  1984, 13  of 1984, 18 of 1984 and 21 of 1984.      The petitioners  who were  part-time  village  officers questioned the  constitutional validity of this Ordinance by petitions filed  both in  this Court  and in the High Court. The petitions filed in the High Court were withdrawn to this Court under Article 139 A.      The Counsel  for the Petitioners did not urge the other points in view of these decisions.      Gazula Dasaratha  Rama  Rao  v.  The  State  of  Andhra Pradesh & Ors., [1961] 2 S.C.R. 931, B.R. Sharkaranarayana & Ors. v.  The State  of Mysore  & Ors.,  (A.l.R. 1966  S.C.C. 1571), K  Rajendran & Ors. etc. etc. v. State of Tamil  Nadu JUDGMENT: 511      It was  however contended  ml behalf of the petitioners (i)that the  Ordinance was  void and ineffective due to lack of application of mind by the Governor to the subject-matter of the  Ordinance, (ii)  that the Ordinance having lapsed as the Legislature  did not pass an Act in its place, the posts which were  abolished should  be deemed  to revived, and the issue of  successive ordinances the subsequent one replacing the earlier  one did  not serve  any purpose, and (iii) that

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 17  

the abolition of posts and the consequent deprivation of the right of  the petitioners to hold the said posts amounted to an infringement  of their  fundamental  right  to  life  and personal  liberty   guaranteed  under   Article  21  of  the Constitution .      Dismissing the Writ Petitions. ^      HELD: 1.  Under Article  123 of  the  Constitution  the President can  promulgate an  ordinance on the advice of the Council of  Ministers to meet the requirement of a situation when either House of Parliament is not in session. Similarly under Article 213 of the Constitution the Governor may issue an ordinance on the advice of this Council of Ministers when the Legislative  Assembly or  where there  are two Houses of the Legislature in a State either of them is not in session. Since under  Article  85  of  the  Constitution  it  is  not permissible to  allow a period of six months to intervene in the case  of each  Mouse  of  Parliament  between  its  last sitting in  one session and the date appointed for its first meeting in  the next  session and  since under clause (2) of Article 123  of the Constitution an ordinance has to be laid before both  Houses of Parliament and would cease to operate at the  expiration of  six  weeks  from  the  reassembly  of Parliament, it  cannot be  said that  either  House  can  be avoided by  the President  beyond seven  and a  half  months after the  passing of an ordinance. It is open to Parliament if it  chooses to  approve it  or not.  Having regard to the conditions  prevailing  in  India  the  Constitution  makers thought that  the ordinance  making power should be given to the President to deal with unforeseen or urgent matters- The position under  Article 213  of the Constitution is also the same. [523D-G]      2. The  Legislative action  under our  Constitution  is subject  only   to  the   imitations   prescribed   by   the Constitution  and   to  no   other.  Any  law  made  by  the Legislature, which  it is  not competent  to pass,  which is violative of  the provisions in Part III of the Constitution or  any  other  constitutional  provision  is  in-effective. [525G-H]      3. The  motives of the legislature in passing a statute is beyond the scrutiny of courts. Nor can the courts examine whether  the   legislature  had  applied  its  mind  to  the provisions of  a statute  before passing  it. The  propriety expediency ’and  necessity of  a legislative act are for the determination  of   the  legislative   authority   and   are determination by  the courts.  An  ordinance  passed  either under Article  123 or  under Article 213 of the Constitution stands on  the same  footing. When  the Constitution    says that the ordinance    making      power is 512 legislative power and an ordinance shall have the same force as an  Act, an  ordinance should  be clothed  with  all  the attributes of an Act of legislature carrying with it all its incidents,   immunities    and   limitations    under    the Constitution. It cannot be treated as an executive action or an administrative decision.      Gazula Dasaratha  Rama  Rao  v.  The  State  of  Andhra Pradesh &  Ors" [1961]  2 S.C.R. 931 B.R. Shankaranarayana & Ors., v. The State of Mysore & Ors, (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1571), K. Rajendran & Ors. etc. etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., 11982] 3  S.C.R. 628,  Lakhi Narayan  Das v. The Province of Bihar, []949)  F.C.R. Vol.  Xl 693,  R.R. Garg  etc. etc. v. Union of  India & Ors. etc. [19821 I S.C.R. 947 and A.K. Roy etc. v.  Union of India & Anr., [1982] 2 S. C.R. 272 at page 299. referred to.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 17  

    4. Article  213 of  the Constitution  does not say that the Ordinance  shall be  void from  the commencement  on the State Legislature  disapproving it.  It says  that it  shall cease to operate. It only means that it should be treated as being effective  till it  ceases to operate on the happening of the events mentioned in clause (2) of Article 213. In the instant case, the Andhra Pradesh Abolition of Posts of Part- time Village Officers ordinance 1984 deals with two separate matters. By  clause 3  it abolishes  the posts  of part-time village officers on the commencement of the Ordinance and it further declares  that every  person who  held the post of a part-time village officer would cease to hold that post with effect  from  that  date.  By  clause  4  and  other  allied provisions, the  Ordinance has  provided for the creation of posts of  Village Assistants  and appointment and conditions of  service   of  Village   Assistants  who  are  full-tin-e employees of  the Government.  There  is  no  doubt  that  a separate provision  is made in clause 5 of the Ordinance for payment of  some amount to the ex-part-time village officers [528H; 529A-C]      5.A  mere   disapproval  by  Parliament  or  the  State Legislature of  an ordinance  cannot, however, revive closed or completed transactions.      6. The  abolition of the posts and the declaration that the incumbents  of those  posts would cease to be holders of those posts  under clause 3 of the Ordinance being completed events. there  is  no  question  of  their  revival  or  the petitioners continuing to hold those posts any longer.      7. Even  if the  other provisions of the Ordinance have ceased to  be in  force,  there  can  be  no  constitutional difficulty arising therefrom because it is open to the State Government to  create new  posts in  exercise of  its powers under Article 162 of the Constitutional as long as the field is not  occupied by an Act of the Legislature or a rule made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution.[531 E- F]      State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, [1962] 2 Supp. 380, referred to.      Steavenson v. Oliver 151 English Reports 1024, referred to. 513

& ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 623, 1546/84                          etc. etc.      Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.      Subramanya Poty,  T.S. Krishnamurty  Iyer, Miss  Malini Poduval, B.  Kanta Rao, Subodh Markandeya, Mrs. Sheil Sethi, A.K Ganguli, A.K. Charkarvarti, C.S. Vaidyanathan and Prabir Choudhary, G.N.  Rao T.C.  Gupta. and  Attar Singh  for  the appearing Petitioners.      K. Subramanya Reddy, Adv. Genl. (AP), E. Manohar, Addl. Adv. Genl (AP), T.V.S.N. Chari, Kailash Vasudev Sudash Menon and  Miss   Vrinda  Grover,  and  B.  Parthasarthi  for  the Respondents.      D.K Sen, P.P. Singh and R.N. Poddar. for the U.O.I.      K Ram Kumar for the Intervener.      The judgment of the Court was delivered by      VENKATARAMIAH, J.  In the  above writ  petitions  filed under Article  32 of  the Constitution  the petitioners have questioned the constitutional validity of the Andhra Pradesh Abolition of  Posts of Part-time Village Officers Ordinance, 1984 (Ordinance  No. 1  of 1984) (hereinafter referred to as

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 17  

’the Ordinance’)  promulgated  by  the  Governor  of  Andhra Pradesh on  January 6,  1984 in exercise of his powers under Article 213  of the Constitution by which the posts of part- time Village Officers in the State of Andhra Pradesh came to be abolished  and provision  was made for the appointment of Village Assistants. Some of the petitions which are disposed of by  this judgment had been filed before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh  under Article  226 of  the Constitution  for similar reliefs.  They were  withdrawn to  this Court  under Article 139A  of the  Constitution form  hearing them  along with the petitions filed under Article 32.      Section 2(d)  of the  Ordinance defined  the expression ’part-time village  officer’ as a person who held any of the village  offices   of  headman,   munsiff,  reddy,  monigar, peddakapu, patel,  karnam or  patwari or  triune officer  or holder of any such village office by whatever designation it may be locally known including their 514 assistants appointed  under (i)  the Andhra  Pradesh (Andhra Area) Village  Offices Service  Rules, 1969, (ii) the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Village Offices Service Rules, 1978 or (iii)  any other law. The petitioners were the holders of these  posts   immediately  prior   to  the   date  of   the promulgation of the Ordinance.      It is  necessary to  set out  at  this  stage  a  brief history of  the posts  held by the petitioners. The State of Andhra   Pradesh    was   constituted   under   the   States Reorganisation Act,  1956 consisting  of two  areas known as the ’Andhra  Area’ and  the  ’Telangana  Area’.  There  were different laws  governing the village administration in  the two areas.  The village  establishment in  the  Andhra  Area which  previously   formed  part  of  the  State  of  Madras consisted of  headmen and  karnams who were village officers and  talyaris,   vettis  and  neergantis  who  were  village servants. Their  appointment and  conditions of service were governed by  the Madras Hereditary Village-Offices Act, 1895 (Madras  Act  No.  III  of  1895).  They  were    originally hereditary offices.  In Gozula  Dasaratha Rama  Rao  v.  The State of  Andhra Pradesh  & Ors.(l)  decided on  December 6, 1960 this Court held that section 6(1) of the said Act which provided for appointment of village officers and servants on the hereditary  basis  was  hit  by  Article  16(2)  of  the Constitution and  was, therefore,   void.  In the  Telangana Area, the  village establishment  consisted of  the posts of patwari, mali  patels and  police patels  who  were  village officers and  sethsindhis  and  neeradis  who  were  village servants. Their  duties and  responsibilities were laid down by ’Dastur-ulAmal’  1293 Hijri  (Fasli 1285)  and ’Dastur-e- Dehi’. These  posts were  also hereditary in character. They were also  known as watans. After the decision of this Court referred  to   above,  the   Government  of  Andhra  Pradesh appointed a  Committee called  the Village  Officers Enquiry Committee under G.O.Ms. No. 1042, Revenue (1) dated June 16, 1961 to  propose, among  others a  scheme  for  the  village establishment of  the entire  State of  Andhra Pradesh under the chairmanship  of K.M.  Unnithan, I.C.S.  since the State Government was  of the view that the then existing system of part-time   officers working  at the  village level  was not conducive to  the interests  of public  administration.  The said Committee  submitted its  report in 1961. It found that taking an  overall view of the nature and quantum of work of the village officers in the two areas of the (1) [1961] 2 S.C.R.. 931. 515 State there was not enough work for all village officers and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 17  

that  it   was   necessary   to   reorganise   the   village establishment by  appointment  of  full-time  officers  with larger volume  of work. The Committee recommended that steps should be  taken to  reduce the number of posts by merger of functions and  increasing the  area over  which the  village officers could exercise jurisdiction. In course of time, the Governor of  Andhra  Pradesh  promulgated  rules  under  the proviso to  Article 309  of the Conitution called the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra  Area) Village  Offices Service  Rules, 1969 providing  for   the  regulation   of  the  recruitment  and conditions of  service of  holders of village offices in the Andhra Area  of the State of Andhra Pradesh with effect from May 22, 1969. The Legislature of the State of Andhra Pradesh passed the Andhra Pradesh Watans (Abolition) Act, 1978 which came into force with effect from December 8, 1977 abolishing all the watans (village offices together with the properties appertaining to  them) other  than sethsindhis and neeradies in the  Telangana Area  of  the  State.  Simultaneously  the Andhra Pradesh  (Telangana  Area)  Village  Offices  Service Rules, 1978  were promulgated  by the  Governor with  effect from 7th  December, 1977  providing for  the recruitment and conditions  of  service  of  the  village  officers  in  the Telangana Area. The village officers in both the areas were, however, still  part-time officers.  Then on January 6, 1984 on the  recommendation of  the State Government the Governor promulgated the  Ordinance  which  is  challenged  in  these proceedings.      Section 3  of the  Ordinance declared that the posts of part-time village officers in the State of Andhra Pradesh as defined in  section 2(d) thereof stood abolished with effect on and  from the  date of  the commencement of the Ordinance which came  into force at once and every person who held the post of  part-time village  officer in any part of the State of Andhra  Pradesh would  with effect  on and from that date cease to  hold such  post. By  virtue of the said provision, the posts  of part-time  village officers  ceased to  be  in existence on  January 6,  1984 and  the incumbents  of those posts ceased  to be  employees of the Government on and from that date. Thus the transaction of abolition of posts became an accomplished  fact on  January 6, 1984 and there remained nothing more  to be  done with  regard to  that event.  What remained to  be done  was perhaps payment of amount, if any, to  those   who  thereby  ceased  to  be  the  employees  of Government as provided by section 5 of the 516 Ordinance  and   the  recruitment   of  persons  as  Village Assistants as provided by section 4 of the Ordinance for one or more  revenue villages  and the framing of rules relating to the  conditions of their service as provided by section 6 of the  Ordinance. The remaining provisions of the Ordinance were ancillary  and incidental to the abolition of posts and the filling  up of the new posts of Village  Assistants. The abolition of  the posts was, however, not dependent upon the filling up of the new posts of Village Assistants. They were two independent  transactions. The abolition of the posts of part-time village  officers became  elective on  the  coming into force  of the Ordinance. It may be stated here that the Ordinance has  not yet  been replaced by an Act of the State Legislature. It  is, however,   succeeded by four ordinances viz. Ordinance  No. 7  of 1984,  Ordinance No.  13 of  1984, Ordinance No. 18 of 1984 and Ordinance No. 21 of 1984.      These petitions  are in  line with two cases which have already     been   decided   by   this   Court   viz.   B.R. Shankaranarayana &  Ors. v. The State of Mysore & Ors.(1) in which the  constitutionality of  the Mysore  Village Offices

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 17  

Abolition Act,  1961 (Act  No. 14 of 1961) was upheld and K. Rajendran &  Ors. etc. etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.(2) in which  the validity  of the Tamil Nadu Abolition of Posts of Part-time  Village Officers  Ordinance, 1980  (Tamil Nadu Ordinance No. 10 of 1980) and of the Tamil Nadu Abolition of Posts of  Part-time Village  Officers Act,  1981 (Tamil Nadu Act No.3  of 1981) was upheld. Hence the learned counsel for the petitioners  very fairly, and we think  rightly, did not many of  the contentions  which has  been rejected  by  this Court in  the said  decisions.   They, however,  pressed the following contentions before us in support of the petitions:      (i)  that the  Ordinance is void and ineffective due to           lack of application of mind by the Governor to the           subject matter of the Ordinance;      (ii) that  the   Ordinance   having   lapsed   as   the           Legislature did  not pass an Act in its place, the           posts which  were  abolished  be  deemed  to  have           revived and the issue of (1) A.l.R.1966 S.C.1571. (2) 119821 3 S.C.R. 628. 517      successive ordinances  the subsequent one replacing the      earlier one did not serve any purpose; and      (iii)that the  abolition of  posts and  the  consequent           deprivation of  the right  of the  petitioners  to           hold the said posts amounted to an infringement of           their  fundamental  right  to  life  and  personal           liberty  guaranteed   under  Article   21  of  the           Constitution.      Before  dealing  with  the  above  contentions  of  the petitioners it  is useful  to refer to the provisions of the Constitution relating  to the power of the Executive to make laws by  the issue  of ordinances.  In the instant cases the Ordinance is  issued by  the Governor  in  exercise  of  the legislative power  conferred on him under Article 213 of the Constitution. Article 213 reads thus:           "213.  (1)   If  at  any  time,  except  when  the      Legislative Assembly of a State is in session, or where      there is  a Legislative Council in a State, except when      both houses  of the  Legislature are  in  session,  the      Governor is  satisfied that  circumstances exist  which      render it  necessary for  him to take immediate action,      he may  promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances      appear to him to require;           Provided that  the  Governor  shall  not,  without      instructions from  the President,  promulgate any  such      Ordinance if-      (a)  a Bill  containing the same provisions would under           this  Constitution   have  required  the  previous           sanction of  the President  for  the  introduction           thereof into the Legislature; or      (b)  he would  have deemed  it necessary  to reserve  a           Bill  containing   the  same  provisions  for  the           consideration of the President; or      (c)  an Act  of the Legislature of the State containing           the same  provisions would under this Constitution           have been invalid unless, having been reserved for           the  consideration   on  the   President,  it  had           receive(l the assent of the President. 518      (2)  An ordinance  promulgated under this article shall           have the  same force  and effect  as an Act of the           Legislature  of  the  State  assented  to  by  the           Governor, but every such Ordinance-      (a)  shall be  laid before  the Legislative Assembly of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 17  

         the State, or where there is a Legislative Council           in the  State, before  both the  houses, and shall           cease to  operate at  the expiration  of six weeks           from the  re assembly  of the  Legislature, or  if           before the  expiration of that period a resolution           disapproving  it  is  passed  by  the  Legislative           Assembly and agreed to by the Legislative Council,           if any,  upon the passing of the resolution or, as           the case may be, on the resolution being agreed to           by the Council; and      (b)  may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor.           Explanation.-Where the  Houses of  the Legislature      of a State having a Legislative Council are summoned to      re assemble on different dates, the period of six weeks      shall be reckoned from the later of those dates for the      purposes p, of this clause.      (3) If  and so  far as  an Ordinance under this article      makes any provision which would not be valid if enacted      in an  Act of  the Legislature of the State assented to      by the Governor, it shall be void:           Provided that,  for the purposes of the provisions      of this  Constitution relating  to the effect of an Act      of the  Legislature of a State which is repugnant to an      Act of  Parliament or an existing law with respect to a      matter enumerated  in the Concurrent List, an Ordinance      promulgated  under   this  article   in  pursuance   of      instructions from  the President  shall be deemed to be      an Act  of the  Legislature of the State which has been      reserved for  the consideration  of the  President  and      assented to by him."      Article 213  of the Constitution corresponds to Article 123 of  the Constitution which confers similar powers on the president in 519 relation to  matters on  which  Parliament  can  make  laws. Article 123 reads thus:           "123. (1)  If at any time, except when both Houses      of  Parliament   are  in   session,  the  President  is      satisfied that  circumstances  exist  which  render  it      necessary for  him to  take immediate  action,  he  may      promulgate such  Ordinances as the circumstances appear      to him to require.      (2)  An ordinance  promulgated‘under this article shall      have the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament,      but every such ordinance-      (a)  shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and           shall cease  to operate  at the  expiration of six           weeks from  the reassembly  of Parliament,  or, if           before the  expiration of  that period resolutions           disapproving it  are passed  by both  Houses, upon           the passing  of the  second of  those resolutions;           and      (b)  may be withdrawn at any time by the President.      Explanation.-Where  the   Houses  of   Parliament   are      summoned to  reassemble on  different dates, the period      of six  weeks shall be reckoned from the later of those      dates for the purposes of this clause.      (3)  If and  so far  as an Ordinance under this article      makes any  provision which  Parliament would  not under      this Constitution  be competent  to enact,  it shall be      void."      The slight difference that exists between the above two articles arises  on account of the need to obtain the assent of the  President on certain legislative matters even though they are  within the  legislative competence  of  the  State

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 17  

Legislature but  that does not make any difference regarding the points  to be considered in these petitions because they are common  to both  Article 123  and  Article  213  of  the Constitution,      At the  outset the  learned counsel for the petitioners questioned the  constitutional propriety of the power of the Executive to  make laws which would have a lasting effect on the rights of people in a 520 democratic society  where  peoples’  representatives  should ordinarily be  entrusted with  the duty of making such laws. It is  true that  while our  Constitution  has  adopted  the pattern of  separation of powers amongst the three organs of the Government,  namely, the  Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary,  it has  conferred legislative  power on  the Executive subject to certain conditions by  enacting Article 123 and  Article  213  of  the  Constitution.  It  has  also associated the President and the Governor with the making of the laws  even when  Parliament or the State Legislature, as the case may be, enacts them. Article 79 of the Constitution says that  there shall  be a  Parliament for the Union which shall consist  of the  President and  two Houses to be known respectively as  the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) and the House of  people (Lok Sabha). The assent of the President to a Bill  passed by both the Houses of Parliament is essential for its  becoming law under Article 111 of the Constitution. Similarly under  Article 168  of  the,  Constitution  it  is provided that the State Legislature consists of the Governor and the Legislative Assembly of a State and where there is a Legislative Council,  the State  Legislature consists of the Governor and  the two  Houses. The  Governor’s assent or the President’s assent when it is reserved for his consideration to a Bill passed by the State Legislature is necessary under Article 200  of the  Constitution before  it can become law. The powers  conferred on the President under Article 123 and on the  Governor under  Article 213 of the Constitution are, however, Legislative  powers which  may be exercised without prior approval of the concerned legislature.      In India  the Governor-General had been given the power under section  72 of  the Government  of India  Act, 1915 to make ordinances which read thus:           "72.  Power   to  make   ordinances  in   case  of      emergency.  The   Governor-General  may,  in  cases  of      emergency, make and promulgate ordinances for the peace      and good  government  of  British  India  or  any  part      thereof, and any ordinance so made shall, for the space      of not more than six months from its promulgation, have      the like  force of  law as  an Act passed by the Indian      legislature but  the power  of making  ordinances under      this section is subject to the like restrictions as the      power of  the Indian  Legislature to make laws; and any      ordinance made under this 521      section is  subject to the like disallowance as and Act      passe   by the Indian legislature and may be controlled      or superseded by any such Act."      It is  seen that  the above  provision stated  that  an ordinance made  under it  had the  force of  law as  an  Act passed by  the Indian  legislature but  the power  of making ordinances under  it was subject to like restrictions as the power of  the  Indian  legislature  to  make  laws  and  any ordinance made under this section was to remain in force for the period  of not more than six months from the date of its promulgation unless  adopted or superseded earlier by an Act of the  Legislature. Chapter IV of Part II of the Government

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 17  

of India  Act, 1935  recognised three  kinds of  legislative powers enjoyed  by the  Governor-General. Section 42 of that Act  conferred   the  power   on  the   Governor-General  to promulgate ordinances  during  the  recess  of  Legislature. Section 43  of that  Act  conferred  the  power  on  him  to promulgate ordinances  at any  time with  respect to certain subjects and  section 44  conferred  the  power  on  him  in certain circumstances to enact Acts. Chapter IV of Part V of the Government  of India  Act, 1935 which contained sections 88,89 and  90 conferred  similar legislative  powers on  the Governors  of   Provinces.  Articles  123  and  213  of  the Constitution have been enacted on the pattern of sections 42 and 88  of the  Government of  lndia Act, 1935. The relevant part of  section 42  of the Government of India Act, 1935 is given below for ready reference. It read thus:-           "42.  Power   of  Governor-General  to  promulgate      ordinances during recess of Legislature.      (1)  If at any time when the Federal Legislature is not           in session  the Governor-General is satisfied that           circumstances exist  which render it necessary for           him to  take immediate  action, he  may promulgate           such ordinances  as the  circumstances  appear  to           require:      (2)  An ordinance  promulgated under this section shall           have the  same force  and effect  as an Act of the           Federal Legislature  assented to  by the  Governor           General, but every such ordinance-      (a)  shall be  laid before  the Federal Legislature and           shall cease  to operate  at the  expiration of six           weeks from 522      the reassembly  of the  Legislature, or,  if before the      expiration of  that period  resolutions disapproving it      are passed  by both  Chambers, upon  the passing of the      second of those resolutions;      (b)  shall be  subject to  the provisions  of this  Act           relating to  the power  of His Majesty to disallow           Acts  as   if  it  were  an  Act  of  the  Federal           Legislature assented  to by  the Governor-General;           and      (c)  may be  withdrawn at  any  time  by  the  Governor           General.      (3)  If and  so far  as an ordinance under this section           makes any  provision which the Federal Legislature           would not under this Act be competent to enact, it           shall be void."      Section 88  of the  Government of India Act, 1935 which was more  or less in similar terms and which conferred power on the  Governor of a province to issue an ordinance came up for consideration before the Federal Court of lndia in Lakhi Narayan Das  v.  The  Province  of  Bihar(1)  Mukherjee,  J. speaking for  the Federal  Court observed  at pages  699-700 thus:           "It is admitted that the Bihar Legislature was not      in session  when this  Ordinance  was  passed.  It  was      urged, however,  in the  Court below,  and the argument      was repeated before us, that no circumstance existed as      is contemplated  by s.  88 (1)  which could justify the      Governor in promulgating this Ordinance. This obviously      is a matter which is not within the competence of court      to investigate.  The   language of  the  section  shows      clearly that  it is the Governor and the Governor alone      who has  got to  satisfy himself as to the existence of      circumstances  necessitating  the  promulgation  of  an      Ordinance. The  existence of  such necessity  is not  a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 17  

    justiciable matter  which the  Courts could  be  called      upon to determine by applying an objective test. It may      be noted  here that  under the  Government of India Act      the Governor-General  has powers  to make Ordinances in      cases of emergency (vide s. 42 of the Government of (4) [1949] F.C.R. Vol. Xl 693. 523      India Act  and s.  72 of Sch. IX which is now omitted);      and   it was  held by the Privy Council in King Emperor      v. Benoarilal  (1945) 72  I.A. 57,  and Bhagat Singh v.      The  King  Emperor  (1931  )  58  I.A.  169,  that  the      emergency which  calls for  immediate action  has to be      judged by  the Governor-General  alone. On promulgating      an ordinance,  the Governor-General  is not  bound as a      matter of  law to  expound reasons  therefor, nor is he      bound to  prove affirmatively  in a court of law that a      state of  emergency did actually exist. The language of      s.  88  postulates  only  one  condition,  namely,  the      satisfaction of  the Governor  as to  the existence  of      justifying  circumstances,  and  the  preamble  to  the      Ordinance expresses  in clear terms that this condition      has  been   fulfilled.  The  first  contention  of  the      appellants must therefore be rejected."      Under Article 123 of the Constitution the President can promulgate an  ordinance on  the advice  of the  Council  of Ministers to  meet the  requirements  of  a  situation  when either House  of Parliament  is not  in  session.  Similarly under Article 213 of the Constitution the Governor may issue an ordinance  on the advice of his Council of Ministers when the Legislative  Assembly or  where there  are two Houses of the Legislature  in a   State  either  of  them  is  not  in session. Since  under Article  85 of  the Constitution it is not permissible to allow a period of six months to intervene in the  case of  each House  of Parliament  between its last sitting in  one session and the date appointed for its first meeting in  the next  session and  since under clause (2) of Article 123  of the Constitution an ordinance has to be laid before both  Houses of Parliament and would cease to operate at the  expiration of  six  weeks  from  the  reassembly  of Parliament, it  cannot be  said that  either Houses  can  be avoided by  the President  beyond seven  and a  half  months after the  passing of an ordinance. It is open to Parliament if it  chooses to  approve it  or not.  Having regard to the conditions prevailing  in India  the Constitution  makers  a thought that  the ordinance  making power should be given to the President  to deal  unforeseen or  urgent  matters.  The position under  Article 213  of the Constitution is also the same. Dealing  with the  criticism that  Article 123  was an undemocratic  provision,   Bhagwati,  J.  speaking  for  the majority of  the Constitution  Bench said  in R.K. Garg etc. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc.(l) at pages 965-966 thus: (1) [1982] 1 S.C.R. 947. 524           "Now at first blush it might appear rather unusual      and that  was the  main thrust  of the criticism of Mr.      R.K. Garg  on this  point-that the  power to  make laws      should have  been entrusted  by the founding fathers of      the Constitution to the executive, because according to      the  traditional   outfit  of  a  democratic  political      structure,   the    legislative   power   must   belong      exclusively  to  the  elected  representatives  of  the      people  and   vesting  it   in  the  executive,  though      responsible to  the legislature, would be undemocratic,      as it might enable the executive to abuse this power by      securing  the  passage  of  an  ordinary  bill  without

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 17  

    risking a  debate in the legislature. But if we closely      analyse this  provision and  consider  it  in  all  its      aspects, it  does not appear to be so startling, though      we may  point out even if it were, the Court would have      to accept  it as  the expression of the collective will      of the  founding fathers. It may be noted, and this was      pointed out  forcibly by Dr. Ambedkar while replying to      the criticism  against the  introduction of Article 123      in the Constitution Assembly-that the legislative power      conferred on  the President under this Article is not a      parallel  power   of  legislation.   It  is   a   power      exercisable only when both Houses of Parliament are not      in session  and it has been conferred ex-necessitate in      order to  enable the  executive  to  meet  an  emergent      situation. Moreover,  the law  made by the President by      issuing an  Ordinance is  of strictly limited duration.      It ceases  to operate  at the  expiration of  six weeks      from the  reassembly of  Parliament or  if  before  the      expiration of  this period, resolutions disapproving it      are passed  by both  Houses, upon  the passing  of  the      second of  those resolutions.  This  also  affords  the      clearest indication that the President is invested with      this legislative  power only  in order  to  enable  the      executive to  tide over an emergent situation which may      arise whilst  the  Houses  of  Parliament  are  not  in      session. Further  more, this  power  to  promulgate  an      Ordinance conferred  on the  President is  co-extensive      with the  power of  Parliament to  make  laws  and  the      President cannot  issue an  Ordinance which  Parliament      cannot enact into a law. It will therefore be seen that      legislative power  has been  conferred on the executive      by the  constitution makers for a necessary purpose and      it is hedged in by limitations and conditions. The con- 525      ferment of such power may appear to be undemocratic but      it  is   not  so,  because  the  executive  is  clearly      answerable to  the legislature and if the President, on      the aid  and advice  of the  executive, promulgates  an      Ordinance in  mis-use  or  abuse  of  this  power,  the      legislature cannot  only pass a resolution disapproving      the Ordinance but can also pass a vote of no confidence      in  the   executive.  There   is  in   the  theory   of      constitutional law  complete control of the legislature      over the executive, because if the executive misbehaves      or forfeits  the confidence  of the legislature, it can      be thrown  out  by  the  legislature.  Of  course  this      safeguard against  misuse or  abuse  of  power  by  the      executive would control in efficacy and value according      as  if  the  legislative  control  over  the  executive      diminishes and  the executive  begins to  dominate  the      legislature. But  nonetheless it  is a  safeguard which      protects the  vesting of  the legislative  power in the      President from  the charge  of  being  an  undemocratic      provision."      The  above   view  has   been   approved   by   another Constitution Bench  of this  Court in A.K. Roy etc. v. Union of  lndia   &  Anr.(1)  Both  these  decisions  have  firmly established that  an ordinance  is a  ’law’  and  should  be approached on  that basis.  The language  of clause  (2)  of Article 123  and  of  clause  (2)  of  Article  213  of  the Constitution  leaves   no  room   for  doubt.  An  ordinance promulgated under  either of these two articles has the same force and  effect as  an Act  of Parliament or an Act of the State Legislature,  as the  case may be. When once the above conclusion is  reached the  next question  which arises  for

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 17  

consideration is whether it is permissible to strike down an ordinance on  the ground  of non-application of mind or mala fides or  that the  prevailing circumstances did not warrant the issue  of the Ordinance. In other words, the question is whether the  validity of  an  ordinance  can  be  tested  on grounds similar  to those  on which an executive or judicial action  is   tested.  The   legislative  action   under  our Constitution is  subject only  to the limitations prescribed by the  Constitution and  to no other. Any law made by their legislature, which  it is  not competent  to pass,  which is violative of  the provisions in Part III of the Constitution or any other constitutional provision is (1) [1982]2 S.C.R. 272 at page 299. 526 ineffective. It is a settled rule of constitutional law that the question  whether a  statute is constitutional or not is always a  question of  power of  the legislature  concerned, dependent upon the subject matter of the statute. the manner in which  it is  accomplished and  the mode  of enacting it. While the courts can declare a statute unconstitutional when it transgresses  constitutional limits,  they are  precluded from inquiring  into the  propriety of  the exercise  of the legislative power. It has to be assumed that the legislative discretion  is   properly  exercised.  The  motives  of  the legislature in  passing a  statute is beyond the scrutiny of courts. Nor  can the  courts examine whether the legislature had applied  its mind  to the provisions of a statute before passing it.  The propriety  expediency   and necessity  of a legislative act are for the determination of the legislative authority and  are not  for determination  by the courts. An ordinance passed  either under  Article 123 or under Article 213 of the Constitution stands on the same footing. When the Constitution  says   that  the  ordinance  making  power  is legislative power  and   an ordinance  shall have  the  same force as an Act, an ordinance should be clothed with all the attributes of an Act of legislature carrying with it all its incidents,   immunities    and   limitations    under    the Constitution. It cannot be treated as an executive action or an administrative decision.      The true  legal position  about the  justiciability  of these issues  in relation to an ordinance has been expressed in K.  Nagaraj & Ors.etc.  v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. etc.(l) at page 50 by one of us (Chandrachud, C.J.) thus:           "It is  impossible to  accept the  submission that      the Ordinance  can be invalidated on the ground of non-      application of mind. the power to issue an ordinance is      not  an  executive  power  but  is  the  power  of  the      executive to  legislate. The  power of  the Governor to      promulgate an  ordinance is  contained in  Article  213      which  occurs   in  Chapter   IV  of  Part  VI  of  the      Constitution.  The   heading   of   that   Chapter   is      "Legislative Power  of the  Governor."  This  power  is      plenary within  its field  like the  power of the State      Legislature to  pass laws  and there are no limitations      upon that power except those to which the legisla- (1) [1985] 1 SCALE  31. 527      tive power  of the  State Legislature  is subject There      fore,  though  an  ordinance  can  be  invalidated  for      contravention of  the constitutional  limitations which      exist upon  the power  of the State legislature to pass      laws it  cannot be  declared invalid  for the reason of      non-application of  mind, any  more than  any other law      can be. An executive act is liable to be struck down on      the ground of non-application of mind. Not the act of a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 17  

    Legislature.           On the question as to the legislative character of      the  ordinance  making  power,  we  may  refer  to  the      decisions of  this Court  in A.K. Roy v. Union of India      and R.K. Garg v. Union of India."      The ordinance  says that it had been Promulgated on the      basis  of   a  policy   decision  taken  by  the  State      Government. The relevant part of the Ordinance reads:           "Whereas the  State Government  are of the opinion      that the  system of  part-time village officers is out-      moded and  does not  fit in  with the  modern needs  of      village administration;           And  whereas  the  State  Government  have,  after      careful  consideration,  taken  a  policy  decision  to      abolish all  the posts of part-time village officers on      grounds of  administrative necessity and to introduce a      system of  whole-time  officers  to  be  in  charge  of      village administration;           And whereas the Legislature of the State is not in      session and the Governor of Andhra Pradesh is satisfied      that circumstances  exist which render it necessary for      him to take immediate action;           Now,  therefore,   in  exercise   of  the   powers      conferred  by   clause  (1)   of  article  213  of  the      Constitution of  India, the Governor hereby promulgates      the following Ordinance."      It is  next seen that the State Government introduced a Bill L.A.  No. 3  of 1984 before the Legislative Assembly of the State  to replace  the Ordinance  by an Act o n February 24, 1984  within about  seven weeks  from the  date  of  the Ordinance. The  said Bill  was   referred to  a Joint Select Committee and the Bill was not passed 528 till June  7, 1984.  In order  to keep  the  effect  of  the Ordinance alive for purposes of any action that was still to be taken  under it the Governor on the advice of the Council of Ministers again issued another ordinance, Ordinance No. 7 of 1984  dated March 21,1984. This was followed by Ordinance No. 13  of 1984  dated April  27, 1984,  Ordinance No. 18 of 1984 dated  June 7,  1984 and Ordinance No. 21 of 1984 dated July 19,  1984. In order to give effect to section 11 (1) of the Ordinance,  the State  Government promulgated the Andhra Pradesh Abolition of part-time Village Officers (Fixation of amount payable  for total  service) Rules,  1984 on February 24, 1984 and an Errata to the above Rules on March 27, 1984.      In the  circumstances of the case we do not, therefore, find any  substance in  the first contention urged on behalf of the petitioners.      The next  question is  whether the  posts of  part-time village officers  revive as the Ordinance is not replaced by an Act  of the  legislature of the State. This contention of the petitioners  is based   on  clause (2) of Article 213 of the Constitution.  It is  argued on their behalf that on the failure of  the State Legislature to pass an Act in terms of the Ordinance  it should  be assumed  that the Ordinance had never become  effective and that it was void ab initio. This contention  overlooks   two  important  factors  namely  the language of  clause (2)  of Article  213 of the Constitution and  the   nature  of   the  provisions  contained-  in  the Ordinance. Clause  (2) of Article 213 says that an ordinance promulgated under that Article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the  Governor but  every such ordinance (a) shall be laid before the  Legislative Assembly  of the  State,  or,  where there is a Legislative Council in the State, before both the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 17  

Houses and   shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from  the reassembly  of the  Legislature or if before the expiration  of that  period a resolution disapproving it is passed  by the  Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Legislative  Council,  if  any,  upon  the  passing  of  the resolution or,  as the  case may be, on the resolution being agreed   to by  the Council  and (b) may be withdrawn at any time by  the Governor.  It is  seen that  Article 213 of the Constitution does  not say  that the Ordinance shall be void from the  commencement on the State Legislature disapproving it. It  says that  it shall  cease to operate. It only means that it  should be treated as being effective till it ceases to operate on the happening of the events mentioned; 529 in clause  (2) of  Article 213. Secondly the Ordinance deals with two  separate matters. By section 3 of the Ordinance it abolishes the  posts of  part-time village  officers on  the commencement of  the Ordinance  and it further declares that every person  who held  the  post  of  a  part-time  village officer would  cease to hold that post with effect from that date. By section 4 and other allied provisions the Ordinance has provided  regarding the  creation of  posts  of  Village Assistants and  appointment and  conditions  of  service  of Village Assistants  who  arc  full  time  employees  of  the Government There  is no  doubt that  a separate provision is made in  Section 5  of the  Ordinance for  payment  Or  some amount to  the ex-part-time  village officers. Now by virtue of section  3 of  the Ordinance  all the  posts of part-time village officers  stood abolished  on January 6,1984 and the petitioners ceased  to be  employees of the State Government These two  matters became  accomplished facts  on January 6, 1984, irrespective  of whether  the holders  of these  posts were paid  any amount  under section  5 or  whether the  new posts of  Village Assistants  were filled up or not. when if the Ordinance  is assumed  to have  ceased to operate from a subsequent date  by reason of clause (2) of Article 213, the effect of section 3 of the Ordinance was irreversible except by express  Legislation. An  analogous  question  arose  for consideration before  a Constitution  Bench of this Court in State of  Orissa v.  Bhupendra Kumar  Bose.(1) The  facts of that case  were these.  Elections were  held for the Cuttack Municipality and  twenty seven persons were declared elected as Councillors.  One of the defeated candidates filed a writ petition before  the High  Court of  Orissa challenging  the elections. The  High Court  set aside  the elections  on the ground that  the electoral  roll had  not been  prepared  in accordance with  law. Since  the State  Government felt that the said  decision affected  not merely the elections to the Cuttack Municipality  but some  other municipalities  in the State of  Orissa where  also similar irregularities had been committed in  the preparation  of the  electoral rolls,  the Governor promulgated  an ordinance on January 15, 1959 which contained provisions  validating the electoral rolls and the elections held  on their  basis notwithstanding any judgment to the  contrary. The  said ordinance,  however,  lapsed  on April I,  1959. The  petitioner  when  had  filed  the  writ petition  earlier   again  filed   another   writ   petition questioning the  continuance of  the elected  Councillors in office by virtue of the ordinance. The High (1) [1962] 2 Supp. S.C.R. 380. 530 Court allowed  the writ petition and issued an injunction to the elected Councillors restraining them from functioning as Councillors. The  State Government and the councillors filed the above  appeal before  this Court.  It was contended that

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 17  

the ordinance  was a  temporary statute  which was  bound to lapse after  the expiration  of the prescribed period and so as soon  as it lapsed the invalidity in the elections to the Cuttack Municipality  stood revived. This Court rejected the contention  relying  upon  the  decision  in  Steavenson  v. Oliver.(l) This  Court finally  observed  at  pages  401-402 thus:           "Now, turning  to the  facts in  the present case,      the Ordinance  purported to  validate the  elections to      the Cuttack  Municipality which had been declared to be      invalid by  the High  Court by  its earlier judgment so      that as a result of the Ordinance, the elections to the      Cuttack Municipality  must be  held to have been valid.      Can it  be said  that the validation was intended to be      temporary in  character and was to last only during the      life-time of  the Ordinance  ? In  our opinion,  having      regard to the object of the Ordinance and to the rights      created by  the  validating  provisions,  it  would  be      difficult to  accept the contention that as soon as the      Ordinance expired the validity of the elections came to      an end  and their  invalidity was  revived. The  rights      created by  this Ordinance  are, in  our opinion,  very      similar to  the rights with which the court was dealing      in the  case of  Steavenson and  they must  be held  to      endure and last even after the expiry of the Ordinance.      The Ordinance  has in  terms provided that the Order of      Court  declaring   the   elections   to   the   Cuttack      Municipality to be l; invalid shall be deemed to be and      always to  have been  of no  legal effect  whatever and      that the  said elections  are thereby  validated.  That      being so,  the said  elections must  be deemed  to have      been validly  held under  the Act  and the  life of the      newly elected  Municipality would  be governed  by  the      relevant provisions of the Act and would not come to an      end as  soon as the Ordinance expires. Therefore, we do      not think  that the preliminary objection raised by Mr.      Chetty against  the competence  of the   appeals can be      upheld." (1) 151 English Reports 1024. 531      We do not, however, mean to say here that Parliament or the   State Legislature is powerless to bring into existence the  same  state  of  affairs  as  they  existed  before  an ordinance was  passed even  though they may be completed and closed matters  under the Ordinance. That can be achieved by passing an express law operating retrospectively to the said effect, of  course, subject  to  tile  other  constitutional limitations.A mere  disapproval by  Parliament or  the State Legislature of  an ordinance  cannot, however, revive closed or completed transactions.      In the  petitions before  us also  the position  is the same as  in the decision referred to above. The abolition of the posts  and the  declaration that the incumbents of those posts would cease to be holders of those posts under section 3 of  the Ordinance  being completed  events,  there  is  no question of  their revival  or the petitioners continuing to hold those  posts any  longer.  The  above  contention  has, therefore, to be rejected in the circumstances of this case.      In view  of what  has  been  stated  above  it  is  not necessary to consider the contention of the petitioners that it was  not open  to the  Government to  issue one ordinance after  another  to  keep  alive  the  effect  of  the  first ordinance as  the first  ordinance itself  brought about the desired effect  by section  3 thereof.  Even  if  the  other provisions of  the Ordinance  have ceased  to be  in  force,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 17  

there can  be no constitutional difficulty arising therefrom because it  is open  to the  State Government  to create new posts in  exercise of  its powers  under Article  162 of the Constitution as  long as the field is not occupied by an Act of the  Legislature or  a rule  made under  the  proviso  to Article 309 of the Constitution.      It is  next contended  that by  abolishing the posts of part-time village  officers and  by throwing the petitioners out  of   the  posts   held  by  them,  Article  21  of  the Constitution had  been violated.  It is  hardly necessary to deal with  this point  elaborately since the petitioners are not being  deprived o  f their  right to life and liberty by the abolition  of the posts of part-time village officers or by their ceasing to be holders of those posts.      It is  lastly urged  that the  State Government  may be asked to consider the cases of those petitioners who possess the prescribed  qualifications for  appointment  as  Village Assistants. We are 532 informed that the number of posts of Village Assistants that are   going to  be created  would be about one-eighth of the number of  posts of  part-time village  officers  which  are abolished.  It  is  also  difficult  in  law  to  issue  any direction in  that behalf  in the facts and circumstances of this case.  We, however,  record that in paragraph 21 of the Counter Affidavit  filed by  B.V.  Janardhan  Reddy,  Deputy Secretary to  Government, Revenue  Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh it is stated thus:           "In addition,  the Government  is of the view that      such of those village officers who possess the required      qualifications  as   prescribed  and   otherwise  found      suitable will  also be  considered for  appointment  of      Village Assistants  subject to  the availability of the      posts."      We trust that the State Government will give due regard to the  above  said  statement  while  making  appointments. Statements contained in affidavits are meant to be honoured.      In the  result these  petitions  fail  and  are  hereby dismissed. We make no order as to costs. N.V.K.                                  Petitions dismissed. 533