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PETITIONER: STATE OF U.P.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HARI SHANKAR TEWARI

DATE OF JUDGMENT25/02/1987

BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH PATHAK, R.S. (CJ) DUTT, M.M. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR  998            1987 SCR  (2) 426  1987 SCC  (2) 490        JT 1987 (1)   563  1987 SCALE  (1)462  CITATOR INFO :  R          1987 SC2332  (20)  R          1989 SC 764  (14)  D          1992 SC 979  (16A)

ACT:     National  Security  Act,  1980--Section  3(2)--Detention Order-Assailed in Court--Duty of Court--To find out  whether impugned  activities affect ’Public order’ or ’law  and  or- der’.

HEADNOTE:     A Division Bench of the High Court quashed the order  of detention of the respondent, made under Section 3(2) of  the National  Security  Act, 1980 as bad in law,  following  the earlier  Full Bench decision in the case of Ashok  Dixit  v. State  and others that a solitary assault on one  individual which may well be equated with ordinary murder can hardly be said to disturb public peace of place public order in  jeop- ardy so as to bring the case within the purview of the  Act, that  it  can only raise a ’law and order’  problem  and  no more,  and that the act or incident which may be  attributed to  the detenu may be reprehensible and yet if  it  concerns only  specific individuals and has no impact on the  general members of the community and has no potentiality of disturb- ing the even tempo of life of the people, it cannot be  held to be an activity prejudicial to public order.     In  appeal by the State, it was contended that the  High Court was wrong in quashing the detention order. Dismissing the appeal, this Court,     HELD: Conceptually, there is difference between law  and order and public order but what in a given situation may  be a matter covered by law and order may really turn out to  be one  of public order. Facts of each case have to  be  looked into  to  ascertain whether a matter relates to  the  larger circle or the smaller circle. An act which may not at all be objected  to  in certain situations is  capable  of  totally disturbing the public tranquility. When communal tension  is high,  an  indiscreet act of no significance  is  likely  to disturb  or  dislocate  the even tempo of the  life  of  the community.  An order of detention made in such  a  situation

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has to take note of the potentiality of the act objected to. No  hard  and fast rule can really be evolved to  deal  with problems of human society. Every 427 possible  situation  cannot  be  brought  under  water-tight classifications and a set of tests to deal with them  cannot be  laid  down. As and when an order of detention  is  ques- tioned,  it is for the court to apply these wellknown  tests to  find out whether the impugned activities upon which  the order  of detention is grounded go under the  classification of public order or belong to the category of law and  order. [432H; 434D-F]     In  the instant case, it is unnecessary to  examine  the facts  to find out whether the grounds furnished in  support of  the order of detention related to public order  or  not. The  respondent suffered detention for a major part  of  the period  covered by the order and was released when the  High Court quashed it. The detention being one of 1984, in normal course,  would have lapsed more than eighteen  months  hack. [434H; 435A-B]     Pushkar  Mukherjee  and Ors. v. State  of  West  Bengal, [1969]  2 SCR 635; Superintendent, Central Prison,  Fategarh v.  Ram  Manohar Lohia, [1960] 2 SCR 821;  Dr.  Ram  Manohar Lohia  v. State of Bihar and Ors., [1966] 1 SCR 709; In  re: Sushanta  Goswami & Ors., [1969] 3 SCR 138; Madhu Limaye  v. Sub Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr and others, [1971] 2  SCR 711;  Kanu Biswas v. State of WestBengal, [1972] 3 SCC  831; Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, [1970] 3 SCR 288;  Babul Mitra alias Anil Mitra v. State of West Bengal, [1973] 1 SCC 393; Kuso Sah v. State of Bihar and Ors., [1974] 2 SCR  195; Ram Ranjan Chatterlee v. State of West Bengal, [1975] 3  SCR 301; Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration and others,  [1982] 2 SCC 403; S.K. Kedar v. State of West Bengal, [1972] 3  SCC 816; Nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of West Bengal, [1972]  1 SCC 498, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 106 of 1987.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated 9.9.  1985  of  the Allahabad High Court in H.C.W.P. No. 16272 of 1984. Yogeshwar Prasad, D. Bhandari and Vishal Jeet for the Appel- lant. R.K. Garg, Mohan Pandey and R.B. Misra for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     RANGANATH  MISRA,  J. This appeal by  special  leave  is directed  against  the order of the Division  Bench  of  the Allahabad  High  Court by which it has quashed an  order  of detention of the respondent 428 made under section 3(2) of the National Security Act  (here- inafter  referred  to as ’the Act’). The High  Court  relied upon a decision of a Full Bench of that Court in Ashok Dixit v.  State  and others disposed of on 1.8.1985  being  Habeas Corpus  Petition No. 11161 of 1984 for its  conclusion  that the detention of the respondent was bad in law. The majority opinion of the Full Bench, as far as relevant said:               "A  solitary assault on one  individual  which               may  well be equated with ordinary murder  can               hardly  be  said to disturb  public  peace  or               place public order in jeopardy so as to  bring               the case within the purview of the Act. It can               only  raise a ’law and order’ problem  and  no

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             more.  Assaulting  an individual in a  bus  or               train  on  account of enmity may  affect  only               certain  individuals;  but if the  assault  is               made indiscriminately in the bus or train  and               passengers are harassed indiscriminately,  the               same would be likely to endanger public  order               as this kind of incident is bound to have such               impact that it will disturb the even tempo  of               life  of  the community. The act  or  incident               which  may be attributed to the detenu may  be               reprehensible  and  yet if  it  concerns  only               specific  individuals and it has no impact  on               the  general members of the community and  has               no  potentiality of disturbing the even  tempo               of life of the people, it cannot be held to be               an activity prejudicial to public order."     The Full Bench in its turn referred to several decisions of  this  Court in its attempt to bring  out  a  distinction between  the concepts of Law and order and public order  and one  of such decisions of this Court is the case of  Pushkar Mukherjee  v. State of West Bengal, [1969] 2 SCR  635.  This Court said therein:               "The difference between the concepts of public               order  and  law and order is  similar  to  the               distinction between public and private  crimes               in the realm of jurisprudence. In  considering               the  material elements of crime, the  historic               tests which each community applies are intrin-               sic  wrongfulness  or  the  social  expediency               which are the two most important factors which               have  lead to the designation of certain  con-               duct as criminal. Dr. Alien has  distinguished               public  and private crimes in the  sense  that               some  offences primarily injure specific  per-               sons and only secondarily the public interest,               while others directly injure the public inter-               est and affect individuals only remotely. (See               Dr. Allen’s Legal               429               Duties  pp.249) There is a  broad  distinction               along  these lines, the differences  naturally               arise in the application of any such test."     It is claimed that these observations of this Court were taken as the guideline by the Full Bench to ascertain wheth- er  the allegations brought the case within the  purview  of public order. Learned counsel for the appellant has strongly canvassed  that  the  test laid down by Dr.  Allen  was  not applicable  to judge the validity of a detention  order  and the  High Court has gone wrong in quashing the detention  of the respondent.     It  has not been disputed at the Bar that  public  order and law and order are two distinct concepts. There is  abun- dance  of  authority of this Court drawing  the  distinction between  the  two. In the case  of  Superintendent,  Central Prisons,  Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia, [1960] 2  SCR  821 Subba Rao J., as he then was, spoke for the Court thus:                     "The expression public order has a  very               wide  connotation. Public Order is  the  basic               need in any organised society. It implies  the               orderly  state  of society  any  community  in               which  citizens  can peacefully  pursue  their               normal activities of life. In the words of  an               eminent Judge of the Supreme Court of  America               "the  essential  rights  are  subject  to  the               elementary  need for order without  which  the

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             guarantee   of   those  rights  would   be   a               mockery   ........  It (public order) is  syn-               onymous  with public peace, safety  and  tran-               quillity."     In Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, [1966] 1 SCR 709 Hidayatullah, J., as he then was, speaking for the  majority view observed:                     -                     "One  has  to imagine  three  concentric               circles.  The  law and  order  represents  the               largest  circle within which the  next  circle               representing  public  order and  the  smallest               circle  represents  security of State.  It  is               then  easy to say that an act may  affect  law               and order but not public order just as an  act               may  affect public order but not public  order               just as an act may affect public order but not               the security of the State." 430 In  Sushanta  Goswami & Ors., [1969] 3 SCR  138  case,  this Court observed:-                     "The contravention of law always affects               public  order  but before it can  be  said  to               affect public order, it must affect the commu-               nity  or the public at large. A mere  disturb-               ance  of law and order leading to disorder  is               not  necessarily sufficient for  action  under               the  Act but a disturbance which  will  affect               public  order can alone justify the  detention               under that Act." A Constitution Bench was again called upon to deal with this problem. In the case of Madhu Limay v. Sub Divisional Magis- trate, Monghyr, [1971] 2 SCR 742 Hidayatullah, CJ., speaking for the Court observed:-               "In a judgment, the expression ’in the  inter-               est  of public order’ in the  constitution  is               capable  of  taking within  ’itself  not  only               those  acts which disturb the security of  the               State  or  act within order puglique,  as  de-               scribed  but also certain acts  which  disturb               public  tranquillity or are prejudice  of  the               peace. It is not necessary to give the expres-               sion  a  narrow meaning because, as  has  been               observed,  the expression in the  interest  of               public order is very wide." In  Kanu Biswas v. State of West Bengal, [ 1972] 3  SCR  831 this Court stated:-                     "The  question  whether a man  has  only               committed  a  breach of law and order  or  has               acted  in a manner likely to cause a  disturb-               ance  of  the public order, is a  question  of               degree and the extent of the reach of the  act               upon  the society. Public order is,  what  the               French  call, is something more than  ordinary               maintenance  of law and order. The test to  be               adopted in determining whether an act  affects               law and order or public order as laid down  in               the above case Arun Ghosh v. State of WestBen-               gal,  [1970]  3 SCR 288 is: Does  it  lead  to               disturbances  of  the current of life  of  the               community so as to amount to a disturbance  of               public  order  or  does it  affect  merely  an               individual leaving the tranquillity of society               undisturbed? In  Babul  Mitra v. State of West Bengal, [1973] 1  SCC  393 this court observed:

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431                    "The  distinction between law  and  order               and  public order have been pointed  out  suc-               cinctly in Arun Ghosh v. State of West  Bengal               (supra).  According to that decision the  true               distinction between the areas of law and order               and public order is that one of degree and the               extent  of  the reach of the act  in  question               upon  society. The Court pointed out that  the               act by itself is not determinative of its  own               gravity. In its quality, it may not differ but               in its potentiality it may be very different." A three-Judge Bench examined the same point in Kuso Shah  v. State  of Bihar, [1974] 2 SCR 195. Referring to  the  facts, the Court observed:                    "These acts may raise problems of law and               order  but we find it impossible to see  their               impact on public order. The two concepts  have               well-defined  contours.  It  being  wellestab-               lished  that stray and unorganised  crimes  of               theft  and assaults are not matters of  public               order  since  they do not tend to  effect  the               even  flow of public life. Infractions of  law               are bound in some measure to lead to  disorder               but  every infraction of law does  not  neces-               sarily result in public disorder. As  observed               in Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West  Bengal,               (supra) the line of demarcation must be  drawn               between serious and aggravated forms of disor-               der  which  directly affect the  community  or               injure the public interest and the  relatively               minor  breaches of peace of purely local  sig-               nificance  which  primarily  injure   specific               individuals  and  only in a  secondary  sense,               public  interest. In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia  v.               State  of Bihar, (supra) Hidayatullah, J.  has               expressed this concept picturesquely by saying               that  one  has  to  imagine  three  concentric               circles: law and order represents the  largest               Circle within which is the next circle  repre-               senting  public order and the smallest  circle               represents the security of the state. Law  and               order  comprehends disorders of  less  gravity               than  those  affecting public  order  just  as               public  order  comprehends disorders  of  less               gravity  than those affecting the security  of               state." In  Ram Ranjan Chatterlee v. State of West Bengal, [1975]  3 SCR 301 dealing with the same question, this Court stated:               "It  may be remembered that qualitatively  the               acts  which affect law and order are not  dif-               ferent from the acts which               432               affect  public order. Indeed a state of  peace               or  orderly tranquillity which prevails  as  a               result  of  the observance or  enforcement  of               internal  laws and regulations by the  Govern-               ment  is a feature common to the  concepts  of               law  and order and public order. The  distinc-               tion  between the areas of law and  order  and               public order, as pointed out by this Court  in               Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (supra)  is               one  of degree and extent of the reach of  the               Act in question on society. It is the potenti-               ality of the Act to disturb the even tempo  of

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             the  life  of  the community  which  makes  it               prejudicial  to the maintenance of the  public               order.  If the contravention in its effect  is               confined  only to a few  individuals  directly               involved as distinguished from a wide spectrum               of public it would raise a problem of law  and               order  only. These concentric concepts of  law               and  order and public order may have a  common               epicentre but it is the length, magnitude  and               intensity  of the terror-wave unleashed  by  a               particular  exception of disorder  that  helps               distinguished  it as an act  affecting  public               order from that concerning law and order." In  Ashok  Kumar v. Delhi Administration, [1982] 2  SCC  403 this Court re-examined the question and stated:-                     "The true distinction between the  areas               of public order and law and order lies not  in               the  nature or quality of the act but  in  the               degree  and extent of its reach upon  society.               The  distinction between the two  concepts  of               law  and order and public order is a fine  one               but  this does not mean that there can  be  no               over-lapping.  Acts  similar  in  nature   but               committed  in different contexts  and  circum-               stances  might cause different  reactions.  In               one case it might affect specific  individuals               only  and therefore touch the problem  of  law               and  order  while in another it  might  affect               public  order. The act by itself therefore  is               not  determinative of its own gravity.  It  is               the  potentiality  of the act to  disturb  the               even tempo of the life of the community  which               makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the               public order."     These are sufficient to draw the conclusion that concep- tually there is difference between law and order and  public order but what in a given situation may be a matter  covered by  law  and order may really turn out to be one  of  public order. We may now refer to two cases of 433 this  Court for that purpose. In Arun Ghosh’s  case  (supra) Chief Justice Hidayatullah stated thus:                    "Take  the  case of assault on  girls.  A               guest at a hotel may kiss or make advances  to               half a dozen chamber maids. He may annoy  them               and also the management but he does not  cause               disturbance of public order. He may even  have               a fracas with the friends of one of the  girls               but even then it would be a case of breach  of               law and order only. Take another case of a man               who  molests  women  in lonely  places.  As  a               result  of his activities girls going to  col-               leges  and schools are in constant danger  and               fear. Women going for their ordinary  business               are afraid of being waylaid and assaulted. The               activity of this man in its essential  quality               is  not  different from the act of  the  other               man. But in its potentiality and in its effect               upon  the public tranquillity there is a  vast               difference. The act of the man who molests the               girls in lonely places causes a disturbance in               the  even tempo of living which is  the  first               requirement  of public order. He disturbs  the               society  and community. His act makes all  the               women  apprehensive of their owner and he  can

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             be  said to be causing disturbance  of  public               order  and  not merely  committing  individual               action which may be taken note by the criminal               prosecution agencies." Equally  useful would be reference to two other  cases,  Ma- thew, J. in S.K. Kedar v. State of West Bengal, [1972] 3 SCC 816 approved the ratio of the decision referred to above and indicated :-               "The  question whether a person has only  com-               mitted a breach of law and order or has  acted               in  a manner likely to cause a disturbance  of               the  public  order is one of  degree  and  the               extent of the reach of the act upon the socie-               ty.  An act by itself is not determinative  of               its  own gravity. In its quality, it  may  not               differ  from other but in its potentiality  it               may be very different. Similar acts in differ-               ent contexts affect differently law and  order               on the one hand and public order on the other.               It is always a question of degree of the  harm               and  its  effect upon  the  community.  Public               order  is  the even tempo of the life  of  the               community  taking  the country as a  whole  or               even as specified localities. It is the degree               of disturbance and its effect upon the life of               the  community in a locality which  determines               whether  the  disturbance amounts  only  to  a               breach of law and order." 434 In  Nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of West Bengal,  [1972]  1 SCC 498 the Court observed as follows:                    "The target of arson, was an  educational               institution and particularly the registers and               other  papers  maintained by  it.  The  object               obviously was vandalism, to disrupt its  work-               ing  by  burning its records and to  create  a               scare  so that neither the teaching staff  nor               the  pupils would dare attend it for  prosecu-               tion  of  studies.  The acts  in  question  no               doubt,  would be acts similarly to those  com-               mitted  by a person who resorts to arson,  but               in  the circumstances, were acts different  in               potentiality  and therefore, amounted  to  af-               fecting public order."     In the final analysis, therefore, one has to turn to the facts  on each case to ascertain whether the matter  relates to the larger circle or the smaller circle. An act which may not  at all be objected to in certain situations is  capable of totally disturbing the public tranquillity. When communal tension  is  high, an indiscreet act of no  significance  is likely to disturb or dislocate the even tempo of the life of the  community. An order of detention made in such a  situa- tion has to take note of the potentiality of the act object- ed  to. No hard and fast rule can really be evolved to  deal with  problems  of human society. Every  possible  situation cannot  be brought under water-tight classifications  and  a set  of tests to deal with them cannot be laid down. As  and when  an  order of detention is questioned, it  is  for  the Court  to apply these well-known tests to find  out  whether the impugned activities upon which the order of detention is grounded  go  under the classification of  public  order  or belong to the category of law and order.     The  criticism  of  learned council  for  the  appellant against the ratio in Pushkar Mukherjee’s case is perhaps not warranted. We have pointed out above that the ratio of  that

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decision  has  been  approved in several  later  cases.  The reference  to Dr. Allen’s classification was  obviously  in- tended to bring into bold relief the basic distinction.  The guideline  indicated in that judgment in another part  falls in line with the general principles adopted by this Court in several  authorities. We do not find that the Full Bench  of the Allahabad High Court adopted any wrong basis to draw the difference between the two concepts.     In  our opinion, it is unnecessary to examine the  facts of  this case to find out whether the grounds  furnished  in support of the order of 435 detention  related  to public order or not.  The  respondent suffered detention for a major part of the period covered by the  order and was released when the High Court quashed  it. The  detention  being one of 1984, in normal  course,  would have lapsed more than eighteen months back. The appeal fails and is dismissed. N.P.V.                                          Appeal  dis- missed. 436