REPORTABLE

  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 773    OF 2003

Sundar Babu & Ors. ...Appellant(s)

Versus

State of Tamil Nadu ...Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT,J.

Challenge  in  this  appeal  is  to  the  order passed by the  learned single

Judge of the Madras High Court rejecting the petition filed under Sec.482 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Code').

 Background facts in short are as follows:

Sukanya (hereinafter referred to as `the complainant') was married with

Sunder  Babu-appellant  No.1.   Appellant  No.  2-Mr.  Venugopal  and  Mrs.

Ramathilagam appellant No.3 are the parents of Sunder Babu.  A.4-Rajinishree is

his sister and Andalammal is his maternal grandmother.  The marriage took place

on 25/11/1998.  The

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appellant  No.1 left  for USA on 1/7/1999.   The complaint was filed on 6/2/2000

alleging commission of  offence  punishable  under Sec.498A of  the  Indian  Penal

Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC') and Sec.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (in

short `D.P. Act').

The complaint was treated as First Information Report and investigation

was  undertaken.   On  completiion  of  investigation  charge-sheet  was  filed  on

8/6/2000.  A divorce petition was filed by the complainant which appears to have

been granted ex parte on 12/7/2001.  According to the appellants, complainant-

Sukanya has remarried on 24/8/2002.   It  was a stand of  the appellant  that the

complaint filed was nothing but an abuse of  the process of law.  The allegations

were unfounded.  There was no basis for making the allegations. The appellant

No.1 had left for USA after about six months of the marriage.  Long thereafter on

6/2/2000, the complaint was filed. No explanation for the delayed lodging of the

complaint was offered.  In essence, it was submitted that  

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the continuance of the proceedings will  be an abuse of the process of law.  The

prosecuting  agency  before  the  High  Court  contested  the  petition  filed  under

Sec.482 Cr.P.C. taking the stand that a bare perusal of the complaint discloses

commission of alleged offences and therefore it is not a case which needed to be

allowed.   The  High  Court  accepted  the  stand  of  the  respondent-State  and

dismissed the application.

In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant submitted that

the factual scenario indicated above and even a cursory glance of the complaint

petition shows that the same was nothing but an attempt to falsely implicate the

accused persons. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  State  supported  the

judgment.   

Though the  scope for  interference  while  exercising  jurisdiction  under

Sec.482 Cr.P.C. is limited, but it  can be made in cases as  spelt out in the case of

Bhajan Lal. The illustrative examples laid down therein are as follows:

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1 Where the allegations made in the first information report or the

complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in

their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a

case against the accused.

2 Where  the  allegations  in  the  first  information  report  and  other

materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable

offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Sec.156(1)

of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview

of Sec.155(2) of the Code.

3 Where  the  uncontroverted  allegations  made  in  the  FIR  or

complaint  and the  evidence  collected  in  support  of  the  same do not

disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the

accused.

4 Where,  the  allegations  in  the  FIR  do  not  constitute  a  cognizable

offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,  no investigation is

permitted  by  a  police  officer  without  an  order  of  a  Magistrate  as

contemplated under Sec. 155 (2) of the Code.

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1 Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd

and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can

ever  reach  a  just  conclusion  that  there  is  sufficient  ground  for

proceeding against the accused.

2 Where  there  is  an  express  legal  bar  engrafted  in  any  of  the

provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal

proceeding  is  instituted)  to  the  institution  and  continuance  of  the

proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or

the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of

the aggrieved party.

3 Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide

and/or  where  the  proceeding  is  maliciously  instituted  with  an  ulterior

motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite

him due to private and personal grudge.”

Even a cursory perusal of the complaint shows that the case at hand falls

within the category (7) of the illustrative parameters highlighted in  Bhajan Lal's

case (supra).

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The parameters for exercise of power under Sec.482 have been laid down

by this Court in several cases.

The Section does not confer any new power on the High Court.  It only

saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the

Code.  It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may

be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent

abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.  It is

neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern

the  exercise  of  inherent  jurisdiction.   No  legislative  enactment  dealing  with

procedure can provide for all  cases that may possibly arise.  Courts, therefore,

have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary

for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is

the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and

preserves inherent powers of the High Courts.  All courts, whether  

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civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in

their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a

wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle “quando lex aliquid

alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest” (when

the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist).

While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court

of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be

exercised sparingly,  carefully  and with caution and only when such exercise is

justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised

ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which

alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if

any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court

has power to prevent abuse.  It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow

any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice.  In

exercise

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of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if  it finds that

initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of

these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.  

As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Sec.482

of  the Code are very wide  and the very plenitude of  the power requires  great

caution in its exercise.  Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of

this  power  is  based  on  sound  principles.  The  inherent  power  should  not  be

exercised  to stifle  a  legitimate prosecution.   The  High Court  being  the highest

court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a

case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence

has not  been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved,

whether  factual  or  legal,  are  of  magnitude  and  cannot  be  seen  in  their  true

perspective without sufficient material.  Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be

laid  down  in  regard  to  cases  in  which  the  High  Court  will  exercise  its

extraordinary jurisdiction of

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quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1992

(4) SCC 305), Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar (AIR 1964 SC1 ) and Minu

Kumari v. State of Bihar (2006 (4) SCC 359).       (See (2008) 11 SCALE 20)

Consequently,  the appeal  deserves to be allowed.  The proceedings in

Criminal Petition No. C.C.No. 385/2000 pending before the Judicial Magistrate,

Palladam, are quashed.

The appeal is allowed.

                         ................. .J.               (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

    ....................J.                                        (LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA)

     ...................J.                                         (P. SATHASIVAM) New Delhi, February 19, 2009.