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PETITIONER: SUBHASH CHAND

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/01/1988

BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH RAY, B.C. (J)

CITATION:  1988 AIR  584            1988 SCR  (2) 556  1988 SCC  (1) 717        JT 1988 (1)   109  1988 SCALE  (1)99  CITATOR INFO :  F          1988 SC2235  (5)

ACT:      Punjab  Borstal   Act,  1926:   ss.  5  and  2(4)(i)(a- Adolescent convicted  for offence of murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life-Whether entitled to the benefit of the Act.

HEADNOTE: %      Sectlon 5  of the  Punjab Borstal  Act,  1926  empowers courts  to  pass  a  sentence  of  detention  in  a  Borstal institution in the case of male persons less than twenty one years  of   age  convicted   of  an   offence,  in  lieu  of transportation or  rigorous imprisonment. Section 2(4)(i)(a) of the  Act which  defines ’offence’ takes in offences other than an offence punishable with death.      In  his   writ  petition   under  Article   32  of  the Constitution, the  petitioner who has been convicted for the offence of  murder and  sentenced to  imprisonment for  life claimed benefit  of the  Punjab Borstal  Act relying on Hava Singh v.  State of  Haryana, AIR  1987 SC  2001.  The  State contested his claim      Dismissing the writ petition. ^      HELD: l.  l  The  Punjab  Borstal  Act  does  not  have application  to   an  offence   punishable  under   s.   302 I.P.C.[561F-G]      1.2 What  is excepted in the definition of ’offence’ in s. 2(4)(i)(a)  of the  Act is an offence which is punishable with death.  One of  the punishments under s. 302 I.P.C. for the offence  of murder is death, and. therefore, the offence of murder would be covered with s. 2(4)(i)(a) of the Act and to such  a conviction  the Punjab  Borstal Act would have no application. [560F-G]      1.3 The  petitioner is,  therefore, not entitled to the benefit of  the Punjab  Borstal Act as he has been sentenced to  imprisonment   for  life   for  the  offence  of  murder punishable under  s. 302  I.P.C. for  which the  sentence of death is prescribed as an alternate. [561G] 557

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    1.4 In Hava Singh’s, case the definition of offence was not  placed   for  consideration   before  the   court  and, therefore, the  conclusion which  has been  reached  is  not correct. [561F]      Emperor v.  Mt. Janki  & Anr.,  AIR 1932 Nag. 130; King Emperor v. Nga San Htwa & Ors., AIR 1927 Rangoon 205; Chetti v. State  of Madhya  Pradesh, AIR  1959 MP  291; Emperor  v. Bahawati, AIR  1928 Lahore  920; State  v. Sheo Shankar, AIR 1956 All.  326; Public Prosecutor of Madras v. Paneswar Rao, AIR 1946  Mad. 178;  Sarkar v. Jalam Singh, AIR 1950 Raj. 28 and Narauji  Premji v.  Emperor, AIR 1928 Bom. 244. referred to.      Hava Singh  v. State  of  Haryana,  AIR  1987  SC  2001 overruled.

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (CRL) No. 745 of 1987.      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).      J.M. Khanna for the Petitioner      Ravindra Bana,  G. Venkatesh Rao and C.V. Subba Rao for the Respondents.      The following order of the Court was delivered:                             O R D E R      The petitioner  has been  convicted for  the offence of murder and  sentenced to imprisonment for life. He claims in this application  under Article  32 of  the Constitution the benefit of the Punjab Borstal Act and has placed reliance on a decision  of this Court in the case of Hava Singh v. State of Haryana,  AIR 1987  SC 2001. A counter affidavit has been filed disputing the tenability of the claim.      In  Hava   Singh’s  case   (supra)  a  two-Judge  Bench (including one of us) was considering the claim of a convict for an  offence of murder to release taking into account the period the  prisoner had  stayed in the Borstal institution. In that case, it was observed:                "It is evident from the averments made in the           writ petition  as well  as in  the  said  counter-           affidavit  that   the  petitioner  was  admittedly           adolescent at the time of his con- 558           viction was  sent to  Borstal Institute at Hissar.           Subsequently,  he  has  been  transferred  to  the           District Jail  at Rohtak  and  is  undergoing  the           sentence of imprisonment for life. It appears from           the objects  and reasons  of Punjab  Borstal  Act,           1926 that  the object of the Act is to provide for           segregation of  adolescent prisoners from those of           more mature  age, and their subsequent training in           separate institutions.  These Borstal Institutions           meant for  detaining adolescent  offenders and  to           impart to  them such industrial training and other           instructions and subject them to such disciplinary           and moral  influence  as  will  conduce  to  their           reformation. This  is evident  from the provisions           of section  2(1) of Punjab Borstal Act, 1926. Sub-           section (2)  of  section  2  defines  detained  as           detained  in  and  detention  as  detention  in  a           Borstal Institution.  Section 5  of the  said  Act           which is very vital for the purpose of decision of           this case is quoted hereinbelow:                ’5. Powers  of courts  to pass  a sentence of                detention in  a Borstal  Institution  in  the

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              case of  a convict  under twenty-one years of                age in  lieu of  transportation  or  rigorous                imprisonment-(1) When  any male  person  less                than twenty-one  years of age is convicted of                an  offence   by  a   court  of  sessions,  a                Magistrate specially  empowered under section                30 of  the Code  of Criminal Procedure, 1898,                or a  Judicial Magistrate of the first class,                or is  ordered  to  give  security  for  good                behaviour and  fails to  give such  security,                and when by reason of this criminal habits or                tendencies or  associations with  persons  of                bad character  it is expedient in the opinion                of the Judge or Magistrate, that he should be                detained, such  Judge or  Magistrate may,  in                lieu of  passing a sentence of transportation                or rigorous  imprisonment, pass  an order  of                detention for  a term which shall not be less                than two  years and  shall not  exceed  seven                years when  the order is passed by a Court of                sessions or  a Magistrate specially empowered                under section  30 of  the  Code  of  Criminal                Procedure, 1898,  and shall  not be less than                two years  nor exceed  three years,  when the                order is  passed by  a judicial magistrate of                the first class not so empowered.                (2) ........................................ 559                (3)......................................... This court further stated:                "The petitioner who was adolescent admittedly           being less  than twenty-one  years of  age at  the           time of  his  conviction  though  convicted  under           Section   302/34    I.P.C.   and    sentenced   to           imprisonment for  life, was  sent to  the  Borstal           Institute in  accordance with  the  provisions  of           Punjab Borstal Act, 1926. On his attaining the age           of about  twenty-one years he was transferred back           to the  Jail. There is no provision except section           20 under  the said  Act for  transferring back  an           adolescent convict  on his  attaining the  age  of           twenty-one years  from the  Borstal  Institute  to           Jail  for   undergoing  the   unexpired  term   of           imprisonment. The Court  then referred  to section  20 of  the Act dealing with incorrigibles and observed: n                "The section empowers the State Government to           commute the residue of the term of detention of an           inmate  in  Borstal  Institute  to  such  term  of           imprisonment of  either description  not exceeding           the residue as the State Government may direct and           also to  order transfer  of the inmate to any jail           in Punjab  in order  to complete  the said term of           imprisomnent when such an inmate is reported to be           incorrigible or is exercising bad influence on the           other inmates of the Institution or such an inmate           has committed  a major Borstal Institution offence           as provided in the rules." The Court then stated:                "This Court  while considering  an indentical           case  in   the  State   of   Andhra   Pradesh   v.           Vallabhapuram Ravi,  AIR 1985  SC 870 has observed           that a  person detained  in a Borstal School under           section 10-a  has to  be  released  after  he  has           served the full term of 5 years of detention or on

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         his completing  23 years  of  age.  He  cannot  be           retransferred  thereafter   to  prison.   Such   a           retransfer  would   defeat  the  very  object  and           purpose of  the Act  of providing for detention of           young offenders  in Borstal School for the purpose           of  reformation   and   rehabilitation   of   such           offenders’. It is to be 560           noted  in   this  connection   that  sentence   of           detention  is   passed  in  lieu  of  sentence  of           imprisonment which may have been passed. Hence the           detention order under section S of the said Act is           not imprisonment  and  Borstal  School  where  the           adolescent offender  is detained  is not a prison.           It has  also been  observed further  that  section           433-A, Cr.  P.C. would  not operate where a person           is detained  by an order under section 10-a of the           Act. Section  433-A of the Code was introduced not           to set  at naught  provisions like 10-A of the Act           which dealt with a special class of offenders like           adolescent  offenders   but   only   to   regulate           capricious and  arbitrary decisions  under Section           432 of  the Code and the remission rules sometimes           reducing the  sentence of  imprisonment  for  life           imposed on  persons  who  had  been  convicted  of           capital  offences   but  had   been  sentenced  to           imprisonment for  life to  short periods like five           to six years."      Under the  Punjab Act,  ’offence’ has  been defined  in section 2(4) to mean-                "an offence punishable with transportation or           rigorous imprisonment  under the Indian Penal Code           other than-                (a) an offence punishable with death;." Hava Singh’s  case  did  not  refer  to  the  definition  of ’offence’ and  relied upon  the decision in the case of Ravi (supra) though  the  scheme  of  the  Andhra  Act  was  very different. The  Andhra  Act  known  as  the  Andhra  Pradesh Borstal Schools  Act, 1925,  does not have the definition of ’offence’ and  there is no exclusion as provided in the Pun- jab Act.      What is  excepted in the definition is an offence which is punishable  with death.  Section 302  of the Indian Penal Code provides:                "Whoever commits  murder  shall  be  punished           with death or imprisonment for life and shall also           be liable to fine. " One of  the punishments  for the  offence of murder is death and, therefore,  the offence  of  murder  would  be  covered within section  2(4)(i)(a) of  the Punjab  Act and to such a conviction the Punjab Borstal Act would have no application. Support for such a view is available from 561 several decisions  of different  High Courts. Section 562(1) of the  Code A  of Criminal  Procedure of 1898 as amended in 1923 brought in the phrase:                "Punishable with  death or transportation for                life". In Emperor  v. Mt.  Janki &  Anr., AIR  1932 Nag.  130  that phrase was  interpreted disjunctively and women convicted of an offence  for which transportation for life was one of the punishments provided  were held  ineligible for  release  on probation under  section 562.  It was  pointed out  that the words ’death  or transportation  for life’  must be  read as referring to  offences the penalty for which provided by the

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Penal Code  contains either death or transportation for life as one  of the punishments awarded and not necessarily both. Reliance was  placed on a full Bench decision of the Rangoon High Court  in King Emperor v. Nga San Htwa & Ors., AIR 1927 Rangoon  205   which  was  dealing  with  a  similar  phrase occurring in  section 497  of the old Code. A Division Bench of the  Madhya Pradesh  High Court  in Chetti  v.  State  of Madhya Pradesh,  AIR 1959 MP 241 also took the same view. In Emperor v. Bahawati, AIR 1928 Lahore 920 it was held that as one of  the alternative  punishments for  that offence under section 307  of the  Penal Code, is transportation for life, it is  obvious that  section 562  is not  applicable and the accused must be sentenced to rigorous imprisonment and fine. The Allahabad  High Court  in the  case  of  State  v.  Sheo Shanker, AIR  1956 All. 326, the Madras High Court in Public Prosecutor of Madras v. Paneswar Rao, AIR 1946 Mad. 178, the Rajasthan High Court in Sarkar v. Jalam Singh, AIR 1950 Raj, 28 and  the Bombay  High Court in Naranji Premji v. Emperor, AIR 1928 Bom. 244 have taken the same view.      In Hava  Singh’s case the definition was not placed for consideration  before   the  Court   and,   therefore,   the conclusion which has been reached is not correct. The Punjab Borstal  Act   does  not  have  application  to  an  offence punishable under  section 302 IPC. therefore, the conclusion in Hava  Singh’s case  is not correct. The petitioner is not entitled to  the benefit of the Punjab Borstal Act as he has been sentenced  to imprisonment  for life for the offence of murder punishable  under  section  302  IPC  for  which  the sentence of death is prescribed as an alternate.      The writ petition is dismissed. P.S.S.                                   Petition dismissed. 562