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PETITIONER: SURESH KUMAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: TOWN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, BHOPAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT03/03/1989

BENCH: SAIKIA, K.N. (J) BENCH: SAIKIA, K.N. (J) OZA, G.L. (J)

CITATION:  1989 AIR 1222            1989 SCR  (1) 908  1989 SCC  (2) 329        JT 1989 (1)   439  1989 SCALE  (1)534  CITATOR INFO :  F          1989 SC1228  (1)  F          1989 SC1229  (1)

ACT:     Madhya  Pradesh Town Improvement Trust--Section  68-Land acquired--Compensation for such land--Determine market value taking into account its special value.     Constitution of India, 1950:--Art. 136--Appeal involving question  of  valuation of acquired  land-interference  with award--Only  when erroneous principle invoked  or  important piece of evidence overlooked or misapplied.     Land Acquisition Act, 1894--Sections, 4,  23-25--Compen- sation      for      land      acquired--Principles      for determination--Determine  market value of land  taking  into consideration its special value.

HEADNOTE:      Respondent--Town Improvement Trust Bhopal acquired  152 acres  of land in village Jamalpura under section 68 of  the Madhya Pradesh Town Improvement Trust Act within the munici- pal limits of Bhopal. That land included 12.62 acres of land belonging  to the appellant on which stood a house,  a  well and  some trees. The appellant being not satisfied with  the amount  of compensation offered to him by the Trust, made  a Reference to the Compensation Tribunal. The Tribunal awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.6,000 per acre for the  land, Rs.5,000 for the building, Rs.3,000 for the well and  Rs.815 for  the  trees. Thus the Tribunal awarded a  total  sum  of Rs.1,20,000   as   compensation  as  against  a   claim   of Rs.13,39,560  made  by the appellant. On  appeal,  the  High Court, maintained the award in respect of the building, well and  the trees but enhanced the same so far as the  land  is concerned  by determining the market value of Rs.12,000  per acre.  Working  or this basis, including 15%  solatium,  the total  amount of compensation awarded worked out to  he  Rs. 1,84,923.     Being dissatisfied with the Order of the High Court,  he has come up to this Court after obtaining special leave.     The main contentions urged by the appellant are (i) that the house and well are undervalued; (ii) that the land ought to have been treated as urbanised developed land; (iii) that

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potential value of the land has not 909 been  taken into consideration while  determining  compensa- tion; (iv) that the value of the sales of similar plots  has wrongly been rejected. Partly allowing the appeal, this Court,     HELD:  In determining market value, where there  was  no sufficient  direct  evidence of market price, the  Court  is required to ascertain as best as possible from the materials before  it,  what  a willing vendor  would  reasonably  have expected to obtain from a willing purchaser from the land in its particular position and with its particular  potentiali- ty. [914C-D]     A  land which is certainly or likely to be used  in  the immediate  or reasonably near future for  building  purposes but  which at the valuation date is waste land or  has  been used for agricultural purposes, the owner, however,  willing a vendor he is, is not likely to be content to sell the land for its value as waste or agricultural land as the case  may be. The possibility of its being used for building  purposes would have to be taken into account. However, it must not be valued  as though it had already been built upon. It is  the possibilities of the land and not its realised possibilities that must be taken into consideration. [914E-F]     In  estimating  the market value of the  land,  all  the capabilities of the land and all its legitimate purposes  to which it may be applied, or for which it may be adapted  are to  be considered and not merely the condition it is in  and the use to which it is put at the time applied by the owner. The proper principle is to ascertain the market value of the land taking into consideration the special value which ought to  be  attached to the special advantage possessed  by  the land;  namely, its proximity to developed  urbanised  areas. [915A-B]     The  value of the potentiality has to be  determined  on such  materials as are available and without  indulgence  in fits of imagination. [915B-C]     A court of appeal interferes not when the judgment under attack is not right, but only when it is shown to be  wrong. [912E]     In an appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India involving  the question of valuation of acquired  land,  the Supreme Court will not interfere with the award unless  some erroneous principle has been invoked or some important piece of evidence has been overlooked or misapplied [912B-C] 910     When  the willing vendor had agreed to sell land  at  14 annas  per  sq. feet after development and  the  development charge  was to be paid by the willing purchaser it could  be reasonable  to deduct only 50% on account of the land to  be set  apart for roads, drains etc. and not beyond that.  Con- sidering  this aspect of the matter and the potential  value of the land as urban developed area the Court took the  view that  the compensation may justly be enhanced by 1/6th  i.e. to  Rs.14,000 per acre. Solatium 15% was maintained but  the rate of interest was raised to 9% on the enhanced  compensa- tion till payment. [918F-G ]     Atmaram Bhagwant v. Collector ofNagpur, A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 92, followed; Dollar Company Madras v. Collector of  Madras, [1975]  Suppl. S.C.R. 403; Gajapatiraju v.  Rev.  Divisional Officer,  A.I.R.  1939 P.C. 98; Mahabir  Prasad  Santuka  v. Collector, Cuttack, [1987] 1 S.C.C. 587 and U.P.  Government v.H.S. Gupta, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 202.

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JUDGMENT:     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2931  (N) of 1981.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  7.10.1980  of  the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Miscellaneous First Appeal  No. 78 of 1974. L.M. Singhvi, D. Bhandari and A.K. Sanghi for the Appellant. T.S. Krishnamurthy Iyer and S.K. Gambhir for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     K.N.  SAIKIA, J. This Civil Appeal by special  leave  is from  the order dated 7.10.1980 of the High Court of  Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur in Misc (F) Appeal No. 78 of 1974,  allow- ing the appeal and enhancing compensation for land  acquired by the Improvement Trust, Bhopal.     The  Improvement Trust, Bhopal, hereinafter referred  to as ’the Trust’, acquired 152 acres of land of Village Jamal- pura  by  Notification dated 30th April, 1965  issued  under Section 68 of the Madhya Pradesh Town Improvement Trust Act, 1960, hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’, and took posses- sion  of  the  land sometimes in June, 1967.  Out  of  these acquired land the instant appellant owned 12.62 acres where- upon stood a house, a well and some trees. The whole of  the acquired land including that of the appellant was within the limits of Bhopal Municipal Corporation. On 25.3.1966 Notifi- cation under Section 71 of 911 the Act was issued vesting the land in the Trust. The  Trust offered  compensation at the rate of Rs.950 per acre  (@  14 paise  per sq. ft.) amounting to Rs.11,997.00; for the  well Rs.3,108; and for the trees Rs.815 and for compulsory acqui- sition 15% amounting to Rs.2,400. The appellant made  refer- ence,  No.  8  of 1970 to the  Compensation  Tribunal  under Section 72(3) of the Act. The Tribunal awarded  compensation at  the  rate of Rs.6,000 per acre (Rs.0.28 Paise  per  sqr. ft.)  for the land, Rs.5,000 for the building, Rs.3,000  for the well and Rs.815 for the trees. Thus the Tribunal by  its award  dated  25th  November, 1972 awarded a  total  sum  of Rs.1,20,060  inclusive  of interest as compensation  to  the appellant, as against his claim at the rate of Rs.20,000 per acre for the land, Rs.20,000 for the building, Rs.5,000  for the well, Rs.2,500 for the trees and Rs. 10,000 for loss  of business  and  earnings, his total claim  amounting  to  Rs. 13,39,560. On appeal, being Misc. (F) Appeal No. 78 of 1974, the High Court maintained the award in respect of the Build- ing,  well and the trees, but enhanced the  compensation  in respect  of  the land determining the market  value  at  Rs. 12,000  per  acre and the total area being 12.62  acres  the total  compensation inclusive of that allowed for the  house etc. and 15% solatium worked out to Rs. 1,84,293.  Dissatis- fied, the appellant obtained leave and filed this appeal.     Dr.  L.M.  Singhvi  learned counsel  for  the  appellant submits, inter alia, that the house and the well were gross- ly  undervalued; that both the Tribunal as well as the  High Court  misdirected themselves in treating the land as  agri- cultural  land  but not as urbanised developed land  on  the erroneous  ground  that there was no  building  activity  of substantial  nature at the time of acquisition in  spite  of the  fact that a part of the land was already  converted  to Abadi,  that  both the Tribunal as well as  the  High  Court failed to take into consideration the potential value of the land;  and that evidence of sales of similar plots  was  not accepted on the ground that those pertained to small  plots; and that the High Court committed an error when it  deducted the  development  charge from the agreed  price  instead  of

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adding  it to the agreed price while calculating the  market value.     Mr.  Krishnamurthi  learned counsel for  the  respondent Trust  submits  that the house and the  well  were  properly valued;  that it was not correct that the Tribunal  did  not correctly  consider the question of the nature of  the  land which  it  held to be agricultural because it did  not  find therein any building activity of substantial nature. At  any rate,  counsel submits, the High Court took into  considera- tion  the potential value of the land and as such there  was no omission to consider any 912 relevant  material or misdirection in this regard.  Counsel, however, fails to explain the reason of deducting the devel- opment  charge from the agreed price, instead of adding  it, while calculating market value of the lands on the basis  of evidence produced by the claimant. This, however,  according to counsel, is not a sufficient ground for our  interference in  this  appeal under Article 136 of  the  Constitution  of India.     In  an appeal under Article 136 of the  Constitution  of India involving the question of valuation of acquired  land, this  Court  will not interfere with the award  unless  some erroneous principle has been invoked or some important piece of  evidence has been overlooked or misapplied, as was  held in Atmaram Bhagwant v. Collector of Nagpur, A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 92.  In Dollar Company, Madras v. Collector of Madras,  1975 Suppl.  S.C.R. 403 the Land Acquisition Officer awarded  Rs. 800  per ground as compensation and the City Civil Court  on reference  awarded at the rate of Rs. 1,000 pet ground,  and the  High  Court on appeal awarded Rs.1800 per  ground.  The appellant  himself purchased the suit land about  10  months before the Notification under Section 4 was made at a  price of  Rs.410 per ground whereafter the appellant has  spent  a little money on filling up a pond. Dismissing the appeal  it was observed that this Court interferes with the judgment of the  High Court only if the High Court applies  a  principle wrongly or because some important point affecting  valuation has been overlooked or misapplied. A Court of appeal  inter- feres  not when the judgment under attack is not right,  but only when it is shown to be wrong. As there was no error  in principle  in  the High Court judgment nor had  any  of  the limited grounds on which that Court’s jurisdiction could  be legitimately  exercised  was made out, the appeal  was  dis- missed. Therefore, it is for the the appellant to show  that there is ground for interference in this case.     As regards the value of the house, the Land Compensation Tribunal clearly observed that it visited the spot and found that  the  house  ’was in  extremely  dilapidated  condition having  big  cracks in foundation, walls  and  pillars.  The foundation  was getting-loose. The roof of  asbestos  sheets was sagging, indicating that the wood rafters had been badly damaged.  Doors and windows were in bad condition.  The  two verandahs of the house were temporary, with roof of asbestos sheets.’     The  house, according to the Tribunal might be 20 to  25 years old and depreciation would be 5% per year. Considering the above factors 913 we  are of the view that the compensation  awarded,  namely, Rs.5,000  is  reasonable. Also from evidence  we  find  that Rs.3,000 for the well was reasonable. There was no error  of principle  and  hence  there can be no  grievance  on  these counts.     Regarding nature of the land the Tribunal noted that the

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claimants  in most of the references asserted that  the  ac- quired land should be valued as urban house site because  of alleged potential value and had claimed compensation between the Rs.3 to Rs. 1 per sqr. ft. The Trust disputed the  claim and  urged that the lands at the time of  acquisition,  were either  agricultural  or- merely fallow land  and  they  had absolutely  no  urban site value. The claimants  also  urged that  the lands were situated within Corporation limits  and lands  of some of the claimants were already diverted  (con- verted).  We  agree with Mr. Krishnamurthi that  though  the Tribunal treated it as agricultural, the High Court proceed- ed on the principle of developed land.     It  is true that the market  value of the land  acquired has  to  be correctly determined and paid so that  there  is neither  unjust enrichment on the part of the  acquirer  nor undue  deprivation  on the part of the  owner.  Dr.  Singhvi argues that failing to consider potential value is an  error of  principle. It is an accepted principle as was laid  down in Gajapatiraju v. Rev. Divisional Officer, A.I.R. 1939 P.C. 98 that the compensation must be determined by reference  to the price which a willing vendor might reasonably expect  to obtain  from  willing purchaser. The disinclination  of  the vendor to part with his land and the urgent necessity of the purchaser to buy it must alike be disregarded. Neither  must be  considered as acting under compulsion. The value of  the land  is not to be estimated at its value to  the  purchaser but  this does not mean that the fact that  some  particular purchaser  might desire the land more than others is  to  be disregarded. The wish of a particular purchaser, though  not his  compulsion, may always be taken into consideration  for what it is worth. Any sentimental value for the vendor  need not be taken into account. The vendor is to be treated as  a vendor  willing to sell at the market price. Section  23  of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, enumerates the matters to be considered  in  determining compensation- The  first  to  be taken into consideration is the market value of the land  on the  date of the publication of the Notification under  Sec- tion  4(1). Market value is that of a willing vendor  and  a willing  purchaser.  A willing vendor would  naturally  take into  consideration such factors as would contribute to  the value of his land including its unearned increment. A  will- ing  purchaser  would also consider more or  less  the  same factors. There may be many ponder- 914 able  and imponderable factors in such estimation  or  guess work. Section 24 of the Act enumerates the matters which the Court  shall  not  take into  consideration  in  determining compensation. Section 25 provides that the amount of compen- sation  awarded  by  the Court shall not be  less  than  the amount  awarded  by the Collector under Section 11.  As  was observed in Gajapatiraju (supra) sometimes, it happens  that the land to be valued possesses some unusual, and it may be, unique features, as regards its position or its  potentiali- ty.  In  such a case the court has to ascertain as  best  as possible from the materials before it what a willing  vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing  purchaser, for  the  land  in that particular position  and  with  that particular  potentiality. In the instant case also  the  ac- quired land possesses Some important features being  located within  the Corporation area and its potentiality for  being developed  as  a residential area. In such  a  situation  in determining its market value, where there was no  sufficient direct  evidence of market price, the Court was required  to ascertain as best as possible from the materials before  it, what  a  willing vendor would reasonably  have  expected  to

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obtain  from a willing purchaser from the land in this  par- ticular  position and with this particular potentiality.  It is an accepted principle that the land is not to be  valued, merely  by reference to the use to which it has been put  at the  time at which its value has to be determined, that  is, the  date of the notification under Section 4, but  also  by reference  to the use to which it is reasonably  capable  of being put in the future. A land which is certainly or likely to  be used in the immediate or reasonably near  future  for building  purposes but which at the valuation date is  waste land or has been used for agricultural purposes, the  owner, however willing a vendor he is. is not likely to be  content to sell the land for its value as waste or agricultural land as  the case may be. The possibility of its being  used  for building  purposes  would  have to be  taken  into  account. However, it must not be valued as though it had already been built upon. It is the possibilities of the land and not  its realised  possibilities that must be taken  into  considera- tion, In other words, the value of the land should be deter- mined  not necessarily according to its present  disposition but laid out in its lucrative and advantageous way in  which the  owner can dispose it  of. It is well  established  that the  special, though natural, adaptability of the  land  for the  purpose for which it is taken, is an important  element to  be  taken into consideration in determining  the  market value  of the land. In such a situation the land might  have already  been valued at more than its value as  agricultural land,  if it had any other capabilities. However, only  rea- sonable and fair capabilities but not far-fetched and  hypo- thetical capabilities are to be taken into consideration. In sum, in estimating 915 the market value of the land all of the capabilities of  the land,  and  all its legitimate purposes to which it  may  be applied or for which it may be adapted are to be  considered and  not merely the condition it is in and the use to  which it is at the time applied by the owner. The proper principle is  to  ascertain the market value of the land  taking  into consideration  the special value which ought to be  attached to the special advantage possessed by the land; namely,  its proximity to developed urbanised areas.     The  value of the potentiality has to be  determined  on such  materials as are available and without  indulgence  in fits  of the imagination. In Mahabir Prasad Santuka v.  Col- lector, Cuttack, [1987] 1 S.C.C. 587 the evidence on  record was  that the land was being used for agricultural  purposes but  it  was fit for non-agricultural purposes  and  it  had potentiality for future use as factory or building site  and that  on  industrialisation of the  neighbouring  areas  the prices increased tremendously, and that aspect, it was held, could not be ignored in determining compensation.     On  the  question as to whether the land  was  urbanised developed land or not we find that the Tribunal consolidated all the 15 references arising out of the acquisition for the purpose  of recording evidence and, that is, how it came  to consider  the Exts. P-1, P-2, P-3, and P-8 being  agreements of sale executed by Phool Chand Gupta who was father of  the claimant  in reference No. 1 of 1970 while  the  petitioners reference  was No. 8 of 1970. Similarly the Ext. D-1 to  D-6 also pertained to small plots of land out of land in  refer- ence  No.  1 of 1970. The High Court rightly held  that  the Exts. P-1, P-2, P-3 and P-8 and the sale deeds Exts. D-1  to D-6  furnished  a  more reliable data for  working  out  the market value. If those lands were the urban developed  house site  lands, their prices would have reflected the same.  It

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cannot,  therefore be said that High Court was in  error  in taking  the above Exts. into consideration. However,  poten- tial  value was not separately considered. Exts.  P-1,  P-2, P-3  and P-8 were agreements of sale executed on 29th  July, 1961 in respect of small parcels of land wherein the  vendor agreed to sell the land at that time at the rate of 14 annas per  sqr.  ft. to Rs. 1 per sqr. ft. It was  further  agreed that  the vendees would pay development charges at the  rate of 4 annas per sqr. ft. The vendor and the respective  vend- ees  were examined- It should be noted that the  Exts.  were agreements  to sell and not sales. The High Court  observed. that the idea behind those transactions was that the  vendor would  apply to the revenue authority for diversion and  the town planning authority for sanction of lay-out plan and the sale  deeds would be executed after the land was  developed. The High Court also noted that 916 there was nothing to show that the agreements were  prepared only to be used later as evidence of market value. In Decem- ber 1960 Phool Chand Gupta applied for diversion of his land to  the Sub-Divisional Officer. In January 1961  application was also made to the Town Planning Authority for sanction of the  lay-out plan but in the meantime the land was  notified for acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act sometimes  in 1962 and Phool Chand Gupta tried to extricate his land  from acquisition  which,  however, did not  materialise  and,  as already  noted, on 30.4.65 the instant notification  to  ac- quire under Section 68 of the Act was issued. Rejecting  the contention that the agreements were spurious, the High Court observed that the very fact that applications were made  for diversion and for sanction of lay-out plan went to show that the owner was interested in the development in the land  and in  selling it after dividing it into plots. Thus, the  High Court, rightly took into consideration the above Exts, which pertained to a part of the acquired land of 152 acres.     The High Court also considered the sale deeds Exts.  D-1 to  D-6 which pertained to small plots of lands out of  land in reference No. 1 of 1970. Those sale deeds were registered in 1966-67, but the agreements to sale were entered into  in 1959-62.  The  respective purchasers and  the  vendors  were examined. The market value on the basis of Ext. D-2 made  in the  sale  deed of 1962 selling only to 12.50 sqr.  ft.  for Rs.260 which worked out to Rs.8712 per acre. The High  Court did not say that these Exts. were rejected. By Ext. P-5, P-6 and  P-32  small parcels of land, at Kumharpura  were  sold. Kumharpura  was noted to be two to three furlongs away  from the acquired land. The market rate according to these  Exts. ranged  from  Rs. 1.88 to 2.34 per sqr. ft. The  High  Court observed  that these sales could not be a useful  guide  for determining the market value of land acquired. We are of the view that compared to Exts. P-1, P-2, P-3 and P-8 Exts.  P-5 and P-6 and P-32 were less indicative of the market value of the acquired land. We feel that the appellant should have no grievance  for  rejection of these sales of  Kumharpura.  We find  force in the contention of Dr. Singhvi that  potential value was not taken into account in this case to the  extent it should have been done. From the award dated 25.11.1972 it appears  that  the  acquired land was  situated  at  Village Nissatpura,  within  Corporation limits of Bhopal  Town  and consisting of Khasra No. 190/ 73, 136/74, 178/74, 135/75-76, the total area being 12.62 acres. The High Court found  that the land was bounded on three sides by three roads:  towards the  eastern side by Berasia road; towards the western  side by Sultania road; and towards the northern side by  P.G.B.T. College Road. Southern boundary of the land was a Nala.  The

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High 917 Court  also noticed that the land abutted to roads,  namely, Berasia road and P.G.B.T. College road and the claimant  had a house on the land and that the claimant had stated that he had  obtained  water  and electricity  connection  from  the Corporation  and the electricity Board.: 7.60 acres of  land out of 12.62 acres had been diverted and the land was even.     At  paragraph  14 of the special leave  petition  it  is stated that the land is approachable from two different  and important  localities  of Bhopal Town.  From  Bajaria  Chowk Shahjanabad, a road, called Sultania Infantry road, proceeds Military Lines called Sultania Infantry lines. On both sides of  this  road,  there is the thickly  habited  locality  of Shahjahanabad,  till about two furlongs. Slightly  ahead  is the enterance porch gate of the Military lines. Just  before the  gate, a tarred road bifurcates on the right  hand  side and it enters the acquired  land of Swatantra Kumar Ref. No. 1/70.  This tarred road was constructed by the  Trust  after acquisition  of the lands. It goes on all sides  of  village Jamalpura, which is surrounded on all sides by the lands  of Ref. No. 1/70. A part of land of Ref. No. 1/70 was developed after acquisition, and the tarred road reaches the developed plots.  We  have to note that such detail evidence  was  not there  before  the Tribunal and no  benefit  of  development pursuant  to  and after the acquisition can  be  taken  into consideration.  Even so, from the map and  juxtaposition  we have  no  doubt that the acquired  land  had  potentialities which deserved to be counted.     In  U.P. Government v.H.S. Gupta, A.I.R. 1957  S.C.  202 where in computing compensation for acquisition of an estate outside  the Municipal area the High Court had  given  valid and  weighty  reasons for adopting the  principle  that  the valuation  should be on plot-wise though there  was  certain advantages  in computing the value at the block  rate  where vast area of land was acquired, this Court held that in  the circumstances of that case the proper mode of valuation  was plot rate basis. In the instant case the application of  the principle  that  if  the land has to be sold  in  one  block consisting of a large area, the rate likely to be fixed  per sq.  ft. would be lower than if an equal extent of  land  is parcelled  out into smaller bits and sold to different  pur- chasers could not be found fault with. The price fetched for smaller extent of land similarly situated with the same kind of  advantages and drawbacks can also be applied to a  large area valued plot-wise instead of block-wise.     In  the instant case relying on Exts. P-1, P-2, P-3  and P˜8 and considering the fact that applications were made for diversion and for sanction of a lay-out plan the High  Court found that it went to show that the owner was interested  in developing the land and in selling it by 918 dividing  it into plots. The lowest rate of price  in  these agreements  was  14 annas per sqr. ft.  and  the  agreements mentioned  that  4 annas per sqr. ft. Would  be  needed  for developing  the  land.  This charge was to be  paid  by  the purchaser.  So the price of developed land would be Rs.  1/2 per  sqr.  ft. The evidence of M.P. Jain  (D.W.  9),  Senior Draftsman  of  the Improvement Trust went to show  that  ex- penses for improvement of land ranged from Rs. 1.50 to 2 per sqr.  ft. The statement of Shri Jain was recorded  in  1972. Making some allowance for the increase in the rate the  High Court  considered it proper to hold that in 1965  when  this land  was  acquired the charges for improvement  would  have worked at 75 paise (12 annas) per sqr. ft. It had also  come

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in  the evidence of Shri Jain that 50 to 60 per cent of  the land  had  to be left for roads, drainage,  gardens,  school etc.  and it was only then that the lay-out plan  was  sanc- tioned.   High  Court,  accordingly,  deducted   improvement charges at the rate of 12 annas per sqr. ft., and the market rate  for unimproved land in the light of  these  agreements worked  out  to 6 annas per sqr. ft. As 50% of the  land  at least  had to be left out for roads etc; so the market  rate of  3  annas per sqr. ft. was applied for the  entire  unde- veloped  land. Market rate thus worked out to  Rs.8,000  per acre  approximately.  However, the High  Court  awarded  Rs. 12,000  per  acre. There was an additional  factors  in  the calculation. Mr. Krishnamurthi therefore submitted that  the High  Court took into consideration the potential  value  of the land as a developed area but while making calculation it may  have  committed mistake. To our mind the error  was  in wholly overlooking the basic price agreed to be paid by  the purchaser  and the standard of development they  visualised. The  whole  of the basic price could not be expected  to  be eaten  up  by the development of the land  to  the  standard contemplated  by the vendor and purchaser. When the  willing vendor  has  agreed to sell land at 14 annas  per  sqr.  ft. after development and the development charge was to be  paid by  the willing purchaser, it could be reasonable to  deduct only  50% on account of the land to be set apart for  roads, drains etc. and not beyond that. Considering this aspect  of the  matter  and the potential value of the  land  as  urban developed area we are of the view that the compensation  may justly be enhanced by 1/6th to Rs. 14,000 per acre and we do so. We maintain 15% solatium but raise the rate of  interest to 9% on the enhanced compensation from today till  payment. We leave it open for the appellant to move for higher inter- est  and solatium if entitled by virtue of subsequent  judg- ment of this Court, if any. In  the result, this appeal is allowed as above. We make  no order  as to costs.  Y.L.                                  Appeal allowed. 919