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PETITIONER: T. SIVASUBRAMANIAM & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KASINATH PUJARI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       31/08/1999

BENCH: V.N.Khare, S.N.Phukan

JUDGMENT:

V.N. KHARE, J.:

     The  appellants herein are the landlords  (hereinafter referred  to  as  the  landlord).  The  landlord  filed  a petition   before   the  Rent   Controller   under   section 10(2)(ii)(a),  10(2)(vii)  and 10(3)(a)(i) of the  Tamilnadu Building  (Lease  and Rent Control) Act,  1960  (hereinafter referred   to   as   the  Act)   for   eviction   of   the respondents-tenants  from  the premises.   The  respondents- tenants  contested  the  said petition denying  the  alleged requirements  of the landlord for the premises as bona fide. The  Rent  Controller  allowed  the petition  filed  by  the landlord  and ordered eviction of the tenants.  The  appeals preferred by the tenants were also rejected by the Appellate Authority.    However,  the  High   Court  in  the  revision petitions  filed by the tenants set aside the orders of  the two  Courts below and allowed the revisions.  The High Court was  of  the view that the landlord having not set  out  his need  much  less  bona  fide need for the  premises  in  the petition,  no  order  for eviction could  have  been  passed against the tenants.  It is against the said judgment of the High Court the landlord is in appeal before us.

     Challenge  to  the order under appeal is laid on  twin grounds.   The first ground is that the element of need  for the  premises  is implicit when a landlord desires  to  live separately  from  his father and the view taken by the  High Court  that  the  mere  desire to  live  separately  is  not sufficient   to  constitute  need   for  the  premises,   is erroneous.   The second ground is that it is not permissible for   the  High  Court  in   exercise  of   its   revisional jurisdiction  under Section 25 of the Act to interfere  with the  concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the two Courts below.   According  to the learned counsel, the  High  Court while  upsetting  the judgments of the two Courts below  has transgressed its powers conferred on it by Section 25 of the Act.

     In  order  to  appreciate  the  arguments  of  learned counsel,  it is relevant to set out the relevant  provisions under  which the landlord filed petition for eviction of the tenants.   Sections  10(3)(a)(i) and (e) of the Act read  as

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under :

     10(3)(a) A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause  (d), apply to the Controller for an order  directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building -

     (i)  In  case  it is a residential  building,  if  the landlord  requires  it  for his own occupation  or  for  the occupation  of  any  member of his family and if he  or  any member of his family is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned.

     (e)  The Controller shall if he is satisfied that  the claim  of the landlord is bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on  such  date as may be specified by the Controller and  if the  Controller  is not so satisfied he shall make an  order rejecting the application.

     A  bare reading of the aforesaid provisions would show that  a  landlord  can seek an order of eviction  against  a tenant  (a)  if  he  requires   the  premises  for  his  own occupation  or  for occupation of any member of his  family; and  (b)  the  landlord or any member of his family  is  not occupying  a  residential building of his own in  the  city, town or village concerned and an order of eviction against a tenant  cannot be passed by the Rent Controller unless he is satisfied  that  the  requirement of the  landlord  for  the premises  is  bona fide.  In the present case, the  landlord sought the eviction of the tenant on the following averments made  in his petition filed under section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act.

     6.The  petitioners are now living with the father  of the  1st  petitioner.   They  are  now  desirous  of  living independently  away  from their father.  The petitioners  do not  have  any house of their own in the City of Madras  and neither  of  them  are occupying a residential  building  of their own in the city of Madras.

     The  aforesaid averments show that the landlord sought the possession of the premises by evicting the tenant merely on  the  ground that he desires to live  independently  away from his father.  The question that arises for consideration is,  whether mere desire to live separately from the  father would  constitute need or requirement for the premises.   In Hameeda  Hardware  Stores v.  Mohal Lal Sowcar (1988) 2  SCC 513, this Court held thus :

     A  landlord  seeking  eviction  of a  tenant  from  a non-residential  premises under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act  in  order to succeed in his petition  should  establish that  he  bona  fide requires the premises, in  addition  to proving  the  other ingredients referred to  therein,  since clause (e) of Section 10(3) is also applicable to a petition filed  under  sub-clause (iii) of Section 10(3).   The  word claim  means  a demand for something as due or to seek  or ask  for  on the ground of right etc.  The word  claim  in clause (e) of Section 10(3) of the Act should, therefore, be construed  as  the  requirement  of   the  landlord  or  his

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deservedness.  Deserve means to have a rightful claim or a just  claim.   In the context of Rent Control law  which  is enacted  for  the  purpose of giving protection  to  tenants against unreasonable evictions and for the purpose of making equitable  distribution of buildings amongst persons who are in  need  of them in order to prove that his claim  is  bona fide  a landlord should establish that he deserves to be put in  possession of the premises which is in the occupation of the tenant.

     In  Amarjit Singh v.  Smt.  Khatoon Quamarain (1986) 4 SCC  736 it was held, that the distinction between  desire and need must also be kept in view for purpose of eviction of a tenant for bona fide need of the landlord.  In Ram Dass vs.  Iswar Chander (1988) 3 SCC p.131, it was held as thus :

     Landlords  desire for possession, however honest  it might  otherwise be, has inevitably a subjective element  in it  and  that desire, to become a requirement must have  the objective element of a need.

     From  the  aforesaid decisions it is clear  that  mere desire  of  the landlord to live separately from his  father cannot  be attributed to his need for the premises  occupied by  the tenant.  It is often seen that a desire often  takes its  origin from what one likes and dislikes and necessarily it  is not depended upon his need.  But we cannot lose sight of  the  fact  that sometimes the desire may be  outcome  of ones  need.   So  when a landlord desires a  premises,  the requirement  of  law is that the landlord must set  out  his need  for  the premises in his petition and  establish  that such  a  need  is bona fide.  The need must  be  bona  fide, genuine, honest and conceived in good faith.  In the present case  what  we  find  is that, it was  not  pleaded  by  the landlord  in  his  petition that he for  certain  compelling reasons  desires to live separately from his father and  for that  reason he required the premises.  We also do not  find any  evidence  on record to show that the landlord  required the  premises and his need was bona fide.  The only material on  record  for  eviction  of the tenants  before  the  Rent Control  Authority was mere desire of the landlords to  live separately from his father.  Such a desire is not substitute of the need for the premises which a landlord is required to plead  and  establish.   Thus, we are of the view  that  the landlords  desire to live separately was not a valid ground for  eviction  of  the  tenants   from  the  premises.   We, therefore,  find  no substance in the submission of  learned counsel for the appellants.

     So  far  as  the second submission is  concerned,  the language  employed  in Section 25 of the Act, which  confers revisional  jurisdiction  to the High Court, is  very  wide. Under section 25 of the Act, the High Court can call for and examine  the  record of the appellate authority in order  to satisfy  itself as to regularity of such proceedings or  the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or orders passed  therein.  The words to satisfy itself employed  in Section   25   of  the  Act  no   doubt  is   a   power   of superintendence,  and  the  High Court is  not  required  to interfere  with the finding of fact merely because the  High Court  is  not in agreement with the findings of the  Courts below.   It is also true that power exercisable by the  High Court  under section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power to  reappraise  or  reassess the evidence for  coming  to  a

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different  finding  contrary to the finding recorded by  the Courts  below.  But where a finding arrived at by the Courts below  is  based  on no evidence, the High  Court  would  be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the Courts  below.   In the present case what we find  is  that, neither the landlord has not set out his need or requirement for  the premises for his occupation in his petition nor  he led any evidence to show that his need is bona fide.  In the absence  of such evidence, the Rent Controller and the First Appellate  Authority  acted contrary to law in allowing  the petition  of  the landlord by directing the eviction of  the tenants.   In  such circumstances, the High Court was  fully justified  in  interfering with the findings of  the  Courts below.   We,  therefore,  reject the  second  submission  of learned counsel.

     For  the aforesaid reasons we do not find any merit in the appeals which are accordingly dismissed.  There shall be no order as to costs.