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PETITIONER: SURINDER SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/09/1986

BENCH: THAKKAR, M.P. (J) BENCH: THAKKAR, M.P. (J) SINGH, K.N. (J)

CITATION:  1986 AIR 2166            1986 SCR  (3) 946  1986 SCC  (4) 667        JT 1986   578  1986 SCALE  (2)550

ACT:      Constitution of  India, 1950-Article  226-Copy  of  the impugned order  to be  produced before  High Court  in  writ proceedings-Improper for  High Court  to quash  an order not produced before it.      Displaced  Persons   (Compensation  and  Rehabilitation Compensation) Act  1954/ Displaced  Persons (Compensation  & Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955      Administrative Law-Delegated legislation-Framing of the rules is  not condition  precedent to  the exercise of power expressly and unconditionally conferred by statute.

HEADNOTE:      The plot  in question,  being an  evacuee property  was included in  the  compensation  pool  under  s.  14  of  the Displaced   Persons    (Compensation   and    Rehabilitation Compensation) Act,  1954 and  put to  auction sale on August 24, 1959.  The highest  bid of  the appellant  was provision ally accepted  and he  deposited l/5th  of the  amount,  but failed to  deposit the balance amount. The Managing officer, therefore, cancelled  the auction sale. The Chief Settlement Commissioner set aside the order of the Managing officer and allowed time  to the  appellant to  deposit the  balance  of purchase price  by May  30, 1968,  but the  appellant  again failed to  deposit the  amount within time. Consequently the Settlement officer  by  his  order  dated  October  2,  1968 cancelled the  auction sale  made in  appellant’s favour and the property  was put  to auction  sale on January 17, 1969. Respondents Nos.  2 and 3 made the highest bid and deposited 20%  of  the  amount.  The  appellant  appealed  before  the Assistant Settlement officer against the order dated October 2, 1968  cancelling the  auction sale, which was rejected on April 2,  1969. His  revision petition was also dismissed on August 13, 1969. However, in the petition under s. 33 of the Act made before the Central Government, the order cancelling the auction sale held on August 24, 1959 was 947 set aside  by the  authority exercising the delegated powers of the  Central Government  and granted 15 days’ time to the appellant for  depositing the  balance of the purchase price with a  condition that  on failure to deposit the balance of

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the auction  price the  petition shall  stand dismissed. The appellant again  failed to  deposit the  amount within time, but on  a request  made by  him, the  time was extended till February 28,  1970 and the appellant deposited the remaining auction price within the extended time.      A petition  under Article  226 filed by the respondents Nos. 2  and 3  challenging the  order dated February 6, 1970 setting aside  the order cancelling the auction sale held on August 24,  1959 and  order extending time till February 28, 1970 and also for a direction to the authorities to finalise the auction  sale held  in their  favour on January 17, 1969 was  dismissed  by  a  Single  Judge.  The  Division  Bench, however, allowed  the Letters  Patent  Appeal,  quashed  the orders of  delegated authority  and directed the authorities to finalise the auction sale held in respondents’ favour and held: (1)  that sale  of urban  agricultural property  which formed part  of the  compensation pool could be held only in accordance  with   the  Rules   framed  under   the  Act  as contemplated by ss. 8 and 40. Since no rules had been framed for the  disposal of  the urban  agricultural property,  the Central Government  could not  lawfully provide  for sale of the urban  agricultural land  by  executive  directions  and consequently auction  sale  held  on  August  24,  1959  was illegal; (2)  that the delegated authority exercising powers under s.  33 had  no  jurisdiction  to  grant  time  to  the appellant for  making deposit  or to further extend the time to enable  him  to  deposit  balance  of  auction  price  by February 28,  1970; and (3) that the delegated authority had passed orders  in violation  of natural justice as no notice was issued to the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and no opportunity of hearing was afforded to them.      Allowing the  appellant’s appeal  partly and  modifying the order of the High Court, the Court, ^      HELD: 1.  Sections X  and 20  of the  Displaced Persons (Compensation  and  Rehabilitation  Compensation)  Act  1954 provide for  payment of compensation to displaced persons in any of  the forms  as specified  including by  sale  to  the displaced persons of any property from the compensation pool and setting  off the purchase money against the compensation to them. [956B-C]      2. Section  16 confers  power on the Central Government to take 948 measures which  it may  consider necessary  for the custody, management and  disposal of  compensation pool property. The Central Government  had, therefore,  ample  powers  to  take steps for  disposal of pool property by auction sale and for that  purpose  it  had  authority  to  issue  administrative directions. [956C-D]      3. Section 40(2) (j) of the Act provides for framing of rules prescribing procedure for the transfer of property out of the  compensation pool and the adjustment of the value of the  property   so  transferred   against  the   amount   of compensation. Neither  s. 8,  16, 20 nor s. 40 lay down that payment of  compensation by  sale of  the pool property to a displaced person  shall not be done unless rules are framed. These provisions  confer power on the Central Government and the  authorities   constituted  under   the   Act   to   pay compensation to  displaced persons  by sale, or allotment of pool property  to them  in accordance  with rules,  if  any. [956D-E]      4. Framing  of rules  regulating the  mode or manner of disposal  of  urban  agricultural  property  by  sale  to  a displaced person  is  not  a  condition  precedent  for  the

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exercise of  power by the authorities concerned under ss. 8, 16 and  20. If  the legislative  intent was  that until  and unless rules  were framed  power conferred  under  the  said sections could not be exercised, that intent could have been made clear  by using  the expression  "except in  accordance with the  rules framed" a displaced person shall not be paid compensation by sale of pool property. In the absence of any such  provision  the  framing  of  rules,  could  not  be  a condition precedent for the exercise of power. [956E-G]      5. Where a statute confers powers on an authority to do certain act  or exercise power in respect of certain matters subject to rules, the exercise of such power does not depend on the  existence of  Rules  unless  the  statute  expressly provides for  the same.  In other words, framing of rules is not a  condition precedent  to the  exercise  of  the  power expressly and  unconditionally  conferred  by  the  statute. [954H; 955A-B]      6. The  expression "subject  to Rules"  only  means  in accordance with  the rules, if any. If rules are framed, the powers so  conferred on  authority  could  be  exercised  in accordance with  those rules.  But if  no rules  are framed, there is  no void  and the  authority is  not precluded from exercising the Power conferred by the statute. [955B-C]      Bishan Singh  v. The  Central Govt. and others 1961(63) Punjab Law Reporter p. 75, over-ruled. 949      T. Cajee  v. U.  Jormanik Siem  and Anr.,  [1961] 1 SCR 750, B.N.  Nagarajan and  Ors. v.  State of Mysore and Ors., [1966] 3 S.C.R. 682, Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Gopinath,  [1968] 1  S.C.R. 767,  U.P. State  Electricity Board v. City Board Mussoorie and Ors., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 815, relied upon.      7. The  Central Government  had ample  jurisdiction  to issue administrative  directions regulating  the payment  of compensation to  the displaced  persons by sale of the urban agricultural property.  The view  taken by the High Court in Bishan Singh’s  case [1961] 63 P.L.R. 75 is not sustainable. The High  Court was, therefore, in error in holding that the auction sale  held in  appellant’s favour on August 24, 1959 was illegal and void. [956G-H]      8. So far as the challenge to the validity of the order of the  delegated authority  extending time  to  enable  the appellant to  deposit the  auction sale  money is concerned, the High  Court had quashed the same although that order was not before  it, as  none of  the  parties  filed  the  same. Respondents who  had challenged that order should have filed a copy  thereof. In  the absence  of the  impugned order the High Court could not quash the same.      (9) Normally  whenever an  order of  Government or some authority is  impugned before  the High  Court under Article 226 of  the Constitution,  the copy  of the  order  must  be produced before  it. In the absence of the impugned order it could not  be possible  to ascertain  the reasons  which may have impelled  the authority  to  pass  the  order.  It  is, therefore, improper to quash the order which is not produced before the  High Court  in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. [957E-F]      (10) The  power conferred  upon the  Central Government under s.  33 of  the Act  is a residuary power in nature. It confers wide  powers on  the Central  Government to call for the record  of any  case and  to pass any order which it may think fit  in  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  The  only limitation on  exercise of  this power  is that  the Central Government  shall   not  pass   any  order   which  may   be inconsistent with  any of  the provisions of the Act and the

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rules made  thereunder. Therefore, the Central Government or the delegated  authority has power to set aside any order of the subordinate authorities, or to issue directions which it may consider  necessary on the facts, of the case subject to the aforesaid rider. This power is intended to be used to do justice and  to mitigate  hardship to  a party unbriddled by technicalities. Therefore, the 950 delegated authority  while exercising  powers of the Central Government under s. 33 had ample jurisdiction to grant time. [957H; 958A-C]      11. Extension  of  time  to  enable  the  appellant  to deposit the  money did  not amount  to review of the earlier order  dated  6.2.70  and  the  default  cause  therein  was intended to ensure compliance of the order. [958D]      Mahanta Ram  Das v.  Ganga Das,  [1961] 3  S.C.R.  763, relied upon.      12. After  cancellation of  the auction  sale  held  in appellant’s favour, the property in dispute was again put to auction sale  and at that auction sale respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were  the highest  bidders. Their  bid  was  provisionally accepted and  they had  deposited one-fifth  of the  auction sale amount. [959D E]      13. The  highest bidder at an auction sale does not get any right  or interest in the property till the auction sale is approved,  confirmed and the sale deed is executed in his favour. The  respondents have  been  in  possession  of  the property since  long and  furthermore on  the basis of their highest bid  made at the subsequent sale they had sufficient interest in  the matter  to contest the appellant’s petition made under  s. 33 of the Act. The High Court was, therefore, right in  holding that  the  respondents  should  have  been afforded opportunity  of hearing  before any  order  on  the appellant’s petition  was passed.  Since no such opportunity was afforded,  the High  Court was justified in quashing the order. The  High Court’s  order to  that extent  is  upheld. [960A-D]      Bombay Salt  and Chemical v. Johnson and Ors., AIR 1958 SC 289, referred to.      14. The  Central Government or the authority exercising its power under s. 33 of the Act is directed to consider the appellant’s petition  afresh in  accordance with  law  after giving  notice  and  affording  opportunity  of  hearing  to respondent Nos. 2 and 3. [960D-E]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2062 of 1972.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  14.10.1971 of  the Punjab and  Haryana High  Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 63 of 1971. 951      Rajinder Sacchar,  Naunit Lal,  Kailash Vasdev and P.R. Ramesesh for the Appellant.      A. Minocha and Mrs. Veena Minocha for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SINGH, J.  This appeal is directed against the Judgment of a  Division Bench  of Punjab & Haryana High Court setting aside order of a Single Judge and also the order made by the Central Govt. granting extension of time to the appellant to deposit purchase  price in  connection with the auction sale dated August  24,  1959  held  in  appellant’s  favour,  and directing the  Rehabilitation  Department  to  take  further

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proceedings regarding  auction sale  held in  favour of  the respondents.      Plot No.  168 situate  in Jalandhar  City,  an  evacuee property was included in the compensation pool under Sec. 14 of the  Displaced Persons  (Compensation and  Rehabilitation Compensation) Act,  1954. This  plot was put to auction sale on August  24, 1959.  The appellant who was displaced person made the  highest bid  of Rs.20,000,  it  was  provisionally accepted and  he deposited  one-fifth of  the amount  at the conclusion of  the auction,  but he  failed to  deposit  the balance amount. The Managing officer therefore cancelled the auction sale. On a Revision Petition filed by the appellant, the Chief  Settlement Commissioner  by his order dated March 30, 1968  set aside  the order  of the  Managing officer and allowed time  to the  appellant to  deposit the  balance  of purchase price  by May  30, 1968. The appellant again failed to deposit  the amount  within time, consequently Settlement officer by  his order  dated 2.10.1968 cancelled the auction sale made in appellant’s favour. Thereafter the property was put to  auction sale  on January  17, 1969.  At that auction sale Sohan  Lal and  Sunder Lal,  respondents who  are  also displaced persons  made their  highest bid for Rs.27,025 and they deposited  20% of  the amount  at the conclusion of the auction. Meanwhile the appellant preferred an appeal against the order dated 2.10.1968 cancelling the auction sale before the Asstt.  Settlement officer,  but the appeal was rejected on 2.4.1969.  The appellant  preferred a  Revision  Petition before the  Chief Settlement  Commissioner but  that too was dismissed on  August 13, 1969. Thereafter the appellant made a  petition   under  sec.   33  of   the  Displaced  Persons (Compensation  &   Rehabilitation)  Act,  1954  (hereinafter referred to  as the Act) before the Central Government. Shri Rajni 952 Kant exercising  the delegated  powers of  the Central Govt. set aside  the order  cancelling the  auction sale  held  on August 24,  1959 and  granted 15 days’ time to the appellant for depositing  the balance  of the  purchase price  by  his order dated  February 6,  1970  with  a  condition  that  on failure to  deposit the  balance of  the auction  price  the petition shall  stand dismissed.  The appellant again failed to deposit  the amount within time, but on a request made by the appellant  Shri Rajni  Kant extended  time till February 28, 1970  for depositing  the remaining  amount of  purchase money. Admittedly  the  appellant  deposited  the  remaining auction price  by February 28, 1970. The respondents filed a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the Punjab & Haryana High Court challenging the order of Shri  Rajni Kant  dated February  6, 1970  as well as his subsequent order  extending time  till February 28, 1970 and also for issue of a direction to the authorities to finalise the auction sale held in their favour on January 17, 1969. A learned Single Judge after hearing the parties dismissed the petition. On a Letters Patent Appeal a Division Bench of the High Court  allowed the  appeal set  aside the  order of the learned Single  Judge  dismissing  the  writ  petition,  and quashed the  order of  Shri Rajni  Kant granting time to the appellant to  deposit the  balance amount  of the sale price under sec.  33 of  the Act.  The Division Bench directed the authorities  to   finalise  the   auction   sale   held   in respondents’ favour.  Aggreived the  appellant has preferred this appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court.      The High  Court held  that sale  of urban  agricultural property which formed part of the compensation pool could be held only  in accordance with the Rules framed under the Act

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as contemplated  by sec.  8 and  sec. 40. Since no rules had been framed  for the  disposal  of  the  urban  agricultural property; the  Central Government could not lawfully provide for  sale  of  the  urban  agricultural  land  by  executive directions. Consequently  auction sale  held on  August  24, 1959 was illegal. The High Court further held that Sri Rajni Kant exercising  the powers  under sec. 33 of the Act had no jurisdiction to  grant time  to  the  appellant  for  making deposit or  to further  extend the  time to  enable  him  to deposit balance  of auction  price  by  February  28,  1970. Lastly the  High Court  held that Shri Rajni Kant had passed orders in  violation of  natural justice  as no  notice  was issued to  the respondents  Sohan Lal  and Sunder Lal and no opportunity of hearing was afforded to them.      The first  question which falls for consideration is as to whether in 953 the absence  of the rules the Central Govt. had authority in law to  provide for  disposal of  urban agricultural land by auction sale.  In order  to appreciate  the  problem  it  is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act and the rules.  The Act was enacted by the Parliament to provide for the  payment of  compensation and  rehabilitation of the displaced persons  and  to  provide  for  matters  connected therewith. A  large number  of persons had been displaced on account of  the civil  disturbances which  occurred  due  to partition of the country in 1947.  The  Act   provides   for payment  of  compensation  to  the  "displaced  persons"  as defined by  sec. 2(b)  of the  Act. Section  4 provides  for making of an application by displaced persons for payment of compensation. Section  8 lays  down that  a displaced person shall be  paid  compensation  as  determined  under  sec.  7 "subject to  any rules  that may  be made under this Act" in any one of the forms, namely:-           (a) in cash;           (b) in Govt. bonds;           (c)  by  sale  to  the  displaced  person  of  any           property from  the compensation  pool and  setting           off the  purchase money  against the  compensation           payable to him;           (d) by any other mode of transfer to the displaced           person of  any property from the compensation pool           and setting  off the  valuation  of  the  property           against the           (e)  transfer  of  shares  or  debentures  in  any           company or corporation;           (f) in such other form as may be prescribed.      Section 14 constitutes compensation pool which consists of evacuee  property including  urban and rural agricultural land. Section  16 confers power on the Central Govt. to take such measures as it considers necessary or expedient for the custody, management  and "disposal" of the compensation pool in order  that it  may be effectively utilised in accordance with the  provisions of  the  Act.  Sec.  20  provides  that subject to  any rules  that may  be made  under the  Act the Managing officer  or Managing  Corporation may  transfer any property by  sale or  by lease  to a  displaced person or by allotment or  in any  other manner  as  may  be  prescribed. Section 40 confers power, on the Central 954 Government to  frame rules  to carry  out the purpose of the Act. Subsec.  (2) specifies  the matters in respect of which rules may  provide for  payment of  compensation. Clause (j) provides for  framing of  rules laying  down  procedure  for transfer of  property out  of the  compensation pool and the

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manner of  realisation of  the sale  proceeds or the adjust- ment of  the value  of the  property transferred against the amount of compensation. The Central Govt. in exercise of its powers under  the Act  framed rules  known as the "Displaced Persons (Compensation  & Rehabilitation)  Rules 1955.  These rules were  notified on  May 21,  1955. The  rules  did  not contain any  express provision  for the  disposal  of  urban agricultural property  by sale.  Since the Central Govt. had not  framed   rules  regulating  the  disposal  by  sale  or otherwise of  urban agricultural  land forming  part of  the compensation pool,  it issued  press notes and memorandum in 1957 &  1958 containing  executive  directions  laying  down principles  and   procedure  for   the  transfer   of  urban agricultural land  to displaced  persons. According to these directions the  evacuee urban  agricultural land  was to  be disposed of  in the  same  manner  as  other  urban  evacuee property. These  directions accordingly  authorised disposal of the  urban agricultural  property by auction sale in case the value  of the  property was  more than  Rs. 10,000.  The auction sale  of the  plot in dispute on August 24, 1959 was held in  accordance with  the aforesaid directions issued by the Central Govt.      The High  Court has  held that the disposal of property forming part  of the  compensation pool was "subject" to the rules framed  as contemplated by ss. 8 and 40 of the Act and since no  rules had  been framed  by the  Central Government with regard  to  the  disposal  of  the  urban  agricultural property  forming   part  of   the  compensation  pool,  the authority constituted  under the  Act had no jurisdiction to dispose of  urban agricultural  property  by  auction  sale. Unless  rules  were  framed  as  contemplated  by  the  Act, according to  the  High  Court  the  Central  Govt.  had  no authority in  law to issue executive directions for the sale and disposal  of urban  agricultural property. This view was taken,  placing   reliance  on  an  earlier  decision  of  a Deviation Bench  of that  Could  in  "Bishan  Singh  v.  The Central Govt.  & Ors.", 1961 (63) Punjab Law Reporter P. 75. The Division Bench in Bishan’s case took the view that since the disposal  of the  compensation pool property was subject to the  rules that  may be  made, and  as no  rules had been framed, the  Central Govt.  had no authority in law to issue administrative directions  providing for the transfer of the urban agricultural  land by auction sale. In our opinion the view taken  by the  High Court is incorrect. Where a statute confers powers on an authority to do certain 955 acts or  exercise  power  in  respect  of  certain  matters, subject to  rules, the  exercise of  power conferred  by the statute does not depend on the existence of Rules unless the statute expressly  provides for  the same.  In  other  words framing of  the rules  is not  condition  precedent  to  the exercise  of   the  power   expressly  and   unconditionally conferred by  the statute.  The expression  "subject to  the Rules only  means, in  accordance with the rules, if any. If rules are framed, the powers so conferred on authority could be exercised in accordance with these rules. But if no rules are framed  there is  no  void  and  the  authority  is  not precluded  from   exercising  the  power  conferred  by  the statute. In "T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem & Anr. ", [1961] 1 S.C.R. 750  the Supreme Court reversed the order of the High Court whereby  the order  of District Council removing Siem, was quashed  by the  High  Court  on  the  ground  that  the District Council  had not  framed any rules for the exercise of its  powers as  contemplated by  para  3(1)  (g)  of  6th Schedule to  the Constitution.  The High Court had taken the

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view that  until a  law as contemplated by para 3(1) (g) was made there  could be  no question  of exercise  of power  of appointment of  a Chief  or Siem  or removal either. Setting aside the  order of  the High Court, a Constitution Bench of this Court  held that  the administration  of  the  District including the  appointment or removal of Siem could not come to a  stop till regulations under para 3(1) (g) were framed. The view  taken by  the High  Court that  there could  be no appointment or  removal  by  the  District  Council  without framing of  the Regulation  was set  aside. Similar view was taken by  this Court  in B.N.  Nagarajan &  Ors. v. State of Mysore &  Ors., [1966]  3  S.C.R.  682,  Mysore  State  Road Transport Corporation  v. Gopinath,  [1968] 1 S.C.R. 767. In U.P. State Electricity Board v. City Board Mussoorie & Ors., [1985] 2  S.C.R. 815 validity of fixation of Grid Tarrif was under-challenge. Section 46 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 provide  that tariff  known as the Grid Tariff shall be fixed from  time to  time in accordance with any regulations made in  that behalf.  Section 79 of the Act conferred power on  the   Electricity  Board   to  frame   regulations.  The contention that  Grid Tariff  as contemplated  by sec. 46 of the Electricity  (Supply) Act  could not  be  fixed  in  the absence of  any regulations  laying  down  for  fixation  of tariff, and  that the  notification  fixing  tariff  in  the absence of  such Regulations  was illegal,  was rejected and this Court observed-           "It is  true that sec. 79(h) of the Act authorises           the Electricity  Board to  make Regulations laying           down the  principles governing  the fixing of Grid           Tariffs. But s. 46(1) of the Act does not say that           no Grid Tariff can be fixed until such 956           regulations are  made. It  only provides  that the           Grid  Tariff  shall  be  in  accordance  with  any           Regulations and  nothing more.  We are of the view           that the  framing of  regulations under sec. 79(h)           of the  Act cannot  be a  condition precedent  for           fixing Grid Tariff."      As noted  earlier ss.  8 and  20 of the Act provide for payment of  compensation to  displaced persons in any of the forms as  specified  including  by  sale  to  the  displaced persons of  any property  from  the  compensation  pool  and setting off  the purchase  money  against  the  compensation payable to  him. Sec.  16 confers power on the Central Govt. to take  measures which  it may  consider necessary  for the custody, management  and disposal  of the  compensation pool property. The Central  Govt. had  therefore ample  powers to take steps for disposal of pool property by auction sale and for that  purpose it  had authority  to issue administrative directions. Sec.  40(2) (j)  provides for  framing of  rules prescribing procedure  for the  transfer of  property out of the compensation pool and the adjustment of the value of the property so  transferred against the amount of compensation. Neither ss.  8, 16,  20 or sec. 40 lays down that payment of compensation by  sale of  the pool  property to  a displaced person shall  not be  done unless  rules are  framed.  These provisions confer  power on  the Central  Government and the authorities constituted under the Act to pay compensation to displaced persons  by sale, or allotment of pool property to them in  accordance with  rules, if  any. Framing  of  rules regulating  the   mode  or   manner  of  disposal  of  urban agricultural property by sale to a displaced person is not a condition  precedent  for  the  exercise  of  power  by  the authorities concerned  under ss. 8, 16 and 20 of the Act. If the legislative  intent was that until and unless rules were

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framed power  conferred on the authority under ss. 8, 16 and 20 could  not be exercised, that intent could have been made clear by using the expressing "except in accordance with the rules  framed"   a  displaced   person  shall  not  be  paid compensation by sale of pool property. In the absence of any such  provision  the  framing  of  rules,  could  not  be  a condition precedent for the exercise of power.      The Central  Govt.  had  ample  jurisdiction  to  issue administrative  directions   regulating   the   payment   of compensation to  the displaced  persons by sale of the urban agricultural property.  The view  taken by the High Court in Bishan Singh’s  case (supra)  is not  sustainable. The  High Court was  therefore in  error in  holding that  the auction sale held  in appellant’s  favour on  August  24,  1959  was illegal and void . 957      The second  question relates  to the  validity  of  the order of  Shri Rajni Kant the officer to whom power under s. 33 was  delegated, extending time to enable the appellant to deposit the auction sale money. Shri Rajni Kant by his order dated 6.2.70  exercising the delegated powers of the Central Govt.  under  sec.  33  of  the  Act  set  aside  the  order cancelling  the   auction  sale  held  in  August  1959  and permitted the  appellant  to  deposit  the  balance  of  the purchase money  within fifteen  days from  the date  of  the order with a default clause that on his failure his petition would  stand   dismissed.  In  accordance  with  that  order appellant was  entitled to  deposit the  money till February 21, 1970.  It appears that on appellant’s request the office prepared a  challan which was valid up to February 20, 1970. The appellant went to the State Bank on February 20, 1970 to make the  deposit but  due to  rush he  could not  make  the deposit. On  his application  Shri Rajni  Kant extended  the time permitting  the deposit  by 28.2.1970  as a  result  of which a  fresh challan  was prepared  which was  valid up to 28.2.1970 and  within that  period appellant  deposited  the balance purchase  money. The  subsequent order of Shri Rajni Kant was  challenged by  the respondents  and the High Court has quashed  that order,  although that order was not before the High  Court as  none of  the parties filed the same. The respondents who  had challenged the order of Shri Rajni Kant should have filed a copy of the order. In the absence of the order under  challenge the  High Court  could not  quash the same. Normally  whenever an order of Govt. Or some authority is impugned  before the  High Court  under Art.  226 of  the Constitution, the  copy of the order must be produced before it. In  the absence  of the  impugned order  it would not be possible to  ascertain the  reasons which  may have impelled the authority to pass the order. It is therefore improper to quash an  order which  is not produced before the High Court in a  proceeding under  Art. 226  of the  Constitution.  The order of  the High Court could be set aside for this reason, but we think it necessary to consider the merits also.      Sec. 33 reads as under:           "Certain residuary powers of Central Govt.-                The Central  Govt. may  at any  time call for           the record  of any  proceeding under  this Act and           may pass  such order in relation thereto as in its           opinion the  circumstances of the case require and           as is  not inconsistent with any of the provisions           contained  in   this  Act   or  the   rules   made           thereunder."      The power  conferred upon  the Central Govt. under this provi- 958

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sion is  a residuary  power in  nature as  the title  of the section  itself   indicates.  By   enacting   this   section Parliament has conferred wide powers on the Central Govt. to call for  the record of any case and to pass any order which it may  think fit in the circumstances of the case. The only limitation on  exercise of  this power  is that  the Central Govt. shall  not pass  any order  which may  be inconsistent with any  of the  provisions of  the Act  and the rules made thereunder. Therefore  the Central  Govt. Or  the  delegated authority  has   power  to   set  aside  any  order  of  the subordinate authorities, or to issue directions which it may consider necessary  on the  facts of  a case. subject to the aforesaid rider.  This power  is intended  to be  used to do justice and to mitigate hard- t ship to a party unriddled by technicalities. Sri  Rajni Kant  while exercising  powers of the Central  Govt. under  sec.  33  of  the  Act  had  ample jurisdiction to  set aside  the orders  of  the  subordinate authorities cancelling  the auction  held on August 24, 1959 and to permit the appellant to deposit the balance amount of the purchase money and he further had jurisdiction to extend the time  initially granted  by him.  Extension of  time  to enable the  appellant to deposit the money did not amount to review of the earlier order dated 6.2.70. In our opinion the High Court  has committed error in holding that extension of time amounted  to review  of the  order  dt.  6.2.1970.  The default  clause  in  the  initial  order  dt.  6.2.1970  was intended to  ensure compliance of the order. It did not mean that on  expiry of  the stipulated period Sri Rajni Kant had no power  to extend the period or to pass another order. The purpose and  object of  such orders  was considered  by this Court in  Mahanth Ram  Das v.  Ganga Das [1961] 3 S.C.R. 763 where the  High Court, had granted time to the appellant for payment of  deficit court  fee  with  a  condition  that  in default the appeal shall stand dismissed. The appellant made an application  for extension  of time  but the  High  Court rejected the  application on  the ground  that grant of time would amount  the review  of earlier order. This Court while setting aside the High Court’s order, observed:           "Such   procedural    orders   though   peremptory           (conditional decrees  apart) are,  in essence,  in           terrorem, so  that dilatory  litigants  might  put           themselves in  order and avoid delay. They do not,           however, completely  stop a Court from taking note           of events  and circumstances  which happen  within           the time fixed. "      This  Court   further  held  that  the  court  was  not powerless to  deal with  events which  may have  taken place subsequently and the court 959 has power  to mould its practice to meet a situation. In the instant case,  the Central Govt. has very wide powers and it could mould its practice in order to mitigate hardship which may be  caused to a party in the circumstances of a case and for that  purpose it  may grant  or extend  time as  it  may consider fit in the circumstances of a case having regard to subsequent events.  Such orders do not amount to review. Sri Rajni Kant  had no  doubt  passed  a  peremptory  order  but nonetheless  he   had  jurisdiction  to  take  into  account subsequent  events  and  to  enlarge  time  granted  to  the appellant for  making the  deposit as  that  order  was  not inconsistent with  any provision of the Act or Rules. In our opinion the High Court committed an error in holding that by granting time Sri Rajni Kant had reviewed his earlier order.      The High Court has further held that Sri Rajni Kant had acted in  violation of  principles  of  natural  justice  in

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passing  orders  in  appellant’s  favour  as  no  notice  or opportunity of hearing was afforded to respondents Sohan Lal and Sunder  Lal. There is no dispute that after cancellation of the auction sale held in appellant’s favour, the property in dispute was again put to auction sale on January 17, 1969 and  at   that  auction   sale  Sohan  Lal  and  Sunder  Lal respondents  were   the  highest   bidders.  Their  bid  was provisionally  accepted   and  in   pursuance  thereof  they deposited one-fifth  of the  auction  sale  amount.  If  the Central Govt.  Or any other authority exercising power under sec. 33  of the  Act were  to set aside the order cancelling the auction  sale held  in appellant’s  favour and if he was permitted to  deposit the  remaining amount  of the purchase money the  property would  be transferred to him and in that event Sohan Lal and Sunder Lal who had also made the highest bid and  made the  initial deposit would suffer prejudice as they would  not be  entitled to  the property in dispute. In these  circumstances  the  respondents  were  interested  in supporting the  order of  cancellation of  the auction  sale made in  appellant’s favour and they had sufficient interest in proceedings  taken under sec. 33 of the Act. We therefore agree with  the High Court that in all fairness, respondents should have  been afforded  opportunity of  hearing  to  the respondents while exercising power under sec. 33 of the Act.      Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  urged  that  the respondents being  the highest  bidders  at  the  subsequent auction sale  had no  right in the property and as such they were not  entitled to  any opportunity of hearing before the Central Govt. He placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Bombay  Salt and  Chemical v. Johnson & Ors., AIR 1958 SC 289. We  have considered  the said  decision, where  in this Court has 960 taken the  view that  the highest  bidder at an auction sale does not  get any right or interest in the property till the auction sale  is approved,  confirmed and  the sale  deed is executed in  his favour.  The respondents  even though  they were the  highest bidders  at the subsequent auction sale do not have any right or interest in the ’property’ in dispute. The question  is however not whether they have any ’right or interest’  in   the  property  but  whether  they  would  be prejudicially affected.  They would  certainly be  affected, adversely if  the appellant  get relief in proceedings under sec. 33  of  the  Act  in  respect  of  the  said  property. Respondents have  been in  possession of  the property since long and further more on the basis of their highest bid made at the  subsequent sale they have sufficient interest in the matter to  contest the  appellant’s petition made under sec. 33 of  the Act.  We are therefore in agreement with the High Court that respondents should have been afforded opportunity of hearing  before any order on the appellant’s petition was passed. Since  no such  opportunity was  afforded, the  High Court was  justified in  quashing the  orders of  Sri  Rajni Kant. We  accordingly uphold  the High Court’s order to that extent.      We therefore  allow the  appeal partly  and modify  the order of the High Court to the extent indicated hereinabove. The Central Government or the authority exercising its power under sec.  33 of  the  Act  is  directed  to  consider  the appellant’s petition  afresh in  accordance with  law  after giving notice  and affording opportunity of hearing to Sohan Lal and  Sunder Lal,  respondents. In these circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. A.P.J.                               Appeal allowed in part. 961

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