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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  453-455 of 2008

PETITIONER: State of U.P. & Ors. etc.

RESPONDENT: Roshan Singh & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/01/2008

BENCH: Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & AFTAB ALAM

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of S.L.P (C) Nos.16970-72 of 2005)

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1.      Leave granted.

2.      Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment of the  learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court allowing the  Civil Misc. Writ Petitions 17464 of 1984, 8825 of 1995 and  19050 of 1995.  Challenge in the first writ petition was to the  order passed by the Prescribed Authority under the U.P.  Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1954 (in short the  \021Act\022) and the appellate order passed by the Appellate  Authority.         

3.      Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:   

       After issuance of notice under Section 10(2) of the Act an  area of 17 Bighas 10 Biswas and 2 Biswansis of land of the  respondent-Roshan Singh was declared as surplus. Thereafter  consolidation operation commenced. Proceedings under  Section 107 of the Act were initiated on 28.3.1974 and the  respondent-Roshan Singh was granted opportunity to file his  response to the notice.  The objection was filed on 25.5.1974  and by order dated 14.1.1980 the Prescribed Authority after  determining the surplus gave opportunity to the respondent to  indicate the choice of land to be retained.  The respondent did  not indicate any choice.  Therefore by order dated 8.4.1982, 17  Bighas 10 Biswas and 2 Biswansis of land was declared as  surplus.  Thereafter, possession of the surplus land was  taken.  There is a provision for appeal under Section 12 of the  Act. But the respondent-Roshan Singh did not prefer any  appeal.  On the other hand on 17.2.1984 an application titled  under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (in short  \021CPC\022) was filed.  Stand taken was that in the consolidation  proceedings different area was indicated and, therefore,  holding was reduced. Objections were filed by the  functionaries of the State on 23.3.1984 and 30.3.1984.   Considering the objections the Prescribed Authority by order  dated 3.4.1984 rejected the claim of the respondent-Roshan  Singh.  An appeal was preferred by him i.e. Revenue Appeal  no.24 of 1984 in the Court of III Additional District Judge,  Banda, U.P.  The appeal was dismissed on 21.8.1984.  Civil  Writ Petition no.17464 of 1984 was filed before the Allahabad  High Court.  Subsequently, the surplus land was distributed.  These were challenged in Civil Writ Petition no.8825 of 1995

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and 19050 of 1995.  The first writ petition was allowed by a  learned Single Judge with the following observations:                       \023Havind heard Sri V.K.S. Chaudhary,  learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of  the petitioner and Smt. Archana Srivastava,  learned Standing Counsel for the respondents,  this Court is of the view that as the reduction  of area made during the consolidation  operation is made for public purposes, the  petitioner is entitled to the benefit of said  reduction.  The submission made by the  learned counsel for the petitioner has got force  and therefore, the writ petition deserves to be  allowed.\024                                                                          4.      It is to be noted that the above quoted portion was the  only basis on which the writ petition was allowed.  Two orders  were also allowed following the decision rendered in the first  case.     

5.      Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the  approach of the High Court is clearly erroneous.  Firstly,  petition under Section 151 was not maintainable when  statutorily an opportunity and/or forum is provided which was  not availed.  Further the proceedings under the Act and the  Consolidation Act operate in different fields and, therefore,  even if the area was different same was on the basis of the  parameters under the Consolidation Act and a belated attempt  to re-open concluded issues by resorting to Section 151 was  clearly impermissible.                       6.      Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there  cannot be two different areas; one under the Act and the other  the Consolidation Act.  Therefore, the High Court was justified  in its view.     

7.      The principles which regulate the exercise of inherent  powers by a court have been highlighted in many cases.  In  matters with which the CPC does not deal with, the Court will  exercise its inherent power to do justice between the parties  which is warranted under the circumstances and which the  necessities of the case require.  If there are specific provisions  of the CPC dealing with the particular topic and they expressly  or necessary implication exhaust the scope of the powers of  the Court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation  to a matter, the inherent powers of the Court cannot be  invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the  CPC.  The inherent powers of the Court are not to be used for  the benefit of a litigant who has remedy under the CPC.   Similar is the position vis-‘-vis other statutes.  The object of  Section 151 CPC is to supplement and not to replace the  remedies provided for in the CPC.  Section 151 CPC will not be  available when there is alternative remedy and same is  accepted to be a well-settled ratio of law.  The operative field of  power being thus restricted, the same cannot be risen to  inherent power.  The inherent powers of the Court are in  addition to the powers specifically conferred to it. If there are  express provisions covering a particular topic, such power  cannot be exercised in that regard.  The section confers on the  Court power of making such orders as may be necessary for

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the ends of justice of the Court.  Section 151 CPC cannot be  invoked when there is express provision even under which the  relief can be claimed by the aggrieved party.  The power can  only be invoked to supplement the provisions of the Code and  not to override or evade other express provisions.  The position  is not different so far as the other statutes are concerned.   Undisputedly, an aggrieved person is not remediless less  under the Act.                        

8.      The conclusions of the High Court are not only cryptic  but also without indication of any basis.  As rightly contended  by learned counsel for the appellant long after the period  provided for preferring an appeal under Section 12 of the Act,  the application under Section 151 CPC was filed.   

9.      This Court in State of W.B. and Ors. v. Karan Singh  Binayak and Ors. (2002 (4) SCC 188), inter alia observed as  follows:

\023The period of 25 years under the lease expired  in the year 1976. The notification under the  Act was issued on 11th November, 1954. In  1957 record of rights was prepared under  Section 44 of the Act according to which the  land was held retainable under Section 6(1)(b)  of the Act. The possession was handed over to  the original owners in 1981 on liquidation of  the lessee on an order being passed by the  High Court directing official liquidator to  disclaim the property which was later  transferred to the writ petitioners in terms of  the agreements of sale entered in the year  1988 and sale deeds in 1992-93. Meanwhile,  in the year 1991 on proceedings being taken  under the ULC Act, 6145.90 square meter of  the land was held to be excess under the said  Act. In June 1993, the plans were sanctioned  and construction commenced. It can, thus, be  seen that after the preparation of record-of- rights, not only the appellants did not take any  steps and slept over the matter but various  steps as above were taken by the respondents  in respect of the land in question. The  argument that the proceedings under the ULC  Act or the preparation of record-of-rights were  ultra vires and the acts without jurisdiction  and, therefore, those proceedings would not  operate as a bar in appellants invoking  inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC  by virtue of conferment of such power under  Section 57A of the Act is wholly misconceived  and misplaced. The inherent powers cannot be  used to reopen the settled matters. These  powers cannot be resorted to when there are  specific provisions of the Act to deal with the  situation. It would be an abuse to allow the  reopening of the settled matter after nearly  four decades in the purported exercise of  inherent powers. It has not even been  suggested that there was any collusion or  fraud on behalf of the writ petitioners or the  erstwhile owners. There is no explanation  much less satisfactory explanation for total  inaction on the part of the appellants for all  these years.\024

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10.     In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar and Ors. (AIR  1964 SC 993) it was, inter alia, observed as follows:            \023There is one other aspect from which the  same question could be viewed.  Order IX Rule  7 prescribes the conditions subject to which  alone an application competent under the  opening words of that rule ought to be dealt  with.  Now, the submission of Mr. Pathak if  accepted, would mean to ignore the opening  words and say that though specific power is  conferred when a suit is adjourned for hearing,  the Court has an inherent power even when (a)  it is not adjourned for that purpose, and (b)  and this is of some importance when the suit  is not adjourned at all,  having regard to the  term of Order XX Rule 1.  The main part of  Order IX Rule 7 speaks \023of good cause being  shown for non-appearance\024 on a previous day.   Now what are the criteria to be applied by the  Court when the supposed inherent jurisdiction  of the Court is invoked?  Non-constat it need  not be identical with what is statutorily  provided in Rule 7.  All this only shows that  there is really no scope for invoking the  inherent powers of the Court.  Lastly, that  power is to be exercised to secure the ends of  justice.  If at the stage of Rule 7 power is  vested in the Court and after the decree is  passed Order IX Rule 13 becomes applicable  and the party can avail himself of that remedy,  it is very difficult to appreciate the ends of  justice which are supposed to be served by the  Courts being held to have the power which the  learned counsel says must inhere in it.  In this  view it is unnecessary to consider whether to  sustain the present submission the respondent  must establish that the court was conscious  that it lacked specific statutory power and  intended to exercise an inherent power that it  believed it possessed to make such orders as  may be necessary for the ends of justice.\024

        11.     Looked at from any angle the orders of the High Court  impugned in these appeals cannot be sustained and are set  aside.  It is to be noted that subsequent two writ petitions were  allowed primarily on the ground that first writ petition was  allowed.   

       The appeals are allowed but in the circumstances  without any order as to costs.