13 December 1996
Supreme Court
Download

SUNDER DAS & ORS. Vs GAJANANRAO & ORS.

Bench: N.P. SINGH,S.B. MAJMUDAR
Case number: Appeal Civil 3550 of 1984


1

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 8  

PETITIONER: SUNDER DAS & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: GAJANANRAO & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       13/12/1996

BENCH: N.P. SINGH, S.B. MAJMUDAR

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T S.B. Majmudar. J.      This appeal  on the  grant of  special leave  to appeal under Article  136 of  the Constitution of India is directed against the  judgment and  order of  a Division Bench of the High Court  of Madhya  Pradesh in  First Appeal      No.2 of 1979 whereby  the Division Bench  dismissed the First Appeal and confirmed  with modification  the decree  passed by  the Trial Court  against the  appellants in Civil Suit No.13A of 1978 in  the Court  of learned  District Judge,  Datia.  The facts leading to this appeal shortly stated are as under.      The appellants are the original defendants against whom respondent nos.1 to 3, original plaintiffs, filed the aforesaid  suit for  a declaration  that the  registered Sale Deed  dated 30th  May 1959  executed by  their  father, respondent no.4  in this  appeal who  was original defendant no.6 in  the suit,  in favour  of the  present appellants is void and  inoperative at  law and  for  restoration  of  the possession of  the suit  house bearing  Municipal No  1153/1 situated in  Rajgarh locality  of Datia town in the State of Madhya Pradesh.  For the  sake convenience  we will refer to the  appellants   as  original   contesting  defendants  and respondents 1  to 3 as plaintiffs in the latter part of this judgment. Respondent  no.4, father  of  the  plaintiffs  was joined as  defendant no.6  in the  suit.  The  case  of  the plaintiffs is that their father original defendant no.6 had executed registered  Sale Deed dated 50th May 1955 conveying the suit  house to  the contesting  defendants for  a sum of Rs.l800/- and  delivered possession  of the  said  house  to them. According  to the  plaintiffs the suit house was their ancestral property  in which  they had  90   undivided 3/4th interest. That their father, defendant no.6, had no right to transfer  the   suit  house  in  favour  of  the  contesting defendants and  consequently the  said  Sale  Deed  was  not binding on them.      The  said   suit  was   contested  by   the  contesting defendants on the ground that the house belonged exclusively to  their  vendor  defendant  no.6  and  plaintiffs  had  no interest therein.  lt was  alternatively contended that even assuming that  the suit house was an ancestral house wherein

2

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 8  

the plaintiffs, had undivided interest defendant no.6, their vendor, had  alienated the  said house  for family necessity and his transaction was binding on the plaintiffs. Defendant no.6 father  of the  plaintiffs on  the other hand supported the plaintiffs.      Learned Trial  Judge after  recording the evidence came to the  conclusion that  the suit  house  was  an  ancestral property of  the parties  wherein the  plaintiffs had  3/4th undivided interest  while their  father defendant  no.6  had 1/4th interest  and consequently  the   Sale Deed dated 30th May 1959  was voidable  to the  extent of  3/4 share  of the plaintiffs.   Accordingly the  learned Trial  Judge directed the plaintiffs  to be placed in joint possession of the suit house along  with the  contesting defendants  1 to  5. Being aggrieved by  the aforesaid judgment and decree of the Trial Judge the  contesting defendants carried the matter in First Appeal before  the High  Court. As  stated earlier  Division Bench of the High Court was pleased to the same. However the cross objections  filed by  the plaintiffs  were allowed and accordingly Trial Court’s decree was modified as under :      "The suit  of  the  plaintiffs  for      possession    is     decreed    the      contesting  defendants  to  deliver      possession of the suit house to the      plaintiffs but the execution of the      decree in  so far as it directs the      contesting  defendants  to  deliver      possession of the suit house to the      plaintiffs shall  remain stayed for      a period  of six  months from today      and, if  before the  expiry of  the      period  the  contesting  defendants      bring a suit for general partitions      then the  stay should continue till      the disposal of the suit  but if no      such suit  is  brought  within  the      period, the  stay of  execution  of      the  decree shall  stand  cancelled      on the  expiry of the period of six      months and  the plaintiffs shall be      entitled to  obtain the  possession      of the suit house."      It is  the aforesaid decree in favour of the plaintiffs as confirmed  with modification by the Division Bench of the High Court  that is brought on the anvil of scrutiny of this Court  in   the  present  proceedings  by  the  dissatisfied contesting defendants.      At the  outset it may be started that at the suggestion of the  Court the  contesting parties  were  given  time  to explore any  possibility of settlement. But we were informed that settlement  was not  possible. However  is view  of the fact that  two of the plaintiffs are minors at the time when their father  executed the  impugned Sale  Deed and  as  the prices of  the properties  have naturally got escalated over years  the  Court  suggested  to  learned  counsel  for  the appellants, contesting defendants, that in case they succeed in this  appeal they may ex. gratia make payment of suitable amount to  the respondent-plaintiffs  to avoid  any possible heart burning  to them.  We  are  happy  to  note  that  the suggestion of  the Court  was accepted  by  the  appellants, contesting defendants.  Appellant no.1  Sunder Das  who  was present in  the Court  has filed  a written  undertaking  on affidavit to  the effect that having consulted Laxman son of Tehalram, appellant  no.2  in  this  appeal  he  was  giving undertaking to  this Court that if the appeal filed on their

3

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 8  

behalf is  allowed and the judgment and decree are set aside they shall  pay ex  gratia an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- to the plaintiff respondents Gajanan Rao, Ravindra Kumar and Govind Rao within three months from the date of the delivery of the judgment. We  were also  informed by the learned counsel for the appellants  that similar affidavits will he filed by the remaining appellants  within one week of the delivery of the judgment in  case the  appeal is  ultimately allowed and the suit of  the plaintiffs is dismissed. They undertake to make payment of  Rs.2.00,000/- to  the  plaintiffs  aforesaid  ex gratia with  a view to alleviate likely heart burning of the plaintiffs in  such an  eventuality. We  appreciate the good gesture made  by the  appellants. It  is now  time for us to deal with the merits of the appeal.      We have  heard the  learned counsel  for the contesting defendants as  well as  for  the  respondent  plaintiffs  in support of their respective cases.      Learned counsel for the contesting defendants submitted that both the courts below had patently erred in law as well as on facts in taking the view that the suit for challenging the impugned  Sale Deed  was within limitation. According to the learned  counsel the  suit was  barred by Article 109 of the Limitation Act. On merits it was contended that the suit house belonged  exclusively to  the  contesting  defendants’ vendor original  defendant no.6,  father of  the  plaintiffs and, therefore the plaintiffs had no right to challenge the said Sale  Deed. It  was alternatively  contended that  even assuming that  the suit  property was  ancestral property as plaintiffs father  defendant no  6 was  the ’karta’  of  the joint Hindu  family  the  Sale  Deed  executed  by  him  was Perfectly legal  and valid  and binding  on  the  plaintiffs unless it  was shown  that the Sale Deed was vitiated on the ground of it being executed or paying off a debt incurred by their father  fol an  illegal or immoral purpose. That there was no  such case  pleaded by  the plaintiffs.  It was  next contended that the said transaction was for  legal necessity and for  family requirement  as mentioned  in the  Sale Deed these recital were binding on defendant no.6. That there was no cogent  evidence led  by the  plaintiffs to  rebut  these recitals in  the Sale  Deed. That both the courts below were patently  in   error  when  they  took  the  view  that  the transaction was not binding on the plaintiffs. That the suit was purely  a collusive  suit got  filed by  defendant  no.6 through his  sons after  eleven and  a  half  years  of  the transaction. That they stood by the transaction for all these  years, allowed the contesting defendants to spend huge sums  of money  for re-construction and  rennovation of the house  and that  suit was filed merely to knock out more money from  the contesting  defendants and  to harass  them. Hence it was liable to be dismissed even on merits.      On the  other hand  learned counsel  Shri Khanduja  for the respondent-plaintiffs  submitted that both the courts on appreciation of evidence had come to a concurrent finding of fact that there was no legal necessity for defendant no.6 to execute the  Sale Deed. That defendant no.6 was not shown to have incurred  any debts or was in such a stringent economic condition that  he was required to sell of the suit house to the contesting  defendants and, therefore on the evidence on record the  conclusion reached by both the court  below that defendant no.6,  father of the plaintiffs. could not legally alienate the  undivided 3/4th  interest of the plaintiffs in the suit  house, remained  well justified  and called for no interference in this appeal.      Having  carefully   considered  the   aforesaid   rival contentions we  find that  the judgment and decree as passed

4

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 8  

by Trial  Court and  as confirmed  with modification  by the Division bench  of the  High Court  cannot  be    sustained. However before we proceed to consider the merits of the case we may  in the  first instance  deal with  the  question  of limitation for  filing the  present suit. Article 109 in the Schedule to  the Limitation  Act. 1963 provides for a period of limitation  of twelve  years  for  a  Hindu  governed  by Mitakshara law  who files  a suit  to set aside his father’s alienation of  ancestral property  and twelve  years’ period begins from  the date  when alienee  takes possession of the property. In  the present  case the contesting alienees took possession of  the suit  property on 30th May 1959 when they got registered  Sale Deed in their favour. Counting 12 years from 30th  May  1959  limitation  for  filing  the  suit  or challenging the  said alienation  would expire  by 29th  May 1971. The  present suit  was filed  on 20th  August  1970  . Therefore it was clearly within limitation. However the said suit underwent  rough weather It was originally filed in the court of  Civil Judge  Class II, Datia on the basis that the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction of the court would be Rs.1800/-  the consideration amount mentioned in the Sale Deed. In  the first  instance the  said court  took the view that the suit was within its pecuniary jurisdiction. However the High  Court took  a contrary  view  and  held  that  the valuation of the suit should be equal to the market value of the property  on the  date of  the suit  and  hence  ordered return of  the plaint  for presentation  to the proper court and that  is how the suit was filed in the District Court on 26th November  1975 after  valuing the  suit at Rs.42,700/-. The  contention   of  learned  counsel  for  the  contesting defendants is  that the limitation for file in the suit will have to  be seen from the date of filling of the second suit before the  competent court  and if 26th November 1975 being the date  of filing  of that suit is taken to be the date in the light of which limitation question is to be decided then the period  of limitation  of 12  years from the date of the Sale Deed  dated 30th  May 1959  must  be  treated  to  have expired and  the suit  was,  therefore,  beyond  time.  This contention was rightly not accepted by both the courts below for the  simple reason  that originally  the suit  was filed within limitation, but it was filed before a court which was found to  be lacking  in pecuniary  jurisdiction and when it was re-filed  before a  competent court  the plaintiffs were entitled to  the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act enabling them  to get exclusion of the time from 20th August 1970 to 22nd November 1975 when the High Court took the view that the  suit should  be returned  for presentation  to the proper  court.  It  is  obvious  that  the  plaintiffs  were prosecuting in  good fath  their suit  before a  court which from  defect   of  pecuniary  jurisdiction,  was  unable  to entertain it  and if  this period gets excluded the re-filed suit on  26th   November 1975 would remain within limitation of 12  years from  the date  of the  impugned Sale Deed. The plea of  bar of  limitation as raised by the learned counsel for the contesting defendants, therefore stands rejected.      So far  as the merits of the case are concerned certain salient facts  which are  well established on record deserve to be  noted. There is ample evidence on record to show that the suit  house was the ancestral house of the plaintiff and defendant no.6.  Evidence shows  that  originally  the  suit house was occupied by plaintiffs’ grand-father Mukundrao who had died  60 years  prior to  the filing  of the suit. It is also revealed from the evidence that suit house was occupied by plaintiffs’  father defendant  no.6 and  also by latter’s uncle. They  were staying together till defendant no.6 uncle

5

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 8  

died. Even  the recital  in the  impugned sale  Deed to  the effect that the Sale Deed was executed Oil account of family necessity indicated  that the  suit house  was  treated  was joint family property wherein obviously the plaintiffs would have interest. Both the courts below have held that the suit house was  an ancestral property in the hands of plaintiffs’ father, defendant  no.6. This  finding is  well sustained on the record of the case and calls for no interference in this appeal. We,  therefore, reject  the contention  canvassed by learned counsel  for the  appellants that the suit house was self-acquired property of defendant no.6.      Once it  is held  that the  suit house was an ancestral property in the hands of palintiffs’ father, defendant no.6, the plaintiffs  could naturally  have right  by birth in the suit  house.  However  the  moot  question  is  whether  the alienation of  the suit  house by  the impugned Sale Deed by the plaintiffs’  father, defendant  no.6 to  the  contesting defendants was  binding on  the plaintiffs.  So far  as this question  is   concerned  it  Must  be  kept  in  view  that plaintiffs’ father  was  the  ’karta’  of  the  joint  Hindu family., The evidence shows that at the relevant time he was working as  Upper Division  Clerk  in  the  civil  court  at Chhatarpur. His  monthly income was Rs.150/- in 1958-59 when the sale  Deed was  executed as  seen from his deposition as D.W.1. He  has clearly  recited in the impugned sale Deed in favour of  the contesting defendants that he was selling the suit house  for Rs.1800/- on account of family necessity. He revealed in  his deposition  before the  court that he had a family of  seven persons  to be maintained out of his income of Rs.150/-  per months  as he  had got  his wife three sons namely tile present plaintiffs and two young daughters It is also revealed  from his  evidence that  he  was  staying  at Chhatarpur as he was serving as  Upper Division Clerk in the Chhatarpur court.  The suit  house was  situated at  village Datia. According  to defendant  no.6 he occasionally came to Datia   to look  after the house. No attempt was made in his evidence to  get out  of the clear recitals in the Sale Deed that  he   had  entered  into  the  transaction  for  family necessity. It  is also  pertinent to  note that  our of  the three plaintiffs  plaintiffs no.1  was major  at the time of the Sale Deed. Me his conspicuously remained absent from the witness box and avoided inconvenient cross examination which is might  have faced,  In support  of  the  plaintiffs  only plaintiff no.3  P.M.1   Govind Rao who was admittedly aged 8 years at  the time  of the  Sale Deed  has been examined. He naturally could  not have  any personal knowledge about what transpired in  1959 when  his father  who was  serving in  a Civil Court  as Upper  Division Clark thought it fit to sell the ancestral  house in  village Datia to the defendants and whether the  recital made  by him  in the Sale Deed that the transaction was  being executed  for  family  necessity  was right of  not. Nor  defendant  no.6  vendor  father  of  the plaintiffs; had  even   whispered about  the  necessity  for inserting the recital in the Sale Deed that he was executing the same  for family  necessity. It  has to  be kept in view that defendant  no.6 being  the father of the plaintiffs and ’karta’ of  the joint  Hindu family  was legally entitled to alienate the  suit house  also the  interest  of  the  minor plaintiffs in  the said  house even for his won requirements unless it  was shown that the transaction was tainted by any immoral or  illegal propose. That is not the plaintiffs. Nor have they  suggested that  their father  was addicted to any immoral conduct. Their only case is that their father had no right to  alienate   their undivided  interest in  the  suit house. We  must keep  in view  the fact  that defendant no.6

6

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 8  

father of  the plaintiffs  was  a  worldly  person  who  was presumed to know the ways of the world as he was attached to the Civil  Court as  Upper Division  Clerk at  the  relevant time. His evidence shows that upto 1954 he had worked in the Civil Court  as a Lower Division Clerk. Then he was promoted by the High Court to the post of Upper Division Clerk in the year 1954  and he was transferred to Panna and from Panna he was transferred  to Chhatarpur. He also deposed that he used to visit  Datia in  connection with supervision of the  suit house. Therefore,  defendant no.6,  father of the plaintiffs apart form  being the  ’karta’ of the joint Hindu family was well versad in the ways of the world and was not a novice or a layman.  With his  open eyes he disposed of the suit house which appeared to be almost a ruin for Rs.1800/-. It is easy to visualize  that  when  defendant  no.6  the  vendor,  was staying with his family at Chhatarpur and when the ancestral house at  Datia Village was in a ruinous condition and which would almost  be a  burden to  them he thought it fit in his wisdom to  dispose it  of for  Rs.1800/- in  favour  of  the defendants and made an express recital in the Sale Deed that it was  for family necessity that he was disposing it of. As a Hindu  father and ’karta’ of the family he had every right to do  so and  in the process could have legally disposed of the interest of his minor sons in the said property also for the benefit  of the  family and necessity of the family. The plaintiffs have not been able to lead any cogent evidence to rebut the  clear recitals  found in  the Sale  Deed to  that effect. We  may usefully  remind ourselves  of what  Mulla’s Hindu law  16th Edition  by  S.T.  Desai  has  to  state  in connection with  alienation by  father’ at  paragraph 256 of the said volume. It reads as under "      "256.     Alienation by  father-  A      Hindu father  as such  has  special      powers  of  alienating  coparcanary      property which  no other coparcener      has.  In   the  exercise  of  these      powers-      (1)  he  may   make   a   gift   of           ancestral movable  property to           the   extent    mentioned   in           paragraph  225.  and  even  of           ancestral  immovable  property           to  the  extent  mentioned  in           paragraph 226.      (2)  he  may,   sell  or   mortgage           ancestral  property,   whether           movable     or      immovable,           including the  interest of his           sons, grandsons  and grandsons           therein, for  the  payment  of           his  own  debt,  provided  the           debt was  an  antecedent  debt           and  was   not  incurred   for           immoral or illegal purposes             [Paragraph 295].      Except as  aforesaid, a  father has      no greater  power over  coparcenary      property  than  any  other  manager      (o), that  is  to  say,  he  cannot      alienate    coparcenary    property      except for  legal necessity  or for      the   benefit    of   the    family      [paragraph 242].  This section must      be read  with what  is stated under      paragraphs 213-215 ante".

7

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 8  

    Shri  Khanduja,   learned  counsel  appearing  for  the respondent plaintiffs  in this connection submitted that the defendants as  alienees should  have properly enquired as to why the  transaction was being entered into by the father of the minor  plaintiffs in  their favour.  It is  difficult to appreciate this  submission. The  evidence on record clearly shows that  contesting defendants  before entering  into the suit transaction  had taken  all permissible processions and made enquires  in  this  connection.  contesting  defendants witness no.1  Tehalram stated  in this  evidence that he was informed by  defendant no.6, that his uncle had expired. His debt has  to be paid off. Money lenders had also to be paid. That he  tried to  verify these  facts. That  he went to the shop of  Chetandes in the area. He also enquired from grocer Meghamal and  out that  defendant no.6  was  in  debts  and, therefore, he came to the conclusion that defendant no.6 was in need  of money  and accordingly  he had sold his house to him.  Shri   Khanduja  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the plaintiffs  submitted  that  defendant  no.1  in  his  cross examination has  stated that  defendant no.6 Hanumantrao had no title  to the  property and  in order  to help him he had purchased the  house from him. It is difficult to appreciate this contention. The evidence of defendant no.1 when read in its correct  perspective showed  that he was informed by one Ganpati that  the property  belonged to King and the King of Datia had  given  it  to  the  ancestor  of  the  plaintiffs Mukundrao to  stay therein  and accordingly  he thought that defendant no.6 would not be having title to the property. It must be kept in view that plaintiffs’ ancestor Mukundrao had died 60 years prior  the suit. Therefore, even if originally the property  have  belonged  to  the  King  it  was  being, occupied  by   plaintiffs’  ancestor   Mukundrao   and   his descendants since  generations as owners thereof and even by doctrine of  adverse possession  they would  have  perfected their title.  It may  also he  kept in  view that  there was nothing Oil  the record  to suggest.  that the King of Datia had ever  attempted to  Put forward  any claim  of ownership over the  suit property. Even that apart it was not the case of the  plaintiffs themselves that the suit property did not belong to  their father  or their ancestors. On the contrary their case is that the suit house did belong to their father jointly with  them. Therefore  it is too date in the day for the learned  counsel for  the plaintiffs to submit that suit house did  not belong  to the plaintiff  and their father or that at  the time  of the  sale plaintiffs’  father  had  or right. title  or interest in the suit house. In our view the evidence on  record clearly  establishes that the defendants made all permissible efforts to find out the legal necessity which  prompted  defendant  no.6  to  enter  into  the  said transaction in  their favour.  It  is  of  course  true,  as contended by  Shri Khanduja  for  the  plaintiffs  that  the efforts made  by the  contesting defendants  by relying upon the evidence of Meghamal D.W.2 who is said to have sold grocery  on credit  to defendant  no.6 at  the relevant time remained  unsuccessful as  there would  have been  also occasion for  defendant no.6 who was staying with his family at Chhatarpur  to purchase  at  Datia  grocery  items  on  a continuous basis  on credit  from witness Meghamal. But even leaving aside the evidence of witness Meghamal which was not accepted by  courts below  we find  that the evidence of the evidence, of  the  plaintiffs  and  defendant  no.6  clearly establishes that  the suit  house which was in a dilapidated and ruinous  condition at  Datia was  found to   be  a  dead burden to the family and. therefore. for family necessity it was disposed  of by defendant no.6, father of the plaintiffs

8

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 8  

in 1959. The said transaction, therefore, as the recitals in the Sale  Deed themselves  rightly showed,  in the  light of surrounding circumstances  was a transaction for the benefit of the  family. The  said conclusion  of ours  gets  further fortified from  the well  established facts  on record  that after purchasing  the suit  house the  contesting defendants re-constructed it  to a  substantial extent  by spending  an amount of  Rs.33,000/- as  held by  a Division  Bench of the High Court especially when the suit house was purchased for an amount of Rs.1800/-. That shows that it must  be   in  a   totally  dilapidated  condition  and  the defendants appear to have purchased only the site on which they  put a  substantially new  construction at a huge cost of  Rs. 33,000/  as compared  to the  original purchase price of  Rs. 1800/.  They very fact that defendant no.6 who was  presumed   to  be  well  acclimatised  with  the  court proceedings as  he was an Upper Division clerk in the in the Civil Court  at Chhatarpur at the relevant time stood by the transaction and the recitals in the sale Deed for eleven and a half years and the further fact that he saw to it that his sons challenged  the transaction after such a long period of time when  defendants in  the meantime went on spending huge amounts on  the property  and ultimately came forward in the suit to support the plaintiffs, leave no rood for doubt that the suit was got filed by defendant no.6 only with a view to knock out  more money from the contesting defendants and was clearly a  collusive suit.  On an  overall consideration  of evidence on  record,  therefore, we find ourselves unable to endorse the  conslusions reeached  by both  the courts below that the suit transaction was not binding on the plaintiffs. The said  finding is  against the  weight  of  evidence  and cannot be sustained. We, therefore, hold that the plaintiffs had made  out no  case for getting any relief from the court in the  present proceedings  and their  suit was, therefore, liable to be dismissed. Accordingly this appeal succeeds and is allowed.  The judgment  and decree  passed by  the  Trial Court and  as confirmed  with modification by the High Court are quashed  and set  aside.  Plaintiffs’  suit  will  stand dismissed. However  in the  facts and  circumstances of  the case there will be no order as to costs all throughout.      Before parting  with the  present proceedings, however, we may mention that, as noted earlier, appellant no.1 on his own behalf  and on  behalf of  appellant no.2  has  given  a written  undertaking   to  this   Court  to  pay  ex  gratia Rs.2,00,000/- to  the plaintiff  respondents. We also permit the remaining  contesting defendants to file similar written undertaking  will   stand  accepted  and  accordingly  while allowing the  appeal of the contesting defendants, we direct the  appellant-defendants  to  ex  gratia  pay  sum  of  Rs. 2,00,000/- to  the  respondent  -  plaintiffs  within  three months from  today. The  said amount  be  deposited  by  the appellants  in   the  Trial  Court  within  that  time.  The deposited amount  of Rs.. 2,00,000/- will be permitted to be withdrawn by  the plaintiffs  from the  Trial Court  on  due identification. Orders accordingly.