07 October 2005
Supreme Court
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STATE THROUGH INSPECTOR OF POLICE, A.P. Vs K. NARASIMHACHARY

Bench: S.B. SINHA,R.V. RAVEENDRAN
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000082-000082 / 2004
Diary number: 19357 / 2003
Advocates: Vs NEERU VAID


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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  82 of 2004

PETITIONER: State Through Inspector of Police, A.P.                  

RESPONDENT: K. Narasimhachary                                                

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/10/2005

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & R.V. Raveendran

JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT

S.B. SINHA, J :

       The State is in appeal before us from a judgment of the Andhra  Pradesh High Court dated 20.03.2003 in Criminal Appeal No.1058 of 1996,  recording a finding of acquittal as against the Respondent, upon reversing a  judgment passed by the Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, Nellore, dated  06.12.1996 convicting the Respondent herein for commission of  offences  punishable under Sections 7, 11, 13(3) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the  Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, ’the Act’) and sentencing him  to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of  Rs.1,000/-.   

       The Respondent herein was a Mandal Revenue Inspector in the office  of Mandal Revenue Office, Cuddapah in the year 1994.  The complainant  (PW-1) was the owner of some immovable property situated within the  jurisdiction of the said Mandal Office.  He intended to get himself registered  as a contractor with the Public Works Department wherefor a certificate as  regard valuation of his property was necessary.  An application to that effect  was filed before the Mandal Revenue Officer (PW-3) on 01.03.1994.  The  Mandal Revenue Officer adopted a peculiar procedure by putting his initial  thereon and handed over the same to PW-1 himself and asked him to give it  to the  accused.  When PW1 handed over application to the accused on the  same day,  he is said to have asked him to present the same before the  Village Administrative Officer (PW-4) and to bring cultivation accounts  relating to his lands and certain statements.  PW-4 thereafter recorded the  statements of PW-1 and his grandmother.  He  granted his own (VAO’s)  Statement, statement of PW-1, his grandmother and village elders as also  certified copies of Adangals, extracts (revenue records) marked as Exs.P-2  to P-6 to the said PW-1.  PW-1 allegedly handed over the same to the  Respondent on 02.03.1994.  The Respondent is said to have demanded a  sum of Rs.1,000/- for issuance of the property valuation certificate.  He on  the next day i.e. on 03.03.1994 met the Respondent at the office of PW-3  and  upon negotiation, the amount of alleged illegal gratification was  reduced to Rs.600/- from  Rs.1000/-.  A complaint was made to the ACB on  05.03.1994 at 6.35 A.M.  A trap was laid at 12.30 P.M.  on the same day  upon complying with the usual formalities. A sum of Rs.600/- in the  denomination of Rs.50/- is said to have been recovered from the Respondent  allegedly kept by him in his right pocket of the trouser.   

       The defence of the Respondent was that certificate valuing the  complainant’s land for a sum of Rs. one lac  was submitted on 04.03.1993  itself whereas PW-1 wanted that the valuation of the lands should be made  three lacs; and as the Respondent did not oblige, PW-1 bore grudge against  him as a result he was falsely implicated.           The learned Special Judge framed as many as five issues and  answered them against the Respondent by a judgment dated 6.12.1996,

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holding the Respondent  guilty of  the offence punishable under Section  13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act.

       On appeal, the High Court reversed the said findings, inter alia,  holding that the order of sanction dated 1.5.1995 was not proved by PW-6 in  accordance with law.   On merit of the matter also, the High Court opined  that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case against the  Respondent.

       Mr. P. Vinay Kumar, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the  Appellant, in assailing the impugned judgment, would contend that the High  Court committed an error in holding that the order of sanction was not  admissible in evidence having not been proved by PW-6 in accordance with  law.   

       The learned counsel also took us through the evidences of the  prosecution witnesses and submitted that PW-3 and PW-5 corroborated the  evidence of the complainant (PW-1).  It was contended that the fact that the  Respondent was merely a recommending authority and not the final  authority for the purpose of grant of a valuation certificate cannot be treated  to be a ground for disbelieving the entire prosecution case.   

       Mr. Srinivas R. Rao, the  learned counsel appearing on behalf of the  Respondent, on the other hand, would submit that the prosecution was bound  to prove the order of sanction in accordance with law.  The learned counsel  in this behalf relied upon a decision of this Court in R.J. Singh Ahuluwalia  vs. The State of Delhi [(1970) 3 SCC 451].

       The learned counsel would take us through the judgment of the High  Court and submit that the High Court has taken into consideration all the  facts and circumstances of this case in arriving at a finding that the State has  not been able to prove its case against the Respondent.   

The order of sanction dated  02.03.1995 has been produced in  original.  The order of sanction is a Government Order No.GOMs. No.76   dated 02.03.1995

       A bare perusal of the order of sanction shows that the allegation as  against the Respondent herein for taking into consideration that the  Government of Andhra Pradesh, who was the competent authority to remove  the said Sri K. Narasimha Chari, Mandal Revenue Inspector, Cuddapah,  from the Government Service, after fully and carefully examining the  material placed before them  in respect of the said allegations and having  regard to the circumstances of the case considered that the Respondent  should be prosecuted in the court of law; whereupon the order of sanction  was issued in the name of the Governor.  Shri N. Madanmohan Reddy,  Secretary to the Government, merely authenticated the said order of sanction  which was issued in the name of the Governor of Andhra Pradesh.  The  order of sanction was, thus, issued by the State in discharge of its statutory  functions in terms of Section 19 of the Act.  The order of sanction was  authenticated.   The said order of sanction was  an executive action of a State  having been issued in the name of the Governor.  It was authenticated in the  manner specified in the Rules of Executive Business.  The authenticity of the  said order has not been questioned.  It was, therefore, a public document  within the meaning of Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act.  PW-6 proved  the signature of Shri N. Madanmohan Reddy.  He identified his signature.   He was not cross-examined on the premise that he did not know the  signature of Shri N. Madanmohan Reddy.  In answer to the only question put  to him, he stated "By the time the Secretary signed in Ex.P.17  I was in  G.A.D."

       Nothing was, thus, elicited in the cross-examination of the said  witness to show  that he was not a competent witness to identify the  signature of Shri Madanmohan Reddy.

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       The Respondent, therefore, allowed the said document to be exhibited  without any demur.  He did not question the admissibility of the said  document before the Trial Court, either when the same was exhibited or at  the final hearing before the trial court.  He, therefore, could not be permitted  to question the admissibility of the said document for the first time before  the appellate court.  [See Ranvir Singh and Another Vs. Union of India,  2005 AIR SCW 4565 : 2005 (7) SCALE 238].   

       A public document can be proved in terms of Sections 76 to 78 of the  Evidence Act.  A public document can be proved otherwise also.  The High  Court, therefore, was not correct in invoking the provisions of Section 47 of  the Indian Evidence Act in the instant case as it was not called upon to form  an opinion as to by whom the said order of sanction was written and signed.   PW-6 was not examined as an expert or was required to give his opinion as  regard the correctness or otherwise of the signature of the said N.  Madanmohan Reddy.  The authenticity of the said document was never in  question.

       The High Court relied upon a decision of this Court in Gulzar Ali vs.  State of H.P. [(1998) 2 SCC 192], wherein this Court observed :

"It must be remembered that expert evidence regarding  handwriting is not the only mode by which genuineness  of a document can be established. The requirement in  Section 67 of the Evidence Act is only that the  handwriting must be proved to be that of the person  concerned. In order to prove the identity of the  handwriting any mode not forbidden by law can be  resorted to. Of course, two modes are indicated by law in  Sections 45 and 47 of the Evidence Act. The former  permits expert opinion to be regarded as relevant  evidence and the latter permits opinion of any person  acquainted with such handwriting to be regarded as  relevant evidence. Those and some other provisions are  subsumed under the title "Opinion of third persons, when  relevant". Opinions of third persons, other than those  enumerated in the fasciculus of provisions, would have  been irrelevant. Among the permitted opinions those  mentioned in Sections 45 and 47 are also included. So it  cannot be said that identity of handwriting of a document  can be established only by resorting to one of those two  sections. There can be other modes through which  identity of the handwriting can be established\005"  

       It is, therefore, evident that the High Court misread and misconstrued  the law laid down by this Court in the aforementioned decision.  It also  wrongly applied Section 47 of the Indian Evidence Act.                  In  R.J. Singh Ahuluwalia (supra), this Court was concerned with the  validity of the sanction; inasmuch as therein the Home Ministry, which was  the sanctioning authority did not make any sanction, as a result whereof it  was conceded by the State that in absence thereof  the prosecution must fail.

       In Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed vs. State of Andhra Pradesh [(1979) 4 SCC  172], the order of sanction was found to be invalid as the sanctioning  authority did not duly apply its mind.

       Therein this Court held that an order of valid sanction can be proved  by the Sanctioning Authority in two ways : either (1) by producing the  original sanction which itself contains the facts constituting the offence and  the grounds of satisfaction; or (2) by adducing evidence aliunde to show that  the facts were placed before the Sanctioning Authority and the satisfaction  arrived at by it.  In this case, the original order of sanction has been  produced.

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             So far as the merit of the matter is concerned, as would appear from  the discussions made hereinbefore that the prosecution case  is not entirely  free from doubt.  PW-1 intended to obtain a signature as regard valuation of  his lands so as to enable him to get himself registered with the Public Works  Department as a contractor.  He went to PW-3.  PW-3 did not send the same  to the Respondent by following the existing procedure.  He merely initialed  the same and handed over it back to PW-1 allegedly for the purpose of  giving it to the Respondent who in turn asked to take it to PW-4.   

       It is really curious that when PW-1 handed over the application to  PW-4 on 2.3.1994,  on the same day his statement as also the statement of  his grandmother were recorded and all the documents, namely, Ext. P-2  and  P-6 were handed over by him to PW-1 who in turn  handed them over to the  Respondent.  It was at this stage the purported demand was said to have been  made.  Strangely enough he met the Respondent in the evening of  03.03.1994, although a demand was said to have been made by the  Respondent on 02.03.1994 in the office, presumably after office hours and  then  the amount of gratification was reduced from Rs.1,000/- to Rs.600/-.    PW-1 did not make any complaint to PW-3 on the said date i.e. 03.03.1994  and even on 04.03.1994, although from the conduct of PW-1 and PW-3, it is  evident that they were very close to each other. PW-3 apparently intended to  help him out of way.  The valuation certificate was sent to PW-3 by the  Respondent on 04.03.1994 which was signed by PW-3 on the same day.  It  was also certified by PW-4.  It is wholly unlikely that although his demand  was not met, the Respondent would forward his certificate to PW-3.  The  natural conduct of the Respondent, if he had in fact demanded any amount  by way of gratification, would have been to wait for PW-1 to meet his  demand.   

       It is not in dispute that it was PW-4, who was to evaluate the property  and it was PW-3 who was to grant the certificate.  The Respondent was  merely a recommending authority.  In the aforementioned situation, the High  Court has arrived at  the following findings :

"\005The evidence on record in this case discloses that  Ex.P1 was submitted by PW1 directly to PW3 and it has  moved with almost jet speed.  The local verification,  recording of statements, furnishing of certified copies of  revenue record etc., had taken place within one day.  The  file reached PW3, in all probability on 03.03.1994 and he  signed on the next day.  PW3 was very much accessible  to PW-1.  If he sensed and delay or if there were any  hindrances, he could have brought the same to the notice  of PW.3 himself.  When PW3 received  Ex.P1 directly  from PW.1 without any objection, there should not have  been any impediment in handing over the Ex.P.8 to PW.1  directly.  The accused was neither the issuing authority  nor was the outward clerk.  He figured somewhere in  between.  The handing over of Ex.P8 by PW3 to the  accused appears to be deliberate and planned.   Suggestions to PW3 that he was suspended for certain  irregularities on earlier occasion, he bore grudge against  the  accused and wanted to implicate him gains credence  in this regard."

       Shri K. Kumar (PW-8) was the  Deputy Superintendent of Police,  ACB, at Tirupathi.  On 05.03.1994, he was at Cuddapah.  According to PW- 1, he approached PW-8 at 6.35 a.m., whereas according to PW-8, he came to  him at 8.00 a.m.  The mediators were summoned and the trap was laid after  making all arrangements therefor at about 12.30 p.m.   After the transaction  was completed, the Respondent was found having not only the tainted  amount of Rs.600/- but also a sum of Rs.235/- in different denominations  and wads.   Why the said amount of Rs.235/- which was recovered from the

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right pocket of the accused was not subjected to  phenolphthalein  test is a  matter of guess.  The amount  of Rs.235/- was kept in the same pocket of his  trouser, it must have come in contact with the tainted amount.   

       PW-1 appears to be an influential person.  He could approach PW-3  directly.  He  was in a position to obtain a certificate, copies of various  documents from PW-4 on the same day as also obtain a certificate from him  on the same day.   Thus, as the valuation certificate was sent to PW-3 by the  Respondent on 04.03.1994, there does not appear to be any good reason as  to why PW-1 would not come to know thereabout.  According to him, he  came to know that PW-8 was at Cuddapah and be approached him in the  early morning at 6.35 on 05.03.1994.   

       Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of  the opinion that two views are possible and the view of the High Court  cannot be said to be wholly improbable; it cannot be said, in view of the  discussions made hereinbefore, that the materials brought on records would  lead to only  one conclusion, i.e., the guilt of the accused.  The impugned  judgment, therefore,  is sustained.

       For the reasons aforementioned,  we do not intend to interfere with the  impugned judgment of the High Court.  The Appeal is dismissed  accordingly.