Reportable  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10061  OF 2010 [Arising out of SLP [C] No.29901/2010]

State of U.P. & Ors. … Appellants

Vs.

Jasvir Singh & Ors. … Respondents

O R D E R

R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J.

Leave granted. Heard.

2. In regard to acquisition of the lands of respondents under notifications  

dated 18.8.1981 and 14.11.1981 issued under section 4(1) and section 6 of  

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (’Act’ for short), the LAO had made an award  

offering  a  compensation  of  Rs.12000/-  per  acre  which  was  increased  to  

Rs.17000/- per acre by the Reference Court, and to Rs.30,000/- per acre by  

the Allahabad High Court. On further appeal by the respondents, this Court  

by order dated 12.9.2005 set aside the judgment dated 29.1.2004 of the High  

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Court  and remanded the  matter  to  the  High Court  for  fresh  decision  on  

merits in regard to quantum and statutory benefits, in accordance with law.  

This Court also observed that since the appeals were old, the High Court will  

have to take steps to dispose the appeals expeditiously. We are informed that  

the appeals (FA No.880 of 1993 and FA No.401 of 1998) are still pending  

consideration by the High Court.  

3. The respondents thereafter filed a writ petition (No.77449 of 2005)  

seeking a direction for issue of a fresh notification under sections 4 and 6 of  

the Act, after setting aside the notifications dated 18.8.1981 and 14.11.1981  

under sections 4(1) and 6 of the Act. They also sought a direction to the  

appellant to pay mesne profits and damages with interest, after adjusting the  

amount under the award already made, from the date of taking possession  

(19.9.1986) till date of issuance of fresh notification under Section 4(1) of  

the Act. The respondents thereafter filed two applications for amendment of  

prayers seeking a direction for determination of market value as on the date  

of  final  award  after  a  fresh  notification  and  not  with  reference  to  the  

notification dated 18.8.1991.

4. In the said writ proceedings, the Division Bench of the High Court  

apparently suggested to the state government that it should settle the claim  

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of the respondents. There was resistance from the state government. This led  

to  series  of  interim orders  by the High Court.  We may refer  to  them to  

understand the background in which the impugned order was made.

4.1) We may begin by extracting the directions issued on 19.5.2010.

“The grievance of the petitioners is that possession over the land of the  petitioners  has  been  taken  over  by  the  respondents  authority  without  authority of law.

This  Court  had  directed  to  settle  the  matter  outside  the  Court.  In  compliance of the Court’s  order,  the State Government constituted two  committees  of  which  first  was  headed  by  the  Collector  of  the  district  concerned, who after determining gave his report and has recommended a  rate, which was acceptable to the petitioner. The second committee which  was headed by Divisional Commissioner of the division concerned also  gave his report and has recommended a rate, which too was acceptable to  the petitioner. Thus, it is contended that the rate recommended by both the  committees is acceptable to the Petitioner.  

We, however, direct the Respondents-State Government to take a decision   on the report as recommended by both the committee within a period of   one month from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order.”   

(Emphasis supplied)

4.2) When the matter thereafter came up on 5.7.2010, the High Court made  

the following order :

“List/put up on 12.7.2010.

On that day,  the Principal Secretary, Public Works Department, Govt. of   U.P.  Lucknow shall  appear to show cause as  to  why our  order  dated   19.5.2010 has not been complied with by accepting the rates given by the   

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Collector and Divisional Commissioner. An affidavit shall also be filed by  him by that date.”

(Emphasis supplied)

In  compliance  with  the  said  order,  an  affidavit  was  filed  on  behalf  of  

Principal Secretary, P.W.D. explaining that as the District Magistrate and the  

Commissioner  had  arrived  at  the  rate  on  the  basis  of  sale  deed  dated  

25.09.2008 by ignoring the fact that the notification under Section 4(1) of  

the Land Acquisition Act had been issued on 18.08.1981, the said reports  

were  not  accepted  by  the  Government.  It  was  also  stated  that  the  State  

Government has taken a decision to pay compensation for the land at the rate  

of Rs.30,000/- per acre with solatium and interest, in all Rs.10,99,853-75,  

and that had been communicated to the Respondents. It may be noted that  

the  District  Magistrate  had  approved  the  report  of  the  District  Land  

Acquisition  Officer  dated  17.2.2009  working  out  the  amount  due  as  

Rs.29,86,99,086/- (at the rate 84,74,760/- per acre worked out on the basis of  

a sale deed 25.9.2008 in regard to a small plot measuring 240 sq.m.).  

4.3) When the matter came up on 12.7.2010, the High Court recorded the  

presence  of  Sri  Ravindra  Singh,  Principal  Secretary,  Public  Works  

Department, Govt. of U.P., Lucknow, and exempted his personal attendance  

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and adjourned the  matter  by  twenty  days.  When the  matter  came up on  

5.8.2010, the following order was made by the High Court:  

“Upon hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, Senior Advocate Shri  V.K.S.  Chaudhary  and  the  Advocate  General,  (it  is  directed  that  the)  Government shall file an affidavit within two weeks as to why the rate  recommended by the Collector has not been accepted.

List after two weeks for further hearing.”     

4.4) Thereafter the appellant filed an affidavit dated 19.8.2010 submitting  

that  the  matter  was  re-examined and found that  the  recommendations  of  

District Magistrate as well as of Commissioner were not binding on State  

Government; that this Court (in Swarna Lata Vs. State of Haryana - (2010) 4  

S.C.C. 532) has held that a writ petition challenging the notifications under  

Section 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was not maintainable after lapse  

of  several  years;  and  that  therefore  the  writ  petition  was  liable  to  be  

dismissed. The matter again came up on 30.8.2010 and the division bench  

perused  the  said  affidavit  and  requested  the  Advocate  General  to  be  

available  at  the  next  hearing on  7.9.2010.  When the  matter  came up on  

22.9.2010, the division bench made the impugned order which is extracted  

below :   

“Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, we direct the Principal   Secretary  (Finance)  and  Principal  Secretary  (Revenue)  Govt.  of  U.P.  

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Lucknow to appear in person before this Court on the next date fixed in   this case to show cause as to why the interest at the rate of 9% be not   charged on the delayed payment which has occurred on account of them  and the recovery thereof be not made from their personal salary to the   extent of 50% each respectively.

List this case for further orders/hearing on 20.10.2010. The copy of this  order be sent to the Principal Secretary (Finance) and Principal Secretary  (Revenue) Govt. of U.P. Lucknow through FAX by tomorrow.”

(Emphasis supplied)

5. Aggrieved by the said order dated 22.9.2010 directing the Principal  

Secretary (Finance) and Principal Secretary (Revenue) of the Government of  

U.P., to appear in person and the direction to show cause as to why interest  

at the rate of 9% per annum shall not be charged and the same be recovered  

from  their  personal  salary  to  the  extent  of  50%  each  on  the  payments  

allegedly delayed by them, the State has filed this appeal by special leave,  

raising the following questions :   

(a) Whether the High Court while hearing a writ petition challenging a  land acquisition can force the State Government to settle the matter  outside the Court?

(b) Whether the High Court was justified in calling the senior officers  of  the state  government  and directing them to settle  the matter,  when the writ petition filed by Respondents is being resisted by the  state government (by contending that the writ petition itself was  not maintainable as it purported to challenge the land acquisition  proceedings  24  years  after  the  issuance  of  notifications  under  Sections  4  and  6  of  the  Act  and  19  years  after  taking  of  the  possession)?

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(c) Whether the High Court was justified in repeatedly directing the  senior  officers  of  the  rank  of  Secretaries  to  Government  to  be  present in court, when the state government refused to settle the  matter,  and  pressurize  them  to  settle  the  disputed  claim,  by  threatening to recover the entire interest from their salaries?  

6. The fact that the issue relating to increase of compensation is pending  

in appeals before the High Court in pursuance of the order of remand by this  

Court,  is  not  in  dispute.  The  quantum of  compensation  will  have  to  be  

decided in those appeals and not in a writ petition. As on date, there is no  

order either in the appeal or the writ petition determining any amount (other  

than what was awarded by the Reference Court) as due to the respondents.  

The contention and prayer of the respondents in the writ petition that fresh  

notifications  should  be  issued  regarding  the  acquisitions  and  the  

compensation should be determined with reference to the current rates as on  

the date of such fresh notification and not as on 18.8.1981, is a matter that is  

yet  to  be  decided  in  the  writ  petition.  As both the  writ  petition  and the  

appeals are pending, it cannot be said that there is any delay on the part of  

the state government or its officers in effecting payment of compensation.  

The delay at present is in fact on account of the pendency of the matters  

before the High Court. If the High Court was of the view that the matter was  

getting unnecessarily delayed, or that any injustice had been caused to the land  

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owners,  it  ought  to  have  heard  the  writ  petition  finally  and  decided  the  

dispute on merits instead of listing the matter on several days and asking  

different senior officers of the state government to be present and virtually  

intimidate them to agree for a settlement by paying compensation at current  

market  value  instead  of  with  reference  to  18.8.1981.  The  procedure  and  

method adopted by the Division Bench of the High Court, to say the least, is  

improper and requires to be deprecated.

7. It is a matter of concern that there is a growing trend among a few  

Judges of the High Court to routinely and frequently require the presence, in  

court, of senior officers of the government and local and other authorities,  

including officers of the level of Secretaries, for perceived non-compliance  

with its suggestions or to seek insignificant clarifications. The power of the  

High Court under Article 226 is no doubt very wide. It  can issue to any  

person or authority or government, directions, orders, writs for enforcement  

of  fundamental  rights  or  for  any other  purpose.  The High Court  has the  

power to summon or require the personal presence of any officer, to assist  

the court to render justice or arrive at a proper decision. But there are well  

settled norms and procedures for exercise of such power.

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8. This court has repeatedly noticed that the real power of courts is not in  

passing decrees and orders, nor in punishing offenders and contemnors, nor  

in  summoning  the  presence  of  senior  officers,  but  in  the  trust,  faith  and  

confidence of the common man in the judiciary. Such trust and confidence  

should  not  be  frittered  away  by  unnecessary  and  unwarranted  show  or  

exercise of power. Greater the power, greater should be the responsibility in  

exercising such power. The normal procedure in writ petitions is to hear the  

parties through their counsel who are instructed in the matter,  and decide  

them  by  examining  the  pleadings/affidavit/evidence/documents/material.  

Where the court seeks any information about the compliance with any of its  

directions,  it  is  furnished  by  affidavits  or  reports  supported  by  relevant  

documents. Requiring the presence of the senior officers of the government  

in court should be as a last resort, in rare and exceptional cases, where such  

presence is absolutely necessary, as for example, where it  is necessary to  

seek assistance in explaining complex policy or technical issues, which the  

counsel is not able to explain properly. The court may also require personal  

attendance of the officers, where it finds that any officer is deliberately or  

with ulterior motives withholding any specific information required by the  

court  which  he  is  legally  bound  to  provide  or  has  misrepresented  or  

suppressed the correct position.

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9. Where the State has a definite policy or taken a specific stand and that  

has been clearly explained by way of affidavit, the court should not attempt  

to impose a contrary view by way of suggestions or proposals for settlement.  

A court  can  of  course  express  its  views and issue  directions  through its  

reasoned orders, subject to limitations in regard to interference in matters of  

policy. But it should not, and in fact, it cannot attempt to impose its views by  

asking an unwilling party to settle on the terms suggested by it. At all events  

the courts should avoid directing the senior officers to be present in court to  

settle the grievances of individual litigants for whom the court  may have  

sympathy.  The  court  should  realize  that  the  state  has  its  own  priorities,  

policies  and compulsions which  may result  in  a  particular  stand.  Merely  

because the court does not like such a stand, it cannot summon or call the  

senior  officers  time  and  again  to  court  or  issue  threatening  show cause  

notices.  The  senior  officers  of  the  government  are  in-charge  of  the  

administration of the State, have their own busy schedules. The court should  

desist from calling them for all and sundry matters, as that would amount to  

abuse of judicial power. Courts should guard against such transgressions in  

the exercise of power.  Our above observations do not of course apply to  

summoning of contemnors in contempt jurisdiction.

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10. We  have  made  the  above  observations  rather  reluctantly.  Our  

observations should not be construed as restricting or limiting the exercise of  

the  extraordinary  jurisdiction  of  High  Courts  under  Article  226  of  the  

Constitution of India. The observations are intended to be guidance for self-

regulation and self-restriction by courts.  It  became necessary as  we have  

noticed that the learned Presiding Judge of the Bench has been frequently  

making such orders directing senior officers of the Government to be present  

and  settle  claims.  It  is  a  coincidence  that  another  case  where  a  similar  

procedure was adopted by the learned Presiding Judge of the bench,  came  

up before us today – Lake Development Authority, Nainital vs. Heena Khan  

(CA No.10087-10090 of 2010 decided on 26.11.2010). We have no doubt  

that the learned Judge bona fide believes that by requiring the presence of  

senior officers, he could expedite matters and render effective justice. But it  

is not sufficient that the object of the Judge is noble or bonafide. The process  

of achieving the object should be just and proper, without exceeding the well  

recognised norms of judicial propriety.   

11. In this context we may refer to the following observations of this court  

in State of Gujarat vs. Turabali Gulamhussain Hirani - 2007 (14) SCC 94 :

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“A large number of cases have come up before this Court where we find  that  learned  Judges  of  various  High  Courts  have  been summoning  the  Chief  Secretary,  Secretaries  to  the  Government  (Central  and  state),  Directors General of Police, Director-CBI or BSF or other senior officials  of the Government. There is no doubt that the High Court has power to  summon these officials, but in our opinion that should be done in very rare  and exceptional cases when there are compelling circumstances to do so.  Such summoning orders should not be passed lightly or as a routine or at  the top of a hat.        Judges  should  have  modesty  and  humility.  They  should  realize  that  summoning a  senior official,  except  in some very rare and exceptional  situation,  and that too for compelling reasons, is counterproductive and  may  also  involve  heavy  expenses  and  valuable  time  of  the  official  concerned.   The judiciary must  have respect  for  the  executive and the  legislature.  Judges should realize that officials like the Chief Secretary,  Secretary  to  Government,  Commissioners,  District  Magistrates,  senior  police officials,  etc. are extremely busy persons who are often working  from morning till night.”  

12. On the facts and circumstances, the interim directions of the Division  

Bench  of  the  High  Court,  issued  while  dealing  with  a  writ  petition  

challenging  the  acquisition,  requiring  the  Principal  Secretary  (PWD),  

Principal Secretary (Finance) or Principal Secretary (Revenue) to be present  

on different dates, are improper and are liable to be interfered.   

13. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and  

request the High Court to dispose of the pending appeal expeditiously on  

merits. To avoid any impression of bias or prejudice, we request the Hon’ble  

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Chief Justice of the High Court to assign the matter to some other bench. All  

questions are left open.

……………………….J. (R.V. Raveendran)

New Delhi; ……………………….J. November 26, 2010. (A.K. Patnaik)

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