http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4  

PETITIONER: STATE OF RAJASTHAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SANJAY KUMAR & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       01/05/1998

BENCH: M.K. MUKHERJEE, SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T QUADRI, J.      Special leave is granted.      The state of Rajasthan has assailed the validity of the judgment and  order of  the High  Court of Rajasthan in S.B. Crl. Misc. Petition No. 293 of 1996 dated April 11, 1996.      On  February  29,  1988,  the  Senior  Drugs  Inspector (I.B.), collected  samples of  (i) tenokap suspension B. No. 303 and (ii) Tab. Oxyphenbutabne I.P. B. No. 1114 from M/s . Jayshree Medical  Centre, Baroda (Gujarat), meant for public sale .  He sent  those samples  for  chemicals  analysis  to Government Analyst,  Food and  Drugs Laboratory,  baroda  on March 2,1988.  In his  report of July 2,1988, the Government Analyst  opined  that  those  drugs  were  not  of  standard quality.  After  due  enquiry  and  investigation  the  Drug Controller  ordered  prosecution  of  t  he  respondents  on February 3,  1990 and  accordingly the Drugs Inspector (IB), Directorate, Medical and Health Services, Rajasthan, Jaipur, filed complaint under Section 18(A) read with Sections 16,17 and 17A  punishable under Sections 27(d) and 27(b)(i) of the Drugs and  Cosmetics Act, 1940, on June 28,1991. On the same day, the  learned Additional  Civil Judge  &  C.J.M.,  Court No.6,  Jaipur  City  jaipur  took  cognizance  on  the  said complaint as  Criminal Case No. 247/91 and issued summons to all the  respondents. That  order of  the learned magistrate was questioned  by the  respondents before the High Court in S.B.Crl. Misc.  Petition No.  293 of  barred  by  limitation under Section 468(2)(c) Cr. P.C. By order of April 11, 1996, the learned  Single Judge  of the  High Court who dealt with that petition  accepted  that  contention  and  quashed  the proceeding in  the  said  criminal  case  initiated  by  the learned Magistrate on June 28, 1991.      Shri Aruneshwar  Gupta, the  learned counsel  appearing for the  State, contends that the High Court was in error in computing  the   period  of  limitation  from  the  date  of collecting samples  instead of  from the  date of the report dated July  2,  1988  of  the  Government  Analyst.  Learned counsel for  the respondents  while supporting  the order of the High  Court argued  that the  date when the samples were collected was  the date  of the  offence so  it was  rightly

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 4  

taken as the starting point of limitation and from that date the complaint was clearly barred by limitation.      The only  question that  arises for  consideration  is: whether the  complaint in  question is  barred by limitation under Section 468 Cr. P.C.      In the  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Chapter XXXVI has been  added prescribing limitation for taking cognizance of certain  offences with  a view to expedite the process of detection and  investigation of  crimes and  also to  ensure observances of the principle of fairness in the total of the offences  by   barring   belated   prosecution.   Delay   in prosecution of  offences causes  undue hardship  as it keeps the sword  handing on  the heads  of accused  persons and it also results in the material evidence getting vanished. This chapter applies  to all  such offences  for which punishment prescribed is  less than  three years. But it does not apply to offences  for which  punishment prescribed  is more  than three years  and to  economic offences  under various  Acts, which are excluded under Central Act 12 of 1974 or any State Acts. It  contains seven  sections  (467-473).  Section  467 defines the  expression ’period  of limitation’  used in the chapter. Section  468 creates  bar to  taking cognizance  of offences after  lapse of  period of limitation. Sections 469 to  473   deal  with   various  aspects  of  computation  of limitation.  Of   the  aforementioned   provisions,  we  are concerned with  Sections 468  and 469.  Sub-section  (1)  of Section 468  ordains that  no Court shall take cognizance of an offence  of the  category specified  in sub-section  (2), after the  expiry of  the ’period  of limitation’ prescribed thereunder.  This,   however,  is   subject  to   the  other provisions of the Code. Sub-section (2) postulates different period of  limitation for  offences with  reference  to  the punishment provided for them; if the punishment provided for an offence in any Act is only fine, the period of limitation fixed is  six months;  if the  offence  is  punishable  with imprisonment for  a term  not exceeding one year, the period of limitation  prescribed is  one year and if the offence is punishable with  imprisonment for  a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years, the period of limitation laid down is three years. And sub-section (3) spells out the rule of limitation in cases of joinder of charges; if a person is tried for  more  offences  than  one,  then  the  period  of limitation will  be determined with reference to the offence which is  punishable with  the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment; for example, if a person  is tried for various offences and some of them are punishable with  fine and  some with imprisonment for a term less than  a year  and some  for  which  the  punishment  is provided upto three years, then the period of limitation for all the  offences, if they are tried together, will be three years.      Section 469  deals with  commencement of  the period of limitation and it reads thus:      " 469.  Commencement of  the period      of limitation  - (1)  The period of      limitation,  in   relation  to   an      offender, shall commence -           (a)  on   the  date   of   the                offence; or           (b) where  the  commission  of                the offence was not known                to the  person  aggrieved                by the  offence or to any                police officer, the first                day on which such offence

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4  

              comes to the knowledge of                such  person  or  to  any                police officer, whichever                is earlier; or           (c) where  it is  not known by                whom  the   offence   was                committed, the  first the                day on which the identity                of the  offender is known                to the  person  aggrieved                by the  offence or to the                police   officer   making                investigation  into   the                offence,   whichever   is                earlier."      A plain  reading of the provision extracted above shows that in sub-section (1) three alternative starting points of limitation have  been  specified  -  (a)  the  date  of  the offence; (b)  the first  day on which an offence came to the knowledge of  the person  aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer,  whichever is  earlier, in  a case where the commission of  the offence  was not  known to  any of  them, or(c) the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to  the person  aggrieved by  the offence  or  to  the police  officer   making  investigation  into  the  offence, whichever is  earlier, but  this can  be called  in aid in a case  where  it  is  not  known  by  whom  the  offence  was committed. basically from the date of the offence the period of limitation  will start  but there will be cases where the commission of  offence or  identity of the offender comes to knowledge of  those concerned  with it long thereafter so in such situations  clauses (b)  and (c),  as the  case may be, would be the date of commencement of period of limitation.      Now we  shall see  which clause  of sub-section  (1) of Section 469  is attracted to the facts of the case. For this purpose it  will be necessary to revert to the facts of this case. The  essence of the offences charged is manufacture of adulterated, sub-standard, misbranded, spurious drugs within the meaning  of the  relevant provisions  of the  Act and/or storage,  distribution   and   sale   of   such   drugs   in contravention of  the provisions  of the Act. On the date of collection of samples from respondent No.16, on February 29, 1988, it  could not  have been  said that  any  offence  was committed as  selling of  drugs per se is no offence and the quality of  the drugs  was not known to the Drugs Inspector, the complainant on that date. It is only, when the report of the Government  Analyst was  receive, that  it came to light that the  provisions of  the Act are violated and offence is committed. So  on the  facts of  this case it cannot be said that Clause  (a) of  Section 469(1)  is attracted.  That the drugs   which    were   offered    for   sale    were   sub- standard/adulterated, within the meaning of the Act, came to the knowledge  of the  Drugs Inspector  only on July 2, 1988 when the  report of  the Government  Analyst was received by him; and  therefore, clause  (b) of  Section 469(1)  will be attracted.      Under cognate legislations of different States, similar questions arose  before the  High Courts.  In R.S. Arora vs. The State  (1987) Crl.  Law Journal 1225, the question which fell for  consideration of  Delhi High Court was whether for prosecution under Sections 7, 19 and 16(1) of the Seeds Act, 1966, the  period of  limitation of  six months  would start from the  date of  collection of samples under clause (a) or from the  date of Seed Analyst report for purposes of clause (b) of  Section 469(1)  Cr.P.C. The  learned Single Judge of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4  

the Delhi  High Court  took the  view  that  the  limitation commences from  the date  of submission of the report by the Seed Analyst  to the  Inspector, so Section 469(1) (b) would apply. The  same view  was taken by the Bombay High Court in Omprakash Gulabchandji  Partani vs. Ashok & Anr. (1992) Crl. L. J. 2704.      In M/s.  Satyanarayana General Traders & Ors. vs. State (1993) 2  Crimes 203,  a learned  Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh high  Court held that for prosecution of offences of mis-branding  under   Insecticides  Act,   the   period   of limitation would  start from the date on which the report of the Analyst  was received  but not  from the  date of taking samples and thus Section 469(1) (b) would be attracted.      We are  in entire agreement with the views expressed by the learned Judges of the High Courts in the above cases.      For  the  above  reasons,  in  the  instant  case,  the limitation for  the  purpose  of  Section  468(2)  (c)  will commence from  July 2,  1988, the  date of  knowledge of the commission of offence to the concerned officer under Section 469(1) (b)  but not  from  February  29,1988  (the  date  of collection of  samples by  the Drugs  Inspector) and  as the complaint was  filed on  June 28, 1991 which is within three years so  the complaint  is not  barred by  limitation under Section 468(2)  (c). The  High Court has missed this germane aspect erroneously  took the  date of  commencement  of  the limitation as  February 29,1988  , the  date  on  which  the samples were  collected by  the Drugs Inspector form accused No. 16.  It is  thus clear that the High Court has committed illegality in  so computing  the period of limitation, which results in miscarriage of justice.      In the  result, we  set aside the impugned order of the learned Single  Judge of the High Court dated April 11,1996, allow  the  appeal  and  remand  the  case  to  the  learned Additional Civil  Judge and Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 6  Jaipur City  Jaipur, for  disposal in accordance with law.