REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.6249-6250 0F 2001

STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. — APPELLANTS

VERSUS

THE COMMITTEE FOR PROTECTION OF DEMOCRATIC  RIGHTS, WEST BENGAL & ORS.

— RESPONDENTS

WITH  

W.P. (CRL.) 24 OF 2008, SLP (CRL.) NO.4096 OF 2007 AND

W.P. (C) NO.573 OF 2006

J U D G M E N T

D.K. JAIN, J.:

1.The issue which has been referred for the opinion of  

the  Constitution  Bench  is  whether  the  High  Court,  in  

exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the  

Constitution of India, can direct the Central Bureau of  

Investigation  (for  short  “the  CBI”),  established  under  

the  Delhi  Special  Police  Establishment  Act,  1946  (for  

short  “the  Special  Police  Act”),  to  investigate  a  

cognizable offence, which is alleged to have taken place  

within the territorial jurisdiction of a State, without  

the consent of the State Government.

2.For  the  determination  of  the  afore-stated  important  

legal issue, it is unnecessary to dilate on the facts  

obtaining  in  individual  cases  in  this  bunch  of  civil  

appeals/special  leave  petitions/writ  petitions  and  a  

brief reference to the facts in Civil Appeal Nos.6249-

6250  of  2001,  noticed  in  the  referral  order  dated  8th  

November, 2006, would suffice.  These are:

One  Abdul  Rahaman  Mondal  (hereinafter  referred  to  

as,  “the  complainant”)  along  with  a  large  number  of  

workers of a political party had been staying in several  

camps of that party at Garbeta, District Midnapore, in  

the  State  of  West  Bengal.   On  4th January,  2001,  the  

complainant and few others decided to return to their  

homes  from  one  such  camp.   When  they  reached  the  

complainant’s  house,  some  miscreants,  numbering  50-60,  

attacked them with firearms and other explosives, which  

resulted  in  a  number  of  casualties.  The  complainant  

managed  to  escape  from  the  place  of  occurrence,  hid  

himself and witnessed the carnage.  He lodged a written  

complaint with the Garbeta Police Station on 4th January,  

2001 itself but the First Information Report (“the FIR”  

for  short)  for  offences  under  Sections  

148/149/448/436/364/302/201  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code,  

1860 (for short “the IPC”) read with Sections 25/27 of  

the Arms Act, 1959 and Section 9 (B) of the Explosives  

Act, 1884 was registered only on 5th January, 2001.  On 8th

January, 2001, Director General of Police, West Bengal  

directed the C.I.D. to take over the investigations in  

the  case.   A  writ  petition  under  Article  226  of  the  

Constitution was filed in the High Court of Judicature at  

Calcutta by the Committee for Protection of Democratic  

Rights,  West  Bengal,  in  public  interest,  inter  alia,  

alleging that although in the said incident 11 persons  

had died on 4th January, 2001 and more than three months  

had elapsed since the incident had taken place yet except  

two persons, no other person named in the FIR, had been  

arrested; no serious attempt had been made to get the  

victims identified and so far the police had not been  

able to come to a definite conclusion whether missing  

persons were dead or alive.  It was alleged that since  

the  police  administration  in  the  State  was  under  the  

influence of the ruling party which was trying to hide  

the incident to save its image, the investigations in the  

incident may be handed over to the CBI, an independent  

agency.

3.Upon consideration of the affidavit filed in opposition  

by the State Government, the High Court felt that in the  

background of the case it had strong reservations about  

the impartiality and fairness in the investigation by the  

State police because of the political fallout, therefore,  

no useful purpose would be served in continuing with the  

investigation  by  the  State  Investigating  Agency.

Moreover, even if the investigation was conducted fairly  

and truthfully by the State police, it would still be  

viewed with suspicion because of the allegation that all  

the assailants were members of the ruling party.  Having  

regard to all these circumstances, the High Court deemed  

it appropriate to hand over the investigation into the  

said incident to the CBI.   

4.Aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court, the  

State of West Bengal filed a petition for special leave  

to appeal before this Court.  On 3rd September, 2001 leave  

was granted. When the matter came up for hearing before a  

two-Judge Bench on 8th November, 2006, taking note of the  

contentions urged by learned counsel for the parties and  

the  orders  passed  by  this  Court  in  The  Management  of  

Advance Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shri Gurudasmal & Ors.1 and  

Kazi Lhendup Dorji Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation &  

Ors.2, the Bench was of the opinion that the question of  

law  involved  in  the  appeals  was  of  great  public  

importance and was coming before the courts frequently  

and,  therefore,  it  was  necessary  that  the  issue  be  

settled  by  a  larger  Bench.   Accordingly,  the  Bench  

directed that the papers of the case be placed before the  

Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for passing appropriate  

orders  for  placing  the  matter  before  a  larger  Bench.  

When  the  matter  came  up  before  a  three-Judge  Bench,  

1 1970 (1) SCC 633 2 1994 Supp (2) SCC 116

headed  by  the  Hon’ble  Chief  Justice  of  India,  on  29th  

August,  2008,  this  batch  of  cases  was  directed  to  be  

listed before a Constitution Bench.  This is how these  

matters have been placed before us.

The Rival Contentions:

5.Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing  

on behalf of the State of West Bengal, referring to Entry  

80 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution  

of India; Entry 2 of List II of the said Schedule as also  

Sections 5 and 6 of the Special Police Act strenuously  

argued that from the said Constitutional and Statutory  

provisions  it  is  evident  that  there  is  a  complete  

restriction on Parliament’s legislative power in enacting  

any law permitting the police of one State to investigate  

an  offence  committed  in  another  State,  without  the  

consent  of  that  State.  It  was  urged  that  the  Special  

Police Act enacted in exercise of the powers conferred  

under the Government of India Act, 1935, Entry 39 of List  

I (Federal Legislative List) of the Seventh Schedule, the  

field now occupied by Entry 80 of List I of the Seventh  

Schedule of the Constitution, replicates the prohibition  

of  police  of  one  State  investigating  an  offence  in  

another State without the consent of that State.  It was  

submitted that Entry 2 of List II which confers exclusive  

jurisdiction on the State Legislature in regard to the  

police, the exclusive jurisdiction of a State Legislature

cannot  be  encroached  upon  without  the  consent  of  the  

concerned State being obtained.  

6.Learned senior counsel submitted that the separation of  

powers between the three organs of the State, i.e. the  

Legislature,  the  Executive  and  the  Judiciary  would  

require each one of these organs to confine itself within  

the field entrusted to it by the Constitution and not to  

act in contravention or contrary to the letter and spirit  

of the Constitution.   

7.Thus, the thrust of argument of the learned counsel was  

that  both,  the  federal  structure  as  well  as  the  

principles of separation of powers, being a part of the  

basic  structure  of  the  Constitution,  it  is  neither  

permissible for the Central Government to encroach upon  

the  legislative  powers  of  a  State  in  respect  of  the  

matters specified in List II of the Seventh Schedule nor  

can  the  superior  courts  of  the  land  adjure  such  a  

jurisdiction  which  is  otherwise  prohibited  under  the  

Constitution.  It was urged that if the Parliament were  

to pass a law which authorises the police of one State to  

investigate in another State without the consent of that  

State,  such  a  law  would  be  pro  tanto  invalid  and,  

therefore,  the  rule  of  law  would  require  the  courts,  

which are subservient to the Constitution, to ensure that  

the federal structure embodied in the Constitution as a

basic principle, is not disturbed by permitting/directing  

the police force of a State to investigate an offence  

committed in another State without the consent of that  

State.  

8.Relying heavily on the observations of the Constitution  

Bench in Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of India  

& Anr.3 to the effect that Article  142, even with the  

width of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a new  

edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring express  

statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby  

to achieve something indirectly which cannot be achieved  

directly,  learned  counsel  contended  that  when  even  

Article 142 of the Constitution cannot be used by this  

Court to act contrary to the express provisions of law,  

the High Court cannot issue any direction ignoring the  

Statutory and Constitutional provisions.  Learned counsel  

went to the extent of arguing that even when the State  

police  is  not  in  a  position  to  conduct  an  impartial  

investigation because of extraneous influences, the Court  

still cannot exercise executive power of directing the  

police force of another State to carry out investigations  

without the consent of that State.  In such a situation,  

the matter is best left to the wisdom of the Parliament  

to enact an appropriate legislation to take care of the  

situation.  According to the learned counsel, till that  

3 (1998) 4 SCC 409

is done, even such an extreme situation would not justify  

the Court upsetting the federal or quasi-federal system  

created by the Constitution.   

9.As regards the exercise of jurisdiction by a High Court  

under Article 226 of the Constitution, learned counsel  

submitted  that  apart  from  the  fact  that  there  is  a  

significant difference between the power of this Court  

under  Article  142  of  the  Constitution  and  the  

jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the  

Constitution  because  of  territorial  limitations  under  

Article  226  (1)  of  the  Constitution,  a  High  Court  is  

disentitled from issuing any direction to the authorities  

situated  outside  the  territories  over  which  it  has  

jurisdiction.  According to the learned counsel Clause  

(2) of Article 226 would have no application in a case,  

such as the present one, since the cause of action was  

complete at the time of filing the writ petition and the  

power under Clause (2) can be exercised only where there  

is  a  nexus  between  the  cause  of  action  which  arises  

wholly or partly within the State and the authority which  

is situated outside the State.  It was asserted that the  

CBI being a rank outsider, unconnected to the incident,  

which took place within the State of West Bengal, the  

investigation  of  which  was  being  conducted  by  the  

jurisdictional  local  police  in  West  Bengal,  had  no  

authority to take up the case for investigation.

10.Shri Goolam E. Vahanvati, learned Solicitor General of  

India,  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  Union  of  India,  

submitted that the entire approach of the State being  

based on an assumption that the alleged restriction on  

Parliament’s legislative power under Entry 80 of List I  

of  the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the  Constitution  and  

restriction on the power of the Central Government under  

Section  6  of  the  Special  Police  Act  to  issue  a  

notification  binds  the  constitutional  courts  i.e.  the  

Supreme Court and the High Courts is fallacious, inasmuch  

as  the  restrictions  on  the  Central  Government  and  

Parliament  cannot  be  inferentially  extended  to  be  

restrictions on the Constitutional Courts in exercise of  

their  powers  under  Articles  32  and  226  of  the  

Constitution  as  it  is  the  obligation  of  the  Superior  

Courts  to  protect  the  citizens  and  enforce  their  

fundamental  rights.   Learned  counsel  vehemently  argued  

that the stand of the appellants that the exercise of  

power by the Supreme Court or the High Courts to refer  

investigation to CBI directly without prior approval of  

the concerned State Government would violate the federal  

structure of the Constitution is again misconceived as it  

overlooks the basic fact that in a federal structure it  

is the duty of the courts to uphold the Constitutional  

values and to enforce the Constitutional limitations as  

an ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.  In support

of the proposition, learned counsel placed reliance on  

the decisions of this Court in State of Rajasthan & Ors.  

Vs. Union of India & Ors.4, S.R. Bommai & Ors. Vs. Union  

of India & Ors.5 and  Kuldip Nayar & Ors. Vs. Union of  

India & Ors.6.  

11.Relying on  the recent  decision by  a Bench  of nine  

Judges of this Court in I.R. Coelho (D) By LRs. Vs. State  

of  Tamil  Nadu7,  learned  counsel  submitted  that  the  

judicial review being itself the basic feature of the  

Constitution,  no  restriction  can  be  placed  even  by  

inference and by principle of legislative competence on  

the powers of the Supreme Court and the High Courts with  

regard  to  the  enforcement  of  fundamental  rights  and  

protection of the citizens of India.  Learned counsel  

asserted that in exercise of powers either under Article  

32  or  226  of  the  Constitution,  the  courts  are  merely  

discharging their duty of judicial review and are neither  

usurping any jurisdiction, nor overriding the doctrine of  

separation of powers.  In support of the proposition that  

the  jurisdiction  conferred  on  the  Supreme  Court  by  

Article 32 as also on the High Courts under Article 226  

of the Constitution is an important and integral part of  

the basic structure of the Constitution, learned counsel  

placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Special  

4 (1977) 3 SCC 592 5 (1994) 3 SCC 1 6 (2006) 7 SCC 1 7 (2007) 2 SCC 1

Reference No.1 of 19648,  Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. Vs.  

Union  of  India  &  Ors.9,  Fertilizer  Corporation  Kamgar  

Union (Regd.), Sindri & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.10,  

Nilabati  Behera  Vs.  State  of  Orissa  &  Ors.11 and  L.  

Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors.12.  Relying on the  

decision  of  this  Court  in  Dwarkanath,  Hindu  Undivided  

Family Vs. Income-Tax Officer, Special Circle, Kanpur &  

Anr.13, learned counsel emphasised that the powers of the  

High Court under Article 226 are also wide and plenary in  

nature similar to that of the Supreme Court under Article  

32 of the Constitution.

The Questions for Consideration:

12.It is manifest that in essence the objection of the  

appellant to the CBI’s role in police investigation in a  

State without its consent, proceeds on the doctrine of  

distribution of legislative powers as between the Union  

and the State Legislatures particularly with reference to  

the  three  Lists  in  the  Seventh  Schedule  of  the  

Constitution and the distribution of powers between the  

said three organs of the State.  

13.In  order  to  appreciate  the  controversy,  a  brief  

reference to some of the provisions in the Constitution  

8 [1965] 1 S.C.R. 413 9 (1980) 3 SCC 625 10 (1981) 1 SCC 568 11 (1993) 2 SCC 746 12 (1997) 3 SCC 261 13 [1965] 3 S.C.R. 536

would be necessary.  The Constitution of India is divided  

into  several  parts,  each  part  dealing  in  detail  with  

different aspects of the social, economic, political and  

administrative  set  up.   For  the  present  case,  we  are  

mainly concerned with Part III of the Constitution, which  

enumerates the fundamental rights guaranteed by the State  

primarily to citizens and in some cases to every resident  

of  India  and  Part  XI  thereof,  which  pertains  to  the  

relations between the Union and the States.  

14.Bearing in mind the basis on which the correctness of  

the impugned direction is being questioned by the State  

of  West  Bengal,  we  shall  first  notice  the  scope  and  

purport  of  Part  XI  of  the  Constitution.  According  to  

Article  1  of  the  Constitution,  India  is  a  ‘Union’  of  

States, which means a Federation of States. Every federal  

system requires division of powers between the Union and  

State Governments, which in our Constitution is effected  

by Part XI thereof.  While Articles 245 to 255 deal with  

distribution of legislative powers, the distribution of  

administrative powers is dealt with in Articles 256 to  

261.   Under  the  Constitution,  there  is  a  three-fold  

distribution of legislative powers between the Union and  

the  States,  made  by  the  three  Lists  in  the  Seventh  

Schedule of the Constitution.  While Article 245 confers  

the legislative powers upon the Union and the States,  

Article  246  provides  for  distribution  of  legislative

powers between the Union and the States.  Article 246,  

relevant for our purpose, reads as follows:

“246. Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament  and  by  the  Legislatures  of  States  —  (1)  Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3),  Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with  respect to any of the matters enumerated in List  I in the Seventh Schedule  (in this Constitution  referred to as the “Union List”).

(2)  Notwithstanding  anything  in  clause  (3),  Parliament  and,  subject  to  clause  (1),  the  Legislature  of  any  State  also,  have  power  to  make laws with respect to any of the matters  enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule  (in  this  Constitution  referred  to  as  the  “Concurrent List”).

(3)  Subject  to  clauses  (1)  and  (2),  the  Legislature of any State has exclusive power to  make laws for such State or any part thereof  with respect to any of the matters enumerated in  List  II  in  the  Seventh  Schedule  (in  this  Constitution referred to as the ‘State List’).

(4)  Parliament  has  power  to  make  laws  with  respect  to  any  matter  for  any  part  of  the  territory  of  India  not  included  in  a  State  notwithstanding  that  such  matter  is  a  matter  enumerated in the State List.”

15.The Article deals with the distribution of legislative  

powers  between  the  Union  and  the  State  Legislatures.  

List I or the ‘Union List’ enumerates the subjects over  

which  the  Union  shall  have  exclusive  powers  of  

legislation in respect of 99 items or subjects, which  

include  Defence  etc.;  List  II  or  the  ‘State  List’  

comprises of subjects, which include Public Order, Police  

etc.,  over  which  the  State  Legislature  shall  have  

exclusive  power  of  legislation  and  List  III  gives

concurrent powers to the Union and the State Legislatures  

to legislate in respect of items mentioned therein.  The  

Article postulates that Parliament shall have exclusive  

power to legislate with respect to any of the matters  

enumerated in List I notwithstanding anything contained  

in  clauses  (2)  and  (3).   The  non  obstante clause  in  

Article 246(1) contemplates the predominance or supremacy  

of the Union Legislature.  This power is not encumbered  

by anything contained in clause (2) and (3) for these  

clauses themselves are expressly limited and made subject  

to the non obstante clause in Article 246(1).  The State  

Legislature has exclusive power to make laws for such  

State or any part thereof with respect to any of the  

matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule and  

it also has the power to make laws with respect to any  

matters enumerated in List III (Concurrent List).  The  

exclusive  power  of  the  State  Legislature  to  legislate  

with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II  

has  to  be  exercised  subject  to  clause  (1)  i.e.  the  

exclusive power of Parliament to legislate with respect  

to matters enumerated in List I.  As a consequence, if  

there is a conflict between an Entry in List I and an  

Entry in List II, which is not capable of reconciliation,  

the power of Parliament to legislate with respect to a  

matter enumerated in List II must supersede pro tanto the  

exercise  of  power  of  the  State  Legislature.   Both

Parliament  and  the  State  Legislature  have  concurrent  

powers of legislation with respect to any of the matters  

enumerated  in  List  III.   The  words  “notwithstanding  

anything contained in clauses (2) and (3)” in Article 246  

(1) and the words “subject to clauses (1) and (2)” in  

Article  246  (3)  lay  down  the  principle  of  federal  

supremacy  viz.  that  in  case  of  inevitable  conflict  

between  Union  and  State  powers,  the  Union  power  as  

enumerated in List I shall prevail over the State power  

as  enumerated in  Lists II  and III  and in  case of  an  

overlapping between Lists II and III, the latter shall  

prevail.  Though, undoubtedly, the Constitution exhibits  

supremacy of Parliament over State Legislatures, yet the  

principle of federal supremacy laid down in Article 246  

of the Constitution cannot be resorted to unless there is  

an irreconcilable direct conflict between the entries in  

the Union and the State Lists.  Thus, there is no quarrel  

with the broad proposition that under the Constitution  

there  is  a  clear  demarcation  of  legislative  powers  

between the Union and the States and they have to confine  

themselves within the field entrusted to them.  It may  

also be borne in mind that the function of the Lists is  

not  to  confer  powers;  they  merely  demarcate  the  

Legislative field.  But the issue we are called upon to  

determine  is  that  when  the  scheme  of  Constitution  

prohibits encroachment by the Union upon a matter which

exclusively  falls  within  the  domain  of  the  State  

Legislature,  like  public  order,  police  etc.,  can  the  

third organ of the State viz. the Judiciary, direct the  

CBI, an agency established by the Union to do something  

in respect of a State subject, without the consent of the  

concerned State Government?

16.In  order  to  adjudicate  upon  the  issue  at  hand,  it  

would  be  necessary  to  refer  to  some  other  relevant  

Constitutional and Statutory provisions as well.

17.As noted earlier, the Special Police Act was enacted  

by the Governor General in Council in exercise of the  

powers conferred by the Government of India Act, 1935  

(Entry 39 of List I, Seventh Schedule).  The said Entry  

reads as under:-

“Extension  of  the  powers  and  jurisdiction  of  members of a police force belonging to any part  of  British  India  to  any  area  in  another  Governor’s  Province  or  Chief  Commissioner’s  Province, but not so as to enable the police of  one  part  to  exercise  powers  and  jurisdiction  elsewhere without the consent of the Government  of the Province or the Chief Commissioner as the  case  may  be;  extension  of  the  powers  and  jurisdiction  of  members  of  a  police  force  belonging to any unit to railway areas outside  that unit.”

It is manifest that the Special Police Act was passed in  

terms  of  the  said  Entry  imposing  prohibition  on  the  

Federal  Legislature  to  enact  any  law  permitting  the  

police  of  one  State  from  investigating  an  offence  

committed in another State, without the consent of the

State.  The said Entry was replaced by Entry 80 of List I  

of  the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the  Constitution  of  India.  

The said entry reads thus:

“Extension  of  the  powers  and  jurisdiction  of  members of a police force belonging to any State  to any area outside that State, but not so as to  enable  the  police  of  one  State  to  exercise  powers and jurisdiction in any area outside that  State without the consent of the Govt. of the  State in which such area is situated; extension  of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a  police force belonging to any State to railway  areas outside that State.”

Entry 2 of List II of the Constitution of India, which  

corresponds to Entry 2 List II of the Government of India  

Act, conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the States in  

matter relating to police reads as under:

Entry 2 List II: “Police (including railway and village police)  subject to the provisions of entry 2A of List  I.”

Entry 2A of List I: “Development of any armed force of the Union or  any other force subject to the control of the  Union or any contingent or unit thereof in any  State  in  aid  of  the  civil  power;  powers,  jurisdiction, privileges and liabilities of the  members  of  such  forces  while  on  such  deployment.”

18.From a bare reading of the afore-noted Constitutional  

provisions,  it  is  manifest  that  by  virtue  of  these  

entries, the legislative power of the Union to provide  

for the regular police force of one State to exercise  

power and jurisdiction in any area outside the State can  

only be exercised with the consent of the Government of

that particular State in which such area is situated,  

except  the  police  force  belonging  to  any  State  to  

exercise power and jurisdiction to railway areas outside  

that State.

19.As the preamble of the Special Police Act states, it  

was enacted with a view to constitute a special force in  

Delhi for the investigation of certain offences in the  

Union  Territories  and  to  make  provisions  for  the  

superintendence and administration of the said force and  

for  the  extension  to  other  areas  of  the  powers  and  

jurisdiction of the members of the said force in regard  

to the investigation of the said offences. Sub-section  

(1)  of  Section  1  specifies  the  title  of  the  Special  

Police Act and sub-section (2) speaks that the Special  

Police Act extends to the whole of India.  Section 2  

contains 3 sub-sections.  Sub-section (1) empowers the  

Central Government to constitute a special police force  

to be called the Delhi Special Police Establishment for  

the investigation of offences notified under Section 3 in  

any  Union  Territory;  sub-section  (2)  confers  upon  the  

members of the said police establishment in relation to  

the investigation of such offences and arrest of persons  

concerned  in  such  offences,  all  the  powers,  duties,  

privileges and liabilities which police officers of that  

Union Territory have in connection with the investigation  

of  offences  committed  therein  and  sub-section  (3)

provides that any member of the said police establishment  

of or above the rank of Sub-Inspector be deemed to be an  

officer in charge of a police station. Under Section 3 of  

the  Special  Police  Act,  the  Central  Government  is  

required to specify and notify the offences or classes of  

offences  which  are  to  be  investigated  by  the  Delhi  

Special  Police  Establishment,  constituted  under  the  

Special Police Act, named “the CBI”.  Section 4 deals  

with the administrative control of the establishment and  

according  to  sub-section  (2),  the  “superintendence”  of  

the Establishment vests in the Central Government and the  

administration  of  the  said  establishment  vests  in  an  

officer  appointed  in  this  behalf  by  the  Central  

Government.   Explaining  the  meaning  of  the  word  

“Superintendence” in Section 4(1) and the scope of the  

authority of the Central Government in this context, in  

Vineet Narain & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr.14, a Bench  

of three Judges of this Court said:  

“40.…The word “superintendence” in Section 4(1)  cannot be construed in a wider sense to permit  supervision of the actual investigation of an  offence  by  the  CBI  contrary  to  the  manner  provided by the statutory provisions. The broad  proposition  urged  on  behalf  of  the  Union  of  India that it can issue any directive to the CBI  to  curtail  or  inhibit  its  jurisdiction  to  investigate  an  offence  specified  in  the  notification  issued  under  Section  3  by  a  directive under Section 4(1) of the Act cannot  be  accepted.  The  jurisdiction  of  the  CBI  to  investigate an offence is to be determined with  reference  to  the  notification  issued  under  

14 (1998) 1 SCC 226

Section  3  and  not  by  any  separate  order  not  having that character.”

20.Section  5  of  the  Special  Police  Act  empowers  the  

Central Government to extend the powers and jurisdiction  

of the Special Police Establishment to any area, in a  

State, not being a Union Territory for the investigation  

of any offences or classes of offences specified in a  

notification under Section 3 and on such extension of  

jurisdiction,  a  member  of  the  Establishment  shall  

discharge the functions of a police officer in that area  

and shall, while so discharging such functions, be deemed  

to be a member of the police force of that area and be  

vested with the powers, functions and privileges and be  

subject to the liabilities of a police officer belonging  

to that police force.

21.Section 6, the pivotal provision, reads as follows:-

“6. Consent of State Government to exercise of  powers and jurisdiction. - Nothing contained in  Section 5 shall be deemed to enable any member of  the  Delhi  Special  Police  Establishment  to  exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area in a  State, not being a Union Territory or railway  area, without the consent of the Government of  that State.”

22.Thus,  although  Section  5(1)  empowers  the  Central  

Government  to  extend  the  powers  and  jurisdiction  of  

members of the Delhi Special Police Establishment to any  

area in a State, but Section 6 imposes a restriction on  

the  power  of  the  Central  Government  to  extend  the

jurisdiction  of  the  said  Establishment  only  with  the  

consent of the State Government concerned.

23.Having noticed the scope and amplitude of Sections 5  

and  6  of  the  Special  Police  Act,  the  question  for  

consideration is whether the restriction imposed on the  

powers  of  the  Central  Government  would  apply  mutatis  

mutandis to the Constitutional Courts as well.  As stated  

above,  the  main  thrust  of  the  argument  of  Shri  K.K.  

Venugopal,  learned  senior  counsel,  is  that  the  course  

adopted  by  the  High  Court  in  directing  the  CBI  to  

undertake  investigation  in  the  State  of  West  Bengal  

without the consent of the State is incompatible with the  

federal structure as also the doctrine of separation of  

powers between the three organs of the State, embodied in  

the  Constitution  even  when  the  High  Court,  on  the  

material before it, was convinced that the State Police  

was dragging its feet in so far as investigation into the  

4th January, 2001 carnage was concerned.  

24.In  so  far  as  the  first  limb  of  the  argument  is  

concerned, it needs little emphasis that, except in the  

circumstances  indicated  above,  in  a  federal  structure,  

the  Union  is  not  permitted  to  encroach  upon  the  

legislative powers of a State in respect of the matters  

specified in List II of the Seventh Schedule.  However,  

the second limb of the argument of the learned counsel in

regard to the applicability of the doctrine of separation  

of powers to the issue at hand, in our view, is clearly  

untenable.   Apart  from  the  fact  that  the  question  of  

Centre  –  State  relationship  is  not  an  issue  in  the  

present  case,  a  Constitutional  Court  being  itself  the  

custodian of the federal structure, the invocation of the  

federal structure doctrine is also misplaced.   

25.In  a  democratic  country  governed  by  a  written  

Constitution, it is the Constitution which is supreme and  

sovereign.   As  observed  in  Raja  Ram  Pal Vs. Hon’ble  

Speaker,  Lok  Sabha  &  Ors.15,  the  Constitution  is  the  

suprema lex in this country.  All organs of the State,  

including this Court and the High Courts, derive their  

authority, jurisdiction and powers from the Constitution  

and owe allegiance to it.  Highlighting the fundamental  

features of a federal Constitution, in Special Reference  

No.1 (supra), the Constitution Bench (7-Judges) observed  

as follows:

“…the essential characteristic of federalism is  ‘the  distribution  of  limited  executive,  legislative and judicial authority among bodies  which  are  coordinate  with  and  independent  of  each other’. The supremacy of the Constitution  is  fundamental  to  the  existence  of  a  federal  State in order to prevent either the legislature  of  the  federal  unit  or  those  of  the  member  States  from  destroying  or  impairing  that  delicate balance of power which satisfies the  particular  requirements  of  States  which  are  desirous  of  union,  but  not  prepared  to  merge  their individuality in a unity. This supremacy  of  the  Constitution  is  protected  by  the  

15 (2007) 3 SCC 184

authority of an independent judicial body to act  as the interpreter of a scheme of distribution  of powers.”

26.It is trite that in the Constitutional Scheme adopted  

in  India,  besides  supremacy  of  the  Constitution,  the  

separation  of  powers  between  the  legislature,  the  

executive  and  the  judiciary  constitutes  the  basic  

features of the Constitution.  In fact, the importance of  

separation  of  powers  in  our  system  of  governance  was  

recognised in Special Reference No.1 (supra), even before  

the basic structure doctrine came to be propounded in the  

celebrated  case  of  His  Holiness  Kesavananda  Bharati  

Sripadagalvaru Vs. State of Kerala & Anr.16, wherein while  

finding certain basic features of the Constitution,  it  

was opined that separation of powers is part of the basic  

structure of the Constitution. Later, similar view was  

echoed in Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi Vs. Shri Raj Narain &  

Anr.17 and  in  a  series  of  other  cases  on  the  point.  

Nevertheless, apart from the fact that our Constitution  

does not envisage a rigid and strict separation of powers  

between the said three organs of the State, the power of  

judicial review stands entirely on a different pedestal.  

Being  itself  part  of  the  basic  structure  of  the  

Constitution, it cannot be ousted or abridged by even a  

Constitutional  amendment.  [See:  L.  Chandra  Kumar Vs.  

Union of India & Ors. (supra)].  Besides, judicial review  

16 (1973) 4 SCC 225 17 1975 (Supp) SCC 1

is  otherwise  essential  for  resolving  the  disputes  

regarding the limits of Constitutional power and entering  

the Constitutional limitations as an ultimate interpreter  

of the Constitution.  In Special Reference No.1 of 1964  

(supra), it was observed that whether or not there is  

distinct and rigid separation of powers under the Indian  

Constitution, there is no doubt that the Constitution has  

entrusted to the judicature in this country the task of  

construing  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  and  of  

safeguarding the fundamental rights of the citizens. In  

Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi  (supra),  Y.V. Chandrachud, J.  

(as His Lordship then was), drawing distinction between  

the American and Australian Constitution on the one hand  

and the Indian Constitution on the other, observed that  

the  principle  of  separation  of  powers  is  not  a  magic  

formula for keeping the three organs of the State within  

the  strict  confines  of  their  functions.   The  learned  

judge  also  observed  that  in  a  federal  system,  which  

distributes powers between three coordinate branches of  

government,  though  not  rigidly,  disputes  regarding  the  

limits of Constitutional power have to be resolved by  

courts.  Quoting  George  Whitecross  Paton,  an  Australian  

Legal Scholar, that “the distinction between judicial and  

other  powers  may  be  vital  to  the  maintenance  of  the  

Constitution  itself”,  the  learned  judge  said  that  the  

principle  of  separation  of  powers  is  a  principle  of

restraint which “has in it the percept, innate in the  

prudence of self-preservation (even if history has not  

repeatedly  brought  in  home),  that  discretion  is  the  

better part of valour”18.   

27.Recently in State of U.P. & Ors. Vs.  Jeet S. Bisht &  

Anr.19, S.B. Sinha, J. dealt with the topic of separation  

of powers in the following terms:

“77. Separation of powers is a favourite topic  for  some  of  us.  Each  organ  of  the  State  in  terms of the constitutional scheme performs one  or the other functions which have been assigned  to  the  other  organ.  Although  drafting  of  legislation and its implementation by and large  are  functions  of  the  legislature  and  the  executive respectively, it is too late in the  day to say that the constitutional court’s role  in that behalf is non-existent. The judge-made  law  is  now  well  recognised  throughout  the  world.  If  one  is  to  put  the  doctrine  of  separation  of  power  to  such  a  rigidity,  it  would not have been possible for any superior  court  of  any  country,  whether  developed  or  developing,  to  create  new  rights  through  interpretative process.

78.  Separation  of  powers  in  one  sense  is  a  limit on active jurisdiction of each organ. But  it  has  another  deeper  and  more  relevant  purpose: to act as  check and balance over the  activities of other organs. Thereby the  active  jurisdiction of  the  organ  is  not  challenged;  nevertheless there are  methods of prodding to  communicate the institution of its excesses and  shortfall in duty. Constitutional mandate sets  the dynamics of this communication between the  organs of polity. Therefore, it is suggested to  not  understand  separation  of  powers  as  operating  in  vacuum.  Separation  of  powers  doctrine has been reinvented in modern times.

xxx xxx xxx

18 Julius Stone: Social Dimensions of Law and Justice, (1966) p. 668. 19  (2007) 6 SCC 586

80. The modern view, which is today gathering  momentum  in  constitutional  courts  the  world  over, is  not only  to demarcate  the  realm  of  functioning in a negative sense, but also to  define  the  minimum content  of  the  demarcated  realm of functioning. Objective definition of  function and role entails executing the same,  which  however  may  be  subject  to  the  plea  of  financial  constraint but  only  in  exceptional  cases. In event of any such shortcoming, it is  the essential duty of the other organ to advise  and  recommend  the  needful to  substitute  inaction. To this extent we must be prepared to  frame answers to these difficult questions.

xxx xxx xxx

83. If we notice the evolution of separation of  powers doctrine, traditionally the  checks and  balances dimension  was  only  associated  with  governmental  excesses  and  violations.  But  in  today’s  world  of  positive  rights  and  justifiable  social  and  economic entitlements,  hybrid  administrative  bodies,  private  functionaries discharging public functions, we  have  to  perform  the  oversight  function  with  more urgency and enlarge the field of  checks  and balances to include governmental inaction.  Otherwise  we  envisage  the  country  getting  transformed  into  a  state  of  repose.  Social  engineering  as  well  as  institutional  engineering  therefore  forms  part  of  this  obligation.”

28.Having discussed the scope and width of the doctrine  

of  separation  of  powers,  the  moot  question  for  

consideration  in  the  present  case  is  that  when  the  

fundamental  rights,  as  enshrined  in  Part  III  of  the  

Constitution,  which  include  the  right  to  equality  

(Article 14); the freedom of speech [Article 19(1)(a)]  

and the right not to be deprived of life and liberty  

except by procedure established by law (Article 21), as  

alleged  in  the  instant  case,  are  violated,  can  their

violation  be  immunised  from  judicial  scrutiny  on  the  

touchstone of doctrine of separation of powers between  

the Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary.  To put it  

differently,  can  the  doctrine  of  separation  of  powers  

curtail the power of judicial review, conferred on the  

Constitutional  Courts  even  in  situations  where  the  

fundamental rights are sought to be abrogated or abridged  

on the ground that exercise of such power would impinge  

upon the said doctrine?

29.The Constitution is a living and organic document. It  

cannot remain static and must grow with the nation. The  

Constitutional  provisions  have  to  be  construed  broadly  

and liberally having regard to the changed circumstances  

and the needs of time and polity.  In Kehar Singh & Anr.  

Vs. Union of India & Anr.20, speaking for the Constitution  

Bench, R.S. Pathak, C.J. held that in keeping with modern  

Constitutional practice, the Constitution of India is a  

constitutive document, fundamental to the governance of  

the country, whereby the people of India have provided a  

Constitutional  polity  consisting  of  certain  primary  

organs, institutions and functionaries with the intention  

of  working  out,  maintaining  and  operating  a  

Constitutional order. On the aspect of interpretation of  

a  Constitution,  the  following  observations  of  Justice  

20 (1989) 1 SCC 204

Dickson of the Supreme Court of Canada in  Lawson A.W.  

Hunter & Ors. Vs. Southam Inc.21 are quite apposite:

“The  task  of  expounding  a  constitution  is  crucially  different  from  that  of  construing  a  statute.  A statute defines present rights and  obligations.  It is easily enacted and as easily  repealed.   A  constitution,  by  contrast,  is  drafted with an eye to the future.  Its function  is  to  provide  a  continuing  framework  for  the  legitimate exercise of governmental power and,  when joined by a Bill or a Charter of rights,  for  the  unremitting  protection  of  individual  rights  and  liberties.   Once  enacted,  its  provisions cannot easily be repealed or amended.  It  must,  therefore,  be  capable  of  growth  and  development  over  time  to  meet  new  social,  political  and  historical  realities  often  unimagined by its framers.  The judiciary is the  guardian  of  the  constitution  and  must,  in  interpreting  its  provisions,  bear  these  considerations in mind.”

30.In  M.  Nagaraj  &  Ors.  Vs.  Union  of  India  &  Ors.22,  

speaking  for  the  Constitution  Bench,  S.H.  Kapadia,  J.  

observed as under:

“The  Constitution  is  not  an  ephemeral  legal  document embodying a set of legal rules for the  passing  hour.  It  sets  out  principles  for  an  expanding future and is intended to endure for  ages to come and consequently to be adapted to  the various crisis of human affairs. Therefore, a  purposive rather than a strict literal approach  to  the  interpretation  should  be  adopted.  A  Constitutional provision must be construed not in  a narrow and constricted sense but in a wide and  liberal  manner  so  as  to  anticipate  and  take  account of changing conditions and purposes so  that  a  constitutional  provision  does  not  get  fossilised but remains flexible enough to meet  the newly emerging problems and challenges.”  

      [Emphasis supplied]

21  (1984) 2 S.C.R.145 (Can SC) 22 (2006) 8 SCC 212

31.Recently,  in  I.R.  Coelho (supra),  noticing  the  

principles  relevant  for  the  interpretation  of  

Constitutional provisions, Y.K. Sabharwal, C.J., speaking  

for the Bench of nine Judges of this Court, observed as  

follows:

“The  principle  of  constitutionalism  is  now  a  legal principle which requires control over the  exercise of Governmental power to ensure that it  does not destroy the democratic principles upon  which it is based. These democratic principles  include  the  protection  of  fundamental  rights.  The principle of constitutionalism advocates a  check  and  balance  model  of  the  separation  of  powers;  it  requires  a  diffusion  of  powers,  necessitating  different  independent  centres  of  decision  making.  The  principle  of  constitutionalism  underpins  the  principle  of  legality which requires the Courts to interpret  legislation  on  the  assumption  that  Parliament  would  not  wish  to  legislate  contrary  to  fundamental rights. The Legislature can restrict  fundamental rights but it is impossible for laws  protecting  fundamental  rights  to  be  impliedly  repealed by future statutes.”  

Observing  further that  the  protection  of  fundamental  

constitutional rights through the common law is the main  

feature of common law constitutionalism, the Court went  

on to say:

“Under  the  controlled  Constitution,  the  principles  of  checks  and  balances  have  an  important role to play. Even in England where  Parliament is sovereign, Lord Steyn has observed  that  in  certain  circumstances,  Courts  may  be  forced to modify the principle of parliamentary  sovereignty,  for  example,  in  cases  where  judicial review is sought to be abolished. By  this the judiciary is protecting a limited form  of  constitutionalism,  ensuring  that  their  institutional  role  in  the  Government  is  maintained.”

32.The Constitution of India expressly confers the power  

of  judicial  review  on  this  Court  and  the  High  Courts  

under Article 32 and 226 respectively.  Dr. B.R. Ambedkar  

described Article 32 as the very soul of the Constitution  

– the very heart of it – the most important Article.  By  

now,  it  is  well  settled  that  the  power  of  judicial  

review, vested in the Supreme Court and the High Courts  

under  the  said  Articles  of  the  Constitution,  is  an  

integral part and essential feature of the Constitution,  

constituting  part  of  its  basic  structure.   Therefore,  

ordinarily, the power of the High Court and this Court to  

test  the  Constitutional  validity  of  legislations  can  

never be ousted or even abridged.  Moreover, Article 13  

of  the  Constitution  not  only  declares  the  pre-

constitution laws as void to the extent to which they are  

inconsistent  with  the  fundamental  rights,  it  also  

prohibits the State from making a law which either takes  

away totally or abrogates in part a fundamental right.  

Therefore, judicial review of laws is embedded in the  

Constitution by virtue of Article 13 read with Articles  

32 and 226 of our Constitution.  It is manifest from the  

language  of  Article  245  of  the  Constitution  that  all  

legislative  powers  of  the  Parliament  or  the  State  

Legislatures  are  expressly  made  subject  to  other  

provisions  of  the  Constitution,  which  obviously  would  

include  the  rights  conferred  in  Part  III  of  the

Constitution.  Whether there is a contravention of any of  

the rights so conferred, is to be decided only by the  

Constitutional Courts, which are empowered not only to  

declare a law as unconstitutional but also to enforce  

fundamental  rights  by  issuing  directions  or  orders  or  

writs  of  or  “in  the  nature  of”  mandamus,  certiorari,  

habeas  corpus,  prohibition and  quo  warranto for  this  

purpose.  It is pertinent to note that Article 32 of the  

Constitution  is  also  contained  in  Part  III  of  the  

Constitution, which enumerates the fundamental rights and  

not alongside other Articles of the Constitution which  

define  the  general  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court.  

Thus, being a fundamental right itself, it is the duty of  

this  Court  to  ensure  that  no  fundamental  right  is  

contravened  or  abridged  by  any  statutory  or  

constitutional  provision.   Moreover,  it  is  also  plain  

from the expression “in the nature of” employed in clause  

(2) of Article 32 that the power conferred by the said  

clause is in the widest terms and is not confined to  

issuing the high prerogative writs specified in the said  

clause but includes within its ambit the power to issue  

any  directions  or  orders  or  writs  which  may  be  

appropriate  for  enforcement  of  the  fundamental  rights.  

Therefore, even when the conditions for issue of any of  

these writs are not fulfilled, this Court would not be  

constrained to fold its hands in despair and plead its

inability to help the citizen who has come before it for  

judicial redress. (per P.N. Bhagwati, J. in Bandhua Mukti  

Morcha Vs. Union of India & Ors.23).

33.In this  context, it  would be  profitable to  make a  

reference  to  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Nilabati  

Behera  (supra).   The  Court  concurred  with  the  view  

expressed by this Court in Khatri & Ors. (II) Vs. State  

of Bihar & Ors.24 and  Khatri & Ors. (IV) Vs. State of  

Bihar & Ors.25, wherein it was said that the Court is not  

helpless to grant relief in a case of violation of the  

right  to  life  and  personal  liberty,  and  it  should  be  

prepared “to forge new tools and devise new remedies” for  

the  purpose  of  vindicating  these  precious  fundamental  

rights.   It  was  also  indicated  that  the  procedure  

suitable in the facts of the case must be adopted for  

conducting the enquiry, needed to ascertain the necessary  

facts, for granting the relief, as may be available mode  

of redress, for enforcement of the guaranteed fundamental  

rights.  In his concurring judgment, Dr. A.S. Anand, J.  

(as His Lordship then was), observed as under:

“35. This Court and the High Courts, being the  protectors  of  the  civil  liberties  of  the  citizen,  have  not  only  the  power  and  jurisdiction  but  also  an  obligation  to  grant  relief  in  exercise  of  its  jurisdiction  under  Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to the  victim  or  the  heir  of  the  victim  whose  fundamental  rights  under  Article  21  of  the  

23 (1984) 3 SCC 161 24 (1981) 1 SCC 627 25 (1981) 2 SCC 493

Constitution of India  are established to have  been  flagrantly  infringed  by  calling  upon  the  State to repair the damage done by its officers  to  the  fundamental  rights  of  the  citizen,  notwithstanding the right of the citizen to the  remedy  by  way  of  a  civil  suit  or  criminal  proceedings.  The State, of course has the right  to be indemnified by and take such action as may  be  available  to  it  against  the  wrongdoer  in  accordance  with  law  –  through  appropriate  proceedings.”

34.It may not be out of place to mention that in so far  

as this Court is concerned, apart from Articles 32 and  

142 which empower this Court to issue such directions, as  

may be necessary for doing complete justice in any cause  

or matter, Article 144 of the Constitution also mandates  

all authorities, civil or judicial in the territory of  

India, to act in aid of the orders passed by this Court.

35.As regards the power of judicial review conferred on  

the High Court, undoubtedly they are, in a way, wider in  

scope.  The High Courts are authorised under Article 226  

of the Constitution, to issue directions, orders or writs  

to any person or authority, including any government to  

enforce fundamental rights and, “for any other purpose”.  

It is manifest from the difference in the phraseology of  

Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution that there is a  

marked difference in the nature and purpose of the right  

conferred  by  these  two  Articles.   Whereas  the  right  

guaranteed by Article 32 can be exercised only for the  

enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part III

Court under Article 32, must apply equally in relation to  

the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under  

Article 226 of the Constitution.

38.Article 21, one of the fundamental rights enshrined in  

Part  III  of  the  Constitution  declares  that  no  person  

shall be deprived of his “life” or “personal liberty”  

except according to the procedure established by law.  It  

is trite that the words “life” and “personal liberty” are  

used  in  the  Article  as  compendious  terms  to  include  

within themselves all the varieties of life which go to  

make up the personal liberties of a man and not merely  

the  right  to  the  continuance  of  person’s  animal  

existence.  (See: Kharak Singh Vs. State of U.P.27)

39.The paramountcy of the right to “life” and “personal  

liberty”  was  highlighted  by  the  Constitution  Bench  in  

Kehar Singh (supra).  It was observed thus:

“To  any  civilised  society,  there  can  be  no  attributes  more  important  than  the  life  and  personal  liberty  of  its  members.   That  is  evident from the paramount position given by the  courts to Article 21 of the Constitution.  These  twin attributes enjoy a fundamental ascendancy  over all other attributes of the political and  social order, and consequently, the Legislature,  the  Executive  and  the  Judiciary  are  more  sensitive to them than to the other attributes  of daily existence.  The deprivation of personal  liberty  and  the  threat  of  the  deprivation  of  life  by  the  action  of  the  State  is  in  most  civilised  societies  regarded  seriously  and,  recourse,  either  under  express  constitutional  provision  or  through  legislative  enactment  is  provided to the judicial organ.”

27 (1964) 1 SCR 332

40.In  Minerva  Mills (supra),  Y.V.  Chandrachud,  C.J.,  

speaking for the majority observed that Articles 14 and  

19 do not confer any fanciful rights.  They confer rights  

which  are  elementary  for  the  proper  and  effective  

functioning of democracy.  They are universally regarded  

by  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights.   If  

Articles 14 and 19 are put out of operation, Article 32  

will  be  drained  of  its  life  blood.   Emphasising  the  

significance of Articles 14, 19 and 21, the learned Chief  

Justice remarked:  

“74. Three Articles of our Constitution, and only  three, stand between the heaven of freedom into  which Tagore wanted his country to awake and the  abyss of unrestrained power. They are Articles  14, 19 and 21. Article 31-C has removed two sides  of  that  golden  triangle  which  affords  to  the  people  of  this  country  an  assurance  that  the  promise  held  forth  by  the  preamble  will  be  performed by ushering an egalitarian era through  the discipline of fundamental rights, that is,  without emasculation of the rights to liberty and  equality  which  alone  can  help  preserve  the  dignity of the individual.”

41.The  approach  in  the  interpretation  of  fundamental  

rights has again been highlighted in M. Nagaraj (supra),  

wherein this Court observed as under:

“This  principle  of  interpretation  is  particularly apposite to the interpretation of  fundamental rights. It is a fallacy to regard  fundamental rights as a gift from the State to  its  citizens.  Individuals  possess  basic  human  rights  independently  of  any  constitution  by  reason of basic fact that they are members of  the  human  race.  These  fundamental  rights  are  important as they possess intrinsic value. Part- III  of  the  Constitution  does  not  confer

“When  the  legislative  and  executive  powers  are  united  in  the  same person, or in the same body of  Magistrates, there can be no liberty  ... Again, there is no liberty, if the  judicial power be not separated from  the legislative and executive.”

Madison points out that Montesquieu did not feel  that  different  branches  could  not  have  overlapping functions, but rather that the power  of one department of Government should not be  entirely in the hands of another department of  Government.  

Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No.78,  remarks on the importance of the independence of  the  judiciary  to  preserve  the  separation  of  powers and the rights of the people:

“The complete independence of the  courts  of  justice  is  peculiarly  essential  in  a  limited  Constitution.  By  a  limited  Constitution,  I  understand one which contains certain  specified  exceptions  to  the  legislative  authority;  such,  for  instance, that it shall pass no bills  of attainder, no ex post facto laws,  and the like. Limitations of this kind  can  be  preserved  in  practice  in  no  other way than through the medium of  courts of justice, whose duty it must  be to declare all acts contrary to the  manifest  tenor  of  the  Constitution  void.  Without  this,  all  the  reservations  of  particular  rights  or  privileges  would  amount  to  nothing.”  (434)  

Montesquieu  finds  that  tyranny  pervades  when  there is no separation of powers:

“There  would  be  an  end  of  everything, were the same man or same  body, whether of the nobles or of the  people,  to  exercise  those  three  powers, that of enacting laws, that of  executing the public resolutions, and  of trying the causes of individuals.”  

The Court further observed: (SCC pg.105, paras 129- 130)

“Equality,  rule  of  law,  judicial  review  and  separation  of  powers  form  parts  of  the  basic  structure  of  the  Constitution.  Each  of  these  concepts are intimately connected. There can be  no rule of law, if there is no equality before  the  law.  These  would  be  meaningless  if  the  violation  was  not  subject  to  the  judicial  review.  All  these  would  be  redundant  if  the  legislative, executive and judicial powers are  vested  in  one  organ.  Therefore,  the  duty  to  decide whether the limits have been transgressed  has been placed on the judiciary.  

Realising  that  it  is  necessary  to  secure  the  enforcement of the Fundamental Rights, power for  such  enforcement  has  been  vested  by  the  Constitution in the Supreme Court and the High  Courts. Judicial Review is an essential feature  of the Constitution. It gives practical content  to the objectives of the Constitution embodied  in Part III and other parts of the Constitution.  It may be noted that the mere fact that equality  which is a part of the basic structure can be  excluded  for  a  limited  purpose,  to  protect  certain kinds of laws, does not prevent it from  being part of the basic structure. Therefore, it  follows  that  in  considering  whether  any  particular feature of the Constitution is part  of the basic structure - rule of law, separation  of power - the fact that limited exceptions are  made for limited purposes, to protect certain  kind of laws, does not mean that it is not part  of the basic structure.”  

Conclusions:

44.Thus,  having  examined  the  rival  contentions  in  the  

context  of  the  Constitutional  Scheme,  we  conclude  as  

follows:

(i) The  fundamental  rights,  enshrined  in  

Part  III  of  the  Constitution,  are  

inherent and cannot be extinguished by  

any  Constitutional  or  Statutory  

provision.  Any  law  that  abrogates  or  

abridges such rights would be violative

of  the  basic  structure  doctrine.  The  

actual effect and impact of the law on  

the rights guaranteed under Part III has  

to be taken into account in determining  

whether  or  not  it  destroys  the  basic  

structure.  

(ii) Article 21 of the Constitution in its  

broad perspective seeks to protect the  

persons  of  their  lives  and  personal  

liberties  except  according  to  the  

procedure established by law.  The said  

Article  in  its  broad  application  not  

only takes within its fold enforcement  

of the rights of an accused but also the  

rights of the victim. The State has a  

duty to enforce the human rights of a  

citizen providing for fair and impartial  

investigation against any person accused  

of commission of a cognizable offence,  

which may include its own officers. In  

certain situations even a witness to the  

crime may seek for and shall be granted  

protection by the State.  

(iii) In view of the constitutional scheme and  

the jurisdiction conferred on this Court  

under Article 32 and on the High Courts  

under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  

the  power  of  judicial  review  being  an  

integral part of the basic structure of  

the Constitution, no Act of Parliament  

can exclude or curtail the powers of the  

Constitutional Courts with regard to the  

enforcement of fundamental rights.  As a  

matter of fact, such a  power  is

essential to give practicable content to  

the  objectives  of  the  Constitution  

embodied in Part III and other parts of  

the Constitution. Moreover, in a federal  

constitution,  the  distribution  of  

legislative  powers  between  the  

Parliament  and  the  State  Legislature  

involves  limitation  on  legislative  

powers and, therefore, this requires an  

authority other than the Parliament to  

ascertain  whether  such  limitations  are  

transgressed.  Judicial review acts as  

the  final  arbiter  not  only  to  give  

effect  to  the  distribution  of  

legislative  powers  between  the  

Parliament  and  the  State  Legislatures,  

it  is  also  necessary  to  show  any  

transgression  by  each  entity.  

Therefore, to borrow the words of Lord  

Steyn, judicial review is justified by  

combination  of  “the  principles  of  

separation of powers, rule of law, the  

principle  of  constitutionality  and  the  

reach of judicial review”.   

(iv) If the federal structure is violated by  

any legislative action, the Constitution  

takes  care  to  protect  the  federal  

structure by ensuring that Courts act as  

guardians  and  interpreters  of  the  

Constitution  and  provide  remedy  under  

Articles 32 and 226, whenever there is  

an  attempted  violation.   In  the  

circumstances,  any  direction  by  the  

Supreme  Court  or  the  High  Court  in

exercise  of  power  under  Article  32  or  

226  to  uphold  the  Constitution  and  

maintain  the  rule  of  law  cannot  be  

termed  as  violating  the  federal  

structure.

(v) Restriction  on  the  Parliament  by  the  

Constitution  and  restriction  on  the  

Executive  by  the  Parliament  under  an  

enactment, do not amount to restriction  

on  the  power  of  the  Judiciary  under  

Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution.

(vi) If in terms of Entry 2 of List II of The  

Seventh  Schedule  on  the  one  hand  and  

Entry 2A and Entry 80 of List I on the  

other,  an  investigation  by  another  

agency is permissible subject to grant  

of consent by the State concerned, there  

is  no  reason  as  to  why,  in  an  

exceptional  situation,  court  would  be  

precluded from exercising the same power  

which the Union could exercise in terms  

of the provisions of the Statute.  In  

our opinion, exercise of such power by  

the  constitutional  courts  would  not  

violate  the  doctrine  of  separation  of  

powers.  In fact, if in such a situation  

the  court  fails  to  grant  relief,  it  

would be failing in its constitutional  

duty.

(vii) When  the  Special  Police  Act  itself  

provides that subject to the consent by  

the  State,  the  CBI  can  take  up  

investigation in relation to the crime

which  was  otherwise  within  the  

jurisdiction  of  the  State  Police,  the  

court  can  also  exercise  its  

constitutional power of judicial review  

and  direct  the  CBI  to  take  up  the  

investigation within the jurisdiction of  

the State.  The power of the High Court  

under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  

cannot  be  taken  away,  curtailed  or  

diluted  by  Section  6  of  the  Special  

Police Act.  Irrespective of there being  

any  statutory  provision  acting  as  a  

restriction on the powers of the Courts,  

the restriction imposed by Section 6 of  

the Special Police Act on the powers of  

the Union, cannot be read as restriction  

on  the  powers  of  the  Constitutional  

Courts.  Therefore, exercise of power of  

judicial  review  by  the  High  Court,  in  

our  opinion,  would  not  amount  to  

infringement of either the doctrine of  

separation  of  power  or  the  federal  

structure.

45.In  the  final  analysis,  our  answer  to  the  question  

referred  is  that  a  direction  by  the  High  Court,  in  

exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the  

Constitution,  to  the  CBI  to  investigate  a  cognizable  

offence  alleged  to  have  been  committed  within  the  

territory of a State without the consent of that State  

will neither impinge upon the federal structure of the  

Constitution nor violate the doctrine of separation of  

power and shall be valid in law.  Being the protectors of

civil liberties of the citizens, this Court and the High  

Courts have not only the power and jurisdiction but also  

an  obligation  to  protect  the  fundamental  rights,  

guaranteed by Part III in general and under Article 21 of  

the Constitution in particular, zealously and vigilantly.  

46.Before parting with the case, we deem it necessary to  

emphasise that despite wide powers conferred by Articles  

32 and 226 of the Constitution, while passing any order,  

the  Courts  must  bear  in  mind  certain  self-imposed  

limitations  on  the  exercise  of  these  Constitutional  

powers.  The very plenitude of the power under the said  

Articles requires great caution in its exercise.  In so  

far as the question of issuing a direction to the CBI to  

conduct investigation in a case is concerned, although no  

inflexible guidelines can be laid down to decide whether  

or not such power should be exercised but time and again  

it has been reiterated that such an order is not to be  

passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party  

has levelled some allegations against the local police.  

This  extra-ordinary  power  must  be  exercised  sparingly,  

cautiously and in exceptional situations where it becomes  

necessary to provide credibility and instil confidence in  

investigations or where the incident may have national  

and international ramifications or where such an order  

may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing  

the  fundamental  rights.   Otherwise  the  CBI  would  be

flooded with a large number of cases and with limited  

resources, may find it difficult to properly investigate  

even  serious  cases  and  in  the  process  lose  its  

credibility  and  purpose  with  unsatisfactory  

investigations.   

47.In  Secretary,  Minor  Irrigation  &  Rural  Engineering  

Services, U.P. & Ors. Vs. Sahngoo Ram Arya & Anr.31, this  

Court had said that an order directing an enquiry by the  

CBI  should  be  passed  only  when  the  High  Court,  after  

considering the material on record, comes to a conclusion  

that  such  material  does  disclose  a  prima  facie case  

calling  for  an  investigation  by  the  CBI  or  any  other  

similar  agency.   We  respectfully  concur  with  these  

observations.

48.All  the  cases  shall  now  be  placed  before  the  

respective Benches for disposal in terms of this opinion.  

    .……………………………CJI.      (K.G. BALAKRISHNAN)  

     …………………………………J.      (R.V. RAVEENDRAN)

     …………………………………J.      (D.K. JAIN)

31 (2002) 5 SCC 521

     …………………………………J.      (P. SATHASIVAM)

     …………………………………J.      (J.M. PANCHAL)

NEW DELHI; FEBRUARY 17, 2010.