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PETITIONER: SUNIL BATRA ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DELHI ADMINISTRATION AND ORS. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT30/08/1978

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA SHINGAL, P.N. DESAI, D.A.

CITATION:  1978 AIR 1675            1979 SCR  (1) 392  1978 SCC  (4) 494  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1979 SC 916  (82)  E          1980 SC 249  (4)  R          1980 SC 470  (10)  F          1980 SC1535  (2,11,20,21,23,30,38)  REL        1980 SC1579  (3)  RF         1980 SC1789  (112)  RF         1980 SC2147  (51)  R          1981 SC 625  (2,4,7,8,10,11,12,14)  RF         1981 SC 746  (3,4,6)  R          1981 SC 939  (3)  R          1981 SC1767  (11,22)  MV         1982 SC1325  (75)  F          1982 SC1413  (45)  R          1983 SC 361  ((2)1,12,14,17)  RF         1983 SC 465  (3,5,12,16,17)  R          1983 SC 473  (6)  RF         1985 SC 231  (2,3)  R          1986 SC 180  (39)  F          1989 SC1375  (20,71)  RF         1991 SC 101  (30,70,115,227,278)  RF         1991 SC 345  (6)  RF         1991 SC2176  (39)

ACT:      Prisons   Act    1894-Section   30-Scope    of-Solitary confinement-Imposition of  bar-fetters under.  s.  56  on  a prisoner-Whether  violates   Articles  14,  19,  21  of  the Constitution 1950.      Practice  and  Procedure-Necessity  of  social  welfare organisation to intervene in the litigative process.      Prisons  Act  1894  and  Punjab  Jail  Manual-Need  for revision to  reflect the  deeper meaning  in the behavioural norms correctional attitudes and luimane orientation for the prison staff and prisoners alike.      Words & Phrases-Under sentence of Death and ’apart from all other prisoner’s-Meaning of

HEADNOTE:      Section 30(2)  of the  Prisons Act  provides that every

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prisoner under sentence of death shall be confined in a cell apart from  all other  prisoners and  shall be placed by day and by night under the charge of a guard.      The petitioner  in W.P.  No. 2202  of 1977  who  was  a convict under  sentence of  death  challenged  his  solitary confinement. It  was contended  on his  behalf that s. 30(2) does not  authorise placing  a prisoner  under  sentence  of death in  solitary confinement  and that  the jail authority could not  arrogate to  itself  the  power  to  impose  such punishment under  the garb  of giving effect to s. 30(2). On the other  hand it was contended on behalf of the State that the section  merely permits statutory segregation for safety of the  prisoner in  the prisoner’s  own interest  and  that instead of  striking down  the provision,  the Court  should adopt a  course of  so reading down the section as to denude it of its ugly inhuman  features.      The petitioner in W.P. 565 of 1977 contended that s. 56 of the  Prisons Act which confers unguided, uncanalised, and arbitrary powers on the Superintendent to confine a prisoner in irons is ultra vires Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution.      Dismissing the petitions. ^      HELD: (per  Chandradchud C.J.  Fazal Ali,  Shinghal and Desai, JJ.).      1. Section  30(2) does not empower the prison authority to  impose   solitary  confinement  upon  a  prisoner  under sentence of  death. Even  jail discipline  inhibits solitary confinement as a measure of jail punishment. [499H]      2. It  has been  well established that convicts are not by  mere  reason  of  the  conviction  denuded  of  all  the fundamental rights which they otherwise possess. For example a man of profession who is convicted would stand stripped of his right  to  hold  consultations  while  serving  out  his sentence; but  the Constitution  guarantees  other  freedoms like the  right to acquire, hold and dispose of property for the exercise  of which  incarceration can  be no impediment. Likewise even 393 a convict  is entitled  to the  precious right guaranteed by Art. 21  that he  shall not  be  deprived  of  his  life  or personal  liberty   except  according   to   the   procedure established by law. [495G-H]      Procunier v.  Martiney 40  L. Ed. 2d. 224 at 248; Wolff v. Mcdonnel  41 L. Ed 409 at 501; D. Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. [1975] 2 SCR 24 referred to.      3. Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Penal Code leave no room for  doubt that  solitary confinement  is by  itself  a substantive punishment  which can  be imposed  by a court of law. It  cannot be  left to  the whim  and caprice of prison authorities. The  limit of  solitary confinement that can be imposed under  Court‘s order  is strictly  prescribed by the Penal Code. [498 B-C]      4. Solitary  confinement is  so revolting to the modern sociologist  and   law  reformer  that  the  Law  Commission recommended that  the punishment  of solitary confinement is out of tune with modern thinking and should not find a place in the  Penal Code  as a  punishment to  be ordered  by  any criminal court  even though it may be necessary as a measure of jail discipline. [498 F-G]      5. The explanation to s. 44(8) of the Prisons Act makes it clear  that a  person is not wholly segregated from other prisoners in  that he is not removed from the sight of other prisoners  and   he  is   entitled  to  have  his  meals  in association with  one or  more other  prisoners.  Even  such separate confinement cannot exceed three months. Para 847 of

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the Punjab  Jail Manual,  if literally enforced would keep a prisoner totally  out of  bounds, that  is, beyond sight and sound. Neither separate confinement nor cellular confinement of a  condemned prisoner  would be as tortuous or horrendous as solitary  confinement of  a condemned  prisoner.  Section 30(2) merely  provides for  confinement of  a prisoner under sentence of death in a cell apart from other prisoners. Such confinement can neither be cellular confinement nor separate confinement  and   in  any   event  it  cannot  be  solitary confinement [499E-H]      6. A  "prisoner under sentence of death" in the context of s. 30(2) can only mean a prisoner whose sentence of death has become  final, conclusive  and indefeasible which cannot be annulled  or avoided  by any  judicial or  constitutional procedure.  Till  then  a  person  who  is  awarded  capital punishment can  be said  to be  a prisoner under sentence of death. There  is an inordinate time lag between the sentence of death passed by the Sessions Judge and the final disposal of appeal  by the  High Court  or Supreme Court depending on the circumstances  of each  case  or  the  rejection  of  an application for  mercy by  the President or the Governor. It cannot be  said that  under s. 30(2) such prisoner, from the time the death sentence is awarded by the Sessions Judge has to be  confined to a call apart from other prisoners. [501F, 502C, 501C, 501E]      7. Jail  custody is something different from custody of a convict  suffering simple  or rigorous  imprisonment.  The purpose behind  enacting s.  366(2) of  the Code of Criminal Procedure  is  to  make  the  prisoner  available  when  the sentence  is   required  to   be  executed.  Unless  special circumstances exist, even in cases where a person is kept in a cell  apart from other prisoners with day and night watch, he must  be within the sight an sound of other prisoners and be able to take food in their company. [502 E-G] 394      8. Section  30(2) as  interpreted is  not violative  of Art. 20.  When a  prisoner is  committed under a warrant for jail custody under s. 366(2), Cr. P.C. and if he is detained in solitary  confinement which is a punishment prescribed by s. 73,  I.P.C. it will amount to imposing punishment for the same offence  more than  once, which  would be  violative of Art. 20(2).  But as  the prisoner  is  not  to  be  kept  in solitary confinement  and the  custody in  which he  is kept under  s.   30(2)  would   prelude  detention   in  solitary confinement,  there  is  no  chance  of  imposing  a  second punishment  upon   him  and,  therefore,  s.  30(2)  is  not violative of Art. 20. [502H; 503 A-B]      9. Personal  liberty of  the person who is incarcerated is to a great extent curtailed by plaintive detention. It is even curtailed in preventive detention. The liberty to move, mix, mingle,  talk,  share  company  with  co-prisoners,  if substantially curtailed,  would  be  violative  of  Art.  21 unless the curtailment has the backing of law. Section 30(2) establishes the  procedure by  which it can be curtailed but it must be read subject to the interpretation placed in this judgment. Once  s. 30(2) is read down, its obnoxious element is erased  and it  cannot be  said   that it is arbitrary or that there  is deprivation  of personal  liberty without the authority of law. [504E-F] t      10. Classification  according to  sentence for security purposes is  valid and  therefore s.  30(2) does not violate Art. 14. The restriction imposed by s. 30(2)  is  not unreasonable.  It is  imposed keeping  in view  the safety of  the prisoner and the prison security and does not violate Art. 19. [505F]

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    11. There  is no  warrant for  an implicit  belief that every  prisoner  under  sentence  of  death  is  necessarily violent  or   dangerous  requiring   his  segregation.   The rationale underlying s. 30(2) is that the very nature of the position and  predicament of  a prisoner  under sentence  of death leads to a certain situation  and  present problems  peculiar to such persons and warrant their separate  classification and treatment as a measure of jail administration  and prison discipline. It can hardly be questioned that  prisoners under  sentence of  death form  a separate class  and their  separate classification has to be recognised. [505 A-C]      12. Section 30(2) as interpreted does not mean that the prisoner is  to be  completely segregated  except in extreme cases of  necessity which  must be specifically made out and that too after he become a prisoner under sentence of death. [505F]      13. Section  56 is  not violative  of Arts.  14 and 21. [511C] The  power under  s. 56  can be  exercised  only  for reasons  and   considerations  which   are  germane  to  the objective  of   the  statute,  viz.:  safe  custody  of  the prisoner,  which   takes  in  considerations  regarding  the character and propensities  of  the prisoner.  These and  similar  considerations  bear direct nexus  with the safe custody of prisoners as they are aimed   primarily    at   preventing   their   escape.   The determination of  the necessity  to put  a prisoner  in  bar fetters has  to be  made after  application of  mind to  the peculiar and  special  characteristics  of  each  individual prisoner. The nature and length of sentence or the magnitude of the  crime committed by the prisoner are not relevant for the purpose of determining that question. [509A-C]      14. There  are  sufficient  guideiines  in  s.  56.  It contains a  number of  safe guards  against  misuse  of  bar fetters by the Superintendent. Such circumscribed peripheral discretion with  duty to give reasons which are revisable by the higher 395 authority cannot  be described  as arbitrary  so  as  to  be violative of  Art. 14.  The A  Superintendent  can  put  the prisoner in bar fetters only after taking into consideration the peculiar  and special characteristics of each individual prisoner. No  ordinary routine  reasons can  be  sufficient. Duty to  record reasons  in the  Superintendent‘s journal as well as  the  prisoner‘s  history  ticket  will  narrow  the discretionary power  conferred on  him. The  reasons must be recorded in  the language intelligible and understandable by the prisoner.  A further  obligation  is  that  the  fetters imposed  for   the  security,   shall  be   removed  by  the Superintendent as  soon as he is of opinion that this can be done with safety. The Superintendent will have to review the case at  regular and  frequent  intervals  for  ascertaining whether the fetters can be removed. [510-A-B, 509E-H]      15. Moreover the section does not permit the use of bar fetters for  an unusually  long period,  day and  night, and that too when the prisoner is confined in a secure cell from where escape is somewhat inconceivable. [511B] C Per Krishna Iyer J. concurring      1. The  vires of  section 30  and  section  56  of  the Prisons  Act  upheld.  These  and  other  provisions,  being somewhat out  of tune with current penelogical values, to be revised by  fresh legislation.  Prison  Manuals  are  mostly callous colonial  compilations and  even  their  copies  are mostly beyond  the prisoner’s ken. Punishments. in civilized societies, must not degrade human dignity or would flesh and

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spirit.  The   cardinal  sentencing  goal  is  occupational, changing  the consciousness of the criminal to ensure social defence. Where  prison treatment  abandons  the  reformatory purpose  and   practises  dehumanizing   techniques  it   is wasteful, counter-productive  and irrational hovering on the hostile brink of unreasonableness (Article 19). [488B-C]      (2)  Solitary   confinement,  even  if  mollified  an(l modified  marginally,   is  not  sanctioned  by  s.  30  for prisoners ’under  sentence of  death’. But it is legal under that section to separate such sentences from the rest of the prison community  during hours  when prisoners are generally locked in.  The  special  watch,  day  and  night.  Of  such sentences by  guards upheld.  Infraction of  privacy may  be inevitable, but guards must concede minimum human privacy in practice. [488E]      (3) Prisoners  ’under sentence  of death’  shall not be denied any  of the  community  amenities.  including  games, newspapers, books,  moving around  and meeting prisoners and visitors,  subject   to  reasonable   regulation  of  prison management. Section  30 is  no substitute  for  sentence  of imprisonment and  merely prescribes the manner of organizing safe jail custody authorised by s. 366, Cr. P. C. [488F]      (4) If  the prisoner  desires loneliness for reflection and remorse, for prayers and making peace with his maker, or opportunities for meeting family or friends. such facilities shall be  liberally granted,  having regard to the stressful spell  of  terrestial  farewell  his  soul  may  be  passing through, the  compassion society  owes to  him whose life it takes. [488H]      (5) The crucial holding under s. 30(2) is that a person is not ’under sentence of death’, even if the sessions Court has sentenced  him to  death subject  to confirmation by the High Court.  He is not ’under sentence of death’ even if the High Court  imposes,  by  confirmation  or  fresh  appellate infliction, death  penalty, so  long as  an  appeal  to  the Supreme Court  is likely  to be  or has  been  moved  or  is pending Even  if this Court has awarded capital sentence, s. 30 9-526SCI /78 396 does not  cover him so long as his petition for mercy to the Governor  and/or   to  the   President  permitted   by   the Constitution, Code  and Prison  Rules, has not been disposed of.  Of  course,  once  rejected  by  the  Governor  or  the President, and  on further  application there  is no stay of execution by  the authorities,  he  is  ’under  sentence  of death’, even  if he  goes on making further mercy petitions. During  that   interregnum   he   attracts   the   custodial segregation specified  in s. 30(2). To be ’under sentence of death‘  means  ’to  be  under  a  finally  executable  death sentence’. [48H, 489A-C]      (6) Further  restraint on  such a condemned prisoner is not ruled  out, if  clear and  present danger of violence or likely violation  of custody is, for good reasons, made out, with due regard to the rules of fair play implied in natural justice. Minimal  hearing shall  be accorded to the affected prisoner if he is subjected to further severity. [489D]      (7) On  the necessity for prison reform and revision of Jail Manuals held:-           (a)  Section 56  must be  tamed and trimmed by the                rule of  law and  shall not turn dangerous by                making prison ’brass’ an imperium in imperio.                The superintendent’s  power shall  be  pruned                and his  discretion, bridled for the purpose.                [489 E]           (b)    Under-trials  shall  be  deemed  to  be  in

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              custody,   but    not   undergoing   punitive                imprisonment.  So  much  so,  they  shall  be                accorded   more   relaxed   conditions   than                convicts. [489E]           (c)   Fetters, especially  bar fetters,  shall  be                shunned as violative of human dignity, within                and  without   prisons.  The   indiscriminate                resort to  handcuffs when accused persons are                taken to  and from court and the expedient of                forcing irons  on prison  inmates are illegal                and shall  be stopped  forthwith  save  in  a                small category of cases. Reckless handcuffing                and chaining  in  public  degrades,  puts  to                shame finer  sensibilities and  is a  slur on                our culture. [489F]           (d)   Where an under trial has a credible tendency                for violence  and escape a humanely graduated                degree of ’Iron’ restraint is permissible if-                only if-other  disciplinary alternatives  are                unworkable. The burden of proof of the ground                is on the custodian. And if he fails, he will                be liable in law. [489G]           (e)  The ’iron’ regimen shall in no case go beyond                the intervals,  conditions and  maxima killed                down for  punitive ’irons’. They shall be for                short spells,  light  and  never  applied  if                sores exist. [489H]           (f)  The discretion  to impose  ’irons’ is subject                to   quasi-judicial    oversight,   even   if                purportedly imposed  for reasons of security.                [490A]           (g)  A previous  hearing. minimal may be, shall be                afforded  to   the  victims.  In  exceptional                cases, the hearing may be soon after. [490 B]           (h)  The gourmands for ’fetters’ shall be given to                the victim.  ,2nd when the decision to fetter                is made, the reasons shall be recorded in the                n journal  and in  the history  ticket of the                prisoner in  the State  language. If  he is a                stranger  to   that  language   it  shall  be                communicated to  him, as  far as possible, in                his language.  This applies  to cases as much                of prison  punishment as  of ’safety fetters.                [490 B-C] 397           (i)   Absent provision  for independent  review of                preventive  and   punitive  A   action,   for                discipline or  security, such action shall be                invalid   as   arbitrary   and   unfair   and                unreasonable. The  prison officials will then                be liable  civilly and criminally for hurt to                the person  of the  prisoners. The State will                urgently set  up or  strengthen the necessary                infra structure and process in this behalf-it                already exists in embryo in the Act. [490C-D]           (j)  Legal aid shall be given to prisoners to seek                justice from prison authorities, and, if need                be, to  challenge the  decision  in  Court-in                cases where  they are  too poor  to secure on                their  own.  If  lawyer’s  services  are  not                given, the  decisional process becomes unfair                and unreasonable, especially because the rule                of law  perishes for  a disabled  prisoner if                counsel   is    unapproachable   and   beyond                purchase. By  and large,  prisoners are poor,

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              lacking legal  literacy, under  the trembling                control of  the jailor,  at his  mercy as  it                were, and  unable to meet relation or friends                to take  legal action.  Where a remedy is all                but dead  the  right  lives  only  in  print.                Article 19 will be violated in such a case as                the process  will be unreasonable. Article 21                will be  infringed  since  the  procedure  is                unfair and is arbitrary. [490E-F]           (k)  No ’fetters’  shall continue  beyond day time                as noctural  fetters on locked-in detenus are                ordinarily uncalled  for,  viewed  from  cons                derations of safety. [490G]           (I)  The prolonged  continuance of  ’irons’, as  a                punitive or preventive step, shall be subject                to previous  approval by an external examiner                like a  Chief Judicial Magistrate or Sessions                Judge who  shall briefly  hear the victim and                record reasons.  They are ex-officio visitors                of most Central Prisons. [490G]           (m)  The Inspector-General  of Prisons shall, with                quick despatch  consider revision  petitions,                by  fettered   prisoners   and   direct   the                continuance or  discontinuance of  the irons.                In the  absence of  such prompt decision, the                fetters  shall   be  deemed   to  have   been                negatived and shall be removed. [490H-491A]      (8)  The Jurisdictional reach and range of this Court’s Writ to  held prison  caprice and  cruelty in constitutional leash is  incontestable. Prisoner  have enforceable liberals devalued may  be but  not demonetized,  and under  on  basic scheme,  Prison   Power  must  bow  before  Judge  Power  is fundamental freedom are in jeopardy. Activist legal aid as a pipeline to  carry to  the court  the breaches of prisoners’ basic rights  is a  radical humanist concomitant of the rule of prison  law.  And  in  our  constitutional  order  it  is axiomatic that  the  prison  laws  do  not  swallow  up  the fundamental rights  of the  legally unfree, and as sentinels on the  qui vive,  courts will  guard freedom  behind  bars, tempered, of course, by environmental realism but intolerant of torture  by executive echelons. The policy of the law and the parmountcy  of the  Constitution are  beyond purchase by authoritarians glibly  invoking ’dangerousness’  of  inmates and peace  in prisons.  If judicial  realism is  not  to  be jettisoned, judicial  activism must  censor the  argument of unaccountable prison autonomy. [409H, 410A, 412G-413B]           (9)     Class  actions,   community   litigations,                representative suits,  test cases  and public                interest proceedings  are in  advance on  our                traditional  court   processes   and   foster                people’s vicarious involvement in our justice                system with a broad 398 based concept  of locus  standi so  necessary in a democracy where the  masses are  in many senses weak. The intervention of social  welfare  organisations  in  litigative  processes pregnant with  wider implications  is  a  healthy  mediation between the  people and  the rule of law. Wisely. permitted, participative   justice,   promoted   through   mass   based organizations and public bodies with special concern seeking to intervene,  has a democratic potential for the little men and law. [414H, 415B]      (10) Rehabilitation  effort as a necessary component of incarceration is  part of the Indian criminal justice system as also of the United States. The custodial staff can make a

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significant contribution by enforcing the rule of prison law and preparing  convicts for  a law-abiding  life after their release. The  important proposition is that it is a crime of punishment  to   further  torture   a  person   under  going imprisonment, as  the remedy  aggravates the malady and thus ceases to  be a reasonable justification for confiscation of personal freedom and is arbitrary because it is blind action not geared  to the  goal of  social defence, which is one of the primary ends of imprisonment. [416H, 416C, 417F]      Mohammed Giasuddin  v. State of Andhra Pradesh  1977(3) SCC 287,  Shelton v.  Tucker 364  US  476  (1950)  at  p.468 referred to.      (11)  The   Court  does   not  ’rush  in’  to  demolish provisions    where    judicial    endeavor,    ameliorative interpretational, may  achieve  both  constitutionality  and compassionate  resurrection.   The  semantic   technique  of updating  the  living  sense  of  a  dated  legislation  is, perfectly legitimate,  especially when,  in  a  deve  loping country like ours, the corpus juris is in some measure a Raj hang over. Courts must, with intelligent imagination, inform themselves of  the values  of  the  Constitution  and,  with functional flexibility,  explore the  meaning of meanings to adopt that Constitution which humanly constitutionalises the statute  in   question.  The   jurisprudence  of   statutory construction, especially when a vigorous break with the past and smooth  reconciliation  with  a  radical  constitutional value-set are  the object,  uses the art of reading down and reading  wide,  as  part  of  interpretational  engineering; [419D-E, 420E, 422B]       Weems  v. United  States 54 L. ed. p. 801, Harvard Law Review Vol.  24 (1970-71)  p. 54-55. R. L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1964) 6 SCR 784 referred to.      (12) Part III of the Constitution does not part company with the  prisoner at  the  gates,  and  judicial  oversight protects the  prisoner’s  shrunken  fundamental  rights,  if flouted upon  or frozen by the prison authority. Is a person under death  sentence, or  under trial  unilaterally  dubbed dangerous liable  to suffer extra torment too deep for fears ? Emphatically  no, lest  social  justice,  dignity  of  the individual, equality  before the  law, procedure established by law  and the  seven lamps  of freedom  (Art.  19)  become chimerical  constitutional   clap  trap.  The  operation  of Articles 14,19  and 21  may be pared down for a prisoner but not puffed  out altogether.  The necessary  sequitur is that even a  prisoner, standing  trial has  basic liberties which cannot be bartered away. [428H-429B. 429E]      (13) So  the law is that for a prisoner all fundamental rights are  an enforce able reality though restricted by the fact of  imprisonment. When  human rights  are hashed behind bars, constitutional justice impeaches such law. [430 C-B]       A.  K. Gopalan  v. State  of Madras 1950 SCR 88; R. C. Cooper v.  Union of  lndia (1971)  SCR 512;  Kharak Singh v. State of  U.P. (1964)  SCR 232;  Maneka Gandhi  v. Union  of India (1978) 1 SCR 218, referred to. 399      (14)  Is  solitary  confinement  or  similar  stressful alternative, putting  the prisoner  beyond the zone of sight and speech  and society  and  wrecking  his  psyche  without deceive   prophylactic    or    penological    gains,    too discriminating  to   he  valid   under   Article   14,   too unreasonable to  be intra  vires Article 19 and too terrible to qualify  for being  human law  under Article  21 ? If the penal law  merely  permits  safe  custody  of  a  condemned’ sentence, so  as to  ensure  his  instant  availability  for execution with  all the  legal rituals on the appointed day,

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is not  the hurtful  severity of  hermetic insulation during the tragic  gap between  the first  judgment and the fall of the pall,  under guise  of  a  prison  regulation,  beyond(l prison power ? [431F-G]      (15) lt  is a certainty that a man in the death row who has invited  that fate by one murder and is striving to save himself from  the allows by frantic forensic proceedings and mercy petitions is not likely to make his hanging certain by committing any murder within the prison. [434B]      (16) A  mere administrative  officer’s deposition about the behavioral  may be  of men  under contingent sentence of death cannot  weigh  with  us  when  the  limited  liberties expression and  locomotion of  prisoners are  sought  to  be unreasonably pared down or virtually wiped out by oppressive cell insulation.  Where total  deprivation to  the truncated liberty of  prisoner locomotion is challenged the validatory burden is on the State. [436C-D]      (17)  Criminological   specialists  have   consistently viewed  with   consternation  the   imposition  of  solitary confinement   punitively    and,    obviously,    preventive segregation stands  on a  worse footing   since  it does not have even  a disciplinary  veneer.  Our  human  order.  must reject ’solitary confinement’ as horrendous. [444H, 445 A-B]      In re Ramanjulu Naidu AIR 1947 Mad 381 approved.      James C. Colemen-Abnormal Psychology and Modern Life p. 105: Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953 Report pp. 216-217.      Law Commission to India-42nd Report. Referred to.      (18) Petitioner  is under ’statutory confinement’ under the authority  of section 30(2) of the Prisons Act read with section 366(2)  Cr. P.C.  It will  be  a  stultification  of judicial power if, under guise of using section 30(2) of the Prisons   Act,   the   Superintendent   inflicts   what   is substantially solitary  confinement which  is a  species  of punishment  exclusively   within  the  jurisdiction  of  the criminal court.  Held Petitioner  shall  not  be  solitarily confined. [447B]      (19) Law  is not  a formal  label, nor  logomachy but a working  technique  of  justice.  The  Penal  Code  and  the Criminal Procedure  Code regard  punitive solitude too harsh and the  Legislature cannot be intended to permit preventive solitary confinement, released even from the restrictions of Sections 73  and 74  IPC, Section  29 of the Prisons Act and the restrictive Prison Rules. It would be extraordinary that a far  worse solitary  confinement, marked  as safe custody, sans maximum,  sans intermission, sans judicial oversight or natural justice, would be sanctioned. [447D-E]      (20) Section  30 of the Prisons Act can be applied only to a prisoner "under sentence of death". Section 30(2) which speaks of  "such" prisoners necessarily relates to prisoners under sentence  of death.  We have  to discover  when we can designate  a  prisoner  as  one  under  sentence  of  death. Confinement  inside   prison  does  not  necessarily  impart cellular isolation. Segregation of one person 400 all alone  in a single cell is solitary confinement. That is a separate  punishment which  the Court alone can impose. It would be   subversion of this statuary provision (Section 73 and 74  IPC) to  impart a  meaning to  Section 30(2)  of the Prisons Act  whereby  a  disciplinary  variant  of  solitary confinement can  be clamped  down on a prisoner, although no court has awarded such a punishment. [448B, 448D]      (21) "Apart  from all  other prisoners" used in Section 30(2) is  also a phrase of flexible import, segregation into an isolated  cell is  not warranted by the word. All that it

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connotes is  that in  a cell  where there are a plurality of inmates, the  death sentence  will have to be kept separated from the  rest in  the same  cell but  not too  close to the others. And  this separation  can  be  effectively  achieved because the  condemned prisoner  will be  placed  under  the charge of a guard by way and by night. [448-F-G]      (22) Prison  offences are  listed  in  section  45  and section 46  deals with punishment for such offences. Even if a grave  prison offence  has been  committed. the punishment does not  carry segregated  cellular existence  and  permits life in  association in  mess and exercise in view and voice but not  in communication  with  other  prisoners.  Punitive separate confinement  shall  not  exceed  there  months  and section  47   interdicts   the   combination   of   cellular confinement    and    "separate    confinement"    "Cellular confinement"  is   a  stricter   punishment  than   separate confinement and  it cannot  exceed 14  days because  of  its rigor. Less  severe is  cellular confinement  under  section 46(10)  of   the  Prisons   Act  and  under  section  46(8). Obviously, disciplinary needs of keeping apart a prisoner do not involve  any harsh  element of  punishment  at  all.  An analysis of  the provision  of the  Penal Code  and  of  the Prisons Act  yields the  clear inference  that section 30(2) relates  to  separation  without  isolation,  keeping  apart without close confinement. [449B, 450B-C, 450F, 450H]      (23) The  Court awards  only  a  single  sentence  viz. death. But  it cannot  be  instantly  executed  because  its excitability is  possible only  on confirmation  by the High Court. In  the meanwhile,  the sentence  cannot be let loose for he  must be available for decapitation when the judicial processes are  exhausted. So it is that section 365(2) takes care of this awesome interregnum by com  missing  the convict  to jail  custody. Form 40 authorities safe keeping.  The ’safe  keeping’ in  jail custody  is  the limited jurisdiction  of the  jailor.  The  convict  is  not sentenced to  imprisonment. He  is not sentenced to solitary confinement. He is a guest in custody in the safe keeping of the host-jailor  until  the  terminal  hour  of  terrestrial farewell whisks  him away  to the  halter. The  inference is inevitable that  if  the  ’condemned’  man  were  harmed  by physical or  mental torture  the law  would not tolerate the doing, since  injury and  safety  are  obvious  enemies.  To distort safe-keeping  into a  hidden opportunity to cage the ward and  to traumatize  him is to betray the custody of the law. Safekeeping  means keeping  his body  and mind  in fair condition. To  torture his mind is unsafe keeping. Injury to his personality  is not  safe keeping. To preserve his flesh and crush  his spirit  is not  safe keeping.  Any  executive action which  spells infraction of the life and liberty of a human being  kept  in  prison  precincts,  purely  for  safe custody, is  a challenge  to the basic notion of the rule of law unreasonable,  unequal, arbitrary  and unjust. [451 D-H, 452B, D.F]      (24) A  convict is  under sentence  of death  when, and only when?  the capital  penalty inexorably  operates by the automatic process of the law. 401      Abdul Azeez v. Karnataka [1977] 3 SCR 393: D. K. Sharma v. M. P. State A [1976] 2 SCR 289 referred to. [454G]      (25) A self-acting sentence of death does not come into existence in  view of  the impediment  contained in  section 366(1) even  though the Sessions Court might have pronounced that sentence.  Assuming that  the High  Court has confirmed that death  sentence or  has de novo imposed death sentence, even then,  there is  quite a likelihood of an appeal to the

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Supreme Court  and when an appeal pends against a conviction and sentence  in regard  to an offence punishable with death sentence such  death sentence  even if confirmed by the High Court shall  not work  itself, until  the Supreme  Court has pronounced  judgment   Articles  72   and  161  provide  for commutation of  death sentence  even like  sections 433, 434 and 435  Cr. P.C.  Rules 547  and 548  made under the Prison Act, provide for a petition for commutation by the prisoner. It follows  that during the Pendency of a petition for mercy before the  State Governor  or the  President of  India  the death sentence  shall not be executed. Thus, until rejection of the  clemency motion  by these two high dignitaries it is not possible  to predicate  that there  is a  self-executory death sentence  and he  becomes subject  to it only when the clemency  application   by  the  prisoner  stands  rejected. [455BD, 456B, H 457A]      (26) The  goals of  prison keeping, especially if it is mere safe  keeping, come   be  attained without  requiring a prisoner to  live in  the exacerbated conditions 1) of bare- floor solitude.  Functionally  speaking,  the  court  has  a distinctive duty  to reform  prison practices  and to inject constitutional consciousness  into  the  system.  Sastre  v. Rockefeller 312F.  Suppl. 863 (1970). Wolfe v. Mc Donnell 41 I. rd. 2d p. 935. [465 B-C]      (27) The  great problems of law are the grave crises of life and  both can be solved not by the literal instructions of   printed    enactments   but   by   the   interpretative sensitization of  the heart-to  ’one  still,  sad  music  of humanity. [471 G]      (28 )  . The  humane thread  of jail jurisprudence that runs right  through  is  that  no  prison  authority  enjoys amnesty  for  unconstitutionality  and  forced  farewell  to fundamental right  is an institutional outrage in our system where stone  walls and  iron bars shall bow before- the rule of law. [471H-472A]      (29) Many  states like  Tamil Nadu,  Kerala  etc.  have abandoned the  disciplinary barbarity  of bar  fetters.  The infraction of  the prisoner  s freedom by bar fetters is too serious to  be viewed  lightly and  the  basic  features  of reasonableness must be built into the administrative process for constitutional  survival. Therefore,  an outside agency, in the  sense of an official. higher than the Superintendent or external  to the  prison department,  must be  given  the power to review the older of ’irons’. Rule 423 speaks of the Inspector General  of Prisons  having to  be informed of the circumstances necessitating  fetters and belchains. Rule 426 has a similar import. A right of appeal or revision from the action of  the Superintendent  to the  Inspector General  of prisons and  quick action by way of review v are implicit in the provision. [477D. 477F-478A]      (30) one  of the  paramount requirements of a valid law is that it must be within the cognizance of the community if a competent search for it were made. Legislative tyranny may be unconstitutional  if the  State by  devious methods  like pricing legal publication monopolised by government too high denies the 402 equal  protection  of  the  laws  and  imposes  unreasonable restrictions on exercise of fundamental rights [485G. 486B]      Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik v. State of A.P. [1975] 3 SCC 185, 189.      (31) The  roots of  our Constitution  lie deep  in  the finer. spiritual  sources  of  social  justice,  beyond  the melting  pot   of  bad   politicking  feudal  crudities  and sublimated sadism,  sustaining itself  by profound  faith in

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Man and  his latent  divinity, and so it is that the Prisons Act provisions and the Jail Manual itself must be revised to reflect  this   deeper  meaning  in  the  behavioral  norms, correctional attitudes and humane orientation for the prison staff and prisoners alike. [492E]                          ARGUMENTS For the Petitioner in Writ petition No. 2202 of 1977.      1. Section  30 by its language docs not enjoin the jail authorities to confine a prisoner under sentence of death to solitary confinement.  It provides  that  a  prisoner  under sentence of  death should  be confined  in a cell apart from all other  prisoners and shall be placed day and night under the charge  of a  guard. Such  a  prisoner  is  entitled  to participate  in  all  the  recreational  and  rehabilitation activities of  the jail  and is also entitled to the company of other prisoners.      2. Section  30 requires that a prisoner "under sentence of death"  shall be  confined in  the manner.  prescribed by sub-section (2).  The expression  ’under sentence  of death’ also occurs  in s.  303 I.P.C..  In [1976]  2 ’SCR  289  the Supreme Court  held that  the expression ’must be restricted to a sentence which is final, conclusive and ultimate so far as  judicial  remedies  are  concerned‘r  As  far  as  death sentence is concerned the trial does not end in the Sessions Court and  confirmation proceedings  in the High Court are a continuation of the trial, [1975] 3 SCR. 574. In other words until the  High Court confirms a sentence of death, there is no operative  executable sentence  of death.  Article 134 of the Constitution  also provides for an appeal to the Supreme Court in  certain cases  where the  High Court  has  awarded death penalty.      3. The  conditions of  solitary  confinement  have  the tendency of depriving a prisoner of his normal faculties and may have  the tendency  to destroy  a prisoner’s mentallity. Justice, Punishment,  Treatment by  Leonard orland 1973 Edn. 297, 307-308:  Havelock Ellis,-The  Criminal p. 327; History of solitary  confinement and its effects-134 US 160.      4. Solitary  confinement is  imposed  as  a  punishment under sections 73 and 74 I.P.C. and under the Prisons Manual as a matter of prison discipline. It does not exceed 14 days at a time. In the case of prisoner who is under a sentence  of  death, as  construed by  the jail authorities, however, such confinement continues over long periods.      5. The  Law Commission  of India in its 42nd Reports at p. 78 has recommended the abolition of solitary confinement. Courts have  also condemned it. A.l.R. 1947 Mad. 386; 134 US 160, 167. 168.      6.  There   are  compelling   reasons  that   a  narrow construction should  be put on Sec. 30 which will reduce the extreme rigour  and penalty of the law. Only a court has the authority to  inflict a  punishment. The jail authorities do not have  a right  to inflict  any punishment  except  as  a matter of jail discipline. As 403 s. 30  empowers the jail authorities to impose an additional punishment of  solitary A  confinement, it is submitted that it is violative of Art. 20(l) of the Constitution.      7. The  expression under  ’sentence of death’ should be construed to  mean  ’under  a  final  executable,  operative sentence of  death’. There is legislative injunction against the execution  of a  sentence of death in Ss. 366, 413, 414, 415, 432  and 433  Cr. P.  C. A  sentence of death cannot be executed till  the appeal, if any, has been finally disposed of by the Court. A prisoner has also the right to make mercy petitions to  the Governor  or the president as the case may

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be. Para 548 of the Prison Rules provides that in no case is the  sentence   of  death  to  be  carried  out  before  the Government s  reply to  the mercy petition is received. Till this time  arrives, a  prisoner under  sentence of  death is entitled to  be treated as a human being with a hope for the future, entitled  to struggle  for rehabilitation.  Till the final stage has arrived such a prisoner cannot be treated as a lost, condemned human being.      8.  Section  30  is  violative  of  Au  t.  14  of  the Constitution. It imposes the penalty or solitary confinement on condemned  prisoners without  any distinction. The Prison Manual does  contain provision  for dangerous  prisoners who may, as  a matter  of prison discipline, be kept in solitary confinement. Failure  to make  a distinction  between a safe prisoner under sentence of death and a hostile and dangerous prisoner introduces  arbitrariness in the treatment accorded to prisoners  under sentence  of death and thus is violative of Article 14.      9. A prisoner is not deprived of his personal liberties [1975]2 SCR  24. Article 21 is subject to Article 14. [19781 1 S.C.C.  248 The  expression ’life’  as used  in Article 21 means something  more than  mere animal  existence  and  the inhibition against  is  deprivation  extends  to  all  those limits and faculties by which life is enjoyed. For the Respondent in W.P. 2202/77      1. Criminal law of India recognises capital punishment. It is  awarded in  very few  cases. It  is not  the rule but rather the exception, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 340.      2. Death  penalty has  been upheld as constitutional in [1973] 2  S.C.R. 541.  Section 354  (3)  Cr.  P.C.  Of  1973 requires the  recording of  reasons for  infliction of death penalty.      3. there is no provision for substantive due process in the Indian  Constitution. 11950]  S.C.R. 88, [1973] 2 S.C.R. 541/548.      4.. A  prisoner is  not a slave of the State and is not denuded of  all  fundamental  rights.  Lawful  incarceration brings about  the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many rights and  makes them  unavailable to  prisoners. Prisoners have less  than the  full panoply  of freedoms which private persons  would   have  in   non-prison   situation.   Prison regulations  and   prison  discipline   and   considerations underlying our  penal system  necessitate restrictions being imposed. 92L, ed. 1356. 224 T. ed. 224. 238-24: 411 ed. 935. 950, 954, 957. [1975] 2 S.C.R. 24.      5. Solitary  confinement is  complete isolation  of the prisoner from all human society and confinement in a cell so arranged that  he has  no direct intercourse or right of any human being or no employment or instruction. Webster’s Third New International  Dictionary Vol. III p. 2170, 33L ed. 835, 839. 404      6. lt  is a  misnomer to  characterise confinement in a cell as  provided in  Section JO(2)  read with Chapter 31 of the Jail Manual as solitary confinement.      7. There  is a fundamental distinction between solitary confinement imposed I punishment or an additional punishment and confinement  of prisoner  under sentence  of death  in a separate cell,  for the purpose of preventing his suicide or escape and  for ensuring the presence of the prisoner on the day appointed for execution.      8. The  expression "under sentence of death" in section 30(2) means  under sentence of death which is executable and which is  finally conclusive and ultimate so far as judicial remedies are  concerned. [1976] 2 S.C.R 289, [1977] 3 S.C.R.

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393.  Section   30(2)  should   be  so   construed  and  its implications worked  out having  regard to  Sections 413-415 Cr. P.C‘.      9. The rational underlying section 30(2) and Chapter 31 of the  Manual is  that prisoners  under sentence  of death, present problems  peculiar to  such persons  which  warrants their separate  classification and treatment as a measure of jail administration  and jail  discipline.  Prisoners  under sentence of  death are  in a  class by  themselves and their separate classification  has been  recognised over the years in India  and other  civilized countries.  Even in countries where solitary  confinement as a norm of punishment has been abolished, confinement  of prisoners under sentence of death continues. [Halsbury’s  Laws of England Vol. 30 p. 601. para 1151. U.K. Prison Rules 1964 (r.r. 74-76].      10.  The   fundamental  distinction   between  imposing solitary confinement  as a  punishment and  as  a  necessary measure of  jail discipline is recognised in the 42nd Report of the law Commission. (para 380).      11. Section  30(2) so  construed is  not  violative  of Article 14.  The failure  to sub-classify  does not  involve breach of Article 14.      12. In the United States solitary confinement even as a punishment by  itself has  been consistently  held to be not violative of the VIII Amendment. What the Courts have struck down is  the particular system of solitary confinement if it is implemented  and maintained  in an  inhuman or  barbarous manner. Conditions  in jail  may not be perfect or ideal but the same  cannot be  said to  be sub-human  or violative  of human dignity  of prisoners.  Certain matters  may  urgently call for  reform but  that does not brand the Regulations as unconstitutional . For the Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 565/77      1. (a) The petitioner who is an under-trial prisoner is a French  National and  not being a citizen of India certain fundamental rights like Article 19 are not available to him. But as  a human  being he  is entitled  on the  basic rights which are  enshrined in  Articles 14  20 21  and 22  of  the Constitution.      (b) The  petitioner who  was arrested  on 6th July 1976 alongwith four  other foreigners  has been  kept  under  bar fetters 24  hours a  day auld  they are  welded on  him ever since his arurest.      2. The  petitioner seeks  to challenge Paragraph 399(3) of the  Punjab laid Manual and Section 56 of the Prison Act, as violative  of the  petitioner’s fundamental  right  under Articles 14  and 21 of the Constitution. The following facts indicate the  brutality inflicted  by the respondents on the Petitioner. 405      (a) By  continuous wearing  of bar  fetters? there were wounds on  his ankles  A and  he  represented  to  the  jail authority to  remove them.  As no  relier was  obtained, the petitioner. filed  a writ  petition in  the Delhi High Court challenging the  conditions of  his detention  but the  High Court dismissed  the same as not maintainable on February 2, 1977 relying  on 1972(2)  S.C.R. 719.  As such  despite  his wounds the petitioner had to suffer.      (b) The  Jailor  ordered  removal  of  bar  fetters  in February 9,  1977  for  15  days  but  jail  authorities  in violation of  medical advice  put bar  fetters after  9 days i.e. 18th  February 1977.  The respondents  thereby violated the mandatory provisions of the Act.      (c) The  Punjab Jail  Manual is  totally  an  out-dated enactment inasmuch  as even  after 30 years of Independence,

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paragraph 576(d)(1)  makes the  wearing  of  Gandhi  Cap  by prisoners a  jail offence an pargraph 63010) permits inhuman punishment like  beating, besides  putting bar fetters under paragraph 399 read with section 56 of the Prison Act. LEGAL SUBMISSIONS      1. A  person in  jail is  already subject  to  enormous curtailment of  his liberties.  The protection  of  whatever liberties are  left inside  the jail demand that they cannot be  taken   away  arbitrarily   and  without  the  procedure established by  laws. The  greater the restriction, stricter should be the security of the Court, so that the prisoner is not subjected  to unnecessary  and  arbitrary  loss  of  his remaining liberties.      2. Paragraphs 399 and 435 of the Punjab Jail Manual are not laws  under Article  13(3) of  the Constitution of India and are  void as  they restrict personal liberty without the authority of law under Article 21 of the Constitution. These provisions bar  which bar  fetters can be put on a prisoner, severely curtailing his liberty of movement of limbs, on the ground that  he  is  dangerous  and  as  long  as  the  jail authorities consider  it necessary  are void  as they do not have authority of law (1964) 1 SCR 332, 338, 339, 345.      3. (a)  Section 56  of  the  Prison  Act  is  arbitrary inasmuch as  it allows  the jail  authorities to  choose any type of  irons to  be put  on any prisoner. in paras 425 and 614 of  the  Punjab  Jail  Manual,  3  types  of  irons  are mentioned; handcuffs  weighing 2 Ibs., link fetters weighing 2 Ibs  and bar  fetters weighing  5 Ibs. Section 56 does not give any  guide-line as  to which fetters are to be put on a prisons-  who   is  considered   dangerous.  Thus  similarly situated prisoners can has discriminate under. the section.      (b) Since  section 56 which allows the Prison Authority to put  irons on  prisoner depending  upon the  state of the prison it  is violative of Article 14 as well 15 Article 21. because if  the prisoner  is fortunate to be imprisoned in a well-guarded modern  Jail he  would not  be put under irons, while a  similarly situated prisons who is unfortunate to be put in  a dilapidated  jail, he  would be  made to suffer by being put under irons.      (c) Section  56 is  ultra vires  of Articles  14 and 21 because it  allows the  Jail authorities to put irons on the personal assessments  as "to the character of prisoners" The section thereby  gives complete  power to  pick  and  choose prisoners for. being confined in irons. 406      (d) Section  56 of  the Prison Act and paragraph 399 of the Jail  Manual, which restrict personal liberty, in so far as they  abridge and  take  away  fundamental  rights  under Article 14,  will have to meet the challenge of that Article otherwise it  is not  a valid  law. [1967]  3 S.C.R.  28/46; [19701 3 S.C.R. 530/546 and [1978] I S.C.R. 248/323.      4. Paragraph 399(3) of the Manual and section 56 of the Prison ACT  which  impose inhuman and cruel restrictions and subjects the  petitioner to  Torture more than those who are punished for jail offences are not laws when judged from the evolving  standards   of  decency  and  present  concept  of civilization. When  bar fetters are to be used as punishment they cannot  be put continuously for more than 3 months vide paragraphs 616  and 617,  while under impugned paragraph 399 and under  section 56  of the  Prison Act  they can  be  put indefinitely.      5. When  a prisons  is subject  to  cruel  and  inhuman treatment the  Court  has  the  power  and  jurisdiction  to interfere because  of its  sentencing  function,  since  the prisoner is behind bars by the order of the Court. Hence the

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condition   of    his   confinement   is   the   continuing, responsibility of the Court      6. In  view of  the Preamble  and  Article  51  of  the Constitution, which  obligate the  State  to  respect  human dignity  and   foster  respect  for  international  law  and obligations,  the  Courts  have  a  constitutional  duty  in interpreting provisions  of domestic laws to give due regard to  international   law   and   country’s   inter   national obligations.      7. This  is also because the judicial process is a part of the  State activity  vide Article 12 of the Constitution, and the  directive principles  are addressed  as much to the Executive and the Legislature as they are to the judiciary.      8. When  domestic law  is applied to a foreigner. there is a  presumption that  the legislature  intends to  respect rules of  international law  and  country’s  inter  national obligations.      70 ER  712/716; [1960]  3 All.  E. R. 814/821; 1891 (1) Q.B.D. 108/112.      9. In  interpreting statutes particularly ancient penal statutes, it  is the  duty of the court to interpret it in a broad  and   liberal  sense   in  the  light  of  prevailing conditions and  prefer a  construction which is favorable to the individual.      [1953] S.C.R.  825/847; A.I.R.  ]961  S.C.  1494,  1968 S.C.R. 62. For the Respondent in Writ Petition No. 565/77      1. Challenge to Sec. 56 of the Prisons Act 1894 must be judged  in   the  context  of  the  subject  matter  of  the legislation viz. "Prisons".      2. Maintenance  of penal  institution  (Prison)  is  an essential function  of government for preservation of social order through enforcement of criminal law.      3. One of the primary and legitimate goals of any penal institution is  the maintenance  of  institutional  security against escape  of the prisoner from the care and custody of the  penal   institution  to  which  he  has  been  lawfully committed 40  I. ed.  2nd 234,  235, 239; 41 L. ed. 2nd 495, 501. 502.      4.  There   must  be   mutual   accommodation   between institutional  needs   and  constitutional  provisions.  Not unwisdom but  unconstitutionality is  the touch stone. 41 L. ed. 2d. 935, 951. 954. 407      5. Several  features of  prison administration  may  be undesirable  or   ill-advised  but  that  cannot  result  in condemnation of  the statute  as unconstitutional,  [1975] 2 S.C.R. 24,  28; 40  L. ed.  2d 224,  235.  Courts  are  ill- equipped to  deal with  the increasingly  urgent problem  of prison administration and reform.      6. Power  under section 56 can be exercised for reasons and considerations  which are  germane to  and carry out the objective of the statute, namely, "safe custody of prisoners The following  conditions must  be  fulfilled  before  power under section 56 is exercised:-      (a)  Existence   of  necessity,   as  opposed  to  mere expediency or convenience, for confining prisoners in irons, 11 Guj. L. R. 403, 413.      (b) The determination of necessity to confine prisoners in irons  is to  be made with reference to definite criteria namely,  state  of  the  prison  or  the  character  of  the prisoners.      (c) The  expression "character of the prisoners" in the context and  on a true construction is referable to past our present characteristics  or attributes  of a  prisoner which

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have a  rational and proximate nexus with and are germane to considerations  regarding  safe  custody  of  prisoners  and preventing their escape.      (d) The determination must be made after application of mind to  the peculiar  and special  characteristics of  each individual prisoner.      ( e ) The expressions, "dangerous prisoners" or ’unsafe prisoners" has a definite and well recognised connotation in the context of prison legislation prison literature.      (f) Under  para 399  (3)(e), special reasons for having recourse to fetters are required to be fully recorded in the Superintendent’s journal and noted in the prisoner s history ticket. Decisions regarding imposition of fetters have to be reviewed from  time to  time, in  order to determine whether their continued  imposition is warranted by consideration of security (vide para 435).      (g) Para  69 of the Jail Manual provides for a revision to the Inspector  General the  order of the Superintendent.      (h) Prisoner  can also  avail of  redress under para 49 read with para 53B of the Manual.      (i) Determination  of the  Superintendent  is  open  to judicial review  on the principles laid down in [1966] Supp. S.C.R. 311 and [1969] 3 S.C.R. 108.      (j) Power  under section  56 is  not punitive in nature but precautionary in character.      8. If  the legislative  policy is  clear and  definite, discretion vested in a body of administrators or officers to make selective  application of  the law  does  not  infringe Article 14.  A guiding  principle  has  been  laid  down  by section 56  which has the effect of limiting the application of the provision to a particular category of persons, [1975] I S.C.R. 1, 21, 22, 23, 48-53.      9.   There    is   a    presumption   in    favour   of constitutionality of  statutes, [1959] S.C.R. 279, 297. This presumption applies  with greater  force  when  the  statute under  consideration   is  one   dealing  with  prisons  and maintenance of internal security in penal institutions 408      10. It  is not  open to  the  petitioner  to  challenge section 56  on the  ground that  power can be exercised with reference to  "the state  of prison",  inasmuch as no action based on  that part  of the  provisions is taken against the petitioner [1955] I S.C.R. 1284, 1295.      11.  There   is  no   provision  in   our  Constitution corresponding to  VIII Amendment  of the  U.S. Constitution, [1973] 2 S.C.R. 541, 548.      12. There  is also  no provision  for  substantive  due process in the Indian   Constitution.      [1950] S.C.R. 88; [1973] 2 S.C. R. 541. 548.

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 2202 and 565 of 1977.      Under Article 32 of the Constitution.      Y. S. Chitale (A.C.), Randhir Jain, M. Mudgal and G. K. B.  Chowdhury   (A.C.)  for  the  petitioner  (in  W.P.  No. 2202/77).      N. M.  Ghatate, S. V. Deshpande, Sumitra Bannerjee & M. K. D.  Namboodiry for  the petitioner  (in W.P.  No. 565  of 1977).      Soli J.  Sorabjee, Addl. Sol. Genl., K. N. Bhatt, R. N. Sachthey and  Girish Chandra  for the  petitioner  (in  W.P. No.2202/77)

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    Soli J.  Sorabjee, Addl.  Sol. General,  E. C. Agarwala and Girish Chandra for the respondents (in W.P. 565/77).      V. M.  Tarkunde, P.  M. Parekh  for the  Intervener (in W.P. No. 565/77).      The following Judgments of the Court were delivered:      KRISHNA IYER,  J.-The province  of prison  justice, the conceptualization of  freedom behind  bars and  the role  of judicial  power  as  constitutional  sentinel  in  a  prison setting, are  of the gravest moment in a world of escalating torture by  the minions  of State,  and in India, where this virgin area of jurisprudence is becoming painfully relevant. Therefore, explicative length has been the result; and so it is that,  with all  my reverence for and concurrence with my learned brethren  on the  jurisdictional and jurisprudential basics they  have indicated,  I have  preferred to  plough a lonely furrow. The Core-questions.      One important  interrogation lies  at the root of these twin writ petitions: Does a prison setting, ipso facto, out- law the  rule of law. lock out the judicial process from the jail gates  and declare  a long  holiday for human rights of convicts in confinement, and (to 409 change the  mataphor) if  there is  no total  eclipse,  what luscent segment  is open for judicial justice ? Three inter- related problems  project themselves:  (i) a  jurisdictional dilemma between  ’hands off  prisons’ and  ’take  over  jail administration’  (ii)   a  constitutional  conflict  between detentional security and inmate liberties and (iii) the role of processual  and substantive  reasonableness  in  stopping brutal jail  conditions. In such basic situations, pragmatic sensitivity, belighted  by the  Preamble to the Constitution and balancing  the vulnerability  of ’caged’  human to State torment and  the prospect  of escape  or internal  disorder, should be the course for the court to navigate      I proceed  to lay  bare  the  broad  facts,  critically examine.  the   legal  contentions  are  resolve  the  vital controversy which  has profound  impact on our value system. Freedom is  what Freedom  does-to the  last and  the  least- Antyodaya.      Two petitines-Batra and Sobraj-one Indian and the other French, one  under death sentence and the other facing grave charges, share  too different shapes, the sailing and arrows of incarceratory  fortune, but instead of submitting to what they describe  as shocking  jail  injustice,  challenge,  by separate  writ   petitions,  such   traumatic  treatment  as illegal. The soul of these twin litigations is the question, in  spiritual   terms,  whether  the  prison  system  has  a conscience in constitutional terms, whether 2 prisoner, ipso facto, forfeits  person- hood to become a rightless slave of the State  and, in cultural terms, whether man-management of prison  society   can  operate   its  arts  by  ’zoological’ strategies. The  grievance of  Batra, sentenced  to death by the Delhi  Sessions Court,  is  against  to  facto  solitary confinement, pending  his appeal,  without to jure sanction. And the  complaint of  Sobraj  is  against  the  distressing disablement, by  bar fetters,  of men behind bars especially of undertrials, and that for unlimited duration, on the ipse dixit of  the prison  ’brass’. The  petitioners, seek to use the rule  of law  to force open the iron gates of Tihar Jail where they  are now  lodged, and  the Prison  Administration resists judicial action, in intra-mural matters as forbidden ground. relying  on sections  30 and 56 of Prisons Act, 1894 (the Act,  hereafter). The  Petitioners invoke  articles 14, 21(and 19, in the case of Batra) of The Constitutional.

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    The  paramount  law.  Prison  discipline  and  judicial oversight.      The jurisdictional reach and range of this Court’s writ to hold  prison caprice  and cruelty in constitutional leash is incontestable,  but teasing intrusion into administrative discretion is legal anathema, 410 absent  breaches  of  constitutional  rights  or  prescribed procedures. Prisoners  have enforceable  liberties  devalued may be  but not  demonetized; and  under our  basic  scheme, prison Power  must bow  before judge  Power  if  fundamental freedoms are  in jeopardy. The principle is settled, as some American decisions have neatly put it.(’).      "The Matter  of internal  management of  prisons or cor      rectional institutions  is vested in and rests with the      hands of  those institutions  operating under statutory      authority and  their acts  and administration of prison      discipline and  over all  operation of  the institution      are not subject to court super vision or control absent      most- unusual  circumstances or absent a violation or a      constitutional right." But Corwin notes.(2)           "Federal courts  have intensified  their oversight      of State  penal  facilities,  reflecting  a  heightened      concern with  the extent  to which the ills that plague      so-called    correctional     institution-overcrowding,      understaffing.   unsanitary    facilities,   brutality,      constant fear of violence, lack of adequate medical and      mental  health   care,  poor  food  service,  intrusive      correspondence   restrictions,    inhumane   isolation,      segregation, inadequate  or non-existent rehabilitative      and/or  educational  programs,  deficient  recreational      opportunities-violate  the   Eight  Amendment   ban  on      ’’cruel and unusual punishments."      The hands-off’  doctrine is  based  on  the  fallacious foundation stated in 1871 in Ruffin v. Commonwealth:           "He has,  as a  consequence of his crime, not only      for feited  his liberty,  hut all  his personal  rights      except these  which the  law in its humanity accords to      him. He  is for  the  time  being,  the  slave  of  the      State."(8) During the  century that  followed, the American courts have whittled away  at  the  doctrine  and  firstly  declared  in Jordan(4) that  when the  responsible prison authorities.... have abandoned elemental con-      (1) Federal  Reporter 2d.  Series, Vol.  386,  p.  684; Donnel Douglas v. Maurice H. Sigler.      (2) Supplement  to Edward S. Corwin’s. The Constitution p. 245.      (3) 62 Vs . (21 Gratt) 790, 796 (1871)      (4) 257  Fed. Suppl.  674 Jordan  l.. Fitzharris (N. D. Cal. 1966) 411 cepts of  decency by  permitting conditions  to prevail of a shocking and  debased   nature.,   the courts must intervene promptly  to   restore  the  primal  rules  of  a  civilized community ill accord with the mandate of the Constitution of the United States.      In Coffin  V.  Reichard  the  court  was  persuaded  to intervene when,  while lawfully  in custody  a  prisoner  is deprived of  some right  the B,  loss  of  which  makes  his imprisonment more burdensome than the law permits:           "When a  man, possesses  a substantial  right, the      Courts will be diligent in finding a way to protect it.      The fact  that a  person is  legally in prison does not      prevent the  use of  habeas corpus to protect his other

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    inherent rights.      In John  v.Dys, the  (Court again  held  it  preferable "that a  potentially dangerous  individual be  set free than the least  degree of   and  impairment of an   individuals’s basic  constitutional   rights  be   permitted.  Thus,   the constitutionally  of   imprisonment,   its   duration,   and conditions  Can  be  validity  tested  by  means  of  habeas corpus.      The harshest  blow to the old ‘hands-off’ doctrines was struck by   Manree  v. Pepa,  365 US  167, 5  L.Ed. 2d,, 492 (1961).      Where the  court insisted  on ‘‘civilized  standards of      humane decency"  and interdicted the subhuman condition      which could only serve to destroy completely the spirit      and undermine the sanity of the prisoner.      By l 975, the United states Supreme Court sustained the indubitable proposition  that constitutional  rights did not desert convicts  but dwindled in scope. A few sharp passages from Eve Pall(1) opinions and some telling observations from Charles Wolff(2)  nail the  argument the prisioners the non- persons.      Mr. Justice  Steward. who  delivered the opinion of the Court in  Eve  Pell  observed  "Courts  cannot,  of  course, abdicate their  constitutional responsibility  to  delineate and  protect  fundamental  liberties.  But  when  the  issue involves a  regulation limiting  one  of  several  means  of communication by  an inmate,  the  institutional  objectives furthered by  that regulation  and the  measure of  judicial deference owed  to corrections officials in their attempt to serve these  interests are  relevant in gauging the validity of the regulation."      (1) 417 US 817 41 Ed. 2d 495.      (2) 41 L. Ed. 2d. 935. 10-526SCI/78 412      Mr. Justice  Douglas. in  his dissenting  view,  stated ’prisioners   are    still   ’persons’   entitled   to   all constitutional  rights   unless  their   liberty  has   been constitutional by  curtailed by procedures that satisfy  all the requirements  of due process, (emphasis, added).      In the  later case  of charles  Wolff, the  court  made emphatic  statements   driving  home  the  same  point.  For instance, Mr.  Justice  White,  who  spoke  for  the  court, observed: "Lawful imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable many.  rights   and  privileges   of  the  ordinary  citizen retraction in  by the  considerations underlying  our  penal system.  But   though  his   rights  may  be  diminished  by environment,     prisoner  is   not   wholly   stripped   of constitutional protections  when he is imprisoned for crime. There is  no‘ iron  Curtain drawn  between the Constitutions and the  prisons of  this country,  .. In  sum there must be mutual  accommodation   between  institutional   needs   and objectives and  the provisions  of the Constitution that are of general application.      Mr. Justice  Marshall expressed  himself explicitly  "I have previously stated my view that a prisoner does not shed his basic  constitutional rights  at the  prison Gate, and I fully support  the court’s  holding  that  the  interest  of inmates is  freedom from imposition of serious discipline is a liberty’ entitled to due process protection."      Mr.  Justice  Douglas,  again  a  dissenter,  asserted: "Every prisoner’s  liberty i.e., of course, circumscribed by the very  fact of  his confinement,  but his interest in the limited  liberty   left  to   him  is  then  only  the  more substantial. Conviction  of a  crime does  not render  one a

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nonperson whose  rights are     subject to the within of the prison  administration,   and  therefore,   the   imposition of any  serious punishment within the prison system requires procedural safeguards of course, a bearing  need  not be  held before  a prisoner  is subjected to some minor deprivation,  such as  an evening’s loss of television privileges. Placement  in solitary  confinement, however, is not in that category".      I   may   now   crystalise   this   legal   discussion. Disciplinary autonomy,  in the  hands of  mayhem- happy jail staffers, may  harry human  rights and the walis from behind the high  walis will  not easily  break through  the  sound- proof, night-proof barrier to awaken the judges’ writ juris- diction. So,  it  follows  that  activist  legal  aid  as  a pipeline to  carry to  the court  the breaches of prisoners’ basic rights  is a  radical humanist concomitant of the rule of prison  law.  And  in  our  constitutional  order  it  is axiomatic that  the  prison  laws  do  not  swallow  up  the fundamental rights  of the legally unfree, and, as sentinels on the  qui vive,  courts will  guard Freedom  behind  bars, tampered, of course, by environmental realism but intolerant of torture by executive echelons. The policy 413      Of the  law and the paramountcy of the constitution are beyond   purchase    by   authoritarians   glibly   invoking ’dangerousness’ of inmates and peace in prisons.      If judicial  realism is  not to be jettisoned, judicial activism must  censor the  argument of  unaccountable prison autonomy.      ’Dangerousness’  as  a  cover  for  police  and  prison atrocities is  not unusual,  as a recent judicial enquiry by Mr. Justice Ismail in a ’Tamil Nadu prison indicates:           "The black  hole of  Calcutta is  not a historical      past but  a  present  reality.  The  Report  finds  the      detenus were  deliberately lodged  in the  nineth block      which was previously occupied by leprosy prisoners.           on the  night of  February 2,  "there were brutal,      merciless and  savage beatings  of the  detenus in  the      nineth block", earlier in the afternoon, the Chief Head      Warder went  to the  block and  noted down the names of      the detenus and the cells in which they were locked up.      The exercise  was undertaken. The Judge finds that "the      beating of  the detenus that took place on the night of      February 2,  1976 was  a premeditated,  pre-planned and      deliberate one  and not  undertaken on  the spur of the      moment either  because of  any provocation   offered by      the detenus  to go  into the  cells as contended by the      jail officials"           (other lurid  judicial reports  from other  States      also have appeared.      After   all,    though   the   power   vests   in   the Superintendent, it  is triggered  by the  guard. We  cannot, without check  permit human  freedom to  be gouged  by  jail guards under guise of ’encounters’ and ’escape attempts’.      Mr. Justice  Douglas stressed  this aspect  in Wolff v. Mcdonnel: (1)           .We have  made progress  since then  but  the  old      tradition  still  lingers.  Just  recently.  an  entire      prison system  of one state was held as inhumane .. The      lesson to  be learned  is that  courts cannot  blithely      defer to the supposed expertise of prison official when      it comes to the constitutional rights. of inmates.           "Prisoners often have their privilege revoked, are      denied the  right of access to counsel, sit in solitary      or maximum  security or less accrued ’good time’ on the

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    basis of a single,      (1) 41 L. Ed. 2d. 935 at p.976 414      unreviewed report  of a guard. When the Courts deter to      administrative discretion,  it is  this guard  to  whom      they. delegate  the final  word  on  reasonable  Prison      Practices. This  is the  central evil in prison.... the      unreviewed discretion  granted to  the  poorly  trained      personnel who deal directly with persons."      If wars  are too  important to be left to the generals, surely prisoners’  rights are too precious to be left to the jailors. We  must add  a caveat. Where prison torture is the credible charge and human person the potential casualty, the benefit of  scepticism justly  belongs to  the  individual’s physical-mental immunity,  not to  the  -  hyper-sensitivity about safe custody. Some  welcome  features.:  Community  based  litigation  and participative justice’, Supportive of democratic legality.      A few  special forensic  features  of  the  proceedings before us have seminal significance and I adv. rt to them in as helpful  factors in  the progressive  development of  the legal process.      The  essence   of  this  class  of  litigation  is  not adjudication  on   particular   grievances   of   individual prisoners but  broad delivery  of social  justice.  It  goes beyond   mere   moral   weight-lifting   out.   case-by-case correction but  transcend into  forensic humanisation  of  a harsh legal   legacy which has for long hidden from judicial view lt  is the necessitous task of this Court, when invited appropriately, to  adventure even into fresh areas of as any and injustice and to inject humane constitutional ethic into imperial statutory  survivals, especially  when the (prison) Executive  thirty  years  after  Independence,  defends  the alleged wrong  as right and the Legislatures, whose members? over the  decades,  are  not  altogether  strangers  to  the hurtful features  of jails,  are perhaps  pre-occupied  with more  popular   business  than   concern  for  the  detained derelicts  who   are  a   scattered,  voiceless,   noiseless minority.      Although neither  of these  writ petitions  is a  class action in  the strict  sense, each is representative of many other similar  cases  I  think  these  ’martyr’  litigations possess  a   beneficient  potency   beyond  the   individual litigant,   and   their   consideration   on   the   widely- representative basis  strengthens the  rule  of  law.  Class actions. community  litigations, representative  suits, test cases and  public interest proceedings are in advance on our traditional court  processes and  faster people’s  vicarious involvement in  our justice system with a broadbased concept of locus standi so necessary in a democracy where the masses arein many senses weak. 415      Another hopeful  processual feature  falls for  notice. Citizens for  Democracy, an  organisation operating  in  the field of  human rights, has been allowed to intervene in the sobraj case and, on its behalf, Shri Tarkunde has made legal submissions  fuelled   by  passion  for  jail  reforms.  The intervention of  social welfare  organisation in  litigative processes pregnant  with wider  implications  is  a  healthy mediation between  the People  and the  Rule of  law. Wisely permitted,  participative  justice,  promoted  through  mass based organizations  and public  bodies with special concern seeking to  intervene, has  a democratic  potential for  the little men  and the  law. We  have  essayed  as  length  the solutions to  the  issues  realised  and  heard  parties  ad

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libitum because  of their  gravity and  novelty.. although a capsulated discussion  might make-do. A short cut is a wrong cut where people’s justice is at stake. This Court’s role as catalyst of prison justice.      It in an unhappy reflection, charged With pessimism and realism, that  Governments have  come and  Governments  have gone but  the   jails largely manage to preserve the macabre heritage and  ignore the  mahatma’s message.  And this, with all the  reform  bruited  about  for  decades  and  personal experience of statesman in state power. The learned Attorney General at a very early stage of one of these cases, and the learned  Additional   Solicitor  General  as  well  as  Shri Tarkunde in  the course of their submissions, did state that this Court’s  reformist response  to the  challenges  raised here may go a long way in catalysing those humane changes in the prison  laws and  practices already high on the national agenda of  Government.  Disturbing  Commission  Reports  and public proceedings  put to  shame prison  justice and  shake people’s faith  in the  firm fighting  functionalism of  the judicial process.  So I  have stretched  the canvas wide and counsel have copiously helped the Court. Prison decency and judicial responsibility      What penitentiary  reforms will promote rapport between current prison  practices and  constitutional norms  ? Basic prison decency  is an  aspect of  criminal justice.  And the judiciary has  a constituency of which prisoners, ordered in by court sentence, are a numberous part.      This vicarious  responsibility has  induced the Supreme Court of the United stats to observe.           "ln a  series of  decisions this  Court held  that      even though  the Governmental purpose be legitimate and      subs -tantial, that purpose cannot b,- pursued by means      that 416      broadly Stifle  fundamental personal liberties when the      end can  be more  narrowly  achieved.  The  breadth  of      legislative abridgement  must he viewed in the light of      less  drastic   means  for  achieving  the  same  basic      purpose." (Shelton  v. Tucker,  364 US  476  (1950)  at      p.468)(1).      Karuna is a component of jail Justice.      Ex. post  facto  justification  of  prison  cruelty  as prevention  of  disorder  and  escape  is  often  a  dubious allegation. Another factor often forgotten, while justifying harsh  treatment   of  prisioners,   is  the  philosophy  of rehabilitation. The  basis is  that the  custodial staff can make a  significant contribution  by enforcing  the rule  of prison law  and preparing  convicts for  a law-abiding  life after their  release-  mainstreaming,  as  it  is  sometimes called.      Mr. Justice,  Stewart in  Pall  adverted  to  the  twin objectives of  imprisonment. ’An  important function  of the correction system is the deterrence of crime. The premise is that by  confining criminal  L 1)  offenders in  a  facility where  they  are  isolated  from  the  rest  of  society,  a condition that most people presumably find undesirable, they and others  will  be  deterred  from  committing  additional criminal offences.  This isolation, of course, also serves a protective function by quarantining criminal offenders for a given period  of time while, it is hoped, the rehabilitative processes of  the corrections  system [  work to correct the offender’s demonstrated  criminal  proclivity.  Thus,  since most offenders  will eventually  return to  society, another paramount  objective   of  the  corrections  system  is  the rehabilitation of  those committed  to its custody. Finally,

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central to  all other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of  internal security  within the  corrections facilities  themselves.   It  is   in  the  light  of  these legitimate  penal   objectives  that  a  court  must  assess challenges  to   prison  regulations   based   on   asserted constitutional rights of prisoners. ’      The benign  purpose behind  deprivation of  freedom  of locomotion and  expression is  habilitation of  the criminal into good  behavior, ensuring  social defence on his release into the  community. This rationale is subverted by torture- some treatment,  antagonism and  bitterness which  spoil the correctional process. ’Fair treatment.... ..will enhance the chance of  rehabilitation by reactions to arbitrariness’ (33 L. Ed. 2d. 484).      Rehabilitation  effort  as  a  necessary  component  of incarceration is  part of the Indian criminal justice system as also of the United states.      (1) See  Substantive Criminal  Law by Cherif Bassiouni, p. 115 417 For  instance?   this   correctional   attitude   has   been incorporated as  a  A  standard  by  the  National  Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: (1)           ".. A  rehabilitative purpose  is or  ought to  be      implicit  in  every  sentence  of  an  offender  unless      ordered otherwise by the sentencing court."      In Mohammad  Giasuddin v.  state of  A.P.(1) this Court strongly endorsed the importance of the hospital setting and the therapeutic goal of imprisonment:           "Progressive criminologists  across the world will      every that  the  Ghanaian  diagnosis  of  offenders  as      patients and  his conception  of prisons  as hospitals-      mental and  moral- is  the  key  to  the  pathology  of      delinquency and  the thera- putic role of ’punishment’.      The whole  man is  a healthy  man and  very man is born      good. Criminality  is  a  curable  deviance.  .  .  Our      prisons should  be correctional  houses, not cruel iron      aching the  soul.. ’This  nation  cannot-  and,  if  it      remembers  its   incarcerated   leaders   and   freedom      fighters-will  not  but  revolutionize  the  conditions      inside that grim little world. We make these persistent      observa tions  only to  drive home  the  imperative  of      freedom-that  its   deprivation,  lay   the  state,  is      validated only  by a  plan to  make the  sentence  more      worthy  of   that  birthright.  There  is  a  spiritual      dimensional to the first page of our Constitution which      projects into penology." All this  adds up  to the important proposition that it is a crime of  punishment to  further torture a person undergoing imprisonment, as  the remedy  aggravates the malady and thus cases to  be a  reasonable justification for confiscation of personal freedom  and  is  arbitrary  because  it  is  blind action not  geared to  the goal  of social defence, which is one of  the primary  ends of  imprisonment. It  reversed the process  by   manufacturing  worse  animals  when  they  are released into  the mainstream of society. Roger G. Lanphear, in a  recent study.  has quoted  a  telling  letter  from  a prisoner which makes the poignant point.(3)      Dear Mrs. Stender:      (1)  61, pg.  43: Quoted in Freedom from Crime by Roger           Lanphear, J. r). (Nellore Publishing Company).      (2)  1977 (3) S. C. C. 287.      (3)  Regers C..  Lamphear Freedom From Crime through TM           - Sidhi Progress pp. 46-47. 418

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         You cannot  rehabilitate a  man through  brutality      and disrespect.  Regardless of  the  crime  a  man  may      commit, he  still is a human being and has feeling. And      the main reason most inmates in prison today disrespect      their keepers  is because they  themselves (the inmates      are  disrespected   and  arr  not  treated  like  human      being;.. I  myself have  witnessed brutal  attacks upon      inmates and have suffered a few myself, uncalled for. I      can understand  a guard  or guards  an  restraining  an      inmate if  he becomes  violent. But  many a  time  this      restraining has turned into a brutal beating. Does this      type   of    treatment   bring    About   respect   and      rehabilitation ?  No. It  only instills   hostility and      causes alienation  toward the prison officials from the      inmate or inmates involved.           If you  treat a  man like an animal, then you must      expect him  to act like one. For every action, there is      a reaction. This is only human nature. And in order for      an inmate  to act like a human being you must trust him      as   Such. Treating  him like  an animal  will only get      negative results  from him.  You can’t spit in his face      and expect him to smile and thank you. I have seen this      happen also.  There is  a large  gap between the inmate      and prison  officials. And  it will  continue  to  grow      untill the  prison officials learn that an inmate is no      different than  them, only  in the  sense that  he  has      broken a  law. He  still has  feelings, and  he’S still      human being. And until the big wheels in Sacramento and      the  personel   inside  the  prisons  start  practicing      rehabilitation, and  stop practising  zoology, then the      can expect continuous chaos and trouble between inmates      and officials.                                                 Lewis Moore"      We must heed the wholesome counsel of the British Royal Com mission(l) :           "If the  suggestion were that, because of enormity      of the  crime,  murderers  ought  to  be  subjected  to      special rigorous  treatment, this  would run counter to      the "accepted principle of modern prison administration      that imprisonment  is itself The penalty and that it is      not the  function of  the Prison  as authorities to add      further penalties  day by day by punitive conditions of      discipline, labour diet and general treatment.      (1) Royal Commission on Capital Punishment. 419      The  relevance  of  the  though  that  accentuation  of injury, beyond   imprisonment, may be counter-productive of’ the therapeutic  objective of     the penal  system will  be clear when we test such infliction on the touchstone of Art. 19  and   the,  reasonableness’  of  the  action.  In  depth application of these seminal aspects may be considered after unfolding, the  fact-situations in the two cases. Suffice it to  say  that,  so  long  as  judges  are  invigorators  and enforcers of  constitutionality and  performance auditors or legality, and  convicts serve  terms in  that grim microcosm called prison  bu the  mandete of  the court,  a  continuing institutional responsibility  vests in the system to moniter in  the   incarceratory   process   and   prevent   security ’excesses’. Jailors  are bound by the rule of law and cannot inflict supplementary  sentences under  disguises or  defeat the primary  purposes of imprisonment. additional torture by forced cellular solitude or iron immobilisation- that is the complaint here-stands  the  peril  of  being  shot  down  as lunreasonable,   arbitary    and    is    perilously    near unconstitutionality.

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Court’s interpretative function when faced with invalidatory alternative.      Batra puts  in issue the constitutionality of S. 30 (2) of the  Prisons Act, 1894 (the Act, for short) while Sobhraj impugns the vires of S.56. But the Court does not ’rush into demolish provisions where judicial endeavour, amelioratively interpretational, may  achieved both  constitutionality  and compassionate  resurrection.   The  salutary   strategy   of sustaining  the  validity  of  the  law  and  softening  its application was,  with lovely  dexterity adopted by Sri Soli Sorabjee appearing  for the State. The semantic technique of updating the  living sense  of dated legislation isk, in our view,  perfectly   legitimated,  especially   when,   in   a developing country  like ours,  the corpus juirs is, in some measure a raj hand-over.      Parenthetically, we may express surprise that, going by the Punjab  Jail Manual  (1975), the  politically  notorious Regulation III  of 1818 and ban on Gandhi cap’ still survive in Free  India’s Corpus  Juris, what  with all the sound and fury against  detention without trial and national homage to Gandhiji.      To meet  the needs  of India  today, the imperatives of Independence   desiderate   a   creatives   role   for   the Court in  interpretation and  application,  especially  when enactments from  the imperial  mint govern. Words grown with the world. that is the dynamics of semantics.      Read Dickerson (1) has suggested :           "the Courts  are at  least free  from  control  by      original legislatures.  Courts, for  one, has contended      that, consistently  with the ascertained meaning of the      statute, a court      (1) The  Interpretation and Application of Statutes, p. 245. 420      should he  able to  shake off  the dust of the past and      plant its feet firmly in the present.           The  legislature  which  passed  the  statute  has      adjourned  and   its  members   gone  home   to   their      constituents or  to a long rest from all law making. So      why bother  about what they intended or what they would      have done  ? Better  be prophetic  than archaeological,      better deal  with the future than with the past, better      pay a  decent respect  for a  future  legislature  than      stand in  awe of  one that has folded up its papers and      joined its  friends at  the  country  club  or  in  the      cemetery                Let the courts deliberate on what the present      or future  legislature would  do after  it had read the      courts opinion, after the situation has been explained,      after the  court has  exhibited the whole fabric of the      law into  which this  particular bit of legislation had      to be adjusted."      Constitutional deference  to the  Legislature  and  the democratic assumption  that people’s  representative express the wisdom  of the community lead courts into interpretation of statutes  Which preserves and sustain the validity of the provision. That  is to  say, courts  must, with  intelligent imagination,  inform   themselves  of   the  values  of  the Constitution and," with functional flexibility, explore  the meaning of  meaning to adop that construction which humanely constitutionalizes the  statute ;11 question. Plainly stated we must  endeavour to interpret the words in sections 30 and 56 of  the Prisons  Act and  the paragraphs  of’ the  Prison Manual in such manner that while the words belong to the old order, the  sense  radiates  the  new  order.  The  luminous

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guideline on Weems v. United states sets our sight high :           "Legislation, both statutory and constitutional is      enacted, it  is true, from an experience of evils, but-      its  general   language  should   not,  therefore,   be      necessarily  confined   to  the  form  that  civil  had      therefore,  taken.  Time  works  changes,  brings  into      existence new  conditions and  purposes.  Therefore,  a      principle, to  be  vital,  must  be  capable  of  wider      application than the mischief which gave it birth. This      is  peculiary  true  of  constitutions.  They  are  not      ephemeral   enactments   designed   to   meet   passing      occasions. They  are, to use the words of Chief Justice      Marshall, "designed  to approach  immortality as nearly      as human  institutions can  approach it". The future is      their care,  and provisions  for events of good and bad      tendencies of which no prophecy      (1) 54 L. ed. 801 (Weems v. United States) 421      can be  made. In  the application  of  a  constitution,      there fore,  our contemplation  cannot be  only of what      has been,  but of  what may  be. Under any other rule a      constitution would  indeed be as easy of application as      it would  be. Under any other rule a constitution would      indeed be  as easy  of  applications  as  it  would  be      deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles      would have  little value, and be converted by precedent      into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in      the words  might be  lost in reality. And this has been      recognised.   The   meaning   and   vitality   of   the      Constitution  have   developed   against   narrow   and      restrictive construction."      A note  in Harvard Law Review(1) commenting on Weems v. United States urges such a progressive construction:           "The inhibition  of the  infliction of  ’cruel and      unusual punishment’ first appears in the Bill of Rights      of 1680,  at a time when the humanity-of Judge Jeffreys      of Bloody  Assizes’ fame  and of  his fellows under the      Stuarts, loomed  large in  the popular mind. ... In the      eighth Amendment  to the  Constitution  of  the  United      States the  same prohibition is found.... (Courts) have      held that  whatever is now considered cruel and unusual      in fact  is forbidden  by  it.  Another  difference  of      interpretation intersects  these  divergent  views  and      separates the  Courts which  confine the  words to  the      kind or  mode of punishment from those who extend their      meaning to include as well its degree or severity. Tn a      recent case  concerning such a provision in the Bill of      Rights of  the Philippine  Islands, which  has the same      meaning was  the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court of      United States,  committing itself  to the  most liberal      interpretation, not  only  held  that  the  clause  was      concerned with  the degree  of punishment, but approved      of the  extension of  its scope  to keep  pace with The      increasing enlightenment  of public  opinion (Weems  v.      United States, 217 US, 349. It is, indeed, difficult to      believe that  a law  passed in the twentieth century is      aimed solely  at abuses which became almost unknown two      hundred years  before, even though it is an exact trans      script of  an old Bill. And excessive punishment may be      quite as  had as  punishment cruel  in its very nature.      The fear of judicial intermeddling voiced by one of the      dissent-      (1) Hervard Law Review, Vol. 24 (1910-II) p. 54-55. 422      ing judges  seems scarcely  warranted, for the power to

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    prevent disproportionate  punishment is to be exercised      only when  the punishment  shocks public  feeling. With      thin limitation,  the progressive  construction of this      clause laid down by this case seems desirable."                                             (emphasis added)      The jurisprudence of statutory construction, especially when vigorous  break with the past and smooth reconciliation with a  radical constitution  value-set are the object, uses the art  of reading  down  and  reading  wide,  as  part  of interpretational  engineering.   Judges  are  the  mediators between the  social tenses.  This Court  in R.  L. Arora  v. State of  Uttar Pradesh  & Ors(1)  and in  a host  of  other cases, has  lent precedential  support for  this proposition where that  process renders  a statute  constitutional.  The learned Additional  Solicitor General has urged upon us that the Prisons  Act (Sections  30 and  56) can  be  vehicle  of enlightened value if we pour into seemingly fossilized words a freshness  of sense.  "It is  well settled that if certain provisions of  law construed  in one  way will be consistent with the  Constitution, and  if another interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction."      To put  the rule beyond doubt, interstitial legislation through interpretation  is a  life-process of  the  law  and judges are party to it. In the present case we are persuaded to adopt  this semantic  readjustment   so as  to obviate  a legicidal sequel.  A validation-orient  approach becomes the philosophy of  statutory construction,  as we will presently explain by application. The two  problems and our basic approach      The specific questions before us are whether the quasi- solitudinous cellular  custody of  sorts imposed on Batra is implicit in  his death sentence and otherwise valid and. the heavy irons  forced on the per son of Sobhraj still standing his  trial   comport  with   our  constitutional  guarantees qualified and  curtailed by the prison environs. Necessarily our perspective  has to  be humanistic-juristic becoming the Karuna   of   our   Constitution   and   the   international consciousness on  human rights.  Three quotes  set this tone sharply. In the words of Will Durant(2): ’It is time for all good man  to come  to the  aid of their party, whose name is civilization’. And,  more particularised  is the observation of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger about what is to) be           (1) [1964] 6 S.C.R. 784.           (2)  Will Durant’s  Article "What  Life has taught           Me". published  in Bhawan’ Journal, Vol. XXIV, No.           18, April 9,1978. p. 71 at p. 72. 423 done with  an offender  once he  is convicted,  that this is ’one of  mankind’s unsolved and largely neglected problems’. And Winston Churchill’s choice thought and chiselled diction bear repetition:           "The mood  and temper of the public with regard to      the treatment of crime and criminals is one of the most      unfailing tests of the civilization of any country." And a  clinching comment  concludes this  thought. The White Paper entitled  "People in  Prison" published by the British Government in November, 1969, articulates a profound thought in its concluding paragraph, much less true for India as for the United Kingdom:           A society that believes in the worth of individual      beings can  have the  quality of  its belief judged, at      least in part, by the quality of its prison and probate      services and of the resources made available to them." Batra facts

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    I begin  with the  critical facts  in  the  first  writ petition. Sunil  Batra, sentenced  to death   but struggling survive, supplicates  pathetically that  although his appeal against the  death sentence  still pends he is being subject to solitary  confinement which  is contrary to the provision of the  Penal Code,  the Criminal Procedure Code, the Prison Act an(l  Articles 14,  19 and  12 of  the Constitution. The Sessions Court of Delhi held him guilty of a gruesome murder compounded with robbery and awarded the capital penalty, way back in January, 1977 . Until then, Batra was class prisoner eligible for  amenities which  made his confinement bearable and  companionable.   But  once   the  death   penalty   was pronounced, the prison superintendent promptly tore him away from fellow  human, stripped  him of  the B class facilities and locked  him up in a single cell with a small walled yard attached, beyond  the view and voice of others save the jail guards and  formal visitors  in discharge  of their official chores and  a few  callers once hl a blue moon. The prisoner filed an  appeal against  his conviction and sentence to the High Court,  which also heard the reference for confirmation of the  death sentence  unclear sec.  395  of  the  Criminal Procedure Code  (for short,  the Code). In the meanwhile-and it proved  a terribly  long while-he  was warehoused,  as it were   in   a   solitary   cell   and   kept   substantially incommunicado.      The quasi-solitary  confinement was  challenged in  the High  Court,   perhaps  vaguely   (not  particularising  the constitutional infirmities of Sec. 30 of The Prisons Act and the Punjab  Jail Rules)  but was  given short  shrift by the High Court.  The learned  single Judge  reasoned: ’The  only point for  consideration is  whether the petitioner can have the facility  as demanded  by him till the sentence of death is confirmed.  By going  through all these rules I am of the clear view that he cannot 424 be given  the facilities  as it  might  lead  to  disastrous consequences. It  also becomes  the function of the State to look to  the personal  safety of  such a condemned prisoner. There  is   no  force   in  the  petition  which  is  hereby dismissed". The appeal to a division bench was withdrawn and the present  writ petition  under Art. 32 was filed, n where the  lay   prisoner  urged  his  litany  of  woes  and  some constitutional generalities, later supplemented by Sri Y. S. Chitale as  amicus curiae.  His lurid  lot was  pathetically painted by  counsel. Grim  walls glare at him from all sides night and  day; his  food is  inserted into the room and his excretory needs  must be fulfilled within the same space. No pillow to  rest his restless head, no light inside, save the bulb that  burns blindly  through the night from outside. No human face  or voice  or view  except the  warder’s constant compulsory intrusion  into the  prisoner’s privacy  and  the routine revolutions of officials’ visitations, punctuated by a few  regulated visits  of permitted  relatives or friends, with iron  bars and peering warder’s presence in between. No exercise except  a generous  half hour, morning and evening, in a  small, walled  enclosure from  where he  may do asanas were he  yogi, do  meditation were  he sanyasi  and practise communion with  Nature were  he Wordsworth  or  Whiteman  or break down  in speechless  sorrow were he but common clay. A few books,  yes; newspapers  ? No  talk to others ? No; save echoes of  one’s own  soliloquies; no sight of others except the stone  mercy  in  pathetic  fallacy.  This  segregation, notwithstanding  the   prescribed   category   of   visitors permitted and  censored letters allowed, argues Sri Chitale, is violation   the primordial gregariousness which, from the

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beginning of  the species,  has been man’s social milieu and so constitutes  a  psychic  trauma,  when  prolonged  beyond years, too  torturesome for  tears, even in our ancient land of silent  mystics and  lonely cavemen.  For the  great few, solitude sometimes  is best  society but  for the commonalty the wages  of awesome seculsion, if spread over long spells, is insanity. For the fevered life of the modern man, more so under  the  stress  of  sentence,  solitude  is  terror  and cellular vacuum  horror. Just think not of the contemplative saint but  of the  run of  the mill  mortal. Cage his lonely person and  monitor his  mind  and  mood  with  a  sensitive understanding. Then  you know that moments bear slow malice; hours hang  heavy with  ennui; days  drop dead,  and  lonely weeks wear  a vicious  stillness; for  sure. weary months or singleness, with monotonous nights, made more hurtful by the swarms of  mosquitoes singing  and ’stinging,  and  in  many cells.  by  the  blood-thirsty  armies  of  bugs,  invisibly emerging from  nocturnal nowhere, to hide and bite, make for lunacy. Time  cries halt  and the victim wonders, is death a better deal? Such is the torture and tension of the solitary cell, picturised by counsel. 425      The Tihar  Jail is  the scene  and a  glimpse of  it is good. Law  is not  a brooding  omnipresence in the sky but a behavioural omnipotence on the earth, a do-don’t calculus of principled pragmatism.  So, any  discussion  of  prison  law problems must  be  preceded  by  a  feel  of  the  cell  and surroundings. For  this reason  we now set out the inspector notes left  by Chief Justice Beg, who visited the ’condemned cell’ along its two brothers on the bench:           "We inspected  the cell  in which the prisoner was      con fined.  We were  relieved to  find that  conditions      there did  not correspond to the picture which eloquent      arguments of  his counsel  before us conjured up in our      minds. We had been led to believe that the prisoner was      kept in  some kind  of a dungeon with only a small hole      through which light could penetrate only when there was      enough sunshine.  It was  true that  the  prisoner  was      living in a room with a cemented floor and with no bed,      furniture, or  windows in  it. The  light came  from  a      ventilator with  iron bars  on the  wall at the back of      the room  and the  wide gate of iron bars in front. The      light was,  however, enough. It is also true that there      was no  separate room for the petitioner to take a bath      in or to answer calls of nature. But in this very room,      the site  of which  given on a diagram furnished by the      jail authorities,  water  and  sanitary  fittings  were      installed in  one corner  of the  room. In front of the      room there  was a  small verandah  with pakka walls and      iron gates  separating each  side of  it from a similar      verandah in  front of  an adjoining  cell. The entrance      into this  verandah was  also through  a   similar iron      gate. The inner room in which the prisoner was confined      had also  a gate of iron bars. All gates were with iron      bars on  frames so  that  one  could  see  across  them      through the  spaces between  the bars.  All these gates      were locked.  We learnt that the petitioner was able to      come into  the verandah at certain times of the day. At      that  time   only  he   could  communicate  with  other      similarly kept  prisoners whom he could see and talk to      through  the   iron  bars.  In  other  words,  for  all      practical  purposes,   it  was   a  kind   of  solitary      confinement.           We did  not see a separate guard for each prisoner      in the  row of  cells for prisoners sentenced to death.

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    All these  prisoners were certainly segregated and kept      apart. But  it is difficult to determine, without going      into the  meaning of  ’solitary confinement’. as a term      of law  whether the  conditions in which the petitioner      was kept amounted to ’solitary 426      confinement’. Probably, if small windows with iron bars      were  provided   between  one  cell  and  another,  the      prisoners could  talk to  each other  also so  that the      confinement would  no longer  be solitary  despite  the      fact that they are kept in separate adjoining cells.           The petitioner  did not complain of any discomfort      other than  being kept  in ’solitary  confinement’  and      being made  to sleep  on the  floor. He asked us to see      another part of the prison where undertrials were kept.      When  we   visited  that  part,  we  found  dormitories      provided there   for under-trial prisoners who had beds      there and  their own  bedding and  clothing. They  also      had, in  that part  of the  prison, radio sets, some of      which belonged  to the prisoners no others to the jail.      The under  trials were  allowed to mix with each other,      play games  or do  what they wanted within a compound."      (emphasis, ordered). ’      The basic  facts hearing  upon  the  condition  of  the prisoner  in  his  cell  are  not  denied  although  certain materials have been averred in the counter affidavit to make out that  the mental  mayhem imputed to the system vis a vis the petitioner is wild and invalid.      For updating  the post-sentence  saga of  Batra  it  is necessary to  state that the High Court has since upheld the death penalty  imposed on  him; and open to him still is the opportunity to  seek leave  to appeal under Art. 136 and, if finally frustrated in this forensic pursuit, to move for the ultimate alchemy  of Presidential  communication under  Art. 72. The  cumulative period  from  when  the  Sessions  Court sentences to  death to  when;  the  Supreme  Court  and  the President  say   ’nay’  for   his  right   to  life  may  be considerable as in this very case. From them, if discomfited at all  stages and condemned to execution, to when he swings on the  rope to  reach ’the  undiscovered country from whose bourn no  traveller returns’ is a different, dismal chapter. Keeping these  spells of suffering separate, we may approach the poignant  issue of  quasi-solitary confinement  and  its legality.      Art 21 insists upon procedure established by law before any person can be denuded of his freedom of locomotion. What then is  the law  relied upon  by the  State to cut down the liberty of the person to the bare bones of utter isolation ? Section 30  of the  Prisons Act  is pressed  into service in answer.  The   respondent’s  counter-affidavit  alleges,  in substantiation of  cellular  seclusion  and  deprivation  of fellowship, the following facts :-           "In fact,  I submit that the provisions of Sec. 30      of the  Prisons Act take in all necessary safeguard for      the protection  of the  prisoners  sentenced  to  death      which are abso- 427      lutely necessary  in view  of the state of mind of such      prisoners as  well as all the possible circumstances in      which these prisoners may indulge in harming themselves      or any  other  criminal  activity  in  their  voluntary      discretion and  in the  alternative the  possibility of      their being  harmed by  any other  prisoner. A prisoner      under  sentence   to’  death   can  connive  with  such      prisoners and  may  thereby  succeed  in  getting  some

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    instrument by  which he  may commit  suicide or  may be      enabled to  escape from  the jail.  Moreover a prisoner      under sentence of death has a very harmful influence on      the other prisoners.           In the  administration of  prisoners in  jail  the      maximum security measures have to be adopted in respect      of the  prisoners under  sentence of death. As they are      highly frustrated  lot, they will always be on the look      out for  a opportunity to over-power the watch and ward      guard, and make attempt to escape. It is quite relevant      to add  that under  the  existing  provisions  of  Jail      Manual, Armed  Guard P  cannot be  posted to  guard the      prisoners. The  Warder guard  has to  guard  them  bare      handed. Tn  case the  prisoners under sentence to death      are allowed  to remain outside the cells, then it would      be next  to impossible  for the  guard to  control them      bare handed           Under the  provisions of  the  new  Cr.  P.C.  the      Capital   Punishment    is   awarded   only   t(h   the      exceptionally few  prisoners  because  now  it  is  the      exception rather than rule, and the learned Courts have      to record  special reasons  for  awarding  the  extreme      punishment.  This  implies  that  the  prisoners  under      sentences  of   death   are   exceptionally   dangerous      prisoners, who  do require  maximum  security  measures      while confined in Jail. Under the existing arrangements      in  the   Jail  there  can  be  no  substitute  to  the      confinement treatment  of such prisoners otherwise than      in the  cells. After  having been  awarded the  capital      punishment the  prisoners sentenced  to  death  harbour      feelings of  hatred against  the authorities.  If  such      prisoners are  allowed to remain outside the cells then      there is  every possibility  of incidents  of  assaults      etc. On the fact (sic) of such prisoners.           ..... If  the prisoners  sentenced  to  death  are      mixed up  with other  categories of  prisoners then the      very basic  structure of superintendence and management      of jails will be greatly jeopardised. 11-526SCI/78 428           .... I submit that the provisions of Section 30 of      the Prisons Act are absolutely necessary looking to the      state of mind of prisoners under sentence of death, the      possibility of  such prisoners  harming  themselves  or      getting harmed  by others  or escaping  in view  of the      relevant sociological  aspects of  security relating to      the Society in the modern States."      These  factual-legal  submission  deserve  examination. When arguments  spread out the learned Additional Solicitors abandoned some  of the  extreme stances  taken in the States affidavit and reduced the rigour of the averments by gentler postures.      Essentiality, we  have to  decide whether,  as a  fact, Batra is  being subjected  to solitary  confinement. We have further to explore whether S.30 of the Act contemplates some sort of solitary confinement for condemned prisoners and, if it does,  that legalizes  current  prison  praxis.  We  have further to investigate whether such total seclusion, even if covered by  S. 30(2)  is the  correct  construction,  having regard to  the conspectus  of the  relevant provision of the Penal Code  and Criminal Procedure Code. Finally, we have to pronounce upon the vires of S. 30(2), if it does condemn the death sentence to dismal solitude.      The learned  Additional Solicitor  General made a broad submission   that   solitary   confinement   was   perfectly

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constitutional and  relied on  citations from  the  American Courts at the lesser  levels Its bearing on the structure of his argument  is that  if even  in a country like the United States where  the VIIIth  Amendment balls  cruel and unusual punishment. the  ’solitary’ has  survived judicial scrutiny, it  is   a  fortiori  case  in  India,  where  there  is  no constitutional  prohibition   against  cruel   and   unusual punishment.      True our  Constitution has  no ’due  process’ clause or the VIII Amendment; but, in this branch of law, after Cooper and Maneka  Gandhi the  consequence is the same. For what is punitively outrageous,  scandalizingly unusual  or cruel and rehabilitatively    counterproductive,     is     unarguably unreasonable and  arbitrary and  is shot down by Art. 14 and 19 and  if inflicted  with procedural unfairness, falls foul of Art.  21. Part  III of  the Constitution  does  not  part company  with  the  prisoner  at  the  gates,  and  judicial oversight  protects   the  prisoner’s  shrunken  fundamental rights, if  flouted, frowned  upon or  frozen by  the prison authority. Is  a person  under death  sentence or undertrial unilaterally dubbed dangerous liable to suffer extra torment too deep  for tears  ? Emphatically no, lest social justice, dignity  of   the  individual,   equality  before  the  law, procedure established by law and the seven 429 lamps of  freedom (Art. 19) become chimerical constitutional claptrap. A  Judges, even  within a  prison setting, are the real, though  restricted, ombudsmen  empowered to  prescribe and prescribe,  humanize and  civilize the life-style within the carcers.  The operation of Articles 14, 19 and 21 may be pared down for a prisoner but not puffed out altogether. For example, public  addresses by  prisoners may be put down but talking to  fellow prisoners  cannot.  Vows  of  silence  or taboos on  writing poetry  or drawing cartoons are violative of Article  19. So  also, locomotion  may be  limited by the needs of  imprisonment but binding hand and foot, with hoops of steel,  every man  or women sentenced for a term is doing violence  to   Part  III.   So  Batra   pleads  that   until decapitation he  is human  and so  should not be scotched in mind by  draconian cellular  insulation nor  stripped of the basic fellowship  which keeps  the spirit  flickering before being extinguished by the swinging rope.      Is it  legal or legicidel to inflict awesome loneliness on  a  living  human  ?  The  lesser  poser  to  the  prison administration  is,  what  is  its  authority,  beyond  bare custody, to  wound the condemned men by solitary confinement ?  Indeed,   the  Additional   Solicitor  General,   at  the threshold,  abandoned   such  an   ’extinguishment’   stance ambiguously lingering  in the  State’s counter affidavit and argued only  for their  realistic circumscription,  since  a prison context  affects the  colour, content  and contour of the freedoms  of the legally unfresh. The necessary sequitur is that  even a person under death sentence has human rights which are  non-negotiable and  even  a  dangerous  prisoner, standing trial, has basic liberties which cannot be bartered away. The Cooper effect and the Maneka armour vis-a-vis prisons.      The ratio in A. K. Gopalan’s case where the Court, by a majority, adopted  a restrictive  construction and ruled out the play  of  fundamental  rights  for  anyone  under  valid detention, was  upturned in  R.C. Coopers case.(1) In Maneka Gandhi the  Court has  highlighted  this  principle  in  the context of Art. 21 itself.      And what  is ’life’ in Art. 21? In Kharak Singh s case. Subba Rao,  J. quoted  Field, J.  in Munn v. Illino’s (1877)

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94, U.S.  113, to  emphasise the  quality of life covered by Art. 21:           "Something more  than mere  animal existence.  The      inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those      limbs and  faculties by  which  life  is  enjoyed.  The      provision H      (1) [1971] 1 SCR 512. 430      equally prohibits  the mutilation  of the  body by  the      amputation of  an arm  or leg, or the putting out of an      eye, or  the destruction of any other organ of the body      through which  the soul  communicates  with  the  outer      world." [1964(1) SCR  232 at 357]., A dynamic meaning must attach to life and liberty.      This court  has upheld  the right of a prisoner to have his work published if it does not violate prison discipline. (State  v.   Pandurang)(1).  The  martydom  of  Gopalan  and resurrection by Cooper paved the way for Maneka(2) where the potent invocation of the rest of Part III, even after one of the rights  was validity  put out of action, was affirmed in indubitable breadth.  So the  law is that for a prisoner all fundamental  rights   are  an  enforceable  reality,  though restricted by  the  fact  of  imprisonment.  The  omens  are hopeful for  imprisoned humans because they can enchantingly invoke Maneka  and, in its wake Arts. 14, 19 and even 21, to repel the  deadening impact  of unconscionable incarceratory inflictions based on some lurid legislative text or untested tradition. As  the twin  cases unfold  the facts, we have to test the contentions of law on this broader basis.      Prisons are  built with  stones of  Law’ (sang  William Blake) and  so, when  human rights  are hashed  behind bars, constitutional justice  impeaches such  law. In  this sense. courts which sign citizens into prisons have an onerous duty to  ensure   that,  during  detention  and  subject  to  the Constitution, freedom from torture belongs to the detenu.      I may  project, by way of recapitulation, issues in the two cases. Is Batra or any convict condemned to death-liable to  suffer,  by  implication,  incarceratory  sequestration, without specific  punishment of  solitary confinement,  from when the  Sessions Judge  has  pronounced  capital  sentence until that inordinate yet dreadful interregnum ends when the last court  has finally  set its seal on his liquidation and the highest  executive has  signed ’nay’  on  his  plea  for clemency? Is  prison law,  which humiliates the human minima of jail justice, unlaw ? Is Batra, strictly speaking, ’under sentence  or   death’  until   its  executability,  and  his terrestrial farewell  have become  irrevocable by  the final refusal to  commute, by  the  last  court  and  the  highest Executive ?  Till then,  is  he  entitled  to  integrity  of personalities viz.  freedom from crippling on body, mind and moral fibre, even while in      (1)  [1966] (i)  S.C.R. 702  and see  [1975] 3  SCC 185           (Chandrachud, J.)      (2) [1978] 1 S.C.R. 248. 431 custody, or  is he  deemed under  s. 30 of the Act to suffer lone  A  imprisonment  until  cadaverisation?-a  qualitative hiatus in approach and impact.      I have  limned the key questions canvassed on behalf of Batra  before  us  and,  if  I  may  forestall  my  eventual response, Law  India stands  for Life,  even the dying man’s life and  lancets its  restorative was into that limbo where languish lonely  creatures whose  personhood  is  excoriated even  if  their  execution  is  unexecutable  until  further

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affirmation.      In  the  next  case  we  have  Sobhraj,  an  undertrial prisoner kept  indefinitely under bar fetters, as a security risk, arguing  against the constitutionality of this obvious torture, sought  to be  justified by  the  State  under  the prison law  as a  safety procedure.  The two  cases  have  a certain ideological  kinship. The  jurisprudential watershed between   the   jail   sub-culture   under   the   Raj   and criminological consciousness  in Free India is marked by the National Charter of January 26, 1950 . ‘      Bluntly put,  are jail keepers manegerie managers ? Are human  beings,  pulverized  into  living  vegetables,  truly deprived of  life, the  quality of  life,  or  at  least  of liberty, that  limited loop of liberty, the fundamental Law, in its  basic mercy,  offers to  the prison  community ? Are punitive techniques  of physio-psychic  torture practiced as jail  drill,   with   the   trappings   of   prison   rules, constitutional anathema  when pressed  beyond a point? Every Constitution projects  a cultural  consciousness and  courts must breathe this awareness.      A few  more variants  of these  interrogatories may  be spelt out.  Is solitary  confinement  or  similar  stressful alternative, putting  the prisoner  beyond the zone of sight and speech  and society  and  wrecking  his  psyche  without decisive   prophylactic    or   penological    gains,    too discriminatory to  be valid  under Art. 14, too unreasonable to be intra vires Article 19 and too terrible to qualify for being human  law under  Article 21?  If the penal law merely permits safe  custody of  a ’condemned’  sentence, so  as to ensure his  instant availability  for execution with all the legal rituals  on the  appointed day,  is  not  the  hurtful severity of  hermetic  insulation  during  that  tragic  gap between the  first judgment and then fall of the pall, under guise of a prison regulation, beyond prison power ?      This epitome,  expressed tartly,  lays bare  the  human heart of  the problem debated with elaborate legal erudition and compassion at the Bar. 432      These are  critical problems which symbolize the appeal to higher values, and inspired by this lofty spirit, counsel have argued. I must, right at the outset, render our need of appreciation for the industry and illumination brought in by Shri Y.  S. Chitale,  amicus curiae,  as  he  pressed  these points of  grave portent  and legal moment. So am I beholden to Shri Soli Sorabjee, the Additional Solicitor General, who has displayed commendable candour and benign detachment from his brief and shown zealous concern to advance the rights of man, even  ’condemned’ man,  against  the  primitive  drills behind the  ’iron curtain’  sanctified by  literal legality. The Prison Manual is no Bible. ’This shared radical humanism at the  bar has narrowed the area of dispute and reduced the constitutional tension, and this has made my task easy.      Right now  we will examine some of the fallacies in the counter affidavit  filed by  the State.  This will  help  us judge the  reasonableness or otherwise, the arbitrariness or otherwise, and  the processual  fairness or otherwise of the prescription  of   the  de   facto   solitary   confinement, especially where  the Court  has not awarded such a sentence and the Jail Superintendent has read it into S. 30(2).      A  prefatory   clarification  will  melt  the  mist  of obscurity in the approach of the State. Many a murderer is a good man  before and  after the crime and commits it for the first and last time under circumstantial crises which rarely repeat. Some  murderers  are  even  noble  souls,  patriotic rebels, or  self-less sacrificers  for  larger,  some  times

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misguided,  causes.   Not  an   unusual  phenomenon  is  the spectacle of  persons in  the death  row being  political or social  dissenters,   sensitive  revolutionaries,   national heroes, coloured people socio-economic pariahs or victims of fabricated evidence.  Brutus  and  Bhagat  Singh  plus  some proletarians, blockheads  and blackguards! And this powerful realisation has  driven  many  countries  to  abolish  death penalty and  our own  to narrow  the area  of  this  extreme infliction by  judicial compassion  and executive  clemency. Against this  contemporary current  of penological humanity, it is  presumptuous  to  impose  upon  this  court,  without convincing back-up  research, the  preposterous  proposition that death  sentences, often  reflective in  their  terminal chapter and  ’sickled over  by the pale cast of thought, are homicidal or  suicidal beasts  and must therefore be kept in solitary confinement. (1)           "... the  evidence given to us in the countries we      visited and  the information  we received  from others,      were M  uniformly to  the effect  that murderers are no      more likely      (1) Royal  Commission on  Capital Punishment, 1949-1953 Report pp. 216-217. 433      than any  other prisoners  to commit  acts of  violence      against A  officers or  fellow prisoners  or to attempt      escape; on  the contrary  it would  appear that  in all      countries murderers  are, on  the whole  better behaved      than most prisoners Political coups,  so frequent  in our times, put ’murderers’ in  power   who  would  otherwise  have  been  executed.  To universalise is to be unveracious when validation is founded on habituated hunch, not authentic investigation.      Once we  set our  sights clear, we see a string of non- sequitur in  the naked assertions of the State and an encore of  the   folklore  of   ’dangerousness’  surrounding  human sentenced to  death!  The  burden  of  the  song?  strangely enough, is  that solitary  confinement is  a com- passionate measure to  protect the  prisoner lest  he be killed or kill himself or  form a  mutual aid  society with other condemned prisoners for hera kiri Community life for a death sentence, the  social   psychology  of  the  Jail  Superintendent  has convinced him  to swear,  is a  grave risk  to himself.  So, solitary segregation;  The ingenious  plea  in  the  counter affidavit is  like asserting  not only  that grapes are sour but n  that sloss  are sweet. Not only is group life bad for him because  he may  murder but ’solitary’ is a blessing for him because  otherwise he  may be  murdered! To swear that a solitary cell  is the  only barricade  against the condemned men  being   killed  or  his  killing  others  is  straining credulity to  snapping point.  Why  should  he  kill  or  be killed? Most  murderers are  first offenders  and often  are like their fellow-men once the explosive stress and pressure of motivation  are released.  Are there  prison  studies  of psychic perversions  or lethal  precedents probabilising the homicidal or suicidal proclivities of death sentence, beyond the non-medical jail superintendent’s ipse dixit?      We are  dealing with  men under sentence of death whose cases pend  in appeal or before the clemency jurisdiction of Governor or  President. Such men, unless mad, have no motive to commit suicide or further murder within the jail. If they mean to  take their  life themselves  why plead in appeal or for commutation?  The very  legal struggle  to escape  death sentence strongly  suggests they want to cling to dear life. Dostoevsky(1) once  said that  if, in the last moment before being  executed,  a  man,  however  brave,  were  given  the

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alternative of spending the rest of his numbered days on the top of  a bare rock, with only enough space to sit on it, he would choose it with relief.      The instinct  of self  preservation is  so  inalienable from biological  beings that  the  easy  oath  of  the  Jail Superintendent that condemned           (1)  L.M. Hiranandani,  The Sentence of Death, The           illustrated Weekly  of India,  Aug. 29.  Sept.  4,           page 8. 434 prisoners are  prone to commit suicide if given the facility looks too recondite to commend credibility.      Likewise, the  facile statement  that men  in the death row are  so desperate  that they will commit more murders if facility offers  itself  lacks  rational  appeal.  It  is  a certainty that  a man  in the death row who has invited that fate by  one murder and is striving to save himself from the gallows by  frantic forensic proceedings and mercy petitions is not  likely to make his hanging certain by committing any murder within the prison. A franker attitude might well have been for  the Superintendent  to swear  that  prison  praxis handed down from the British rule has been this and no fresh orientation to  the prison  staff or  re-writing of the jail manual having  taken place,  the Past has persisted into the Present and  he is  an  innocent  agent  of  this  inherited incarceration ethos.      Nothing is  averred Lo  validate the near-strangulation of the  slender  liberty  of  locomotion  inside  a  prison, barring vague  generalities. The seat of crime is ordinarily explosive tension,  as stressologists have substantiated and the award  of death  sentence as against life sentence turns on a  plurality of  imponderables. Indeed, not in frequently on the  same or  similar facts judges disagree ’on the award of death  sentence. If the trial Court awards death sentence the Jail  Superintendent holds  him dangerous  enough to  be cribbed day  and night.  If the  High Court converts it to a life term  the convict,  according to  prison masters,  must undergo a  change of  heart and  become sociable, and if the Supreme Court enhances the sentence he reverts to wild life! Too absurd  to he  good! To find a substantial difference in prison treatment  between the  two ’lifers’  and ’condemned’ con victs-is  to infer  violent conduct or suicidal tendency based on  the fluctuating sentence alone for which no expert testimony is forth coming. On the other hand, the ’solitary’ hardens the  criminal, makes  him desperate  and breaks  his spirit or  makes him  break out of there regardless of risk. In short, it is counter-productive.      A few  quotes from  a recent American study on prisons, hammer home the negativity of the "solitary".(1) The "hole", or  solitary   confinement,  is  often  referred  to  as  an "Adjustment Center" (AC) Here is one man’s memory of it from San Quentin prison in California.           When I  first saw  it, I just couldn’t believe it.      It was a dungeon. Nothing but cement and filth. I could      not imagine      (1)  Rogers G. Lamphear: Freedom From Crime through the           M. Sidhi. Program, pp. 128-129. 435      who have  lived in  there before me. All day I just sat      there on  my bunk, in a sort of daze? staring at my new      abode           .... Instead  of bad spring there was a flat steel      plate (which  is the  same throughout  the  Hole);  the      window  was  cemented  up,  except  for  the  very  top      section, which  was one  quarter the standard size, and

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    without any  glass panes,  thus  exposing, the occupant      to all  kinds of  weather (the rain would actually come      through,  into   the  cell);   there  was  no  shelving      whatsoever-not so  much as  a hook  to hand  a towel or      clothes on  (and it  was against the regulations to fix      up a  clothes line; so anyone who did so, did it at the      risk of  being beefed).  In short,  there was  nothing;      just four walls, and room enough to take five paces-not      strides-from one  end of the cell to the other. Nothing      to break  the  monotony  of  cement  except  the  usual      graffiti. The  window  was  too  high  for  a  view  of      anything but  the roof  of the  wing next  door. It was      truly a dungeon; a bomb; a crypt. And it was "Home" for      twenty four hours a day, every day."(1) One prisoner wrote:           I swear  I want  to cry  sometimes, when I look at      some of  the older  prisoner who have been in prison so      long that  they  hold  conversations  with  people  who      aren’t there  and blink  their sad eyes once every four      or five minutes.           . .  . All  I can do at’ this stage of the game is      to look  at my  older brothers of oppression and wonder      if this  will be me 15 or 20 years from now. Can I hold      on? Will  I last?  Will I  some day  hold conversations      with ghosts?           ... I  have seen cats leave here twice as hostile,      twice as  confused, twice as anti-social than they were      when they  entered. Depleted  of  nearly  all  of  them      mental justices,  they are  "thrown back"  into society      where they  are expected  to function like normal human      beings. And  then society  wonders why recidivism is so      high in the country; why a man serves five or ten years      in prison only to go out and commit the same act again.           They seem to fall apart emotionally and mentally;           To say  that T became a nervous and paranoid wreck      would be understatement. My mother would end up crying      (1) Ibid pp. 131-132. 436      every  time   she  came   to  see  me,  because  of  my      nervousness, which  caused my hands to shake, and I had      developed a sty in my right eye."      When handling  the inner  dynamics of  human action, we must be  informed of  the basic  factor of human‘ psychology that "Nature  abhors a  vacuum; and man is a social animal". (Spinoza). In  such all  area we must expect Brandies briefs backed by  opinions of  specialists on  prison tensions,  of stressologists on the etiology of crime and of psychiatrists who have  focussed attention on behaviour when fear of death oppresses their  patients. A  mere administrative  officer’s deposition about  the  behaviourial  may  be  of  men  under contingent sentence  of death  cannot weigh with us when the limited liberties  of expression and locomotion of prisoners are sought to be unreason ably pared down or virtually wiped out by oppressive cell insulation. No medical or psychiatric opinion or  record of  jail events as a pointer, is produced to prove,  even prima  facie, that this substantial negation of  gregarious   jail  life   is  reasonable.   Where  total deprivation      of  the  truncated  liberty  of  prisoner’s locomotion is  challenged the  validatory burden  is on  the State      The next  fallacy in  the counter-affidavit  is that if the  murder   is  monstrous  deserving  death  sentence  the murderer  is   a  constant   monster  manifesting  continued dangerousness. Does this stand to reason? A woman who coldly poisons all  her crying  children to  death to  elope with a

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paramour may  be guilty of maniacal murder and, perhaps, may be awarded  death sentence.  But is  she, for that reason, a dangerously  violent   animal?  other   diabolical  killings deserving  death  penalty  but  involving  no  violence?  in special social  settings, may  be visited  with  life  term, though the  offender is  a ghastly murderer. Imagine how the respondent’s test of behaviourial violence breaks down where death sentence  is demolished  by a  higher  court  for  the reason it  has been on his head for years or he is too young or too  old, or  commuted by the President for non-legal yet relevant  considerations   as  in   the  case  of  patriotic ‘terrorists. The  confusion between  sentencing criteria and blood-thirsty prison behaviour is possible to understand but not to accept.      Having dealt with some of the untenable positions taken by the  affient, I move on to a consideration of the torture content of  solitary confinement.  The  Batra  treatment  is little  short  of  solitary  confinement.  This  inclination persuaded the  court to make the interim ll direction on 5th May, 1978           "We direct that until further orders of this Court      the  petitioner   Sunil  Batra  will  not  be  kept  in      ’confinement’ as 437      contemplated by  S. 30(2)  of the  Prisons Act, 1894. A      Reasons to follow".      Even so,  from a  larger angle, it becomes necessary to explain  why   a  sensitized   perspective  repels  judicial condonation  of  solitary  confinement  of  sorts.  What  is solitary  confinement,   experiencially,  juristically,  and humanistically  understood   ?  At   the   close   of   this consideration, a  legal definition  OF solitary  confinement may be given to the extent necessary in this case.      American high-security  prisons, reportedly  with their tours, tantrums and tensions, may not help comparison except minimally. Even  so, the  Additional Solicitor  General draw our attention  to observations  of the U.S. Court of Appeals decisions  affirming   segregated  confinement   in  maximum security prisons.  His  point  was  autonomy  for  the  jail administration in matters of internal discipline, especially where inmates were apt to be:           (1) "threat  to themselves,  to others,  or to the      safety and  security of  the institution. Such a policy      is perfectly  proper and  lawful and its administration      requires  the   highest  degree  of  expertise  in  the      discretionary function of balancing the security of the      prison with  fairness to  the individual  con fined. In      the case  at bar  the record  reveals that  appellant’s      confinement  in   segregation  is  the  result  of  the      considered judgment  of the  prison authorities  and is      not arbitrary". In  the   specific  cases  cited  the  facts  disclose  some justification for insulation.      "Appellant  has  indeed,  been  in  segregation  for  a      protracted period, continuously for more than two years      prior to  the  present  hearing.  However,  his  record      during these  separate  periods  when  he  was  allowed      confinement  "within  the  population  "  of  a  prison      reflects  a   history  of  participation,  directly  or      indirectly, in  conduct of  extreme violence.  Although      his con  duct in  segregation has  since been  entirely      satisfactory the  G trial  court was manifestly correct      in  determining  that  appellant  has  been  denied  no      constitutional right  and  that  the  determination  of      whether appellant  presently ’should  be  considered  a

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    threat to  others or  the safety  or  security  of  the      penitentiary is  a matter  for administrative  decision      and not the courts."      (1)  Kenneth  Grahm   v.  J.   T.  Willingham   Federal           Reporter, 2d Series Vol. 384 P. 2d. p. 367. 438      But, in  our cases,  no record  revealing balancing  of considerations or  compelling segregation  or murderous  in- prison violence  save that  he is  potentially ’under  death sentence’, is  shown. To be mindless is to be cruel and that is reflex  action of  the jail  bosses  when  prisoners  are routinely sent  to the  solitary  cell  on  hunch  or  less. Alleging chances of killing or being killed as the alibi for awarding ’solitary’ is an easy ’security’ phobia which shows little appreciation of the suffering so heaped. And abuse is undetected and  indiscriminate in  that walled  world within the world.           "Commenting  on   solitary  cellular  confinement,      Pandit Nehru  observes that the gaol department adds to      the sentence  of  the  court  an  additional  and  very      terrible punishment,  so far  as   adults and even boys      accused  of  revolutionary  activities  are  concerned.      Over-zealous prison  administrators in  the  past  have      contributed  not   a  little   to  the   disrepute  and      unpopularity of  the Government  by making reckless use      of this on political offenders or detenus." (1) The great  Judge Warren,  CJ in Trop. v. Dulles(2) refers to the condemnation of segregation and observes:           "This   condemnation   of   segregation   is   the      experience  years  ago  of  people  going  stir  crazy,      especially in segregation".      That compassionate  novelist, Charles  Dickens, in  his ’American Notes  and  Pictures  from  Italy’  describes  the congealing  cruelty   of   ’solitary   confinement’   in   a Pennsylvania Penitentiary (p. 99) :           I am  persuaded that those who devised this system      of prison  discipline, and  those benevolent  gentlemen      who carry  it into  execution, do  not know  what it is      that they  are doing.  I believe  that very few men are      capable of estimating the immense amount of torture and      agony which  this  dreadful  punishment  prolonged  for      years, inflicts  upon the sufferers; and in guessing at      it myself,  and in  reasoning from  what  I  have  seen      written upon  their  faces,  and  what  to  my  certain      knowledge  they   feel  within,  I  am  only  the  more      convinced that  there is  a depth of terrible endurance      in it  which none  but  the  sufferers  themselves  can      fathom, and  which no  man has  a right to inflict upon      his  fellow-creatures.  I  hold  this  slow  and  daily      tempering with  the  mysteries  of  the  brain,  to  be      immeasurably worse than any torture of the body; and      (1) B. K. Bhattacharya: Prisons, p. 111.      (2)  Leonard Orland, Justice, Punishment, Treatment, p.           297. 439      because  its  ghastly  signs  and  tokens  are  not  so      palpable to  the eye  and sense  of touch as scars upon      the Flesh;  because its wounds are not upon the surface      and it  extorts few  cries that  human ears  can  hear;      thereore,  I   the  more   denounce  it,  as  a  secret      punishment which  slumbering humanity  is not roused up      to stay. I hesitate once, debating with myself whether,      if I  had the  power of  saying "Yes"  or "No". I would      allow it  to be tried in certain cases, where the terms      OF  imprisonment   were  short;  but  now,  I  solemnly

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    declare, that with no rewards or Honours could I walk a      happy man  be neath  the open  sky by  day, or lie down      upon bed  at night,  with the  consciousness  that  one      human creature,  for any length of time, no matter what      lay suffering  this unknown  punishment in  his  silent      cell, and  I the  cause or  I consenting  to it  in the      least degree."      Viewing cellular  isolation from  a human  angle,  that literary genius,  Oscar Wilds,  who crossed  the path of the criminal law, was thrown into prison and wrote De Profundis, has poetized  in prose,  with  pessimism  and  realism,  the lonely poignancy of the iron infirmary. I quote:           A great  river of  life Hows between me and a date      so distant.  Hardly, if  at all,  can you see across so      wide a  waste .  . . suffering is one very long moment.      We cannot  divide it by seasons. We can only record its      moods, and  chronicle their return. With us time itself      does not  progress. It  revolves. It  seems  to  circle      round one  centre of pain. The paralysing immobility of      a life  every circumstance of which is regulated to the      inflexible laws  of  an  iron  formula:  this  immobile      quality, that  makes each  dreadful  day  in  the  very      maniutest detail like its brother, seems to communicate      itself to  those external  forces the  very essence  of      whose existence is ceaseless change.           ..... For  us there is only one season, the season      of sorrow.  The very  sun and  moon seem taken from us.      Outside, the  day may  be blue  and gold, but the light      that creeps  down through  the thickly-muffled glass of      the small  iron-barred window beneath which one sits is      grey and  niggard. It is always twilight in one’s cell,      as it  is always  twilight in  one’s heart.  And in the      sphere of  thought, no less than in the sphere of time,      motion is no more." 440 And Shri  Jawaharlal Nehru has recorded in his Autobiography in tho Thirties (1) :           "Some  individuals,  sentenced  for  revolutionary      activities for  life or  long term of imprisonment, are      often kept in solitary confinement for long period. But      in the  case of  these persons-usually  young boys-they      are kept  along although  their behaviour in gaol might      be exemplary.  Thus an  additional  and  very  terrible      punishment is  added by  the  Gaol  Department  to  the      sentence of  the Court,  without any  reason  therefor.      This seems  very extraordinary and hardly in confirmity      with any  rule of law. Solitary confinement, even for a      short period,  is a  most painful  affair, for it to be      prolonged for  years is  a terrible thing. It means the      slow and  continuous deterioration of the mind, till it      begins to  border on  insanity; and the appearance of a      look  of  vacancy,  or  a  frightened  animal  type  of      expression. It is killing of the spirit by degrees, the      slow vivisection  of the  soul. Even  if a man survives      it. he  becomes abnormal  and an absolute misfit in the      world."      Much has  been said in The course of the argument about the humanism imparted by interviews and letters. Nehru wrote about the Naini Prison, which retains its relevance for many prisons even today, speaking generally:-           "Interviews  are  only  permitted  once  in  three      months, and  so are  letters-a monstrously long period.      Even so,  many prisoners cannot take advantage of them.      If they  are illiterate, as most are, they have to rely      on some gaol official to write on their behalf: and the

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    latter, not  being keen  on adding  to his  other work,      usually avoids  it. Or,  if a  letter us  written,  the      address is  not properly  given and the letter does not      reach. Interviews  are still  more difficult. Almost in      variably they  depend on  a gratification for some good      official. often  prisoners are transferred to different      gaols, and  their people  cannot trace them. I have met      many prisoners  who had  lost complete touch with their      families for years, and did not know what had happened.      Interviews, when  they do take place after three months      or more  are most  extraordinary. A number of prisoners      and their  interviewers are  placed together  on either      side  of   a  barrier,   and  they   all  try  to  talk      simultaneously. There  is a  great deal  of shouting at      each other,  and the slight human touch that might have      come from the interview is entirely absent."      (1) Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography, p. 222. 441      The curse of the system is, in Nehru’s words:           "Not the  least effort  is made  to  consider  the      prisoner as  an  individual,  a  human  being,  and  to      improve or  look after  his mind.  The one thing the UP      administration excels  is  in  keeping  its  prisoners.      There are  remarkably few  attempts to  escape.  and  I      doubt if one i ten thousand succeeds in escaping."      A sad  commentary on  the die-hard  ’solitary’ in  some Indian Jails  is gleaned from a recent book, "My Years in an Indian Prison-Mary  Tyler"  (Victor  Gallantz  Ltd..  London 1977). The  author, a  young British,  Mary Tyler,  was in a female ward,  kept solitary  as  a  nasality,  and  deported eventually. She writes:           "By ten o’clock that morning I found myself locked      in room  fifteen feet square and completely bare except      for a small earthen pitcher and three tattered, coarse,      dark grey  blankets stiff  with the grease and sweat of      several generations  of prisoners,  which I  folded  to      make a  pallat on  the stone  floor My  cell formed one      corner of the dormitory building and looked out on to a      yard at the end of the compound farthest from the gate.      The two  outer walls were open to the elements; instead      of windows,  there were  three four-foot  wide openings      barred from  the floor  to a  height of eight feet. The      door was  fastened with  a long  iron  bolt  and  heavy      padlock; the  walls. covered  in patchy whitewash, wear      pock-marked high  and low  with holes  of  long-removed      nails. In  one! corner a rickety waist-high wooden gate      concealed a  latrine, a niche with raised floor, in the      centre of  which was  an oblong  slit directly  over  a      cracked earthen  tub. My latrine jutted out adjacent to      the one  serving the  dormitory where  the rest  of the      women prisoners  slept. The open drains from both these      latrine and  Kalpana’s ran  past the two outer walls of      my cell, filling the hot nights with a stench that made      me wretch  he crevices  between the broken concrete and      crumbling brickwork  of the  drains were  the  breeding      grounds of  countless flies  and giant mosquitoes that,      as if  by mutual pre- arrangements, performed alternate      day and night shifts in my cell to disturb my sleep and      rest.           My first few days in ’solitary’ were spent as in a      dream, punctuated  only  by  the  Chief  Head  Warder’s      morning and  evening rounds  to  check  the  lock,  the      bustling appearance  of the  matine bringing  food  and      water, or the wardress fumbling with her keys to unlock      me to clean my teeth and baths.

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442           During   the daytime,  the key  to the gate of the      female word  was in the custody of a ’duty-warder’, one      of the  hundred and  fifty warders  in the jail. He was      responsible for  opening the  gate  to  admit  convicts      bringing food, the doctor or other persons on essential      business. Administration  of the  jail was in the hands      or a staff of Assistant Jailors and clerks, subordinate      to the  Jailor who  had overall  responsibility for the      day to  day running of the prison. He was answerable to      the most  exalted personage  in the jail hierarchy, the      Superintend (dent.           His unpredictable  temper  and  behaviour  were  a      source of  as much  exasperation to his subordinates as      to ourselves He demonstrated his authority by reversing      his previous instructions so many times that in the end      nobody was  really sure  what he wanted. The jail staff      operated by  by-passing hi  n as much as possible so as      not to  get caught  out if  he happened  to change  his      mind."      Judicial opinion across the Atlantic, has veered to the view that  it is near-insanity to inflict prolonged solitary segregation upon  prisoners. And  the British System has bid farewell to solitary confinement as a punishment. I refer to these contemporary  developments not  to hold on their basis but to  get a  feel of  this  jail  within    jail.  Without empathy, decision-making may be futility.      It is  fair to  state that Sri Soli Sorabjee, expressed himself   for jail reform and his heart was with those whose limited  liberty   was  ham   strung,  although  he  pleaded strenuously that  the reformist  goal could  be  reached  by reading new  meaning without  voiding the  provision. So  he tried to  tone down the acerbity of the isolation imposed on Batra by  calling it  statutory  segregation,  not  solitary confinement. But,  ‘as will  be later  revealed, the  former hides  the   harshness  verbally   but  retains   the  sting virtually. Presbyter is priest writ large.      A host  of criminological  specialists has consistently viewed  with   consternation  the   imposition  of  solitary confinement    punitively-and,     obviously,     preventive segregation stands  on a  worse footing,  since it  does not have even  a  disciplinary  veneer.  I  may,  with  eclectic brevity,  quote   from  the  wealth  of  juristic  crudition presented to  us by  Shri Chitale  in support  of his thesis that forced  human segregation,  whatever its  label,  is  a barbaric cruelty  which has  outlived its  utility  and  the assumption  that   condemned   prisoners   or   lifers   are dangerously violent is a facile fiction. 443      One main thrust, however, of the congregate school came      on the  issue of the effects of constant and unrelieved      isolation of  prisoners. It was unnatural, the New York      camp insisted, to leave man in solitary, day after day,      year after  year; indeed, it was‘ not unnatural that it      bred insanity."(1)      "Harlow and  Harlow (1962)  have conducted  experiments      with  species  closely  related  to  human  beings.  Of      special interest  are the  variables  involved  in  the      causation of  psycho pathological  syndromes in man. In      measuring the  relation between  social environment and      social  development,   Harlow  reports  that  the  most      constant and  dramatic finding  that  social  isolation      represents the  most destructive  abnormal environment.      As this isolation progresses from partial to total, the      severity  of   impairment     increases,  ranging  from

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    schizord-like postures to depressive-type postures."(2)      Eloquent  testimony   to  man’s  need  for  belonging,,      acceptance, and  approval is provided by the experience      of small  groups of  scientists, officer,  and enlisted      personnel  who   voluntarily  subjected  themselves  to      isolated antartic  living for the better part of a year      (Robrer,  1961).   During   this   period   troublesome      individuals  were   occasionally  given   the   "silent      treatment" in which a man would be ignored by the group      as if  he did  not exist.  This  ’isolation’  procedure      resulted  in   a  syndrome   called  the   ’long  eye’,      characterized by varying combinations of sleeplessness,      outbursts of crying, hallucinations, a deterioration in      habits of  personal hygiene, and tendency fr the man to      move aimlessly about or to lie in his bunk staring into      space. These  symptoms cleared  up when  he  was  again      accepted by  and permitted  to interact  with others in      the group."(3)      "The use  of the dark or isolation cell-the hangover of      the  medieval   dungeon-known  in  prison  parlance  as      ’Klondika‘,  is  probably  the  most  universally  used      prison punishment in      (1)  David J.  Rotman. Historical perspectives-Justice,           Punishment, Treatment by Leonard Oreland, 1973, p.           144.      (2)  Psychiatrist and  the  Urban-setting-Comprehensive           Text Book  of Psychiatrist-ll,  2nd  Ed.  Vol.  II           (1976) by  A  .  M.  Freeman,  Harlod  I.  Kaplan,           Benjamin J. Sedock, p. 2503.      (3)  James C.  Coleman-Abnormal Psychology  and  Modern           Life p. 105. 12-526SCI/78 444      the history of American penology.(1)      Some prisoners  are kept  in these  gloomy  places  for      month. What  to do  with a rebellious prisoner bedevils      all wardens,  but a  sustained sojourn  in a punishment      cell is  not the  answer. The excessive use of Klondike      is a  grim example  of what  is known  to  students  of      corrections as ’deed end’ penology. Resorting to it for      long periods  o time is n illustration of total lack of      imagination and outmoded prison administration, all too      current in  most of  our prisons  even today  Not  much      different from  the  dark  or  isolation  cell  is  the      ’segregation’ block  or ward.  In this isolated part of      the prison  an inmate  may  be  placed  because  he  is      ’uncooperative’.  is  considered  dangerous  or  a  bad      influence, or  for some  other reason arrived at by the      warden  his deputy in charge of custody."      A much  more recent  case which  bids well  to become a      cause clebre  is that  of Robert  Shroud who  has spent      approximately the  same period of time in ’segregation’      in the  federal prisons  of Leavenworth  and  Alcatraz.      Stroud was  first sent  to prison  when he was nineteen      for killing  a man  in Alska  in   1909. While  in  the      Leavenworth prison he killed a guard in the dining room      for which  he was sentenced to be hanged. This sentence      was commuted to life by President Woodrow Wilson. While      in prison  in  ’segregated  cell’,  Stroud  became  all      expert in  disease of  birds and  is  alleged  to  have      become a world-wide authority in his field.(2)      "Regarded as  a rational  method of treatment, cellular      confinement is   curious  monument of human perversity.      That it should have been established shows the absolute      ignorance of criminal nature which existed at the time;

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    that  it   should  still   persist  shows  the  present      necessity for   widespread  popular knowledge  of these      matters. It  may be  possible. to  learn to  ride on  a      wooden horse,  or to  swim on a table, but the solitary      cell  does   not  provide  wooden  substitute  for  the      harmonising influence f honest society.(3) Criminological jurists  like Dr.  Bhattacharya, who was also judge of he Calcutta High Court, take the view that cellular or separate confinement deserves to be condemned:      (1)  Harry  Elmer  Barnes  and  Negley  K.  Testers-New           Horzons in Criminology, 3rd Ed. 2p. 351-352.      (2)  Royal Commission  on Capital  Punishment 1949-1953           Report pp. ;217.      (3) Havelock  Ellis, The  Criminal, 5th  Edn. 1914,  r. 327. 445      Many  penologists   in  India  take  exception  to  the      solitary confinement  rule. It is hard to differentiate      between this  as an  mode of judicial punishment and by      way of  a jail  punishment for  the results are equally      disastrous to  the physical  and mental health of those      subjected to them".(1)      Yahya Ali.  J., in 1947, loll before our constitutional charter Came  into being,  had  expressed  himself  strongly against ’solitary  confinement’ and  we feel  more  strongly about it  and against  it.  Our  humane  order  must  reject solitary  confinement’  as  horrendous.  The  learned  Judge observed :      " Solitary  confinement should  not be  ordered  unless      there are  special features  appearing in  the evidence      such as extreme violence or brutality in the commission      of the offence. The only reason given by the Magistrate      is that  the ’sanctity  or home  life has become to him      (the appellant)  a mere  mockery and the desire to take      what he  wants regardless  of ownership is not in him’.      This can  be said  of every  person convicted  under S.      379, Penal  Code and  I do  not consider  that to  be I      circumstance justifying  the passing  of  an  order  of      solitary confinement.  The direction regarding solitary      confinement will be deleted."      "As  regards   the  sentence   relating   to   solitary      confinement the  attention of the Magistrate is invited      to my  judgment in  Criminal Appeal  No 114 of 1947. As      pointed out in that judgment although the imposition of      the sentence  of solitary; confinement was legal, under      the Larceny  Act of  1861 (24  and 25 Vict. Ch. 96) the      power was very rarely exercised by a criminal Court. By      enacting 56  and 57  Vict.  Ch.  54  on  22-9-1893  the      provisions  in   Larceny  Act   relating  to   solitary      confinement  which  had  become  obsolete  for  several      decade by  that date  were formally repealed. A century      of experience  has   thus led to its abandonment in the      United  Kingdom  and  at  the  present  day  it  stands      condemned and  has generally  given place  to  work  in      association during  the day and confinement in cell for      the  night,  in  cases  where  isolation  at  night  is      considered necessary  for a  brief time  for particular      prisoners all exclusively for the maintenance of prison      discipline Although  in the  medieval times  under  the      influence of  the eccesiastics  it was  considered that      cellular confinement as a      (1) B. K. Bhattacharya, Prisons, p. 117,      (2) AIR 1947 Madras 381 446      means of  promoting reflection  and penitence,  it came

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    since to  be realised that this kind of treatment leads      to a  morbid state  of mind  and  not  infrequently  to      mental derangement and as a form of torture it fails in      its effect  on the  public. It must, therefore, so long      as is  part of  the Indian Penal Code, be administered,      if ever  in the  most exceptional cases of unparalleled      atrocity or brutality."      The Law Commission of India in its 42nd Report took the view that  solitary confinement was "out of tune with modern thinking and  should not find a place in the Penal Code as a punishment to  be  ordered  by  any  criminal  court".  Some ambivalent observation  that such  treatment may  perhaps be necessary as  a measure  OF jail  discipline has  been  made without any  special supportive  reasons as  to why  such  a penelogical horror  as long  solitary confinement  should be allowed to  survive after death within the prison. Probably, all that  was meant  by the  Commission was  that, for  very short  spells   and  under   ameliorative  conditions,   the ’solitary’ may be kept alive as a disciplinary step.      The propositions  of law canvassed in Batra’s case turn on what  is solitary confinement as a punishment and what is non-punitive custodial  isolation  of  a  prisoner  awaiting execution. And secondly, if what is inflicted is, in effect, ’solitary’, does section 30(2) of the Act authorise it, and, if it  does, is  such a  rigorous regimen constitutional. In one sense,  these questions  are pushed  to the  background, because Batra’s submission is that he is not ’under sentence of death’  within the  scope of section 30 until the Supreme Court has  affirmed and Presidential mercy has dried up by a final ’nay’.  Batra has  been  sentenced  to  death  by  the Sessions Court.  The sentence  has since been confirmed, but the  appeal  for  Presidential  commutation  are  ordinarily precedent to  the hangmen’s  lethal move,  and remain  to be gone through.  is contention is that solitary confinement is a separate  substantive  punishment  of  maddening  severity prescribed by sections 73 of the Indian Penal Code which Can be imposed  only by  the Court;  and so  tormenting is  this sentence that even the socially less sensitive Penal Code of 1 860  has interposed,  in its  cruel tenderness, intervals, maxima and  like softening  features in both sections 73 and 7. Such  being the  penal situation,  it is  argued that the incarcertory   insulation    inflicted   by    the    Prison Superintendent  on   the  petitioner   is  virtual  solitary confinement unauthorised  by the  Penal Code and, therefore, illegal.  Admittedly,   no  solitary  confinement  has  been awarded to  Batra. So,  if he  is de facto so confined it is illegal. Nor  does a  sentence of  death under  section  53, I.P.C. carry with it a supplementary 447 secret clause  of solitary  confinement. What  warrant  then exists for  A solitary  confinement on  Batra  ?  None.  The answer offered is that he is not under solitary confinement. He is  under ’statutory  confinement’ under the authority of section 30(2)  of the  Prisons Act  read with section 366(2) Cr. P.C.  It will  be a  stultification of judicial power if under guise  of using  section 30(2)  o the Prisons Act, the Superintendent  inflicts   what  is  substantially  solitary confinement which  is a  species of  punishment  exclusively within the  jurisdiction of  the criminal  court.  We  hold, without hesitation,  that Sunil Batra shall no be solitarily confined. Can  he be  segregated from  view  and  Voice  and visits and  comingling, by  resort to  section 30(2)  of the Prisons Act  and reach  the same result ? To give the answer we must  examine the  essentials of  solitary confinement to distinguish it from being ’confined in a cell apart from all

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other prisoners’.      If solitary  confinement is  a revolt against society s humane essence,  there is  no  reason  to  permit  the  same punishment to  be smuggled  into the prison system by naming it differently. Law is not a formal label, nor logomachy but a working  technique of  justice. The  Penal  Code  and  the Criminal Procedure  Code regard  punitive solitude too harsh and the  Legislature cannot be intended to permit preventive solitary confinement, released even from the restrictions of section 73  and 74 I.P.C., Section 29 of the Prisons Act and the restrictive Prison Rules. It would be extraordinary that a far  worse solitary  confinement, masked  as safe custody, sans maximum,  sans intermission, sans judicial oversight or natural justice,  wold be  sanctioned. Commonsense  quarrels with such nonsense.      For a  fuller comprehension of the legal provisions and their  construction  we  may  have  to  quote  the  relevant sections and thereafter make a laboratory dissection thereof to get  an understanding of the components Which make up the legislative sanction  for semi-solitary  detention  of  Shri Batra. Section 30 of the Prisons Act rules:      "30  (1)  Every prisoner under sentence of death shall,           immediately on  his arrival  in the  prison  after           sentence, be  searched by,  or by  order  of,  the           Deputy Superintendent,  and all  articles shall be           taken from  him which  the  Deputy  Superintendent           deems it  dangerous or inexpedient to leave in his           possession.           (2)  Every such  prisoner, shall  be confined in a           cell apart  from all other prisoners, and shall be           placed by  day and  by night  under  charge  of  a           guard." 448 This falls  in Chapter V relating to discipline of prisoners and has to be read in that context. Any separate confinement contemplated  in   section  30(2)   has  this   disciplinary limitation as  we will  presently see.  If we pull to pieces the whole provision it becomes clear that section 3() can be applied only  to  a  prisoner  "under  sentence  of  death". Section 30(2)  which speaks  of "such" prisoners necessarily relates to  prisoners   under sentence  of death. We have to discover when  we can  designate a  prisoner  as  one  under sentence of death.      The  next   attempt  is   to  discern  the  meaning  of confinement "in  a cell apart from all other prisoners". The purpose is to maintain discipline and discipline is to avoid disorder.   fight   and   other   untoward   incidents.   if apprehended.      Confinement inside a prison does not necessarily import cellular isolation. Segregation of one person all alone in a single cell  is solitary  confinement. That  is  a  separate punishment which  the Court  alone can impose. It would be a subversion of  this statutory  provision (section  73 and 74 I.P.C.) to impart a meaning to section (1)(2) of the Prisons Act whereby  a disciplinary  variant of solitary confinement can be  clamped down  on a  prisoner, although  no court has awarded such  a punishment,  by a  mere construction,  which clothes an executive officer, who happens to be the governor o the  jail, with  harsh judicial  powers to be exercised by punitive restrictions and unaccountable to anyone. the power being discretionary and disciplinary.      Indeed, in  a jail,  cells are  ordinarily occupied  by more than  one inmate  and community life inside dormitories and cells  is common.  Therefore, "to be confined in a cell" does not  compel us  to the  conclusion that the confinement

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should be in a solitary cell.      Apart from  all other  prisoners" used in section 30(2) is also  a phrase  of flexible import. ’Apart’ has the sense of ’To  one side,  aside . apart from each other, separately in action  or function’ (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary). Segregation into  an isolated  cell is  not warranted by the word. All that it connotes is that in a cell where there are a plurality  of inmates  the death  sentence will have to be kept separated  from the  rest in  the same  cell but no too close to  the others. And this separation can be effectively achieved because the condemned prisoner will be placed under the charge  of a  guard by  day and by night. The guard will thus stand  in between the several inmates and the condemned prisoner. Such a meanings preserves the disciplinary purpose and avoids  punitive harshness.  Viewed function  ally,  the separation is  authorised, not obligated. that is to say, if discipline needs  it the  authority shall be entitled to and the prisoner 449 shall be  liable to separate keeping within the same cell as explained A  above.  ‘Shall"  means,  in  this  disciplinary context, "shall  be liable to". If the condemned prisoner is docile and  needs the  attention of fellow prisoners nothing forbids the jailor from giving him that facility.      When we  move on  to Chapter  XI we  come across Prison Offences which  are listed  in section  45. Section 46 deals with punishment for such offences. We reproduce the relevant portion:           46. The  Superintendent  may  examine  any  person      touching any  such offence, and determine thereupon and      punish such offence by           (6)  imposition of  handcuffs of  such pattern and           weight, in such manner and for such period, as may           be  prescribed  by  rules  made  by  the  Governor           General in Council;           (7)  imposition of  fetters of  such  pattern  and           weight, in such manner and for such period, as may           be  prescribed  by  the  rules  made  by  Governor           General in Council;           (8)  separate  confinement   for  any  period  not           exceeding three months;           Explanation:-  Separate   confinement  means  such           confinement with  or without  labour as secludes a           prisoner from  communication with,  but  not  from           sight of  other prisoners, and allows him not less           than one  hour’s exercise per diem and to have his           meals  in  association  with  one  or  more  other           prisoners; .           (10) cellular  confinement   for  any  period  not      exceeding fourteen days;           Provided  that,  after  such  period  of  cellular           confinement an  interval of not less duration than           such period  must elapse  before the  prisoner  is           again   sentenced    to   cellular   or   solitary           confinement:           Explanation:-  Cellular   confinement  means  such           confinement with  or without  labour  as  entirely           secludes a  prisoner from  communication with, but           not from sight of other prisoners." 450      Sub-section (6)  and (7)  relate to  "irons"  and  have relevance to  the Sobraj  case which  we will presently deal with. Sub-section  (8) speaks  of "separate confinement" for any period  not exceeding  three months.  There is a further explanation which  to some  extent softens the seclusion. It

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obligates the authority not to keep the prisoner "from sight of other  prisoners" and allows him not less than one hour’s exercise per  diem and to have his meals in association with other prisoners.  Thus it  is clear  that even  if  a  grave prison offence  has been  committed, the punishment does not carry segregated  cellular existence  and  permits  life  in association in  mess and exercise, in view and voice but not in communication  with other  prisoners. Moreover,  punitive separate confinement  shall  not  exceed  three  months  and section  47   interdicts   the   combination   of   cellular confinement and  "separate confinement"  so as not to exceed together the  periods  specified  there.  It  is  useful  to mention that "cellular confinement" is a stricter punishment than separate  confinement and  it  cannot  exceed  14  days because of its rigour. It entirely excludes a prisoners from communication with  other prisoners but it shall not exclude a prisoner from sight o other prisoners.      Solitary confinement  has the  severest  sting  and  is awardable only by Court. o island a human being, to keep him incommunicado from  his fellows is the story of the Andamans under the British, of Napoleon in St. Helena. The anguish of aloneness has  already been dealt with by me and I hold that section 30(2)  provides no alibi for any form of solitary or separated cellular  tenancy for  the death sentence, save to the extent indicated.      This study clearly reveals that solitary confinement as a sentence under the Penal Code is the severest. Less severe is cellular  confinement under section 46(10) of the Prisons Act and  under section  .6(8). obviously, disciplinary needs of keeping apart a prisoner do not involve any harsh element of punishment  at all.  We cannot,  therefore, accede to any argument which will upset the scheme or subvert the scale of severity. Section  30(2), understood in the correct setting, plainly excludes  any trace  of severity and merely provides for a  protective  distance  being  maintained  between  the prisoner under  death  sentence  and  the  other  prisoners, although they  are accommodated  in the  same cell  and  are allowed to  communicate with  each other,  eat together, see each other  and for  all other  practical purposes  continue community life.      An analysis  of the provisions of the Penal Code and of the Prisons  Act yields  the clear  inference  that  section 30(2) relates to separation without isolation, keeping apart without  close   confinement.   Whatever   the   name.   the consequence of the ’solitary’ regime has been maddening: 451           "So  many   convicts  went   mad  or   died  as  a           consequence of  the solitary  regime that  by  the           mid-19th century it was generally abandoned..."(1) The ’separate  system’, the  "silent system", the "hole" and other variants possess the same vice. In the present case we are satisfied  that what  reigns in  Tihar  for  ’condemned’ prisoners  is   sound  proof,   sight-proof,   society-proof cellular insulation  which is  a first  cousin  to  solitary confinement.      Section  366(2),   Cr.P.  Code   has  bearing  on  this discussion, for it states:      "The  Court  passing  the  sentence  shall  commit  the      convicted person to jail custody under a warrant."      So, the  Court awards  only  a  single  sentence  viz., death. But  it cannot  be  instantly  executed  because  its executability is  possible only  on confirmation by the High Court. In  the meanwhile, he cannot be let loose for he must be available  for decapitation  when the  judicial processes are exhausted.  So it  is that  section 365(2) takes care of

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this awesome  interregnum by  committing the convict to jail custody. Form 40 authorises safe keeping. We may extract the relevant part of the Form:           "This is  to authorise  and require you to receive      the said  (prisoner’s name)  into your  custody in  the      said jail,  together With  this warrant,  and him there      safely to  keep until  you  hall  receive  the  further      warrant or  order of  this Court,  carrying into effect      the order of the said Court".      This ’safe  keeping’ in  jail custody  is  the  limited jurisdiction of  the jailor. The convict is not sentenced to imprisonment. He is lo sentenced to solitary confinement. He is a  guest in  custody, in  the safe  keeping of  the host- jailor until  the  terminal  hour  of  terrestrial  farewell whisks him  away to  the halter.  This is trusteeship in the hands o  the Superintendent  not imprisonment  in  the  true sense. Section 366(2) Criminal procedure Code (Jail Custody) and  Form  4  (safely  to  keep)  underscore  this  concept, reinforced by the absence of a sentence o imprisonment under section 53,  read with  section 73,  Indian Penal  Code. The inference is  inevitable that  if the  ’condemned’ men  were harmed by  physical or  mental torture  the  law  would  not tolerate the  doing since  injury  and  safety  are  obvious enemies.  And  once  this  qualitative  distinction  between imprisonment and safe keeping within      (1) Britannica  Book of  the Year  1975-Events of 1974. p.567. 452 the prison  is grasped,  the power  of  the  jailor  becomes benign. Batra,  and others of his ilk, are entitled to every creature comfort  and cultural  facility that  compassionate safe-keeping  implies.   Bed  and   pillow,  opportunity  to commerce with  human kind, worship in shrines, if any, games books, newspapers, writing material, meeting family members, and all  the good  things of  life, so long as lie lasts and prison facilities  exist. To  distort  safe-keeping  into  a hidden opportunity to cage the ward and to traumatize him is to betray  the custody of the law Safe custody does not mean deprivation, isolation,  banishment from  the lenten banquet of prison  life and infliction o travails as if guardianship were best fulfilled by making the ward suffer near-insanity. May be,  the Prison  Superintendent has  the alibi of prison usage, and  may be,  he is innocent of the inviolable values of our  Constitution. May be there is something wrong in the professional training  and the  prison culture.  May be,  he misconceives his  mission unwittingly  to help God ’Whom God wishes  to   destroy,  He   first  makes   mad’.  For.  long segregation lashes  the senses  until the spirit lapses into the neighbourhood  of lunacy. Safe-keeping means keeping his body and  mind in  fair condition.  To torture  his mind  is unsafe keeping.  Injury  to  his  personality  is  not  safe keeping. So,  section 366,  Cr.P.C. forbids  any  act  which disrupts the man in his body and mind. To preserve his flesh and crush  his spirit  is not safe keeping. whatever else it be.      Neither the  Penal Code nor the Criminal Procedure Code lends validity  to any action beyond the needs of safety and any other  deprivation, whatever  the reason,  has  not  the authority  of   law.  Any   executive  action  which  spells infraction of  the life and liberty of a human being kept in prison precincts, purely for safe custody, is a challenge to the basic  notion of  the rule of law-unreasonable, unequal, arbitrary and  unjust. A  death  sentence  can  no  more  be denuded or  life’s  amenities  than  a  civil  debtor,  fine defaulter, maintenance  defaulter  or  contemner  indeed,  a

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gross confusion accounts for this terrible maltreatment.      The  Prisons   Act  (Sec.   30(2))  spells   out   with specificity  the  point  of  departure  from  ordinary  jail custody needed  in the  case of  those  ’under  sentence  of death’. That  is to  say, they  get the  same conditions  of prison life  as  other  general  prisoners,  except  in  two particulars. During hours of cellular confinement, condemned prisoners shall  be  secluded  from  others.  Dusk  to  dawn keeping aside  is one restriction. Such sentences shall also be subject  to twenty-four  hour watch by guards. Both these are  understandable  restraints  in  the  setting  of  death sentence as  reasonable concomitants of safe custody without inflicting cruelty.      To exaggerate  security  unrealistically  is  morbidity and, if  it is  a pervasive  malady, deserves psychiatry for the prison administration. 453 In  every  country,  this  transformation  from  cruelty  to compassion  within  jails  has  found  resistance  from  the echelons  and   the  Great   Divide   between   pre-and-post Constitution penology  has yet to get into the metabolism of the Prison  Services. And  so, on  the  national  agenda  of prison  reform  is  on-going  education  for  prison  staff, humanisation of  the profession and recognition of the human rights of the human beings in their keep.      In my  Judgment section  30(2) does  not  validate  the State’s treatment of Batra. To argue that it is not solitary confinement  since   visitors  are   allowed,  doctors   and officials come  and a guard stands by, is not to take it out of the category.      Since arguments  have been  addressed, let  us  enquire what are  the vital  components of  solitary  confinement  ? Absent statutory  definition, the  indication we  have is in the Explanation to Paragraph 510 of the Jail Manual:           ’Solitary confinement  means such confinement with      or without  labour as  entirely secludes  the  prisoner      both from  sight  of,  and  communication  with,  other      prisoners."      The hard  core of  such confinement is (a) seclusion of the prisoner,  (b) from  sight of  other prisoners,  and (c) from communication  with other  prisoners. To  see a  fellow being is  a solace to the soul. Communication with one’s own kind is  a balm to the balm to the aching  spirit. Denial of both with  complete segregation superimposed, is the journey to insanity.  To test  whether a certain type of segregation is, in Indian terms, solitary confinement, we have merely to verify whether  interdict on  sight and  communication  with other prisoners  is imposed.  It is no use providing view of or conversation  with jail  visitors, jail officers or stray relations. The  crux of  the matter  is  communication  with other prisoners  in full  view. Bad  fellows in  misery have heartloads to  unload and real conversation between them has a   healing   effect.   Now   that   we   have   an   Indian conceptualisation of  solitary  confinement  in  the  Prison Manual itself,  lexical exercises, decisional erudition from other countries  and legomachic  niceties with  reference to law  dictionaries  are  supererogatory.  Even  the  backward psychiatry of the Jail Manual considers continuation of such confinement as  "likely to  prove injurious to mind or body" or even  prone to  make the  person  "permanently  unfit  to undergo such  confinement" [vide paragraph 512(7) and (9) of the Jail Manual.      In  Words   and  Phrases   (Permanent  Edn.)   solitary confinement as  a punishment  is regarded  as "the  complete isolation of  the prisoner  from all  human society  and his

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confinement in a cell of considerable size so 454 arranged that  he had  no direct intercourse or sight of any human  being  and  no  employment  or  instruction".  It  is worthwhile comparing  the allied  but less harsh confinement called "close  confinement" which  means "such  custody, and only such  custody as  will safely  secure the production or the body  of the  prisoner on  the  day  appointed  for  his execution".      A more practical identification of solitary confinement is what we find in Black’s Law Dictionary:           "ln a general sense, the separate confinement of a      prisoner, with  only occasional  access  of  any  other      person and  that only  at the discretion of the jailor;      in a  stricter  sense,  the  complete  isolation  of  a      prisoner from  all human society and his confinement in      a cell  so arranged  that he  has no direct intercourse      with or  sight of any human being, and no employment or      instruction." Complete  isolation  from  all  human  society  is  solitary confinement in  its stricter sense. The separate confinement of a  person with occasional access of other persons is also solitary confinement.      The ingenious  arguments to  keep Batra in solitudinous cell  must  fail  and  he  shall  be  given  facilities  and amenities of  common prisoners  even  before  he  is  ’under sentence of death’. Is he under sentence of death? Not yet.      Clearly, there  is a  sentence of  death passed against Batra by  the Sessions  Court but  it is provisional and the question is  whether under  section 30(2) the petitioner can be confined  in a cell all by Himself under a 24-hour guard. The key  words which  call for humanistic interpretation are "under sentence of death" and "confined in a cell apart from all other prisoners".      A convict  is ’under  sentence of  death when, and only when.  the   capital  penalty  inexorably  operates  by  the automatic process  of the  Law without  any slip between the lip and  the cup.  Rulings of  this Court  in Abdul Azeez v. Karnataka(1) and  D. K. Sharma v. M. P. State(2), though not directly on  this point,  strongly suggest this reasoning to be sound. Section 366 Cr. P.C. has pertinence at this point:           "366. (1)  When the  Court of  Sessions  passes  a      sentence of  death, the  proceedings shall be submitted      to the  High  Court  and  the  sentence  shall  not  be      executed unless it be confirmed by the High Court.      (1) [1977] (3) S.C.R. 393.      (2) [1976] (2) S.C.R. 289 455           (2) The  Court passing  the sentence  shall commit      the  A   convicted  person  to  jail  custody  under  a      warrant."      So  it   is  clear   that  the  sentence  of  death  is inexecutable until  ’confirmed by  the High  Court’. A self- acting sentence  of death  does not  come into  existence in view of  the impediment  contained in  section  366(1)  even though  the   Sessions  Court  might  have  pronounced  that sentence.      I go  further. Let  us assume  that the  High Court has confirmed that  death sentence  or has de novo imposed death sentence. Even  there is  quite a likelihood of an appeal to the Supreme Court and the plenary power of the highest court extends to  demolition or the death sentence. Naturally, the pendency of  the appeal itself inhibits the execution of the sentence. Otherwise, the appellate power will be frustrated,

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the man  executed and  the Supreme  Court stultified  if  it upsets the death sentence later. In our view, when an appeal pends against  a conviction  and sentence  in regard  to  an offence punishable  with death sentence, such death sentence even if  confirmed by  the High  Court shall not work itself out until  the Supreme  Court has  pronounced.  section  415 Cr.P.C. produces this result inevitably.           "415. (1)  Where a person is sentenced to death by      the High  Court and an appeal from the judgment lies to      the Supreme  Court under  sub-clause (a)  or sub-clause      (b) of E clause (1) of article 134 of the Constitution,      the  High  Court  shall  order  the  execution  of  the      sentence to  be postponed  until the period allowed for      preferring such appeal has expired, or, if an appeal is      preferred within  that period,  until  such  appeal  is      disposed of.           (2)  Where  a  sentence  of  death  is  passed  or      confirmed by  the High  Court, and the person sentenced      makes an application tc the High Court for the grant of      a certificate under article 132 or under sub-clause (c)      of clause  (l) of article ] 34 of the Constitution, the      High Court shall order the execution of the sentence to      be postponed  until such  application is disposed of by      the High  Court, or if a certificate is granted on such      application, until the period allowed for preferring an      appeal to  the Supreme  Court on  such certificate  has      expired.           (3)  Where  a  sentence  of  death  is  passed  or      confirmed by  the High  Court, and  the High  Court  is      satisfied that  the person sentenced intends to present      a petition to the Supreme 456      Court for  the grant  of special  leave to appeal under      article. 136  of the Constitution, the High Court shall      order the execution of the sentence to be postponed for      such period as it considers sufficient to enable him to      present such petition      Article 72  and 161  provide for  commutation of  death sentence even  like sections  433, 434  and 435  Cr.P.C. The rules made  under the  Prisons Act,  taking  note  of  these provisions, provide  for a  petition for  commutation by the prisoner. Rule 547 and rule 548 framed under the Prisons Act relate to the subject of petitions for mercy:      "(a) Rules framed by the Government  of  India :           I.-  lmmediately  on  receipt  of  a  warrant  for      execution consequent  on the  confirmation by  the High      Court of  sentence of  death, Jail Superintendent shall      inform the  convict concerned  that if  he  desires  to      submit a  petition for mercy, it should be submitted in      writing  within   seven  days   of  the  date  of  such      intimation.           II- If  the convicts  submit a petition within the      period of  seven days prescribed by Rule I it should be      addresses both  to the  local  Government  and  to  the      Governor-General in  Council, and the Superintendent of      Jail shall  forthwith despatch it, in duplicate, to the      Secretary to  the local  Government in  the  Department      concerned. together  with a  covering letter  reporting      the date  fixed for  the execution  an(l shall  certify      that the  execution has  been stayed pending receipt of      the orders of the Governor in Council and the Governors      General in  Council on  the petition  if  no  reply  is      received within  15 days  from the date of the despatch      of the  petition the  Superintendent shall telegraph to      the Secretary to the local Government drawing attention

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    to the  fact, but  he shall  in no  case carry  out the      execution before  the receipt of the local Government’s      reply."      It follows  that during  the pendency of a petition for mercy before  the State  Governor or  the President of India the death  sentence  shall  not  be  executed.  Thus,  until rejection of the clemency motion by these 457 two high  dignitaries it  is not  possible to predicate that there is  a self  executory  death  sentence.  Therefore,  a prisoner becomes legally subject. to a self-working sentence of death  only when  the clemency  application both prisoner stands rejected.  Of course,  thereafter  section  30(2)  is attracted.  A  second  or  a  third,  a  fourth  or  further application for mercy docs not take him out of that category unless there  is a specific order by the competent authority staying the execution of the death sentence.      The conclusion  inevitably follows  that Batra, or, for that matter,  others like  him, cannot be classed as persons "under sentence  of death". Therefore the cannot be confined apart from  other prisoner.  Nor is he sentenced to rigorous imprisonment and  so cannot be forced to do hard labour.. He is in custody because the Court has, pending confirmation of the death  sentence, commanded  the Prison Authority to keep the sentence  in custody. The concrete result may be clearly set out.      Condemned prisoner  like Batra  shall be merely kept in custody and shall not be put to work like those sentenced to rigorous imprisonment.  These prisoners  shall not  be  kept apart or  segregated except on their own volition since they do not  come under  section 30(2). They shall be entitled to the amenities  of ordinary inmates in the prison like games, books,  newspapers,  reasonably  good  food,  the  right  to expression, artistic  or other, and normal clothing and bed. In a  sense,  they  stand  better  than  ordinary  prisoners because  they   are  not   serving  any   term  of  rigorous imprisonment, as  such. However,  if their gregarious wishes induce them  to live  in  fellowship  and  work  like  other prisoners they  should be allowed to do so. To eat together, to sleep  together, to  work  together,  to  live  together, generally speaking,  cannot be  denied  to  them  except  on specific  grounds   warranting  such   a  course,   such  as homosexual tendencies,  diseases, violent  proclivities  and the like.  But if  these grounds  are to  be the  basis  for revocation of advantages to the prejudice of the sentence he should be  given a  hearing in brief in essential compliance with the canons of natural justice.      Deference to  the erudite  efforts of Counsel persuades me, before  l part  with this topic to refer to an anthology of Anglo-American opinions, judicial and academic, which has been made  available to  us to  some of  which I  have  made reference. The  Judges in the United States have had to deal with  the   issue  and  before  I  wind  up  on  the.  legal implications of  solitary confinement I may refer to some of them.      Punitive segregation  is regarded  as too harsh that it is limited  to no  more than  8  days  except  with  special approval of the commissioner 458 of corrections  in many  American states...  The average for this type  of punitive  incarceration is five days. Now note what the U.S District court states:           "This punishment  is imposed  only after  a formal      written  notice,  followed  by  a  hearing  before  the      disciplinary committee."

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    The emphasis  on limited  periods  and  hearing  before punishment have been built into the procedure for punishment of solitary  confinement. This is important when we consider whether any  form of harsh imprisonment, whether of solitary confinement or  of  bar  fetters,  should  not  comply  with natural  justice   and  be  severely  limited  in  duration. Preventive solitude and fetters are an a fortiori case.      An Afro-American citizen Sostre, brought a Civil Rights action   Sostre v.  Rockfeller(2)  complaining  of  solitary confinement otherwise  called(l  punitive  segregation.  The year long  stay in  that segregation  cell was  bitter.  The sting of  the situation  was ’human  isolation loss of group privileges’. On this Judge held:           "This court  finds that punitive segregation under      the conditions  to which  plaintiff  was  subjected  at      Green Haven is physically harsh, destructive of morale,      dehumanizing  in   the  sense  that  it  is  needlessly      degrading, and  dangerous to  the maintenance of sanity      when continued  for more  than a  short period  of time      which should certainly not exceed 15 days’.      The decision  on punitive  segregation  confinement  in Sostre v. Rockfeller is of value since the case, as here, is one of  indefinite punitive confinement. The Court held that it was  so disproportionate  that it  amounted to  cruel and unusual punishment:           "The Court  also holds  that the  totality of  the      circumstances to  which Sostre  was subjected  for more      than a  year was  cruel  and  unusual  punishment  when      tested against  the evolving  standards if decency that      mark the progress of maturing society .(Trio v. Dulles,      356 U.S 86 ,101(1958)(Opinion of warren C.J)           This condemnation of segregation is the experience      years ago  of people  going stir  crazy, especially  in      segregation". (T. 320)) The conditions which undeniably      existed in  punitive segregation  of Green  Haven  this      Court finds. " could only      (1)  Justice Punishment,  Treatment by  Leonard Orland,           The Free Press New York, p. 293.      (2) 312 F. Suppl. 863 (1970). 459      serve to  destroy completely  the spirit  and undermine      the sanity  of the  prisoner "Wright v. Machmann, supra      387. F.  2nd at 526, when imposed for more than fifteen      days .  Subjecting a  prisoner to the demonstrated risk      of the  loss   of his  sanity  as  punishment  for  any      offence  in   prison  is   plainly  cruel  and  unusual      punishment as judged by present standards of decency.      What is  of considerable interest is the observation on procedural due  process whish in our country has its counter part in  Article 21,  as expounded  in  Maneka  Gandhi.  The American Judge observed in Sostre’s case           Very recently,  the Supreme  Court reiterated  the      firmly established  due process  principles that  where      governmental action  may seriously injure an individual      and the  reasonableness of  that action depends on fact      findings ,  the evidence  used to prove the governments      case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has      an  opportunity   to  show   that  it  is  untrue.  The      individual also  have the  right to retain counsel. the      decision maker’s  should  state  the  reasons  for  the      determination and  indicate the  evidence upon which he      relied. Finally,  in such  cases, the high court ruled,      an impartial decision-maker is essential           The Court  holds that  plaintiff was,  in  affect,      ’sentenced’  to   more     than  a   year  in  punitive

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    segregation with  out the  minimal  procedural  drastic      punishment upon a prisoner."      There has  been considerable emphasis by the Additional Solicitor  general  on  the  prison  setting  in  truncating processual justice.  The U.S.  District Court  in Sostre had this to say:           "The  difficult   question,  as  always,  is  that      process was  due. In  answering that  question, we mays      not uncritically  adopt the  holdings of decisions that      take color  from contexts  where  the  shading  are  as      different   from the  instant case as the cases we have      discussed:           As a  generalization, it  can  be  said  that  due      process embodies  the differing  rules  of  fair  play,      which through  the years,  have become  associated with      differing   types    of   proceedings.    Whether   the      constitution requires that a particular right obtain in      a specific proceeding depends upon a 13 - 526 SCI/78 460      complexity of  factors. The nature of the alleged right      involved,  the   nature  of  the  proceeding,  and  the      possible   burden   on   that   proceeding,   are   all      considerations which must be taken into account      A meaningful  passage in  the appellate judgment in the same case may be excerpted:           We are  not to  be understood  as disapproving the      judgement of many courts that our constitutional scheme      does  not  contemplate  that  society  may  commit  law      breakers to  the capricious  and arbitrary  actions  of      prison officials. If substantial deprivations are to be      visited upon  a prison,  it is  wise that  such  action      should  at   least  be  premised  on  facts  rationally      determined. This  is not  a concept without meaning. In      most cases  it would  probably be  difficult to find an      inquiry minimally fair and rational unless the prisoner      were con  fronted with  the accusation, informed of the      evidence against him.’      The Supreme  Court of  the United  states  in  Wolf  v. McDonnell(1) considered  the question  of  due  process  and prison  disciplinary   hearing,  confrontation   and  cross- examination and even presence of counsel. Mr. Justice White, speaking for  the majority,  struck the balance that the due process clause demanded and insisted:           . .  We hold  that written  notice of  the charges      must be  given to  the dsciplinary-action  defendant in      order to inform him of the charges and to enable him to      marshal the  facts and  prepare a  defence. At  least a      brief period  of time after the notice, no less than 24      hours, should  be allowed  to the inmate to prepare for      the appearance before the Adjustment Committee.           We  also  hold  that  there  must  be  a  "written      statement by the fact-finders as to the evidence relied      on and reasons‘’ for the disciplinary action.           Although  Nebraska   does  not   seem  to  provide      administrative  review  of  the  action  taken  by  the      Adjustment  Committee,   the  actions   taken  at  such      proceedings may  involve review  by other  bodies. They      might furnish  the basis  of a decision by the Director      of  Corrections   to  transfer  an  inmate  to  another      institution because he is considered "to be incor-      (1) 41 L. Ed. 2d p. 935. 461      rigible by  reason of  frequent intentional breaches of      discipline", and  are certainly likely to be considered

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    by  the  state  parole  authorities  in  making  parole      decisions. Written  records of  proceedings  will  thus      protect  the  inmate  against  collateral  consequences      based on  a  misunderstanding  of  the  nature  of  the      original proceeding.  Further, as  to the  disciplinary      action itself, the provision for a written record helps      to insure  that  administrators,  faced  with  possible      scrutiny by state officials and the public, and perhaps      even  the   courts,  where  fundamental  constitutional      rights may have been abridged, will act fairly. Without      written  records,  the  inmate  will  be  at  a  severe      disadvantage  in   propounding  his  own  cause  to  or      defending himself  from others.  lt may  be that  there      will be occasions when personal or institutional safety      are so  implicated, that  the  statement  may  properly      exclude certain  items of  evidence, but  in that event      the statement should indicate the fact of the omission.      Otherwise, we  perceive no  conceivable  rehabilitative      objective or  prospect of  prison disruption  that  can      flow from  the requirement  of these statements. We are      also of the opinion that the inmate facing disciplinary      proceedings should  be allowed  to call  witnesses  and      present  documentary   evidence  in  the  defence  when      permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to      institutional safety or correctional goals".      As to  the right to counsel Mr. Justice White felt that then the  proceedings may  receive an  "adversary cast", but proceeded to observe:           "Where an  illiterate inmate is involved, however,      or where  the complexity of the issue makes it unlikely      that the inmate will be able to collect and present the      evidence necessary for an adequate comprehension of the      case, he  should be  free to  seek the  aid of a fellow      inmate, or  if that  is  forbidden,  to  have  adequate      substitutes aid  in the  form to help from the staff or      from a  sufficiently competent inmate designated by the      staff. We  need not pursue the matter further here, how      ever, for  there is no claim that respondent Mcdonnell,      is within  the class  of inmates  entitled to advice or      help from others in the course of a prison disciplinary      hearing." The learned  Judge, however,  felt that  in situations where Habeas Corpus  applications had to be made qualified inmates may be permitted to serve as legal advisers.      Mr.  Justice   Marshall  went  much  farther  than  the majority and observed: 462           ".. by  far the  greater  weight  of  correctional      authority  is   that  greater  procedural  fairness  in      disciplinary    proceedings,    including    permitting      confrontation  and   cross-examination,  would  enhance      rather  than  impair  the  disciplinary  process  as  a      rehabilitative tool.           Time  has   proved  ..  that  blind  deference  to      correctional officials  does no  real service  to them.      Judicial  concern  with  procedural  regularity  has  a      direct hearing  upon the  maintenance of  institutional      order; the  orderly care  with which decisions are made      by the  prison authority  is intimately  related to the      level of  respect  with  which  prisoners  regard  that      authority.           There is nothing more corrosive to the fabric of a      public institution  such as  a prison  than  a  feeling      among those  whom  it  contains  that  they  are  being      treated unfairly.

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         As the Chief Justice noted... "fair treatment ....      will enhance  the chance  of rehabilitation by avoiding      reactions to arbitrariness."                ..We  have   recognized  that   an  impartial      decision- maker  is a  fundamental requirement  of  due      process in  a variety  of relevant  situations,  and  I      would hold this require lent fully applicable here. But      in my  view there  is no constitutional impediment to a      disciplinary  board   composed  of  responsible  prison      officials like  those on the Adjustment Committee here.      While it  might well  be desirable to have persons from      outside  the  prison  system  sitting  on  disciplinary      panels, so  as to eliminate any possibility that subtle      institutional  pressures  may  effect  the  outcome  of      disciplinary cases  and  to  avoid  any  appearance  of      unfairness, in my view due process is satisfied as long      as  no  member  of  the  disciplinary  board  has  been      involved in  the investigation  or prosecution  of  the      particular case,  or has had any other form of personal      involvement in the case."      Mr. Justice  Douglas, in  his dissent,  quoted from  an earlier case           "Certain  principles   have  remained   relatively      immutable our jurisprudence. One of these is that where      govern mental  action seriously  injures an individual,      and the  reasonableness of  the action  depends on fact      findings, the  evidence  used to prove the Government’s      case must  be disclosed  to the  individual so, that he      has an  opportunity to  show that  it is  untrue. While      this is important in the case of documentary 463      evidence, it  is even more important where the evidence      consists of  the testimony  of individuals whose memory      might be  faulty or  who in fact, might be perjurers or      persons   motivated    by    malice,    vindictiveness,      intolerance,   prejudice,   or   jealously.   We   have      formalized these  protections in  the  requirements  of      confrontation and cross-examination............... This      Court has  been zealous  to protect  these rights  from      erosion. It  has spoken  out not only in criminal cases      but also in all types of cases where administrative and      regulatory actions were under scrutiny. The decision as      to whether  an inmate should be allowed to confront his      accusers should  not  be  left  to  the  unchecked  and      unreviewable  discretion  of  the  prison  disciplinary      board. The argument offered for that result is that the      danger of  violent response  by the  inmate against his      accusers  is   great,  and   that   only   the   prison      administrators  are   in  a   position  to  weigh,  the      necessity of  secrecy in each case. But it is precisely      this unchecked  power of prison administration which is      the problem that due process safeguards are required to      cure. "Not  only, the principle of judicial review, but      the whole  scheme of  American government,  reflects an      institutionalized mistrust  of any  such unchecked  and      unbalanced  power   over  essential   liberties.   That      mistrust does not depend on an assumption of inveterate      venality  or  incompetence  on  the  part  of  men;  in      Power...."      Going the whole length of extending the right to cross- examination, the  learned Judge  took  the  view  that  fair procedure  inside   prisons  is   part   of   a   successful rehabilitative programme, and observed:           "The goal is to reintegrate inmates into a society      where men  are supposed  to be  treated fairly  by  the

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    government, not arbitrarily. The opposed procedure will      be counter-productive.  A report prepared for the Joint      Commission on  Correctional Manpower  and Training  has      pointed out  that the  "basic hurdle (to reintegration)      in the  concept of  a prisoner  as a non-person and the      jailor as  an absolute  monarch. The  legal strategy to      surmount this  hurdle is  to adopt rules maximizing the      prisoner’s freedom,  dignity, and  responsibility. More      particularly, the  law must  respond to the substantive      and procedural claims that prisoners may have...."      The substance of these decisions is that ’a prisoner is not temporarily  a slave of the State and is entitled to the fair  process   of  law   before  condemnation  to  solitary confinement. The U.S. Judges‘ 464 generally have  refused to  accept arbitrary  or  capricious discipline in jail administration.           "We would  not lightly condone the absence of such      basic  safeguards  against  arbitrariness  as  adequate      notice, an  , opportunity  for the prisoner to reply to      charges  lodged   against   him,   and   a   reasonable      investigation into the substantial discipline.(1)      Another passage  from Judge  Fainberg in  the same case deserves our attention:           "In this  Orwellian age, punishment that endangers      sanity, no  less than  physical injury by the strap, is      prohibited by the Constitution. Indeed, we have learned      to our  sorrow  in  the  rest  few  decades  that  true      inhumanity seeks  to destroy  the   psyche rather  than      merely the  body. The  majority opinion emphasizes that      after all  Sostre  could  have  obtained  release  from      isolation at  my time by agreeing to abide by the rules      and to cooperate. Perhaps that is so, but that does not      change the  case.. The  possibility of endless solitary      confinement is  still there, unless the prisoner ’gives      in’. The  same observation could be made if Sostre were      tortured until  he so  agreed, but  no one  would argue      that torture  is therefore permitted. The point is that      the  means   used   to   exact   submission   must   be      constitutionally  acceptable,   and   the   threat   of      virtually endless  isolation that  endangers sanity  is      not." (emphasis, added)      Quite a few other decisions of this lesser level courts of the  United States  have been  brought to  our notice  by counsel in  an endeavour  to validate or invalidate solitary confinement from  a constitutional  angle. Unless  driven to pronounce upon  constitutionality we  may not  go  into  the question at  all. Even so, for a perspicacious understanding of the  facets of  solitary confinement,  its soul or rather its soullessness,  I may  refer to a few of the cited cases. The Court  will stand four square between a prisoner and the methodology  of   destroying  completely   tile  spirit  and undermining the  sanity of the prisoner in jail. This we do, not because  of  anything  like  the  Eighth  Amendment  but because unreasonable restrictions and arbitrary deprivations are abnoxious  to Part  III, especially  Articles 14 and 19, even within the prison setting.      (1) Sostre V. Rockefeller. 312 F. SUPDI. 863 (1970) 465      The facie submission, ’that the determination as to the methods   of dealing  with such  incorrigible persons  is  a matter of internal management of State prisons and should be left to  the discretion  of  prison  administrators....’  is untenable if,  within  the  cell,  fundamental  concepts  of decency do not prevail and barbaric conditions and degrading

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circumstances do  violence to  civilised standards of humane decency as  the Court  pointed out  in Hancock v. Avery. The goals of  prison keeping,  especially if  it  is  mere  safe keeping, can  be attained  without requiring  a prisoner  to live in the exacerbated conditions of bare floor solitude.      Functionally speaking, the court has a distinctive duty to reform  prison practices  and  to  inject  constitutional consciousness into the system.           "The challenge  of prison reform is too compelling      for courts  to decline to exercise their inherent power      to   protect   the   constitutional   rights   of   the      incarcerated. Affording  such protection  demands  that      courts  do   more  than   merely  invalidate   specific      practices;  it   demands   that   they   confront   the      institution of  prison as  a  whole.  The  totality  of      conditions approach and the purposive model of analysis      afford framework for this confrontation."(’)           Moreover, prison  officials may  welcome  judicial      intervention,  because  it  enables  them  to  initiate      reforms that  are politically  and financially  costly.      Studies  have   demonstrated  that  one  by-product  to      totality  of  conditions  prison  cases  is  that  they      sensitized both  the public and prison officials to the      need for prison reform. As a result, progressive prison      authorities and  humanitarian citizens’ groups are able      to take  advantage of  this  increased  sensitivity  to      advocate reform." The Sobraj Case      I now  switch to  the  averments  in  the  petition  by Sobraj. Chief Justice Beg and his companion Judges including me, it  may be  right to  state here,  did incidentally  see Sobraj (the  other petitioner),  standing in  chains in  the yard, with  iron on wrists, iron on ankles iron on waist and iron to  link up, firmly rivetted at appropriate places, all according to rules !      The manacled numbers of the Tihar Jail community appear lo be  alarmingly large  and fluctuating,  if we  go by  the averments in the      (1) Harward  Civil  Right-Civil  Liberties  Law  Review (Vol. ]2) 466 affidavit of the petitioner and the counter affidavit by the State. In  January, 1978 according to Sobraj, there were 207 under trial prisoners with bar fetters in Tihar Jail and all of them, exception Sobraj, were Indian citizens, all of them belonging to  the ’C’  class, which  is a  poverty sign, and many of  them minors  ! We  are remind  of what  Douglas, J. Observed in Hicks:(1)           "The wanderer, the pauper, the unemployed-all were      deemed to be potential criminals..........           I do  not see  how economic or social statutes can      be made  a crime  any more than being a drug addict can      be. " Even  the intervener,  Citizens for  Democracy, have, with passion but  without partisanship,  complained that  ’over a hundred other prisoners in Tihar Jail are subjected to these inhuman  conditions’   !  The  State  has  controverted  the arithmetic but  has not refuted the thrust of the submission that  a  substantial  number  of  undertrial  prisoners  has suffered aching irons over their anatomy. As against 207 the State admits  a total  of 93  prisoners.. ’in  bar fetters’. There is  no dispute that all but the petitioner were of the ’C’ class  category, that  is, men  whose socio-economic lot was weak.  The Superintendent of the Central Jail has a case that on  January 20,  1978, ’the bar fetters of 41 prisoners

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were removed’. Likewise, on February 6, 1978, bar fetters of 26  prisoners  were  removed.  The  trend  of  the  counter- affidavit  is   that  this  Superintendent  has  taken  some ameliorative measures  to normalise  conditions in the Jail. The discrepencies  between the  competing statements  do not demolish  the   gravemen  of  the  charge  that  the  "iron’ methodology  of   keeping  discipline  has  had  a  somewhat dangerous access  into the  prison  Superintendent’s  mental kit. If  irons must  rule the jail community there is jejune justice in  our prison  campuses.  The  abolition  of  irons altogether in  some states without calamitous sequel as e.g. Kerala and Tamil Nadu, is worth mention.      Now the  Sobraj facts. Sobraj has been in custody since July 6,  1976, having been arrested from Vikram Hotel, along with three  criminal companions  of British,  Australian and French extraction.  His interpol  dossier is  stated  to  be terrible and  his exploits  include  jail  break  and  grave crime. We  merely  mention  this  fact  but  decline  to  be deflected by  it because  it is  disputed, although the jail officers cannot  be faulted  if they  are influenced by such information. The  Sobraj story,  since his  arrest  in  July 1976, is  one of  continuous  and  indeterminate  detention, partly under  the Maintenance  of Internal  Security Act and currently as an undertrial facing serious charges, including      (1)383 US 252 (1966) 467 murder. The  prisoner challenged  the legality  of arbitrary ’irons’ in  A the  High Court  but was  greeted with laconic dismissal. The  parsimonious words,  in which  the order was couched, ran:           This is a petition from jail. In view of the facts      the petition  is not  maintainable. It  is dismissed in      limine.  The  petitioner  informed  of  the  order’....      Discomfited Sobraj has moved this Court.      The disturbing  fact of years of pre-trial imprisonment apart, the  agonising aspect, highlighted by Dr. Ghatate for the petitioner  and by  Shri Tarkunde as intervener, is that until the Court sometime ago directed a little relaxation in the rigour  of the ’iron’ prescription, Sobraj (and how many submissive  sufferers   like  Him  there  are  ?)  has  been continuously subjected  to  the  torturesome  ’bar  fetters, through twenty  four hours daily and every day of the month, ’religiously’ for  nearly two  years, what  with the  kindly presumption of  innocence jurisprudentially playing upon him in tragic irony. Sobraj bitterly complains of persistence in bar fetters  notwithstanding wounds  on  heels  and  medical advice to  the  contrary.  The  State  defends  bar  fetters statutorily  by   section  56   of  the   Prisons  Act   and realistically as  preventive  medicine  for  ’dangerousness’ pathology, in  exercise of  the wise  discretion of the Jail Superintendent,  overseen   by  the   revisory  eye  of  the Inspector  General  of  Prisons  and  listened  to  by  Jail Visitors. The  bar fetter procedure, denounced by counsel as intolerable, is  described by  the State as inconvenient but not inhumane, evil but inevitable, where the customer is one with dangerous  disposition and  attainments. It is admitted that Sobraj  has been  in fetters  to inhibit  violence  and escape.      The sorrows  of Sobraj  cannot be  appreciated nor  his constitutional claims  evaluated without a fuller account of the bar  fetter chapter of his jail life. Ever since July 6, 1976, he  has been  kept in  bar fetters,  duly welded,  all these  months   without  respite   through  the   period  of preventive  detention   and  after.   We  have   it  on  the petitioner’s word  that no  holiday was  given  to  the  bar

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fetter therapy,  although the  Resident Medical  Officer has noted, in  the history ticket of the prisoner, entries which are tell-tale.           "9-2-1977-multiple  infected   wounds   on   right      ankles. Bar  fetters be  removed from  right leg for 15      days.                                      Sd/- Dr. Mittal. R.M.O.           9-2-1977-Bar fetters removed from right leg for 15      days on medical advice.                                            Sd/- Mr. Mukhreja                           Assistant Superintendent of Jails. 468                                              Sd/- Mr. Andhur                                 Dy. Superintendent of Jails.           12-2-1977-Bar fetters also to be removed from left      foot.                                              Sd/- Dr. Bokra.           12-2-1977-Fetters be  removed from  left foot  for      two weeks, on medical advice.                                              Sd/- Mr. Marwa,                                  Dy. Superintendent of Jails                                         (Respondent No. 3) r           18-2-1977-He is  desperate and dangerous prisoner;      for security  reasons it  is necessary  to keep  him in      fetters. His  wounds may  also  be  dressed.  (emphasis      added)                                            Sd/- Mr. Marwa, n                                  Dy. Superintendent of Jails                                           (Respondent No. 3)      The  counter-affidavit   of  Shri   Marwa,   the   then Superintendent, has taken up an extreme position about which I am  special.  For  instance,  he  has  asserted  that  the Resident Medical  officer had examined the petitioner on 3rd September  1977,   and  found   no  wound   on  his  ankles. Significantly on  September 4, 1977, this Superintendent has recorded a  note in  his journal: "1 was informed by Shri S. S. Lal,  A.S., that  Charles Sobraj  has inflicted injury on his ankles deliberately. I am certain in my mind that he has done so  as to  be produced  before Hon’ble Supreme Court of India on  6-9-1977 in  connection with  his  Writ  Petition, wherein he  has mentioned  that his  ankles are  injured and thus his bar fetters should be removed.      In  an   endeavour  to   make  out   that   there   was discrimination and  recklessness in  the imposition  of  bar fetters, the petitioner has set out two circumstances.      He has averred:           "It is  significant to mention that the undertrial      prisoners in  the  following  serious  cases  who  were      confined in Tihar Jail were without any fetters:-           (i)  All undertrial  prisoners in  Baroda Dynamite                case who were also detained under MISA;           (ii) All the  persons accused in the Hon’ble Chief                Justice of India (Shri A. N. Ray’s) attempt: 469           (iii)All accused  persons in Samastipur Bomb Blast                case where  the former Railway Minister, Shri                L. N. Mishra, was killed;           (iv) All accused  persons  in  Vidya  Jain  murder                case; and           (v)  All  accused   persons  in  famous  Bank  Van                Robbery case held at New Delhi;      What may  have relevance  to the  criticism of  the bar fetters technology running riot in Tihar Jail is another set of circumstances  about this  high security  Jail which  was commissioned after Independence (1958).

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    The first  is, that  a large number of prisoners, a few hundred at times-minors and undertrials too-are shackled day and night  four days  and months  on end  by bar fetters-too shocking to contemplate with cultural equanimity. And, this, prima facie,  shows up the class character of jail injustice for an  incisive sociologist. Practically all these fettered creatures are  the poor.  Sobraj is  the only class prisoner subjects fetters,  the others  being class people. A cynical but to  observer may comment necessarily violent in Gandhian India but  that the  better-off are  able to  buy the  class justice current  in the  ’caste  system’  behind  the  bars- according to  rule, of  course. Anyone  whose socio-economic level is  higher is a class prisoner, undertrial or convict; everyone whose  lot is  below that  line is a class jailbird who is  often deprived  of basic amenities and obliged to do hard labour  if he  is a convict. Poverty cannot be degraded as ’dangerousness’  except by  subversion of our egalitarian ethos. How  come that  all the  undertrial who are under bar fetters are  also from the penurious ? This, suspiciously is ’soft’ justice syndrome towards the rich, not social justice response towards the poor.      The petitioner  has alleged additional facts to paint a para-violent  picture   of   the   prison   atmosphere   and frightening profile  of the jail hierarchy. For instance, if I may excerpt the portions of his affidavit.-           "In para  630 of  the Punjab Jail Manual, which is      of 1898, still the punishment of Whipping, para 628 and      629, is  valid and  the Jail  Authorities used the said      Whipping Rule  at their  own discretion, that is to say      almost  daily  beating  the  prisoners  and  some  time      beating them  up to  Death as  a case which happened in      1971 and  went unpunished  but for  some Jail officials      suspended for an year.’ 470      Some flegellations  and killings are referred to by him which  may   be  skipped.  The  lurid  lines  so  drawn  are blistering commentary  on the  barbarity of  prison  regimen even if  a fraction of the imputations possesses veracity. A fraction of  the facts alleged, if true may warrant the fear that a little Hitler lingers around Tihar precincts.      The counter-version on the factual and legal aspects of the  Sobraj  charges  against  the  Prison  Authorities  has already been indicated.      Right at this stage, 1 may read S. 56, which is the law relied on  to shackle  the limited  freedom of  movement  of Sobraj:           56.  Whenever   the  Superintendent  considers  it      necessary (with  reference either  to the  State of the      prison of  the character of the prisoners) for the safe      custody of  any prisoners  that they should be confined      in  irons,   he  may,   subject  to   such  rules   and      illustrations as  may be  laid down  by  the  Inspector      General with  the sanction  of the Local Government, so      confine them.’      Before formulating  the heads of argument in the Sobraj case it  is necessary  to state that the respondent, after a vain effort  to secure  certain pre-Independence  government proceedings  of  the  Punjab,  now  in  Pakistani  archives, admitted  that   it  could  not  make  good  the  validating existence,  of  the  local  government’s  sanction  for  the instructions  of   the  Inspector  General  of  Prisons,  as required by  S. 56  of the Act, although such an instruction is found  in the  Jail Manual.  Nothing else,  which compels judicial notice  is available, and so the rule is not show‘n to be  valid. Sobraj’s  grievance is shocking shackling with

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bar fetters.  Iron  on  wrists,  iron  on  ankles,  iron  in between, welded  strongly that  all oppressive 6 Ibs. weight hampers movement,  hinders sleep  and hurts  all the time so much that life is poor purchase. And yet he is in a stage of presumptive innocence  and under judicial custody. The basic fact   that    Sobraj   is    fettered   during   the   Jail Superintendent’s sole  discretion is  not denied; and he has been enduring  this distress  for a  chronic couple of years with no  hope of  relief except the unlikely change of heart of the  head of the prison. The defence of the State is that high-risk  prisoners,   even  the  under-trials,  cannot  be allowed to  bid for escape, and where circumstances justify, any result  oriented measure,  including fetters, is legally permissible. It  is argued  that a prison is not play-ground and hyper-sensitive  reaction to  irons  may  be  functional folly, if we realise that custodial security has high prison priority. Dangerous  persons, if  they are to be produced to answer justice,  must suffer indefinite immobilisation, even if  painfully   inconvenient,  not  punitively  imposed  but preventively clamped down, until the danger lasts. 471 Rights and Realities      Sobraj, in  chains, demands  constitutional rights  for man. For  there are several men like him in the same prison, undertrials, indigents,  even minors.  The official  journal allegedly  registers   the  laconic   reason  for  the  Jail Superitendent’s  fiat   to  impose  bar  fetters  and  these ’dangerous’ reasons  are recorded  in English in the history tickets of the (mostly) ’C’ class ‘un-English’ victims. This voodoo is  in compliance  with the  formula of  the rule and jail visitors  march past.  The Inspector-General of prisons revises, if moved, and the spirit-crushing artifice survives as a  technique of  jail discipline. Ordinarily, the curtain falls, the groan or moan is hardly heard, the world falls to sleep, the Constitution and the Court sublimely uphold human rights but the cells weep for justice unheard.      There is  a sad  fascination to read Nehru on the Naini Prison which is but a portrait of any Indian prison of those times:           ’For years and years many of these ’lifers’ do not      see a  child or woman, or even animals. They lose touch      with the  outside world  completely and  have no  human      contacts left.  They brood and warp themselves in angry      thoughts of  fear and  revenge and  hatred; forget  the      good of  the world, the kindness and joy, and live only      wrapped up  in the  evil, till  gradually  even  hatred      loses its  edge and  life becomes  a soul less thing, a      machine like  routine. Like automations they pass their      days  each   exactly  like  the  other,  and  have  few      sensations; except  one fear  ! From  time to  time the      prisoner’s body  is weighted  and measured.  But how is      one to  weigh the  mind and  the spirit  which wilt and      stunt themselves  and  wither  away  in  this  terrible      atmosphere of  oppression ?  People argue  against  the      death  penalty,   and  their  arguments  appeal  to  me      greatly. But  when I see the long drawn out agony, of a      life spent  in prison, I feel that it is perhaps better      to have  that penalty  rather than  to  kill  a  person      slowly and  by degrees.  one of the ’lifers’ came up to      me once  and asked me. "What of us lifers ? Will Swaraj      take us out of this hell ?"      The great  problems of law are the grave crises of life and both  can be  solved not  by the  literal instruction of printed enactments,  but by the interpretative sensitization of the heart to ’the still, sad music of humanity.

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    The humane thread of jail jurisprudence that runs right through is  that no  prison  authority  enjoys  amnesty  for unconstitutionality,  and  forced  farewell  to  fundamental rights is an institutional outrage in our 472 system where  stone walls and iron bars shall bow before the rule of  law  Since  life  and  liberty  are  at  stake  the gerontocracy of  the Jail  Manual  shall  have  to  come  to working terms with the paramountcy of fundamental rights.      A valuable  footnote to  this approach may be furnished by recalling  how Mahatma  Gandhi regarded  jails as  social hospitals’ and  Prime Minister(1)  Shri Morarji Desai, while he was  Home Minister  of Bombay  way back  in 1952 told the conference of Inspectors-General of Prisons:           "it is not enough to consider a prisoner merely as      a prisoner..  To my  mind a prisoner is not a matter of      contempt.   Even   the worst criminal, as you call him,      is after  all a human being as good or bad as any other      outsider: what  ever remedies you can find out to treat      prisoners,  unless   your  attitude  changes,  and  you      consider that the prisoners inside the jails are really      human  beings  equal  in  self-respect  to  your  self-      respect, you  will never  be affective  in whatever you      do, because  you will affect them only in so far as you      extract from  them the  same respect  for you  and also      good feeling  for you  and that  cannot come unless you      behave on  equal terms withy them ..."(2)      A synthetic  grasp of  the claims of custodial security and prison  humanity is essential to solve the dilemma posed by the  Additional Solicitor  General.   If we  are soft  on security, escapes  will escalate:  so be stern, red in tooth and claw’  is the  submission.   Security first and security last, is  an argument  with a familiar and fearful ring with Dwyerlist memories and recent happenings.   To cry’ wolf’ as a cover  for official  violence upon helpless prisoners is a cowardly act.   Chaining  all  prisoners,  amputating  many, caging some,  can all  be fobbed off, if every undertrial or convict were  painted as  a  potentially  dangerous  maniac. Assuming a  few are  likely to  escape,   would you  shoot a hundred prisoners  or whip  everyone every day or fetter all suspects  to   prevent  one   jumping-ail?      These   wild apprehensions have  no value in our human order, if Articles 14, 19  and 21  are the prime actors to stampede courts into vesting unlimited  power in  risky hands  with no convincing mechanism for  prompt, impartial  check.   A sober  balance, rights that alone will fill the constitutional bill.      (1) Indian Correctional Journal, Vol. 1, No.2 July 1957 p.6a.      (2)   Indian Correctional  Journal , Vol. 1, No.2, July 1957 pp.25. 473      The grave  danger of over-emphasizing order, discipline and security   within  the prison, while interpreting S. 56, is that  it lands  itself unawares  to a  pre-conceived, one sided meaning.           "The unconscious  or  half-conscious  wresting  of      fact and  word and  idea to suit a pre-conceived notion      or the  doctrine or  principle of  one’s preference  is      recognised by  Indian logicians  as  one  of  the  most      fruitful sources  of fallacy; and it is perhaps the one      which  it   is  most   difficult  for   even  the  most      conscientious thinker to avoid. For the human reason is      incapable of  always playing  the detective upon itself      in this  respect; it  is its  very nature to seize upon      some partial  conclusion, idea,  principle, become  its

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    partisan and  make it  the key to all truth, and it has      an infinite  faculty of  doubting upon  itself so as to      avoid detecting  in its  operations this  necessary and      cherished weakness."(1)      Judges must  warn themselves  against this  possibility because  the   nation’s  confidence   in  the   exercise  of discretionary power  affecting life  and  liberty  has  been rudely shaken  especially when  the Court trustingly left it to the  Executive. A  prison is a sound-proof planet, walled from view  and visits regulated, and so, rights of prisoners are hardly  visible, checking  is  more  difficult  and  the official position of the repository of power inspires little credibility where  the victims  can be political protesters, unpopular figures,  minority champions  or artless  folk who might fail to propitiate arrogant power of minor minions.      The learned Additional’ Solicitor General commended for our  consideration   the  judicial   strategy  of  softening draconian disablement  implied in  S. 56  by  a  process  of interpretation  as   against  invalidation.  We  agree,  and proceed to  consider whether  the language  of S.  56  lends itself to such leniency. The impugned provision runs thus:           "Whenever   the    Superintendent   considers   it      necessary (with  reference either  to the  state of the      prison or  the character of the prisoners) for the safe      custody of  any prisoners  that they should be confined      in  irons,   he  may,   subject  to   such  rules   and      instructions as  may be  laid down  by  the  Inspector-      General with  the sanction  of the Local Government, so      confine them "      The relevant  ’rules’ may  also be referred to. A whole fasciculus of rules under the heading ’confinement in irons’ deals with  this subject.  The more  relevant ones are Rules 423, 428, 432, 433 and 435. These      (1) Sri Aurobindo-Essays on the Gita, p. 37. 474 rules’ merely  provide for  stacking irons,  describe  their details, specify  the category  and conditions  of prisoners who may  be required  to wear  irons, direct  their  medical examination, the removal of fetters and the like.      Besides, there  are provisions which specify situations where ordinarily  prisoners are  exempt  from  fetters,  and fetters shall not, ordinarily and without special reasons to be recorded by the Superintendent in his Journal, be imposed on any  ’unconvicted criminal prisoner’ (See R. 430). Sobraj is yet  unconvicted. The  other categories  so exempted need not detain  us. To  avoid conclusion  it is not apt to state that these  ’rules and  instructions’ have no legal force as the source  of power,  S. 56, desiderates for their validity the sanction  of the  ’Local  Government’.  After  strenuous efforts to  trace such sanction, the Addl. Solicitor General failed to  make good  this condition precedent. The sanction being absent,  the  instructions  are  no  more  than  self- presented procedure and cannot qualify for recognition under Art. 21.  In this  sense, S.  56 stands  unclad and  must be constitutionally tested on its sweeping phraseology of naked brevity.      Even otherwise,  the rules  come into  play only to the extent the  Act permits,  since the stream cannot rise above the  source.   Therefore,  S.  56  demands  close  scrutiny. Confinement in  irons is  permitted for  the safe custody of prisoners. Therefore,  the sine  qua non  is the presence of safety to  the point  of necessity  compelling fetters. Safe custody is  imperilled only where escape probability exists. Such escape  becomes a  clear and  present danger only where the prisoner has by his precedents shown an imminent attempt

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to escape.  Mere violence  by a prisoner of bad behaviour or other misconduct  which has no reference to safe custody has no relevance  to S.  56. Supposing  a prisoner  were  short- tempered, vulgar or even homosexual, his safe custody within the prison is not in jeopardy. His misbehaviour unrelated to security is  the only  issue then  involved and correctional therapy is  the prescription. S. 56 is not attracted so long as the safe custody of that prisoner is not shaky. The focus is on his escape and, maybe, on overt and covert attempts in that behalf. Other disorder or vice may deserve disciplinary attention but  S.56 is  not a nostrum for all administrative aches within jails.      The  second   requirement  of   S.  56   is  that   the Superintendent  must  consider  it  necessary  to  keep  the prisoner  in  irons  for  the  sake  of  safe  custody.  The character of  the prisoner, not generally, but with specific reference  to   safe  custody,   must  be   studied  by  the Superintendent and  if he reaches the conclusion responsibly that there is necessity to confine 475 the man  in irons  to prevent  escape from  custody, he  may exercise his  powers under  S. 56.  To consider  a  step  as necessary the  authority  must  exercise  intelligent  care, bestow serious consideration and conclude that the action is not  only   desirable  or   advisable  but   necessary   and unavoidable. A  lesser standard  shows scant  regard for the statutory imperative.      S.56  empowers  the  Deputy  Superintendent  to  put  a prisoner in  irons only  in situations  of urgent  necessity followed by  an immediate  report to the Superintendent. The point that  emerges is  that  only  a  finding  of  absolute necessity can  justify the  exercise of  the ’iron’ power by the  Deputy   Superintendent  and  the  Superintendent  must respect the  spirit of  S. 58  when he  uses the power. This must be  an objective finding, and must, therefore, be based on tangible  matters which  will be  sufficient to satisfy a man  acting   with  a  sense  of  humane  justice,  properly instructed in the law and assessing the prognosis carefully. Random decisions,  freak impressions,  mounting  suspicions, subjective  satisfaction  and  well-grounded  allergy  to  a particular prisoner  may be  insufficient. We  must remember that even  though s.  56 is  a pre-Constitution  measure its application must  be governed  by the imperative of Articles 14, 19  and  21.  Life  and  liberty  age  precious  values. Arbitrary action  which tortuously tears into the flesh of a living man  is too serious to be reconciled with Articles 14 or 19  or even  by way  of  abundant  caution.  Whatever  is arbitrary   in    executive   action    is   pregnant   with discrimination and  violates  Art.  14.  Likewise,  whatever decision  is  the  product  of  insufficient  reflection  or inadequate material  or unable to lead to the inherence of a clear and  present danger,  is unreasonable  under Art.  19, especially when  human freedom  of helpless  inmates  behind prison walls  is the  crucial issue.  Article 21, as we have explained while  dealing with  Batra  case,  must  obey  the prescriptions of  natural justice (see Maneka Gandhi) as to, the quantum  and quality  of  natural  justice  even  in  an emergency). Reasonableness  in this  area also involves some review of  the action  of an  executive officer  so that the prisoner who suffers may be satisfied that a higher official has with  detachment, satisfied  himself about the necessity to better  him. Such  administrative fairness  is  far  more productive of  order in  prison than  the counter productive alternative of  requiring every  security  suspect  to  wear iron. Prison  disorder is  the dividend  from such  reckless

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’discipline’  and   violent  administrative  culture,  which myopic superintendents miss.      This constitutional  perspective  receives  ideological reinforcement from  the observations  of Mr. Justice Douglas in Morrissey v. Brewer. (1)      (1) 33 I,. Ed. 484, 505.      14-526SCI1/78 476           "The rule  of law is important in the stability of      society. Arbitrary actions in the revocation of paroles      can only  impede and  impair the rehabilitative aspects      of modern penology. "Notice and opportunity for hearing      appropriate  to  the  nature  of  the  case",  are  the      rudiments of  due process  which restore faith that our      society is run for the many, not the few, and that fair      dealing rather  than caprice will govern the affairs of      men."      To judge  whether Sobraj’s  fetters were legal, we must go further  into the period for which this cruel process was to persist.  Even prisoners  who are  ’lifers’ shall  not be retained in  iron for more than three months except with the special sanction  of the  Inspector General (See S. 57). The rules also take a horrifying view of the trauma of fetters.      The power  to confine in iron can be constitutionalised only if  it is  hemmed in  with severe  restrictions.  Woven around the  discretionary power there must be protective web that balances  security of  the prison  and the integrity of the person.  It is true that a discretion has been vested by S. 56  in the  Superintendent to  require a prisoner to wear fetters. It  is a  narrow power in a situation of necessity. It  has   no  be   exercised  with  extreme  restraint.  The discretion has  to be  based on  an objective  assessment of facts and  the facts themselves must have close relevance to safe custody.  It is  good to highlight the total assault on the human  flesh, free  movement and  sense of dignity this, ’iron’ command involves. To sustain its validity in the face of  Art.   19  emergencies   uncontrollable  by  alternative procedures are  the only  situations in  which this  drastic disablement   can   be   prescribed.   Secondly   processual reasonableness cannot  be  burked  by  invoking  panic-laden pleas,  rejected in Charles Wolff by the U.S. Supreme Court.      Such a  power,  except  in  cases  of  extreme  urgency difficult to  imagine in  a grim  prison setting where armed guards are  obviously available  at instant notice and watch towers vigilantly  observe (save  in case  of sudden riot or mutiny extraordinarly),  can be  exercised only after giving notice and  hearing and  in an  unbiased manner. May be that the hearing is summary, may be that the communication of the grounds is  brief, maybe  that  oral  examination  does  not always  take   place;  even   so  natural  justice,  in  its essentials, must be adhered to for reasons we have explained in Gill and Maneka Gandhi.      I regard as essential that reasons must be assigned for such harsh  action as  is contemplated and such reasons must be recorded in the history ticket of the prisoner as well as in the journal. Since the reasons are intended to enable the Petitioner to challenge, if aggriev- 477 ed, the  record must be in the language of the petitioner or of the A region, and not in English as is being done now.      There must  be special  reasons of  an extraordinary or urgent character when fetters are fastened on an unconvicted prisoner. Those substantial reasons must be recorded and its copy furnished  to the prisoner. Rule 430 commands that this be done.  Even otherwise,  the procedural  panacea of giving

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specific  reasons  (not  routine  chants)  has  a  wholesome restraining effect. And the constitutional survival of S. 56 depends on the formula of reasonableness.      The spirit and substance of rule 432 make it clear that the record  of the reasons is imperative and has a function. Rule 433,  whatever the  Superintendent’s affidavit may say, clearly shows  that the  wearing of  fetters must be for the briefest periods  and deserves frequent scrutiny. Indeed, in our  view,  except  in  remotely  extraordinary  situations, rational justification  for bar  fetters of  an  unconvicted prisoner cannot  be found  except on the confession that the Prison Superintendent  and  his  staff  are  incompetent  to manage and indifferent to reasonableness. We cannot be swept off our  constitutional feet  by scary  arguments of  deadly prisoners and  rioting gangs, especially when we find States in India  which have abandoned the disciplinary barbarity of bar fetters (Tamil Nadu, Kerala et. al).      The import  of rule  435 is  that even  in cases  where security compels  imposition of  fetters this should be only for the  shortest possible  time. The  fact that,  even as a punishment, irons  must be  restricted in  its use  (see  S. 46(7) ) argues for prophylactic irons being for the shortest spell. At  night, when the prisoner is in a cell there is no particular reason  to apprehend or possibility of escape. So nocturnal hand-cuffs and chains are obnoxious and vindictive and anathema in law.      The infraction of the prisoner’s freedom by bar fetters is too  serious to  be viewed lightly and the basic features of ’reasonableness’  must be  built into  the administrative process  for   constitutional   survival.   Objectivity   is essential  when   the  shackling  is  prima  facie  shoking. Therefore, an  outside agency,  in the  sense of  an officer higher than  the Superintendent  or external  to the  prison department, must  be given the power to review the order for ’irons’. Rule 423 speaks of the Inspector General of Prisons having to  be informed  of the  circumstances  necessitating fetters and  belchains. Rule 426 has a similar import. It is right to  generalise that  the substance  of the ’rules’ and the insistence  of the  Section contain the command that the Inspector General of Prisons shall post haste, say within 48 hours at  least. receive  a report of such an infliction and consider whether it is just and neces 478 sary. He  should also  be ready to receive complaints by way of appeals about ’irons’ from prisoner concerned. A right of appeal or  revision from the action of the Superintendent to the Inspector  General of Prisons and quick action by way of review are implicit in the provision. If there is delay, the negation of good faith, in the sense of absence of due care, is inevitable and the validity of the order is in  peril.      Another remedy  also may be visualised as feasible. The visitors of  jails include  senior executive officers of the Division, Sessions Judges and District Magistrates (see rule 47). This  is ordinarily an All India pattern. The duties of official visitors  include satisfying  themseleves that  the provisions of  the Prisons  Act, rules,  regulations, orders and directions  are duly  observed. Undoubtedly,  the proper adherence to  S. 56  and the  related rules falls within the purview of  ’rule’. 49 . ’Rule’ S 3 states that all visitors shall have  the opportunity  of observing the state of jail, its management  and every  prisoner con  fined therein.  The visitors, official  and non-official, have power to call for and inspect  jail records.  ’Rule’ 53  and 53B  are pregnant provisions. We  read humane  amplitude into  this  group  of

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’rules’   so   as   to   constitutionalise   the   statutory prescriptions. They  spell out  a duty  on the  part of  the visitors and  the Inspector  General  of  Prisons.  to  hear appeals or  complaints from  the prisoners  regarding  irons forced on  them. The reasonableness of the restriction being the constitutional  badge, the only way we can sustain S. 56 of the  Act is  to imply  in the  broad group  of provisions external examinership, immediate review and cutting short of the iron regime to the briefest spell.      A few  submissions linking  up ’dangerousness’ with bar fetters urged  li’ by  the Additional  Solicitor General may now be considered.      The learned  Additional Solicitor  General  urged  that there was  a built-in  guideline  for  the  superintendent’s discretion. Considerations of safety, expressed in paragraph 435  and  S.  56.  remove  the  vice  of  arbitrariness  and unreasonableness. Reference  to paragraph  433 was  made  to make out that only dangerous prisoners were to be chained in this manner.  We cannot  lose sight  of the fact that a non- convict prisoner  is to  be regarded  differently and it may even be  a misnomer  to treat such a remandee as a prisoner. We see  a  distinction  between  unconvicted  prisoners  and convicted  prisoners  being  dealt  with  differently.  (See paragraph 392  of the  Manual). Assuming  the indiscriminate provision in para 399 embracing dangerous prisoners ’whether they are  awaiting trial  or  have  been  convicted’  to  be applicable,  we   should  deal   with  the   two  categories differently. Para 399(3) reads: 479           "Special precautions  should be taken for the safe      custody  of   dangerous  prisoners   whether  they  are      awaiting  trial   or  have  been  convicted.  On  being      admitted to jail they should be (a) placed in charge of      trustworthy warders,  (b) confined  in the  most secure      building available,  (c) as far as practicable confined      in  different   barracks  or   cells  each  night,  (d)      thoroughly  searched   at   least   twice   daily   and      occasionally   at    uncertain   hours    (the   Deputy      Superintendent must search them at least once daily and      he must satisfy himself that they are properly searched      by  a  trustworthy  subordinate  at  other  time),  (e)      fettered if  necessary (the  special reasons for having      recourse to  fetters should  be fully  recorded in  the      Superintendent’s journal  and noted  in the  prisoner’s      history ticket).  They should  not be  employed on  any      industry affording facilities for escape and should not      be entrusted  with  implements  that  can  be  used  as      weapons.  Warders   on  taking   over  charge  of  such      prisoners must  satisfy themselves  that their  fetters      are intact  and the  iron bars  or the  gratings of the      barracks in  which they are confined are secure and all      locks, bolts,  etc. are  in proper  order. They  should      during  their   turns  of   duty   frequently   satisfy      themselves that all such prisoners are in their places,      should acquaint themselves with their appearance."      All these factors focus our attention on the concept of ’dangerousness’  as   controlling  discretionary  power  and validate the Section.      The learned  Additional Solicitor  General argued  that the expression  ’dangerous’ was neither vague nor irrational but vivid  and precise,  and regulated the discretion of the officer sufficiently to eliminate the vice of arbitrariness. He cited  authorities to  which we  will presently  come but before examining  them as  validation of  incapacitation  of risky prisoners  we may as well refer to some aspects of the

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problem presented  by (1) what kind of danger should lead to incapacitation ?  (2) what authority is to make the decision on whether or not that danger is present ? (3) on what basis is that authority to decide who among offenders is dangerous and for how long ?      Predictions of dangerousness are hazardous. In 1966 the Supreme Court  released  967  offenders  held  in  New  York psychiatric institutions  beyond the term of their sentences because they  were  considered  dangerous.  (They  had  been confined  without   proper  procedures).    Researchers  who followed the  subsequent careers  of these  persons for four years  found   that  only   2  percent   were  returned   to institutions for 480 the criminally insane; more than half were not readmitted to any  institution.  However,  the  criteria  by  which  these persons had  been. declared dangerous in the first place are questionable, and  they had been held an average of thirteen years beyond their sentences.      The prognosis  depends  on  the  peculiarities  of  the individual and  on interpretation  by  the  individuals  who study his case-i.e on the idiosyncrasies of their (intuitive ?) judgment criteria.      All institutions  that hold people against their wishes need outside  supervision, for, by definition, they lack the internal checks  and balances  that  make  such  supervision unnecessary elsewhere.  One can  check out  of  a  hotel  if abused, but not out of a prison. Prison staffs? which unlike hotel staffs,  can also  totally circumscribe the activities of  inmates-have  extensive  coercive  power  that  must  be checked by  an outside  authority if it is not to be abused. While sharing the, purposes of the penal system, the outside authority should be altogether independent of the management of  the  institutions  it  is  to  super  vise  and  of  its personnel. (The  general supervisory  power of the judiciary is too  cumbersome and  has not proven sufficient anywhere). Such outside  authorities exist  abroad: In  Great British a ’Board of  visitors’ deals  with violations  of prison rules and deals with complaints by prisoners. In France a Judge de l’ application des peines is presumed to do so, and in Itlay a guidice di sorveglienza.      Kent   S.    Miller   writes    on   the   subject   of dangerousness(’):           " ....a  definitional problem  needs to  be  dealt      with. State  statutes have  been notoriously  vague  in      their  references  to  dangerousness,  in  large  parts      leaving the determination of dangerousness to the whims      of the  Court and  of others  involved in  applying the      concept." Professionals concerned with prediction of violent behaviour had differed in their judgments. Writes Miller:           "Considerable attention has been given to the role      of  psychological   tests   in   predicting   dangerous      behaviour, and  there is  a wide range of opinion as to      their value."           "Thus far  no structured  or projective test scale      has been  derived which,  when used alone, will predict      violence in  the  individual  case  in  a  satisfactory      manner. Indeed,  none has  been  developed  which  will      adequately  post  dict  let  alone  pre  dict.  violent      behaviour.  However,   our  review  of  the  literature      suggests that it might be possible to demonstrater that      violence could  be predicted  using psychological tests      if      1. Kenu S. Miller: Managing Madness, PP. 58, 66. 67. 68

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481      programs of  research were  undertaken that  were  more      sophisticated than the studies done to date."           "Courts and community agencies must muddle through      these difficulties  and deal  with such problems in the      best way  they can.  The fact  that we  have difficulty      defining the  predicting dangerous  behaviour does  not      mean that  members of  the community can disregard such      patterns of  behaviour. And the fact that psychiatrists      do not  agree on the nature and scope of mental illness      does not  imply that  the law  can be oblivious to such      matters. ..                ..But  we   are  on   dangerous  ground  when      deprivation of liberty occurs under such conditions.                The   practice    has   been    to   markedly      overpredict. In  addition, the courts and mental health      professionals  involved   have  systematically  ignored      statutory requirements  elating  to  dangerousness  and      mental illness...                In  balancing  the  interest  of  the  state,      against  the   loss  of   liberty  and  rights  of  the      idividual, a  prediction of  dangerous  behaviour  must      have a  high level  of probability,  3 condition  which      currently does not exist), and the harm to be presented      should be considerable.)"      If our  law were  to reflect a higher respect for life, restraint of  the person  is justified only if the potential harm is  considerable. Miller’s  conclusions are  meaningful and relevant:           "If confinement  takes place,  there should  be  a      short-term mandatory review." "..                the basis  for police power commitment should      be physical  violence or  potential  physical  violence      which is  imminent, constituting  a ’clear and present’      danger  and   based  on  testimony  related  to  actual      conduct. Any  such  commitment  should  be  subject  to      mandatory review within two weeks." "......                Restraint should  be time-  limited,  with  a      maximum of five to seven days."      The  inference   is  inevitable   that  management   of dangerousness in  the prison  setting is  often overkill and underscientific. The  irrationality of  bar fetters based on subjective judgment  by men without psychiatric training and humane  feeling   makes  every   prisoner  ’dangerous’.  Dr. Bhattacharya writes(l):      (1) Dr. B. K. Bhattacharya.: Prisons p. 116. 482           "In the  Delhi jail  particularly in 1949 one came      across an  astonishing sight  of  numerous  under-trial      prisoners in  fetters, merely  on the  ground that they      had more  than one  case pending against them. This was      noticed, though in a far less degree, in Patiala and in      Jaipur. Numerous  transportation prisoners were secured      behind bars in cells, yet they were put in bar-fetters,      not to  mention the escapes and condemned prisoners. In      Delhi jail  one gained  an impression  that bar-fetters      were the rule of the day." The key jurisdictional preconditions are:      (i) absolute necessity for fetters;      (ii) special  reasons  why  no  other  alternative  but           fetters will alone secure custodial assurance:      (iii)record  of   those  reasons  contemporaneously  in           extenso;      (iv) such record  should not  merely  be  full  but  be           documented   both    in   the   journal   of   the

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         Superintendent  and  the  history  ticket  of  the           prisoner. This latter should be in the language of           the prisoner so that he may have communication and           recourse to redress.      (v)  the basic  condition of dangerousness must be well           grounded and recorded;      (vi) all these are conditions precedent to ’irons’ save           in a great emergency,      (vii)before preventive  or  punitive  irons  (both  are           inflictions of bodily pain) natural justice in its           minimal form  shall be  complied with  (both  audi           alteram and the nemo judex rules).      (viii)the fetters  shall be  removed  at  the  earliest           opportunity .  That is  to say,  even if some risk           has  to  be  taken  it  shall  be  removed  unless           compulsive   considerations    continue   it   for           necessities of safety;      (ix) there shall be a daily review of the absolute need           for the fetters, none being easily conceivable for           nocturnal manacles;      (x)  if it  is found the fetters must continue beyond a           day, it  shall be  held illegal  unless an outside           agency like  the District  Magistrate or  Sessions           Judge,   on    materials   placed,   directs   its           continuance. 483      Although  numerically  large,  these  requirements  are reasonably practical  and reconcile  security with humanity. Arguments to the contrary are based on alarmist a priori and may render S. 56 ultra vires. Having regard to the penumbral zone, fraught  with  potential  for  tension,  tantrums  and illicit violence  and malpractice, it is healthy to organize a prison  ombudsman for  each State. Sex is an irrepressible urge  which   is  forced  down  by  long  prison  terms  and homosexuality  is   of  hidden   prevalence  in  these  dark campuses.  Liberal   paroles,  open   jail’s,  frequency  of familial meetings,  location of  convicts in  jails  nearest their homes  tend to  release stress,  relieve distress  and insure security better than flagellation and fetters.      The upshot  of the  discussion is  that the shackles on Sobraj shall  be shaken  off right away and shall not be re- worn without  strict adherence to the injunctions spelt out. Active  prison   justice  bids  farewell  to  the  bloodshot heritage  of   fierce  torture  of  flesh  and  spirit,  and liabilitative processes  reincarnate as  a healing  hope for the  tense,  warped  and  morbid  minds  behind  bars.  This correctional orientation  is a constitutional implication of social justice  whose index  finger points to Art. 14 (anti- arbitrariness), Art.  l9 (anti-reasonableness)  and  Art  21 (sensitized processual humanism).      Prison  reform  is  burgeoning  in  the  administrative thanking and,  hopefully one may leave it to legislative and executive effort  to concretise, with feeling for ’insiders’ and  concern   for  societal   protection,  with  accent  on perimeter security and correctional strategy, the project of prison reform.      Presumptive   innocence   blushes   when   ad   libitum discretion is vested in the jailor to put preventive fetters unfettered by  the annoying  rules of  natural justice.  The prisons become  houses of  horror if hundreds of undertrials and even minors have to suffer, on grounds of dangerousness, this  disciplinary   distress  in   one  jail.  That  Prison Superintendent   surely   needs   his   discretion   to   be disciplined,    being     otherwise     dangerous.     Since constitutionality  focusses  on  rationality  and  realistic

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reasonableness these forensic dissections go to the heart of the issue.      I hold  that bar fetters are a barbarity generally and, like whipping,  .must  vanish.  Civilised  consciousness  is hostile to  torture within  the walled  campus. We hold that solitary confinement,  cellular segregation  and  marginally modified editions  of  the  same  process  are  inhuman  and irrational. More dangerous are these expedients when imposed by the  untuned and  untrained power  of a jail superior who has, as  part of  his professional  equipment, no  course in human psychology,  stressology or  physiology,  who  has  to depend on no medical 484 or psychiatric  examination, prior to infliction of irons or solitary, who  has no  obligation to  hear the victim before harming him,  whose ’reasons’ are in English on the histcry- tickets and therefore unknowable and in the Journal to which the prisoner  has no  access.  The  revisory  power  of  the Inspector General  of Prison,  is illusory when the prisoner does not  know  of  his  right  to  seek  revision  and  the Inspector General  has no  duty to  visit  the  solitary  or ’fettered’ creatures  or  to  examine  every  case  of  such infliction. Jail  visitors have  no  powers  to  cancel  the superintendent’s orders  nor obligation to hold enquiry save to pity  and to  make remarks. Periodical parades prisoners, when the  visitors or dignitaries call for a turn-out, prove a circus in a zoo from a practical standpoint or/and journal entries and  history-tickets a voodoo according to rule, the key  point   to  be  noted  being  that  after  this  public exhibition within  the prison. the complaining prisoners are marked men  at the  iron mercy of the hierarchy. there being no active  legal aid  project busy  within the  prison. This ferocious rule  of law, rule and nude, cannot be sustain  r) ed as  anything but arbitrary, unreasonable and procedurally heartless. The  peril to  its life from the lethal stroke of Articles 14,  19 and  21 read  with 13  needs no far-fetched argument. The abstruse search for curative guideline in such words  as   ’dangerous’  and   ’necessary‘  forgetting   the totalitarian backdrop  of stone  walls  and  iron  bars,  is bidding farewell  to raw reality and embracing verbal marga. The law  is not abracadabra but at once pragmatic and astute and does  not surrender its power before scary exaggerations of security by prison bosses. Alternatives to ’solitary’ and ’irons’ are  available to  prison technology, give the will, except     where      indifference,     incompetence     and unimaginativeness hold  prison authorities  prisoner. Social justice cannot  sleep if  the Constitution  hangs limp where its consumers most . need its humanism. Access and the Law      An allegedly  unconscionable action of Government which disables men  in detention  from seeking  judicial  remedies against State  torture was  brought to  our notice.  I would have  left   the  matter   as  an   unhappy  aberration   of governmental functioning  but the  fundamental character  of the imputation leaves us no option but to drive home a basic underpinning of  our government of laws. Democratic legality stands stultified  if the  Corpus Juris  is not  within  the actual ken  or reasonable  reach of the citizen; for it is a travesty of  the rule  of law  if   legislation, primary  or subordinate, is not available in published form or is beyond the purchase  of the average affected Indian. To come to the point. we were told that the Punjab Jail Manual was not made 485 available to  the prisoners  and, indeed, was priced so high that few  could buy The copy of the Manual handed over to us

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is seen to be officially published in 1975 and priced at Rs. 260.30, although it contains merely a collection of the bare text of  certain statutes,  rules and  instructions  running into 469  printed pages.  If what  was mentioned  at the Bar were true  that the Manual as sold before at around Rs. 20/- but as  suddenly marked  up more  than ten  times the former price solely  to deter people from coming to know the prison laws, then  the rule  of law were surely scandalized. It was suggested that  by this means the indigent prisoner could be priced out  of his  precious liberties  because he could not challenge incarceratory  injury without precise awareness of the relevant  provisions of  law beyond his means. Were this motivation true  the seriousness of the impropriety deepens. But we have not been taken into these vicious coils and keep out of  that probe.  However, let us be clear. Access to law is fundamental  to freedom  in a  government of laws. If the rule of law is basic to our constitutional order. there is a double imperative  implied by  it-on the citizen to know and on the  State to  make known. Fundamental rights cease to be viable if  laws calculated  to canalise  or constrict  their sweep arc  withheld from  public access;  and  the  freedoms under Article  19(1) cannot  be restricted by hidden on ’low visibility’ rules  beyond discovery  by  fail-  search.  The restriction must  be reasonable  under Article 19(2 ) to (6) and how  can any  normative prescription  be  reasonable  if access to it is not available at a fair price or by rational search ?  1 Likewise,  under Article 21, procedural fairness is the badge of constitutionality it life and liberty are to be leashed or extinguished; and how can it be fair to bind a man by  normative processes collected in books too expensive to  buy   ?  The   baffling   proliferation   and   frequent modification of subordinate legisation and their intricacies and inaccessibility  are  too  disturbing  to  participative legality  so   vital  to   democracy,   to   leave   us   in constitutional quiet.  Arcane law is ac had as lawless fiat, a caveat the administration will hopefully heed.      One of  the paramount requirements of valid law is that it must  be within  the cognizance  of the  community  if  a competent  search   for  it  were  made.  It  is  worthwhile recalling the  observations of  Bose J.  made in a different context but has a philosophic import:           "Natural justice  requires that  before a  law can      become operative  it must  be promulgated or published.      It must  be broadcast  in some recognizable way so that      all men  know what it is;.. The thought that a decision      reached in  the secret recess of a chamber to which the      public have  no access  and of  which they can normally      know nothing(T. can nevertheless 486      affect their  lives, liberty  and property  by the mere      passing  of  a  Resolution  without  anything  more  is      abhorrent to civilized men. It shocks conscience."(’) Legislative tyranny  may be unconstitutional if the State by devious methods  like pricing legal publications monopolised by government  too high  denies the  equal protection of the laws and  imposes unreasonable  restrictions on  exercise of fundamental rights.  The cult  of the occult is not the rule of law  even as access to law is integral to our system. The pregnant import  of what  I have  said will,  I hope, be not lost on the executive instrumentality of the State. Contemporary danger      We must  have a  sense of  the prevalence  of primitive cruelty haunting our prison cells and what is more alarming, of the increasing versatility of prison torture in countries civilised and  other. Our  country is  no island  and courts

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must be  aware and  beware. While  l am far from inclined to exaggerate possibilities  of  torture  in  the  silent  zone called prison,  we are not disposed to dismiss international trends collected  in a recent article entitled "Minds behind bars" (2)           "The technology  of torture  all over the world is      growing ever more sophisticated-new devices can destroy      a prisoner’s  will in  a matter  of hours-but  leave no      visible marks  or signs  of brutality.  And government-      inflicted terror  has evolved its own dark sub-culture.      All over  the world, torturers seem to feel a desire to      appear respectable  to  their  victims....There  is  an      endlessly inventive  list of  new methods of inflicting      pain and  suffering on fellow human beings that quickly      cross continents  and ideological barriers through some      kind of  international secret-police  network. The ’wet      submarine’ means  near suffocations  of   a prisoner by      immersing him  in water,  or, frequently, in urine; the      ’dry submarine’  is  the  same  thing,  except  that  a      plastic bag  is tied  over the victim’s head to deprive      him  of   oxygen.  Another   common   technique,   ’the      telephone’, consists  of delivering sharp blows in both      ears simultaneously,  which often causes excruciatingly      painful rupture  of the  ear drums. ’The helmet’ is put      over the  head of  a torture  victim to magnify his own      screams. In  ’the hook’  the victim  is hoisted off the      ground by  his hands, which are tied behind his back in      such a  way that  the stretching  of the  nerves  often      causes      (l) A.l.R. 1951 SC-467.      (2) Listner, Dec. 1977 issue. 487      paralysis of  the arms.  ’People on  the hook’ says one      Uruguyan torture  victim, ’cannot take a deep breath or      hardly any  breath. They  just moan;  it’s a  dreadful,      almost inhuman noise.’           And torturers  all over the world use the language      of grisly  disinformation to  describe their  work.  In      Uganda Amin’s  secret police  are known  as the  ’State      Research Bureau’,  and B.  the main  torture houses are      called ’Public Safety Units’. In Brazil, torturers call      their  sessions  ’spiritual  sessions’  and  in  Chile,      torturers refer  to the  Villa Grimaldi, their place of      work, as  the Palacio de la Risa-the Place of Laughter.      In Iran,  Otaq-e-Tamehiyat, ’the  room where  you  make      people walk’,  meant the  blood stained  chamber  where      prisoner’s were  forced to  walk after  torture to help      their blood to circulate.           What is  encouraging in  all this  dark picture is      that we  feel that  public opinion in several countries      is much more aware of our general line than before. And      that is positive. I think, in the long run, governments      can’t ignore  that. We  are also encouraged by the fact      that,  today,   human  rights   are  discussed  between      governments-they  are   now  on   the  inter   national      political agenda.  But, in the end, what matters is the      pain and  suffering the  individual endures  in  police      station or cell."      I imply  nothing from  the quote  but  it  deepens  our awareness in approaching our task.      Now that  the dilatory discussion overlapping at times, has come to an end, I may concretise the conclusions in both the cases, lest diffusion should leave the decision vague or with ragged edges. They flow from the elevating observations of Chandrachud,  J. (as  he then  was) in  Bhuvan  Mohan,(1)

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amplified by humanity:           "We cannot  do better  than say that the directive      principle contained  in Article  42 of the Constitution      that ’The  State shall  G: make  provision for securing      just and humane conditions of work’ may benevolently be      extended to  living  conditions  in  jails.  There  are      subtle  forms  of  punishment  to  which  convicts  and      undertrial prisoners  are sometimes  subjected  but  it      must be  realised that  these  barbarous  relics  of  a      bygone era  offend against the letter and spirit of our      Constitution." . (l)Bhuvan Mohan  Patnaik v.  Sttae of A.B [1975] (3) SCC185. 189, 488 The correction  and direction  indicated by the Constitution have been broadly spelt out by me so that progressive prison reforms may move towards ’fresh woods and pastures new’. i.      1.   I uphold the vires of Section 30 and Section 56 of the Prisons  Act, as  humanistically read by interpretation. These and other pro visions, being somewhat out of tune with current penological  values  and  mindless  to  human-rights moorings, will,  I hope, be revised by fresh legislation. It is a  pity that  Prison Manuals  are mostly callous colonial compilations and  even their  copies are  beyond  prisoners’ ken. Punishments,  in civilised  societies, must not degrade human dignity  or  wound  flesh  and  spirit.  The  cardinal sentencing goal  is correctional; changing the consciousness of the  criminal to  ensure  social  defence.  Where  prison treatment abandons  the reformatory  purpose  and  practises dehumanizing techniques  it is  wasteful, counter-productive and  irrational,   hovering  on   the   hostile   brink   of unreasonableness (Art.  l9).’ Nor  can torture  tactics jump the  constitutional   gauntlet  by  wearing  a  ’preventive’ purpose.  Naturally,  inhumanity,  masked  as  security,  is outlawed beyond  backdoor entry,  because what  is banned is brutality. be its necessity punitive or prophylactic.      2. I  hold that solitary confinement, even if mollified and modified  marginally, is  not sanctioned  by Sec. 30 for prisoners ’under  sentence of  death’. But it is legal under that Section  to separate  such sentencees  from the rest of the  prison   community  during  hours  when  prisoners  are generally locked  in. I  also uphold  the special watch, day and night,  of such  sentencees  by  guards.  Infraction  of privacy may  be inevitable,  but guards must concede minimum human vacy in practice.      3. By  necessary implication, prisoners ’under sentence of death’  not’ shall  not be  denied any  of the  community amenities, including games, newspapers, books, moving around and meeting  prisoners and  visitors, subject  to reasonable regulation of prison management. Be it noted that Sec. 30 is no  substitute  for  sentence  of  imprisonment  and  merely prescribes  the  manner  of  organising  safe  jail  custody authorised by Sec. 366 of the Cr. P.C.      4. More  importantly if the prisoner desires loneliness for reflection  and remorse,  for prayers  and making  peace with his  maker, or  op portunities  for meeting  family  or friends, such  facilities shall be liberally granted, having regard to  the stressfull  spell of terrestrial farewell his soul may  be passing  through the compassion society owes to him whose  life it takes.      5. The  crucial holding  under Sec.  30(2)  is  that  a person is  not  ’under  sentence  of  death’,  even  if  the sessions court has sentenced him 489 to death  subject to  confirmation by  the High Court. He is

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not ’under  A sentence  of death’  even if  the  High  Court imposes, by  confirmation  or  fresh  appellate  infliction, death penalty,  so long as an appeal to the Supreme Court is likely to  be or  has been moved or is pending. even if this Court has  awarded capital  sentence, Sec. 30 does not cover him so long as his petition for mercy to the Governor and/or to the  President permitted  by the  Constitution, Code  and Prison  Rules,  has  not  been  disposed.  Of  course,  once rejected by  the Governor  and the President, and on further application  there   is  no   stay  of   execution  by   the authorities, he  is ’under  sentence of  death’, even  if he goes  on   making  further   mercy  petitions.  During  that interregnum he  attracts the custodial segregation specified in Sec.  30(2), subject to the ameliorative meaning assigned to the  provision. To be ’under sentence of death’ means ’to be under a finally executable death sentence’.      6. I  do not  rule out  further  restraint  on  such  a condemned prisoner  if clear  and present danger of violence or likely  violation of  custody is,  for good reasons, made out, with  due regard  to the  rules of  fairplay implied in natural justice.  Minimal hearing  shall be  accorded to the affected if he is subjected to further severity.      1. Sec. 56 must be tamed and trimmed by the rule of law and shall not turn dangerous by making the Prison ’brass’ an imperium in  imperio. The  Superintendent’s power  shall  be pruned and his discretion bridled in the manner indicated. E      2. Under-trials  shall be  deemed to be in custody, but not undergoing punitive imprisonment. So much so, they shall be accorded more relaxed conditions than. convicts.      3. Fetters, especially bar fetters, shall be shunned ns violative of  human dignity, within and without prisons. The indiscriminate resort  to handcuffs when accused persons are taken to  and from  court and the expedient of forcing irons on prison inmates are illegal and shall be stopped forthwith save in  a small  category of  cases dealt  with next below. Reckless ’ handcuffing and chaining in public degrades, puts to shame finer sensibilities and is a slur on our culture.      4. Where  an undertrial  has a  credible  tendency  for violence and  escape a  humanely graduated  degree of ’iron’ restraint  is  permissible  if  only  if-other  disciplinary alternatives are  unworkable. The  burden of  proof  of  the ground is  on the  custodian. And  if he  fails, he  will be liable in law.      5. The  ’iron’ regimen  shall in  no case go beyond the intervals, conditions  and maxima  laid  down  for  punitive ’irons’. They  shall be  for short  spells, light  and never applied if sores exist. 490      6. The  discretion to  impose  ’irons’  is  subject  to quasi-judicial over  sight, even  if purportedly imposed for reasons of security.      7.  A  previous  hearing,  minimal  may  be,  shall  be afforded to  the victims.  In exceptional cases, the hearing may be  soon after.  The rule  in  Gill’s  case  and  Maneka Gandhi’s case gives the guidelines.      8. The  grounds for  ’fetters’ shall  be given  to  the victim. And when the decision to fetter is made, the reasons shall be  recorded in  the journal and in the history ticket of the  prisoner in  the State language. If he is a stranger to that  language it  shall be communicated to him as far as possible, in  his language. This applies to cases as much of prison punishment as of ’safety’ fetters.      9 Absent provision for independent review of preventive and punitive action, for discipline or security, such action shall be  invalid as  arbitrary and unfair and unreasonable.

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The  prison  officials  will  then  be  liable  civilly  and criminally for hurt to the person of the prisoner. The State will urgently  set up  or strengthen  the  necessary  infra- structure and  process in  this behalf-it  already exists in embryo in the Act.      10. Legal  aid shall  be given  to  prisoners  to  seek justice  from  prison  authorities,  and,  if  need  be,  to challenge the  decision in court-in cases where they are too poor to  secure on  their own. If lawyer’s services. are not given,   the   decisional   process   becomes   unfair   and unreasonable, especially  because the  rule of  law perishes for a  disabled prisoner  if   counsel is unapproachable and beyond purchase.  By and  large, prisoners are poor, lacking legal literacy,  under the  trembling control of the jailor, at his  mercy as  it were,  and unable  to meet relations or friends to take legal action. Where a remedy is all but dead the right lives; only in print. Art. 39 A is relevant in the context. Art.  19 will  be violated  in such  a case  as the process will  be unreasonable.  Art. 21  will  be  infringed since the  procedure is  unfair and  is arbitrary. In Maneka Gandhi the rule has been stated beyond mistake.      ll. No  ’fetters’ shall  continue beyond  day  time  as nocturnal  fetters   on  locked-in  detenus  are  ordinarily uncalled for, viewed from considerations of safety.      12. The prolonged continuance of ’irons’, as a punitive or preventive step, shall be subject to previous approval by an external  examiner like  a Chief  Judicial Magistrate  or Sessions Judge  who shall briefly hear the victim and record reasons.  They  are  ex-officio  visitors  of  most  central prisons.      13. The  Inspector General of Prisons shall, with quick despatch consider  revision petitions  by fettered prisoners and direct the continuation or discontinuation of the irons. In the absence of such prompt 491 decision, the fetters shall be deemed to have been negatived and shall A be removed.      Such meticulous clarification has become necessary only because the prison practices have hardly inspired confidence and the  subject is  human rights.  Because prison officials must be  responsible for  the security of the prison and the safety of  its population,  they must have a wide discretion in promulgating rules to govern the prison population and in imposing disciplinary sanctions for their violation. But any humanist-jurist will be sceptic like the American Judges who in William King Jackson v. D. E. Bishop(1) observed:           "(1)  We  are  not  convinced  that  any  rule  or      regulation  as   to  the  use  of  the  strap,  however      seriously  or   sincerely  conceived  and  drawn,  will      successfully  prevent   abuse.  The   pre  sent  record      discloses misinterpretation even of the newly adopted .      . .           (2) Rules  in this  area  are  seen  often  to  go           unobserved. .           (3) Regulations are easily circumvented           (4) Corporal punishment is easily subject to abuse      in the hands of the sadistic and the unscrupulous.           (5) Where power to punish is granted to persons in      lower levels  of administrative  authority, there is an      inherent  and   natural  difficulty  in  enforcing  the      limitations of that power."      We find  many objectionable  survivals  in  the  Prison Manual like  whipping and  allergy to  ’Gandhi Cap’.  Better classification for ’Europeans’ is still in the book ! I hope that Prison  Reform will  receive prompt  attention  as  the

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higher political  echelons in  the country know the need and we may  not be  called upon  to pronounce on the inalienable minima of  human rights  that our constitutional order holds dear. It  is noteworthy  that, as  pointed out  in Furman v. Georgia(2) with  reference to  death sentence,  by  Justices Douglas and  Marshall, the more painful prison cruelties are often imposed  on the  socioeconomic weak  and the  militant minorities.   Our   prisons,   both   in   the   matter   of classification for treatment and in the matter of preventive or punitive  imposts, face the same criticism. To thoughtful sociologists it  seems evident  that prison  severities  are visited  mostly   on  agitators,   dissenters,   protesters, proletarians and weaker sections. Moreover, punitive ’vested interest’   sometimes   wears   ’preventive’   veils,   when challenged and  we cannot  wish away discretionary injustice by      (1) Federal Reporter. 2nd Series, Vol 404, p. 571.      (2) 33 L. Ed. 2d. 346. 1 5- 526 SCI/78 492 burying our  heads in  the sands  of  incredible  credulity. Courts must  be astute  enough to end these ’crimes’ against criminals by correctional interpretation.      ’Freedom behind  bars’ is  part of  our  constitutional tryst and  the index  of our  collective consciousness. That the flower  of human  divinity never  fades, is  part of our cultural  heritage.   Bonded   labour,   cellular   solitary confinement,  corporal   punishments,  status-based  elitist classification and  the like  deserve  to  be  sentenced  to transportation  from   prisons  and   humanising  principles granted visa  into prison campuses. In short, transformation of  consciousness   is  the  surest  ’security’  measure  to antidote  social   entropy.  That   is  the   key  to  human development-rights and  responsibilities-within and  without prisons.      Positive  experiments   in  re-humanization-meditation, music, arts  of self-expression,  games,  useful  work  with wages,  prison   festivals,  sramdan   and  service-oriented activities, visits  by and  to families, even par ticipative prison projects and controlled community life, are among the re-humanization strategies  which need consideration. Social justice, in the prison context, has a functional versatility hardly explored.      The roots  of our  Constitution lie  deep in  the finer spiritual sources  of social justice, beyond the melting pot of bad  politicking, feudal crudities and sublimated sadism, sustaining itself  by profound  faith in Man  and his latent divinity and  the confidence  that ’you  can  accomplish  by kindness what  you cannot  do by force’(l) and so it is that the Prisons  Act provisions  and the Jail Manual itself must be revised to reflect this deeper meaning in the behavioural norms, correctional attitudes and humane orientation for the prison  staff   and  prisoners   alike.  We   cannot  become misanthropes and  abandon values, scared by the offchance of some stray  desperate character. Then amputation of limbs of unruly suspects  may be  surer security measure and corporaI punishment may  have a  field day  atfer a long holiday. The essence of my opinion in both these cases is the infusion of the higher consciousness of the Constitution into the stones of law which make the prison houses.      The winds  of change  must blow  into our  carcers  and self-expression  and   self-respect   and   self-realization creatively substituted  for the  dehumanising  remedies  and ’wild life’  techniques still current in the jail armoury. A few prison villains-they exist-shall not make martyrs of the

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humane many;  and even  from these  few, trust slowly begets trust.   Sarvodaya   and   antyodaya   have   criminological dimensions which our social justice awareness must apprehend and actualize. I justify (1) Pubillus Syrus 493 this observation  by reference  to the  noble  but  inchoate experiment (or  unnoticed epic)  whereby  Shri  Jai  Prakash Narain redemptively brought murderously dangerous dacoits of Chambal Valley  into prison  to turn  a responsible  page in their life  in and out of jail. The rehabilitative follow-up was, perhaps, a flop.      In short,  the  technology  of  raising  the  level  of awareness, not  gene- rating hatred by repression, shows the way to  making prison  atmosphere safe  and  social  defence secure.  Criminology   and  consciousness  are  partners  in community protection. The Final Directions      I hold  that even  though Sec. 30 is intra vires, Batra shall not  be kept  under constant,  guard in a cell, all by himself, unless  he seeks such an exclusive and lonely life. If he  loses all along the way right to the summit court and the top  executive, then  and only  then, shall  he be  kept apart from  the other  prisoners under the constant vigil of an  armed  guard.  Of  course,  if  proven  grounds  warrant disciplinary segregation,  it  is  permissible,  given  fair hearing and review.      The petitioner,  Sobhraj, cannot  be granted the relief of striking  down Section  56 or related prison rules but he succeeds, in  substance, with regard to his grievance of bar fetters. Such fetters shall forthwith be removed and he will be allowed  the freedom  of  undertrials  inside  the  jail, including locomotion-not  if he  has already been convicted. In the eventuality of display of violence or escape attempts or creds  evidence bringing  home such a potential adventure by him,  he may  be kept under restraint. Irons shall not be forced on  him unless  the situation  is  one  of  emergency leaving no  other option  and in any case that torture shall not be  applied without  compliance with natural justice and other limitations indicated in the judgment.      Prison laws,  now in  bad shape,  need  rehabilitation; prison staff,  soaked in  the Raj  past, need reorientation; prison house  and practices.  a  hangover  of  the  die-hard retributive   ethos,    reconstruction;   prisoners,   those noiseless,  voiceless   human  heaps,  cry  for  therapeutic technology; and  prison justice,  after long jurisprudential gestation, must  now be  re-born through judicial midwifery, if need  be. No longer can the Constitution be curtained off from  the  incarcerated  community  since  pervasive  social justice  is  a  fighting  faith  with  Indian  humanity.  I, hopefully, alert  the  nation  and,  for  the  nonce,  leave follow-up action  to the  Administration with  the note that stone walls  and iron bars do not ensure a people’s progress and revolutionary  history teaches  that tense bastilles are brittle before human upsurges and many tenants of iron cells are sensitive harbingers of Tomorrow-many a Socrates, 494 Shri Aurobindo,  tilak, Thoreau,  Bhagat Singh Gandhi! So it is that  there is urgency for bridging the human gap between prison praxis  and prison  justice; in  one sense,  it is  a battle of  the tenses  and in  an another,  an imperative of social justice.      If I  may end  withy an answer to the question posed at the beginning, so long as constitutional guarantees are non- negotiable, human right, entrenched in the National Charter,

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shall  not  be  held  hostages  by  Authority.    Emergency, exigency, dangerousness,  discipline, security  and autonomy are theoretically  palatable expressions,  but  in  a  world where prison are laboratories of torture or warehouses where human commodities  are sadistically kept and the spectrum of inmates  range   from  drift-wood   juveniles   to   heroics dissenters,     courts-     and     other     constitutional instrumentalities-  should   not  consent   to  make   jails judgeproof to  tearful  injustice.    Until  current  prison pathology is  cured and prison justice restored, stone walls and iron  bars will  not solve  the crime crisis confronting society today.      I am  aware that a splendid condensation of the answers to the  score questions  has been  presented by  my  learned brother Desai,  J and I endorse the conclusion. But when the issue is grave and the nation, now and again, groans because prisons breed  horror and  bruited reforms  remain a teasing illusion and  promise of  unreality, brevity  loses its lure for me  and going  it alone to tell the country plain truths becomes unobviable.   If  Parliament and  Government do  not heed to-day, the next day comes.  And, in an appeal to Human To morrow,  ’if none  responds to your call, walk alone walk alone!’ Judicial power is a humane trust ’to drove the blade a little  forward in  your time,  and to feel that somewhere among these  millions you  have left  a  little  justice  or happiness or  prosperity, a  sense of  manliness  or  moral, dignity, a  spring of  patriotism, a  dawn  of  intellectual enlightenment or  a stirring  of duty where it did not exist before’ that is enough.      The petitions  succeed in  principle but in view of the ad interim  orders which  have been  carried out and the new meaning read  into the  relevant provision  of the  Act  the prayer to strike down becomes otiose.  Batra and Sobraj have lost the battle in  part but won the war in full      I agree that the petitions be dismissed.      DESAI, J  -These two petitions under Article 32  of the Constitution by two internees confined in Tihar Central Jail Challenge the  vires of  sections 30  and 56  of the Prisons Act.  Sunil   Batra,  a  convict  under  sentence  of  depth challenges his solitary confinement sought. 495 to be  supported by  the provisions  of s. 30 of the Prisons Act (for  short the  Act); Charles Sobhraj a French national and then  an under  trial prisoner  challenges the action of the Superintendent  of Jail putting him into bar fetters for an  unusually  long  period  commencing  from  the  date  of incarceration on  6th July  1976 till this Court intervented by an  interim order  on 24th February 1978. Such a gruesome and hair-raising  picture  was  pointed  at  some  stage  of hearing that  Chief Justice M. H. Beg, V. R. Krishna Lyer, J and P.  S. Kailasam  J who were then seized of the petitions visited the  Tihar Central  Jail on 23rd January 1978. Their notes of inspection form part of the record.      There are  certain broad submissions common to both the petitions and  they may  first be  dealt before  turning  to specific contentions in each petition. It is no more open to debate  that  convicts  are  not  wholly  denuded  of  their fundamental rights. No iron curtain can be drawn between the prisoner and the Constitution. Prisoners are entitled to all constitutional  rights   unless  their   liberty  has   been constitutionally curtailed  (see Procunier  v. Martinex).(l) However, a  prisioner’s liberty  is in  the very  nature  of things circumscribed  by the  very fact  of his confinement. His interest  in the limited liberty left to him is then all the more  substantial. Conviction  for crime does not reduce

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the person  into a nonperson whose rights are subject to the whim  of  the  prison  administration  and,  therefore,  the imposition of  any major punishment within the prison system is conditional  upon the observance of procedural safeguards (see Wolff  v.  McDonnell).(")  By  the  very  fact  of  the incarceration prisoners  are not  in a position to enjoy the full panoply of fundamental rights because these very rights are subject  to restrictions  imposed by  the nature  of the regime to  which they  have been  lawfully committed.  In D. Bhuvan Mohan  Patnaik &  ors. v.  State of  Andhra Pradesh & ors(3) one of us, Chandrachud J., observed:-           "Convicts  are   not,  by   mere  reason   of  the      conviction denuded  of all the fundamental rights which      they  otherwise   possess.  A   compulsion  under   the      authority of  law, following upon a conviction, to live      in  a   prison-house  entails  by  its  own  force  the      deprivation of  fundamental freedoms  like the right to      move freely  throughout the  territory of  India or the      right to  "practice" a  profession. A man of profession      would  thus   stand  stripped  of  his  right  to  hold      consultations while  serving out  his sentence. But the      Constitution guaran-      (1) 40 L. Ed. 2d. 224 at 24’.      (2) 41 I,. Ed. 2d. 935 at 973.      (3) [1975] 2 SCR 24. 496      tees other freedoms like the right to acquire, hold and      dispose  of   property  for   the  exercise   of  which      incarceration can  be no  impediment. Likewise,  even a      convict is entitled to the precious right guaranteed by      Article 21  of the  Constitution that  he shall  not be      deprived  of   his  life  or  personal  liberty  except      according to procedure established by law". Undoubtedly, lawful  incarceration  brings  about  necessary withdrawal  or  limitation  of  some  of  these  fundamental rights, the retraction being justified by the considerations underlying the penal system (see Poll v. Procunier) (1)      Consciously  and   deliberately  we   must  focus   our attention, while examining the challenge, to one fundamental fact that  we are required to examine the validity of a pre- constitution statute  in the context of the modern reformist theory of  punishment, jail  being treated as a correctional institution. But  the necessary  concomitants of the fact of incarceration, the  security of the prison and safety of the prisoner, are  to be  kept in  the forefront.  Not that  the court would  ever abdicate its constitutional responsibility to delineate  and protect the fundamental rights but it must simultaneously put  in balance  the twin  objects underlying punitive or  preventive incarceration.  The Court  need  not adopt a  "hands off"  attitude as has been occasionally done by Federal  Courts in  the United  States in  regard to  the problem of  prison administration.  It is  all the  more  so because a convict is in prison under the order and direction of the  Court. The  Court has,  therefore, to  strike a just balance between  the dehumanising  prison atmosphere and the preservation  of   internal  order   and   discipline,   the maintenance of  institutional security  against escape,  and the rehabilitation  of the  prisoners.  Section  30  of  the Prisons Act reads  as under:-           "30. (1)  Every prisoner  under sentence  of death      shall, immediately  on his  arrival in the prison after      sentence, be  searched by,  or by  order of, the Jailer      and all  articles shall  be taken  from him  which  the      Jailer deems  it dangerous  or inexpedient  to leave in      his possession.

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         (2) Every  such prisoner  shall be  confined in  a      cell apart  from all  other  prisoners,  and  shall  be      placed by  day and  by night  under  the  charge  of  a      guard".      The gravamen of the argument is that sub-section (2) of s. 30  of the  Act does not authorise the prison authorities in the garb of securing a prisioner under sentence of death, to confine him in a cell      1) 41 L. Ed. 2d. 495 ,at 501. 497 apart from  other prisoners by imposing solitary confinement upon A  him. It  is alleged  that  since  the  date  of  his conviction  by  the  Sessions  Judge  awarding  him  capital punishment, Batra is kept in solitary confinement.      Mr. Chitale,  who gave  us competent  assistance as  an amicus curiae  for Batra, after drawing our attention to the development of  psycho- pathological  syndrome in  prisoners under solitary  confinement for  an unlimited  period, urged that  s.   30  of  the  Act  does  not  empower  the  prison authorities to  place the  prisoner in solitary confinement. It was  said that  if  5.  46(8)  and  (10)  empower  prison authorities to  impose separate or cellular confinement as a punishment for  jail offences,  solitary  confinement  being more tormenting  in effect,  can-  not  be  imposed  on  the prisoner, more  so because it is by itself a punishment that can be  awarded under ss, 73 and 74 of the Indian Penal Code and that  too by a Court. The jail authority cannot arrogate to itself  the power  to impose  such a punishment under the garb of  giving effect  to sub-s. (2) of s. 30. In any event it was  contended that  if sub-s. (2) of s. 30 of the Act is to  be   construed  to   mean  that   it  authorises  prison authorities to  impose solitary  confinement it is violative of Articles 14, 19, 20 and 21 of the Constitution.      It may  be conceded  that solitary  confinement  has  a degrading and  dehumanising effect  on prisioners.  Constant and unrelieved  isolation of a prisoner is so unnatural that it may  breed insanity. Social isolation represents the most destructive abnormal  environment. Results  of long solitary confinement are disastrous to the physical and mental health of those  subjected to it. It is abolished in U.K. but it is still retained in U.S.A. F      If sub-s.  (2) of s. 30 enables the prison authority to impose solitary  confinement of a prisoner under sentence of death not as a consequence of violation of prison discipline but on  the sole  and solitary ground that the prisoner is a prisoner under sentence of death, the provision contained in sub-s. (2)  would offend  article 20  in the  first place as also  articles   14  and   l9.    If  by  imposing  solitary confinement  there   is  total  deprivation  of  comaraderie amongst  coprisoners,  co-mingling  and  talking  and  being talked  to,   it  would   offend  article  21.  The  learned Additional Solicitor General while not adopting any dogmatic position, urged  that  it  is  not  the  contention  of  the respondents that snb-s. (2) empowers the authority to impose solitary  confinement,   but  it  merely  permits  statutory segregation for  safety of  the prisoner  in prisoners’  own interest and 498 instead of  striking down  the provision we should adopt the course of so reading down the section as to denude it of its ugly inhuman features.      It must  atonce be  made clear that sub-s. (2) of s. 30 does not  empower the  prison authority  to impose  solitary confinement, in  the sense  in which that word is understood in para  510 of  Jail Manual, upon a prisoner under sentence

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of death.  Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Penal Code leave no room  for doubt  that solitary confinement is by itself a substantive punishment  which can  be imposed  by a Court of law. It  cannot be  left to  the whim  and caprice of prison authorities. The  limit of  solitary confinement that can be imposed under  Court’s order is strictly prescribed and that provides internal  evidence of  its abnormal  effect on  the subject.  Solitary  confinement  as  substantive  punishment cannot in  any case  exceed 14 days at a time with intervals of not  less duration  than such  periods  and  further,  it cannot be imposed until the medical officer certifies oh the history ticket that the prisoner is fit to undergo it. Every prisoner while  undergoing solitary  confinement has  to  be visited  daily   by  the  medical  officer,  and  when  such confinement is for a period of three months it cannot exceed seven days  in any  one  month  of  the  whole  imprisonment awarded, with  intervals between  the  periods  of  solitary confinement of not less duration than such periods (see  s. 74, IPC). The Court cannot award more than three months’ solitary confinement  even if the total term of imprisonment exceeds  one  year  (see  s.  73,  IPC).  This  is  internal evidence,  if   any  is   necessary,  showing  the  gruesome character of solitary confinement. It is so revolting to the modern sociologist  and law reformist mat the Law Commission in its 42nd Report, page 78, recommended that the punishment of solitary  confinement is out of tune with modern thinking and should  not  find  a  place  in  the  Penal  Code  as  a punishment to  be ordered by any criminal court, even though it may  be necessary  as a measure of jail discipline Sub-s. (2) of  s. 30 does not purport to provide a punishment for a breach of Jail discipline. Prison offences are set out in s. 45. Section  46  confers  power  on  the  Superintendent  to question any person alleged to have committed a jail offence and punish  him for  such offence.  The relevant sub clauses for the  present purpose  are sub-clauses (8) and (10) which read as under:           "46. The  Superintendent may  examine  any  person      touching any such offence, and determine thereupon, and      punish such offence by- 499      ( 8 ) separate confinement for any period not exceeding      three months;           Explanation-Separate   confinement    means   such      confinement  with  or  without  labour  as  secludes  a      prisoner from  communication with,  but not  from sight      of, other  prisoners, and  allows him not less than one      hour’s exercise  per diem  and to  have  his  meals  in      association with one or more other prisoners;      x x x x x           (10)  cellular  confinement  for  any  period  not      exceeding fourteen days:           Provided that such restriction of diet shall in no      case be applied interval of not less duration than such      period  must   elapse  before  the  prisoner  is  again      sentenced to cellular or solitary confinement;           Explanation-Cellular   confinement    means   such      confinement with or without labour as entirely secludes      a prisoner  from communication with, but not from sight      of, other prisoners".      The explanation  to sub-clause  (8) makes it clear that he is  not wholly segregated from other prisoners in that he is not  removed from  the sight of other prisoners and he is entitled to  have his  meals in association with one or more other  prisoners.  Even  such  separate  confinement  cannot exceed  three   months.  Cellular   confinement  secludes  a

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prisoner from  communication with  other prisoners  but  not from the  sight of other prisoners. However, para 847 of the Punjab Jail  Manual and  the provisions  which follow, which prescribe  detailed  instructions  as  to  how  a  condemned prisoner is  to be  kept, if  literally enforced, would keep such prisoner  totally out  of bounds, i.e. beyond sight and sound. Neither separate confinement nor cellular confinement would be  as tortuous  or  horrendus  as  confinement  of  a condemned prisoner  Sub-s. (2)  of s. 30 merely provides for confinement of  a prisoner under sentence of death in a cell apart from other prisoners and he is to be placed by day and night under  the charge  of a  guard. Such  confinement  can neither be cellular confinement nor separate confinement and in any  event it  cannot be  solitary  confinement.  In  our opinion, sub-s.  (2) of  s. 30  does not  empower  the  jail authorities in  the  garb  of  confining  a  prisoner  under sentence of death, in a cell apart from all other prisoners, to impose  solitary confinement on him. Even jail discipline inhibits solitary 500 confinement as  a measure  of jail punishment. It completely negatives any  suggestion that  because a  prisoner is under sentence  of   death  therefore,   and  by  reason  of  that consideration alone,  the jail  authorities can  impose upon him  additional   and  separate   punishment   of   solitary confinement. They  have no  power to  add to  the punishment imposed by  the Court which additional punishment could have been imposed by the Court itself but has in fact been not so imposed. Upon  a true construction, sub-s. (2) of s. 30 does not  empower   a  prison   authority  to   impose   solitary confinement upon a prisoner under sentence of death.      If s. 30(2) does not empower the jail authority to keep a condemned prisoner in solitary confinement, the expression "such prisoner  shall be  confined in  a cell apart from all other prisoners’ will have to be given some rational meaning to effectuate  the purpose behind the provision so as not to attract the  vice of solitary confinement. We will presently point out  the nature  of detention in prison since the time capital sentence  is awarded  to an  accused and until it is executed,  simultaneously   delineating  the   steps   while enforcing the impugned provision.      The next  question is: who is a prisoner under sentence of death  and how  is he  to be  dealt with when confined in prison before execution of sentence? If solitary confinement or cellular  or separate confinement cannot be imposed for a period beyond  three months in any case, would it be fair to impose confinement  in terms of s. 30(2) on a prisoner under sentence of  death right  from the  time the  Sessions Judge awards capital  punishment  till  the  sentence  is  finally executed ? The sentence of death imposed by a Sessions Judge cannot be  executed unless it is confirmed by the High Court (see s.  366(1), Cr.  P.C.). However, we are not left in any doubt that  the prison  authorities treat  such a convict as being governed  by s.  30(2)  despite  the  mandate  of  the warrant under  which he  is detained that the sentence shall not be  executed till  further orders  are received from the Court. It  is undoubtedly obligatory upon the Sessions Judge while imposing  the sentence  of death on a person to commit him  to  jail  custody  under  a  warrant.  Now,  after  the convicted  person  is  so  committed  to  jail  custody  the Sessions Judge  submits  the  case  to  the  High  Court  as required by  s. 366,  Cr. P.C.  The High  Court  may  either confirm the sentence or pass any other sentence warranted by law or  may even  acquit such  a person.  Thereafter, upon a certificate granted by the High Court under Article

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501 134(c) of the Constitution or by special leave under Article 136, an  appeal can  be  preferred  to  the  Supreme  Court. Section 415, Cr. P.C. provides for postponement of execution of sentence  of death  in case  of appeal  to Supreme  Court either upon  a certificate  by the High Court or as a matter of  right  under  Supreme  Court  (Enlargement  of  criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1971, or by special leave under Article 136.  Further, under  Articles 72  and  161  of  the Constitution, the  President and the Governor in the case of sentence of  death has  power to  grant pardon,  reprieve or remittance or commutation of the sentence. No one is unaware of the  long time lag in protracted litigation in our system between the  sentence of  death as  imposed by  the Sessions Court and  the final  rejection of an publication for mercy. Cases are  not unknown  where merely  on account  of a  long lapse of time the Courts have commuted the sentence of death to one  of life  imprisonment on  the sole  ground that  the prisoner was  for a  long time hovering under the tormenting effect of  the shadow  of death.  Could it then be said that under sub-s.  (2) of  s. 30  such prisoner from the time the death sentence  is awarded  by the  Sessions Judge has to be confined in  a cell apart from other prisoners? The prisoner in such  separate, confinement  would be  under a trauma for unusually long  time, and  that could never be the intention of  the  legislature  while  enacting  the  provision.  Such special precautionary  measures heaping  untold misery  on a condemned prisoner  cannot spread  over a long period giving him no  respite to  escape from  the boredom by physical and mental contact  with other prisoners. What then. must be the underlying meaning  of  the  expression  "a  prisoner  under sentence of death" in s. 30 so as to reduce and considerably minimise the  period during  which the prisoner suffers this extreme or additional torture ?        The  expression "prisoner under sentence of death" in the context of sub-s (2) of s. 30 can only mean the prisoner whose sentence  of death  has become  final, conclusive  and indefeasible which  cannot be  annulled  or  voided  by  any judicial or  constitutional procedure.  In other  words,  it must be a sentence which the authority charged with the duty to execute  and carry  out must proceed to carry out without intervention from  any  outside  authority.  In  a  slightly different context  in State of Maharashtra v. Sindhi @ Raman (I), it  was said  that the trial of an accused person under sentence of  death does not conclude with the termination of the proceedings  in the  Court of  Sessions because  of  the reason that  the sentence  of death  passed by  the Sessions Court is subject to confirma-      (1) [1975] 3 SCR 574. 502 tion by  the High  Court. A  trial cannot  be deemed to have concluded  till  an  executable  sentence  is  passed  by  a competent court.  In the  context of  s. 303  of the  Indian Penal Code  it was  said in  Shaik Abdul  Azeez v.  State of Karnataka,(l) that  an accused  cannot be  under sentence of imprisonment for  life at  the time  of  commission  of  the second murder  unless  he  is  actually  undergoing  such  a sentence or  there is  legally  extant  a  judicially  final sentence which  he is bound to serve without the requirement of a  separate order to breathe life into the sentence which was otherwise dead on account of remission under s. 401, Cr. P.C. Therefore.  the prisoner  can be  said to  be under the sentence of  death only  when the  death sentence  is beyond judicial  scrutiny   and  would  be  operative  without  any intervention from  any other authority. Till then the person

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who is  awarded capital  punishment  cannot  be  said  be  a prisoner under  sentence of  death in  the context of s. 30, sub-s. (2). This interpretative process would, we hope, to a great extent  relieve the  torment and  torture implicit  in sub-s. (2) of s. 30, reducing the period of such confinement to a short duration.        What  then is the nature of confinement if a prisoner who is awarded capital sentence by the Sessions Judge and no other  punishment  from  the  time  of  sentence  till  this sentence becomes  automatically executable  ? Section 366(2) of the  Cr. P.C.  enable the  Court to  commit the convicted person who  is awarded  capital punishment  to jail  custody under a  warrant. It  is implicit  in the  warrant that  the prisoner   is    neither   awarded   simple   nor   rigorous imprisonment. The  purpose behind  enacting sub-s. (2) of s. 366 is  to make  available the prisoner when the sentence is required to  be executed.  He is to be kept in jail custody. But this  custody is  something different  from custody of a convict suffering  simple or  rigorous imprisonment.  He  is being kept  in jail  custody for  making him  available  for execution of the sentence as and when that situation arises. After the  sentence becomes  executable he  may be kept in a cell apart  from other prisoners with a day and night watch. But even  here, unless special circumstances exist, her must be within the sight and sound of other prisoners and be able to take food in their company.      If the prisoner under sentence of death is held in jail custody, punitive  detention cannot  be imposed  upon him by jail authorities except for prison offences. When a prisoner is committed  under a  n warrant  for jail  custody under s. 366(2) Cr.P.C. and if he is detained in solitary confinement which is a Punishment prescribed by s.      (1) [1977] 3 SCR 393. 503 73, IPC,  it will amount to imposing punishment for the same offence A more than once which would be violative of Article 20(2). But  as the  prisoner is  not to  be kept in solitary confinement and  the custody in which he is to be kept under s. 30(2)  as interpreted  by us  would preclude detention in solitary confinement,  there is no chance of imposing second punishment upon him and therefore, s. 30(2) is not violative of Article 20.        Article 21 guarantees protection of life and personal liberty. Though  couched in negative language it confers the fundamental right  to life  and  personal  liberty.  To  the extent, assuming  sub-s.  (2)  of  s.  30  permits  solitary confinement, the  limited personal liberty of prisoner under sentence of  death is  rudely  curtailed  and  the  life  in solitary confinement  is even worse than in imprisonment for life. The  scope of  the words  "life and  liberty" both  of which  occur  in  Vth  and  XIVth  Amendments  of  the  U.S. Constitution, which  to some  extent are  the  precurser  of Article 21,  have been vividly explained by Field J. in Munn v. Illinois(1) To quote:           "By the term "life" as here used something more is           meant than  mere animal  existence. The inhibition           against’ its  deprivation  extends  to  all  these           limits and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The           provision equally  prohibits the mutilation of the           body or amputation of an arm or leg or the putting           out of  an eye  or the  destruction of  any  other           organ  of   the  body   through  which   the  soul           communicates with  the outer  world....by the term           liberty, as wed in the provision something more is           meant than mere freedom from physical restraint or

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         the bonds of a prison".        This  statement of law was approved by a Constitution Bench of  this Court  in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.,(2)as also in  D. B.  Patnaik (supra). Personal liberty as used in Article is has been held to be a compendious term to include within itself  all the  varieties of rights which go to make personal liberties of the man other than those dealt with in clause (d)  of Article  19(1). The  burden  to  justify  the curtailment thereof must squarely rest on the State.        There is no more controversy which ranged over a long period about the view expressed in A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras,(3  that   certain  articles   of  the   Constitution exclusively  deal   with  specific  matters  and  where  the requirements of  an article dealing with a particular matter in question are satisfied and there is no infringement of      (1) [1877] 94 US 113 at 142.      (2) [1964] I SCR 332 at 347.      (3) [1950] SCR 88. 504 the fundamental right guaranteed by the article, no recourse can  be  had  to  fundamental  right  conferred  by  another article.  This   doctrine  of   exclusivity  was   seriously questioned in  R. C. Cooper v. Union of India,(l) and it was overruled by  a majority  of Judges  of this  Court Ray,  J. dissenting. In  fact, in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,(2) Bhagwati, J. Observed as under:            "The law must, therefore, now be taken to be well           settled That  article 21  does not exclude article           19 and  that even  if there is a law prescribing a           procedure  for  depriving  a  person  of  personal           liberty and there is consequently no in fringement           of the  fundamental right conferred by article 21,           such law,  in sq  far as it abridges or takes away           any fundamental  right under article 19 would have           to meet  the challenge of that article... if a law           depriving  a   person  of   personal  liberty  and           prescribing a  procedure for that pur- pose within           the meaning of Article 21 has to stand the test of           one or  more of  the fundamental  rights conferred           under article  19 which  may be  applicable  in  a           given situation,  ex hypothesis  it must  also  be           liable to  be tested  with refer  -ence to article           14".        The  challenge under  article 21  must  fail  on  our interpretation of  sub s.(2)  of s.  30. Personal liberty of the  person  who  is  incarcerated  is  to  a  great  extent curtailed by  punitive detention.  It is  even curtailed  in preventive detention.  The liberty  to  move,  mix,  mingle, talk, share  company  with  co-prisoners,  if  substantially curtailed, would  be violative  of  article  21  unless  the curtailment has  the backing  of  law.  Sub-s.(2)  of  s..30 establishes the  procedure by  which it can be curtailed but it must  be read  subject to  our interpretation.  The  word "law" in  the expression  "procedure established  by law" in article 21  has been  interpreted to mean in Maneka Gandhi’s case (supra)  that the law must be right, just and fair, not arbitrary, fanciful  or oppressive. Otherwise it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of article 21 would not be satisfied.  If it  is arbitrary  it would be violative of article 14. Once s. 30(2) is read  down  in the  manner in  which we  have done, its obnoxious element is erased and it cannot be said that it is arbitrary or that there is deprivation of personal liberty without the authority of law.       Incidentally it was also urged that the classification

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envisaged by  s. 30  of prisoner  under sentence of death is irrational  and  it  is  not  based  upon  any  intelligible differentia which  would distinguish  persons of  one  class from others left out and the basis of differentiation      (1) 11971] I SCR 512,      (2) [1978] I SCC 248. 505 has no  nexus with  the avowed policy and object of the Act. There is  no warrant  for  an  implicit  belief  that  every prisoner under  sentence of  death is necessarily violent or dangerous which  requires his  segregation. Experience shows that they become morose and docile and are inclined to spend their last  few  days  on  earth  in  communion  with  their Creator. It  was, therefore,  said that  to proceed  on  the assumption that  every prisoner  under sentence  of death is necessarily of  violent propensities  and dangerous  to  the community   of   co-prisoners   is   unwarranted   and   the classification on the basis of sentence does not provide any intelligible  differentia.   The  rationale  underlying  the provision is  that the  very  nature  of  the  position  and predicament of prisoner under sentence of death as construed by us,  lead to  a certain  situation and  present  problems peculiar  to   such  persons  and  warrants  their  separate classification  and   treatment  as   a  measure   of   jail administration and  prison  discipline.  It  can  hardly  be questioned that  Prisoners under  sentence of  death form  a separate class  and their  separate classification has to be recognised. In England a prisoner under sentence of death is separately classified  as would  appear from para 1151, Vol. 30, Halsbury’s  Laws of England, 3rd Edition. He is searched on reception  and every  article removed  which the governor thinks it  dangerous or inexpedient to leave with him. He is confined in  a separate  cell, kept  apart  from  all  other prisoners and is not required to work. Visits are allowed by relatives, friends  and legal  advisers  whom  the  prisoner wishes to  see etc.  It is true that there is no warrant for the inference  that a  prisoner under  sentence of  death is necessarily of violent  propensities  or  dangerous  to  co- prisoners.  Approaching   the  matter  from  that  angle  we interpreted sub-s. (2) of s. 30 to mean that he is not to be completely segregated  except in  extreme cases of necessity which must be specifically made out and that too after he in the true  sense of  the expression  becomes a prisoner under sentence of  death. Classification according to sentence for the security  purposes is  certainly valid and therefore, s. 30(2) does  not violate  article 14.  Similarly, in the view which we  have taken  of the  requirements of  s. 30(2), the restriction does  not  appear  to  be  unreasonable.  It  is imposed keeping  in view  the safety of the prisoner and the prison security  and it  is not violative of article 19. The challenge in either case must fail.       Charles Sobhraj, a foreigner, was arrested on 6th July 1976 and  on 15th  July 1976  he was served with an order of detention under  s. 3  of the  Maintenance of  Security Act, 1971. his  allegation is  that ever  since he  was lodged in Tihar Central Jail he was put in bar fetters and the fetters were retained continuously for 24 hours a 506 day and  the uncontroverted fact is that since his detention he was  put in  bar fetters till this Court made an order on 24th February  1978 recording  an assurance on behalf of the respondents  given   by  the  learned  Additional  Solicitor General that  the bar fetters shall be removed forthwith for a period  of 14 days except when the prisoner was taken from the  prison  to  the  Court  and  back  and  also  when  the

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petitioner was  taken for the purpose or an interview but if the interview  is in  the cell  no such bar fetters shall be put. By  subsequent orders  this order  dated 24th  February 1978 was  continued. Thus,  from July  1976 to February 1978 the petitioner  was kept in bar fetters. In the affidavit in reply on  behalf of  respondent no. 3, the Superintendent of Tihar Central Jail dated 5th September 1977, gory details of the criminal  activities  of  the  petitioner  are  set  out simultaneously saying  that the  petitioner is  of extremely desperate and  dangerous nature  whose presence is needed by Interpol and, therefore, it has been considered necessary to keep him  under fetters  while in  Jail. While examining the constitutional validity of s. 56  l)  we have not allowed our vision to be coloured, based or abridged by  these averments  as in our opinion for the main contention  raised   by  the  petitioner  they  may  not  be relevant.        The petitioner contends that s. 56 of the Prisons Act so far  as it  confers unguided,  uncanalised and  arbitrary powers on  the Superintendent to confine a prisoner in irons is ultra  vires articles  14 and  21,  the  challenge  under article 19 being not open to him. Section 56 reads as under:              "56.  Whenever the  Superintendent considers it           necessary (with  reference either  to the state of           the prison or the  character of the prisoners) for           the safe custody of any prisoners that they should           be confined  in irons,  he may,  subject  to  such           rules and  instructions as may be laid down by the           Inspector General  with the  sanction of the State           Gov -ernment so confine them".        Sub-para  (3) of  para 399  of the Punjab Jail Manual provides    that special  precautions should  be taken  for the  safe custody of  dangerous prisoners  which inter  alia  includes putting him  under fetters, if necessary. The safeguard that it provides is that if the Superintendent decides to put him in fetters  he  must  record  special  reasons  for  putting fetters in  the Journal  and it  must also  be noted  in the history ticket  of the prisoner. Warders are under a duty to satisfy themselves  that the  fetters are  intact. Para  43S provides that  fetters imposed for security shall be removed by the  Superintendent as soon as he is of opinion that this can be done with safety. Para 507 69 in  Chapter VI  provides that  the  Superintendent  shall discharge A  his duties  subject to  the control of, and all orders passed  by him  shall be  subject to  revision by the Inspector General.      Undoubtedly, the limited locomotion that a prisoner may enjoy while  being incarcerated  is seriously  curtailed  by being put in bar fetters. In order to enable us to know what a bar  fetter is  and how,  when  a  prisoner  is  subjected thereto, his  locomotion is severely curtailed, a bar fetter was shown  to us  and its use was demonstrated in the Court. It may be mentioned that the iron rings which are put on the ankles arc  welded. Therefore,  when the  fetter  is  to  be removed, the  rings have  to be broken open. Then there is a horizontal bar  which keeps the two legs apart and there are two verticle  bars which  are hooked to the waist-belt which makes. even  a slow  motion walking  highly inconvenient. If along with this, handcuffs are put on the prisoner, his life to put  it mildly, would be intolerable. the bar fetters are kept day  and night  even  when  the  prisoner  is  kept  in cellular confinement. It needs not much of an elaboration to come  to   the  conclusion   that  bar  fetters  to  a  very

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considerable  extent   curtail,  if   not   wholly   deprive locomotion which  is one  of the facets of personal liberty. And this  is being  done as  a safety measure with a view to preventing the prisoner from walking as freely- as others or from running  away. It  was tartly  said that   the prisoner have no  fundamental freedom  to escape  from lawful custody and, therefore,  they cannot  complain against precautionary measures which impede escape from the prison.        Article  21 forbids  deprivation of  personal liberty except in  accordance with  the procedure established by law and curtailment of personal; liberty to such an extent as to be a  negation  of  it  would  constitute  deprivation.  Bar fetters make  a  serious  inroad  on  the  limited  personal liberty which a prisoner is left with and, therefore, before such erosion  can be justified it must have the authority of law. At  one stage  it was felt that the provision contained in para  399(3) world  provide the  sanction of  law for the purpose of  article 21. Section 56 confers power for issuing instructions by  the Inspector  General of  Prison with  the sanction of  the State  Government and  section  59  confers power on  the State  Government to  make rules  which  would include the rule regulating confinement in fetters. A deeper probe  into  the  sanction  behind  enactment  of  para  399 ultimately led  the learned  Additional Solicitor General to make the  statement on  behalf of  the respondents that para 399 of  the Punjab  Jail Manual  is  not  a  statutory  rule referable either  to s.  59 or  60 of the Prisons Act, 1894. Learned counsel  stated that despite all efforts respondents were unable to obtain the original or even a copy of the 16- 526SCT /78 508 sanction of  the local  Government referred  to in s. 56. We must, therefore,  conclude that  the provision  contained in para 399 is not statutory and has not the authority of law.         The  question,  therefore,  is,  whether  the  power conferred on  the Superintendent  by s.  56 is  unguided and uncanalised in  the sense  that the  Superintendent can pick and choose a prisoner arbitrarily for being subjected to bar fetters for  such length  of time  as he thinks fit, and for any purpose he considers desirable, punitive or otherwise.         A  bare  perusal  of  s.  56  would  show  that  the Superintendent may put a prisoner in bar fetters (i) when he considers it  necessary; (i;)  with reference  either to the state of  the prison or character cf the prisoner; and (iii) for the  safe custody  of the  prisoner. No we would exclude from consideration  the state  of prison requirement because there is  no material  placed on  record to  show  that  the petitioner was  put in  bar fetters  in view of the physical state of  the Tihar Central Jail. But the Superintendent has first to  be satisfied  about n  the necessity  of putting a prisoner in bar fetters and "neccssity" is certainly opposed to mere  expediency. The  necessity for putting the prisoner in bar  fetters would  have to be examined in the context of the character  of the  prisoner and  the safe custody of the prisoner. The  safe custody  of the  prisoner may comprehend both the  after custody  of the prisoner who ii being put in bar fetters  and of  his companions  in the  prison. We must here. bear  in mind  that the  Superintendent is required to fully record  in his  Journal and  in the prisoner’s history ticket the  reasons for putting the prisoner in bar fetters. When it  is said  that the  power  conferred  by  s.  56  is uncanalised and  unguided it is to be borne in mind that the challenge         has         to         be         examined n the  context of  the subject  matter of  the  legislation, viz., prisons,  and the  subject matter itself in some cases

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provides the  guidelines. In  this context we may profitably refer to Procuniers case (supra). It says . "          "The case at hand arises in the context of prisons.           O,.. of the primary functions of government is the           preservation       of   societal   order   through           enforcement  of   the   criminal   law   and   the           maintenance of  penal institutions is an essential           part of  that task,  The identifiable governmental           interests  at   state  in   this  task   are   the           preservation of internal order and discipline, the           maintenance  of   institutional  security  against           escape   or    unauthorised   entry,    and    the           rehabilitation of the prisoners". I  Two   basic  considerations  in  the  context  of  prison discipline are  the security of the prison and safety of the prisoner.  These  being  the  relevant  considerations,  the necessity or putting any particular 509 prisoner in  bar fetters  must be relatable to them. We are, therefore, of  A the  opinion that the power under s. 56 can be exercised  only for  reasons and considerations which are germane to  the objective of the statute, viz., safe custody of the prisoner, which takes in considerations regarding the character  and  propensities  of  the  prisoner.  These  and similar considerations  bear  direct  nexus  with  the  safe custody  of   prisoners  as  they  are  aimed  primarily  at preventing their  escape. The determination of the necessity to put  a prisoner  in bar  fetters has  to  be  made  after application  of   mind   to   the   peculiar   and   special characteristics of  each individual prisoner. The nature and length of  sentence or  the magnitude of the crime committed by  the  prisoner  are  not  relevant  for  the  purpose  of determining that question.        Again, the power under s. 56 is not unbridled because in the  context of  para 399 special precautions as required by sub-para  3 have  to be  taken for  the safe  custody  of dangerous prisoners,  irrespective of  the fact whether they are awaiting  trial or  have been convicted. lt is difficult to define  with precision  what attributes of a prisoner can justify his  classification as  ’dangerous. But,  these  are practical problems  which have to be sorted out on practical and pragmatic  considerations by those charged with the duty of administering jails.        Let  us look at the conspectus of safeguards that are adumbrated In  s. 56 itself and in para 399 which though not statutory are  binding, on the Superintendent. Determination of necessity  to put  a prisoner  in  bar  fetters  must  be relatable to  the character  of the  prisoner., and the safe custody of  the prisoner. That can only be done after taking into consideration  the peculiar. and special characteristic of each individual prisoner. No ordinary routine reasons can be sufficient.  the reasons have to be fully recorded in the Superintendents Journal  and the  prisoner’s history ticket. Duty to  give reasons  which have,  at last to be plausible, will  narrow   the  discretionary  power  conferred  on  the Superintendent.  It  may  be  made  clear  that  as  far  as posrsible these  reasons must  be recorded in the prisoner‘s history   ticket    in   the   language   intelligible   and understandable by  the prisoner  so  as  to  make  the  next safeguard effective  viz. revision petition under para 69 to the Inspector  General of  Prisons. A  further obligation on the Superintendent  is that  the  fetters  imposed  for  the security shall  be rcmoved  by the Superintendent as soon as he is  of the  opinion that  this can be done with safety as required by  para 435.  In order  to give full effect to the

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requirement  of  para  435,  the  Superintendent  will  have himself to  review the  case of  the prisoner at regular and frequent intervals  for ascertaining whether the fetters can be removed,  consistently with the requirement of safety. It thus becomes clear that there 510 are sufficient guidelines in s. 56 which contain a number of safe.  guards   against  misuse   of  bar   fetters  by  the Superintendent.  Such  circumscribed  peripheral  discretion with duty  to give reasons which are revisable by the higher authority cannot  be described  as arbitrary  so  as  to  be violative of article 14.        It  was submitted  that  in  view  of  the  provision contained in  paras 426 and 427 a prisoner may be put in bar fetters, irrespective  of the  requirement of  prison safety and uninfluenced  by the prisoner’s character, on irrelevant and extraneous  considerations such as length of sentence or the number  of convictions. The only relevant considerations for putting  a prisoner in bar fetters or for containing him in irons  are the character, antecedents and propensities of the prisoner. The nature or length of sentence or the number of convictions  or the  gruesome character  of the crime the prisoner is  alleged to have committed are not by themselves relevant  and   can  not  enter  the  determination  of  the Superintendent except  to the  extent to  which they hear on the question of the safety and safe custody of the prisoner.        The  legislative policy  behind  enacting  s.  56  as interpreted  by   use  is  clear  and  discernible  and  the guidelines prescribed  by‘ the  section have  the effect  of limiting the  application of  the provision  to a particular category of  persons. In  such a  situation  the  discretion circumscribed  by  the  requirement  vested  in  the  prison authority charged  with the  duty  to  manage  the  internal affairs of the prison for the selective application of s. 56 would certainly not infringe article 14.        It  was said  that continuously keeping a prisoner in fetters day  and night  reduces the  prisoner from  a human- being to  an animal, and that this treatment is so cruel and unusual that  the use  of bar  fetters is  anethema  to  the spirit of  the Constitution.  Now, we  do not  have  in  our Constitution any  provision like the VIIIth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution  forbidding the  State from imposing cruel and unusual  punishment as was pointed out by a Constitution Bench of  this Court  in Jagmohan  Singh v. State of U.P.(1) But we cannot be oblivious to the fact that the treatment of a human being which offends human dignity, imposes avoidable torture and  reduces the  man to  the level of a beast would certainly be  arbitrary and  can be questioned under article 14. Now,  putting bar  fetters for  an unusually long period without due  regard for  the safety  of the prisoner and the security of  the prison  would certainly  be  not  justified under s.  56. All  these so  when it  was found in this case that medical  opinion suggested  removal of  bar fetters and yet it  is alleged  that they  were retained thereafter. One cannot subscribe to the view canvassed with      (1) [1973] 2 SCR 541. 511 some vigour that escape from jail cannot be prevented except by A  putting the prisoner continuously in bar fetters. That will be  a sad  commentary on  the prison administration and the administrators. Therefore, s. 56 does not permit the use of bar  fetters for an unusually long period, day and night, and that  too when  the prisoner is confined in secure cells from where  escape is  somewhat inconceivable.  Now that bar fetters of  the petitioner  have been  removed  in  February

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1978, the question of re-imposing them would not arise until and  unless   the  requirement  herein  delineated  and  the safeguards herein provided are observed.        In the result, on the interpretation put by us, s. 56 is not  violative of  Article 14  or 21. The challenge must, therefore, fail.        Both the petitions are accordingly disposed of in the light of the observations made in the judgment.      We share the concern and anxiety of our learned Brother Krishna Iyer,  J. for  reorientation of  the outlook towards prisoners and the need to take early and effective steps for prison reforms.  Jail Manuals  are largely a hangover of the past, still retailing anachronistic provisions like whipping and the ban on the use of the Gandhi cap. Barbaric treatment of a  prisoner from  the point  of view of his rehablitation and acceptance  and retention  in the  mainstream of  social life, becomes counterproductive in the long run.        Justice  Krishna  Iyer  has  delivered  an  elaborate judgement which  deals  with  the  important  issues  raised before us  at great  length and with great care and concern. We have given a separate opinion, not because we differ with him on  fundamentals, but because we thought it necessary to express our  views  on  certain  aspects  of  the  questions canvassed before us. N.V.K                                   Petitions dismissed. 512