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PETITIONER: STATE OF U.P. AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: LABH CHAND

DATE OF JUDGMENT09/02/1993

BENCH: VENKATACHALA N. (J) BENCH: VENKATACHALA N. (J) SHARMA, L.M. (CJ)

CITATION:  1994 AIR  754            1993 SCR  (1) 878  1993 SCC  (2) 495        JT 1993 (2)   298  1993 SCALE  (1)470

ACT: Constitution  of India, 1950 : Article  226-Availability  of alternative  remedy-Admissibility of Writ  Petition  without exhausting legal remedy available-Order of Single Judge bye- passing findings of the Division Bench not sustainable.

HEADNOTE: The  respondent  served  a  notice  on  the  Secretary  U.P. Government,  for settling his outstanding claims  to  enable him  to seek voluntary retirement.  But the Governor by  his order, compulsorily retired him from service with  immediate effect.   Aggrieved  by  the  order  of  the  Governor,  the respondent directly riled a writ petition in the High Court. The  same  was dismissed on the ground that  the  respondent bye-passed  the  alternate  remedy available  to  him.   The respondent  riled  another writ petition in the  High  Court which  was heard by the Single Judge, was,  bye-passing  the order  of the Division Bench allowed the writ  petition  and quashed the impugned order the directed the U.P.  Government to treat the respondent as having retired voluntarily. Challenging  the said order, the appellants  have  contended that  the  Single  Judge  could  not  have  over-ruled   the preliminary  objections raised on behalf of the  appellants; that  since  the  Division  Bench of  the  same  High  Court dismissed the Petition of the respondent for not  exhausting the  alternate  remedy available, the Single  Judge  had  no jurisdiction   to   entertain  that  writ   petition;   that respondent’s issuance of a notice to the Government  seeking permission for the voluntary retirement in the meantime  was untenable;  and  that the view of the Single  Judge  that  a departmental   disciplinary  enquiry  pending  against   the respondent   inhibited  the  Government  from   compulsorily retiring him was also untenable. Allowing the appeal this Court, HELD  : 1.1. That when a Judge of a Single Judge Bench of  a High 879 Court  is required to entertain a second writ petition of  a person  on  a  matter, he cannot, as  a  matter  of  course, entertain such petition, if an earlier writ petition of  the same person on the same  matter had been dismissed  already

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by  another Single Bench or Division Bench of the same  High Court, even if such dismissal was on the ground of laches or on the ground of non-availing of alternate remedy. [889D] 1.2. This judgment should not be understood as coming in the way of the respondent in approaching the U.P. Public Service Tribunal  for  necessary relief in the matter, if he  is  so entitled. [890F] This Singh Nathmal & Ors. v. Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes, [1964] 655 SCR, relied. B.   Prabhakar  Rao  & Ors. v. State of Andhra  Pradesh  and Ors.  etc., AIR 1986 SC 219,227; Danjagu & Ors. v. State  of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1457, 1466 and L.  Hirday Narain v. Income  Tax Officer, Bareilly AIR 1971 SC 33,  36,  referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 498 of 1993. From  the Judgment and order dated 19.2.92 of the  Allahabad High Court in W.P. No. 7498/90. A.K Goel for the Appellants. Labh Chand (In-person) for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATACHALA, J.  Leave granted. Respondent who was in the service of the U.P. Government  as an  Executive Engineer, Minor irrigation, Banda,  served  a notice  dated  December  19,  1989  on  the  Secretary  Area Development-2,  U.P.  Government, Lucknow seeking  from  the Government,  settlement of his outstanding claims  by  March 31,  1990  and  grant of permission to him  to  retire  from service  voluntarily from that date.  It was stated in  that notice  that the respondent’s outstanding  claims  remaining unsettled by the Government before March 31, 1990, shall  be settled before June 30, 1990 and he shall 880 then  be allowed to retire voluntarily.   However,  changing his stance, the respondent wrote a letter dated December 20, 1989  to  the  self-same  Secretary  seeking  grant  of  the Government’s permission to retire voluntarily from March 31, 1990 even if his outstanding claims with it were not settled by that date.  But, the Government, did not grant permission to  the  respondent to voluntarily retire from  its  service with  effect from March 31, 1990 as had been sought by  him. Instead,  the  Governor of U.P. purporting to  exercise  his powers under F.R. 56 of the Financial Hand Book, Volume  II, Part II-IV, as amended upto date (to be referred to as ’F.R. 56’),  issued  an Order dated January 6,  1990  compulsorily retiring  the respondent from the, Government  service  with effect  from  6.1.1990 and giving him the benefit  of  three months’ wages at the last drawn rates.  No doubt, that order of compulsory retirement of the respondent was challenged by him  in a Writ Petition, W.P. No. 1980 of 1990 filed  before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.  But, a  Division Bench of that Court, refused to entertain that Writ Petition and  dismissed it by its Order dated March 29,  1990,  which read :               "Learned  Counsel for the State  has  produced               the   record  and  has  also   filed   counter               affidavit  to  which rejoinder  affidavit  has               been  filed.  However, after looking into  the               record we are of the opinion that it is not  a               fit  case  in which the petitioner  should  be               allowed  to  bye-pass the  alternative  remedy               available  to  him  before  the  U.P.   Public

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             Services   Tribunal.   On  account   of   this               alternative  remedy  being  available  to  the               petitioner  this  petition  is  dismissed   in               limine.  Interim order if any to vacate." The  validity  of the said order of dismissal  of  the  Writ Petition  made by the Division Bench of the High  Court  was not questioned by the respondent in any appeal or any  other legal  proceeding.   The respondent did not also  choose  to approach the U.P. Public Services Tribunal, to seek  reliefs respecting  the order of his compulsory retirement  although the Division Bench of the High Court had dismissed his  Writ Petition  for not availing of the alternative remedy  before that Tribunal. Curiously, the respondent resorted to the course of filing a second Writ Petition before the same High Court  challenging over again the very Order of the U.P. Government by which he had been compulsorily retired 881 and  sought  reliefs  thereto.  That  second  Writ  Petition registered  as  W.P. No. 7498 of 1990, it appears,  did  not come  up  for hearing before a Division Bench  of  the  High Court  as  had  happened with  the  earlier  dismissed  Writ Petition.   Instead,  it has come up for  hearing  before  a single  Judge Bench of the High Court.  By his  Order  dated February 19, 1992 the learned single Judge constituting that single  Judge Bench allowed the Writ Petition,  quashed  the impugned order by which the respondent (the Writ Petitioner) had been compulsorily retired under F.R. 56 and directed the U.P.  Government to treat the respondent as  having  retired voluntarily  from March 31, 1990 and to pay his  salary  for the  period  elapsed  between the  date  of  his  compulsory retirement  and the date from which he wished  to  voluntary retire.   It  is  the sustainability of this  Order  of  the learned single Judge made in the second Writ Petition of the respondent which is challenged by the State of U.P. and  its Chief Engineer in the present appeal by the Special Leave. Mr.  A.K.  Goel,  the learned  counsel  for  the  appellants assailed the Order under appeal on diverse grounds.   First, he  urged  that the learned single Judge of the  High  Court could not have overruled the preliminary objection raised on behalf  of the appellants that the second Writ  Petition  of the  respondent  impugning the Order by which  he  had  been compulsorily  retired was liable to the rejected  in  limine when  his first Writ Petition by which he had  impugned  the self-same  Order, had been dismissed by a Division Bench  of the  same  Court  for  having  sought  to  invoke  the  writ jurisdiction  of  the  High Court without  availing  of  the alternate  remedy before the U.P. Public Services  Tribunal. Secondly, he urged that the view of the learned single Judge of the High Court that the respondent’s issuance of a notice to  the  Government  seeking permission  for  his  voluntary retirement from a future date made the Government loose  its power  to  compulsorily  retire him  in  the  meantime,  was untenable.   Thirdly, he urged that the view of the  learned single   Judge  of  the  High  Court  that  a   departmental disciplinary   enquiry   pending  against   the   respondent inhibited  the  Government from  compulsorily  retiring  him under  F.R.  56, was again untenable.   The  respondent  who appeared  in person could not meet the grounds on which  the Order  under  appeal  was assailed.  Nor  does  his  written submissions  could be regarded as helpful in  meeting  those grounds. The  first ground urged in support of the appeal  if  merits our 882

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acceptance  that that ground by itself would  be  sufficient for  disposal of this appeal, cannot be disputed.   However, we are not oblivious to the fact that that ground, to  merit our  acceptance,  has  to be necessarily  founded  on  valid reasons.  Hence our endeavour here would be to find  whether the  said  ground is founded on reasons and if  so,  whether they are valid. There are two reasons on which the first ground is  founded. They are               (i)   The learned Judge of the High Court,  as               a  High  Court  even if assumed  to  have  had               discretionary power to entertain a second Writ               Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution               notwithstanding  the  fact  that  an   earlier               similar Writ Petition had not been entertained               by   the  sat=  Court  because  of  the   non-               exhaustion  of an alternate  statutory  remedy               available to the petitioner in the matter,  he               could  not  have entertained the  second  Writ               Petition   unless  it  was  found   that   the               discretion already exercised by the High Court               in  refusing  to entertain  the  earlier  Writ               Petition  was  either arbitrary  or  otherwise               unwarranted.               (ii)  The  learned  single Judge of  the  High               Court, by entertaining a second Writ  Petition               under  Article 226 of the Constitution on  the               subject  matter  which  was  covered  by an               earlier   Writ  Petition  dismissed   by   the               Division  Bench of the same Court had given  a               go-bye  to the well-established salutary  rule               of  judicial  practice and procedure  that  an               order  of  a single Judge Bench much  less  of               Judges  of  larger  Bench  of  a  High   Court               refusing   to  entertain  the   earlier   Writ               Petition  in  limine  even on  the  ground  of               laches.  or on the ground of  non-availing  of               alternate  remedy ought not to  be  interfered               with  by  an other single Judge or  Judges  of               larger Benches, except in review or appeal, if               permitted. As  the first ground urged in the support of the  appeal  is founded on the said two reasons, our endeavour here would be to find whether they are valid enough to sustain the same. 883               Reason  (i) :- Entertaining by the High  Court               of a second Writ Petition under Article 226 of               the  Constitution,  filed by  a  person  whose               earlier  Writ  Petition on the  same  subject-               matter  is  dismissed  for  non-exhaustion  of               alternate remedy. When a Statutory Forum or Tribunal is specially created by a statute for redressal of specified grievances of persons  on certain  matters, the High Court should not normally  permit such persons to ventilate their specified grievances  before it  by  entertaining  petitions under  Article  226  of  the Constitution is a legal position which is too  well-settled. A  Constitution Bench of this Court in Thansigh Nathmal  and Ors.  v.  A. Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes, [1964]  6  SCR, 655,  when had the occasion to deal with the question as  to how  the  discretionary jurisdiction of a High  Court  under Article  226  of  the  Constitution,  was  required  to   be exercised  respecting  a  petition filed  there-under  by  a person  coming before it bye-passing a  statutory  alternate remedy  available  to  him for obtaining  redressal  of  his

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grievance  ventilated in the petition, has given  expression to  the  said well settle legal position,  speaking  through Shah, J., as he then was, thus               "The jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.               226  of  the Constitution is couched  in  wide               terms and the exercise thereof is not  subject               to  any  restrictions except  the  territorial               restrictions  which are expressly provided  in               the   Article.   But  the  exercise   of   the               jurisdiction  is  discretionary;  it  is   not               exercised  merely because it is lawful  to  do               so.   They very amplitude of the  jurisdiction               demands  that it will ordinarily be  exercised               subject      to      certain      self-imposed               limitations.........  Where it is open to  the               aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal,               or  even  itself in another  jurisdiction  for               obtaining redress in the manner provided by  a               statute,  the  High Court  normally  will  not               permit, by entertaining a petition under  Art.               226 of the Constitution, the machinery created               under  the Statute to be by-passed,  and  will               leave the party applying to it to seek  resort               to the machinery so set up." (Pages 661-662) The order of a Division Bench of the High Court refusing  to entertain  the earlier Writ Petition of the respondent  here filed under Article 226 884 of  the  Constitution  had  been made  in  exercise  of  its discretionary  jurisdiction on its view that the  petitioner therein had for redressal of his grievance in that  petition an  alternate  statutory  remedy  before  the  U.P.’  Public Services  Tribunal,  an  adjudicatory  machinery   specially created   for  redressal  of  such  grievances,  cannot   be disputed.   What remains, therefore, to be seen  is  whether the  discretion exercised by the Division Bench in  refusing to  entertain the earlier Writ Petition for non-availing  of alternate  remedy and dismissing it, could be said to be  an unwarranted exercise of discretion in the light of the  said well-settled legal position governing such matters.  As  the alternate  remedy which according to the Division Bench  was not  availed of by the respondent here before the filing  of his  earlier Writ Petition, being that available before  the the  Forum of the U.P. Public Services Tribunal, it  becomes necessary  for us to see whether that Forum did  provide  to the  respondent  here a remedy which was both  adequate  and efficacious.  We shall now look into the relevant provisions of the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1976 (for short ’the  Act’) creating the U.P. Public Services  Tribunal  and the rules made thereunder as they would the needed light  on the  exact  nature  of the Tribunal, and  the  adequacy  and efficaciousness of the remedy available with it. Preamble to the Act, declares that it is enacted to  provide for  the  constitution  of  tribunals  to  adjudicate   upon disputes in respect of matters relating to employment of all public servants of the State of Uttar Pradesh.   Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act provides for constitution by the State Government two or more State Public Service Tribunals, each  called a State Public Service  Tribunal.   Sub-section (2)  thereof requires that each Tribunal shall consist of  a Judicial  Member and an Administrative Member.   Sub-section (3)  thereof  requires that the Judicial Member shall  be  a serving Judge of the High Court or a person qualified to  be appointed  as  a High Court Judge while  the  Administrative Member shall be a person who holds or has held the post  of,

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or  any  post  equivalent to, Commissioner  of  a  Division. Section 4 of the Act, which provides for reference of claims to Tribunal for their adjudication reads:               "4.  Reference of claims to Tribunal  If  any               person  who  is or has been a  public  servant               claims   that  in  any  matter   relating   to               employment as such public servant his employer               or any officer or authority subordinate to the               employer has dealt with him in a manner  which               is not in conformity with               885               any contract, or               (a)   in  the  case of a  Government  servant,               with  the provisions of Article 16 or  Article               311  of the Constitution or with any rules  or               law having force under Article 309 or  Article               313 of the Constitution;               (b)   in  the  case of a servant  of  a  local               authority  or  a statutory  corporation,  with               Article  16  of the Constitution or  with  any               rules  or regulations having force  under  any               Act or Legislature constituting such authority               or corporation;               he shall refer such claim to the Tribunal, and               the  decision of the Tribunal  thereon  shall,               subject to the provisions of Articles 226  and               227 of the Constitution, be final               Provided  that no reference shall, subject  to               the terms of any contract, be made in  respect               of  a claim arising out of the transfer  of  a               public servant :               Provided  further  that  no  reference   shall               ordinarily  be  entertained  by  the  Tribunal               until   the   claimant   has   exhausted   his               departmental  remedies  under  the  rules  ap-               plicable to him.               Explanation.   For  the  purposes  of   this               proviso,  it shall no be necessary to  require               the  claimant  (in the case  of  a  Government               servant)  to  avail  also  of  the  remedy  of               memorial to the Governor before referring  his               claim to the Tribunal." Section  5 of the Act requires the Tribunal to be guided  by principles of natural justice in the matter of consideration of  the references, making it clear that it is not bound  by the procedure laid down in the Code in Civil Procedure, 1908 or  the rules of evidence contained in the  Indian  Evidence Act, 1872. Section  6  of the Act expressly bars the  filing  of  suits respecting  matters  to be referred for  adjudication  under Section  4  of the Act.  Section 7 of the Act  empowers  the State Government to make rules for carrying 886 all the purposes of the Act. The  U.P.  Public Services (Tribunals) Rules,  1975  (to  be referred  to  as ’the Rules’) which are made  by  the  State Government  contain elaborate procedural rules,  needed  for effective adjudication of matters by the Tribunal. As is seen from the said Preamble, the provisions in the Act and the Rules, the U.P. Public Services Tribunal is intended to be an exclusive and and exhaustive machinery or forum for adjudication of claims of all public servants including  the persons  in the service or pay of the State  Government,  in matters  of  their employment, inasmuch as,  suits  in  such matters are specifically barred by the provisions in Section

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6  of the Act.  That Tribunal since composes of  a  Judicial Member  who  is  a serving Judge of the  High  Court  or  is qualified to become such Judge and an Administrative  Member who  holds or has held the post of, or any  post  equivalent to,  Commissioner of a Division, it is a statutory  Tribunal of the State possessed of expertise to adjudicate claims  of public  servants in matters of their employment.   That  the Tribunal  in its enquiries being not bound by the  technical rules  of procedure under the Civil Procedure Code  and  the technical rules of evidence under the Evidence Act, it could avail of its vast powers of enquiry to redress grievances of public  servants  concerning  matters  of  their  employment adequately  and efficaciously.  The fact that Section  4  of the Act declares that the decision of the Tribunal is  final subject  to  the provisions of Articles 226 and 227  of  the Constitution  itself  shows  the  nature  of  high  judicial sanctity attached by statute to such decision. The  respondent  had,  since  filed in  the  High  Court  of Judicature  at Allahabad, his first Writ Petition, W.P.  No. 1980  of 1990, challenging the validity of the Order of  the State  Government by which he had been compulsorily  retired from  Government service and claimed several relief  thereto against  the State Government, we have to find  whether  the U.P.  Public Service Tribunal if had been approached by  the respondent  here, could not have, if warranted,  invalidated the  Order  challenged in the Writ Petition  and  given  the reliefs  sought for therein.  If we have regard to the  high status  of the members constituting the Tribunal,  expertise possessed  by  such  members  to  consider  the  claims   of employees  in  matters  of  their  employment,  vast  powers invested in them to hold exhaustive enquiries and 887 to   grant  full  reliefs  in  matters  relating  to   their employment,  we  cannot but hold that that Tribunal  is  the highest  forum created by the Act to give full and  complete relief  to public servants in matters of  their  employment, that too, with expedition.  The claims in the Writ  Petition since  related purely to matters relating to  employment  of the  respondent  under the State  Government,  the  Division Bench  of  the  High Court refused  to  entertain  the  Writ Petition  on  its  view  that  it  had  been  filed  by  the respondent   here  bye-passing  the  U.P.  Public   Services Tribunal.  When the Division Bench had refused to  entertain the  Writ  Petition of the respondent, in  exercise  of  its discretionary   jurisdiction  under  Article  226   of   the Constitution on its view that the respondent could not  have invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226  of the  Constitution for the redressal of his grievances,  bye- passing the special forum created specifically by a  statute for   redressal  of  such  grievances,   efficaciously   and adequately,  it  is not possible for us to think  that  such exercise of discretion was unwarranted, particularly when we have due regard to the settled legal position governing such matters, to which we have already adverted. When  the second Writ Petition, W.P. No. 7498 of 1990  filed by  the  respondent before the said High  Court  challenging over  again the very Order of the State Government by  which he  was  compulsorily retired came up for hearing  before  a learned   single   Judge,   that   learned   single    Judge notwithstanding  the  dismissal by a Division Bench  of  the same  High Court of his similar Writ Petition filed  earlier on  the  ground  of non-exhaustion  of  alternate  statutory remedy,  the appellants who were respondents in  the  second Writ  Petition,  as was rightly expected of them,  raised  a preliminary  objection as to its maintainability relying  on

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the  dismissal Order of the said earlier Writ Petition by  a Division  Bench of the same Court.  But, the learned  single Judge who overruled that preliminary objection in the course of  his Order now under appeal, entertained the second  Writ Petition  on  his  view  that  the  earlier  Writ   Petition dismissed on the ground of non-availing of alternate  remedy by  a  person  was no bar to  entertain  a  subsequent  Writ Petition filed by such person, and sought to derive  support therefore from the decisions of this Court in (i) Daryao and Others v. State of U.P. and Others, AIR 1.961 SC 1457, 1466; (ii) B. Prabhakar Rao and Others etc. v.     State of Andhra Pradesh and Others etc. etc., AIR 1986 SC 210, 227 and (iii) L.  Hirday Narain v. Income-tax Office Bareilly AIR 1971  Sc 33, 36 It  is true that the decisions to which the  learned  single Judge has 888 referred,  have ruled that the dismissal of a Writ  Petition in  limine  on  the alternate remedy being  available  to  a petitioner, does not bar the jurisdiction of the High  Court under  Article 226 of the Constitution or the Supreme  Court under Article 32 of the Constitution to entertain subsequent Writ  Petition  of the same party in relation  to  the  same subject  matter.   But, what has escaped the notice  of  the learned  single Judge is that they do not Jay down that  the discretion  of  the High Court to refuse  to  entertain  the first  Writ Petition on the ground of non-exhaustion by  him of  a statutory remedy, when had been rightly  and  properly exercised, the same could be ignored by the same high  Court when  the  party whose Writ Petition was  dismissed  on  the ground  of  non-exhaustion  of a statutory  remedy  files  a second Writ petition respecting the same subject-matter  and such second Writ Petition could be entertained.  Hence, this reason  is quite valid and fully supports the  first  ground urged in support of the appeal.                (ii)  : Entertaining by the High Court  of  a               second Writ Petition under Article 226 of  the               Constitution,     filed    by     a     person               notwithstanding the order of dismissal of  his               earlier Writ Petition, on the same matter. This  is  one of the two reasons on which the  first  ground urged in support of the appeal, is founded.  This reason  is not  concerned with the discretionary power of the Judge  or Judges   of  the  High  Court  under  Article  226  of   the Constitution  to  entertain  a second  Writ  Petition  of  a person,  whose  earlier Writ Petition was dismissed  on  the ground  of  non-exhaustion of alternate remedy but  of  such Judge  or  Judges having not followed  the  well-established salutary  rule  of judicial practice and procedure  that  an order  of a single Judge Bench or of a larger Bench  of  the same  High Court dismissing the Writ Petition either on  the ground  of laches or non-exhaustion of alternate remedy,  as well,  shall  not be bye-passed by a single Judge  Bench  or Judges  of  a larger Bench except in exercise of  review  or appellate  powers possessed by it.  In the case on  hand,  a Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad dismissed  the respondent’s Writ Petition challenging the sustainability of the  order  of  his  compulsory  retirement  from  the  U.P. Government  service,  while  exercising  its   discretionary jurisdiction  under Article 226 of the Constitution in  that it  took  the  view that the respondent  had  the  alternate remedy  in  the  matter  before the  forum  of  U.P.  Police Services  Tribunal constituted under the Act.  There  cannot be  any doubt that Order of dismissal of the  Writ  Petition could have been reviewed

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889 by  the same Division Bench, in exercise of  the  recognised power  of review possessed by it.  But, as a learned  single Judge  constituting a single Judge Bench of the same  Court, who has, in the purported exercise of his jurisdiction under Article  226  of the Constitution bye-passed  the  Order  of dismissal  of the Writ Petition made by a Division Bench  by entertaining a second Writ Petition filed by the  respondent in  respect  of the subject-matter which  was  the  subject- matter  of earlier Writ Petition, the question  is,  whether the well-established salutary rule of judicial practice  and procedure  governing  such  matters  permitted  the  learned single Judge to bye-pass the Order of the Division Bench  on the  excuse that High Court has jurisdiction  under  Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain a second Writ  Petition since the earlier Writ Petition of the fame person had  been dismissed on the ground of non-availing of alternate  remedy and not on merits. When  a  Judge  of single Judge Bench of  a  High  Court  is required to entertain a second Writ Petition of a person  on a  matter, he cannot, as a matter of course, entertain  such petition, if an earlier Writ Petition of the same person  on the same matter had been dismissed already by another single Judge Bench or a Division Bench of the same High Court, even if  such  dismissal was on the ground of laches  or  on  the ground  of  non-availing of alternate remedy.   Second  Writ Petition  cannot be, so entertained not because the  learned single Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the same,  but because  entertaining of such a second Writ  Petition  would render  the order of the same Court dismissing  the  earlier Writ Petition redundant and nugatory, although not  reviewed by  it in exercise of the recognised power.  Besides,  if  a learned single Judge could entertain a second Writ  Petition of  a  person respecting a matter on which  his  first  Writ Petition  was dismissed in limine by another learned  single Judge  or  a  Division Bench of the  same  Court,  it  would encourage  an unsuccessful Writ Petitioner to go  on  filing Writ Petition after Writ Petition in the same matter in  the same  High Court, and have it brought up  for  consideration before one Judge after another.  Such a thing, if is allowed to  happen,  it  could  result  in  giving  full  scope  and encouragement  to  an  unscrupulous litigant  to  abuse  the process  of the High Court exercising its writ  jurisdiction under  Article 226 of the Constitution in that any order  of any  Bench  of  such  Court refusing  to  entertain  a  Writ Petition  could be ignored by him with impunity  and  relief sought  in the same matter by filing a fresh Writ  Petition. This would only lead to introduction of disorder,  confusion and chaos relating to 890 exercise  of writ jurisdiction by Judges of the  High  Court for  there  could be no finality for an order of  the  Court refusing to entertain a Writ Petition.  It is why, the  Rule of  judicial  practice  and procedure  that  a  second  Writ Petition  shall not be entertained by the High Court on  the subject-matter  respecting which the first Writ Petition  of the same person was dismissed by the same Court even if  the Order  of such dismissal was in limine, be it on the  ground of  laches or on the ground of non-exhaustion  of  alternate remedy,  has  come to be accepted and followed  as  salutary Rule in exercise of writ jurisdiction of Courts. Hence,  we are of the view that this reason  which  supports the  first  ground urged in support of the appeal,  to  wit, that  the learned single Judge ought not have entertained  a second  Writ Petition in respect of the Order of  compulsory

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retirement  of the respondent, when a Division Bench of  the same  Court had refused to entertain a Writ Petition of  the same respondent filed respecting the same subject-matter for non-availing  of  the alternate remedy before the  forum  of U.P. Public Services Tribunal, is also a valid reason. As  the  said valid reasons fully support the  first  ground urged  in  support  of the appeal by which the  order  of  a learned  single  Judge of the High court is  assailed,  that order is liable to be interfered with and set aside. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the  Order of  the  learned single Judge under appeal and  dismiss  the Writ  Petition.  However, in the facts and circumstances  of the case, this judgment shall not be understood as coming in the  way  of the respondent in approaching the  U.P.  Public Services Tribunal for necessary relief in the matter, if  he is so entitled in law.  No costs. J.R.J.                                  Appeal allowed. 391