IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1100 OF 2001  

State of U.P.             ... Appellant

VERSUS

Banne @ Baijnath & Ors.                  ... Respondents

J U D G M E N T  

This  appeal  is  directed  against  the  judgment  of  the

High Court of Judicature at Allahabad delivered in Criminal

Appeal No.1358 of 1980 dated 1st February, 2000 by which

the High Court had acquitted all the five accused who were

convicted and sentenced to undergo six months R.I. under

Section 147 I.P.C., three years R.I. under Section 307/149

I.P.C.  three  months  R.I.  under  Section  323/149  and  to

imprisonment for life under Section 302 read with Section

149 I.P.C. by the trial court.  

Brief  facts  which  are  necessary  to  dispose  of  this

appeal are recapitulated as under:-

1

Members  of  the  accused  and complainant  party  are

close  relatives.  In  order  to  properly  appreciate  the

relationship, the pedigree of the family is reproduced:

2

3

4

On 13.11.1977  a  violent  incident  is  alleged  to  have

taken  place  between  the  accused  and  members  of  the

complainant party, namely, Moti, Gharroo and his sons over

share in plot No.165/2 measuring 1.88 decimals situated in

Village Shivpurwa, P.S. Manduadih, District Varanasi.  It is

admitted case of the parties that Chhakkoo and his brother

Panchu were original tenure holders of the said plot along

with some other plots.   

In  a suit under Section 49 of the U.P. Tenancy Act,

Moti,  Gharroo  and Lalloo  obtained  one  half  share  in  the

joint Khata while the other half share went to descendants

of Panchu, namely, Vinayak and others.  Lalloo, Moti and

Gharroo have since been recorded as co-tenure holders of

the aforesaid plot along with other plots.   

The dispute about the share between Lalloo on the one

hand and Gharroo and Moti on the other started in the year

5

1965.  Lalloo claimed one half share while according to Moti

and Gharroo all the three daughters’ sons Lalloo, Moti and

Gharroo had equal share.  Lalloo took the lead in asserting

his claim by executing a sale deed in respect of 5 decimals

of plot No.251/2 area 10 decimals in favour of Shivlal on

21.1.1965.  He executed second sale deed in respect of 6

decimals of plot No.205/2 measuring 12 decimals in favour

of Nand Lal and Lalloo sons of Dhanesh on 20.12.65.  Moti

deposited ten times land revenue of his one-third share in

the  disputed  joint  Khata  comprising  of  plots  Nos.109,

165/2, 182/2, 205/2 and 251/2 and filed a suit for division

of holdings under Section 138 of the Zamindari  Abolition

and Land Reforms Act for 1/3rd share on 6.1.66.  The suit

was  decreed  ex  parte  on 10.1.1970  and mutation of  this

order was made in Khatauni 1376 F to 1378F.  The ex-parte

decree was, however, set aside on the application of Lalloo,

father  of  the  accused  persons,  after  setting  aside  the  ex

parte decree  on  19.2.1973.   Thereafter  the  suit  was

proceeded in the revenue court.  It was dismissed in default

on  27.7.1977.   The  suit  was  ultimately  restored  on

6

21.2.1979  on  the  application  of  Moti  and  decided  in  his

favour on 25.2.80 against which the appeal has been filed

by the accused persons which is still pending.   

After the death of Lalloo, his five sons succeeded to the

property.  According to the prosecution, the disputed plot

No.165/2 is divided into two portions.   One-third portion

towards  north  has  been  in  possession  of  the  accused

persons since the time of their father Lalloo while the two-

third portion towards south is in the joint cultivation of Moti

and Gharroo.  There is a Merh between the portion in the

occupation  of  the  accused  and that  in  the  possession  of

Moti and Gharroo.  

On  13.11.1977  at  about  7.00  a.m.  Tilakdhari  PW.1

and his father Gharroo went to their portion of the plot in

dispute  along  with  the  bullocks  to  plough  the  land.

Immediately  after  they  had  started  ploughing,  all  the

accused  persons  arrived  there.   Accused  Banne  alias

Baijnath and Binne alias Viswanath were armed with iron

7

rods while the other accused Nanhe alias Narain, Bhola and

Ramji were armed with sticks.  The accused persons asked

Tilakdhari, PW1 and his father to get out of the field.  They

refused to do so saying that the said portion of the field has

been in their possession for a long time and that they would

continue to plough it. Thereupon the accused Banne alias

Baijnath  instigated  other  accused  persons  to  assault

Tilakdhari and his father and drive them away, whereupon

Gharroo  ran  towards  the  house  of  Khatkhat  in  the

neighbourhood.   Hearing  the  hue  and  cry  raised  on  the

spot, Amardhari, Shangoo and Jagga arrived at the spot.   

The accused Ramji gave a lathi blow to Amardhari who

consequently  fell  down  because  of  the  impact  of  blow.

Banne alias Baijnath gave a thrust with the iron rod in the

abdomen which punctured the abdomen of Amardhari.  The

intestine  of  Amardhari  protruded out through the wound

and he also fell  down.  Sahangoo was attacked by Ramji,

Bhole and Nanhe with lathis.  He received lacerated wounds

on his head.  He ran towards the house of Sahdeo and fell

8

down at his doorstep.  Tilakdhari PW1 was also given blows

by the accused persons.

The case of the accused persons is that the members

of the complainant party tried to forcibly dispossess them

and  in  their  right  of  private  defence  some  injuries  were

caused to the members of the complainant party.  

Tilakdhari PW1 dictated a written report Ex. Ka. 1 to

Sitaram on the spot.  He took Sahangoo, Amardhari to P.S.

Manduadih where he submitted the written report Ex. Ka.1,

in terms of which chick FIR Ex. Ka. 13 was prepared and a

case was registered in the general diary.   

Sahangoo, Amardhari and Tilakdhari were escorted to

S.S.P.G. Hospital, Varanasi, where they were examined for

their injuries by Dr. A.K. Dwivedi at 8.45 A.M., 9.00 A.M.

and 12.00 noon respectively. Sahangoo succumbed to the

injuries at 5.45 P.M. on the same day in S.S.P.G. Hospital,

Varanasi and died.  Inquest of the dead body was performed

9

by Ram Chandra Pandey S.I. on 14.11.1977 at 8.00 A.M.

Dr.  Narsingh  Sharma,  Medical  Officer  Incharge  S.V.M.V.

Government  Hospital,  Varanasi  conducted  post-mortem

examination on the dead body of Sahangoo at the mortuary

on 14.11.1977 at 2.30 P.M.  He found the following ante-

mortem injuries on his dead body.  

1. Lacerated wound 6½ cm x  ½ bone deep on the right side crown of head, 7 cm above right eyebrow.  

2. Contusion 10 cm x 4 cm on the back of  right  forearm,  2  cm above  wrist  joint, right Ulna bone fractured.  

3. Abrasion 4 cm x ½ cm on the outer aspect of upper part of right thigh.  

4. Abrasion 2-½ cm x 2 cm on the right shoulder top.  

5. Lacerated  wound  2  cm  x  ¼  cm muscle  deep  on  the  inner  aspect  left dorsum of foot, 2 cm above the root of left big toe.  

On internal examination, he found the right frontal and

temporal bones fractured and the right fronto-parietal suture

10

separated,  brain was congested.   Middle  cranial  fossa was

also fractured.  

Amardhari  received  injuries  and  was  hospitalised  for

two  and  a  half  months.   The  prosecution  examined  10

witnesses in support of its case.     

The  trial  court  though noted  the  injuries  which were

received by the accused persons, but the prosecution has not

explained those injuries on the body of the accused.

It  is pertinent to mention that Dr. A.K. Dwivedi  PW.8

examined accused Vishwanath alias Binney and found the

following injuries on him:

1. Abrasion 1 cm x 1 cm right parietal, 12 cm from right ear.  

2. Abrasion  2  cm  x  2  cm back  of  left knee.  

Dr. A.K. Dwivedi PW.8 also examined the injuries of accused

Narain alias Nanhey and found the following injuries

11

1. Lacerated wound 4 cm x ½ cm x bone  deep  on  right  parietal,  6  cm above right ear.

2. Lacerated  wound  2  cm x  ½  x bone right ring finger back.    

The same Doctor also examined accused Ramji alias Raman

on the same day and found the following injury.:

1. Lacerated wound 4 cm x 1/2 cm x  bone  on  left  side  parietal  14  cm from left ear.   

Dr.  R.K.  Singh,  DW.1 medically  examined  accused  Bhola

and found the following injuries:-

1. Contusion 5 cm x 4 cm on the dorsum of left  palm with tenderness at  the  base  of  II  metacarpal  bone, skin  over  it  bluish  pink.  Restricted movement of left index finger.  X-ray of palm was advised.  

2. Contusion 3 cm x 2 cm on the left side of neck 6 cm below the left ear, skin bluish pink.  

3. Contusion 6 cm x 1-  ½ cm on the  back  towards  right  side  6  cm below the right scapula.  

12

4. Contusion  1  cm  x  1  cm  right side chest over 7th rib below the right nipple.  

5. Abrasion  1  cm  x  1  cm  on  the back towards right side 8 cm. below the right scapula.  

The trial court, on appraisal of evidence, came to the

findings that at the time of incident the prosecution party

was in peaceful possession of the land in question and with

the  dismissal  of  suit  the  accused  persons  came  there

forming an unlawful  assembly  to extend their  possession

over half share and interfered in the peaceful possession of

Gharroo and Moti in the southern portion of the plot.  They

first  assaulted  and  caused  injuries  to  the  deceased  and

other  victims  on  prosecution  side  and  injuries  on  the

defence side were caused during the course of incident and

according  to  the  learned  Sessions  Judge,  the  defence

version  of  the  incident  was  false  and  accordingly,  the

learned  Sessions  Judge  convicted  and  sentenced  the

appellants under various counts as stated in the earlier part

of the judgment.

13

The accused-appellants, aggrieved by the judgment of

the Sessions Judge, filed an appeal before the High Court.

The High Court re-examined the entire evidence and came

to a different conclusion.  The main grievance which has

been  articulated  by  the  High  Court  is  that  though  the

injuries received by the accused persons were noted by the

trial  court,  there  was  no  explanation  by  the  prosecution

about those injuries.  On careful examination of the injuries

caused to the accused the High Court observed that injuries

on them (accused persons) were not superficial or minor or

self-inflicted.  Therefore, the absence of any explanation by

the prosecution about the injuries received by the accused

persons creates serious doubt about the credibility of the

entire prosecution version.  According to the High Court, it

was the bounden duty and obligation of the prosecution to

have  given explanation about  the injuries  of  the  accused

persons.

14

The  High  Court,  on  examination of  the  evidence  on

record, came to the conclusion that it is difficult to hold that

the  complainant  party  was  in  settled  and  peaceful

possession of 2/3 share of the plot in question on the date

of  incident  and  there  seems  to  be  weight  in  the  defence

argument that the accused party was in possession to the

extent of 1/2 share and in any view of the matter there was

a  bona  fide  dispute  between  the  parties  regarding  their

shares and extent of possession. This finding gives twist to

the entire prosecution version and it is not clear as to who

were in fact the aggressors and whether the injuries caused

by the accused persons to the complainant party were  in

fact caused in their  right of their private defence or not.  

The High Court also came to the conclusion that PW.3

Sahadeo  and  PW.4  Narayan  cannot  be  said  to  be  totally

independent  witnesses  as  the  defence  had  filed

documentary evidence to show that Lalloo, the father of the

accused persons had lodged an FIR against these witnesses

for an offence under Section 308 IPC. These witnesses were,

15

therefore,  also somewhat inimical  to  the accused persons

and their  evidence  cannot  be  given due  weight  especially

with  regard  to  the  use  of  Lathi  and  Danda  by  the

prosecution witnesses, particularly when such an important

fact  had  not  been  stated  by  them  in  their  statements

recorded  under  Section  161  Cr.P.C.  and  the  statements

being contradictory to each other with regard to the use of

Danda by the prosecution witness.  The High Court arrived

at the conclusion that the injuries of the accused persons

have not been satisfactorily explained.  

The High Court in the impugned judgment arrived at a

definite  finding  that  it  is  highly  doubtful  that  the

complainant  party  was  in  exclusive  possession  of  the

disputed land at the relevant time and witnesses Sahadeo

PW3  and  Narayan  PW4  cannot  be  considered  to  be

independent witnesses.  A serious doubt has been cast on

the credibility of the prosecution version.  The High Court

allowed  the  appeal  and  set  aside  the  conviction  and

16

sentence of the appellants and they were acquitted of the

offences charged for.

The State of U.P., aggrieved by the impugned judgment

of the High Court, has filed the present appeal by way of

special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution.

The  scope  of  interference  under  Article  136  is  rather

limited.    It  is  settled  legal  position  which  has  been

crystallized in a number of judgments that if the view taken

by the High Court is plausible or possible, then it would not

be  proper  for  this  court  to  interfere  with  an  order  of

acquittal.

This  court,  in  a  recent  judgment  in  Ghurey  Lal v.

State  of  Uttar  Pradesh (2008)  10  SCC  450  considered

earlier cases and laid down that the appellate court should,

therefore,  reverse  an  acquittal  only  when  it  has  “very

substantial and compelling reasons”.  

17

In  Tulsiram Kanu  v.  The State,  AIR 1954 SC 1, this

Court explicated that the appellate court would be justified in

reversing  the  acquittal  only  when very  substantial  question

and compelling reasons are present.  In this case, the Court

used  a  different  phrase  to  describe  the  approach  of  an

appellate  court  against  an  order  of  acquittal.   There,  the

Sessions  Court  expressed  that there was clearly  reasonable

doubt in respect of the guilt of the accused on the evidence

put before it. Kania, C.J., observed that it required good and

sufficiently cogent reasons to overcome such reasonable doubt

before the appellate court came to a different conclusion.  

In  Lekha Yadav  v.  State of Bihar  (1973) 2 SCC 424,

the Court following the case of  Sheo Swarup  (supra) again

reiterated the legal position as under:

“The different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court such as-

(a) substantial and compelling reasons:

(b) good and sufficiently cogent reasons;  

(c) strong reasons.

18

are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion,  but  in  doing  so  it  should  not  only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court below in support of its order of acquittal but should express the reasons in its judgment which led it to hold that the acquittal was not justified.”  

In  Bishan  Singh  & Others  v.  The  State  of  Punjab

(1974)  3  SCC 288,  Justice  Khanna speaking  for  the  Court

provided the legal position:

“22. It is well settled that the High Court in appeal under  Section 417 of  the  CrPC has full  power  to review at large the evidence on which the order of acquittal was founded and to reach the conclusion that upon the evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed.  No limitation should  be  placed  upon that power unless is be found expressly stated be in the Code, but in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusion upon fact the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the  presumption  of  innocence  in  favour  of  the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; &  (4)  the  slowness  of  an  appellate  court  in disturbing  a  finding  of  fact  arrived  at  by  a  judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.”

19

In  Umedbhai  Jadavbhai  v.  The  State  of  Gujarat

(1978) 1 SCC 228, the Court observed thus:

“In an appeal against acquittal, the High Court would not ordinarily interfere with the Trial Court’s conclusion unless there are compelling reasons to do so inter alia on account of manifest errors of law or of fact resulting in miscarriage of justice.”

In  B.N. Mutto & Another  v.  Dr. T.K. Nandi  (1979)  1

SCC 361, the Court observed thus:

“It  stems out  of  the  fundamental  principle  of  our criminal jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to  the  benefit  of  any  reasonable  doubt.  If  two reasonably probable  and evenly balanced views of the  evidence  are  possible,  one  must  necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable doubt. But, fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit of a doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of views,  the  possible  view  in  favour  of  the  accused must  be  as  nearly  reasonably  probable  as  that against him. If the preponderance of probability is all one way, a bare possibility of another view will not entitle the accused to claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore, essential that any view of the evidence  in  favour  of  the  accused  must  be reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of which an accused person may claim, must be reasonable. "A reasonable doubt", it has been remarked, "does not mean some light, airy, insubstantial doubt that may  flit  through  the  minds  of  any  of  us  about almost anything at some time or other, it does not mean  a  doubt  begotten  by  sympathy  out  of

20

reluctance  to  convict;  it  means  a  real  doubt,  a doubt founded upon reasons.  [Salmond J. in his charge  to  the  jury  in  R.V.  Fantle  reported  in 1959 Criminal Law Review 584.]"             

{emphasis supplied}

In  Tota Singh & Another v.  State of Punjab (1987) 2

SCC  529,  the  Court  reiterated  the  same  principle  in  the

following words:

“This Court has repeatedly pointed out that the mere fact that the appellate court is inclined on  a  re-appreciation  of  the  evidence  to  reach  a conclusion  which  is  at  variance  with  the  one recorded in the order  of  acquittal  passed by the court  below  will  not  constitute  a  valid  and sufficient  ground  for  setting  aside  the  acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate court in dealing with  an  appeal  against  an  order  of  acquittal  is circumscribed  by  the  limitation  that  no interference  is  to  be  made  with  the  order  of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion  recorded  by  the  court  below  is  such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court  acting reasonably and judiciously  and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two views are possible  on an appraisal of the  evidence  adduced  in the case and the court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the appellate court cannot legally interfere with an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the  view  taken  by  the  court  below  on  its consideration of the evidence is erroneous.”

(emphasis supplied)

21

This Court time and again has provided direction as to

when the High Courts should interfere with an acquittal. In

Madan Lal  v.  State of J&K,  (1997)  7 SCC 677, the Court

observed as under:

“8.  …….. that there  must  be  “sufficient  and compelling reasons” or “good and sufficiently cogent reasons” for the appellate court to alter an order of acquittal to one of conviction……..”

In  Sambasivan & Others  v.  State of Kerala  (1998) 5

SCC 412, while relying on the case of Ramesh Babulal Doshi

(Supra), the Court observed thus:  

7. The principles with regard to the scope of the  powers  of  the  appellate  court  in  an  appeal against acquittal, are well settled. The powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal are no less  than  in  an  appeal  against  conviction.  But where on the basis of evidence on record two views are reasonably possible the appellate court cannot substitute its view in the place of that of the trial court. It is only when the approach of the trial court in  acquitting  an  accused  is  found  to  be  clearly erroneous in its consideration of evidence on record and  in  deducing  conclusions  therefrom  that  the appellate  court  can  interfere  with  the  order  of acquittal.”

22

In Bhagwan Singh & Others v. State of M.P. (2002) 4

SCC 85, the Court repeated one of the fundamental principles

of criminal jurisprudence that if two views are possible on the

evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the

accused  and the  other  to  his  innocence,  the  view which is

favourable  to  the  accused  should  be  adopted.   The  Court

observed as under:-

“7. The golden thread which runs through the  web  of  administration  of  justice  in  criminal case  is  that  if  two  views  are  possible  on  the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt  of  the  accused  and  the  other  to  his innocence,  the  view  which  is  favourable  to  the accused  should  be  adopted.  Such  is  not  a jurisdiction limitation on the appellate court but a Judge  made  guidelines  for  circumspection.  The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided.”  

In Harijana Thirupala & Others v. Public Prosecutor,

High Court of A.P., Hyderabad (2002) 6 SCC 470, this Court

again had an occasion to deal with the settled principles of law

restated by several decisions of this Court.  Despite a number

of  judgments,  High Courts continue to fail  to keep them in

mind before reaching a conclusion.  The Court observed thus:

23

“10. The principles to be kept in mind in our system  of  administration  of  criminal  justice  are stated  and  restated  in  several  decisions  of  this Court. Yet, sometimes High Courts fail to keep them in mind before reaching a conclusion as to the guilt or  otherwise  of  the  accused  in  a  given case.  The case  on  hand  is  one  such  case.  Hence  it  is  felt necessary  to  remind  about  the  well-settled principles  again.  It  is  desirable  and  useful  to remind  and  keep  in  mind  these  principles  in deciding a case.

11. In  our  administration of  criminal  justice an accused is presumed to be innocent unless such a  presumption  is  rebutted  by  the  prosecution  by producing the evidence to show him to be guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Further if two views are possible on the evidence produced in the case, one indicating to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence,  the view favourable to the accused is to be accepted. In cases where the court  entertains  reasonable  doubt  regarding  the guilt  of  the  accused  the  benefit  of  such  doubt should  go  in  favour  of  the  accused.  At  the  same time, the court must not reject the evidence of the prosecution  taking  it  as  false,  untrustworthy  or unreliable  on fanciful  grounds  or  on the  basis  of conjectures  and  surmises.  The  case  of  the prosecution  must  be  judged  as  a  whole  having regard  to  the  totality  of  the  evidence.  In appreciating the evidence the approach of the court must  be  integrated  not  truncated  or  isolated.  In other words, the impact of the evidence in totality on the prosecution case or innocence of the accused has to be kept in mind in coming to the conclusion as  to  the  guilt  or  otherwise  of  the  accused.  In reaching  a  conclusion  about  the  guilt  of  the accused, the court has to appreciate, analyse and assess the evidence placed before it by the yardstick

24

of probabilities, its intrinsic value and the animus of witnesses. It must be added that ultimately and finally the decision in every case depends upon the facts of each case.

12. Doubtless  the  High  Court  in  appeal either against an order of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal has full power to review the  evidence  to  reach  its  own  independent conclusion. However,  it will not interfere with an order  of  acquittal  lightly  or  merely  because  one other view is possible, because with the passing of an order of acquittal presumption of innocence in favour  of  the  accused  gets  reinforced  and strengthened.  The  High  Court  would  not  be justified  to  interfere  with  the  order  of  acquittal merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court it would have proceeded to record a conviction; a duty is cast on the High Court while reversing an order  of  acquittal  to  examine  and  discuss  the reasons  given  by  the  trial  court  to  acquit  the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If  the High  Court  fails  to  make  such  an  exercise  the judgment will suffer from serious infirmity.”

In  C. Antony  v.  K.G. Raghavan Nair,  (2003) 1 SCC 1

had to reiterate the legal  position in cases where there has

been acquittal by the trial courts.  This Court observed thus:

“6. This Court in a number of cases has held that though the appellate  court  has full  power  to review  the  evidence  upon  which  the  order  of acquittal is founded, still while exercising such an appellate power in a case of acquittal, the appellate court,  should  not  only  consider  every  matter  on

25

record having a bearing on the question of fact and the reasons given by the courts below in support of its order of acquittal, it must express its reasons in the judgment which led it to hold that the acquittal is not justified. In those line of cases this Court has also held that the appellate court must also bear in mind the fact that the trial court had the benefit of seeing  the  witnesses  in  the  witness  box  and  the presumption of innocence is not weakened by the order  of  acquittal,  and  in  such  cases  if  two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of  the  evidence  on  record,  the  appellate  court should not disturb the finding of the trial court.”  

In  State of Karnataka  v.  K. Gopalkrishna,  (2005)  9

SCC 291, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the

Court observed:

“In such an appeal  the Appellate  Court does not lightly disturb the findings of fact recorded by the  Court  below.  If  on  the  basis  of  the  same evidence,  two  views  are  reasonably  possible,  and the view favouring the accused is accepted by the Court  below,  that  is  sufficient  for  upholding  the order of acquittal. However, if the Appellate Court comes  to  the  conclusion  that  the  findings  of  the Court  below  are  wholly  unreasonable  or  perverse and not based on the evidence on record, or suffers from  serious  illegality  including  ignorance  or misreading  of  evidence  on  record,  the  Appellate Court will be justified in setting aside such an order of acquittal.”

26

In The State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC

755, this Court relied on the judgment in State of Rajasthan

v. Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180 and observed as under:

“15. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered  with  because  the  presumption  of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by  acquittal.  The  golden  thread  which  runs through  the  web  of  administration  of  justice  in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the  guilt  of  the  accused  and  the  other  to  his innocence,  the  view  which  is  favourable  to  the accused should be adopted. … The principle to be followed by appellate court considering the appeal against  the  judgment  of  acquittal  is  to  interfere only  when  there  are  compelling  and  substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference.”  

The Court further held as follows:

“16. it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower court is  vitiated  by  some  manifest  illegality  and  the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be  characterized  as  perverse.  Merely  because  two views are  possible,  the court  of  appeal  would  not take  the  view  which  would  upset  the  judgment delivered by the court below.”

27

In  Chandrappa  &  Others v.  State  of  Karnataka

(2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court held:

“(1)  An  appellate  court  has  full  power  to review,  reappreciate  and  reconsider  the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no  limitation,  restriction  or  condition  on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the  evidence  before  it  may reach its  own conclusion,  both  on questions  of  fact  and of law.   

(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”,  “very  strong  circumstances”, “distorted  conclusions”,  “glaring  mistakes”, etc.  are  not  intended  to  curtail  extensive powers  of  an  appellate  court  in  an  appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in  the  nature  of  “flourishes  of  language”  to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal  than to curtail  the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.  Firstly, the  presumption of  innocence  is  available  to him  under  the  fundamental  principle  of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be  presumed  to  be  innocent  unless  he  is proved  guilty  by  a  competent  court  of  law. Secondly,  the  accused  having  secured  his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is

28

further  reinforced,  reaffirmed  and strengthened by the trial court.                                                         (5) If  two  reasonable  conclusions  are possible  on  the  basis  of  the  evidence  on record, the appellate court should not disturb the  finding  of  acquittal  recorded  by the  trial court.”

The following principles emerge from the aforementioned

cases.

1. The  appellate  court  may  review  the  evidence  in

appeals against acquittal under sections 378 and 386

of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.  Its power of

reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can

reappreciate  the  entire  evidence  on  record.  It  can

review the trial court’s conclusion with respect to both

facts and law.  

2. The accused is presumed to be innocent until proved

guilty.  The accused possessed this presumption when

he  was  before  the  trial  court.  The  High  court’s

acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent.

29

3.      There must also be substantial  and compelling

reasons for reversing an order of acquittal.

This court would be justified in interfering with the

judgment of acquittal of the High Court only when there

are very substantial  and compelling reasons to discard

the High Court decision.  

Following are some of the circumstances in which

perhaps this court would be justified in interfering with

the judgment of the High Court, but these are illustrative

not exhaustive.

i) The  High  court’s  decision  is  based  on  totally

erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal

position;   

ii) The  High  court’s  conclusions  are  contrary  to

evidence and documents on record.  

30

iii) The  entire  approach  of  the  High  court  in  dealing

with  the  evidence  was  patently  illegal  leading  to

grave miscarriage of justice;  

iv) The  High   court’s  judgment  is  manifestly  unjust  and

unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the

record of the case;   

v] This  Court  must  always  give  proper  weight  and

consideration to the findings of the High Court.

vi) This  court  would  be  extremely  reluctant  in  interfering

with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High

Court have recorded an order of acquittal.

When  we  apply  the  above  mentioned  parameters  laid

down by a number of cases decided by this court to the facts of

this  case,  then  conclusions  become  irresistible  and  no

interference  is  warranted  by  this  court.   Consequently,  the

appeal filed by the State of UP being devoid of any merits, is

accordingly dismissed.

31

….....……....................J.                                 (Dalveer Bhandari)

                 ..……….................... J.

               (Harjit Singh Bedi) New Delhi; February 10, 2009

32