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PETITIONER: THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: A. GURUSAMY.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       17/02/1997

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, G.T. NANAVATI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Leave granted.  We have  heard learned counsel for both the parties.      This appeal  by special  leave arises from the judgment of the  single Judge  of the  Madras  High  Court,  made  on 23.3.1996 dismissing  S.A. No. 228/96 on the ground that the declaration granted  by  the  Courts  below  was  concurrent finding  of   fact.  Admittedly,  when  the  respondent  was studying in  the school,  he was  described as  a member  of ’Thotti’ community.  The  Presidential  notification  issued under Article  341(1) of  the Constitution read with Article 366(24) of  the  Constitution  notifies  ’Thotti’  to  be  a Scheduled  Caste   as  Item   No.67  of   the   Presidential notification.      Subsequently, in  1970, the  respondent had  obtained a certificate from  the Revenue  Divisional Officer indicating him to  be ’Kattunaicken’  as Item  No.9 of  the list of the Scheduled Tribes  in the  State of  Tamil Nadu issued by the President under  Article 342(1) read with Article 366(25) of the Constitution. Subsequently, he had applied for permanent certificate. On  that basis, an enquiry was conducted and it was found  that the respondent was not a Scheduled Tribe but is a  Scheduled Caste.  Accordingly, the certificate came to be  cancelled.   Impugning  the   said   cancellation,   the respondent filed  a civil  suit for  declaration that  he is ’Kattunaicken’, a  Scheduled  Tribe.  That  declaration  was granted by  the trial  Court dismissed  the  second  appeal. Thus, this appeal by special leave.      The only question is: whether the suit is maintainable? By operation  of Section  9 of  CPC, a  suit of civil nature cognisance of which is expressly or by implication excluded, cannot be  tries by  any civil Court. The declaration of the President of  India,  under  Article  341  and  342  of  the Constitution, with  respect of  lists of  the Scheduled  and Scheduled Tribes  in relation  to a State, that a particular caste or  tribe  is  defined  in  Article  366(24)  or  (25) respectively, is  conclusive subject  to an amendment by the Parliament  under   Article  341(2)   and  342(2)   of   the Constitution. By  necessary implication, the jurisdiction of the civil Court to take cognizance of and give a declaration

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stands  prohibited.   The  question  then  is:  whether  the respondent   has been  given an opportunity to establish has case  before   the  authorities   cancelled  his   community certificate obtained  by him?  The  order  of  the  District Collector  dated   2.12.1991  clearly   mentions   that   an opportunity was  given to  the respondent and he himself had examined him. The District Collector does not decide it like a   suit. What  he does  is an  enquiry complying  with  the principles of  rational justice.  He considered  his  stand, namely, one of the sale deed of 1962 in which his status was declared as Kattunaicken but the same was disbelieved by the District Collector  before cancellation.  It is self-serving document. The authority had, therefore, given an opportunity to the respondent to establish his status and found that the certificate  previously  obtained  was  wrong  and  illegal. Accordingly, he  cancelled  the  certificate  given  to  the respondent on  January 23,  1971. It  is then  contended  by learned counsel  for the  respondent that the guidelines had been given  by the  Collector in  the manner  in  which  the enquiry is  to be conducted and the synonyms are to be taken and in  pursuance thereof,  the   Revenue  Division  Officer granted him the certificate. We find that the stand taken is not correct. The guidelines are only to identify the persons and not  to give  a declaration  as to which community comes under particular  entry of the Presidential notification. It is then  contended that  the respondent  has been  given the right to  enjoy the  status right  from 1971 and, therefore, the principle  of estoppel  applies to  him. We find that it has no  force. It  is a  fraud played on the Constitution. A person who  plays fraud  and  obtains  a  false  certificate cannot plead estoppel. The principle of estoppel arises only when a  lawful promise  was  made  and  acted  upon  to  his detriment: the  party making  promise is  estopped to resile from the promise. In this case, the principle of estoppel is inapplicable because  there is no promise made by  the State that the State would protect perpetration of fraud defeating the Constitutional  objective; no  promise was made that his false certificate  will be  respected and  accepted  by  the State. On  the other hand, he is liable for prosecution. The courts would not  lend assistance to perpetrate fraud on the Constitution and  he cannot be allowed to get the benefit of the fraudulent  certificate obtained  from the  authorities. The   declaration    issued   by   the   courts   below   is unconstitutional and without jurisdiction.      The appeal  is accordingly  allowed.  The  suit  stands dismissed. No costs.