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PETITIONER: SUBHASH CHANDRA AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/02/1980

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. DESAI, D.A.

CITATION:  1980 AIR  800            1980 SCR  (2)1024  1980 SCC  (2) 324  CITATOR INFO :  R          1983 SC 988  (1,2)

ACT:      Motor  Vehicles   Act,  1939,   Section   51(2)-Whether Regional Transport  Authority imposing  a condition  that no permit shall  be renewed  in respect of vehicles which are 7 years  old   is  ultra-vires   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the Constitution-Competency of  the  R.T.A.  to  impose  such  a condition.

HEADNOTE:      Dismissing the special leave petition, the Court ^      HELD: 1.  Mere lexical  legalism cannot  sterilise  the sensible humanism  writ large on s. 51(2)(x). If Indian life is not  ultra vires  Indian law every condition to save life and limb is intra vires such salvationary provision. [1025G]      2. Section  51(2) of  the Motor  Vehicles Act, 1939, is geared to  public safety,  not private  profit and  casts  a solemn duty  not to  be deterred  by any pressure except the pressure of  social justice to Indian lives moving in buses, walking on  roads or  even standing  on margins.  If the top killer-road accident-is  to be awarded death sentence, s. 51 and like provisions must receive severe enforcement. In this spirit-although backtracking  from 4-year-old  models to  7- year-old models-the  state  imposed  condition  18.  Section 51(2) (x) authorises the impost of "any condition" of course having a  nexus with  the statutory purpose. Human safety is one such purpose.                                                    [1025D-F, H]      3. From  the point  of view of the human rights of road users, the  condition regarding  the model  of the permitted bus is within jurisdiction and not to prescribed such safety clauses  is  abdication  of  statutory  duty.  There  is  no conflict between  a  vehicle  being  fit  to  ride  and  the condition as  an additional requirement and safety factor in the shape  of the  year and  the model.  This  is  an  extra measure, a  further insurance  against machine  failure  and cannot contradict the ’fitness’ provision. [1126D, 1027A-B]

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JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Special  Leave  Petition No. 1262 of 1980.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  19-2-1979  of  the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W.P. No. 184 of 1975.      S. N. Kaicker, Mrs. S. Markendeya and S. Markendeya for the Petitioners.      The Order of the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA IYER, J.-An order draped in relative brevity is sufficient since  we are  refusing leave  to appeal although the issue raised is vires of a provision.      After  due  fulfillment  of  the  obligation  for  oral hearing, we  have  considered  the  impact  of  two  earlier decisions cited by Shri Kaicker sup- 1025 posedly striking  a note  contrary  to  the  judgment  under attack but  feel free-why, bound-to dismiss the petition for special leave not merely because the High Court is right but because justice to the travelling public-a lost cause on our made roads-conscientises to that course.      Tersely put,  the petitioner  is the grantee of permits to ply  minibuses as  contract carriages  and in the grant a condition has  been fastened  that the  vehicle shall not be more than  seven years  old. Condition  No. 18,  relating to Mini-Buses Contract  Carriage permits,  and  the  source  of power, s. 51 (2) (x) read thus:           That the  vehicle covered  by the  permit shall be      not more  than four  years old counted from the date of      registration at  any time  during the  validity of  the      permit.           51(2) The  Regional  Transport  Authority,  if  it      decides to  grant  a  contract  carriage  permit,  may,      subject to  any rules  that may be made under this Act,      attach to  the permit  any one or more of the following      conditions, namely:-           (x) any other conditions which may be prescribed.           Section 51(2) (x) any other. ’Four  years’   have  been  relaxed  to  seven  years  since September 23,  1978, the  beneficiaries being the bus owners and the  potential victims  being the unknown casualties who have no  ’poor lobby’ power. The State must remember that it has responsibilities not merely to mini-bus owners, but also to avoid  the daily  tragedies on the Indian high ways under the lethal  wheels of  these whirling  carriages. Section 51 (2) of  the Motor  Vehicles Act,  1939, is  geared to public safety, not private profit and casts a solemn duty not to be deterred by  any pressure  except  the  pressure  of  social justice to Indian lives moving in buses, walking on roads or even standing on margins. If the top killer-road accident-is to be awarded death sentence, s. 51 and like provisions must receive  severe   enforcement.   In   this   spirit-although backtracking from 4-year-old models to 7-year-old models-the state imposed condition 18. This was challenged artfully but unsuccessfully before  the High Court and is attacked before us as  ultra vires  s. 51(2)  of the  Act. We  will  examine briefly the  submission to  reach the  conclusion that  mere lexical legalism cannot sterilise the sensible humanism writ large on  s. 51(2)  (x). If  Indian life  is not ultra vires Indian law  every condition  to save  life and limb is intra vires  such  salvationary  provision.  This  perspective  of social justice  simplifies the  problem and upholds the High Court.      Section  51(2)   (x)  authorises   the  impost  of  any

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condition, of  course, having  a nexus  with  the  statutory purpose. It  is undeniable  that human  safety is  one  such purpose. The State’s neglect in this area of policing 1026 public transport  is deplorable  but when  it  does  act  by prescribing a  condition the  court cannot be persuaded into little legalism  and harmful  negativism. The short question is whether  the prescription  that the  bus shall  be  at  a seven-year old model one is relevant to the condition of the vehicle and  its passengers’  comparative safety and comfort on our  chaotic highways.  Obviously, it  is. The  older the model, the  less the  chances of  the latest safety measures being built  into the  vehicle. Every new model incorporates new devices  to reduce danger and promote comfort. Every new model assures  its age  to be  young, fresh and strong, less likely  to   suffer  sudden  failures  and  breakages,  less susceptible to  wear and  tear and  moral fatigue leading to unexpected collapse.  When we buy a car or any other machine why do  we look  for the latest model ? Vintage vehicles are good for  centenarian display  of curios  and cannot  but be mobile menaces  on our  notoriously neglected  highways.  We have no  hesitation to  hold, from  the point of view of the human rights of road users, that the condition regarding the model of  the permitted  bus is within jurisdiction, and not to prescribe  such safety clauses is abdication of statutory duty.      Two decisions-Masi Ullah v. State Tribunal Appellate(1) and In  re: Ramesh  Chandra Tewari  etc.(2)  were  cited  as striking a  contrary note.  The first deals with s. 48(3) of the Act  and prescription  of the  model or year of the make was held  ultra vires  because, lexically  read, it was held that the  expression specified  description in  s. 48(3) did not  cover,   according  to   dictionaries,  the   year   of manufacture  of   the  vehicle.   We  extract   Black’s  Law Dictionary on  ’description’ to  show how  the  model  of  a vehicle  is   obviously  a   facet   of   its   description. ’Description’ means: (3)           A delineation  or account  of a particular subject      by the  recital of  its  characteristic  accidents  and      qualities. So, dictionary versus dictionary leaves the matter at large, apart from  the plain  function of  the court  to gather the meaning, not  under the  dictatorship  of  dictionaries  but guided by  the statutory  purpose without being deflected by logamachic exercises,  the mischief  to be countered and the public interest  to be  advanced. We  are clear that a later model is  a better  safeguard and,  more relevantly  to  the point, the year of the make and the particulars of the model are part of the description. 1027      The unreported  ruling in  Civil Writ  No. 7317 of 1975 interprets s.  38 of  the Act  and the  non-issuance of  the fitness certificate because the model was not recent enough. May be  the vehicle, regardless of the year of its make, may be fit  and the refusal to certify fitness merely because it is old  may not  always be  right. But  we see  no  conflict between a vehicle being fit to ride and the condition, as an additional requirement  and safety  factor, in  the shape of the year  of the  model. This is an extra measure, a further insurance against  machine failure and cannot contradict the ’fitness’ provision.      More reasons  are, superogatory,  less discussion  will leave the  law obscure.  We hold  the ration of the impugned ruling to be right and refuse leave to appeal. S.R.                                     Petition dismissed.

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