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PETITIONER: STATE OF U.P.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BOOTA SINGH & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/08/1978

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION:  1978 AIR 1770            1979 SCR  (1) 298  1979 SCC  (1)  31  CITATOR INFO :  F          1989 SC1205  (18)

ACT:      Appeal  against   acquitlal-Interference-Scope  of-High Court misreading  evidence, reversing, judgement of Sessions Court-Important conclusion  arrived at by Sessions Court not displaced-High  Court  overlooking  important  circumstances which fully prove the case.      Code of  Criminal Procedure 1898-Sec. 288-Confession of accused-Use of-Corroboration  by other independent evidence- Necessity of-Satisfaction and support in extrinsic evidence- Use of.      Identification  Parade-Necessity   of  keeping  accused baparda explained-evidence  of identification-When  of  weak character.

HEADNOTE:      Three of  the four  accused persons were related to one another and  the fourth  was a,  friend. One of them entered into a  deal for the purchase of land but found it difficult to finance the transaction. The prosecution alleged that all of them  entered into  a conspiracy to obtain money by means fair and  foul and in pursuance of that they hit upon a plan to hire  a taxi,  take possession  of it,  do away  with the driver and  utilities the  sale proceeds  for payment of the purchase money.  By giving  a false reason they hired a taxi in Dehra  Dun, drove  it by  a forest road and after killing the driver they changed the number plate and reached Bombay. When they tried to sell the taxi in Bombay a discrepancy was noticed in  the chassis  number whereupon  respondent No.  I made good  his  escape.  Eventually  respondent  no.  I  was caught. He made a confessional statement before a magistrate detailing various  parts played  by each of the accused. The Session Judge  convicted all  the respondents under ss. 30:2 read with  s. 34 IPC and also under s. 120B. All the accused were convicted of various other offences.      On appeal  She High  Court reversed the judgment of the Sessions Judge  and acquitted  all the  respondents  on  the ground that (i) since the confession of respondent No. 1 was not voluntary  no reliance  could be  placed on it; (ii) the evidence of  identification is  a very weak type of evidence and should  be closely  scrutinised before reliance could be

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placed on  it; and  (iii) the  statements of  P. Ws. S and 7 before  the   trial  court   were  inconsistent  with  their statements made before the committing magistrate.      After special leave to appeal to this Court was granted to  the   State  three  respondents  surrendered  while  one remained absconding. One of the three later died. ^      HELD: (  1 ) The High Court committed errors of law and fact on  most vital  points. It  refused to  draw interences from proved  facts  and  has  laid  down  legally  erroneous principles on  such vital  and crucial  evidence as  that of identification which is a valuable piece of evidence. On the question of identification it has laid down wrong law on the basis of which it failed to consider 299 that evidence. Regarding the confession of the respondent it has not  made a  correct  approach  which  is  to  take  the confession  and   then  to  find  out  how  much  of  it  is corroborated by  other independent  evidence. The confession was  discarded   on  irrelevant   grounds  based   on   pure speculation. Normally  this Court does not interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the High Court but in this case the High Court has, on the one hand misread the evidence and completely overlooked  some of  the important  circumstances which proved  the prosecution  case and  on the  other while setting aside  the judgment  of the Session Judge has failed to displace  the important  reasons given  and circumstances relied on  by the  Sessions Judge. There are substantial and compelling reasons  for setting aside the order of acquittal passed in favour of respondent No. 1. [333 G-H, 334 A-D]      (2)(a) The  High Court  was not  justified in rejecting the confession  or doubting  its veracity  on  the  supposed belief that  respondent No. 1 was in police custody from the time he  was produced before the magistrate to the time when the   statement   was   recorded.   Before   recording   the confessional  statement  the  magistrate  put  a  number  of questions  to  the  accused  to  satisfy  himself  that  the confession  was  being  made  voluntarily  and  without  any coercion or  undue influence.  The respondent stated that he was making the confession to speak the truth. The magistrate took care to see that there was no Police officer present in the court  when the confession was recorded. The magistrate, after warning  the respondent  that he was not bound to make the statement,  gave him  more than  three hours’  time  for reflection. The  High Court’s conjecture that the respondent must have  been sent  to police custody after being produced before the  magistrate is  contrary to  the evidence  of the magistrate. [305H, 306 A-D]      (b) As  the confession  of the  accused was a retracted one it  could be  acted upon  only if  it  is  substantially corroborated  by   independent  circumstances.   It  is  not necessary that a retracted confession should be corroborated in each  material particular, it is sufficient that there is a general corroboration of the important incidents mentioned in the confession. [308 E]      In the  instant case  the circumstances  proved by  the prosecution not only amounted to a complete corroboration of the  confession   but  provided   additional  circumstantial evidence against  the respondent  which are  of a conclusive nature. [308 F]      (c) ’I  he High  Court has made a wrong approach to the whole case  by not  taking the  confessional statement first and then finding,, out whether there arc other circumstances corroborating the various parts of the statement made in the confession. This  may be due to the fact that the High Court

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found that  the confession was not voluntary and, therefore, should be excluded from scintillation [305 E-F]      (d)  In   the  confessional  statement  the  respondent narrated the  motive for  the incident leading to the murder of the  deceased and  this has  been clearly corroborated by the evidence of the vendor of the land. ’I he finding of the High Court  on the  question of motive is against the weight of evidence  on record.  The trial court rightly pointed out that the  prosecution had  proved the motive for the offence by clear evidence. [309 H-310 B]      (e) The  facts mentioned  in the  receipt of  the taxi- stand fully  corroborate the  confessional statement  of the respondent. The  High Court rejected this important document mainly on the ground that it was not mentioned in the report filed with the police by the taxi-stand owner. If he did not mention 3-526 SCI/78 300 in this report about the receipt as having been given by the respondent, that  by itself  would no throw suspicion on the authenticity of  the receipt.  Moreover, the. report was not really the report of murder. containing a detailed narration of all  facts. The witnesses who identified the accused were independent witnesses and were not known to him nor did they bear any animus against him. [310 F-G, 311 A-B, 311 G-H]      (f) Although  there is  no direct  corroboration of the actual t assault on the deceased the circumstantial evidence admitted  in   the  confession  and  corroborated  by  other evidence is  a clear  pointer to  the fact that the deceased had accompanied  the respondent  from the  place. they hired the taxi  to the place of murder. ’The respondents were last seen  with  the  deceased  before  the  murder.  Taking  the circumstances before and after the death of the deceased the murder could  not be  explained  by  any  other.  reasonable hypothesis then the guilty of the respondent [324 B-C]      (g)  There   is  enough   evidence  to  show  that  the respondent deliberately  changed the number plate of the car to conceal its identity and this was done after the deceased had been put to death. This fully corroborates his statement made  in  his  confession.  This  important  document  which demonstrates the  incriminating conduct  of the  respondent. apart from  corroborating his  statement in the confessional statement. has been completely overlooked by the High Court. [325 C]      (h)  The   High  Court  has  taken  an  artificial  and incorrect view in holding that the confession was completely disproved  by   the  medical   evidence.  The  statement  of respondent No. I regarding the death of the deceased was the only manner in which he was murdered. The Sessions Judge has rightly explained  that since  only two  shots were fired it may be  that no shot hit the bones but remained in the flesh and no  trace could  be found  because the  flash had peeled off. Secondly  the postmortem  report revealed that the head was served  from the  body and  this could  have  been  only possible if  the injury was inflicted by a gandasa. Here too since the  flesh had peeled off no trace of the injury could be found.  The skeleton  had been  identified hyp  good  and cogent evidence.  This finding  of the Session Judge had not been displace(l by the High Court.[330 E-H, 331 A-B]      (i) The dead body had been found at the instance of one of the accused and this evidence is clearly admissible under s.  27   of  the  Evidence  Act.  This  has  Bsc  proved  by independent  witnesses.   ’This  clearly   established   the identity of the corpus delecti. [331 E, G]      (3)  l‘he  High  Court  was  wrong  in  laying  down  a

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universal  rule   of  application   that  the   evidence  of identification is  a weak  type of evidence. Where a witness correctly identifies  the accused  at a  test identification parade  held   by  a  magistrate  after  observing  all  the essential formalities  and taking  the necessary precautions and also  identifies the  accused in  court, the evidence of identification can  be believed  unless the  evidence of the witness suffers  from some  other infirmity. The evidence of identification  becomes   strong  if   the  witness  has  an opportunity of  seeing the accused not for a few minuets but for. some length OT time in broad daylight. [317 C, 318 C-D]      In the  present case  the respondent‘s  confession  was proved by the evidence of witnesses who saw him at the taxi- stand for  quite  some  timer  These  evidences  were  in  a position to notice the features of the respondent as closely as  possible.   Their  evidence   fully   corroborates   the confessional statement of the respondent. [318 E-F] 301      Budh Sen  & Anr.  v. State  of U.P.  AIR 1970  SC  ]321 explained. -      Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1978] 3 S.C.R. 694, followed.      State of  Rajashan v.  Ravitha, AIR  1962  Raj.  78  FB approved.      Dhokal Singh & Anr. v. The State, ILR (1953) 3 Raj. 762 disapproved.      (4) It  is well-established that where a person makes a statement before  the trial court which is inconsistent with his statement  made before  the committing magistrate, it is unsafe to  place implicit reliance on his evidence. Before a judge decides  to accept the evidence brought in under.s.288 of the  Code of  Criminal Procedure  as true and reliable he has to  satisfy  himself  that  this  is  really  so.  ’This satisfaction in most cases can come in only if there is such support in  extrinsic  evidence  as  to  give  a  reasonable indication that  not only  what is said about the occurrence in general  but also  what is  said against  the  particular accused sought  to be  implicated in  the crime is true. But where even  without any  extrinsic  evidence  the  judge  is satisfied that the evidence is true and can be safely relied upon, the Judge will be failing in his duty in not doing so. [321 A-E]      In the  instant case  the evidence of P.W. 5 and P.W. 7 fully supported  the prosecution  case that the accused were seen in  a hotel.  P.W. 5  categorically stated that what he had stated before the committing court was not true and thus certified that  what he  stated in  the trtial court was not the correct  version. In his confession statement respondent No. 1  had stated that he, along with the other accused. had taken food  in a  hotel. Thus  there are  cogent reason  and extrinsic circumstances  to lend  support to  the  inference that the  statements given by these two witnesses before the committing magistrate  were in fact true and correct and the Sessions Judge  therefore we.  right  in  relying  on  those statements.  On   the  other   hand  while  rejecting  their statements the High Court made no effort to find out whether the prior  statements made  by them  before  the  committing court was  in fact  true having  regard  to  the  facts  and circumstance of  the ease.  The High  Court was  clearly  in error in  rejecting the  evidence of the two witness.[321 F- H,322 C-E]      Shranappa  Mutyappal  Halke  v.  State  of  Maharastra. [1964] 4 SCR 589 followed.      Harprasad &  Ors. v. State of Maharashtra. [1971] 3 SCC 455 applied.

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    (5,  Acceding.   to  the   Confessional  statement   of respondent No.  2. was not present in the forest at the time of murder.  Nor was  there any  evidence to show that he was with the  respondent No. 1 later. There is some force in the contention that  since at  the time  when the respondent was identified at  the parade  he had  shaved off  his beard and that it  would be  difficult for  the witnesses  to identify such a  person. The possibility of mistake in identification cannot be  excluded. Even  the trial  court has not accepted the  evidence   of  identification   against  him.   In  all probability respondent No. 2 was a co- conspirator but it is unsafe to convict him when he had been acquitted by the High Court. 1332 E-G] 302

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDlCTlON: Criminal Appeal No. 32 of 1972.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  order dated 29-9-1970  of the  Allahabad High  Court  in  Criminal Appeal No. 151] /69.      D. P. Uniyal and o. P. Rana for the Appellant.      A. N.  Mulla, Yogeswar  Pd., S.  K. Bagga  and Mrs.  S. Bagga for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      FAZAL ALI,  J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the  order of  the Allahabad  High Court  dated 29th September, 1970  by  which  the  High  Court  acquitted  the respondents of  the  charges  framed  against  them  by  the Sessions Judge Dehra Dun.      The Sessions  Judge, Dehra  Dun by his order dated 16th July, 1969 convicted the respondents Boota Singh, Asa Singh, Trilok Singh  and Raghubir Singh under section 302 read with section 34  I.P.C. and also under section 120-B I.P.C. Boota Singh, Trilok  Singh and  Asa Singh  were sentenced to death under section  302 read  with section  34 and  section 120-B I.P.C. while  Raghubir Singh  was sentenced  to imprisonment for life for the offence under section 302 read with section 34 and  section 120-B  I.P.C. The four respondents mentioned above were  also  convicted  under  section  364  read  with section 34  and section  120-B I.P.C.  and section  394 read with section  34 and  section 120-B  I.P.C. and each of them were sentenced  to rigorous  imprisonment  for  seven  years under each  count. Boota  Singh was further convicted of the offence under  section 419, I.P.C. and section 471 read with section 465  T.P.C. and  section 47]  read with  section 466 T.P.C. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years, one year  and four  years  respectively.  As  three  of  the respondents, viz.,  Boota Singh,  Trilok Singh and Asa Singh were sentenced to death, the Sessions Judge made a reference to the  High Court  of Allahabad  for  confirmation  of  the sentence of  death. The  respondents who have been convicted by the  Sessions Judge  also  filed  appeals  against  their convictions  and  sentences.  The  appeal  was  heard  by  a Division Bench  of the  Allahabad High  Court which reversed the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge and acquitted all the respondents of the charges framed against them.      Thereafter. the  State of  U.P. preferred  an appeal to this Court and after special leave was granted by this Court the appeal  has been  placed before  us for  hearing. At the time when  the special  leave was  granted, the Court issued non-bailable  warrants   against  the  four  respondents  in pursuance of  which Boota  Singh. Trilok  Singh and Raghubir

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Singh surrendered hut Asa Singh remained absconding. 303 During the  pendency of  the appeal  the  respondent  Trilok Singh died and it is, therefore, manifest that the appeal so far as  this respondent  is concerned  has abated. Before we took up  the appeal  for hearing we segregated the appeal of Asa Singh  as he was absconding and directed that the appeal against other  respondents will  be heard  but the appeal of Asa Singh will be kept pending.      Briefly the  prosecution  case  may  be  summarised  as follows: Respondent  Asa Singh and his brother Bal Singh had entered into  an agreement  with Ram  Lal P.W.  16  and  his father Kaka Ram for purchasing 68 bighas of land at the rate of Rs.  225 per bigha and an earnest money of Rs. 3200/- had been paid  by Asa  Singh and  Bal Singh  at the  time of the agreement and  the balance  of the  amount was  agreed to be paid on the 25th December, 1963. The respondent Trilok Singh had accompanied Asa Singh and the latter went to Ram Lal for negotiating the  aforesaid purchase. The prosecution alleged that Asa  Singh  and  Boota  Singh  respondents  were  first cousins and  were residents  of Chhidarwala. Boota Singh was also related  to Trilok  Singh inasmuch  as Trilok sister is wedded to  the cousin  of Boota  Singh. After the agreement, Asa  Singh  appears  to  have  found  some  difficulties  in arranging for the money to be paid to the vendee P.W. 16 Ram Lal and  under the  terms of  the agreement if the money was not paid  by the due date the entire amount of earnest money of Rs.  3200/-  was  liable  to  be  forfeited.  In  such  a situation the  four respondents entered into a conspiracy to obtain money  by means  fair or  foul. They  accordingly hit upon a  plan to  obtain a  taxi on  hire  and  after  taking possession of  it to  do away  with the  driver and sell the taxi at  some other  place and  utilise the consideration of the sale  for payment  to Ram Lal towards the balance of the purchase money.  In execution  of this common plan Asa Singh remained at  Doiwala while  Boota Singh,  Trilok  Singh  and Raghubir Singh  went to  Dehra Dun and contacted Inder Singh P.W. 2  at Punjab  Taxi Service, Dehra Dun. Trilok Singh and Raghubir Singh  remained standing  at the  petrol pump a few paces away from the office of the Punjab Taxi Service. Boota Singh respondent  went in  and approached Inder Singh P.W. 2 and introduced  himself as  K. Sharma of the Indian Army and gave out that he was on a round for recruiting girls for the military and  for this  purpose he  needed the taxi on hire. The bargain  was finally struck and Inder Singh P.W.2 agreed to provide  Boota Singh  with his taxi at the rate of Rs. 30 per day. Boota Singh thereafter executed a document Ex. Ka-4 in proof  of the  receipt of  the car  and paid  Rs. 50/- as advance. Lal  Singh, the deceased son of Inder Singh was the driver of  the taxi  and in  fact the  virtual owner  of the taxi. The  taxi given  to Boota  Singh bore number UPS-6679. Inder Singh directed Lal Singh to take the taxi 304 with Boota  Singh and  his companions.  Raghubir  Singh  and Trilok Singh  boarded the  taxi when  it reached  the petrol pump. From  Dehra Dun  the taxi  came to  Doiwala where  the party of Boota Singh was joined by Asa Singh. Thereafter all the members  of the  party took  their meals at the hotel of Khem Singh  P.W. 5  and Boota  Singh had purchased a cake of soap from the shop of Jaidev Singh P.W. 7. Thus all the four respondents were  last seen  together at  Doiwala by P.W.s S and 7.  From there  the respondents proceeded to Chhidarwala by forest  road and  after  crossing  some  forest  barriers ultimately reached  Chiddarwala  where  it  was  decided  to murder Lal  Singh and  take complete possession of the taxi.

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In pursuance  of this  conspiracy Lal Singh was taken to the forest and  killed by  the  respondents.  According  to  the prosecution, as  disclosed in  the confession  of respondent Boota Singh Ex. Ka-81, Trilok Singh first fired two shots at the deceased  and then Asa Singh dealt a gandasa blow on the neck of the deceased.      After  having  accomplished  this  nefarious  feat  the respondents took the precaution of removing the number plate of the  car and  substituted a new plate bearing number UPM- 3236. Thereafter,  the respondents  Boota Singh and Raghubir Singh went  to Ambala  where they  tried to get the car with the new  number insured,  and finally  landed at  Bombay and negotiated for  the sale  of the car through a broker and in this connection  contacted P.W.  62 Raja Ram Narain Rane who offered to  buy the  car Al Rs. 16,000 out of which a sum of Rs. 500  was to,  be given  to Raja Ram Narain Rane P.W. 62. This happened  on  16th  December,  1963.  At  the  time  of negotiations with Raja Ram Narain Rane, Boota Singh gave out his name  as J.P.  Singh and  represented that he was son of S.P., Bareilly.  It appears however that some discrepency in the chassis  number and  the number  of the engine was found out  which   raised  a   serious  suspicion   regarding  the genuineness of  the car  and the  matter was reported to the C.I.D. by  P.W. 62.  On the  18th February  1963  respondent Boota Singh along with Anand Singh P.W. 9 went to the office of the  R.T.O. at  Bombay and  contacted P.W.  35  Rati  Lal Chhotu Bhai Desai who was a Motor Vehicles Inspector and who was shown  various papers by Boota Singh. Desai then saw the car and  discovered some  tampering with the chassis number. The papers were? therefore, placed before the Police officer and Boota Singh sensing some trouble made good his escape.      Meanwhile as  Lal Singh  did not  return  for  quite  a number of  days, his brother Harcharan Singh got worried and filed a  missing report before the Police Station Dalanwala, district  Dehra  Dun  on  31st  December,  1963  wherein  he expressed his apprehension that the person who had hired the taxi may have killed Lal Singh and driven away the 305 car This  report was  treated by  the Police  as F.I.R.  and investigation was started in the course of which the blanket of deceased  Lal Singh was recovered from the forest and the respondent Boota  Singh  soon  after  his  arrest  made  the confession Ex.  Ka-81 before  a Magistrate  making  a  clean breast of  the whole  affair. Subsequently,  the respondents were identified  by some  of the  witnesses at  T.I. parades held  at   Nainital  and   Dehra  Dun.   After   the   usual investigation, the Police submitted a charge against all the four respondents  on the  basis of which they were committed to the  Court of  SESSIONS and  convicted and  sentenced  LI indicated above.      The central  evidence against  the respondents consists of the  confessional statement  made by  Boota Singh on 16th March, 1964  before Mr. M. L. Sharma, Magistrate First-class who has  been examined as P.W 23 and in the confession Boota Singh appears  to have  made a  clean breast  of the  entire story detailing  the various  parts played  by him  and  his other  companions.   The  confession   was  sought   to   be corroborated by  a large  number of  circumstances proved by the prosecution  at the  trial and  which will  be discussed hereafter. In  fact,  the  motive  for  the  murder  of  the deceased has  been clearly  indicated in  the confession and was also  corroborated by  the  oral  evidence  led  by  the prosecution as  also the  statement of  Respondent Asa Singh recorded  under   section  342   of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure.

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    The High  Court does  not appear to have made a correct approach to  the present  case inasmuch as it first tried to deal  with   the  various   circumstances  which   went   to corroborate the  confession and dealt with the confession in the last  and held  that as the confession was not voluntary no reliance  could be  placed on  the same.  We should  have expected the  High Court  to have  dealt with the confession first because  that was  the sheet anchor of the prosecution case. The  other  circumstantial  evidence  adduced  by  the prosecution went  to  corroborate  dk  important  facts  and incidents mentioned  in the  confession. We  have  carefully perused the  judgment of  the trial Judge and the High Court and we  are constrained  to observe-that  the High Court has neither  marshalled   the  evidence  correctly  nor  has  it considered the  effect of  some of  the most  important  and vital circumstances  which clinched some of the basic issues arising in  the case.  A major  part of  the judgment or the High Court  is based  on pure  speculations and  some of the reasons  given   by  the   High  Court   for  rejecting  the prosecution evidence are based on conjectures and surmises.      We would,  therefore, like to start with the confession of  respondent  Boota  Singh  which  is  the  pivot  of  the prosecution case.  It would appear that before reloading the confessional statement of the respon 306 dent  Boota  Singh  the  Magistrate  had  put  a  number  of questions to  satisfy himself  that the confession was being made  voluntarily   and  without   any  coercion   or  undue influence. The  respondent Boota  Singh on being asked as to why he was making the confession, clearly stated that he was doing so  because he  wanted to speak the truth. Boota Singh further testified that he was in police custody only for two days before  making the  confession and  where his treatment was good.  The Magistrate  also took  care to see that there was  no  police  officer  present  in  the  court  when  the confession was  recorded. In  his deposition, the Magistrate stated that Boota Singh was produced before him at 1.30 p.m. On the  16th March  and thereafter having warned him he sent the respondent  back  in  court  custody  and  recorded  the statement at  about 4.45  p.m. Thus,  the  respondent  Boota Singh was  given more  than three  hours for reflection. The High Court  conjectures that the respondent Boota Singh must have been sent to police custody after being produced before the Magistrate  on 16th March at .30 p.m. his finding of the High Court is contrary to the evidence of the Magistrate who clearly deposed thus:-           "At the  time when the statement was recorded, the      accused was  produced by  the Court  Moharrir. No  Sub-      Inspector was  present there. There was no constable as      well. When the Court Moharrir came with the accused the      accused was  already  in  handcuffs.  I  got  the  same      removed when  he came inside. The Moharrir went outside      with the handcuffs". This statement clearly shows that after 1.30 p.m. respondent Boota Singh  was in the custody of the Court Moharrir and it was from  his custody  that the  respondent Boota  Singh was produced before  the Magistrate  at 4.45  p.m. for recording the confession. For these reasons, therefore, the High Court was not  justified in  rejecting the  confession or doubting its veracity  on the  supposed belief  that  the  respondent Boota Singh  was in  police custody  from the  time  he  was produced  before   the  Magistrate  to  the  time  when  the statement was recorded.      Another ground  on which  the High  Court rejected  the confession was  that the respondent Boota Singh was taken by

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K. N. Sharma, S.I. in police custody from 10-3-64 to ]2-3-64 and the  High Court  thought that this period must have been utilised for  coercing the  respondent Boota Singh to make a confession which he ultimately made four days later.      The High  Court further found that Vikram Singh P.W. 59 interrogated the  respondent Boota Singh as far back as 9-1- 1964 and  it is  not explained  by the prosecution as to why there was  a  delay  of  two  months  on  the  part  of  the respondent Boota Singh for making the con 307 fessional statement.  The  High  Court  further  found  that immediately after  the S.I.  sent the respondent Boota Singh to jail  custody on  12-3-64, he  submitted a report for the confession of  the respondent  being recorded  which  throws doubt on  the voluntary  nature of  the confession. The High Court further  conjectured that  from these  circumstances a reasonable inference can be drawn that third degrees methods must have  been used  by the police. With very great respect we are  constrained to  say that  the High Court indulged in pure speculation  on this  aspect of  the matter.  There  is absolutely nothing  on record  to show  that the  respondent Boota Singh  was tortured or beaten while in police custody. In fact,  D.W. 1 N. S. David, Assistant Jailor District Jail Dehra  Dun  who  was  examined  on  behalf  of  the  defence categorically stated  that on  12-2-1964 K.  N. Sharma, S.I. admitted the  respondent Boota  Singh in  jail. The  witness testified that  at the  time when he was admitted to jail he had no  injury on  his person  at  that  time.  The  witness further states  that there  was an  entry  in  the  relevant registers to  show that Boota Singh was sent to the Court on 16-3-1964 and  there was  no injury  on the  person of Boota Singh when  he was sent to Court. Furthermore, on his return from court  to jail, there was also no entry with respect to any injury  on his  person.  This  circumstance,  therefore, completely rules  out the  possibility of Boota Singh having been assaulted,  beaten or  tortured by  the police while in their  custody.   Moreover,  the   High   Court   completely overlooked a very important fact which went to show that the confessional  statement   was  true   and   voluntary.   The respondent Boota  Singh in  his statement  under section 342 Cr. P.C.  before the  committing Magistrate which is Exhibit Ka. 113 in answer to question No. 22 stated thus :-           "Bikram  Singh,   Sub-Inspector  and   Kundan  Lal      Sharma, C.I.D. Inspector, took us to P.S. Dalanwala and      locked up  us separately  from each other. They beat me      severely and  pressed and  threatened me  that if I did      not make  a statement  as desired  by them,  they would      kill me."           "There they  beat me  to unconsciousness  and then      brought me  and then  pressed me to make a statement. I      was not  at all in my senses, when they brought me back      to the lock-up, the court had departed." This statement was completely falsified by the circumstances indicated above  yet Boota  Singh gave  a complete  go by to this plea  taken by him before the committing Magistrate and in his statement before the  Sessions Judge he categorically stated that  he made no statement before the Magistrate, but his signature was taken on a blank paper which was 308 converted into  a confession.  In answer  to question No. 21 regarding  the  confession  having  been  read  out  to  the respondent Boota Singh, he stated thus:-           "No I  did not  make any statement. He obtained my      signature on a blank paper" Thus, the  two statements were wholly inconsistent with each

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other and  conclusively show  that the  stand taken  by  the respondent which differed from court to court was absolutely false and  incredible. This  circumstance goes a long way to demolish the  case of  the respondent  Boota Singh  that the confession was  extorted. We are sure that if the High Court had noticed  this glaring  inconsistency in the statement of the Respondent  regarding the manner in which the confession was made  it would  not have thrown out the confession as it did. On  the other  than hand  we have carefully perused the confession of  the respondent  which seem, to have a ring of truth in  it and  in which  the respondent  has ill  a  very straight-forward manner  narrated the  various incidents  in their logical sequence. The Magistrate has also testified on oath that  he was  fully satisfied that the statement of the respondent Boota  Singh was  true and voluntary. The learned Sessions Judge  after considering  the circumstances  gave a clear finding that the confession was true and voluntary and there was  no reason  to distrust  it. The  High Court  was, therefore, not justified in brushing aside the well reasoned finding of  the Session  Judge on  this point  merely on the basis of  speculation and  the circumstances  which were  in fact not  proved. As  however the confession was a retracted one  it   could  be   acted  upon   only  if   substantially corroborated  by   independent  circumstances.   It  is  not necessary that a refracted confession should be corroborated in each material particular, but it is sufficient that there is  a  general  corroboration  of  the  important  incidents mentioned in  the confession.  In the  instant case, we find that the  circumstances proved  by the  prosecution not only amount to  a complete  corroboration of  the confession  but provide  additional   circumstantial  evidence  against  the respondent which  are of  a conclusive  nature. We would now deal with  the confession  in the  light of the observations made above.      To begin  with, Boota  Singh states  in his  confession that he  was a  resident of  Churkana  in  the  District  of Sheikhupur and  at the  relevant time  he  was  residing  at Kichha in  the District  of Nainital.  Asa Singh  and Trilok Singh were cousins, the sons of Chacha and Tau of each other and live  together at  Chhidderwala. The  sister  of  Trilok Singh was  married to Piara Singh, the respondent’s father’s sister’s son  at village  Moonak, as  a result  of which Asa Singh and  Trilok Singh  used to  visit  the  respondent  at Kichha off and on. The respondent then goes 309 on to  state that  Trilok Singh  wanted to  purchase land at Chidderwala and had paid Rs. 1200/- as earnest money to Hans Raj. The  whole transaction  was for  Rs. 16,000/-   or  Rs. 17,000/-? but  as the  purchaser was  short  of  money.  Asa Singh. Trilok  Singh, Raghubir  Singh and  Gopi Goojar along with Boota  Singh conspired together to bring some taxi from Dehra Dun  and sell  the same,  so that  the balance of  the consideration money for the land might be paid and the sale- deed got  registered. This really constituted the motive for the incident  leading to  the murder  of the  deceased,  Lal Singh. The gist of the motive mentioned in the confession is clearly corroborated  by the evidence of P.W. 16 Ram Lal who has deposed that during the time of the occurrence Asa Singh and his  brother Bal  Singh wanted  to purchase his land and the transaction  was settled  at the  rate of  Rs.  225  per bigha, and 68 bighas of land were to be sold. The purchasers had given an advance of Rs. 3200/- which was to be forfeited if the  balance of  the amount  was not  paid.  The  witness further stated  that  as  the  balance  of  the  amount  was eventually not  paid, the  vendor did not deliver possession

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of the land. Thus, shorn of the details Ram Lal corroborates the  statement   of  the   respondent  Boota  Singh  in  the confession regarding  the transaction,  whether the  earnest money was  Rs. 1600/- or the consideration was more than Rs. 16,000 is  a matter of detail on which even if there is some discrepancy that  will not  put the  prosecution case out of court, so  far  as  the  motive  is  concerned.  It  may  be mentioned  here   that  the  Respondent  Asa  Singh  in  his statement before the Sessions Court admitted the purchase of the land  from Ram Lal and merely denied the knowledge as to whether Rs.  3200/- had  been paid  as  earnest  money.  The respondent Asa  Singh statement  that the  land  was  to  be purchased by  Bal Singh  and not  by  him  really  makes  no difference as  Ram Lal  who was admittedly the purchaser was an independent  witness and  he testified  on  oath  to  the transaction relating  to the  sale-deed which  provided  the immediate motive  for the  murder. The  High Court  seems to have brushed  aside the  evidence or  Ram Lal  merely on the ground that  there was  no documentary evidence to show that there was  any negotiation  between the  parties before  the sale-deed was executed and held that the evidence of Ram Lal was not  sufficient proof  of the fact that Asa Singh was in any manner  concerned with  the land purchased by Bal Singh. In  coming   to  this  finding  the  High  Court  completely overlooked the  fact that  the nature of the transaction was clearly mentioned  in the  confession which has been held by us to  be true  and voluntary.  Once the motive mentioned in the confession  was corroborated by an independent witnesses like P.W.  16 Ram  Lal whose  evidence was  and could not be disbelieved by  the  High  Court,  that  was  sufficient  to corroborate the 310 part of  the confession which related to motive. The finding of the  High Court  on the  question of motive appears to be against the  weight of the evidence on the record. The trial court rightly  pointed out  that the  prosecution had proved the motive for the offence by clear evidence.      The next  circumstance mentioned  in the confession was that on 8th December, ]963 Asa Singh, Trilok Singh, Raghubir Singh, Gopi Goojar and respondent Boota Singh started in the tractor of  Asa Singh  and on reaching Doiwala Asa Singh and Gopi stopped  there but  the  other  three,  namely,  Trilok Singh, Raghubir  Singh and  Boota Singh  proceeded to, Dehra Dun by  bus. Boota  Singh went  to the Punjab Taxi Stand and had a  talk with  Inder Singh  for hiring  a  taxi  and  was ultimately successful  in persuading Inder Singh to give the taxi to  him on  hire at  the rate  of Rs. 30/- per day. The respondent further  mentioned in the confession that he paid an advance  of Rs.  50/- and  gave a receipt to Inder Singh. Thereafter, three  of them  proceeded to Doiwala in the taxi hired by  Boota Singh  which was  driven by the deceased Lal Singh who  was the  son of  Inder Singh.  This part  of  the confessional statement  is fully  corroborated not  only  by oral but  also by  documentary evidence. In the first place, there is  Exhibit Ka-4  which is  a receipt  granted by  the respondent Boota Singh to Inder Singh for the advance of Rs. 50/- which  he had  paid to Inder Singh for hiring the taxi. The receipt appears to have been signed by the respondent as K. Sharma.  The signature  of the Respondent was sent to the expert along  with his  admitted specimen signatures and the expert P.W.  32 Shiv  Ram Singh  found  that  it  completely tallied with  the signature  of the  respondent Boota Singh. The expert  had marked the signature of the respondent Boota Singh at  Exhibit Ka-4  as S-3894. Thus, the facts mentioned in the  receipt  fully  corroborate  the  statement  of  the

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respondent Boota Singh mentioned above and the fact that the signature of  the respondent  Boota Singh  tallied with  the signature which he had made on this document is an intrinsic proof of  the genuineness  of Exhibit  Ka-4. The  High Court seems to have rejected this important document mainly on the ground that it was not mentioned in the report filed by P.W. 1 Harcharan  Singh, brother of the deceased who had lodged a written report  at the  Police Station  Dalanwala, Dehra Dun stating therein  that the  respondent had  hired the taxi at the rate  of Rs.  30/- per  day on the ground that he had to visit several  places  like  Hardwar,  Roorkee,  Saharanpur, Meerut, Moradabad,  Mathura, Brindaban,  Aligarh, Agra  etc. The description  oil the  car is given in the report and the witness has  expressed the  apprehension that the respondent may have  killed the  driver and driven away the car. By the time the  report was  lodged  Harcharan  Singh  was  not  in possession 311 of full  facts, and  therefore, he gave a very brief report. If he did not mention the receipt given by the respondent in this report  that by itself would not throw any suspicion on the authenticity  of the  receipt more particularly when the conclusive  circumstance  that  the  receipt  contained  the signature of  the respondent as found by the expert had been established. Moreover,  the report was not really the report of murder  containing a detailed narration of the facts. The brother of the deceased was naturally upset because the taxi having been  taken on  the 8th December had not returned for 23 days  but he  did not  know what  had happened.  In these circumstances, there  was no occasion for Harcharan Singh to mention every  possible detail  in this report. Furthermore, what the  High Court  completely  overlooked  was  that  the respondent Boota  Singh himself  clearly  mentioned  in  his confession that  he had  paid an  advance of  Rs.  50/-  and executed a receipt.      Apart from  this, there  is the oral evidence of P.W. 2 Inder Singh,  P.W. 8.  Pritam Singh  and P.W. 14 Jagir Singh that the  respondent had approached them for hiring the taxi and he himself executed the receipt Exhibit Ka-4 and affixed his signature  in their  presence. The  respondent had given out his name as one K. Sharma. Apart from the question as to whether these  witnesses correctly identified the respondent or not,  there was  sufficient proof  of  the  execution  of Exhibit Ka-4.  For these reasons, therefore, we are not in a position to  support the  finding of  the  High  Court  that Exhibit Ka-4  was not a genuine document. Thus, Exhibit Ka-4 being  proved   must  be  held  to  the  strongest  possible circumstance to  corroborate the  confession of  Boota Singh regarding the  first stage  of the prosecution case, namely, the hiring of the taxi.      Apart  from  Exhibit  Ka-4  there  is  independent  and reliable evidence  to show  that Boota  Singh and others had approached P.W. 2 Inder Singh for living the taxi on hire to respondent Boota  Singh and  the deal was struck as a result of which  Rs. 50/-  was paid  in advance. In this connection the witnesses  examined by  the prosecution arc P.W. 2 Inder Singh, P.W.  8 Pritam  Singh and  P.W. 14  Jagir Singh. At a T.I. parade  held on  9-3-1964 at  Dehra Dun Boota Singh was identified by  P.W. 2 Inder Singh and P.W. 14 Jagir Singh as the person  who had  approached him  for taking  the taxi on hire. At  the same  parade the  respondent Trilok  Singh was identified by  P.W. 8  Pritam Singh and P.W. 14 Jagir Singh. All these  witnesses were  undoubtedly independent witnesses and were  not known to Boota Singh at all, nor they bore any animus against  him. There  was thus  no reason  for them to

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depose falsely against the respondents. 312      P.W. 2 Inder Singh deposes that on 9-12-63 which he was in his  office along  with Pritam  Singh and  Jagir Singh an unbearded gentleman  came to him at about 4 to 4.30 p.m. and represented that  he wanted  to have a taxi car on hire. the witness goes  on to  say that the driver the car was his son Lal Singh  the deceased  and the  number of the car was UPS- 6679 and  it was  of Fiat  make. The  respondent Boota Singh whom the  witness  i(identified  later  at  a  T.I..  parade settled the  hiring charges  at Rs.  30 per  day and paid an advance of Rs. SO/-. The respondent further gave his name as K. Sharma  and wanted  the taxi  for 20  clays. The  witness further stated  that Apart  from the  respondent Boota Singh who masqueraded as one K. Sharma there were two more Sardars near the petrol pump where the car was standing. To the same effect is  the evidence  of P.W. 14 Jagir Singh an(l P.W. 2, Pritam Singh.  The  learned  Sessions  Judge  has  carefully considered the  evidence of these witnesses and has accepted the same.      The High  Court  appears  to  have  brushed  aside  the evidence of  these  independent  witnesses  on  trivial  and speculative grounds.  In the  first place,  the  High  Court found that  there were  tell tale  circumstances in the ease which did  not exclude  the possibility  of  the  respondent Boota Singh and others having been shown to the witnesses at police station  Moonak and  Dalanwala before the T.I. parade was held  at Dehradun.  The circumstances relied upon by the High Court  may be  summarised thus:  P.W. 20  Sri Ram Bajaj admits that  he had arrested Boota Singh and Trilok Singh at Moonak and  kept both  of them  look cd up at Police Station Moonak.           P.W. 59  Vikram   Singh deposes as follows founded      Boota Singh  and Trilok  Singh at P.S. Moonak. They had      been under  custody of  the Punjab Police and they were      Bapurdah." (Emphasis supplied(l). On the  basis of  the evidence  of these  witnesses the High Court suspected that the respondents must have been shown to the witnesses  at Police  Station Moonak.  In coming to this finding, however,  the High  Court completely overlooked the evidence of  these very  witnesses which completely excluded the possibility  of the  respondent having been shown to the witnesses. P.W.  20 who  had arrested Boota Singh and Trilok Singh categorically stated thus:-           "I arrested  Boota Singh  and Trilok Singh accused      at Moonak  in connection  with that  case. I  made them      Bapurdah and told them that they were to Be identified.      I shut  Both of  them   at P.S.  Moonak in  a  Bapurdah      state". (Emphasis ours) . 313 The evidence of these two witnesses clearly shows that every possible  precaution   was  taken  to  keep  the  respondent Bapurdah throughout and even at the Police Station Moonak so that the  respondent may  not be  able to see the witnesses. Similarly, P.W. 59 Vikram Singh clearly stated that although he found  Boota Singh  and Trilok  Singh at P.S. Moonak they were in  police custody  and they were Bapurdah. In the face of this  clear and  specific evidence where was the question for the  High Court  to conjecture  or  speculate  that  the witness must  have been  shown to  the.  respondent  at  the police station  Moonak. the High Court ought to have decided this question  on  the  direct  evidence  of  the  witnesses concerned rather than on pure surmises and conjectures.      The High  Court particularly  relied on the evidence of P.W. 3  Amir Ahmad  who had  stated that he had arrested the

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respondent Asa  Singh on  6-1-1964 and  taken him  to police station Dalanwala. The witness goes on to state that on 8-]- 1964 the  Station officer  took him  to Moonak  and he  went along with him. The witness further state(l that there. were three Sardars  with them  and one of them was known as Gyani and there  were two drivers, one of them was Jagir Singh and the other  was Pritam  Singh. Thus,  the inference  the High Court draws  from this  evidence is  that the respondent Asa Singh was  shown to  the witnesses  Pritam Singh  and  Jagir Singh who were brought together from Dalanwala to Moonak.      The trial  Court discussed the evidence of this witness and gave  cogent reasons  for rejecting the testimony of the witness particularly  when the witness was a disgruntled one having been  suspended on  a criminal  charge and therefore, would be ready to oblige the defence. Moreover, the Sessions Judge  while   criticising  the  evidence  of  this  witness observed as follows:-           "The defence  examined Amir Ahmad (P.W. 3) who was      posted as  a Head  Constable, Karanpur  outpost,  Dehra      Dun. He stated that Asa Singh was arrested by him on 6-      1-64 near Roadways Stand, Dehradun and that he took him      to P.S.  Dalanwala. In  cross-examination  he  admitted      that he  did not make any entry as to the arrest of Asa      Singh on  6-1-64 in the General Diary, that he left the      accused at the Police Station without getting any entry      made because  it was  the  work  of  the  officers.  He      admitted that  he used  to get  entries of  arrival and      departure of accused made at the. Police Station and he      signed the  same. He  was unable  to explain why he did      not ll  adopt the  same procedure in this instance. The      alleged explanation  that he  did not get an entry made      because he had no 314      warrant does  not appeal  to reason..........  He  also      admitted that  he was  being prosecuted  for murder  by      Meerut C.I.D.  and that  Meerut C.I.D.  was responsible      for his  arrest. He  has, therefore,  a grudge with the      Meerut C.I.D.  He did  not know  Asa  Singh  before  he      arrested him.  He had no warrant for his arrest. He was      not given  any direction for the arrest of the accused.      He merely  knew that  the Station  officer had left for      his arrest. In the circumstances it was not expected of      him to  have arrested  accused Asa  Singh.  The  entire      statement  of   the  witness   is   untrustworthy   and      unconvincing." None of  the reasons  given by  the learned  Sessions  Judge appear to have been displaced by the High Court and were not even noticed  by it.  In view  of the admission made by this witness it  is extremely doubtful if the witness in fact had arrested Asa Singh and his entire story appears to be a pure fabrication. For  these reasons,  therefore, the  High Court was not  at all justified in relying on the evidence of P.W. 3 at its face value.      Reliance was  also placed  on the  evidence of  P.W. 27 Mahendra Singh who states thus:           "On 6-1-64  S.O. Vikram Singh Head Constable Amir.      Ahmad, Constables  Raja Ram,  Pritam  Singh,  Tej  Ram,      Mathma Singh  and I  reached Manak. There was none from      the public from us. We started from Dehradun on 8-1-64.      I do  not remember the time when we started from there.      We reached  Mannak in  the Right of 8th and 9th. We did      not go  to Police Station Manak. We stayed at Mannak in      the night  of 8th  and 9th. We had gone there to arrest      Boota Singh and "others". The High  Court appears  to have  made much  of the  alleged

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admission of  the witness  in the  case that  P.W. 3  Pritam Singh had accompanied the police party to Moonak where Boota Singh was  arrested, and  there fore, there is a possibility that Pritam  Singh might  have been shown to Boota Singh. In the first  place, the  witness says  nothing of the sort and the High  Court appears to have misread the evidence of this witness. The  words used by the witness are "Constables Raja Ram, Pritam  Singh, Tej  Ram, Mathma  Singh  and  I  reached Mannak‘’ which  clearly indicate  that he  refers to  Pritam Singh Constable and not to Pritam Singh witness. The witness has further  clarified this  fact by  making  a  categorical statement "that  there was  none from  the public  with us." Merely because  there was  a constable by the name of Pritam Singh it  could not be inferred that P.W. 27 had referred to the witness 315 and not  to the  constable. Even  so, the evidence discussed above  clearly shows that the respondents were kept Bapurdah and concealed  from the  view  of  the  witnesses.  We  are, therefore ,  unable to  agree with  the finding  of the High Court  on   this  point   which  is   not  based  on  proper appreciation of the evidence of P.W. 27.      Apart from  this in  a recent judgment in Ramanathan v. State of  Tamil Nadu(1) this Court approving the decision of the Full  Bench of  the Rajasthan  High Court  in  State  of Rajasthan v. Ranjita(2) and disapproving an earlier decision of the  same High  Court in  Dhokal Singh  and Anr.  v.  The State(::) observed as follows:-           "It appears  however that  the Learned counsel was      not aware  of a later decision of the Full Bench of the      Rajasthan High Court in State of Rajsthan v. Ranjita in      which Dhokal  Singh’s case was referred for the purpose      of  laying  down  the  correct  law  on  the  following      matters:-           (1)  Whether it  is necessary  that entries should           be made  in the  various  Police  records  of  the           precautions that  were to be taken for keeping the           accused  persons   ba-parda  while   under  Police           custody.           (2)  Whether it should be specified in the warrant           of commitment  of the  accused, when he is sent to           the judicial  custody that  he is  to be  kept ba-           parda till  the identification parade takes place,           and what  precautions should  the jail authorities           take for keeping the accused ba-parda.           (3)  Whether necessarily entries should be made in           the jail  records for keeping the accused ba-parda           while he is in the judicial lock up".           The Full  Bench of  the High  Court  examined  the      matter and  held that  the propositions  laid  down  in      Dhakol Singh’s  case could not be regarded as a rule of      law and  had been  far too  broadly laid  down to merit      acceptance even  as practical  propositions  and  could      only lead  to the  accentuation of  the difficulties of      honest investigating  officers and  truthful witnesses.      The Full Bench answered the questions as follows:-           "(1 )  It is  not necessary  that entry  should be      made in  the various  police records of the precautions      that were  taken for  keeping the  accused persons  ba-      parda while under police custody. (l) [1978] 3 S.C.R. 694. (2) A.I.R.. 1962 Raj. 78. (3) I.L.R. (1953) 3 Rajasthan 762. 4-.526 SCI/78 316

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         (2) It  is also  not necessary  to specify  in the      warrant of commitment of the accused when he is sent to      judicial custody  that he  is to  be kept ba-parda till      The  identification  parade  takes  place,  nor  it  is      necessary to  specify the  precautions  that  the  jail      authorities are  to take  for keeping  the accused  ba-      parda.           (3) It  is also  not necessary that entries should      be made in the jail records for keeping the accused ba-      parda while he is in the judicial lock up."      In the  instant case  we have  already pointed out that there is  positive and definite evidence that the respondent was kept ba-parda wherever he was.      Finally, the High Court relied on the circumstance that Boota Singh  was taken  from Moonak to Sangrur and thence to Delhi for a T.I. parade but the T.I. parade ultimately never took place. In this connection, the High Court relies on the affidavit of  Vikram Singh where the deponent states in para 2 as follows:-           "In the  present case,  I took  the  witnesses  to      Delhi Jail on 24.2.64 for the purpose of identification      of the accused Boota Singh and Trilok Singh. On 26.2.64      at about  8 A.M. I came back to Dehradun along with the      witnesses".      The High  Court infers  that as  the respondents  Boota Singh and  Trilok Singh  were brought  for identification at Delhi  and  the  witnesses  were  also  there,  there  is  a possibility of  the  witnesses  having  been  shown  to  the respondents at Delhi on the 25th or 26th February, 1964. The High Court  however completely  overlooked  para  4  of  the affidavit of this very witness where he stated thus:-           "I and  the witnesses remained together and during      that period  the accused  Trilok Singh  and Boota Singh      did not  meet   and the  witnesses nor  did they see us      anywhere".      Thus, from  the affidavit  of this  witness it is clear that although  the respondents  were brought  to Delhi  they were not  at all  allowed to   meet or see the witnesses. In view of  this clear statement there was absolutely no reason for the  High Court to have conjectured that the respondents must have been shown to the witnesses at Delhi. This finding of the High Court is based on no evidence.      Apart   from   this,   there   is   another   intrinsic circumstance which  shows that  the respondents  were  never shown to  the witnesses.  Even though, according to the High Court, Pritam  Singh was  one. Of  the witnesses  who had an opportunity to see respondent Boota Singh yet it appears 317 when the  T.I. parade  took place at Dehra Dun on 9th March, 1964   Pritam Singh was not able to identify Boota Singh who was identified  only by law. 2 Inder Singh and P.W. 14 Jagir Singh. This  completely negatives the suggestion that Pritam Singh could  have seen  the respondents  either at Moonak or Delhi in  which case  he would  have felt  no difficulty  in identifying the  respondent Boota  Singh. In  view  of  this circumstance,  therefore,  we  are  unable  to  sustain  the finding of  the High  Court on  this point and we are of the opinion that  the High  Court appears  to have  reversed the well considered  finding of  the Sessions  Judge without any legal justification.      Another ground  on which  the High  Court rejected  the identification of  P. Ws.  2, 8 and 14 was by laying down an extra ordinary  principle of law, viz., that the evidence of identification is a very weak type of evidence and should be closely scrutinised  before reliance  is placed  on it.  The

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High Court observed as follows:-           "There can  be no two opinions about the fact that      the evidence  of identification  is a very weak type of      evidence  and  should  be  closely  scrutinised  before      reliance  is   placed  on  it.  Reliance  can  in  this      connection be  also made  to the recent decision of the      Supreme Court in Budh Sen and Anr. v. State of U.P."(1)      In support  of its  view the  High Court  relied  on  a decision of  this Court  in Budh Sen & Anr. v. State of U.P. (supra).  We   feel  that  the  High  Court  has  completely misdirected itself  on this  point. In  the first place, the decision of  this Court  relied upon  by the High Court does not at  all apply  to the facts of the present case. In Budh Sen &  Anr. v.  State of  V.P. (supra) what was held by this Court was  that where an accused is not known to the witness from before  and there  is no  T.I. parade,  but the witness identifies the  accused for  the first time in court suck an identification is  valueless. In this connection, this Court has observed as follows:-           "As a  general rule, the substantive evidence of a      witness is  a statement  made in court. The evidence of      mere identification  of the accused person at the trial      for the  first time  is from its very nature inherently      of a  weak character.  The evidence  in order  to carry      conviction should  ordinarily clarify   as  to how  and      under what  circumstances  he  came  to  pick  out  the      particular accused  person and  the details of the part      which the  accused played in the crime in question with      reasonable particularity.  The purpose  of a prior test      identi- (1) A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1321. 318      fication  ,   therefore,  seems   to  be  to  test  and      strengthen the  trustworthiness of that evidence. It is      accordingly considered  a  safe  rule  of  prudence  to      generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony      of witnesses in court as to the identity or the accused      who ar‘e  strangers to  them, in  the form  of  earlier      identification proceeding."      When this  Court held  that evidence  of identification for the  first time at the trial was of a weak character, it merely meant  that where  the evidence of a witness in court is not  tested by  prior identification  parade held in jail not much  reliance can be placed on such a evidence. This is however not  the case  here, nor  can we  take the aforesaid said decision  to lay  down a  rule of universal appellation that the  identification evidence  is a  very weak  type  of evidence. Where the witness correctly identifies the accused at a  T.I. parade  held by  a Magistrate after observing all the  essential   formalities  and   taking   the   necessary precautions and  then identifies  the accused  also in court the evidence  of identification  can be  believed unless the evidence of  witness  suffers  from  some  other  infirmity. Moreover, the evidence of identification becomes stronger if the witness has an opportunity of seeing the accused not for a few  minutes but  for some  length of  time, in  broad day light, when  he would  be able  to note  the features of the accused more  carefully than on seeing the accused in a dark night for  a  few  minutes.  In  the  present  case,  it  is mentioned in  the confession of Boota Singh and is proved by the evidence  of P.Ws. 2, 8 and 14 that the respondent the a talk with  P.W. 2  Inder Singh  in  the  presence  of  other witnesses for  quite some  time and  struck a deal regarding the taxi and gave a receipt to Inder Singh. These witnesses, therefore, were  in a position to notice the features of the

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respondent Boota  Singh  as  closely  as  possible.  In  the circumstances therefore,  we are  unable to  agree with  the High Court  that the  evidence of  identification  of  these witnesses is a weak type of evidence. We also disapprove the universal rule  of application  laid down  by the High Court that the  evidence of  identification  is  a  weak  type  of evidence. For  the reasons  given above we see no reasons to distrust the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 8 and 14 arid we hold that the prosecution  has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent Boota Singh had approached Inder Singh for hiring the taxi  and Inder  Singh allowed  Boota Singh  to take the taxi along  with his son Lal Singh, deceased. In view of the fact that Inder Singh and Jagir Singh identified Boota Singh at T.  I. Parade  which has  been proved by Magistrate M. L. Sharma, P.W.  23 there  was  no  reason  to    distrust  the evidence of identification of these two witnesses as against Boota Singh.  For the  same reasons  there was  no reason to distrust the  evidence of  P.W. 8  Pritam Singh  and P.W. 14 Jagir Singh when 319 they had  identified the  respondent Trilok Singh at a r. 1. parade and  also in  court. The finding of the High Court on this point  is, therefore,  wholly incorrect both in law and on facts.      Thus, the  evidence of  the aforesaid  witnesses  fully corroborates the  confessional statement  of Boota  Singh in regard to  the first  stage of the prosecution case, namely, the circumstances relating to the hiring of the taxi.      The next  circumstance mentioned  in the  confession is that after  hiring the taxi the party of the respondent went to Doiwala  where they were found by Asa Singh and Gopi. All of them  took tea in a hotel. This fact is also corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 5 Khem Singh and P.W. 7 Jaideo Singh which appears  to have  been rejected  by the which Court on grounds which  are not  legally sound.  To begin  with,  the respondent Boota  Singh made  a clear admission that he, Asa Singh and  Lal Singh  and others  had tea  at the  hotel  in Doiwala. P.W. 5 Khem Singh deposed in court that he knew Lal Singh. Two  years ago  Lal Singh had taken food in his hotel along with  4 or  5 persons  who were  not known  to him. He further gays that he knew Asa Singh and he does not remember whether Asa  Singh was  among the persons who had taken food at  his  hotel.  Although  the  witness  had  made  quite  a different statement  before the committing court even in his statement before the Sessions Court he does not disprove the prosecution case because he admits that Lal Singh and 4 or 5 others had  taken food  in the  hotel and  he does  not know whether Asa  Singh had  taken the  food there or not. Before the committing  Court, the witness had stated that Lal Singh and others  had taken  food in his hotel in the beginning of the month  of December  and the  payments was made by all of them collectively.  He had also stated that of these persons who had  taken food at the hotel had come out of the taxi of Lal Singh  and stayed  there for  about 10 to 15 minutes. He has also  stated that  Asa Singh  and Trilok Singh had also’ come to  take food.  The  witness,  was,  however,  declared hostile because  he resiled  from the  statement made before the committing  court and  after his  attention was drawn to the statement, the aforesaid statement was transferred under Section 288  and in  law became  substantive  evidence.  His statement before  the committing  court is Exhibit Ka-72. In this statement he deposed as follows:-           "My hotel  is at the Chaurrah Bazar in Doiwala. In      the beginning of the month of December, 1963 it was the      time of  6 p.m.  I was  at my  hotel. On the evening of

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    that day these men came by a car to take food. The shop      of Jaideo  Singh is in front of my shop. These men took      food at my 320      shop. Dola  Singh is called Jaideo Singh as well. He is      present in  the Court.  He came  to take  his tea  when      these men  were eating their food. Then he went back to      his shop  out of  these men  Trilok Singh and Asa Singh      accused pre sent in Court were known to me from before.      The car  belonged to  Lal Singh. He too was known to me      from before.  After taking  their food  these four  men      along with  Lal Singh  went away  by  the  car  towards      Rishikesh. Out  of those  four men,  two men  were  not      known to me".      In his  statement in  court the  witness  categorically stated that  the statement he had made before the committing court was  correct. But  in cross  examination he made out a new case  that the statement before the committing court was made at the instance of the police. Indeed, if it was so, he would have  at once complained to the committing Magistrate. Similarly, P.  W. 7 Jaideo Singh completely resiled from his statement which  he made  before the  committing court which was also  transferred under  section 288 Cr. P.C. Before the Committing Court  the witness had stated that he had gone to take tea  in the  hotel of  Khem Singh  and found Asa Singh. Trilok Singh  and Lal  Singh were  taking food  together. He knew these persons from before except respondent Boota Singh whom he  identified  at  a  validly  held  T.I.  parade  and thereafter in  the court  of the  committing Magistrate. The witness tried  to explain  in court  that  counsel  for  the respondent dictated  the report  to the reader who took down the same and thereafter he affixed his signature. He further Admitted that  he did  not tell the Magistrate that he would like to  read the statement made by him. He further admitted that he  did not say anything to the Magistrate in regard to pressure. It  is, therefore, clear that the statement of the witness be  fore the  committing court  was true  and he  is falsely resiling  from the  same in  order  to  protect  the respondent.  lt   passes  one’s   comprehension   that   the committing Magistrate  would allow counsel for the plaintiff to dictate  the statement  to the  reader when  in  law  the Magistrate has  to record the statement‘himself. The witness further admits  that whatever  he said before the Committing Magistrate  was   not  due  to  police  pressure.  In  these circumstances, therefor,  there are  intrinsic circumstances which clearly  go  to  show  that  the  statements  the  two witnesses had  made before  the Committing  Magistrate  were true. The  law on  this legal  aspect of the matter has been laid down  by this  Court in  the case of Shranappa Mutyappa Halke v.  State of  Maharashtra(1) where this Court observed as follows:- (1) [1964] 4 S.C.R. 589. 321                "The  question   how  far   evidence  in  the           Committing Court   given  by a witness who resiles           from it  at the  Trial in  Sessions and  which  is           brought in  as evidence at the Trial under section           288 of  the Code  of Criminal  Procedure  requires           corroboration or not, has engaged the attention of           most of  the High  Courts  in  India  in  numerous           cases."                "Where a  person has  made two  contradictory           statements on  oath it  is plainly  unsafe to rely           implicitly  o‘n  his  evidence.  In  other  words,           before one  decides to accept the evidence brought

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         in under  section 288  of  the  Code  of  Criminal           Procedure as  true and  reliable  one  has  to  be           satisfied that  this is  really so.  How can  that           satisfaction be  reached  ?  In  most  cases  this           satisfaction  can  come  only  if  there  is  such           support  in   extrinsic  evidence  as  to  give  a           reasonable indication  that not  only what is said           about the  occurrence in  general but also what is           said against  the particular  accused sought to be           implicated in  the crime  is true.  If there  be a           case- and  there is such infinite variety in facts           and circumstances  of the  cases coming before the           courts that  it cannot  be dogmatically  said that           there can  never be such a case-where even without           such extrinsic  support the  Judge of  facts after           bearing in  mind the  intrinsic  weakness  of  the           evidence, in that two different statements on oath           have been  made, is satisfied that the evidence is           true and can be safely relied upon, the Judge will           be failing in his duty not to do so."      This case  was followed  in a  later decision  of  this Court  in   Har  Prasad  &  Ors.  v.  The  State  of  Madhya Pradesh(1). Applying  the dictum  laid down by this Court to the facts  of the  present case  we find  that the following facts are established:                1.   P. W.  S Khem  Singh and  P.W. 7  Jaideo      Singh fully  sup ported  the prosecution case regarding      the presence  of Boota Singh and others at the hotel of      Khem Singh, P.W.5.                2.   P. W.  S Khem  Singh  has  categorically      stated that  what he  had stated  before the committing      court was  true and  has thus  certified that  what  he      stated in  the court  was not  the correct version, but      the correct  version was  what  he  stated  before  the      committing Magistrate.                3.   The fact  that  respondent  Boota  Singh      along with  Asa High,  Trilok Singh  and Lal  Singh and      others had taken (1) [1971] 3 S.C.C. 455. 322                food at Doiwala at the hotel of Khem Singh is                clearly mentioned  in the confession of Boota                Singh.                4.   So far  as  P.  W.  7  Jaideo  Singh  is      concerned, the  reason given by him for deposing before      the committing  court is wholly unacceptable viz., that      the statement  of the  witnesses before  the committing      court was  not  recorded  by  the  Magistrate  but  was      dictated by the plaintiff’s lawyer to the reader of the      Magistrate.      This statement is palpably absurd and has been made for the first  time in  Court for  the purpose  of  helping  the respondent. Thus,  there are  cogent reasons  and  intrinsic circumstance to  lend support  to  the  inference  that  the statements given  by these  witnesses before  the committing court were in fact true and correct, and the Sessions Judge, therefore, was  right in  relying on those statements namely Ka-72 and  73. The  High Court appears lo have brushed aside the evidence  of P.W.5  Khem Singh  and P.W.  7 Jaideo Singh only on  the  ground  that  these  witnesses  had  made  two inconsistent statements  on oath and made no effort to. find out as  to whether  the prior  statement made by them before the committing  court was  in fact true having regard to the facts and circumstances mentioned above. In our opinion, the High Court was clearly in error in rejecting the evidence of

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the witness on the grounds that it did. In doing so the High Court has not followed the dictum laid down by this Court in the case of Shranappa Mutyappa Halke v. State of Maharashtra (supra). I  thus,  the  fact  that  after  hiring  the  taxi belonging to  Inder Singh, Boota Singh and others along with Lal Singh   reached  Doiwala is  clearly established  and is fully corroborate(l  by the evidence of P.W.5 Khem Singh and P.W. 7  Jaideo Singh  as discussed above. Thus, this part of the confession  of the  respondent Boota Singh appears to be fully corroborated  and it  has been  established that after taking the  Fiat Car  No. UPS  6679 Boota  Singh  and  party including Lal Singh who was driving the car left for Doiwala where they stayed for some time.      The next  statement in  the  confession  is  that  from Doiwala the  respondent Boota  Singh and his party proceeded to Chidderwala  in the  same car  (UPS6679). The  respondent also mentioned  that at  the forest outpost Gopi affixed his signature. This fact is corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 11 Digambar  Dutt Bandola and P.W. 13 Bacchu Ram and Exhibit Ka-74. P.W.  11 Digambar Dutt Bandola states in his evidence that in  December, 1963  he was  a clerk at the Song Bridge, Doiwala and  was in  charge of  the  register  of  the  Toll Barrier. The  witness proves  the entry  at page  6  of  the register about 323 the passing  o’; a  Fiat car bearing No. UPS-6679 going from Dehra Dun to Rishikesh at 6.00 in the evening. This entry is marked as  Exhibit Ka-74.  This evidence,  therefore,  fully corroborates the  statement of Boota Singh in his confession that from  Doiwala the party proceeded to Chidderwala (which is on  way of  Rishikesh)  and  that  Gopi  had  signed  the register at  one of  the forest  outposts which is proved by Exhibit Ka-74.  It would  thus be clear that up to this spot original  number   of  the  Fiat  car,  viz.,  UPS-6679  was retained, because  the evidence  shows that  the number  was changed after  the murder  of Lal  Singh. The High Court has not at all considered the effect of this document nor has it referred to  the evidence  of P.W. 11 Digamber Dutt Bandola, who is  an independent  witness. In  fact, as pointed out by us, the  High Court  has made  a wrong approach to the whole case by not taking the confessional statement first and then finding  out   whether   there   are   other   circumstances corroborating the various parts of the statement made in the confession. Perhaps,  this may  he due  to the fact that the High Court  found t-hat the confession was not voluntary and therefore should  be excluded  from consideration‘n. We have already indicated the reason why this conclusion of the High Court was manifestly wrong and not legally supportable.      According to  Exhibit Ka-74 the car driven by Lal Singh passed the  forest barrier  at about  6 p.m. It appears that there was  another barrier  at a  small distance  from  Song Bridge which  is called the Bhamiawala outpost. The evidence of P.W. 13 Bacchu Ram is to the effect that he was posted in December, 1963,  at this  outpost and he made entries in the register  of  vehicles  passing  through  the  forest  road. According to  the witness,  the  car  bearing  No.  UPS-6679 crossed this  barrier on   8-12-1963  at 6.15  p.m. and  the concerned entry  in the register is Exhibit Ka-10. According to the witness, one Lt. K. S. Chimni had signed the register and he  gave out  the number  of car  as  UPS-662O  but  the witness checked  from the  number plate  and found  that the correct number  was UPS-6679.  The prosecution  alleged that the signature  made by Lt. K. S. Chimni was actually made by the respondent  Boota Singh  himself, but  as his signatures were not  sent to the expert, there was no proof of the fact

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that it  was the  respondent Boota  Singh who had signed the entry. Having  regard to the identity of the car there could be no  doubt that  somebody else  signed as Lt K. S. Chimni, but the  occupants of  the car  were the  respondents  Boota Singh and  his party  including Lal  Singh  and  it  may  be possible that  Gopi who  according to  Boota  Singh  in  his statement may  have affixed  his signature at the outpost as Lt. K. S. Chimni.      The respondent  Boota Singh  then goes on to state that all of them drank wine at the house of Asa Singh and chalked out a programme 324 of committing  the murder  of Lal  Singh for  the purpose of taking exclusive  possession of  the car and in pursuance of this conspiracy  except respondent  Raghubir Singh  all  the four, namely,  Boota Singh, Asa Singh, Trilok Singh and Gopi took Lal  Singh to  the forest. Trilok Singh fired two shots at Lal  Singh and Asa Singh dealt a Gandasa blow on the neck of the  deceased. Thereafter  the respondents  took off  the clothes of  the deceased  and set  fire to them and left the dead body in the same condition. Although there is no direct corroboration of  the  actual  assault  on  Lal  Singh,  the circumstantial  evidence  admitted  in  the  confession  and corroborated is  a clear  pointer to the fact that Lal Singh had accompanied  the respondent  right from  Dehra Dun up to Chidderwala forest  where  he  was  murdered.  .  Thus,  the respondents were last seen with Lal Singh before the murder. Therefore, taking  the circumstances  before and  after  the murder of  Lal Singh,  the murder  of Lal  Singh  cannot  be explained by  any other  reasonable  hypothesis  except  the guilt of  the respondent.  Even the  fact that the dead body was  left   in  the   condition  in  the  forest  itself  is corroborated  by  the  discovery  of  the  skeleton  of  the deceased Lal  Singh from  the forest, his clothes which have been clearly  found by the Session Judge as belonging to the deceased Lal  Singh and  this finding has not been displaced by the High Court.      We shall  deal with  this aspect in greater detail when we take  up the  question of  corpus delecti  which has been argued with  great vehemence  by Mr. Mulla. At the moment we are confining  ourselves to  the nature of the corroboration of the confessional statement of Boota Singh. The respondent Boota Singh  then says  that he  along with Trilok Singh and Raghubir Singh  went to  sell the  car at Bombay and all the three of  them drove  the car by turns. The respondent Boota Singh further  says that  having come  out of  the forest he signed the  register at  the forest  outpost and changed the number plate  of the  car to  UPM-3236. This  portion of his statement is corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 12 Mangali who was  the chowkidar  at Gola  Thappar outpost in 1963. He deposes that  Exhibit Ka-11  is the  register of the outpost and as  he is  illiterate the entries used to be made by the owners of the cars. It is manifestly clear that when the car passed this  outpost it  must have  been after the murder of Lal Singh had already been committed and the number plate of car had  been changed, as admitted by respondent Boota Singh in his confessional statement. The relevant entry is Exhibit Ka-27 and  is dated  8.12.1963 and  shows that a car bearing No. UPM-3236  passed the check post on 8.12.1963. This entry is signed  by respondent  Boota Singh  as K.  Sharma at  two places which  are marked by the expert as Q-2040 and Q-2039. The signatures made by the respondent Boota Singh were 325 sent to  the  expert  along  with  the  specimen  signatures Exhibits Ka-53   and  53A and  which were  numbered  by  the

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expert as Q-3885 and 3886 and the expert has opined that the signatures K.  Sharma made  on this  entry namely Q-2040 and 2039 (Exhibits  Ka-27-28) have  been made by the same person whose specimen  signatures have  been taken  and  which  are marked by  the expert  as Q-3885  and 3886  vide evidence of P.W. 32  Shiv Ram  and his  reports  Exhibit  Ka-64  and  65 wherein he  has given  the detailed reasons for his opinion. Learned counsel for the respondent was not able to repel the opinion of  the expert.  This, therefore, clearly shows that the respondent  Boota Singh  had  deliberately  changed  the number plate  from UPS  6679 to  UPM  3236  to  conceal  the identity of  the car  and this  was done after Lal Singh had been put  to death.  This, therefore, fully corroborates the statement made  by  Boota  Singh  in  his  confession.  This important  document  which  demonstrates  the  incriminating conduct  of   the  respondent   Boota   Singh   apart   from corroborating  the   statement  made   in  the  confessional statement has  been completely overlooked by the High Court. It may also be mentioned here that not only did the specimen signature of  respondent Boota  Singh on Exhibit Ka-53 tally with his  signature in  the register  Exhibit Ka-11 but even the words  ’UPM-3236’ written  by him have been found by the expert to be in the writing of respondent Boota Singh. Thus, it  is   established  by  unimpeachable  evidence  that  the respondent Boota  Singh not  only  made  the  entry  in  the register Exhibit  Ka-11 but also changed the number plate of the car  to UPM-3236  with a view to conceal the identity of the car.      The scene then shifts to Ambala where, according to the prosecution, Boota  Singh accompanied  by Raghubir Singh and others went  to Ambala  and got  the car  insured.  P.W.  27 Balwant Singh  Bhalla deposes  that on 11.12.63 a man filled up  the   insurance  form  Exhibit  Ka-29  and  affixed  the signatures as  J.P. Singh,  and handed  over the same to the witness who  was the  agent of North India General Insurance Company. A bare look at the form Exhibit Ka-29 clearly shows that the  insurance form was filled for a period of one year i.e. from  11.12.63 to 10.12.64. Unfortunately, however, the learned Sessions  Judge has  rightly pointed  out  that  the prosecution  did   not  get   the  respondent   Boota  Singh identified by  the witness  P.W. 29 Balwant Singh nor did he get the  signatures made by the respondent Boota Singh as J. P. Singh  sent to  the expert for examination with his other specimen  signatures.   Even  excluding   these  facts  from consideration what  has been prove(l by the evidence of this witnesses is  that a  car  bearing  no.  UPM-3236  had  been insured for  one year  with the  company of  the witness  at Ambala. It has already been established, as indicated 326 above, that  it was the respondent Boota Singh alone who had changed the  number plate  of the  car in  question, namely, UPS-6679 into  UPM-3236 and  that this  is the car which was taken on  hire by  Boota Singh  and others  and was carrying them right from Dehra Dun to Doiwala, Rishikesh and further. The car  also undoubtedly  reached Ambala  when one  of  the occupants of  the car,  whoever he  may have been, contacted P.W. 29  Balwant Singh and got the car insured for one year. To this  extent, this  is an  important link in the chain of circumstantial evidence  which  if  considered  cumulatively corroborates  the   confession  and   also   serves   as   a circumstance against the respondent Boota Singh.      Needless to  repeat that Boota Singh had already made a clear statement  in the  confession that  after leaving  the dead body.  he along  with Trilok  Singh and  Raghubir Singh proceeded to  Bombay to  sell the car and that the number of

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the car  was change(l  to UPM-3236.  The evidence of P.W. 29 Balwant Singh  and the insurance form clearly establish that the car which had carried these three persons reached Ambala on the  13th December,  1963  as  stated  by  Balwant  Singh P.W.29. The  respondent Boota  Singh then  goes on  to state that at Bombay he stayed for 3 or 4 days first in a Gurdwara and then  in Amrit  Hotel and negotiated for the sale of the car through  a broker  and when  the deal  was  settled  the respondent received  an advance  of 200  but  the  intending purchaser insisted  that the  registration of the car should be changed  into that  of Bombay.  Thereafter the respondent Boota  Singh  and  Trilok  Singh  went  to  R.T.O’s  office, Raghubir  Singh   having  stayed  back  at  the  hotel.  The respondents learnt  there  that  the  police  was  in  their pursuit, so  the party left the car and came back. So far as the present  occurrence is  concerned, the  confession  ends here but  the respondent goes on to narrate another incident in which  also the  respondent tried to get another taxi. It not necessary  for us to dwell on this aspect of the matter, because that is the subject matter of another case. The fact however that  the respondent  was prepared  to make  a clean breast not only of the facts of the present case but also of the other  incident clearly  shows that  he was speaking the truth exhibiting  real sense  of penitence  flowing from the pricking of his conscience.      This  part  of  the  confessional  statement  is  fully corroborated by the evidence led by the prosecution which we will discuss  hereafter.  The  respondent  Boota  Singh  has clearly stated  in his confession that after going to Bombay he contacted  a broker  for negotiating the sale of the car. P.W. 9  Anand Singh  states that  he was  plying a  taxi  at Bombay. On  17.12.63 he  met the  three persons  at National Petrol Pump, Bombay with a 1962 model Fiat car having number plate bear 327 ing number  UPM-3236. The  witness paid  an advance  of  Rs. 200/- and  got a  receipt in  the name of Nirbhai Ram Narsic Das. The  witness further  states that  of the three persons who met  him two  were Sardars  and one was without a beard. The persons who was without beard gave out his name as J. P. Singh and  he affixed  his  signature  on  the  receipt.  On 18.12.63 Boota  Singh as  J. P. Singh took him to the office of the Ex R.T.O. for getting the registration number changed at Bombay.  The witness  also  says  that  the  total  price settled between  the parties  was Rs. 16,200. Thereafter the so called J. P. Singh went inside the office and the witness remained outside and waited right up to 6 in the evening but J. P.  Singh did  not  return.  The  C.I.D.  Police,  Bombay thereafter took  the car  into custody  along with all other papers. The  witness gave  the receipt  given to  him by the respondent Boota  Singh.  The  witness  had  identified  the respondent Boota  Singh at  Dehra Dun  and Raghubir Singh at Nainital at  an identification  parade held by a Magistrate. The witness  also identified Boota Singh before the Sessions Court. The  witness was  subjected  to  a  searching  cross- examination, but  nothing of  importance appear to have been elicited.      P.W. 62  Raja Ram  Narain states  that he  was a broker dealing with the motor cars. On 14-12-63. three persons came to sell  a fiat  car of  1962 model bearing No. UPM-3236. He had a  talk with the person who named himself as J. P. Singh and represented  himself to  be son  of S.  P. Bareilly.  He demanded Rs.  18,000 for the car and offered a commission of Rs. 500 to the witness. The witness accordingly searched for a customer. The customer after examining the chassis and the

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engine number  of the  car became  a little  suspicious  and asked the  witness to verify the same and was not willing to purchase unless  the car was a genuine one. The witness then reported the  matter. to Shri D. Silva and the motor vehicle Inspector P.W.  30 Gulzar Singh deposes that he was attached to the crime branch of the C.I.D., Bombay in December. 1963. on 9.12.63  his officer  Shri Silva  informed him  that  car bearing No.  UPM-3236 seems  to be  a stolen property and an enquiry should  be made from the R.T.O’s office. The witness went to  the R.T.O.s  office  and  took  the  car  into  his custody. After  some time  the man  named Anand  Singh  came there and  gave him a receipt relating to an advance payment of Rs.  200/-. The  witness then took the documents from the R.T.O’s  office   including  the  driving  licence  and  the insurance certificate  etc. Thus,  it would  appear that two independent witnesss  from Bombay,  viz., P.W. 9 Anand Singh and P.W.  62 Raja Ram Narain Rane proved that the respondent Boota Singh contacted them for sale of the car and had shown the car  to them.  But as  there was some discrepancy in the chassis number 328 and the  engine number P.W. 62 Raja Ram Narain Rane became a little  suspicious.  Both  these  witnesses  identified  the respondent Boota Singh at Dehra Dun at a T.I. parade held by P.W. 23  M. L.  Sharma as  discussed above.  Thereafter they identified the respondent Boota Singh both in the committing court and the Sessions Court.      P.W. 62  Raja Ram  Narain Rane had categorically stated that he  had not seen the respondent Boota Singh anywhere in the intervening period i.e. between the time when he visited him at  Bombay and  the  T.I.  parade  held  at  Dehra  Dun. Similarly, P.W.  9  Anand  Singh  has  also  identified  the respondent Boota Singh both in the identification parade and in court. In fact P.W. 9 Anand Singh had identified Raghubir Singh  also.   The  evidence   of  these   witnesses   fully corroborates the  facts stated by the respondent Boota Singh in his  confession which  have been detailed above. The High Court has  made no  real attempt  to consider  the intrinsic evidence of these two independent witnesses which lends full and  complete   assurance  to  and  provide  an  independent corroboration of  the confession  made by  Boota Singh.  All that the  High Court  says is  that for  the reasons  it had given for  rejecting the  other witnesses on the question of identification these  two witnesses  cannot be  relied upon. The High Court completely overlooked the fact that there was no question on these witnesses from Bombay having been shown to the  respondent before  the T.I.  parade. There is not an iota of evidence to suggest this. Similarly, we have pointed out that  the view  of the  High  Court  on  the  nature  of identification  evidence   was  clearly   wrong.  In   these circumstances, therefore, as a matter of fact the High Court has  not  at  all  considered  the  evidence  of  these  two witnesses which  fully supports the prosecution case and the finding of  the High  Court,  therefore,  in  rejecting  the evidence  of   these  two   witnesses  is  vitiated  by  the circumstances mentioned above.      Apart from  the facts  mentioned  above,  there  is  an unimpeachable circumstantial  documentary evidence  to prove the Bombay  incident. Exhibit  Ka-34 is  a declaration  form dated 16.12.63 which was given by the respondent Boota Singh in connection  with the  registration of  the car at Bombay. This is  signed by  him as  J. P.  Singh at two  places; the signatures being Ka-34 and the number given by the expert is 2045. Exhibit  Ka-66 which  is the  form for registration of vehicle in Bombay dated 18.12.63 which is also signed by the

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respondent Boota  Singh as  J. P. Singh and his signature is Ka-36, the expert number being 2046.      There is  another declaration form dated 18.12.63 which is signed  by the respondent Boota Singh as J. P. Singh. and the signature  is Exhibit  Ka-39. There is another signature which is Ka-40. These 329 two signatures  bear the  expert  numbers  2048  and  2048A. Exhibit  Ka-59 is dated 18-12-63 and contains two signatures of Boota  Singh as  J. P. Singh, viz., Exhibit Ka-59 and 60. The expert numbers of the signatures are 3895 and 3896.      Reference to  the evidence  of expert P. W. 32 Shiv Ram Singh would  show that  all these  signatures fully  tallied with the  specimen signatures  of the respondent Boota Singh taken during  the investigation,  and the  signatures J.  P. Singh are  Exhibits 53  and 54.  Thus, the  prosecution  has adduced conclusive  evidence to prove that the car seized by the Police  at Bombay  was the  same which  was hired by the respondent Boota Singh and others from P.W. 2 Inder Singh at Dehra Dun.  This fact is proved both by oral and documentary evidence discussed above and a very well reasoned finding on this point  has been  given by the Sessions Judge which runs thus:-           "In Ex.  Ka-2 agreement  entered into  between Lal      Singh and  Jasbir Singh of Auto Linkers Financiers, the      particulars of  the car  are given  as Fiat  1100, 1962      Model chassis  No.  D  950261.  These  particulars  are      identical with  those of  UPM 3236 seized by the Bombay      Police. Thus the prosecution has been able to establish      that the  car seized  by the  Bombay Police was the one      which the accused Boota Singh along with his companions      hired from M/s Punjab Taxi service."      The learned  Sessions Judge  has also  pointed that the original plate  exhibit Ka-51  had been recovered by P.W. 18 Vikram Singh  from the  Car UPM  3236 and  sent to  P.W.  26 Shariq Alvi  who found  that there  was tampering  with  the number of the plate. Brij Kishore of R.T.O’s office Bareilly stated that  UPM 3236  was a  fake  number  inasmuch  as  it related to  a station wagon belonging to a Junior Government High School,  Pakkwara, District Moradabad. Harcharan Singh, Inder Singh  and Mahendra  Kaur have also identified the car in question  to be  the same  car which  was  hired  by  the respondent Boota  Singh on  8th December,  1963. These facts have not been challenged by the defence. Even the High Court has not  reversed the  finding of the Sessions Judge on this point. Before  closing this part of the case we might advert to an argument advanced before us by Mr. Mulla regarding the specimen signature  of the  respondent Boota  Singh taken by the Police  during investigation.  Mr. Mulla  submitted that the act  of the investigating officer in taking the specimen signature of  the respondent  Boota Singh was hit by section 162 of  the Criminal  Procedure Code  and also  amounted  to testimonial  compulsion  so  as  to  violate  the  guarantee contained in Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The matter 330 is no  longer res  integra and is concluded by a decision of this Court  in the  case of  State of  Bombay v.  Kathi Kalu Oghad & ors.(1) where the Court observed as follows:-                "That is  why it  must be held that by giving           these impressions  or  specimen  handwriting,  the           accused person  does not. furnish evidence against           himself. So when an accused person is compelled to           give a  specimen handwriting or impressions of his           finger, palm  or foot,  it may be said that he has           been compelled  to be a witness; it cannot however

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         be said that he has been compelled to be a witness           against himself."      It  was   also  held  that  merely  taking  a  specimen handwriting does  not amount  to be giving a statement so as to be  hit by  Section 162 Cr. P.C. In view of this decision of the Court, Mr. Mulla did not pursue the point further.      Another  important  comment  made  by  the  High  Court against the  confession was  that the  manner in  which  the deceased Lal  Singh had  k been  killed,  according  to  the statement of  Boota Singh  in his  confession, is completely disproved by  the medical  evidence inasmuch  as there is no evidence of any gun- shot injury having been received by Lal Singh nor  is there  anything to  show that  he received any Gandasa   injury. With  due respects  we are  constrained to observe that  the High Court has taken a very artificial and incorrect view  of the  matter in this regard. The dead body was recovered  three weeks  after the death of the deceased: During this  period the  naked body was ex posed to wind and weather. The  skeleton was  burnt and  the flesh  had peeled off. The  learned Sessions  judge has rightly explained that as only  two shots  were fired  at the deceased according to the Statement  of Boota  Singh in  his confession, it may be that no  shot hit  the bone  but remained in the flesh which having peeled off, no trace of gun shot injury could ever be found. Therefore,  it is  not a  circumstance to  show  that there is  any real  inconsistency between  the  confessional statement of  the respondent  Boota Singh  and  the  medical evidence. As  regards the injury said to have been inflected by a  Gandasa, the  same is  proved  by  the  circumstantial evidence and  the nature  of the skeleton or Lal Singh found in the forest. According to the postmortem report, the lower cervical vertebra  was separated  from the  rest  .  of  the skeleton at the level of the joint and the head was found at a distance  From the body. This would mean that the head was severed from the body and this could have only been possible if the  injury was  . inflicted  by a  Gandasa as the entire flesh had peeled off and traces of (1) [1962] 3 S.C.R. 10. 331 the injury  had obliterated by passage of time. The skeleton remained   in the  forest  exposed  to  rain  and  in  these circumstances we could not expect to find any mark of injury on the  skeleton the  fact however  is that the skeleton has been indentified  to be  that of  the deceased  Lal Singh by good and  cogent evidence  as found  by the  Sessions  Judge which finding  has not  been displaced by the High Court. It is obvious  that the  statement of Boota Singh regarding the death of  the deceased  was the  only manner in which he was murdered. For  these reasons,  therefore, we  are unable  to agree with  the High  Court that  the manner  in  which  the deceased is  said to  have been  assaulted according  to the confessional  statement   has  not   been  proved   by   the prosecution.       This brings us to an argument put forward before us by Mr. Mulla learned counsel for the respondents that there was no reliable  evidence to  prove the  identity of  the corpus delecti. We  are, however, unable to accept this contention. The learned  Sessions Judge  has given  a very well reasoned finding on  this point  which has  not been  reversed by the High Court.        To begin with, the body of the deceased was recovered at the  instance of  respondent Asa  Singh and this fact was proved by  P.W. 17  Sher Singh  and P.W. 31 Jasmer Singh and the  Investigating   officer  P.W.  59  Gulzar  Singh.  This evidence is  clearly admissible  under  section  27  of  the

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Evidence Act.  The only comment made was that Sher Singh had some enmity  with Asa  Singh. the  learned  Sessions  Judge, however, pointed out that there was no long standing, enmity between  Asa   Singh  and   Sher  Singh.   There  were  some proceedings about  8 or  9 years  age and  there  were  some proceeding under  section  127/  117  Cr.  P.C..  after  the occurrence which  is wholly  irrelevant. No comment has been made as  to why Jasmer Singh should not be believed. In this view of  the matter the evidence of the recovery of the dead body at  the instance  of Asa Singh has been proved not only by  the  Investigating  officer  Gulzar  Singh  but  by  two independent witnesses.  Sher Singh  and Jasmer  Singh. This, therefore. clearly  establishes the  identify of  the corpus delecti as  being that  of Lal  Singh. Apart  from this some clothes Exhibits  l 3  14. l  5 were  recovered lying  at  a distance of 3 Lo 4 yards from the body and this recovery has also been  proved by  Sher Singh,  Jasmer  Singh  and  Inder Singh. Portions  of these  clothes were  burnt  which  fully corroborates the confessional statement of Boota Singh where he had  stated that  after taking out the same from the dead body of  Lal Singh  they had  set the  clothes on fire. It H appears, however,  that for  some reason or the other only a very small portion of the clothes were burnt. 5-526 SCI/78 332      Another important evidence which clenches the issue was the recovery,-  of Exhibit  Ka-8 a dry cleaning receipt from the pocket  of the coat of Lal Singh which is Exhibit Ka-13. This receipt  bears the  signature of  Lal Singh. P.W. 3 who was the  salesman at  Dehra Dyeing  and Dry Cleaners deposed that on g. 11.63 Lal Singh had given a pant for dry cleaning and had  been given  receipt Exhibit  Ka-8, the duplicate of which was  with the  dry cleaning  shop and it has also been produced and  is exhibit  Ka-52. This, therefore, completely clinches the  issue and  shows that the dead body could have been of  none  else  than  that  of  Lal  Singh.  Mr.  Mulla suggested that  this receipt may have been introduced by the police in the pocket of the coat during investigation. There is however  no evidence to prove this fact. Nothing has been shown why  the police officers would have gone to the extent of fabricating  the evidence  against the  respondents.  For these reasons,  therefore, we  find  ourselves  in  complete agreement with  the finding  of the  learned Sessions  Judge that the  skeleton recovered from The forest was that of Lal Singh and  we accordingly overrule the argument of Mr. Mulla on this point.      Lastly, Mr. Mulla vehemently contended that there ii no legal evidence against Raghubir Singh. Admittedly, according the confessional  statement of  Boota Singh,  Raghubir Singh was not present in the forest at the time when Lal Singh was murdered. There  is no  evidence to show that Raghubir Singh was present  at Ambala.  It is  true that P.W. 2 Inder Singh and other  witnesses had identified Raghubir Singh as having accompanied the  respondent Boota  Singh to Dehra Dun and he has also  identified as  accompanying Boota  Singh by P.W. 9 Anand Singh,  but it was contented that as. at the time when the respondent  Raghubir Singh  was identified at the parade he had  shaved off  his beard, it would be difficult for the witness to  identify when  at the time they saw him he had a beard. There  appears to  be some  force in this contention. There is clear evidence to show that when Raghubir Singh was identified he  had no  beard it all. Tn these circumstances, therefore, the  possibility  of  mistake  in  identification cannot be  excluded. Even  the trial  Court has not accepted the  evidence   of  identification   against  him.   In  all

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probability  Raghubir   Singh  was   there  and  was  a  co- conspirator as  stated by the respondent Boota Singh himself but in view of the circumstances mentioned above, we find it unsafe to convict him when he has been acquitted by the High Court. We should not be taken as holding that the confession of the  respondent Boota  Singh so  far as Raghubir Singh is concerned is  false. Infact we believe it to be true, but as a matter  of extra  caution we would like to give benefit of doubt to Raghubir Singh. 333       Thus, in short the entire confession of the respondent Boota Singh   is  not  only  corroborated  by  the  evidence discussed  above   but  is  reinforced  by  the  independent evidence plus  identification which  has been  proved by the prosecution and accepted by us. The offence of conspiracy is also proved.      The trial Court has rightly pointed out that the charge under section  465/471 I.P.C.  has  been  proved.  There  is direct evidence of P.W. 35 Ratilal Chhoto Bhai Desai who has correctly identified  Boota Singh  that he  signed as  J. P. Singh  in  his  presence  on  the  papers  relating  to  the registration of  the car  at Bombay.  The signatures made by him are Exhibit Ka-59 and 60 and the documents concerned are Exhibit Ka-34,  36 and 39. The expert P.W. 32 Shiv Ram Singh has clearly  stated that  Exhibits Ka-38  to 40  were in the handwriting of  Boota Singh. It has also been proved as held by the  trial Court  that these  documents were presented by Boota Singh for the purpose of obtaining registration number from the  R.T.O. Bombay  in respect of the stolen car. Thus, we fully  agree with the finding of the trial Court that the change under  section 4651471  and 466/471  I.P.C. has  been clearly proved.  Apart from  this, it  has also  been proved beyond reasonable  doubt that  the  respondent  Boota  Singh impersonated as  one k.  Sharma to  Inder Singh  and falsely represented to  him that he was a military officer in search of recruitment  of girls  in the  Army and on this belief he induced Inder  Singh to  deliver the  taxi to  him  on  hire whereas Boota Singh had no intention whatsoever of returning the car.  The intention  to cheat Inder Singh by Boota Singh was clearly proved. In these circumstances, the charge under section 419  I.P.C. has also been proved beyond doubt. . The High Court  has neither  referred to  the evidence  on those charges nor considered the same but has taken a short course of rejecting  the entire prosecution case after finding that the  confession   was  not  worthy  of  credence  mainly  on speculation as  pointed out  by us. Furthermore, it has also been  proved  that  Boota  Singh  and  others  murdered  the deceased Lal  Singh with  a view  to take sole possession of the car,  and, therefore,  the charge  under section  394/34 I.P.C. is also proved.        Thus,  on a  full and  complete consideration  of the evidence and circumstances of the case we find that the High Court has  committed errors  of record  and  has  overlooked important circumstances  and has  drawn more  on imagination than on  the proved evidence in the case. On the question of identification it  has laid down a wrong law on the basis of which it failed to consider that evidence. The confession of the respondent was discarded by the High Court on irrelevant grounds based on pure speculation. Normally, this Court does not interfere  with an  order of  acquittal passed by a High Court but  in this  case we  find mat  the  High  Court  has misread the evidence and has re 334 versed the judgment of the Sessions Judge without displacing important conclusions  arrived at by the Sessions Judge. The

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High Court  has  overlooked  important  circumstances  which fully proved  the case. Even regarding the confession it has not made  a correct  approach which  is first  to  take  the confession  and  then  to  fin(l  out  how  much  of  it  is corroborated by other independent evidence.      Thus with due deference to the view taken by the Judges of the  High Court  we find  that the  High Court  committee errors of  law and fact on most vital points. It has refused to draw  inferences from proved facts which are irresistible and has laid down legally erroneous principles on such vital and crucial  evidence as  that of  identification which is a valuable piece  of evidence.  The High Court has on one hand completely overlooked  some of  the important  circumstances which amply  proved the  prosecution case  and on  the other while setting  aside the  judgment of the Sessions Judge has failed  to   displace  the   important  reasons   given  and circumstances  relied  on  by  the  Sessions  Judge.  Taking therefore an  overall picture of the whole case we find that there are  substantial and  compelling reasons  for  setting aside the  order of  acquittal passed  by the  High Court in favour of respondent Boota Singh.       For these reasons, therefore, we are unable to sustain the judgment  of the  High Court.  We accordingly  allow the appeal of  the State  against  Boota  Singh  set  aside  the judgment of  the High  Court and  convict  respondent  Boota Singh of offences under section 302 read with section 34 and Section 120-B  I.P.C.  and  sentence  him  to  undergo  life imprisonment for  these offences. The respondent Boota Singh is also convicted under section 364 read with section 34 and section 120-B  I.P.C. and  Section 394  read with section 31 and section  120-B  I.P.C.:  and  sentence  him  to  undergo rigorous imprisonment  for seven  years  under  each  count. Boota Singh  is also  convicted under section 419 I.P.C. 471 read with  section 465  I.P.C. and  section  471  read  with section 466  I.P.C. and  is sentenced  to  undergo  rigorous imprisonment  for   two  years,  one  year  and  four  years respectively. All the sentences are to run concurrently. The respondent Boota  Singh who  is on  bail shall surrender and serve out the remaining portion of the sentence.        The appeal against Trilok Singh abates as he is dead. The appeal against Asa Singh will be taken on later after he surrenders. The  appeal against  Raghubir Singh is dismissed and  the   order  of‘  the  High  Court  acquitting  him  is confirmed. N.V.K.                Appeal allowed against respondent No.1 335