http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 34  

PETITIONER: SUPREME COURT BAR ASSOCIATION

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       17/04/1998

BENCH: S.C. AGRAWAL, G.N. RAY, A.S. ANAND, S.P. BHARUCHA,S. RAJENDRA BABU

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T DR. ANAND. J.      In Re:  Vinay Chandra  Mishra, (1995)  2 SCC  584, this Court found the Contemner, an advocate, guilty of committing criminal contempt  of Court  for having  interfered with and "obstructing the  course of  justice by  trying to threaten, overawe  and   overbear  the   court  by   using  insulting, disrespectful  and  threatening  language",  While  awarding punishment, keeping  in view the gravity of the contumacious conduct of the contemner, the Court said:           " The  facts and circumstances      of the  Present  Case  justify  our      invoking the  power  under  Article      129 read  with Article  142 of  the      Constitution  to   award   to   the      contemner a  suspended sentence  of      imprisonment     together      with      suspension of  his practice  as and      advocate  in  the  manner  directed      herein. We accordingly sentence the      contemner for  his  conviction  for      the   offence   of   the   criminal      contempt as under:           (a)   The    contemner   Vinay      Chandra Mishra  is hereby sentenced      to undergo  simple imprisonment for      a period  of six weeks. However, in      the circumstances  of the case, the      sentence will  remain suspended for      a period  of four  years and may be      activated in  case the contemner is      convicted for  any other offence of      contempt of  court within  the said      period; and           (b) The  contemner shall stand      suspended  from  practising  as  an      advocate  fro  a  period  of  three      years   from    today   with    the      consequence that all held by him in      his capacity  as an advocate, shall

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 34  

    stand vacated by him forthwith.      Aggrieved by  the direction  that the  "Contemner shall stand suspended  from practising as an Advocate for a period of three  years" issued  by this  Court by  invoking  powers under Articles  129 and 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court Bar  Association, through  its Honorary Secretary, has filed this  petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, seeking the following relief:           " Issue  and appropriate writ,      direction,     or      declaration,      declaring  that   the  disciplinary      committees of  the Bar Councils set      up under  the Advocates  Act, 1961,      alone have  exclusive  jurisdiction      to  inquire  into  and  suspend  or      debar an  advocate from  practising      law  for   professional  or   other      misconduct,    arising    out    of      punishment imposed  for contempt of      court  or   otherwise  and  further      declare that  the Supreme  Court of      India or any High Court in exercise      of its inherent jurisdiction has no      such original  jurisdiction,  power      or   authority   in   that   regard      notwithstanding the  contrary  view      held  by   this  Hon’ble  Court  in      Contempt Petition  (Crl.) No.  3 of      1994 dated 10.3.1995." On 21.3.1995,  while issuing  Rule  in  the  writ  petition, following order was made by the Division Bench:           " The question which arises is      whether the  Supreme Court of India      can  while  dealing  with  Contempt      Proceedings  exercise  power  under      Article 129  of the Constitution or      under Article 129 read with Article      142 of  the Constitution  or  under      Article 142 of the Constitution can      debar  a   practicing  lawyer  from      carrying on  his  profession  as  a      lawyer for  any period  whatsoever,      We direct  notice to  issue on  the      Attorney General  of India  and  on      the respondents herein. Notice will      also issue  on the  application for      interim stay.  Having regarding  to      the  importance  of  the  aforesaid      question  we  further  direct  that      this petition  be placed  before  a      Constitution Bench of this Court."      That is  how this  Writ petition has been placed before this Constitution Bench.      The only question which we are called upon to decide in this petition  is whether  the  punishment  for  established contempt of  Court committed  by  an  Advocate  can  include punishment to  debar the concerned advocate from practice by suspending his  licence (sanad)  for a  specified period, in exercise of  its powers  under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India.      Dealing with this issue, the three judge Bench in vinay Chandra Mishra’s case (Supra), opined:           "The  question   now  is  what      punishment should  be meted  out to      the  contemner.   We  have  already

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 34  

    discussed the contempt jurisdiction      of this  Court under Article 129 of      the Constitution. That jurisdiction      is independent of the statutory law      of contempt  enacted by  Parliament      under Entry 77 of List I of Seventh      Schedule of  the Constitution.  The      jurisdiction of  this Court,  under      Article 129  is  sui  generis.  The      jurisdiction to  take cognizance of      the contempt  as well  as to  award      punishment     for     it     being      constitutional,   it    cannot   be      controlled by any statute. Neither,      therefore, the  Contempt of  Courts      Act, 1971  nor the  Advocates  Act,      1981 can be pressed into service to      restrict the said jurisdiction.      The Court  repelled the arguments advanced on behalf of the contemner,  the U.P.  Bar Association  and the  U.P. Bar Council,  that   the  Court   cannot  while  publishing  the contemner  with  any  of  the  "traditional"  or  "accepted" punishments  for  contempt,  also  suspend  his  licence  to practice as  an advocate.  Since that  power is specifically entrusted by  the Advocates  Act, 1961  to the  disciplinary committees of  the State  Bar Council and/or the Bar Council of India. The Bench opined:           What    is     further,    the      jurisdiction  and  powers  of  this      Court under  Article 142  which are      supplementary  in  nature  and  are      provided to  do complete justice in      any matter,  are independent of the      jurisdiction  and  powers  of  this      Court  under   Article  129   which      cannot be  trammeled in  any way by      any statutory  provision  including      the provisions of the Advocates Act      or the contempt jurisdiction of the      court including  of this  Court and      the contempt  of Courts  Act,  1971      being a  statute  cannot    denude,      restrict or  limit  the  powers  of      this  Court   to  take  action  for      contempt under Article 129.      Mr. Kapil  Sibal, learned  senior counsel appearing for the Supreme  Court Bar  Association, and  Dr. Rajiv  Dhawan, senior advocate  appearing for  the Bar  Council of U.P. and Bar Council  of India  assailed the correctness of the above findings and  submitted that  powers conferred on this Court by Article  142, though  very wide in their aptitude, can be exercised only  to "do complete justice in any case or cause pending before  it "  and since   the issue of ’professional misconduct’ is not the subject matter of "any cause" pending before this  court while  dealing with a case of contempt of court, it  could not make any order either under Article 142 or 129  to suspend the licence of an advocate contemner, for which  punishment,  statutory  provisions  otherwise  exist. According to  the learned  counsel, a  court of record under Article 129  of the  Constitution does not have any power to suspend the  licence of a lawyer to practice because that is not a punishment which can be imposed under its jurisdiction to punish  for contempt of Court and that Article 142 of the Constitution cannot  also be  pressed into  aid to  make  an order which  has the  effect of assuming "jurisdiction which

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 34  

expressly vests in another statutory  body constituted under the Advocates  Act,  1961.  The  learned  Solicitor  General submitted that  under Article  129 read  with Article 142 of the  Constitution,   this  Court   can  neither   create   a "jurisdiction" nor  created  a  "punishment"  not  otherwise permitted by  law and  that since  the power  to  punish  an advocate (for  "professional misconduct")  by suspending his licence vests  exclusively in  a statutory  body constituted under the  Advocates Act,  this  Court  cannot  assume  that jurisdiction under  Article 142 or 129 or even under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961.      To appreciate the submissions raised at the bar, let us first notice Article 129 of the Constitution, it reads:      " 129.  Supreme Court to be a court      of record.-      The Supreme  Court shall be a court      of record  and shall  have all  the      power of such a court including the      power of  punish  for  contempt  of      itself".      The Article on its plain language vests this Court with all the  powers of  a court of record including the power to punish for contempt of itself.      The expression  Court of Record has not been defined in the Constitution of India. Article 129 however, declares the Supreme Court  to be  a Court  of Record,  while Article 216 declares a High Court also to be a Court of Record.      A court  of record is a court, the records of which are admitted to  be of  evidentiary value  and  are  not  to  be questioned when  produced before  any court.  The power that courts of  record enjoy  to punish for contempt is a part of their inherent  jurisdiction and  is essential to enable the courts to  administer justice according to law in a regular, orderly and  effective manner  and to  uphold the majesty of law and  prevent interference  in the  due administration of justice.      According to  Jowitt, Dictionary  of English Law, First Edition (p. 526) a court of record has been defined as:      " A Court whereof the acts and judicial proceedings are      enrolled for  a perpetual  memory  and  testimony,  and      which has  power to  fine and  imprison for contempt of      its authority.      Wharton’s Law Lexicon, explains a court of record as:-           "  Record,  courts  of,  those      whose judicial acts and proceedings      are enrolled  on parchment,  for  a      perpetual memorial  and  testimony;      which rolls  are called the Records      of the Courts, and are of such high      and  supereminent   authority  that      their truth  is not to be called in      question. Courts  of Record  are of      two   classes    -   Superior   and      Inferior. Superior Courts of Record      include the  House  of  Lords,  the      judicial Committee,  the  Court  of      Appeal, the  High Court,  and a few      others.  The   Mayor’s   Court   of      London,   the    Country    Courts,      Coroner’s  Courts,  and  other  are      Inferior Courts , Coroner’s Courts,      and  other   are  Inferior  Courts,      Coroner’s  Courts,  and  other  are      Inferior Courts of Record, of which      the Country  Courts  are  the  most

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 34  

    important. Every  superior court of      record has  authority to  fine  and      imprison  for   contempt   of   its      authority;  an  inferior  court  of      record   can    only   commit   for      contempts committed in open courts,      in facie curice."                     (Emphasis Provided)      Nigel Lowe  and Brenda  Sufrin in their treatise on the Law of  Contempt (Third  Edition) (Butterworths 1996), while dealing with  the jurisdiction  and powers  of a  Courts  of Record in respect of criminal contempt say:      "  The   contempt  jurisdiction  of      courts  of  record  forms  part  of      their inherent jurisdiction.           The  power   that  courts   of      record enjoy to punish contempts is      part     of      their     inherent      jurisdiction. The  juridical  basis      of the  inherent  jurisdiction  has      been well described by Master Jacob      as being:           ’the    authority    of    the      judiciary to uphold, to protect and      to fulfil  the judicial function of      administering justice  according to      law  in   a  regular,  orderly  and      effective manner.’           Such a  power is  not  derived      from statute  nor  truly  from  the      common law  but instead  flows from      the very  concept  of  a  court  of      law."           ----------------           All courts  of record  have an      inherent  jurisdiction   to  punish      contempts committed  in their  face      but the  inherent power  to  punish      contempts  committed   outside  the      court   resides    exclusively   in      superior courts of record.           ------------------------           Superior  Courts   of  records      have  an   inherent  superintendent      jurisdiction  to  punish  contempts      committed   in    connection   with      proceedings     before     inferior      courts."                          (emphasis ours)      Entry 77  of List  I of  the Seventh  Schedule  of  the Constitution provides for:      " Constitution,  organisation, jurisdiction  and powers      of  the  Supreme  Court  (including  contempt  of  such      Court), and the fees taken therein; persons entitled to      practice before the supreme Court."      Entry 14   III  of the  Seventh Schedule  provides  for legislation in respect of :      "Contempt of  Court, but  not including contempt of the      Supreme Court."      The language of entry 77 of List I and entry 14 of List III of the Seventh Schedule demonstrate that the legislative power of  the Parliament  and  of  the    State  legislature extends to  legislate with respect to matters connected with contempt of  court by  the Supreme  Court or the High Court, subject however,  to the qualification that such legislation

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 34  

cannot denude, abrogate or nullify, the power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt under Articles 129 or vest that power in some other Court.      Besides, Articles 129, the power to punish for contempt is also  vested in  the Supreme  court by  virtue of Article 142(2).      Article 142 of the Constitution reads:-      " 142.  Enforcement of  decrees and  orders of  Supreme      Court and  orders as  to  discovery,  etc.  -  (1)  The      Supreme Court  in the  exercise of its jurisdiction may      pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for      doing complete  justice in  any cause or matter pending      before, it,  and any  decree so passed or order so made      shall to  enforceable throughout the territory of India      in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law      made by  Parliament and, until provision in that behalf      is so  made, in  such manner  as the  President may  by      order prescribe.      (2) Subject  to the  provisions of any law made in this      behalf by  Parliament,  the  Supreme  Court  Shall,  as      respects the  whole of the territory of India, have all      and every  power to  make any  order for the purpose of      securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or      production of  any documents,  or the  investigation or      punishment of any contempt of itself.      It is,  thus, seen  that the  power of  this  court  in respect of  investigation  or  punishment  of  any  contempt including contempt  of itself, is expressly made ’subject to the provisions  of any  law  made  in  this  behalf  by  the parliament’ by  Article 142(2). However, the power to punish for contempt being inherent in a court of record, it follows that no  act of  parliament  can  take  away  that  inherent jurisdiction of  the Court  of Record to punish for contempt and the  Parliament’s power  of legislation  on the  subject cannot, therefore, be so exercised as to stultify the status and dignity  of the  Supreme Court  and/or the  High Courts, though such  a legislation  may serve  as a  guide  for  the determination of  the nature  of punishment which this court may impose  in the  case of established contempt. Parliament has not  enacted any  law dealing  with the  powers  of  the Supreme Court with regard to investigation and punishment of contempt of  itself. (We  shall refer  to Section 15 of t he Contempt of  Courts Act,  1971, later  on) and  this  Court, therefore exercises  the power to investigate and punish for contempt of  itself by  virtue of  the powers  vested in  it under Articles 129 and 142(2) of the Constitution of India.      The first  legislation to  deal with contempt of courts in this country was the contempt of courts Act, 1926. it was enacted with  a view  to define  and  limit  the  powers  of certain  courts   for  punishing  contempts  of  court.  The preamble to that Act stated:           " Whereas  doubts have  arisen      as to the powers of a High Court of      judicature to  punish  contempt  of      courts and  whereas it is expedient      to  resolve  these  doubts  and  to      define   and   limit   the   powers      exercisable  by   High  Courts  and      Chief Courts in punishing contempts      of Court:  It is  hereby enacted as      follows:"           Section 2 says :-           "Subject to  the provisions of      sub-section (3), the High Courts of      Judicature established  by  Letters

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 34  

    patent shall  have and exercise the      same   jurisdiction,   powers   and      authority in  accordance  with  the      same  procedure  and  practice,  in      respect  of   contempts  of  courts      subordinate to  them as  they  have      and   exercise    in   respect   of      contempts of themselves."      Since, the  Act was  enacted with  a  view  to  ’remove doubts about  the powers  of the  High Court  to Punish  for contempt’, it made no distinction between one Letters Patent High Court and another though it did distinguish between the Letter Patent  High Courts  and the Chief Courts. The doubt, as a  result of  conflict of  judicial opinion,  whether the High Court punish for contempt of a court subordinate to it, was removed  by enactment  of Section  2 of the Act (supra). The Contempt  of  Courts  Act,  1926  was  replaced  by  the contempt  of  Courts  act,  1952.  The  1952  Act  made  the significant  departures   from  the  1926  Act,  First,  the expression "High Court" was defined to include the courts of judicial Commissioner  which  had  been  excluded  from  the purview of  the 1926  Act and  secondly,  the  High  Courts, including the  Court of Judicial commissioner which had been excluded from  the purview of the 1920 Act and Secondly, the High Courts  including the  court of  Judicial  Commissioner which had been excluded from the purview of the 1926 Act and secondly, the High Courts, including the court of a judicial Commissioner, were  conferred jurisdiction  to inquire  into and try  contempt of  itself or  if any court subordinate to it. irrespective of whether the contempt was alleged to have been committed  within of  outside the  local limits  of its jurisdiction and  irrespective of whether the person alleged to be  guilty of  committing contempt  was within or outside such limits.  In the  matter of imposition of punishment for contempt of courts, Section 4 of the 1952 Act Provided,           " Sec.4  Limit  of  punishment      for  contempt  of  Court.  save  as      otherwise expressly provided by any      law for  the time being in force. A      contempt of  court may  be punished      with simple imprisonment for a term      which may  extend to six months, or      with fine  which may  extend to two      thousand rupees, or with both:           Provided that  the accused may      be  discharged  or  the  punishment      awarded may  be remitted on apology      being made  to the  satisfaction of      the Court:           Provided  further   that   not      withstanding   anything   elsewhere      contained in  any law  for the time      being in force, no High Court shall      impose a sentence in excess of that      specified in  this Section  for any      contempt  either   in  respect   of      itself or of a court subordinate to      it."      Thus,  under  the  existing  legislation  dealing  with contempt of  court, the  High Courts  and Chief  Courts were vested with  the  power  to  try  a  person  for  committing contempt  of   court  and  to  punish  him  for  established contempt. The  legislation itself  prescribed the nature and type, as  well as  the extent  of, punishment which could be imposed on  a contemner  by the  High Courts  or  the  Chief

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 34  

Courts. The  second proviso  to Section  4 of  the 1952  Act (supra) expressly restricted the powers of the Courts not to "impose any  sentence in  excess of what is specified in the section" for  any contempt  either of  itself or  of a court subordinate to it.      After the  Constitution of  India  was  promulgated  in 1950, it  appears that  on 1st  of April,  1960, a  Bill was introduced in  the Lok  Sabha ’to  consolidate and amend the law relating to contempt of Court’. The Bill was examined by the Government  which felt  that law relating to contempt of courts was  "uncertain, undefined  and  unsatisfactory"  and that in  the light  of the  constitutional changes which had taken place  in the  country, it  was advisable  to have  to entire law on the subject scrutinised by a special committee to be set up for the purpose. Pursuant to that decision, the Ministry of  Law on  July 29,  1961 set up a Committee under the Chairmanship  of Shri  H.N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor General of  India. The  Committee came to be known as Sanyal Committee and it was required:      (i) to  examine the  law relating to contempt of courts generally, and  in  particular,  the  law  relating  to  the procedure for the punishment thereof:      (ii) to  suggest amendments  therein  with  a  view  to clarifying and reforming the law wherever necessary; and      (iii) to  make recommendations, for codification of the law in the light of the examination made."      The committee  inter-alia opined that Parliament or the concerned legislature has the power to legislate in relation to the  substantive law of contempt of the Supreme Court and the High  Courts Subject  only to the qualification that the legislature cannot take away the powers of the Supreme Court or the  High Court,  as a  Court of  Record, to  punish  for contempt nor vest that power in some other court.      After the  submission of  the Sanyal Committee Reports, the contempt  of Courts  Act, 1952 was repealed and replaced by the contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which Act was enacted to "define and  limit the powers of certain courts in punishing contempt of  courts  and  to  regulate  their  procedure  in relation thereto".  It would be proper to notice some of the relevant provisions of the 1971 Act at this stage.      Section 2  (a), (b)  and (c)  of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 define contempt of court as follows:-           "2.  Definitions.  -  In  this      Act, unless  the context  otherwise      requires,-           (a) ’contempt  of court’ means      civil    contempt    or    criminal      contempt;           (b)  ’Civil   contempt’  means      willful    disobedience    to    an      judgment, decree, direction, order,      writ or other process of a court or      willful breach  of an  under taking      given to a court;           (c) ’criminal  contempt’ means      the publication  whether by  words,      spoken or  written, or by signs, or      by  visible   representations,   or      otherwise) of  any  matter  or  the      doing of  any other  act whatsoever      which-           (i) scandalises  or  tends  to      scandalise, or  lowers or  tends to      lower the  authority of  any court,      or

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 34  

         (ii) prejudices, or interferes      or tends to interfere with, the due      course of any judicial proceedings;      or           (iii) interferes  or tends  to      interfere  with   or  obstructs  or      tends     to      obstruct,     the      administration of  justice  in  any      other manner."           Section 10 provides :-           " Sec. 10. Power of High Court      to punish  contempts of subordinate      courts. -  Every High  Court  shall      have   and    exercise   the   same      jurisdiction, powers  ad authority,      in accordance  jurisdiction, powers      and authority,  in accordance  with      the same procedure and practice, in      respect  of   contempts  of  courts      subordinate to  it as  it  has  and      exercises in  respect of  contempts      of itself:           Provided that  no  High  Court      shall take cognizance of a contempt      alleged to  have been  committed in      respect of  a court  subordinate to      it  where   such  contempt   is  an      offence punishable under the Indian      Panel Code, 1860 (45 of 1860)."           The punishment  for committing      contempt of  court is  provided  in      Section 12  of the  1971 Act  which      reads:-           "12. Punishment  for  contempt      of court.  -(1) Save  as  otherwise      expressly provided  in this  Act or      in any  other law,  a  contempt  of      court may  be punished  with simple      imprisonment for  a term  which may      extend to  six months, or with fine      which may  extend to  two  thousand      rupees, or with both:           Provided that  the accused may      be  discharged  or  the  punishment      awarded my  be remitted  on apology      being made  to the  satisfaction of      the court.           Explanation.- An apology shall      not  be   rejected  merely  on  the      ground  that  it  is  qualified  or      conditional if the accused makes it      bona fide.           (2) Notwithstanding  any thing      contained in  any law  for the time      being  in  force,  no  court  shall      impose a sentence in excess of that      specified in  sub-section  (1)  for      any contempt  either in  respect of      itself or of a court subordinate to      it.           (3)  Notwithstanding  anything      contained in  this section, where a      person is  found guilty  of a civil      contempt,   the    court,   if   it      considers that a fine will not meet

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 34  

    the ends  of  justice  and  that  a      sentence   of    imprisonment    is      necessary,   shall,    instead   of      sentencing    him     to     simple      imprisonment,  direct  that  he  be      detained in a civil prison for such      period not  exceeding six months as      it may think fit.           (4)  Where  the  person  found      guilty  of  contempt  of  court  in      respect of any undertaking given to      a court  is a company, every person      who, at  the time  the contempt was      committed, was  in charge  of,  and      was responsible to, the company for      the conduct  of the business of the      company, as  well as  the  company,      shall be deemed to be guilty of the      contempt and  the punishment may be      enforced, with  the  leave  of  the      court, by  the detention  in  civil      prison of each such person:-           Provided     that      nothing      contained in this sub-section shall      render any  such person  liable  to      such punishment  if he  proves that      the contempt  was committed without      his knowledge  or that he exercised      all due  diligence to  prevent  its      commission.           (5)  Notwithstanding  anything      contained in sub-section (4), where      the contempt  of court  referred to      therein has  been  committed  by  a      company and  it is  proved that the      contempt has  been  committed  with      the consent or connivance of, or is      attributable to  any neglect on the      part  of,  any  director,  manager,      secretary or  other officer  of the      company,  such  director,  manager,      secretary or  other  officer  shall      also be  deemed to be guilty of the      contempt and  the punishment may be      enforced, with  the  leave  of  the      court, by  the detention  in  civil      prison of  such director,  manager,      secretary or other officer.           -------------------           -------------------      An analysis  of the  above provision  shows  that  sub- section (1)  of Section  12  provides  that  in  a  case  of established contempt, the contemner may be punished: (a)  with  simple  imprisonment  by  detention  in  a  civil      prison; or (b)  with fine, or (c)  with both. A careful  reading of  sub-section (2) of Section 12 reveals that the  Act places an embargo on the court not to impose a sentence in  excess of  the sentence  prescribed under  sub- section (1).  A close scrutiny of sub-section (3) of Section 12 demonstrates  that the  legislature intended  that in the case of  civil contempt  a sentence  of fine alone should be imposed except  where the  court considers  that the ends of justice make it necessary to pass a sentence of imprisonment

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 34  

also. Dealing with imposition of punishment under Section 12 (3) of  the Act,  in the  case of Smt. Pushpaben and another vs. Narandas  V. Badiani and another. (1979) 2 SCC 394, this Court opined:           "   A    close   and   careful      interpretation  of   the  extracted      section (Section  12(3)) leaves  no      room for doubt that the legislature      intended that  a sentence  of  fine      alone should  be imposed  in normal      circumstances.     The     statute,      however, confers  special power  on      the Court  to pass  a  sentence  of      imprisonment if it thinks that ends      of justice  so require. Thus before      a Court passes the extreme sentence      of  imprisonment,   it  must   give      special  reasons   after  a  proper      application  of  its  mind  that  a      sentence of  imprisonment along  is      called   for    in   a   particular      situation. Thus,  the  sentence  of      imprisonment is  an exception while      sentence of fine is the rule."      Section 10  of the  1971 Act like Section 2 of the 1926 Act and Section 4 of the 1952 Act recognises the power which a High  Court already  possesses as  a Court  of Record  for punishing for contempt of itself, which jurisdiction has now the sanction  of the  Constitution also by virtue of Article 215. The  Act, however, does not deal with the powers of the Supreme Court  to try  or punish  a contemner for committing contempt of  the Supreme  Court or the courts subordinate to it and  the constitutional  provision contained  in Articles 142(2) and  129 of  the Constitution  alone  deal  with  the subject.      In S.K.  Sarkar, Member,  Board of  Revenue vs.   Vinay chandra Misra, (1981) 1 SCC 436, this court opined:           "   Articles   129   and   215      preserve  all  the  powers  of  the      Supreme Court  and the  High Court,      respectively, as  a Court of Record      which include  the power  to punish      the contempt  of itself. As pointed      out by  this Court  in Mohd.  Ikram      Hussain v.  State of U.P. (AIR 1964      SC 1625), there are no curbs on the      power of  the High  Court to punish      for contempt of itself except those      contained in the Contempt of courts      Act. Articles  129 and  215 do  not      define  as   to  what   constitutes      contempt of  court. Parliament has,      by virtue  of the aforesaid entries      in List  I  and  List  III  of  the      Seventh Schedule,  Power to  define      and limit  the powers of the Courts      in punishing  contempt of court and      to  regulate   their  procedure  in      relation thereto.  Indeed, this  is      what is  stated in  the preamble of      the Act of 1971".                     (Emphasis supplied)      In Sukhdev  Singh v.  Hon’ble C.J.S.  Teja Singh & Ors. AIR 1954  SCR 454,  while recognising  that the power of the High Court  to institute proceedings for contempt and punish

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 34  

the contemner when found necessary is a special jurisdiction which is  inherent in all courts of Record, the Bench opined that "the  maximum punishment  is now limited to six month’s simple imprisonment  or a  fine  of  Rs.  2,000/-  or  both" because of the provision of Contempt of Courts Act.      In England, according to Halsbury’s laws of England 4th Edn. Para 97:           " There  is no statutory limit      to  the   length  of  the  term  of      imprisonment which  may be  imposed      for contempt  of court by the court      of  Appeal,  High  Court  or  Crown      Court.  Similarly   the   statutory      provisions    relating    to    the      suspension    of    sentences    of      imprisonment have no application to      committals for contempt.           Although there  is no limit to      the length of the term which may be      imposed, the  punishment should  be      commensurate to  the offence. Thus,      where contempt  is committed  owing      to a mistaken view of the rights of      the offender, the punishment, where      imprisonment is  deemed  necessary,      should be for a definite period and      should not be severe."           Paras 99  and 100  to  105  of      Halsbury’s Laws deal with the other      punishments which  may  be  imposed      for contempt of court.      "99. Fines  and security  for  good      behavior.  The  Court  may,  as  an      alternative  or   in  addition   to      committing a  contemner,  impose  a      fine or  require security  for good      behavior.           As    in     the    case    of      imprisonment,    there     is    no      statutory limit  to the amount of a      fine which the court can impose.      100. Other  remedies. As  a further      alternative to  ordering committal,      the court  may, in  its discretion,      adopt the  more lenient  course  of      granting an  injunction to restrain      repetition of  the act of contempt.      The court may also penalise a party      in contempt  by ordering him to pay      the costs of the application.      103. Fine.  The court  may,  as  an      alternative   to    committal    or      sequestration, impose  a  fine  for      civil contempt.           In assessing the amount of the      fine, account  should be  taken  of      the seriousness of the contempt and      damage done to the public interest.      104. Other remedies. The court may,      in its  own  discretion,  grant  an      injunction, in lieu of committal or      sequestration,  to   restrain   the      commission or repetition of a civil      contempt. The  court may in lieu of      any  other   penalty  require   the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 34  

    contemner to  pay the  costs of the      motion on a common fund basis.      105.  Costs.   The  costs   of   an      application for  committal  are  in      the discretion  of the  court,  and      should be  asked for on the hearing      of the  application. The respondent      can  as  a  general  rule  only  be      ordered to pay costs if he has been      guilty of  contempt. An  action  is      maintainable in  the Queen’s  Beach      Division to  enforce an  order made      in the chancery Division to pay the      costs of a motion for committal."                     (emphasis supplied)      Thus, the recognised and accepted punishments for civil or criminal  contempt of  court in  English Law,  which have been followed and accepted by the courts in this country and incorporated in the Indian law in so far as, civil contempt, is concerned are: i)   Sequestration of assets: ii)  fine; iii) committal to prison      The  object  of  punishment  being  both  curative  and corrective these coercions are meant to assist an individual complainant to  enforce his  remedy and  there  is  also  an element of public policy for punishing civil contempt, since the administration  of justice  would be  undermined if  the order of   any  court of  law  is  to  be  disregarded  with impunity. Under  some circumstances, compliance of the order may be  secured without  resort  to  coercion,  through  the contempt power. For example, disobedience of an order to pay a sum of money may be effectively countered by attaching the earnings of  the contemner.  In the  same manner, committing the person  of the defaulter to prison for failure to comply with an  order of  specific  performance  of  conveyance  of property, may  be met  also by  the court directing that the conveyance be completed by an appointed person. Disobedience of an undertaking may in the like manner be enforced through process other  than committal to prison as for example where the breach  of  undertaking  is  to  deliver  possession  of property in  a landlord tenant dispute. Apart from punishing the contemner  the Court  to maintain the Majesty of Law may direct the  police force  to  be  utilised  for  recover  of possession and burden the contemner with costs, exemplary or otherwise.      In so  far as  criminal contempt of court is concerned, which charge  is required  to be established like a criminal charge, it is punishable by (i)  fine; or (ii) by  fixed period of simple imprisonment or detention in a civil prison for a specified period; or (iii) both.      In deciding  whether a  contempt is  serious enough  to merit imprisonment,  the court  will take  into account  the likelihood  of   interference  with  the  administration  of justice and  the culpability  of the offender. The intention with which  the act  complained of  is done  is  a  material factor in  determining what  punishment, in  a  given  case, would be appropriate.      The nature  and types  of punishment  which a  court of record can  impose, in a case of established contempt, under the common  law have  now been  specifically incorporated in the contempt  of Courts  Act, 1971  in so  far as  the  High Courts  are  concerned  and  therefore  to  the  extent  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 34  

contempt of  Courts Act  1971 identifies the nature of types of  punishments   which  can  be  awarded  in  the  case  of established contempt,  it does not impinge upon the inherent powers of  the High  Court under  Article 215 either. No new type of punishment can be created or assumed. As already  noticed, the  parliament by  virtue of Entry 77, List I is competent to enact a law relating to the powers of the Supreme Court with regard to contempt of itself and such a law  may prescribe  the nature  of punishment which may be imposed on  a contemner  by  virtue  of  the  provisions  of Article 129 read with Article 142(2). Since, no such law has been enacted  by the  parliament, the  nature of  punishment prescribed, under  the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, may act as  a  guide  for  the  Supreme  Court  but  the  extent  of punishment as  prescribed under  that Act  can apply only to the High  Courts, because  the 1971  Act ipso facto does not deal with  the contempt  jurisdiction of  the Supreme Court, except that Section 15 of the Act prescribes procedural mode for taking  cognizance of  criminal contempt  by the supreme Court also.  Section  15,  however,  is  not  a  substantive provision conferring  contempt jurisdiction. The judgment in Sukhdev Singh’s  case  (supra)  as  regards  the  extent  of "maximum punishment"  which can  be imposed upon a contemner must, therefore,  be construed as dealing with the powers of the High  Courts only  and not of this Court in that behalf. We are,  therefore, doubtful of the validity of the argument of  the   learned  solicitor  General  that  the  extent  of punishment which the supreme Court can impose in exercise of its inherent  powers to punish for contempt of itself and/or of subordinate  courts  can  also  be  only  to  the  extent prescribed under  the contempt  of  Courts  Act,  1971.  We, however, do  not express  any final opinion on that question since that  issue strictly  speaking, does not arise for our decision  in   this  case.   The  question   regarding   the restriction or limitation on the extent of punishment, which this  Court   may  award   while  exercising   its  contempt jurisdiction may  be decided  in  a  proper  case,  when  so raised.      Suspending the  licence to practice of any professional like a lawyer, doctor, chartered accountant etc. When such a professional is  found  guilty  of  committing  contempt  of court, for  any specified  period, is  not a  recognised  or accepted punishment which a court of record either under the common law  or under  the statutory  law can  impose,  on  a contemner, in  addition  to  any  of  the  other  recognised punishments.      The suspension  of an  Advocate from  practice and  his removal  from   the  State   roll  of   advocates  are  both punishments specifically  provided for  under the  Advocates Act,  1961,  for  proven  "professional  misconduct’  of  an advocate. While  exercising its  contempt jurisdiction under Article 129,  the only  cause or matter before this Court is regarding commission of contempt of court. There is no cause of professional  misconduct,  properly  so  called,  pending before the  Court. This Court, therefore, in exercise of its jurisdiction  under   Article  129   cannot  take  over  the jurisdiction  of  the  disciplinary  committee  of  the  Bar Council of  the State  or the Bar Council of India to punish an advocate  by suspending his licence, which punishment can only be imposed after a finding of ’professional misconduct’ is recorded in the manner prescribed under the Advocates Act and the Rules framed thereunder.      When this  Court is  seized of  a matter of contempt of court by  an advocate,  there is  no "case, cause or matter" before  the   Supreme  Court   regarding  his  "professional

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 34  

misconduct" even  though, in  a given  a case,  the contempt committed by  an advocate may also amount to an abuse of the privilege granted to an advocate by virtue of the licence to practice law  but no  issue relating  to his suspension from practice is  the subject  matter of  the case. The powers of this Court,  under Article  129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution, being supplementary powers have "to be used in exercise  of   its   jurisdiction"   in   the   case   under consideration by this Court. Moreover, a case of contempt of court is  not stricto  senso a cause or a matter between the parties inter  se. It  is a matter between the court and the contemner.  It  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  tried  as  an adversarial  litigation.   The  party,   which  brings   the contumacious conduct  of the  contemner to the notice of the court, whether a private person or the subordinate court, is only an informant and does not have the status of a litigant in the contempt of Court case.      The contempt  of court  is a special jurisdiction to be exercised  sparingly  and  with  caution,  whenever  an  act adversely effects  the administration  of justice  or  which tends  to  impede  its  course  or  tends  to  shake  public confidence in  the judicial  institutions. This jurisdiction may also  be exercised  when the act complained of adversely effects the  Majesty of  Law or  dignity of  the courts. The purpose of  contempt jurisdiction  is to  uphold the majesty and dignity  of the  Courts of law. It is an unusual type of jurisdiction combining "the jury, the judge and the hangman" and it  is so because the court is not adjudicating upon any claim between  litigating parties.  This jurisdiction is not exercised to  protect the dignity of an individual judge but to  protect   the  administration   of  justice  from  being maligned. In  the general  interest of  the community  it is imperative that  the authority   of  courts  should  not  be imperiled and  there should be no unjustifiable interference in the administration of justice. It is a matter between the court and  the contemner and third parties cannot intervene. it  is   exercised  in  a  summary  manner  in  aid  of  the administration of  justice,  the  majesty  of  law  and  the dignity of  the courts.  No such  act can be permitted which may have  the tendency to shake the public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the administration of justice.      The power  of the  Supreme Court to punish for contempt of court,  though quite  wide, is  yet limited and cannot be expanded to  include  the  power  to  determine  whether  an advocate is  also guilty  of "Professional  misconduct" in a summary manner,  giving a go bye to the procedure prescribed under the  Advocates Act.  The power  to do complete justice under Article  142 is  in a   way,  corrective power,  which gives preference to equity over law but it cannot be used to deprive a  professional lawyer  of the due process contained in the  Advocates Act  1961 by  suspending  his  licence  to practice in  a summary  manner, while dealing with a case of contempt of court.      In Re:  V.C. Mishra’s  case (supra), while imposing the punishment of  suspended simple  imprisonment, the Bench, as already noticed,  punished the  contemner also by suspending his licence  to practice  as an  advocate  for  a  specified period. The Bench dealing with that aspect opined:      It is  not disputed that suspension      of the  advocate from  practice and      his removal  from the State roll of      advocates  are   both  punishments.      There   is    no   restriction   or      limitation   on   the   nature   of      punishment  that   this  Court  may

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 34  

    award while exercising its contempt      jurisdiction    and     the    said      punishments can  be the punishments      the   Court    may   impose   while      exercising the said jurisdiction.                ( Emphasis supplied)      In taking this view, the Bench relied upon Articles 129 and 142  of the  Constitution  besides  Section  38  of  the Advocates Act, 1961. The Bench observed:           " Secondly, it would also mean      that for  any act  of  contempt  of      court, if  it also happens to be an      act  of   professional   misconduct      under  the  Bar  Council  of  India      Rules, the  courts  including  this      Court, will  have no  power to take      action  since   the  Advocates  Act      confers exclusive  power for taking      action  for  such  conduct  on  the      disciplinary  committees   of   the      State  Bar   Council  and  the  Bar      Council of  India, as  the case may      be. Such  a proposition  of law  on      the face  of it  observes rejection      for  the  simple  reason  that  the      disciplinary  jurisdiction  of  the      State  Bar   council  and  the  Bar      Council of India to take action for      professional     misconduct      is      different from  the jurisdiction of      the Courts  to take  action against      the advocates  for the  contempt of      Court. The  said  jurisdiction  co-      exist court.  The said jurisdiction      co-exist   "dependently   of   each      other. The  action taken  under one      jurisdiction does not bar an action      under the other jurisdiction.           The   contention    is    also      misplaced  for   year  another  and      equally,  if  not  more,  important      reason.   In    the    matter    of      disciplinary  under  the  Advocates      Act, this  Court is  constituted as      the fina’ Appellate authority under      Section 38  of the  Act as  pointed      out earlier.  In that capacity this      court  can   impose  any   of   the      punishments  mentioned  in  Section      35(3) of  the Act including that of      removal of the name of the Advocate      from  the   State   roll   and   of      suspending him  from  practice.  If      that be  so, there is no reason why      his  court   while  exercising  its      contempt jurisdiction under Article      129 read  with Article  142  cannot      impose any of the said punishments.      The punishments so imposed will not      only be  not against the provisions      of any  statute, but  in conformity      with the  substantive provisions of      the advocates  Act and  for conduct      which  is   both   a   professional      misconduct as  well as the contempt

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 34  

    of   Court.   The   argument   has,      therefore, to be rejected."                     (Emphasis supplied)      These observations,  as we  shall presently demonstrate and we say so with utmost respect, are too widely stated and do not  bear closer  scrutiny. After  recognising  that  the disciplinary jurisdiction  of the  State Bar Council and the Bar  Council  of  India  to  take  action  for  professional misconduct is  different from the jurisdiction of the courts to take  action against  the advocates  for the  contempt of court,  how   could  the   court  invest   itself  with  the jurisdiction  of  the  disciplinary  committee  of  the  Bar Council to  punish the  concerned Advocate for "professional misconduct"  in  addition  to  imposing  the  punishment  of suspended sentence  of imprisonment  for committing contempt of court.      The plenary  powers of  this court under Article 142 of the  Constitution   are  inherent   in  the  court  and  are complementary  to   those  powers   which  are  specifically conferred on  the court  by various  statutes though are not limited  by   those  statutes.   These  powers   also  exist independent of  the statutes  with a  view  to  do  complete justice  between  the  parties.  These  powers  also  exists independent of  the statutes  with a  view  to  do  complete justice between  the parties.  These powers are of very wide amplitude and  are in  the nature  of supplementary  powers. This power,  exists as  a separate  and independent basis of jurisdiction, apart  from the  statutes. It  stands upon the foundation, and  the basis  for its exercise may be put on a different  and   perhaps  even  wider  footing,  to  prevent injustice in  the process  of litigation  and to do complete justice between  the parties.  This plenary jurisdiction is, thus, the residual source of power which this Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so and in  particular to  ensure  the  observance  of  the  due process of  law, to do complete justice between the parties. This plenary  jurisdiction is,  thus, the residual source of power which  this court  may draw upon as necessary whenever it is  just and  equitable to  do so  and in  particular  to ensure the  observance of  the due  process of  law,  to  do complete justice  between the  parties, while  administering justice according  to law.  There is  no doubt that it is an indispensable adjunct  to all  other powers and is free from the restraint  of jurisdiction  and operates  as a  valuable weapon in  the hands  of the  court to  prevent "clogging or obstruction of the stream of justice". It, however, needs to be remembered  that the  powers conferred  on the  court  by Article 142  being curative in nature cannot be construed as powers which  authorise the  court to ignore the substantive rights of  a litigant  while dealing  with a  cause  pending before  it.   this  power   cannot  be  used  to  "supplant" substantive law  applicable  to  the  case  or  cause  under consideration of the court. Article 142, even with the width of its  amplitude, cannot  be used  to build  a new  edifice where none  existed earlier,  by ignoring  express statutory provisions dealing  with a  subject and  thereby to  achieve something indirectly  which  cannot  be  achieved  directly. Punishing  a   contemner  advocate,  while  dealing  with  a contempt  of   court  case  by  suspending  his  licence  to practice, a  power otherwise  statutorily available  only to the Bar  Council of  India, on the ground that the contemner is also  an advocate,  is,  therefore,  not  permissible  in exercise  of   the  jurisdiction   under  Article  142.  The construction of Article 142 must be functionally informed by the salutary  purpose of  the Article  viz. to  do  complete

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 18 of 34  

justice between  the parties.  It cannot  be  otherwise.  As already  noticed  in  a  case  of  contempt  of  court,  the contemner and  the court  cannot be  said to  be  litigating parties.      The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to make such order as is necessary for doing  complete justice  " between  the parties  in  any cause or  matter pending  before it." The very nature of the power must  lead the  court to  set limits for itself within which to  exercise those  powers and  ordinarily  it  cannot disregard a  statutory provision  covering a subject, except perhaps to  balance the  equities  between  the  conflicting claims of the litgating parties by "ironing out the creases" in a  cause or  matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of  restricted jurisdiction  of only dispute settling. it is  well recognised  and established  that this court has always been  a law  maker and its role travels beyond merely dispute settling.  It is  a "problem  solver in the nebulous areas". (See. K. Verraswami vs. Union of India (1991 (3) SCC 655) but  the substantive  statutory provisions dealing with the subject  matter of  a given  case, cannot  be altogether ignored by  this court,  while making an order under Article 142. Indeed,  these constitutional  powers can  not, in  any way, be  controlled by  any statutory  provisions but at the same time  these powers  are not  meant to be exercised when their exercise  may come  directly in conflict with what has been expressly  provided for  in statute  dealing  expressly with the subject.      In Bonkya  @ B.S.  Mane & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra (1995 (6) SCC 447) a bench of this court observed.      " The amplitude of powers available      to this  Court under Article 142 of      the  Constitution   of   India   is      normally speaking  not  conditioned      by any  statutory provision  but it      cannot be  lost sight  of that this      Court exercises  jurisdiction under      Article  142  of  the  Constitution      with a  view to  do justice between      the parties but not in disregard of      the relevant statutory provisions."      Dealing with  the powers  of this  court under  Article 142, in  Prem Chand  Garg  vs.  Excise  Commissioner,  U.P., Allahabad, (1963)  Supp. 1.  S.C.R. 885)  it was said by the Constitution Bench:           " In  this connection,  it may      be pertinent  to point out that the      wide powers which are given to this      court for  doing  complete  justice      between the parties, can be used by      this court  for instance, in adding      parties to  the proceedings pending      before   it,    or   in   admitting      additional    evidence,    or    in      remanding the  case, or in allowing      a new  point to  be taken  for  the      first time.  It is  plain  that  in      exercise these  and  similar  other      powers, this  Court  would  not  be      bound by the relevant provisions of      procedure if it is satisfied that a      departure from  the said  procedure      is necessary to do complete justice      between the parties.           That takes  us to  the  second

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 19 of 34  

    argument urged  by  the  Solicitor-      General that  Art. 142  and Art. 32      should   be   reconciled   by   the      adoption of  the rule of harmonious      construction. In  this  connection,      we  ought  to  bear  in  mind  that      though the powers conferred on this      Court by Art. 142(1) are very wide,      and the  same can  be exercised for      doing complete justice in any case,      as we  have already  observed  this      Court cannot even under Art. 142(1)      make an  order plainly inconsistent      with    the    express    statutory      provisions of substantive law, much      less,   inconsistent    with    any      Constitutional   provision.   There      can,  therefore   be  no   conflict      between Art. 142(1) and Art. 32. In      the case  of K.M.  Nanavati v.  The      State of  Bombay  (1961)  1  S.C.R.      497) on which the solicitor-General      relies,  it   was   conceded,   and      rightly,  that  under  Art.  142(1)      this Court  had the  power to grant      bail in  cases brought  before  it,      and  so,   there  was  obviously  a      conflict between  the power  vested      in  this   court  under   the  said      Article  and  that  vested  in  the      Governor of  the State  under  Art.      161. The  possibility of a conflict      between these  powers  necessitated      the  application  of  the  rule  of      harmonious construction.  The  said      rule can have no application of the      present case,  because  on  a  fair      construction of  Art. 142(1),  this      Court has  no power to circumscribe      the  fundamental  right  guaranteed      under Art. 32. The existence of the      said power  is itself  in  dispute,      and  so,  the  present  is  clearly      distinguishable from  the  case  of      K.M. Nanavati."                          (Emphasis ours)      In Re:  Vinay Chandra  Mishra’s case (supra), the three the three  judge Bench  did notice  the observations in Prem Chand Garg’s case (supra) but opined:           " In  view of the observations      of the latter Constitution Bench on      the point, the observations made by      the majority  in Prem  Chand Garg’s      case (supra)  are no  longer a good      law. This  is also  pointed out  by      this Court  in the case of Mohammed      Anis Vs.  union  of  India  &  Ors.      (1994   (Supp.1)    SCC   145)   by      referring to the decisions of Delhi      judicial  Services   Vs.  State  of      Gujarat (supra)  and Union  Carbide      Corporation  Vs.   Union  of  India      (supra) by observing that statutory      provisions  cannot   override   the      constitutional    provisions    and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 20 of 34  

    Article     142(1)      being     a      constitutional power  it cannot  be      limited  or   conditioned  by   any      statutory provision.  The Court has      then   observed    that   it    is,      therefore, clear  that the power of      the Apex Court under Article 142(1)      of  the   Constitution  Cannot   be      diluted by statutory provisions and      the said  position in  law  is  now      well settled  by  the  Constitution      Bench decision  in Union  Carbide’s      case (supra)."                     (Emphasis supplied) Commenting upon  the observations  in Prem Chand Garg’s case (supra) the Bench further opined:           " Apart  from  the  fact  that      these observations  are  made  with      reference to  the  powers  of  this      Court under  Article 142  which are      in  the   nature  of  supplementary      powers and  not with  reference  to      this Court’s  power  under  Article      129, the said observation have been      explained  by  this  Court  in  its      latter decisions  in Delhi Judicial      services Association  v.  State  of      Gujarat (supra)  and Union  Carbide      corporation  v.   Union  of   India      (1991) 4  SCC 574). In paragraph 51      of  the  former  decision,  it  has      been, with respect, rightly pointed      out that the said observations were      made in  the context of fundamental      rights. Those  observations have no      bearing on  the present  issue.  No      doubt,  it   was  further  observed      there that  those observations have      no bearing on the question in issue      in  that   case  as  there  was  no      provision in  any  substantive  law      restricting this  Court’s power  to      quash  proceedings  pending  before      subordinate courts. But it was also      added there that this Court’s power      under Article 142(1) to do complete      justice was  entirely of  different      leave and of a different quality."      As we  shall presently  see, there  is nothing  said in either Delhi  Judicial Service Association’s case (supra) or the Union  Carbide’s  case  supra)  from  which  it  may  be possible to hold that the law laid down in Prem Chand Garg’s case (supra)  is "no  longer a  good law".  Besides, we also find that in Mohd. Anis case referred to by the Bench, there is  no reference made to Prem Chand Garg’s case at all.      In Delhi  Judicial Service  Association Tis  Hazari vs. State of  Gujarat &  Ors. etc.  etc. (1991  (3) SCR 936) the following questions fell for determination.      " (a) whether the Supreme Court has      inherent jurisdiction  or power  to      punish for  contempt of subordinate      or inferior  courts  under  Article      129  of   the   Constitution,   (b)      whether the  inherent  jurisdiction      and power  of the  Supreme Court is

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 21 of 34  

    restricted  by   the  Contempt   of      Courts Act,  1971, (c)  whether the      incident interfered  with  the  due      administration   of   justice   and      constituted contempt  of court, and      (d)  what   punishment  should   be      awarded  to  the  contemners  found      guilty of contempt."           The Court observed:      "Article 142(1) of the constitution      provides  that   Supreme  Court  in      exercise of  its  jurisdiction  may      pass such decree or make such order      as is  necessary for doing complete      justice in  any ’cause’ or ’matter’      pending before  it. The  expression      ’cause’ or  ’matter’ would  include      any proceeding pending in court and      it would cover almost every kind of      proceeding in court including civil      or criminal . The inherent power of      this  Court   under   Article   142      coupled  with   the   plenary   and      residuary powers  under Articles 32      and 136  embraces  power  to  quash      criminal proceedings pending before      any court to do complete justice in      the matter before this Court."           -----------------------           -----------------------      Mr.  Nariman   urged  that  Article      142(1)   does not  contemplate  any      order   contrary    to    statutory      provisions. He  placed reliance  on      the  Courts  observations  in  Prem      Chand Garg Vs. Excise Commissioner,      U.P. Allahabad  91963 Supp.  1  SCR      885 at  889) and  A.R. Anthulay Vs.      R.S. Nayak  and Anr.  (1988 (2) SCC      602) where  the Court observed that      though the powers conferred on this      Court under Article 142(1) are very      wide, but in exercise of that power      the court  cannot  make  any  order      plainly   inconsistent   with   the      express  statutory   provisions  of      substantive law.  It may be noticed      that  in   prem  Chand  Garg’s  and      Antulay’s case (supra) observations      with regard  to the  extent of this      Court’s power  under Article 142(1)      were  made   in  the   context   of      fundamental      rights.      Those      observations have no bearing on the      question in  issue as  there is  no      provision in  any  substantive  law      restricting this  Court’s power  to      quash  proceedings  pending  before      subordinate  court.   This  Court’s      power under  Article 142(1)  to  do      "complete justice"  is entirely  of      different level  and of a different      quality.   Any    prohibition    or      restriction contained  in  ordinary      laws cannot  act as a limitation on

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 22 of 34  

    the constitutional  power  of  this      Court. Once  this Court has selling      of a  cause or matter before it, it      has power  to issue  any  order  or      direction to  do "complete justice"      in the  matter. This constitutional      power of  the Apex  Court cannot be      limited or restricted by provisions      contained in statutory law."           The Bench went on to say:      "No enactment  made by  Central  or      State  Legislature   can  limit  or      restrict the  power of  this  Court      under   Article    142    of    the      constitution, the  court must  take      into  consideration  the  statutory      provisions regulating the matter in      dispute. What  would be the need of      "complete justice"  in a  cause  or      matter would  depend upon the facts      and circumstances  of each case and      while  exercising  that  power  the      court would take into consideration      the   express   provisions   of   a      substantive  statute.   Once   this      Court has  taken seisin  of a case,      cause or  matter, it  has power  to      pass any  order or  issue direction      as may  be necessary to do complete      justice in  the  matter.  This  has      been the  consistent view  of  this      Court  as  would  appear  from  the      decisions of this court in State of      U.P. Vs. Poosu & Anr. (1976 (3) SCR      1005; Ganga  Bishan &  Ors. Vs. Jai      Narain (1986  (1) SCC 75; Navnit R.      Kamani &  Ors. Vs. Jai Narain (1988      (4) SCC 387); B.N. Nagarajan & Ors.      vs. State  of Mysore  & Ors.  (1986      (3) SCR 682): Special Reference No.      1 of  1964,  (supra),  and  Harbans      Singh  vs.   State  of   U.P.  Ors.      (supra) ."                     (emphasis supplied)      In AR  Antulay Vs.  Nayak and Anr. (1988 (2) SCC 602) a seven Judge Bench of this Court said:      "  The   reliance  placed  in  this      context on the provisions contained      in Articles  140  and  142  of  the      Constitution and  Section 401  read      with Section  386 of  the Cr.  P.C.      does not  also help. Article 140 is      only    a     provision    enabling      parliament to  confer supplementary      powers  on  the  Supreme  Court  to      enable it  to deal more effectively      to   exercise    the   jurisdiction      conferred on  it by  or  under  the      Constitution. Article  142 is  also      not  of  much  assistance.  In  the      first place, the operative words in      that article,   again  are "in  the      exercise of its jurisdiction" . The      Supreme Court was hearing an appeal      from the  order  of  discharge  and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 23 of 34  

    connected  matters.  There  was  no      issue or  controversy or discussion      before it  as  to  the  comparative      merits of  a trial before a Special      judge vis-a-vis one before the High      Court.  there   was  only  an  oral      request said  to  have  been  made,      admittedly, after  the judgment was      announced. Wide as the powers under      Article 141  are, they do not in my      view, envisage an order of the type      presently in question. The Nanavati      case, to  which reference  was made      by  Shri   Jethmalani,  involved  a      totally    different     type    of      situation. Secondly,  it is  one of      the contentions  of  the  appellant      that an  order of  this  type,  far      from  being   necessary  for  doing      complete justice  in the  cause  or      matter pending  before  the  court,      has actually resulted in injustice,      an aspect discussed a little later.      Thirdly, however  wide and  plenary      the language  of the  article,  the      directions  given   by  the   Court      should not  be  inconsistent  with,      repugnant for  in violation  of the      specific provisions of any statute.      If the  provisions of  the 1952 Act      had with Article 139-A and Sections      406-407 on  the  Cr.  P.C.  do  not      permit the  transfer of  the case a      Special judge  to the  High  Court,      that  effect   cannot  be   achieve      indirectly."                     (Emphasis supplied)      In Union  Carbide Corpn.  Vs. Union  of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584,  a constitution  Bench of this Court dealt with the ambit and  scope of  the powers  of this court under Article 142  of   the  Constitution.   The  Bench   considered   the observations of  the majority  in Prem Chand Garg vs. Excise Commissioner, U.P.,  1963 Supp.  (1) SCC  885 as well as the observations made  in A.R.  Antulay vs.  R.S. Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602 and observed:           "It is  necessary  to  set  at      rest certain  misconceptions in the      arguments touching the scope of the      powers of  this Court under Article      142(1) of  the Constitution.  These      issues  are   matters  of   serious      public importance.  The proposition      that a  provision in  any  ordinary      law irrespective  of the importance      of the public policy on which it is      founded,  operates   to  limit  the      powers  of  the  Apex  Court  under      Article  142(1)   is  unsound   and      erroneous. In  both Garg as well as      Antulay cases  the point was one of      violation     of     constitutional      provisions    and    constitutional      rights. The  observations as to the      effect   of    inconsistency   with      statutory  provisions  were  really

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 24 of 34  

    unnecessary in  those cases  as the      decisions in  the ultimate analysis      turned    on    the    breach    of      constitutional  rights.   We  agree      with Shri Nariman that the power of      the Court under Article 142 insofar      as quashing of criminal proceedings      are concerned  is not  exhausted by      Section 320  or 321 or 482 Cr. P.C.      or all  of them  put together.  The      power under  Article 142  is at  an      entirely different  level and  of a      different quality.  Prohibitions or      limitations or provisions contained      in  ordinary   laws  cannot,   ipso      facto,  act   as  prohibitions   of      limitations on  the  constitutional      powers  under   Article  142.  Such      prohibitions or  limitations in the      statutes might  embody and  reflect      the scheme  of  a  particular  law,      taking into  account the nature and      status  of  the  authority  or  the      court on which conferment of powers      - limited  in some  appropriate way      is  contemplated.  The  limitations      may not  necessarily reflect  or be      based    on     any     fundamental      considerations  of  public  policy,      Shri  sorabjee,   learned  Attorney      General ,  referring to  Garg case,      said that  limitation on the powers      under  Article  1425  arising  from      ’inconsistency’    with     express      statutory provisions of substantive      law’  must   really  mean   and  be      understood    as    some    express      prohibition   contained    in   any      substantive   statutory   law.   He      suggested that  if  the  expression      ’prohibition’ is  read in  place of      ’provision’  that   would   perhaps      convey the appropriate idea. But we      think that  such prohibition should      also be  shown to  be based on some      underlying fundamental  and general      issues of  public  policy  and  not      merely incidental  to a  particular      statutory  scheme  or  pattern.  It      will again  be wholly  incorrect to      say that  powers under  Article 142      are   subject   to   such   express      statutory prohibitions.  That would      convey  the   idea  that  statutory      provisions        override        a      constitutional provision.  Perhaps,      the proper  way of  expressing  the      idea is  that in exercising  powers      under Article  142 and in assessing      the needs  of ’complete justice’ of      accuse of  matter, the  Apex  Court      will  take   note  of  the  express      prohibitions  in   any  substantive      statutory provision  based on  some      fundamental  principles  of  public

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 25 of 34  

    policy and regulate the exercise of      its    power     and     discretion      accordingly. The  proposition  does      not relate  to the  powers  of  the      Court under  Article 142,  but only      to what  is  or  is  not  ’complete      justice’ of  a cause  or matter and      in the  ultimate  analysis  of  the      propriety of  the exercise  of  the      power.  No   question  of  lack  of      jurisdiction  or   of  nullity  can      arise."                     (emphasis supplied)      Thus, a  careful reading  of the  judgements  in  Union Carbide Corporation  & Ors.  Vs. Union  of India  & Ors. the Delhi judicial Services Association case and Mohd. Anis Case (supra) relied  upon in V.C. Mishra’s case (supra) show that the court  died not  actually doubt  the correctness  of the observations in  Prem Chand Garg’s case (supra). As a matter of fact,  it was  observed that  in the established facts of these cases,  the observations in Prem Chand Garg’s case had "no relevance". This Court did not say in any of those cases that substantive statutory provisions dealing expressly with the subject  can be  ignored by  this Court while exercising powers under Article 142.      As a matter of fact, the observations on which emphasis has been  placed by  us from the Union Carbide’s case, A. R. Antulay’s case  and Delhi Judicial Services Association case (supra) go  to show  that they do not strictly speaking come into any conflict with the observations of the majority made in Prem  Chand Garg’s  case (supra).  It is one thing to say that "prohibitions  or limitations in a statute" cannot come in the  way of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 to do complete  justice between  the  parties  in  the  pending ’cause or  matter arising  out of  that statute, but quite a different thing  to say  that while  exercising jurisdiction under Article  142, this  Court can  altogether  ignore  the substantive provisions  of a  statute,  dealing  with    the subject and  pass orders  concerning an  issue which  can be settled only  through  a  mechanism  prescribed  in  another statute. This  Court did  not lay so in Union Carbide’s case either expressly  or by  implication and  on the contrary it has been  held that  the apex  court will  take note  of the express provisions  of any  substantive  statutory  law  and regulate  the   exercise  of   its  power   and   discretion accordingly. We are, therefore, unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the observations of the Bench in V.C. Mishra’s case that  the low  laid down  by the majority in Prem Chand Garg’s case is "no longer a good law".      In a given case, an advocate found guilty of committing contempt  of   court  may   also  be  guilty  of  committing "professional misconduct"  depending  upon  the  gravity  or nature  of   his   contumacious   conduct,   but   the   two jurisdictions are  separate and  distinct and exercisable by different  forums   by  following   separate  and   distinct procedures. The  power to  punish an Advocate, by suspending his licence  or by  removal of his name from the roll of the State bar Council, for proven professional misconduct, vests exclusively in  the statutory  authorities created under the Advocates Act,  1961, while  the jurisdiction  to punish him for committing  contempt of  court vests  exclusively in the courts.      After the coming into force of the Advocates Act, 1961, exclusive power  for punishing an advocate for "professional misconduct "  has been  conferred on the concerned state Bar

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 26 of 34  

Council and  the Bar  Council of  India. That Act contains a detailed and  complete mechanism  for suspending or revoking the  licence   of  an   advocate   for   his   "professional misconduct’. since,  the suspension or revocation of licence of an advocate has not only civil consequence but also penal consequence, the  punishment being in the nature of penalty, the provisions  have to be strictly construed. Punishment by way of  suspending the  licence of  an advocate  can only be imposed by  the competent statutory body after the charge is established against  the Advocate  in a manner prescribed by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder.      Let us  now have  a quick  look at some of the relevant provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961.      The Act, besides laying down the essential functions of the Bar  Council of  India provides  for the  enrollment  of advocates   and setting  up of  disciplinary authorities  to chastise and, if necessary, punish members of the profession for professional  misconduct.  The  punishment  may  include suspension from practice for a specified period or reprimand or removal  of the  name from  the roll  of  the  advocates. Various provisions  of the  Act deal  with functions  of the State Bar  Councils and  the Bar  Council of  India. We need not, however, refer to all those provisions in this judgment except to the extent their reference is necessary.      According to  Section 30,  every advocate whose name is entered in  the Stat roll of advocates shall be entitled, as of right,  to practice,  throughout the territories to which the Act  extends, in  all courts including the Supreme Court of India.  Section 33  provides that  no person shall, on or after the  appointed day,  be entitled  to practice  in  any court or  before  any  authority  or  person  unless  he  is enrolled as an advocate under the Act.      Chapter V  of  the  Act  deals  with  the  ’conduct  of Advocate’.  After   a   complaint   is   received   alleging professional misconduct  by an  advocate by the Bar Council, the Bar  Council entrusts  the  inquiry  into  the  case  of misconduct to  the Disciplinary  Committee constituted under Section 9  of the  Act. Section  35 lays  down  that  if  on receipt of a complaint or otherwise, a state Bar Council has reason to  believe that  any advocate  on its  roll has been guilty of  professional or  other misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee. Section 36, provides  that  where  on  receipt  of  a  complaint  or otherwise, the  Bar Council  of India  has reason to believe that any advocate whose name is entered on any State roll is guilty of  professional or  other misconduct, it shall refer the case  to the disciplinary Committee. Section 37 provides for an  appeal to  the Bar Council of India against an order made by  the disciplinary  committee of a state Bar Council. Any person  aggrieved by  an order  made by the disciplinary committee of  the Bar  Council of India may prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court of India under Section 38 of the Act.      Section 42(1)  of the  Act confers  on the Disciplinary Committee of  the Bar Council, powers of a civil court under the code  of Civil  procedure and  section 4292) enacts that its proceedings shall  be "deemed" to be judicial proceeding for the purpose mentioned therein.      Section 49 of the Act lays down that the Bar Council of India may make rules for discharging its functions under the Act and  in particular  such Rules  may prescribe inter-alia the standards  of professional conduct to be observed by the advocates  and   the  procedure   to  be   followed  by  the Disciplinary Committees  of the  Bar Council  while  dealing with a  case of  professional misconduct of an advocate. The Bar Council  of India  has  framed  rules  called  ’The  Bar

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 27 of 34  

Council of  India Rules’  (hereinafter referred  to  as  the Rules) in  exercise of  its  rule  making  power  under  the Advocate Act 1951.      Part  VII   of  the   Rules  deals   with  disciplinary proceedings against  the advocates. In chapter I of the part VII provisions  have been  made to  deal with  complaints of professional misconduct  received against  advocates as well as for  the procedure  to be  followed by  the  Disciplinary committees of  the State  Bar Council and the Bar Council of India to  deal with  such complaints received under Sections 35 and  36 of   the  Act. Rule 1 of Chapter I of part VII of the Rules  provides that  a complaint  against  an  advocate shall be  in the form of a petition duly signed and verified as required  under the code of Civil procedure, and shall be accompanied by  the fees  as prescribed by the Rules. On the complaint being  found to  be in  order the  same  shall  be registered and  place before  the Bar Council for such order as it may deem it to pass. Sub-rule (2) provides that before referring a  complaint made  under Section 35(1) of the Act, to one  of its  disciplinary committees  the Bar Council may require the  complainant to  furnish better  particulars and the Bar  Council "may  also call  for the  comments from the advocate complained against ."      Rules 3  and 4  of Chapter  I and  VII provide  for the procedure to  be followed  in dealing  with such complaints. These rules read:      " 3.(1)  After a complaint has been      referred    to    a    Disciplinary      Committee by  the Bar  Council, the      registrar shall  expeditiously send      a notice  to the Advocate concerned      requiring him  to show cause within      a specified  date on  the complaint      made against  him and to submit the      statement of defence, documents and      affidavits  in   support  of   such      defence, and  further informing him      that in  case of his non-appearance      on the  date of  hearing fixed, the      matter   shall    be   heard    and      determined in his absence.      Explanation:  Appearance  includes,      unless     otherwise      directed,      appearance  by   an   Advocate   or      through       duly       authorised      representative.      (2) If  the Disciplinary  Committee      requires or termites, a complainant      may file  a replication within such      time  as   may  be   fixed  by  the      committee.      (3)    The    Chairman    of    the      Disciplinary Committee Hall fix the      date, hour and place of the enquiry      which shall not ordinarily be later      than thirty  days from  the receipt      of  the  reference.  The  Registrar      shall give  notice  of  such  date,      hour and  piece to  the complainant      or  other   person  aggrieved.  The      advocate concerned and the Attorney      General or  He Additional Solicitor      General of  India or  the  Advocate      General as  the case  may  be,  and      shall also  serve on them copies of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 28 of 34  

    the  complaint   and   such   other      documents mentioned  in Rule  24 of      this Chapter as the Chairman of the      Committee may  direct at  least ten      days before  the date fixed for the      enquiry.      Rules 5,  6 and  7 deal  with the  manner of service of notice, summoning of witnesses and appearance of the parties before the  disciplinary committee.  At  any  stage  of  the proceedings,  the  disciplinary  committee  may  appoint  an advocate to  appear as  amicus curiae  and in case either of the parties absent themselves, the committee may; proceed ex parte against the absenting party and decide the case.      Sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 provides:      " This Disciplinary Committee shall      hear the  Attorney General  or  the      Additional  Solicitor   General  of      India or  the Advocate  General, as      the Case  may be or their Advocate,      and parties  or their Advocates, if      they  desire   to  be   heard,  and      determine the  matter on  documents      and affidavits  unless it is of the      opinion that  it should  be in  the      interest of justice to permit cross      examination of  the deponents or to      take oral  evidence, in  which case      the  procedure  for  the  trial  of      civil  suits   shall  as   far   as      possible be followed."      Rules 9  and 10  deal  with  the  manner  of  recording evidence during the enquiry into a complaint of professional misconduct and  the maintenance of record by the committee.      Rule 14(1) lays down as follows:      "The finding of the majority of the      numbers   of    the    Disciplinary      Committee shall  be the  finding of      the Committee.  The reason given in      support of the finding may be given      in the  form of a judgement, and in      the  case   of  a   difference   of      opinion,  any   member   dissinting      shall be  entitled  to  record  his      dissent giving  his own  reason. It      shall   be    competent   for   the      Disciplinary  Committee   to  award      such costs as it thinks fit. "      Rule 16 provides:      " 16(1).  The Secretary  of a State      Bar  Council   shall  send  to  the      Secretary of  the Bar Council India      quarterly   sentiments   complaints      received  and   the  stage  of  the      proceedings before  the  state  Bar      Council and Disciplinary Committees      in such  manner as may be specified      from time to time.      (2)  The   Secretary  of   the  Bar      Council of  India may  however call      for  such  further  statements  and      particulars   as    he    considers      necessary."      An appeal  from the  final order  of  the  disciplinary committee of  the Bar  Council of a State is provided to the Bar Council  of India  under Section  37 of  the Act and the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 29 of 34  

procedure for  filing such  an appeal  is detailed  in Rules 19(2) to 31.      The object  of referring  to the  various provisions of the Advocates  Act, 1961  and the Rules framed thereunder is to demonstrate  that an  elaborate and  detailed  procedure, almost akin to that of a regular trial of a case by a court, has been prescribed to deal with a complaint of professional misconduct against  an advocate before he can be punished by the Bar  Council by  revoking or  suspending his  licence or even for reprimanding him.      In Bar Council of Maharashtra Vs. M.V. Dabholkar & Ors. (1975 (2)  SCC   702) a  seven judge  Bench  of  this  Court analysed the scheme of the Advocates Act 1961 and inter alia observed:      " The  scheme and the provisions of      the   Act    indicate   that    the      constitution of  State Bar Councils      and Bar  Council   of India  is for      one of  the principal  purposes  to      see   that    the   standards    of      professional conduct  and etiquette      laid down  by the  Bar  Council  of      India are  observed and  preserved.      The    Bar    Councils    therefore      entertain   cases   of   misconduct      against advocates. The Bar Councils      are  to   safeguard   the   rights,      privilege    and    interests    of      advocates. The  Bar Councils  is  a      body  corporate.  The  disciplinary      committees are  constituted by  the      Bar Council. The Bar Council is not      the same  body as  its disciplinary      committee.  One  of  the  principal      functions of  the  Bar  Council  in      regard to standards of professional      conduct and  etiquette of advocates      is to  receive  complaints  against      advocates and  if the  Bar  Council      has  reason  to  believe  that  any      advocate   has   been   guilty   of      professional or other misconduct it      shall refer  the case  for disposal      to its  disciplinary committee. The      Bar Councils of a State may also of      its own  motion if it has reason to      believe that  any advocate has been      guilty  of  professional  or  other      misconduct it  shall refer the case      for disposal  to  its  disciplinary      committee. It  is apparent  that  a      state Bar Council not only receives      a  complaint  but  is  required  to      apply its  mind to find out whether      there is any reason to believe that      any advocate  has  been  guilty  of      professional or  other  misconduct.      The Bar  Council has very important      part  to   play,   first   in   the      reception of complaints, second, in      forming reasonable  belief of quilt      of professional or other misconduct      and finally  in making reference of      the  case   to   its   disciplinary      committee. The  initiation  of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 30 of 34  

    proceeding before  the disciplinary      committee is  by the Bar Council of      a State. A most significant feature      is that  no litigant  and no member      of  the   public  can   straightway      commence  disciplinary  proceedings      against an  advocate. It is the Bar      Council of  a State which initiates      the    disciplinary    proceedings.      Thus, after the coming into force of the Advocates Act, 1961 with  effect from 19th May 1961, matters connected with the enrollment  of advocates  as also  their punishment  for professional misconduct  is governed  by the  provisions  of that Act only. Since, the jurisdiction to grant licence to a law graduate to practice as an advocate vests exclusively in the Bar Councils of the concerned State, the jurisdiction to suspend his  licence for  a specified  term or  to revoke it also vests in the same body.      The Letters Patent of the Chartered High Courts as well of the  other High  Courts to admit an advocate to practice. The power  of suspending  from practice  being incidental to that of  admitting to  practice being  incidental to that of admitting to  practice  also  vested  in  the  High  Courts. However, by  virtue of Section 50 of the Advocates Act, with effect from the date when a State Bar Council is constituted under the  Act, the  provisions of the Letters patent of any High Court  and of  any other law" in so far as they related to the  admission and  enrollment of a legal practitioner or confer on  the legal  practitioner the  right to practice in any court  or before  any authority  or a person as also the provisions relating  to the "suspension or removal" of legal practitioners, whether  under the letters patent of any High Court or  of any other law, have been repealed. These powers now vest  exclusively, under  the Advocates  Act, in the Bar Council of  the Concerned  State. Even in England the Courts of justice  are now  relieved from disbarring advocates from practice after  the power  of calling  to the  Bar has  been delegated to  the Inns  of Court.  The power  to disbar  the advocate also now vests exclusively in the Inns of Court and a detailed procedure has been laid therefor.      In Re.  V.C. Misra’s  case, the  Bench relied  upon its appellate jurisdiction  under Section  38  (supra)  also  to support  its   order  of   suspending  the  licence  of  the contemner.      Dealing with the right of appeal, conferred by Sections 37 and  38 of  the  Act,  the  Constitution  Bench  in  M.V. Dabholkar’s case (supra) observed.      "Where a  right of appeal to courts      against   an    administrative   or      judicial  decision  is  created  by      statute, the  right  is  invariably      confined to a person aggrieved or a      person who  claims to be aggrieved.      The meaning  of the words "a person      aggrieved" may  very  according  to      the context  of the statute. One of      the meanings  is that a person will      be  held   to  be  aggrieved  by  a      decision  if   that   decision   is      materially    adverse    to    him.      Normally,  one   is   required   to      establish that  one has been denied      or deprived  of something  to which      one is legally entitled in order to      make one  "a    person  aggrieved".

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 31 of 34  

    Against a  person is aggrieved if a      legal burden is imposed on him, the      meaning of  the words  "  a  person      aggrieved"  is  sometimes  given  a      restricted   meaning   in   certain      statutes which provide remedies for      the  protection  of  private  legal      rights.  The   restricted   meaning      requires denial  or deprivation  of      legal  rights.   A   more   liberal      approach   is   required   in   the      background of statutes which do not      deal with  property rights but deal      with   professional   conduct   and      morality.  The   role  of  the  Bar      Council under  the Advocates Act is      comparable  to   the  role   of   a      guardian  in  professional  ethics.      The  words  "persons  aggrieved  is      sections 37  and 38  of the Act are      of wide  import and  should not  be      subjected    to     a    restricted      interpretation  of   possession  or      denial of  legal rights  or burdens      or financial interests. The test is      whether    the     words    "person      aggrieved" include  "a  person  who      has a  genuine grievance because an      order   has    been   made    which      prejudicially      affects      his      interests". It  has, therefore,  to      be  found   out  whether   the  Bar      Council has  a grievance in respect      of an  order or  decision affecting      the   professional    conduct   and      etiquette."                     (Emphasis supplied)      In O.N.  Mohindroo Vs. The District Judge, Delhi & Anr. (1971 (3)  SCC 5),  it has  been held  that an appeal to the Supreme  Court  under  Section  38  of  the  Act  is  not  a restricted appeal.  It is not an appeal on a question of law alone but  also on  questions of fact and under that Section the Supreme  court has the jurisdiction to pass any order it deems fit  on such  an appeal  but ’no   order  of  the  Bar Council of  India shall be varied by the Supreme Court so as to prejudicially  affect the person aggrieved without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.      This Court  is indeed  the  final  appellate  authority under Section  38 of  the Act  but we  are not  persuaded to agree with  the view  that this Court can in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,  under Section 38 of the Act, impose one of  the punishments,  prescribed under  that Act,  while punishing  a   contemner  advocate   in  a   contempt  case. ’Professional misconduct’ of the advocate concerned is not a matter directly  in issue  in the  contempt of  court  case. while dealing with the contempt of court case, this court is obliged to examine whether the conduct complained of amounts to  contempt  of  court  and  if  t  he  answer  is  in  the affirmative, than  to sentence the contemner for contempt of court  by  imposing  any  of  the  recognised  and  accepted punishments for  committing contempt  of court.  Keeping  in view the  elaborate procedure prescribed under the Advocates Act 1961  and the  Rules framed thereunder it follows that a complaint of professional misconduct is required to be tried by the  disciplinary committee  of the Bar Council, like the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 32 of 34  

trial of  a criminal  case by a court of law and an advocate may be  punished on  the basis  of evidence  led before  the disciplinary  committee  of  the  Bar  Council  after  being afforded an  opportunity of hearing. The delinquent advocate may be  suspended from the rolls of the advocates or imposed any other punishment as provided under the Act.  The enquiry is a  detailed and  elaborate one  and is  not of  a summary nature. It  is therefore,  not permissible for this court to punish an advocate for "professional misconduct" in exercise of the  appellate jurisdiction  by convening  itself as  the statutory body  exercising "original  jurisdiction". Indeed, if in a given case the concerned Bar Council on being apprised  of the contumacious and blame worthy conduct of the  advocate by  the High  Court or  this Court does not take any  action against  the said  advocate, this court may well have  the jurisdiction  in exercise  of  its  appellate powers under  Section 38 of the Act read with Article 142 of the Constitution  to proceed  suo  moto  and  send  for  the records from  the Bar  Council and  pass appropriate  orders against the concerned advocate. in an appropriate case, this Court may  consider the  exercise of  appellate jurisdiction even suo  moto provided  there is  some cause pending before the concerned  Bar Council,  and the  Bar Council  does "not act" or  fails to  act, by  sending for  the record  of that cause and pass appropriate orders.      However, the  exercise of  powers  under  the  contempt jurisdiction  cannot   be  confused   with   the   appellate jurisdiction  under   Section  38  of    the  Act.  The  two jurisdictions are  separate and distinct. We are, therefore, unable to  persuade ourselves  to subscribe  to the contrary view expressed by the Bench in V.C. Mishra’s case because in that case  the Bar Council had not declined to deal with the matter ad  take appropriate  action  against  the  concerned advocate. Since  there was  no cause  pending before the Bar Council,  this   court  could  not  exercise  its  appellate jurisdiction in  respect of  a matter  which was never under consideration of  the bar councils.      Thus, to conclude we are of the opinion that this court cannot in  exercise of  its jurisdiction  under Article  142 read with  Article 129  of the Constitution, while punishing a contemner  for committing contempt of court, also impose a punishment of  suspending his licence to practice, where the contemner happens  to be  an  Advocate.  Such  a  punishment cannot even  be imposed  by taking recourse to the appellate powers under Section 38 of the Act while dealing with a case of  contempt  of  court  (and  not  an  appeal  relating  to professional misconduct  as such).  To that  extent, the law laid down  in Re:  Vinay Chandra Mishra, (1995) 2 S.C.C. 584 is not good law and we overrule it.      An Advocate  who is  found guilty  of contempt of court may also,  as already  noticed, be  guilty  of  professional misconduct in  a given case but it is for the Bar Council of the State or Bar Council of India to punish that Advocate by either  debarring   him  from  practice  or  suspending  his licence, as may be warranted, in the facts and circumstances of each case. The learned Solicitor General informed us that there have  been cases where the Bar Council of India taking note of  the contumacious  and objectionable  conduct of  an advocate, had initiated disciplinary proceedings against him and even  punished him for "professional misconduct", on the basis of his having been found guilty of committing contempt of court. We do not entertain any doubt that the Bar Council of the  State or  Bar Council  of India, as the case may be, when apprised  of the established contumacious conduct of an advocate by  the High  Court or by this Court, would rise to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 33 of 34  

the occasion  , and  take appropriate action against such an advocate.  Under   Article  144  of  the  Constitution  "all authorities civil  and judicial,  in the  territory of India shall act  in aid  of the  Supreme Court".  The Bar  Council which performs  a  public  duty  and  is  charged  with  the obligation to  protect the  dignity of  the  profession  and maintain  professional   standards  and  etiquette  is  also obliged to  act "in  aid of  the Supreme  Court".  It  must, whenever, facts  warrant rise  to the occasion and discharge its duties  uninfluenced by  the position  of the  contemner advocate. It  must act  in accordance  with  the  prescribed procedure, whenever  its attention is drawn by this Court to the contumacious and unbecoming conduct of an advocate which has the  tendency to  interfere with  due administration  of justice. It is possible for the High Courts also to draw the attention of  the Bar  Council of  the State  to a  case  of professional misconduct  of a  contemner advocate  to enable the State Bar Council to proceed in the manner prescribed by the Act  and  the  rules  framed  thereunder.  There  is  no justification to assume that the Bar Councils would not rise to the  occasion, as  they are equally responsible to uphold the dignity of the courts and the majesty of the and prevent any interference  in the  administration of justice. Learned counsel for the parties present before us do not dispute and rightly so  that whenever  a court  of record,  records  its findings about  the conduct of an Advocate while finding him guilty of committing contempt of court and desires or refers the matter  to be  considered by  the concern  Bar  Council, appropriate action  should be initiated by the concerned Bar Council in  accordance with  law with a view to maintain the dignity of  the courts  and to uphold the majesty of law and professional  standards   and  etiquette.  Nothing  is  more destructive of  public confidence  in the  administration of justice than  incivility, rudeness  or disrespectful conduct on the  part of  a counsel towards the court or disregard by the court  of the  privileges of  the bar.  In case  the Bar Council, even  after receiving  ’reference’ from  the court, fails to  take action  against the  concerned advocate, this court might consider invoking its powers under Section 38 of the Act  by sending  for the  record of the proceedings from the Bar  Council and  passing appropriate  orders. Of Course the appellate  powers under Section 38 would be available to this Court only and not to the High Courts. We, however hope that such a situation would not arise.      In a  given case  it may be possible, for this Court or the High Court, the prevent the contemner advocate to appear before it till he purges himself of the contempt but that is much different  from suspending  or revoking  his licence or debarring him  to practice  as an  advocate. In  a  case  of contemptuous,  contumacious,   unbecoming   or   blameworthy conduct  of  an  Advocate-on-Record,  this  court  possesses jurisdiction, under  the  Supreme  Court  Rules  itself,  to withdraw his  privilege to practice as an Advocate-an-Record because that  privilege is  conferred by  this court and the power to grant the privilege includes the power to revoke or suspend it.  The withdrawal of that privilege, however, does not amount to suspending or revoking his licence to practice as an advocate in other courts or Tribunals.      We are  conscious of  the fact  that the conduct of the contemner of  VC Misra’s  case was  highly contumacious  and even atrocious.  It was  unpardonable. the contemner therein had abused  his professional  privileges while practising as an advocate.  he was  holding a  very senior position in the Bar Council  of India  and was  expected to  act in  a  more reasonable way.  He did  not. these  factors appear  to have

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 34 of 34  

influenced the  bench in  that case  to itself punish him by suspending his  licence to  practice also  while imposing  a suspending sentence  of imprisonment for committing contempt of court  but while doing so this court vested itself with a jurisdiction where  none exists.  The position  would,  have been different  had a reference been made to the Bar Council and the  Bar Council  did not  take any  action against  the concerned advocate. In that event, as already observed, this court  in  exercise  of  its  appellate  jurisdiction  under Section  38  of  the  Act  read  with  Article  142  of  the Constitution of  India, might have exercised suo moto powers and sent for the proceedings from the Bar Council and passed appropriate orders  for punishing the contemner advocate for professional misconduct  after  putting  him  on  notice  as required by the proviso to Section 38 which reads thus:-           " Provided  that no  order  of      the disciplinary  committed of  the      Bar  Council   of  India  shall  be      varied by  the Supreme  Court so as      to prejudicially  affect the person      aggrieved  without   giving  him  a      reasonable  opportunity   of  being      heard." but it could not have done so in the first instance.      In V.C.  Mishra’s case,  the  Bench,  relied  upon  its inherent  powers   under  Article  142,  to  punish  him  by suspending his  licence, without the Bar Council having been given any  opportunity to  deal with his case under the Act. We cannot persuade ourselves to agree with that approach. It must be  remembered that  wider the  amplitude of  its power under Article  142, the greater is the need of care for this Court to  see that  the power is used with restraint without pushing back  the  limits  of  the  constitution  so  as  to function within  the bounds  of its own jurisdiction. To the extent, this Court makes the statutory authorities and other organs of  the State perform their duties in accordance with law, its  role is  unexceptionable but it is not permissible or the Court to "take over" the role of the statutory bodies or other organs of the State and "perform" their functions.      Upon the  basis of  what we  have said above, we answer the question posed in the earlier part of this order, in the negative.  The   writ  petition   succeeds  and  is  ordered accordingly.