IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL  APPEAL NO.             OF 2009 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 428 of 2009)

Sukanti Moharana …. Appellant

Versus

State of Orissa    …. Respondent

JUDGMENT

Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The  present  appeal  is  filed  against  the  judgment  and  order  dated  

24.06.2008 passed by the Orissa High Court at Cuttack whereby and  

whereunder  the  High Court  partly  allowed the  appeal  filed  by  the  

appellant herein and set aside the conviction of the appellant under  

Sections 304B, 498A of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘the IPC’)  

and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short ‘the D.P.  

Act’) but convicted her under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced  

her to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life.

3. In order to appreciate the rival contentions advanced by the parties  

and issues involved, it is necessary to set out brief facts of the case  

which gave rise to the present  criminal appeal:  

Marriage was solemnized between the deceased Anjali and Benudhar  

on 15.07.1999.  Deceased Anjali died in the hospital on 14.02.2000 while  

under treatment for burn injuries which she had sustained on 08.02.2000.  

Sukanti  Moharana,  the  appellant  herein  is  the  wife  of  the  brother  of  

Benudhar, the husband of the deceased.   Informant Kabindra Ojha (PW-1)  

and Bharati (PW-3) are the parents of the deceased, Nakafoldi Ojha (PW-4)  

is  the elder  brother  of PW-1 whereas PW-2 is  the wife of PW-4.    One  

Laxmidhar Ojha (PW-5) who was also examined as a witness is acquainted  

to brother of PW-1.

4. The Prosecution case is that at the time of Nirbandha of Benudhar and  

deceased Anjali, the appellant and Benudhar demanded dowry, a television,  

cash  amounting  to  Rs.  8,000/-  and  gold  ring  etc.     In  response  to  the  

aforesaid demand made, PW-1 gave dowry of cash amounting to Rs. 8,000/-,  

a portable black and white T.V. and some gold ornaments at  the time of  

marriage.    

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5. It is alleged that Benudhar and appellant demanded a bigger T.V. and  

subjected the deceased Anjali to torture in that connection after the marriage.  

It  is  also  alleged  by  the  prosecution  that  there  was  illicit  relationship  

between  the  appellant  and  Benudhar.    The  deceased  used  to  complain  

regarding torture and cruelty meted out towards her by both Benudhar and  

appellant  as  well  as  their  illicit  relationship  before her  parents  and other  

relatives.

6. The  deceased  Anjali  had  also  written  a  letter  to  PW-2 which  was  

exhibited  as  Ext.2.  disclosing  her  ordeal  in  the  matrimonial  home.    On  

08.02.2000, the parents  of  the deceased were informed that  the deceased  

with burn injuries was admitted to Head Quarters Hospital, Dhenkanal.   On  

receipt of the aforesaid information, the parents alongwith the brother of the  

deceased went there and found that the deceased had sustained extensive  

burn injuries.   Deceased was thereafter shifted to S.C.B. Medical College  

and Hospital on the same day for treatment. On 09.02.2000, it is alleged that  

the  deceased  regained  her  senses  and  disclosed  before  PW-1  and  other  

relatives that the appellant has poured kerosene on her and set her on fire  

with  a  matchstick  upon  which  the  informant  (PW-1)  lodged  a  first  

information  report  (for  short  ‘the  FIR)  (Ext.  1)  before  the  O.I.C.,  Sadar  

Police  Station,  Dhenkanal,  who  registered  the  case  for  commission  of  

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offences under Sections 498A/307/34 of the IPC and Section 4 of the D.P.  

Act against the appellant and Benudhar.   

7. On  receipt  of  the  aforesaid  FIR,  the  case  was  registered.   The  

investigation of the case was entrusted to the Sub-Inspector of Police (PW-

12).   PW-12  sent  a  message  to  Mangalabag  Police  Station,  Cuttack  for  

recording the dying declaration of the deceased whereupon a Lecturer in the  

Surgery Department of S.C.B. Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack (PW-

10)  recorded  the  dying  declaration  of  the  deceased  on  10.02.2000  in  

presence  of  other  doctors.    The  said  dying  declaration  was proved  and  

exhibited  as  Ext.  8  in  the  trial.    Thereafter,  the  deceased  while  under  

treatment died on 14.02.2000 in the hospital.   After her death an inquest  

was conducted by PW-12 and post mortem examination was done by PW-9.  

Subsequent  to  that,  PW-13  took  charge  of  the  investigation.   PW-13  

completed the investigation and thereafter submitted the chargesheet against  

the  appellant  and  Benudhar  for  commission  of  offences  under  Sections  

498A/304B and 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and Section 4 of the D. P.  

Act.

8. Both the accused namely the present appellant and Benudhar denied  

the charges and claimed to be tried.   During the course of the trial number  

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of witnesses were examined and on completion of the same and after hearing  

the  parties  the  trial  court  passed  its  judgment  and  order  on  15.02.2005  

whereby it  convicted the present appellant under Sections 302, 304B and  

498A of IPC and under Section 4 of the D. P. Act whereas Benudhar was  

convicted  and sentenced  under  Sections  304B and 498A IPC as  well  as  

under  Section  4  of  the  D.  P.  Act.    The  present  appellant  Sukanti  was  

sentenced by the trial court to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to  

pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for  

a period of one years for the offence under Section 302 IPC.  Further,  she  

was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years  

under Section 304B IPC and also to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a  

period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each in default to undergo  

rigorous imprisonment for a further period of three months for the offence  

under Section 498A IPC and also to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a  

period of three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- each, in default to  

undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one month for the offence  

under Section 4 of the D. P. Act.  

9. Feeling  aggrieved,  the  present  appellant  as  also  Benudhar  filed  an  

appeal in the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack which was partly allowed by  

the High Court.  The High Court while allowing the said appeal in part, set  

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aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 304-B and  

Section  498A of  IPC as  well  as  under  Section  4  of  the  D.  P.  Act,  but  

conviction and sentence under Section 302 of IPC was maintained.

 10. So far as Benudhar is concerned his conviction and sentence under  

Section 304B and 498A of IPC as well as Section 4 of the D. P. Act was set  

aside and he was acquitted.   Consequently, the present appeal was filed by  

the present appellant on which initially a notice was issued.

11. The matter was thereafter ordered to be listed for hearing upon which  

we heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties.

12. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that both  

the courts below committed an error of fact and also of law in convicting the  

appellant.   It was submitted that there is no eye witness to the occurrence  

and the entire case rests only on the circumstantial evidence and that also on  

the alleged dying declaration stated to have been made by the deceased.   It  

was  submitted  that  one  dying  declaration  was  allegedly  an  oral  dying  

declaration which was not recorded in writting whereas the second dying  

declaration although recorded but the same suffers from many infirmities  

and therefore, the same should not have been relied upon and should have  

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been rejected as not reliable.   He very strenuously  urged that the said dying  

declaration did not have any certificate of the doctor attached to it certifying  

that the deceased was in a fit condition to make a statement and also the  

signature and the thumb impression of the deceased was not there in the said  

dying declaration.

13. The learned counsel  for  the  State  on the  other  hand supported the  

order of conviction and sentence.   He submitted that both the courts were  

correct and justified in relying upon the aforesaid dying declaration which  

were recorded by the doctor (PW-10) and also on the oral dying declaration.

14. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties, we now  

proceed to analyse the entire evidence on record so as to ascertain whether  

or not the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant would and  

could be upheld.  

15. The  marriage  between  the  deceased  Anjali  and  Benudhar  was  

solemnized  on  15.07.1999  and  Anjali  received  the  burn  injuries  on  

08.02.2000.   Parents of the deceased were informed of the incident on the  

same day i.e. 08.02.2000 whereupon they immediately went to the hospital  

and  found  that  the  deceased  was  admitted  to  Head  Quarters  Hospital,  

Dhenkanal with extensive burn injuries.   As the injuries were very extensive  

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and grievous in nature therefore she was shifted to S.C.B. Medical College  

and Hospital  on the same day for treatment.     PW-1, the informant and  

father of the deceased and PW-3, the mother of the deceased stated that on  

09.02.2000 the  deceased  regained  her  senses  and then  made  a  statement  

before PW-1 and others that appellant Sukanti poured kerosene on her and  

set her on fire with a matchstick.   The Investigation Officer (PW-12) also  

sent a message to Mangalabag Police Station, Cuttack for recording dying  

declaration of the deceased whereupon her dying declaration was recorded  

by a Lecturer of the Surgery Department of the S.C.B. Medical College and  

Hospital, Cuttack on 10.02.2000 in presence of other doctors.

16. While  under  treatment  in  the  same  hospital,  the  deceased  died  on  

14.02.2000 and her post-mortem examination was carried out by the doctor  

namely  PW-9.    A  perusal  of  the  record  would  also  indicate  that  the  

conviction of  the  appellant  Sukanti  for  commission  of  the  offence under  

Section 302 IPC was ordered on the basis of the dying declarations more  

particularly relying on the written dying declaration (Ext. 8).   The doctor  

who recorded her dying declaration was examined in the trial as PW-10.   He  

had stated in his deposition that he was attached to S.C.B. Medical College  

and Hospital, Cuttack as a Lecturer in Surgery and that the deceased was  

admitted to Surgical Ward (Female) on 08.02.2000 on having suffered 90  

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per  cent  burn  injuries.    He  also  stated  that  he  was  associated  with  the  

treatment of the deceased till 14.02.2000 and that on 10.02.2000 at 11.20  

a.m.,  he  recorded  the  dying  declaration  of  the  deceased  in  presence  of  

Professor Amulya Das and two Post Graduate students.   He had also stated  

clearly in his evidence that the deceased was mentally clear and was able to  

make proper statement while making the dying declaration (Ext. 8) which  

has been proved in the trial.  The PW-10 also identified the signatures of  

Professor Amulya Das as well as Dr. R.N. Mahapatra in whose presence the  

dying declaration (Ext. 8) was recorded.

17. The High Court while upholding the conviction and sentence of the  

appellant  under  Section 302 of  the  Indian  Penal  Code also  held that  the  

dying  declaration  (Ext.  8)  gets  independent  corroboration  from  the  oral  

dying declaration made by the deceased before her parents i.e. PW-1 and  

PW-3 as well as PW-4, PW-5 and PW-6.   The said witnesses have testified  

in their evidence that on 09.02.2000 at 9 a.m., the deceased got her sense and  

at about 2 p.m., she was able to talk properly.   It was stated that on being  

asked as to how she sustained burn injuries, the deceased informed PW-1  

and PW-3 that the appellant Sukanti gave her rice to eat and while she was  

eating, appellant Sukanti poured kerosene oil on her back side and thereafter  

lighted her with a matchstick and when she was engulfed by fire, appellant  

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Sukanti closed the door from outside.   Both PW-1 and PW-3 were subjected  

to  extensive  cross-examination  but  the  aforesaid  part  of  the  evidence  

pertaining to the oral dying declaration made by the deceased could not be  

dislodged  in  any  manner  in  the  course  of  cross-examination.    The  FIR  

(Ext.  1) which was lodged on 09.02.2000, by PW-1 itself  also materially  

corroborates the aforesaid facts contained in the dying declarations and the  

evidence of the informant in the court with regard to the dying declaration  

made by the deceased implicating appellant Sukanti in causing burn injuries  

to her.

18. Counsel appearing for the appellant Sukanti strenuously urged before  

us  that  both the  oral  dying  declaration  allegedly  made before  PW-1 and  

PW-3 and recorded dying declaration allegedly made before doctor are not  

reliable and could not be accepted.   In support of the said submission, it was  

submitted that the dying declaration recorded by the doctor did not contain  

any certificate given by the doctor that she was in a stable and fit mental and  

physical  condition  to  make  such  a  statement  and  that  the  said  dying  

declaration also did not contain the signature or thumb impression of the  

deceased.   She also relied upon the evidence of DW-4 and DW-6 who were  

associated with the treatment of the deceased at the Head Quarters Hospital  

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Dhenkanal and bed head ticket (Ext. A) maintained in that hospital in her  

attempt to get over the dying declaration.  

  19. The judgments of the Courts below clearly indicate that endorsements  

at the time of the admission of the deceased in Dhenkanal Hospital made in  

Ext. A as well as in Cuttack Hospital made in Ext. 9 indicate that the cause  

of injury received by the patient was mentioned to be an accident due to  

bursting of stove,  but  that  the said endorsements  do not  indicate  nor the  

evidence of DW-4, DW-5 and DW-6 adduced during the course of the trial  

show that  the  aforesaid  endorsements  were  recorded  on the  basis  of  the  

statements  made  by  the  deceased.   On  the  other  hand  it  is  indicated  

therefrom  that  Bed  Head  Ticket  (Ext.  9)  proves  and  establishes  that  on  

09.02.2000,  as  per  the  history  given by the  deceased herself  the  treating  

physician had endorsed that it was a case of homicidal burn due to ignition  

caused by spilling of kerosene.  Further, though no specific endorsement has  

been made on the dying declaration but there is contemporaneous evidence  

in the form of Ext. 9/1 which makes it clear that the Doctor recording the  

dying declaration had recorded that  the patient  was oriented to  time and  

place and mentally clear at the time of recording of the dying declaration.   

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20 We have scrutinized the contents of the recorded dying declaration  

which was recorded by the doctor of the hospital where the deceased was  

treated  for  her  burn  injuries.    On  going  through  the  same  we  find  no  

infirmity in the said dying declaration as the said dying declaration vividly  

mentions the manner in which the deceased suffered the burn injuries on  

pouring kerosene oil on her by the appellant who also lighted the matchstick  

which  caused  the  fire  and burnt  the  deceased.    The  appellant  not  only  

poured the kerosene oil on the deceased and lit the fire but also closed the  

door after going out of the said room where the deceased was left to burn by  

the fire.   The said description given by the deceased in the dying declaration  

recorded by the doctor is clear, unambiguous and there is no reason why we  

should not accept the said dying declaration as correct and true version of  

the incident.

21. The objections raised by the counsel appearing for the appellant which  

are  of  technical  nature  with  regard  to  recording  and admissibility  of  the  

aforesaid dying declaration.   We are however, of the considered opinion  

that the said dying declaration recorded by the doctor is also corroborated by  

the oral dying declaration made before PW-1 and PW-3 and the said fact  

also finds corroboration from the statement  of PW-1 and PW-3 and also  

from the FIR which were proved through the evidence of PW-1.

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22. Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872  deals with the statement  

of persons who cannot be called as witnesses as because they are dead or  

they cannot be found or they have become incapable of giving evidence or  

their evidence cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense.  

Such  statements  themselves  are  relevant  facts  in  certain  cases.    The  

aforesaid  Section  32  was  enacted  as  an  exception  to  the  general  rule  as  

reflected in Section 60 of the said Act which mandates that oral evidence in  

all cases must be direct i.e. if it refers to a fact which could be seen, it should  

be the evidence of a witness who says he saw it, whereas if it refers to a fact  

which could be heard, it  must be the evidence of a witness who says he  

heard it or if it refers to a fact which could be perceived by any other sense  

or in any other manner, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he  

perceived it by that sense or in that manner.

23. The question as to admissibility of such a dying declaration came up  

for consideration before this Court in several cases.    We have considered  

the  Constitution  Bench  decision  of  this  Court  in  Laxman  v.  State  of  

Maharashtra reported in (2002) 6 SCC 710.   In the said case also there  

was a dying declaration and a question regarding the admissibility  of the  

said dying declaration was raised.   In that connection this Court held that  

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the Court must decide that the declarant was in a fit state of mind to make  

the  declaration,  but  where  the  eye  witnesses’  evidence  including  the  

evidence of  a  Magistrate  who had recorded the dying declaration to that  

effect was available, mere absence of doctor’s certification as to the fitness  

of the declarant’s state of mind, held, would not ipso facto render the dying  

declaration unacceptable.   It was also held that the evidentiary value of such  

a  declaration  would  depend  upon  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  

particular case.

24. In paragraph 3 of the said judgment, this Court discussed the juristic  

theory  recording  acceptability  of  a  dying  declaration  in  the  following  

manner:-

“3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying  declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity,  when the party is  at  the point  of  death and when every  hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood  is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful  consideration to speak only the truth.   Notwithstanding the  same, great caution must be exercised in considering the  weight to be given to this species of evidence on account  of the existence of many circumstances which may affect  their truth.   The situation in which a man is on the deathed  is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the  veracity of his statement…..”

25. The Constitution Bench in that case also referred to an earlier decision  

of this Court in Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat (1998) 9 SCC 303,  

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wherein it was held that the ultimate test is whether the dying declaration  

can  be  held  to  be  a  truthful  one  and  voluntarily  given  and  in  the  said  

decision it was also held that before recording the declaration, the officer  

concerned must find that the declarant was in a fit condition to make the  

statement  in  question.       The  aforesaid  ratio  of  the  said  decision  was  

affirmed in the Laxman case(supra).

26. There  is  another  very  recent  decision  of  this  Court  in  Vikas  and  

Others v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2008) 2 SCC 516 wherein all  

the earlier relevant decisions on the point have been indexed and referred to  

and  relied  upon.   The  said  decision  specifically  reiterates  the  principle  

governing the dying declaration which was stated in the case of Paniben v.  

State of Gujarat reported in (1992) 2 SCC 474.   In paragraph 45 of the said  

judgment, it was stated thus:-

“45. The Court, referring to earlier case law, summed  up  principles  governing  dying  declaration  as  under:  (Paniben case4, SCC pp. 480-81, para 18)

“18. (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence  that  dying  declaration  cannot  be  acted  upon  without  corroboration.

(ii) If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is  true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without  corroboration.

(iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration  carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the  

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result  of  tutoring,  prompting  or  imagination.  The  deceased  had  opportunity  to  observe  and  identify  the  assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration.  

(iv)  Where dying declaration is  suspicious it  should  not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.

(v)  Where the  deceased was unconscious and could  never  make  any  dying  declaration  the  evidence  with  regard to it is to be rejected.

(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity  cannot form the basis of conviction.

(vii)  Merely  because  a  dying  declaration  does  not  contain the details as to the occurrence,  it  is not to be  rejected.

(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it  is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of  the statement itself guarantees truth.

(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether the  deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying  declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where  the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and  conscious  state  to  make  this  dying  declaration,  the  medical opinion cannot prevail.

(x)  Where  the  prosecution  version  differs  from the  version  as  given  in  the  dying  declaration,  the  said  declaration cannot be acted upon.”

27. After referring to the decision of this Court in Khushal Rao v. State  

of Gujarat reported in AIR 1958 SC 22, the principle formulated earlier was  

reiterated  that  where  a  dying  declaration  is  recorded  by  a  competent  

Magistrate,  it  would  stand  on  a  much  higher  footing  inasmuch  as  a  

competent Magistrate has no axe to grind against the person named in the  

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dying declaration of the victim and in absence of circumstances showing  

anything to the contrary, he should not be disbelieved by the court.

28. The aforesaid principles which are laid down are fully applicable to  

the  facts  of  the  present  case  as  in  this  case  the  dying  declaration  was  

recorded  by  a  doctor  who was  most  disinterested  witness.    It  was  also  

categorically stated by the doctor that at the time when she made her dying  

declaration, she was in a fit state of mind.

29. In the case of Nallapati Sivaiah v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Guntur,  

A.P.  reported in AIR 2008 SC 19, in paragraph 18 it was stated thus;

“18. It is equally well settled and needs no restatement at  our hands that dying declaration can form the sole basis  for conviction. But at the same time due care and caution  must be exercised in considering weight to be given to  dying  declaration  in  as  much  as  there  could  be  any  number of circumstances which may affect the truth. This  Court in more than one decision cautioned that the courts  have  always  to  be  on  guard  to  see  that  the  dying  declaration  was  not  the  result  of  either  tutoring  or  prompting or a product of imagination. It is the duty of  the courts to find that the deceased was in a fit state of  mind to make the dying declaration. In order to satisfy  itself that the deceased was in a fit mental condition to  make the dying declaration, the courts have to look for  the medical opinion.”

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30. In  the  said  decision  this  Court  also  referred  to  a  decision  of  the  

aforesaid Constitution Bench and reiterated that there is no requirement of  

law that the dying declaration must necessarily contain a certification by the  

doctor that the patient was in a fit state of mind especially when the dying  

declaration  was recorded by a Magistrate.    It  was also held in the  said  

decision that it is the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit to  

make statement gains importance and that reliance can be placed upon such  

a declaration even in the absence of the doctor provided the court ultimately  

holds the same to be voluntary and truthful.

31. When we apply the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case  

we are of the considered opinion that both the courts were totally justified  

and also right in relying upon the two dying declarations one recorded by the  

doctor (PW-10) and the other i.e. oral dying declaration made to PW-1 and  

PW-3.   The two technical objections which were raised by the counsel for  

the appellant, one regarding the doctor’s certification and endorsement as to  

mental fitness of the deceased, the same was held by this Court to be a rule  

of prudence and not the ultimate test as to whether or not the said dying  

declaration was truthful or voluntary.

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32. The doctor who recorded the dying declaration was examined as a  

witness and he had in his deposition categorically stated that the deceased  

while  making  the  aforesaid  statement  was  conscious  and in  a  fit  mental  

condition  to  make  such  a  statement.    The  aforesaid  position  makes  it  

therefore clear that the aforesaid dying declaration could be relied upon as  

the same was truthfully recorded and the said statement gave a vivid account  

of the manner in which the incident had taken place.

33. There was another objection raised by the counsel appearing for the  

appellant  regarding  the  admissibility  of  the  aforesaid  recorded  dying  

declaration contending inter alia that the signature or the thumb impression  

of  the deceased was not  taken on the  said dying declaration.    The said  

objection according to  us  also is  without  any basis.    The  deceased had  

suffered about 90 to 95 per cent burn injuries covering 90 to 95 per cent  

body surface.   The post mortem report also indicates that there was bandage  

in her thumb as it was burnt.   In such a situation, it was not possible to take  

her signature or LTI on the dying declaration.   There is also no reason why  

a  dying  declaration  which  is  otherwise  found  to  be  true,  voluntary  and  

correct should be rejected only because the person who recorded the dying  

declaration  did  not  or  could  not  take  the  signature  or  the  Left  Thumb  

Impression of the deceased on the dying declaration.   Once it is found that  

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the dying declaration is true and made voluntarily and as also trustworthy,  

there is no reason why the same should not be believed and relied upon.  In  

this  case,  the  said  dying  declaration  is  corroborated  by  the  oral  dying  

declaration  made  by the  deceased before  PW-1 and PW-3 which is  also  

corroborated by the medical evidence and the facts contained in the FIR.

34. Therefore, taking an overall view of all the facts and circumstances of  

the case and the evidence on record, we find no ground to interfere with the  

order of conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court and confirmed  

by the High Court holding the appellant guilty of the offence under Section  

302 IPC.   The present appeal therefore deserves to be dismissed which we  

hereby  do.    The  order  of  conviction  and  sentence  recorded  against  the  

appellant is therefore upheld.

…................………………..J.   [Dalveer Bhandari]

…......………………………J.       [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

New Delhi, July 29, 2009

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