http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5  

PETITIONER: SURJIT SINGH & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BALBIR SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       29/02/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J) G.B. PATTANAIK (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR 1592            1996 SCC  (3) 533  JT 1996 (3)   363        1996 SCALE  (2)865

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Question of  law referred to this Bench is: whether the criminal Court  is debarred from proceeding with the private complaint laid  against the  appellants on June 13. 1983 for offences punishable  under sections  468 and  471 of  Indian Penal Code  [for short,  the ’IPC’]? The respondent had laid the complaint  for offences  punishable under  Sections 420, 467,  468,  471  read  with  Section  120-B,  IPC  with  the allegations that the appellants had conspired and fabricated an agreement dated July 26, 1978 and forged the signature of Smt. Dalip  Kaur and  on the basis thereof they attempted to claim retention  of the  possession of the remaining part of the house.  The Magistrate,  Amritsar had examined witnesses under Section  202 of  the Code  of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [for  short,  the  ’Code’]  and  ordered  issue  of  process summoning the appellants to appear on September 27, 1983. It would appear  that the  appellants filed  civil suit  for an injunction to  restrain Dalip Kaur from interfering with the possession  of  appellants  1  to  3  and  he  produced  the agreement dated  21 2.1984  which  was  said  to  have  been executed  and   signed  by   Dalip  Kaur.   Thereafter,  the appellants filed  an application  to quash  the complaint on the ground  of bar  under  section  195  of  the  Code.  The Magistrate and  on revision the Sessions Judge dismissed the same. When  the revision  was filed  in the  High  Court  of Punjab & Haryana, on a question of law ultimately the matter was referred  to Full  Bench which had answered the question against the  appellants and  remitted the  matter to the the referring Judge.  The learned  single Judge  in the impugned order dated  August 4, 1986 has dismissed the revision. Thus this appeal by special leave.      The only question is: whether the Magistrate, 1st class at Amritsar  is devoid of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the  offence.  Shri  Markandaya,  learned  counsel  for  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5  

appellants placing  strong reliance on the judgments of this Court in  Gopal Krishna  Menon & Anr.v. D. Raja Reddy & Anr. [(1983) 3  SCR 836]3  and Patel  Laljibhai and  Somabhai  v. State of Gujarat[ (1971) Supp . SCR 834] contended that once the document  has been  produced before  the Court it is the civil Court  that has  seining of the matter. It alone or an officer on  its behalf  has to lay the complaint in writing. The  private   complaint  laid  by  the  respondent  is  not maintainable. The  criminal Court  therefore, cannot proceed with the  trial. With a view to appreciate the contention it is necessary  to reiterate  the scope  of Section 195 of the Code which  creates an  embargo on the power of the Court to take cognizance of the offence.      Section 195(1)  (b) (ii) reads that no court shall take cognizance of  any offence  described  in  Section  463,  or punishable under  Sections 471,475 or 476, of the said Code, when such  offence is  alleged to  have  been  committed  in respect of  a document  produced or  given in  evidence in a proceeding in any Court".      This Court in Budhu Ram V. State of Rajasthan [(1963) 3 SCR 376] considered the scope of Section 195 and held thus:      "It  will   be  seen   on  a  plain      grammatical  construction  of  this      provision that  a complaint  by the      court  is   required  where     the      offence is  of forging  or of using      as genuine  any document  which  is      know or  believed to  be  a  forged      document  when   such  document  is      produced or  given in  evidence  in      court. It  is clear  therefore that      it is only when the forged document      is  produced   in  Court   that   a      complaint by the Court is required.      Where, however,  what  is  produced      before the  court is not the forged      document itself,  s.195(1)(c)  will      not apply  on its terms. The reason      for this, as stated by the Judicial      Committee, ’is the practical common      sense of  the matter, for the court      before which  a copy  of a document      is produced  is  not  really  in  a      position to  express any opinion on      the genuineness  of the  original’.      Therefore, even  if  the  Assistant      Settlement Officer is assumed to be      a  court   within  the  meaning  of      s.195(l)(c)   no    complaint   was      necessary   because    the   forged      document itself  was  not  produced      before  the   Assistant  Settlement      Officer in  this case  but  only  a      copy thereof." In this  case it was that since the copy of the document was produced Section  195 of  the Code  was not  a  bar  to  lay private complaint.      The purpose  of imposing embargo created by section 195 was considered in Patel Laljibhai’s case (supra). This Court held at pages 841-42 thus:      "The underlying purpose of enacting      s.195(1)(b) and (c) and s.476 seems      to be  to control the temptation on      the part   of  the private  parties      considering themselves aggrieved by

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5  

    the  offences  mentioned  in  those      sections    to    start    criminal      prosecutions on frivolous vexatious      or insufficient  grounds   inspired      by a revengeful desire to harass or      spite   their    opponents    These      offences have been selected for the      courts  control  because  of  their      direct  impact   on  the   judicial      process. It is the judicial process      in other  words the  administration      of public  justice, which   is  the      direct  and   immediate  object  or      victim of  these offences and it is      only by  misleading the  courts and      thereby perverting  the due  course      of  law   and  justice   that   the      ultimate  object   of  harming  the      private party  is designed  to   be      realized.  As   the  party  of  the      proceedings   of   the   court   is      directly sullied  by the  crime the      Court is  considered to be the only      party  entitled   to  consider  the      desirability of complaining against      the guilty party. The private party      designed ultimately  to be  injured      through  the  offence  against  the      administration of public justice is      undoubtedly entitled  to  move  the      court for persuading it to file the      complaint.  But   such   party   is      deprived  of   the  general   right      recognised by s.190 Cr. P.C. of the      aggrieved     parties      directly      initiating       the       criminal      proceedings.  The   offences  about      which  the   court  alone,  to  the      exclusion of  the aggrieved private      parties, is  clothed with the right      to  complain   may,  therefore,  be      appropriately considered to be only      those offences committed by a party      to a  proceeding in that court, the      commission   of    which   has    a      reasonably  close  nexus  with  the      proceedings in  that court  so that      it can,  without embarking  upon  a      completely  independent  and  fresh      inquiry, satisfactorily consider by      reference   principally    to   its      records    the     expediency    of      prosecuting the  delinquent  party.      It, therefore,  appears to us to be      more  appropriate   to  adopt   the      strict  construction  of  confining      the  prohibition  contained  in  s.      195(1)(c) only  to those  cases  in      which   the    offences   specified      therein were  committed by  a party      to the  proceeding in the character      as such party." At page 846 it was stated that:      "Broadly speaking  we are  inclined      to agree  with the reasoning of the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5  

    Allahabad Full  Bench in Kushal Pal      Singh case  [ILR (1953)  All. 804].      This in  our opinion  reflects  the      better view. The purpose and object      of the  Legislature in creating the      bar against  cognizance of  private      complaints   in   regard   to   the      offences mentioned  in s. 195(1)(b)      and (c) is both to save the accused      person from  vexatious or  baseless      prosecutions inspired  by  feelings      of vindictiveness  on the  part  of      the private  complainants to harass      their opponents  and also  to avoid      confusion which  is likely to arise      on  account  of  conflicts  between      findings of  the  courts  in  which      forged documents  are  produced  or      false evidence  is  led  and    the      conclusions of  the criminal courts      dealing with the private complaint.      It is  for this reason as suggested      earlier, that  the legislature  has      entrusted   the      court,   whose      proceedings had  been the target of      the offence  of perjury to consider      the  expediency   in   the   larger      public  interest,   of  a  criminal      trial of the guilty party."      The object  thereby is to protect persons from needless harassment by  prosecution for private vendetta; to preserve purity of  the judicial process and unsullied administration of justice; to prevent the parties of the temptation to pre- empt the  proceedings pending in a court and to pressure and desist parties  from proceeding  with the case. Equally when the act  complained of relates to an offence, i.e., contempt of lawful  authority of  public servant,  or against  public justice or  for offences  relating to  documents produced or given in  evidence, public  justice demands  absolute bar of private prosecution  and that power be given to the court to lay complaint  under Section  340 of  the Code  as  per  the procedure prescribed  therein. In Patel Laljibhai’s case the main controversy  was as  to when  the accused  had become a party to  the proceedings. However, after the Code came into force in  1974 replacing  the earlier  Code of  1898 it  was omitted and  so it is no longer of any relevance. It is seen that and in the absence of a complaint by this Court, prosecution was held to be not maintainable.      In Sushil  Kumar v.  State of Haryana [AIR 1988 SC 419] the question  was when  a copy  of the  original document is produced and  a private  complaint is laid on the basis of a copy  of  the  forged  agreement,  whether  bar  of  Section 195(1)(b)(ii) gets attracted. This Court had held that until the original  document is produced in the court, there is no bar  of   Section  195  and  that,  therefore,  the  private complaint was held not barred.      In Sanmukhsingh v. The King [AIR 1950 PC 31], the Privy Council also  had held that where the document in respect of which a  charge of forgery had been made against the accused had not itself been produced or given in evidence in certain proceedings but  on the  contrary a  copy  of  it  had  been produced, the  absence of  complaint under Section 195(1)(c) cannot operate as a bar to the trial of the accused.      It would thus be clear that for taking cognizance of an offence,  the  document,  the  foundation  for  forgery,  if

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5  

produced before the court or given in the appellants therein had filed  a civil  suit on  the basis  of  a  cheque  dated November 22,  1963  and  the  civil  suit  had  come  to  be dismissed on  January  30,  1965.  Thereafter,  the  private complaint was  filed on  November 16,  1965. In the light of those facts  it has  held that the respondent was a party to the proceedings in the suit and that, therefore, the private complaint was not maintainable.      In Gopalakrishna  Menon’s case  (supra), the facts were that the  suit was  laid on  the basis of an agreement dated December 3,  1980 and  also a  receipt of  even date for the recovery of  the amounts on the basis of the said agreement. Along with  the plaint  the agreement  and also the receipts were produced  in the  Court. Subsequently,  a complaint was filed for  offence under  Sections 467  and 471, IPC. It was contended that  Section 195(1)(b)(ii)  was a  bar. That  was negatived by the High Court. This Court considering Sections 340 and  195 of  the Code  had held  that as  soon as  it is accepted that  Section 467  punishes forgery of a particular category, Section  195(1)(b)(ii) immediately gets attracted. On the  basis that  the offence punishable under Section 467 is an offence under Section 463 committed in the proceedings of the  court evidence,  the bar  of taking cognizance under Section 195(1)(b)(ii)  gets attracted and the criminal Court is  prohibited  to  take  cognizance  of  offence  unless  a complaint  in   writing  is   filed  as  per  the  procedure prescribed under  Section 340 of the Code by or on behalf of the court.  The object  thereby is to preserve purity of the administration of justice and to allow the parties to adduce evidence  in   proof  of  certain  documents  without  being compelled  or  intimidated  to  proceed  with  the  judicial process. The bar of Section 195 is to take cognizance of the offences covered thereunder.      It is  seen that  in this  case cognizance was taken by the criminal  Court on  September 27,  1983 and the original agreement appears  to have  been filed in the civil Court on February 9,  1984 -  long after  cognizance was taken by the Magistrate. It is settled law that once cognizance is taken, two courses  are open  to the  Magistrate, namely, either to discharge the  accused if the evidence does not disclose the offence or  to acquit  of the  accused after the full trial. Unless either of the two courses is taken and orders passed, the cognizance  duly taken  cannot be set at nought. In this case since cognizance was already taken before filing of the document in  the civil  Court and  the original has not been filed before  cognizance was taken, the High Court was right in directing  that the  Magistrate is  at liberty to proceed with the trial of the criminal case.      The appeal is accordingly dismissed.