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CASE NO.: Writ Petition (crl.)  237 of 1998

PETITIONER: Sube Singh

RESPONDENT: State of Haryana & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/02/2006

BENCH: CJI, B. N. Srikrishna & R. V. Raveendran

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.

         An undated letter from the petitioner, received by this Court  on 19.11.1998, alleging illegal detention, custodial torture and  harassment to family members was registered as a writ petition  under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The State of Haryana  and its Director General of Police, were arrayed as respondents 1  and 2 and the six Police Officers referred to in the letter-petition  were arrayed as respondent Nos.3 to 8. PROLOGUE (According to Police)

2.      On 10.3.1998, at about 10 a.m. Dharam Singh ASI, Police  Post Dhamtan Saheb (Narwana Tehsil, Jind District), along with  Police constables (Ramesh Chand, Jaldhir Singh and Baljit Singh),  while patrolling near Dhamtan Saheb Bus Stand, received  information that one Joginder Singh (son of petitioner) and his  associates were conspiring in his house, to apply pressure on some  tender-bidders.  When the police party proceeded towards Joginder  Singh’s house, they saw two young men coming from the opposite  side, on a motorcycle. On seeing the Police party, the motorcycle  suddenly turned back. On suspicion, the Police party gave chase  and stopped the motorcycle near a petrol-pump. The ASI asked the  motorcyclist and the pillion-rider to identify themselves. The  motorcyclist gave his name as Amrik Singh. The pillion-rider gave  his name as Joginder Singh, a Palledar at Tohana. When the ASI  asked Joginder Singh as to whether he was the same Joginder who  had jumped parole in a case, Joginder Singh started running. When   the Police party chased him, Joginder Singh turned back, whipped  out a pistol and fired at them. Baljit Singh, one of the Constables,  was hit and collapsed. In the ensuing confusion, both Amrik Singh  and Joginder Singh escaped. The injured Constable succumbed to  the bullet injuries. In this connection, FIR No.112 dated 10.3.1998  under Section 302/307/352/186 IPC was registered in P.S., Garhi,  against Joginder Singh and Amrik Singh. On receiving information  of the death of constable, the SP and the DSP rushed to the  hospital and later, went to the Dhamtan Saheb Police Post. In the  meantime, the Police party which had gone to the house of  Joginder, in search of him, did not find him and brought his father  Sube Singh (Petitioner) to the Police Station. According to police,  the SDM and the Chairman of Zila Parishad, Jind, were also present  at the Police Post at that time. The petitioner denied any  knowledge of the whereabouts of his son Joginder. The SP made  some enquiries with the petitioner and left. After inquiries, the

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petitioner was released.  

2.1)    The petitioner along with his brother-in-law Rattan Singh filed  W.P. (Crl.) No.416/1998 in the Punjab & Haryana High Court on  24.3.1998 alleging harassment, torture and illegal detention for  three days (from 10.3.1998 to 13.3.1998) and again for a day  (15.3.1998 to 16.3.1998) and prayed for action against the  concerned Police Officers and for a judicial enquiry. The High Court  by order dated 27.4.1998 disposed of the petition with an  observation that petitioners may file a criminal complaint in a  competent court.  

2.2)    The petitioner went underground for a few months. Further  enquiries by the police revealed that several cases had been  registered against the petitioner and his son Joginder Singh.  Joginder was declared as ’proclaimed offender’ by order dated  12.6.1998 of S.D.J.M., Narwana. The petitioner published a notice  in ’Dainik Tribune’ dated 6.8.1998 that he had disowned his son  Joginder and was not responsible for his actions.  

2.3)    The Police continued with their inquiries and in July, 1998,   ASI Satya Narayan and other Police Officers of Dhamtan Saheb  Police Post again tried to ascertain his whereabouts by making  enquiries with the petitioner and his relatives/friends.  

The Letter  (re : alleged torture and illegal detention)

3.      The petitioner sent an undated letter to this Court (received  on 19.11.1998) wherein he  alleged that ASI Dharam Singh, In- charge of Dhamtan Saheb Police Post, along with some Police  Officers, came to his house on 10.3.1998 at about 11 a.m, to  enquire about the whereabouts of his son Joginder; and that when  he informed them that he was not aware of it, they started beating  him. Thereafter, the Police took him, his wife and two minor  daughters forcibly to the Police Post, through the bazaar. He was  beaten with sticks on the way. When they reached the Police Post,  K.P. Singh, Superintendent of Police as also the Deputy  Superintendent of Police, Narwana, were present. When ASI  Dharam Singh informed them that the persons brought were the  father, mother and sisters of Joginder, the S.P. directed that they  may be brought to ’correct mental attitude’. The ASI took him  inside and beat him for about 10 minutes and brought him back  before the SP again. By then, his wife and daughters were made to  sit in an uncomfortable posture (as students are made to sit in  schools by way of punishment). When the petitioner stated that he  was not aware of his son’s whereabouts, the S.P. became furious  and ordered his men to remove his moustache, whereupon Dharam  Singh sat on his chest (with three policemen pressing his hands  and feet)  and plucked his moustache. Again, they started beating  him, searched his pockets and took away Rs.2,350 which he was  carrying. Then the police took him back to his house and ransacked  the house. ASI Dharam Singh broke open the lock of his trunk and  seized his licensed gun, some cartridges and Arms licence, as also  some jewellery  found in the trunk. Thereafter, the petitioner was  taken back to the Police Post. Though his wife and daughters were  sent back to the house, he was illegally detained in Police custody  for a day and then taken to P.S. Garhi where he was kept for 10  days and during the first 5 days of such detention, he was regularly  beaten. Because of such police harassment and torture, when he  was released he and his younger son Gurmail Singh fled from his  house.

3.1)    On 8.7.1998, the petitioner returned to his house. Satya  Narayan, ASI, (who had succeeded Dharam Singh) and Munshi  (HC) of Dhamtan Police Post, came to his house, with four other

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policemen, handcuffed him and took him to the Police Post. He was  tortured in the Police Post by the ASI and Head Constable Munshi  by thrashing him thrice, each time continuously for 15 minutes.  When he requested for water, he was forced to drink hot water  with salt. The Munshi, Dhamtan Police Post kept him in a wooden  Shikanza for 5 days and he was not allowed to sleep. Then he was  taken to Jind.  He also alleged that the Police forced him to bring  money for the vehicles to conduct raids (to catch his son, Joginder)  and he was forced to accompany them on such raids and was put  in wooden Shikanza at Tulvan Thana.  When he begged that he  should be released, he was informed that he was being taken for  the raids on the instructions of Ranbir Sharma, S.P., Jind, and that  without the permission of the S.P., he could not be released. After  three days he was again taken back to Dhamtan Post and kept  there for 2 days. Thereafter, he was released with a condition to  visit the Police Post everyday in the morning and evening.  

3.2)    The Petitioner alleged that his friends and relatives who  wanted to meet him, when he was being illegally detained, were  not permitted to meet him and they were also tortured. He also  alleged that Munshi (HC) of Dhamtan Police Post was demanding  money from him.  

3.3)    He alleged that in view of such torture, he was forced to  leave his house and remain outside. He prayed for a direction to  the Police to stop the atrocities and torture. He sought  compensation for himself and his wife and daughters for the social,  physical and financial loss, and return of his licensed gun, gold  ornaments and other belongings. He also prayed for a thorough  inquiry into the atrocities and torture committed by the Police and  imposition of punishment to those  who were responsible.

3.4)  The letter of the petitioner was registered as a writ petition  and Rule was issued on 11.1.1999. On 13.9.2000, this Court  appointed Mr. S. Muralidhar, Advocate, as Amicus Curiae, to assist  the Court.  

The alleged Second Round of Harassment :

4.      Joginder was arrested in June, 1999 by Punjab Police. Before  his arrest, he was allegedly involved in two robberies (registered on  19.3.1999 with PS, City Yamunanagar, and on 21.3.1999 with PS,  Indri, Karnal District). On 25.1.2001, when he was being taken to  Ferozepur Court from Ambala jail, Joginder escaped from police  custody. It is further alleged by the police that on 13.2.2001,  Joginder and his associates murdered two residents of Tohana.    

4.1)    According to Police, on 29.1.2001, the SHO, Police Station,  Garhi along with other police officials visited the house of petitioner  in search of Joginder who had escaped from custody. Again in  February, 2001 after the double murder, the S.I. of Police Station,  Tohana along with the ASI in charge of Dhamtan Saheb Police Post,  and other Police officials visited petitioner’s house in search of  Joginder. In that connection, petitioner and his brother were taken  to Police Station Tohana on 14.2.2001 for inquiries and were  released on the same day. They were again called for inquiries on  the next day. On 22.6.2001, the Officer in Charge of Police Post,  Patiala Chowk, Jind, searched the house of Minti Devi (sister of  Joginder), to find out whether Joginder was hiding there. On  24.6.2001, petitioner’s younger son Gurmail Singh was arrested for  possessing illegal arms.   

4.2)    The petitioner filed an affidavit dated 22.2.2001 before this  Court on 3.3.2001 alleging interrogation by Police on 26.1.2001

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and 29.1.2001 in regard to escape of his son Joginder from Police  custody. He also alleged that on 14.2.2001 he and his brother  Narsi were handcuffed and taken to Tohana Police Station and  interrogated and released on 15.2.2001. The S.P. Jind filed a  detailed reply affidavit dated 11.8.2001. A further affidavit was  filed by the petitioner on 1.10.2001 wherein he alleged that his  younger son Gurmail Singh was forcibly taken from his sister’s  house on 22.6.2001 and tortured. This brought forth a further  affidavit dated 20.11.2001 from the S.P., Jind, by way of reply  denying the allegations.

PROCEEDINGS IN THIS COURT :

5.      Not being satisfied with the reply-affidavit filed on behalf of  the State, in regard to the letter-petition, this Court on 9.11.2000  directed the Chief Secretary of the State of Haryana to file a  detailed affidavit in regard to the steps taken on the allegations  made by the petitioner. In view of it, the State got the matter  inquired into by Dr. John V. George, Inspector General of Police,  (Law & Order), Haryana. He submitted a report dated 10.3.2001  stating that the allegations of the petitioner relating to police  torture, illegal detention, harassment to wife and daughters, and  removal of cash/licensed weapon/jewellery were not substantiated.  The said report, however, confirmed that petitioner and his brother  were called to the Police Station couple of times for interrogation  regarding the whereabouts of Joginder. Not being satisfied with the  said report, this Court on 17.10.2001 directed the CBI to inquire  into the matter with reference to the allegations made in the letter  as also the subsequent affidavits filed by the petitioner and his  relatives and the reply affidavits filed by the respondents.  

5.1)    The CBI held a preliminary inquiry and submitted the report  of the Inquiry Officer (A.K. Ohri, ASP) under cover of its letter  dated 22.7.2002. The findings in the said report are arrived at, on  the basis of the allegations made in the affidavits filed before this  Court, and the statements made by the petitioner, his family  members and others (nearly 100 witnesses) before the Inquiry  Officer. The CBI has concluded that some of the allegations of the  petitioner were substantiated while several others were not  substantiated.  

5.2)    On 16.9.2002, this Court directed that the State Government  to take appropriate action on the report of the CBI. In pursuance of  it, an FIR was lodged in Garhi Police Station, Jind District, (FIR  No.152 dated 17.10.2002 under Sections 323, 342, 343, 365 and  384 IPC) on the basis of the CBI report, naming the following 10  officers :- 1.      ASI Dharam Singh (by then S.I.) 2.      ASI Satyanarain 238/Jind 3.      HC Om Parkash No.102/Jind (by then ASI) 4.      Const. Dilbag Singh, No.59/Jind 5.      HC Balbir Singh No.450/Jind 6.      Const. Sudarshan Kumar No.811/Jind 7.      Const. Mukesh Kumar No.99/Jind 8.      Const. Dhoop Singh No.704/Jind 9.      Const. Dharam Pal No.4/Jind 10.     Const. Mohinder Singh 825/Jind (by then HC)

The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Narwana, filed an affidavit  dated 1.11.2002 confirming that FIR was lodged and that he was  investigating  into the matter.  

5.3)    On 11.11.2002, this Court noted that the FIR was registered  and an appropriate chargesheet would be filed by the State in due  course, and that the officers concerned have been

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suspended/posted outside the district. This Court also took note of  the submission of the amicus curiae that in such cases, apart from  CBI inquiry and criminal prosecution, compensation has to be  awarded to the victims, and the submission of the State that  having regard to the facts of the case and having regard to the  registration of the FIR, the matter may have to await the result of  the prosecution. While adjourning the case, this Court observed  that the question of awarding any compensation at that stage, did  not arise.

5.4)    The SP, Jind, by affidavit dated 9.6.2003 informed this Court  that the charge-sheet was filed in the Court of Ilaka Magistrate,  Narwana, and that the case was fixed for 18.7.2003 for framing of  charge. Thereafter, when the matter came up on 4.8.2003, the  amicus curiae again submitted that compensation should be  awarded. This Court directed hearing on the limited question as to  whether compensation should be awarded or not. The criminal  court was also directed to expedite the trial. The criminal case  against the Police officers, we are informed,  is under progress.  

5.5)    Thereafter, arguments on the question as to whether  compensation should be awarded or not were heard on 6.10.2005  and written arguments were submitted by the Amicus Curiae and   the State on 19.10.2005 and 16.11.2005 respectively.  

(Preliminary) Inquiry Report of CBI :

6.      The findings contained in the report of CBI are summarized  below :-

Allegations by Petitioner (and his  relatives)

Finding by C.B.I.

1.       Incident on 10.3.1998

1.1.  Petitioner   was  tortured   at  Dhamtan Saheb Police Post on  10.3.1998 on the directions of   Mr. K. P. Singh, Superintendent  of Police, Jind and Mr. Praveen  Kumar Mehta, DSP, Jind.

Not substantiated  1.2     On 10.3.1998 Dharam Singh ASI  took cash of Rs.2,350/- from the  pocket of the petitioner and  Rs.4,700/- from the pocket of his  friend Narender Singh.  

Not substantiated 1.3    Dharam Singh,  ASI, took   away  the licensed gun, cartridges and  jewellery from the house of  petitioner, on 10.3.1998.  

Not substantiated by  any independent  witness.

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1.4     Dharam Singh,  ASI, Incharge of  Dhamtan Saheb Police Post along  with other Police officials picked  up the Petitioner and his friend  Sardar Narender Singh on  10.3.1998 and took them to the  Police Post and beat them on the  way.  

Substantiated  

1.5    Om Prakash (H.C., PS, Garhi) and  Dilbag Singh, Sentry, beat  petitioner on 11.3.1998. Substantiated (But no  injury report or medical  report is available.)

2.      Illegal detention.

2.1.  Petitioner  was  arrested  on  10.3.1998 and taken to Police  Station Garhi on 11.3.1998  where he was illegally detained  for 10 days and beaten during  first 5 days.  

Detention of petitioner at  P.S. Garhi for some days  was substantiated by an  oral evidence of accused in  an Excise Case (Amarinder  Singh).

2.2.    Rattan     Singh     alias      Ratna  (brother in law of petitioner) was  picket up on 10.3.1998 and kept  illegally at P.S. Garhi and  tortured for 2 days. He was again  arrested on 16.3.1998, tortured  for 4 days and released on  20.3.1998.

Picking up of Rattan Singh  a few days after 10.3.1998  is established. However,  alleged torture and  wrongful confinement is  supported only by his self  statement and not by any  medical or other evidence.

[Note: However, in the writ petition filed by Rattan Singh and  petitioner on 24.3.1998 in the Punjab & Haryana High Court, it is  alleged that petitioner and Rattan Singh were kept in illegal   confinement from 10.3.1998 to 13.3.1998 and again from 15.3.1998  to 16.3.1998. There is no allegation of any torture at all. They only  alleged that they apprehended  harassment and torture by Police.)  

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3.    Incidents  between  8.7.1998 and 7.11.1998  

3.1  Munshi (HC),  in-charge   of  Dhamtan Saheb Police Post  handcuffed petitioner and took  the petitioner to Police Post on  8.7.1998.

Substantiated 3.2 Satya Narayan, ASI, harassed  petitioner between 8.7.1998 and  7.11.1998.

Substantiated 3.3   Satya Narayan, ASI,  demanded  money from the petitioner and  took money from petitioner, for  fuel for the vehicle used to  conduct raids.  

Not Substantiated  3.4     Satya Narayan ASI took 10 kg. of  Desi Ghee from petitioner’s  brother Narsi.  

Not Substantiated  3.5     Satya Narayan, ASI, had  detained Shamsher Singh in  police custody.  

Substantiated  3.6     Satya Narayan, ASI,  tortured  Shamsher Singh and took  Rs.500/- to release him.

Not substantiated. 4.       Re : Incidents in the year 2001

4.1   SHO, Police Station, Garhi along  with other police officials raided  the petitioner’s house in January,  2001 and intentionally flashed a  torch light on the faces of his  young daughters. Not substantiated.  (What is established is  that SHO, PS, Garhi raided  the petitioner’s house on  the night of 31.1.01 to  check whether Joginder  who had escaped from  police custody was at the  house. A torch light was  used as there was no  electricity.)

4.2   On 14.2.01, SHO, Police Station  City, Tohana along with other  police officials had handcuffed  the petitioner and his brother  Narsi and detained for a day.

Not substantiated.

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(However, what is  established is that the  petitioner and his brother  were taken to PS City  Tohana on 14.2.01, for  inquiries in connection  with the report that  petitioner’s son Joginder  Singh and his associates  had committed a double  murder on 14.2.01. After a  few hours of interrogation  they were released).   

4.3  On  22.6.01,  Gurmel  Singh,  younger son of petitioner was  picked up (by Constables Mukesh  Kumar and Dhup Singh in a  vehicle driven by Constable  Dharampal). He was  confined at  PS City, Jind and tortured.  

Substantiated only to the  extent that Gurmel Singh  was picked up on 22.6.01  by police party and  wrongfully confined at PS  City, Jind. (In regard to  alleged torture, the  statement of Gurmel Singh  alone is available without  corroboration).  

4.4    Yad  Ram,   Inspector,  when he  was SHO, PS Alewa forcibly  picked up one Ramphal on  26.7.01 and harassed him when  Ramphal’s house was raided on  29.7.01.  Not substantiated.  (What is established is Yad  Ram had taken Ramphal  on the instructions of ASP,  Jind and examined him for  an hour).  

7.      The report further shows that petitioner was involved in  several criminal cases from 1972 and his son Joginder was involved  in more number of criminal cases from the year 1991, as detailed  below :- Cases in respect of petitioner :   

1.      FIR No. 275 dt. 13.10.72 u/s 61/1/14 Excise Act P.S.  Sadar Kaithal. 2.      FIR No.59 dt. 13.2.78 u/s 379 IPC PS Sadar Kaithal. 3.      FIR No.231 dt. 22.7.85 u/s 25/54/59 Arms Act P.S.  Sadar Kaithal. 4.      FIR No.141 dt. 20.7.86 u/s 61/1/14 Excise Act P.S.  Sadar Narwana. 5.      FIR No.142 dt. 25.4.91 u/s 25/54/59 Arms Act read with  section 5 TADA Act P.S. Sadar Kaithal. 6.      FIR No.147 dt. 25.4.91 u/s 285/336 I.P.C. P.S. Sadar  Kaithal. 7.      FIR No.219 dt. 17.7.91 u/s 324/323/506/34 IPC PS  Sadar Kaithal.

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8.      FIR No.367 dt. 23.11.94 u/s 323/324/148/149 IPC PS  Garhi.   9.      FIR No.277 dt. 25.6.2001 u/s 332/353/225/186/511 IPC  PS City, Jind.

(Note: The petitioner was convicted only in the first case. He  was acquitted in all other cases.)                                       

Cases in respect of Joginder Singh :

a)      FIR No.219 dated 17.7.91 u/s 323/324/506/34 IPC PS  Sadar, Kaithal. b)      FIR No.395 dated 5.7.97 u/s 324/34 IPC PS Civil Lines,  Hissar. c)      FIR No.242 dated 7.9.96 u/s 307/120-B IPC & 25/54/59  Arms Act, PS City, Tohana. d)      FIR No.245 dated 8.9.96 u/s 25/54/59 Arms Act, PS  City, Tohana. e)      FIR No.112 dated 10.3.98 u/s 302/307/353/86/34 IPC &  25/54/59 Arms Act, PS Garhi.. f)      FIR No.57 dated 31.3.99 u/s 392/395 IPC & 25/54/59  Arms Act, PS Indri, Karnal. g)      FIR No.99 dated 19.3.99 u/s 393/394/397/307/452 IPC,  PS City, Yamunanagar. h)      FIR No.94 dated 21.6.99 u/s 399/401 IPC, 25/54/59  Arms Act, PS Malanwala, Distt. Firozepur, Punjab. i)      FIR No.8 dated 26.1.2001 u/s 223/224 IPC, PS GRP,  Ludhiana, Punjab. j)      FIR NO.48 dated 14.2.2001 u/s 302/307/34 IPC and  25/54/59 Arms Act, PS City, Tohana. k)      FIR No.100 dated 16.2.2001 u/s 307/332/353/216 IPC  and 25/54/59 Arms Act, PS Sadar, Fatehabad. l)      FIR No.38 dated 21.2.2001 u/s399/307/402 IPC and  25/54/59 Arms Act, PS City, Narwana. m)      FIR No.29 dated 16.3.2001 u/s 307, 120-B IPC and  25/54/59 Arms Act, PS City, Firozepur, Punjab. n)      FIR NO.149 dated 23.8.2001 u/s 25/54/59 Arms Act, PS  Sadar, Kapurthala, Punjab.    

(Note : Joginder was convicted in regard to FIR 242/1996 and FIR  No.245/1996. Sl. No. (c) and (d) above on 31.1.2002 and  sentenced to undergo RI for six years and two years respectively)  

Position emerging from the records/CBI Report/arguments:

8.      A careful examination of the facts, lead to the following   inferences :  

i)      All allegations (relating to petitioner and his family  members being taken to Police Stations/Police Posts and  being questioned/beaten up/tortured) are in connection  with the effort of Police to find the whereabouts of  Joginder Singh, whenever he was involved in a serious  incident, that is (a) incident on 10.3.1998 when Joginder  was suspected of killing a Police constable, (b) incident  on 25.1.2001 when Joginder escaped from Police

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custody when he was being taken to court, and (c)  incident on 13/14.2.2001 when Joginder was suspected  of killing two persons at Tohana.

ii)     Though there is some evidence of illegal detention and  beating of petitioner and his relatives, the allegations of  custodial torture are exaggerated and to a certain extent  false.  

iii)    There is no medical evidence nor any visible scars/  marks/disability resulting from the alleged torture,  either in the case of petitioner or his family  members/relatives.  

iv)     The complaints of petitioner and his relatives are against  different police officers of different police stations  (totally unconnected with each other) in regard to  incidents at different points of time, in March, 1998,  April, 1998, July, 1998, January, 2001, February, 2001  and June, 2001.  

v)      The case of Petitioner is that he and/or his relatives  were harassed, illegally confined, or tortured, to find out  the whereabouts of Joginder. The police contend that  the allegations by petitioner and his relatives, are by  way of a well conceived plot to prevent police  investigation in regard to misdeeds by Joginder and his  associates and to pre-empt any action by the police  against Joginder or his family members.  

9.      We will next refer to the factors which indicate that petitioner  and his relatives have made false and exaggerated claims in regard  to illegal detention, torture etc., apart from suppressing material  facts.  

9.1)    In his letter to this Court, petitioner has alleged that he was  illegally confined by the Police for 11 days from 10.3.1998 (one day  at Dhamtan Saheb Police Post and 10 days at Police Station,  Garhi). Rattan Singh (brother in law of petitioner) in his affidavit  dated 13.5.1999 alleges that he was illegally detained for 2 days  and again for 4 days. But in the writ petition filed by petitioner and  Rattan Singh in the Punjab and Haryana High Court on  24.3.1998,  it is alleged that the petitioner and Rattan Singh were confined by  Police between 10.3.1998 and 13.3.1998 (three days) and again  for a day between 15.3.1998 and 16.3.1998.  

9.2)    Petitioner, in the letter to this Court, alleges beating and  torture at Dhamtan Saheb Police Post on 10.3.1998 and at Police  Station, Garhi for five days in Police custody between 11.3.1998  and 16.3.1998. Rattan Singh alleges torture for 2 days (from  10.3.1998 to 12.3.1998) and again for four days (from 16.3.1998  to 20.3.1998). But in the writ petition filed in Punjab & Haryana  High Court on 24.3.1998 by petitioner and Rattan Singh, there is  no allegation of beating or torture, but only expression of an  apprehension that they may be arrested, harassed and tortured  (Note : Petitioner blames his counsel for not mentioning the facts  properly in the writ petition filed before the High Court).  

9.3)    In the letter petition, petitioner completely suppressed the  fact that he (along with Rattan Singh) had filed a writ petition on  24.3.1998 in the Punjab & Haryana High Court in regard to the said  incident (between 10.3.1998 to 21.3.1998) and the fact that the  said writ petition was disposed of on 27.4.1998 by the  High Court  reserving liberty to file a criminal complaint.

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9.4)    In the letter petition, the petitioner has alleged four  ’misdeeds’ of police on 10.3.1998 : (a) His torture at the police  post at the Dhamtan Saheb Police Post by Dharam Singh, ASI at  the instance of Superintendent of Police and DSP, (b) Mistreatment  of wife and daughters of the petitioner at the Dhamtan Saheb  Police Post, (c) Rs.2,350/- being taken from his pocket by ASI  Dharam Singh, and (d) Licensed gun, cartridges, arms licence and  gold ornaments being illegally taken by ASI Dharam Singh on  10.3.1998. The CBI report finds that none of these four allegations  is substantiated.  

9.5)    In the letter petition, the petitioner alleged that he had told  police that he was not on good terms with his son Joginder Singh,  that he had already disowned him and  the family was having no  connection with Joginder. He even published a notice in ’Dainik  Tribune’ in August, 1998 stating that he has no connection with his  son Joginder. In his affidavit dated 31.8.2001 (filed in this case on  1.10.2001), petitioner reiterates that he has disowned his son  Joginder and alleges that he did not have any contact with him;  and that in spite of it,  the police were continuously harassing him  and his family members seeking information about the  whereabouts of Joginder and raiding his house and his relatives’  houses to find out whether Joginder was hiding there. But the CBI  inquiry has categorically found that petitioner and his family  members had not disowned Joginder. They were regularly meeting  Joginder when he was in custody. Petitioner was traveling to meet  his son Joginder whenever he was being produced in courts, in  respect of different cases. In fact petitioner received money from  the All India Food & Allied Workers Palledar Union, Tohana (Kacchi  Union) of which he was a member, to meet the expenses of the  travel (to meet his son) on 25.10.2000, 25.11.2000, 21.12.2000,  13.1.2001, 16.1.2001, 23.1.2001, 9.10.2001, 10.10.2001,  11.10.2001, 15.10.2001, 25.10.2001, 7.11.2001, 17.11.2001 and  20.11.2001. Further, the jail records showed that Joginder was met  by petitioner’s wife on 26.8.1999, petitioner’s brother Narsi on  17.11.1999, 18.11.1999 and 1.3.2002, petitioner’s uncle Rama on  20.11.1999, and petitioner’s brother-in-law Rattan Singh on  5.3.2002.  

10.     There was thus reasonable cause for the Police to think that  the family members of Joginder might know about his  whereabouts. The repeated questioning of the family members of  Joginder in the year 1998 and 2001, either at their houses or by  calling them to the Police Station/Post was part of investigation  process and cannot, per se, be considered as harassment or  violation of Article 21. Whether the police exceeded their limits in  questioning the petitioner or his relatives is of course a different  aspect. The report of the CBI shows that there is prima facie  evidence about petitioner and some of his relatives being illegally  detained in Police Station/Post and subjected possibly to some third  degree methods, to extract information regarding the whereabouts  of Joginder Singh. At the same time, the report makes it clear that  neither the illegal detention nor the alleged torture (if true) was of  an extent, alleged by the petitioner and his relatives. The claims  were clearly exaggerated and many a time false also. It is quite  probable that the allegations against Police were levelled and/or  exaggerated to avoid enquiries by the  Police in regard to Joginder.  

11.     This leads us to the question whether, in addition to directing  CBI inquiry and prosecution of the officers concerned, on the facts  and circumstances of this case, compensation should be awarded  to petitioner and his family members, as a public law remedy for  the violation of their fundamental rights under Article 21 of the  Constitution.

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Compensation as a public law remedy :

12.     Though illegal detention and custodial torture were  recognized as violations of the fundamental rights of life and liberty  guaranteed under Article 21, to begin with, only the following  reliefs were being granted in writ petitions under Article 32 or 226 :

a)      direction to set at liberty the person detained, if the  complaint was one of illegal detention.  

b)      direction to the concerned Government to hold an  inquiry and take action against the officers responsible  for the violation.  

c)      If the enquiry or action taken by the concerned  department was found to be not  satisfactory, to direct  an inquiry by an independent agency, usually the  Central Bureau of Investigation.  

Award of compensation as a public law remedy for violation of the  fundamental rights enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution, in  addition to the private law remedy under the Law of Torts, was  evolved in the last two and half decades.   

13.     In the Bhagalpur Blinding case, [Khatri (II) vs State of  Bihar \026 1981 (1) SCC 627], Bhagwati J., (as he then was),  speaking for the Bench, posed the following question while  considering the  relief that could be given by a court for violation of  constitutional rights guaranteed in Article 21 of the Constitution :-  

"... but if life or personal liberty is violated otherwise than in  accordance with such procedure, is the Court helpless to  grant relief to the person who has suffered such  deprivation? Why should the court not be prepared to forge  new tools and devise new remedies  for the purpose of  vindicating the most precious  of the precious fundamental  right to life and personal liberty."

The question was expanded in a subsequent order in Bhagalpur  Blinding case [Khatri (IV) vs State of Bihar \026 1981 (2) SCC  493), thus :- "If an officer of the State acting in his official capacity  threatens to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty  without the authority of law, can such person not approach  the court for injuncting the State from acting through such  officer in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21  ? Can the State urge in defence in such a case that it is not  infringing the fundamental right of the petitioner under  Article 21, because the officer who is threatening to do so is  acting outside the law and therefore beyond the scope of his  authority and hence the State is not responsible for his  action ? Would this not make a mockery of Article 21 and  reduce it to nullity, a mere rope of sand, for, on this view, if  the officer is acting according to law there would ex  concessionis be no breach of Article 21 and if he is acting  without the authority of law, the State would be able to  contend that it is not responsible for his action and  therefore there is no violation of Article 21. So also if there  is any threatened invasion by the State of the fundamental  right guaranteed under Article 21, the petitioner who is  aggrieved can move the court under Article 32 for a writ  injuncting such threatened invasion and if there is any  continuing action of the State which is violative of the

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fundamental right under Article 21, the petitioner can  approach the court under Article 32and ask for a writ  striking down the continuance of such action, but where the  action taken by the State has already resulted in breach of  the fundamental right under Article 21 by deprivation of  some limb of the petitioner, would the petitioner have no  remedy under Article 32 for breach of the fundamental right  guaranteed to him ? Would the court permit itself to  become helpless spectator of the violation of the  fundamental right of the petitioner by the State and tell the  petitioner that though the Constitution has guaranteed the  fundamental right to him and has also given him the  fundamental right of moving the court for enforcement of  his fundamental right, the court cannot give him any relief."      

Answering the said questions, it was held that when a court trying  the writ petition proceeds to inquire into the violation of any right  to life or personal liberty, while in police custody, it does so, not for  the purpose of adjudicating upon the guilt of any particular officer  with a view to punishing him but for the purpose of deciding  whether the fundamental right of the petitioners under Article 21  has been violated and the State is liable to pay compensation to  them for such violation. This Court clarified that the nature and  object of the inquiry is altogether different from that in a criminal  case and any decision arrived at in the writ petition on this issue  cannot have any relevance much less any binding effect, in any  criminal proceeding which may be taken against a particular police  officer. This Court further clarified that in a given case, if the  investigation is still proceeding, the Court may even defer the  inquiry before it until the investigation is completed or if the Court  considered it necessary in the interests of Justice, it may postpone  its inquiry until after the prosecution was terminated, but that is a  matter entirely for the exercise of the discretion of the Court and  there is no bar precluding the Court from proceeding with the  inquiry before it, even if the investigation or prosecution is  pending.

14.     In Rudul Sah vs. State of Bihar [1983 (4) SCC 141], the  petitioner therein approached this Court under Article 32 of the  Constitution alleging that though he was acquitted by the Sessions  Court on 3.6.1968, he was released from jail only on 6.10.1982,  after 14 years, and sought compensation for his illegal detention.  This Court while recognizing that Article 32 cannot be used as a  substitute for the enforcement of rights and obligations which can  be enforced efficaciously through the ordinary processes of courts,  civil and criminal, raised for consideration the  important question  as to whether in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32,  this Court can pass an order for payment of money, as  compensation for the deprivation of a fundamental right. This Court  answered the question thus while awarding compensation:-  

"Article 21 which guarantees the right to life and liberty will  be denuded of its significant content if the power of this  Court were limited to passing orders of release from illegal  detention. One of the telling ways in which the violation of  that right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance  with the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its  violators in the payment of monetary compensation.  Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements of  fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any other  method open to the judiciary to adopt. The right to  compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of  instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest  and which present for their protection the powers of the  State as a shield. If civilisation is not to perish in this

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country as it has perished in some others too well-known to  suffer mention, it is necessary to educate ourselves into  accepting that, respect for the rights of individuals is the  true bastion of democracy. Therefore, the State must repair  the damage done by its officers to the petitioner’s rights. It  may have recourse against those officers."

Rudul Sah was followed in Bhim Singh vs. State of J&K [1985  (4) SCC 677] and Peoples’ Union for Democratic Rights vs.  Police Commissioner, Delhi Police Headquarters [1989 (4)  SCC 730].  

15.     The law was crystallized in Nilabati Behera vs. State of  Orissa [1993 (2) SCC 746]. In that case, the deceased was  arrested by the police, handcuffed and kept in a police custody. The  next day, his dead-body was found on a railway track. This Court  awarded compensation to the mother of the deceased.  J.S. Verma  J., (as he then was) spelt out the following principles :-  

"Award of compensation in a proceeding under Article  32 by this Court or by the High Court under Article  226 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public  law, based on strict liability for contravention of  fundamental rights to which the principle of  sovereign immunity does not apply, even though it  may be available as a defence in private law in an  action based on tort.  

Enforcement of the constitutional right and  grant of   redress embraces award of compensation as part of  the legal consequences of its contravention.

A claim in public law for compensation for contravention of  human rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection of  which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged   remedy for enforcement and protection of such rights, and  such a claim based on strict liability made  by resorting  to   a  constitutional  remedy  provided  for the enforcement of  a fundamental right is ’distinct from, and in addition  to, the  remedy in private law for damages for the tort’  resulting  from the contravention of  the fundamental right. The   defence  of  sovereign  immunity being  inapplicable,  and  alien   to  the concept  of  guarantee of fundamental  rights,   there  can be no question        of  such  a defence being  available in the constitutional remedy.  It is this principle  which justifies award of monetary compensation for  contravention of fundamental rights guaranteed by the  Constitution, when that  is the only practicable mode of  redress available for the  contravention made by the State  or its servants in the purported  exercise of their powers,  and enforcement of the fundamental right is claimed by  resort to the remedy in public law under the Constitution by  recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution."

[Emphasis supplied]      

Dr. A.S. Anand J., (as he then was) in his concurring judgment  elaborated the principle thus :-  

"... Convicts, prisoners or under-trials  are not denuded of  their fundamental rights under Article 21 and  it is  only  such restrictions, as are permitted by law, which can be  imposed on the enjoyment of the fundamental rights by  such  persons. It is an obligation of the State to  ensure that

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there is no infringement of the indefeasible rights  of a   citizen to life, except in accordance with law, while the  citizen is in its custody.  

The public law proceedings serve a different purpose than  the private law proceedings. The relief of monetary  compensation, as exemplary damages, in proceedings  under Article 32 by the Supreme Court or under Article 226  by the High Courts, for established infringement of the  indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 is a remedy  available in public law and is based on the strict liability for  contravention of the guaranteed basic and indefeasible  rights of the citizen. The purpose of public law is not only to  civilize public power but also to assure the citizen that they  live under a legal system which aims to protect their  interests and preserve their rights. Therefore, when the  court moulds the relief by granting ’compensation’ in  proceedings under Article 32 or 226 seeking enforcement or  protection of fundamental rights, it does so under the public  law by way of penalizing the wrongdoer and fixing the  liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in  its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the  citizen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not  to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil  action for damages under the private law but in the broader  sense of providing relief by an order of making ’monetary  amends’ under the public law for the wrong done due to  breach of public duty, of not protecting the fundamental  rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the nature of  ’exemplary damages’ awarded against the wrongdoer for  the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the  rights available to the aggrieved party to claim  compensation under the private law in an action based on  tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent  jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal  law. "

16.     In D. K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997 (1) SCC  416), this Court again considered exhaustively the question and  held that monetary compensation should be awarded for  established infringement of fundamental rights guaranteed under  Article 21. This Court held :-  

"Custodial violence, including torture and death in the lock  ups strikes a blow at the Rule of Law, which demands that  the powers of the executive should not only be derived from  law but also that the same should be limited by law.  Custodial violence is a matter of concern. It is aggravated  by the fact that it is committed by persons who are  supposed to be the protectors of the citizens. It is  committed under the shield of uniform and authority in the  four walls of a police station or lock-up, the victim being  totally helpless. The protection of an individual from torture  and abuse by the police and other law enforcing officers is a  matter of deep concern in a free society.  

Any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading  treatment would fall within the inhibition of Article 21 of the  Constitution, whether it occurs during investigation,  interrogation or otherwise. If the functionaries of the  Government become law-breakers, it is bound to breed  contempt for law and would encourage lawlessness and  every man would have the tendency to become law unto  himself thereby leading to anarchy. No civilized nation can

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permit that to happen. Does a citizen shed off his  fundamental right to life, the moment a policeman arrests  him ? Can the right to life of a citizen be put in abeyance on  his arrest. ... The answer, indeed, has to be an emphatic  ’No’.  

Police is, no doubt, under a legal duty and has legitimate  right to arrest a criminal and to interrogate him during the  investigation of an offence but it must be remembered that  the law does not permit use of third degree methods or  torture of accused in custody during interrogation and  investigation with a view to solve the crime. End cannot  justify the means. The interrogation and investigation into a  crime should be in true sense purposeful to make the  investigation effective. By torturing a person and using third  degree methods, the police would be accomplishing behind  the closed doors what the demands of our legal order  forbid. No society can permit it."

17.     It is thus now well settled that award of compensation  against the State is an appropriate and effective remedy for  redress of an established infringement of a fundamental right under  Article 21, by a public servant. The quantum of compensation will,  however, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.  Award of such compensation (by way of public law remedy) will not  come in the way of the aggrieved  person claiming additional  compensation in a civil court, in enforcement of the private law  remedy in tort, nor come in the way of the criminal court ordering  compensation under section 357 of Code of Civil Procedure.  

18.     This takes us to the next question as to whether  compensation should be awarded under Article 32/226, for every  violation of Article 21 where illegal detention or custodial violence is  alleged.  

Whether compensation should be awarded for every  violation of Article 21

19.     In M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India [1987 (1) SCC 395], a  Constitution Bench of this Court while considering the question  whether compensation can be awarded in a petition under Article  32, observed thus :- "We must, therefore, hold that Article 32 is not powerless to  assist a person when he finds that his fundamental right has  been violated. He can in that event seek remedial  assistance under Article 32. The power of the court to grant  such remedial relief may include the power to award  compensation in appropriate cases. We are deliberately  using the words "in appropriate cases" because we  must make it clear that it is not in every case where  there is a breach of a fundamental right committed by  the violator that compensation would be awarded by  the court in a petition under Article 32. The  infringement of the fundamental right must be gross  and patent, that is, incontrovertible and ex facie  glaring and either such infringement should be on a large  scale affecting the fundamental rights of a large number of  persons, or it should appear unjust or unduly harsh or  oppressive on account of their poverty or disability or  socially or economically disadvantaged position to require  the person or persons affected by such infringement to  initiate and pursue act in the civil courts. Ordinarily, of  course, a petition under Article 32 should not be used  as a substitute for enforcement of the right to claim  compensation for infringement of a fundamental right

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through the ordinary process of civil court. It is only  in exceptional cases of the nature indicated by us  above, that compensation may be awarded in a  petition under Article 32.  ....

If we make a fact analysis of the cases where  compensation has been awarded by this Court, we  will find that in all the cases, the fact of infringement  was patent and incontrovertible, the violation was  gross and its magnitude was such as to shock the  conscience of the court and it would have been  gravely unjust to the person whose fundamental right  was violated, to require him to go to the civil court for  claiming compensation."                                                (emphasis supplied)

In Nilabati Behera (supra), this Court put in a word of caution  thus:-  "Of course, relief in exercise of the power under Article 32  or 226 would be granted only (when) it is established that  there has been an infringement of the fundamental rights of  the citizen and no other form of appropriate redressal by  the court in the facts and circumstances of the case, is  possible. ....Law is in the process of development and the  process necessitates developing separate public law  procedures as also public law principles. It may be  necessary to identify the situations to which separate  proceedings and principles apply and the courts have to  act firmly but with certain amount of circumspection  and self-restraint, lest proceedings under Article 32  or 226 are misused as a disguised substitute for civil  action in private law."                                                  (emphasis supplied)         In D. K. Basu (supra), this Court repeatedly stressed that  compensation can be awarded only for redressal of an established  violation of Article 21. This Court also drew attention to the  following aspect :

"There is one other aspect also which needs our  consideration. We are conscious of the fact that the police in  India have to perform a difficult and delicate task,  particularly in view of the deteriorating law and order  situation, communal riots, political turmoil, student unrest,  terrorist activities, and among others the increasing number  of underworld and armed gangs and criminals. Many hard  core criminals like extremists, the terrorists, drug peddlers,  smugglers who have organized, gangs, have taken strong  roots in the society. It is being said in certain quarters that  with more and more liberalization and enforcement of  fundamental rights, it would lead to difficulties in the  detection of crimes committed by such categories of  hardened criminals by soft peddling interrogation, it is felt in  those quarters that if we lay too much of emphasis on  protection of their fundamental rights and human  rights, such criminals may go scot-free without  exposing any element or iota of criminality with the  result, the crime would go unpunished and in the  ultimate analysis the society would suffer. The  concern is genuine and the problem is real. To deal  with such a situation, a balanced approach is needed  to meet the ends of justice. This is all the more so, in  view of the expectation of the society that police must deal  with the criminals in an efficient and effective manner and

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bring to book those who are involved in the crime. The cure  cannot, however, be worst than the disease itself."

[Emphasis supplied]

In Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan v. Vasant Raghunath Dhoble  [2003 (7) SCC 749] and Munshi Singh Gautam v. State of M.P.  [2005 (9) SCC 631], this Court warned against non-genuine  claims: "But at the same time there seems to be a  disturbing trend of increase in cases where false  accusations of custodial torture are made, trying to  take advantage of the serious concern shown and  the stern attitude reflected by the courts while  dealing with custodial violence. It needs to be  carefully examined whether the allegations of  custodial violence are genuine or are sham  attempts to gain undeserved benefit masquerading  as victims of custodial violence."

In Dhananjay Sharma vs. State of Haryana [1995 (3) SCC  757], this Court refused compensation where the petitioner had  exaggerated the incident and had indulged in falsehood. This Court  held : "Since, from the report of the CBI and our own  independent appraisal of the evidence recorded by  the CBI. we have come to the conclusion that Shri  Dhananjay Sharma and Sushil Kumar had been  illegally detained by respondents 3 to 5 from the  afternoon of 15.1.94 to 17.1.94, the State must be  held responsible for the unlawful acts of its officers  and it must repair the damage done to the citizens  by its officers for violating their indivisible  fundamental right of personal liberty without any  authority of law in an absolutely high-handed  manner. We would have been, therefore,  inclined to direct the State Government of  Haryana to compensate Dhananjay Sharma  and Sushil Kumar but since Sushil Kumar has  indulged in false-hood in this Court and Shri  Dhananjay Sharma, has also exaggerated the  incident by stating that on 15.1.94 when he  was way laid along with Sushil Kumar and  Shri S.C. Puri, Advocate, two employees of  respondents 6 and 7 were also present with  the police party, which version has not been  found to be correct by the CBI, they both have  disentitled themselves from receiving any  compensation, as monetary amends for the  wrong done by respondents 3 to 5, in  detaining them. We, therefore do not direct  the payment of any compensation to them."

                               [Emphasis supplied]

20.     Cases where violation of Article 21 involving custodial  death or torture is established or is incontrovertible stand on a  different footing when compared to cases where such violation  is doubtful or not established. Where there is no independent  evidence of custodial torture and where there is neither medical  evidence about any injury or disability, resulting from custodial  torture, nor any mark/scar, it may not be prudent to accept  claims of human right violation, by persons having criminal  records in a routine manner for awarding compensation. That  may open the floodgates for false claims, either to mulct money

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from the State or as to prevent or thwart further investigation.  Courts should, therefore, while jealously protecting the  fundamental rights of those who are illegally detained or  subjected to custodial violence, should also stand guard against  false, motivated and frivolous claims in the interests of the  society and to enable Police to discharge their duties fearlessly  and effectively. While custodial torture is not infrequent, it  should be borne in mind that every arrest and detention does  not lead to custodial torture.    21.     In cases where custodial death or custodial torture or  other violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 21 is  established, courts may award compensation in a proceeding  under Article 32 or 226. However, before awarding  compensation, the Court will have to pose to itself the following  questions : (a) Whether the violation of  Article 21 is patent and  incontrovertible, (b) whether the violation is gross and of a  magnitude to shock the conscience of the court, (c) whether the  custodial torture alleged has resulted in death or whether  custodial torture is supported by medical report or visible marks  or scars or disability. Where there is no evidence of custodial  torture of a person except his own statement, and where such  allegation is not supported by any medical report or other  corroboration evidence, or where there are clear indications that  the allegations are false or exaggerated fully or in part, courts  may not award compensation as a public law remedy under  Article 32 or 226, but relegate the aggrieved  party to the  traditional remedies by way of appropriate civil/criminal action.  

22.     We should not, however, be understood as holding that  harassment and custodial violence is not serious or worthy of  consideration, where there is no medical report or visible marks  or independent evidence. We are conscious of the fact that  harassment or custodial violence cannot always be supported by  a medical report or independent evidence or proved by marks or  scars. Every illegal detention irrespective of its duration, and  every custodial violence, irrespective of its degree or magnitude,  is outright condemnable and per se actionable. Remedy for such  violation is available in civil law and criminal law. The public law  remedy is additionally available where the conditions mentioned  in the earlier para are satisfied. We may also note that this  Court has softened the degree of proof required in criminal  prosecution relating to such matters.  In State of MP vs.  Shyamsunder Trivedi - 1995 (4) SCC 262, reiterated in  ABDUL GAFAR KHAN and MUNSHI SINGH GAUTAM (supra),this  Court observed :-  

"Rerely in cases of police torture or custodial death, direct  ocular evidence of the complicity of the police personnel  would be available...... Bound as they are by the ties of  brotherhood, it is not unknown that the police personnel  prefer to remain silent and more often than not even pervert  the truth to save their colleagues.......... The exaggerated  adherence to and insistence upon the establishment of proof  beyond every reasonable doubt, by the prosecution, ignoring  the ground realities, the fact-situations and the peculiar  circumstances of a given case....., often results in miscarriage  of justice and makes the justice delivery system a suspect. In  the ultimate analysis the society suffers and a criminal gets  encouraged. Tortures in police custody, which of late are on  the increase, receive encouragement by this type of an  unrealistic approach of the Courts because it reinforces the  belief in the mind of the police that no harm would come to  them, if an odd prisoner dies in the lock-up, because there  would hardly be any evidence available to the prosecution to

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directly implicate them with the torture."

Improving the present situation  

23.     Unfortunately, police in the country have given room for  an impression in the minds of public, that whenever there is a  crime, investigation usually means rounding up all persons  concerned (say all servants in the event of a theft in the  employer’s house, or all acquaintances of the deceased, in the  event of a murder) and subjecting them to third-degree  interrogation in the hope that someone will spill the beans. This  impression may not be correct, but instances are not wanting  where police have resorted to such a practice. Lack of training in  scientific investigative methods, lack of modern equipment, lack  of adequate personnel, and lack of a mindset respecting human  rights, are generally the reasons for such illegal action. One  other main reason is that the public (and men in power) expect  results from police in too short a span of time, forgetting that  methodical and scientific investigation is a time consuming and  lengthy process. Police are branded as inefficient even when  there is a short delay in catching the culprits in serious crimes.  The expectation of quick results in high-profile or heinous  crimes builds enormous pressure on the police to somehow  ’catch’ the ’offender’. The need to have quick results tempts  them to resort to third degree methods. They also tend to arrest  "someone" in a hurry on the basis of incomplete investigation,  just to ease the pressure. Time has come for an attitudinal  change not only in the minds of the police, but also on the part  of the public. Difficulties in criminal investigation and the time  required for such investigation should be recognized, and police  should be allowed to function methodically without interferences  or unnecessary pressures. If police are to perform better, the  public should support them, government should strengthen and  equip them, and men in power should not interfere or belittle  them. The three wings of the Government should encourage,  insist and ensure thorough scientific investigation under proper  legal procedures, followed by prompt and efficient prosecution.  Be that as it may.

24.     Custodial violence requires to be tackled from two ends,  that is, by taking measures that are remedial and preventive.  Award of compensation is one of the remedial measures after  the event. Effort should be made to remove the very causes,  which lead to custodial violence, so as to prevent such  occurances. Following steps, if taken, may prove to be effective  preventive measures:

a)      Police training should be re-oriented, to bring in a  change in the mindset and attitude of the Police  personnel in regard to investigations, so that they  will recognize and respect human rights, and adopt  thorough and scientific investigation methods.  

b)      The functioning of lower level Police Officers should  be continuously monitored and supervised by their  superiors to prevent custodial violence and  adherence to lawful standard methods of  investigation.  

c)      Compliance with the eleven requirements  enumerated in D.K. Basu (supra) should be ensured  in all cases of arrest and detention.  

d)      Simple and fool-proof procedures should be  introduced for prompt registration of first

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information reports relating to all crimes.

e)      Computerization, video-recording, and modern  methods of records maintenance should be  introduced to avoid manipulations, insertions,  substitutions and ante-dating in regard to FIRs,  Mahazars, inquest proceedings, Port-mortem  Reports and Statements of witnesses etc. and to  bring in transparency in action.

f)      An independent investigating agency (preferably the  respective Human Rights Commissions or CBI) may  be entrusted with adequate power, to investigate  complaints of custodial violence against Police  personnel and take stern and speedy action followed  by prosecution, wherever necessary.  

The endeavour should be to achieve a balanced level of  functioning, where police respect human rights, adhere to law,  and take confidence building measures (CBMs), and at the same  time, firmly deal with organized crime, terrorism, white-collared  crime, deteriorating law and order situation etc.

CONCLUSION :

25.     In this case, there is no clear or incontrovertible evidence  about  custodial torture, nor any medical report of any injury or  disability. The grievance of the petitioner and his relatives is  against different officers in different Police Stations at different  points of time. More importantly, several of the allegations are  proved to be exaggerated and false. We, therefore, do not  consider this to be a fit case for award of compensation. All  reliefs which should be granted in such a case, have already  been granted by ordering an inquiry by the CBI and ensuring  that the Police Officers named are prosecuted. The law will have  to take own course.  

26.     This order will not come in the way of any civil court  awarding compensation in an action in tort or the criminal court  awarding compensation under section 357 CPC in the pending  prosecution against any of the officers, if the charges are  established.  With the said observations, we dispose of this  petition, as no further reliefs/directions are called for.

27.     We record our appreciation for the effort put in by Shri S.  Muralidhar, Amicus Curiae, in presenting the matter.