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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  547 of 1997

PETITIONER: State of Punjab                                          

RESPONDENT: Ramdev Singh                                             

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/12/2003

BENCH: DORAISWAMY RAJU & ARIJIT PASAYAT

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

         Sexual violence apart from being a dehumanizing act is an unlawful  intrusion on the right of privacy and sanctity of a     female.  It is a serious blow to her  supreme honour and offends her self-esteem and dignity \026 it degrades and humiliates the  victim and where the victim is a helpless innocent child or a minor, it leaves behind a  traumatic experience. A rapist not only causes physical injuries but  more indelibly leaves a scar on the most cherished possession of a woman  i.e. her dignity, honour, reputation and not the least her chastity.  Rape is not only a crime against the person of a woman, it is a crime  against the entire society. It destroys, as noted by this Court in Shri  Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Miss Subhra Chakraborty (AIR 1996 SC 922), the  entire psychology of a woman and pushes her into deep emotional crisis.  It is a crime against basic human rights, and is also violative of the  victim’s most cherished of the Fundamental Rights, namely, the Right to  Life contained in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in  short the ’Constitution’) The Courts are, therefore, expected to deal  with cases of sexual crime against women with utmost sensitivity. Such  cases need to be dealt with sternly and severely.  A socially sensitized  judge, in our opinion, is a better statutory armour in cases of crime  against women than long clauses of penal provisions, containing complex  exceptions and provisos.  

     The State of Punjab questions acquittal of the respondent  (hereinafter referred to as ’the accused’) who was charged for  commission of offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal  Code, 1860 (for short ’the IPC’).   

We do not propose to mention name of the victim. Section 228-A of  IPC makes disclosure of identity of victim of certain offences  punishable. Printing or publishing name of any matter which may make  known the identity of any person against whom an offence under Sections  376, 376-A, 376-B, 376-C or 376-D is alleged or found to have been  committed can be punished. True it is, the restriction, does not relate  to printing or publication of judgment by High Court or Supreme Court.  But keeping in view the social object of preventing social victimization  or ostracism of the victim of a sexual offence for which Section 228-A  has been enacted, it would be appropriate that in the judgments, be it  of this Court, High Court or lower Court, the name of the victim should  not be indicated. We have chosen to describe her as ’victim’ in the  judgment. (See State of Karnataka v. Puttaraja (2003 (8) Supreme 364)  

       Prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as follows:

       On 1.10.1985 the mother of the victim PW-4 lodged information with  the police that 17-18 days back the accused had committed rape on her

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daughter PW-7. According to the information lodged, the victim had told  her mother after coming from house of the accused that she was forcibly  dragged away by the accused while she was cleaning utensils and was  raped.  At the time of occurrence wife of the accused was absent and  taking advantage of her absence, the accused committed the lustful act.  As the father of the victim PW-5 was lying ill seriously they did not  think it proper to inform him and when he recovered from illness, and  the police had come to the village for investigating into some other  case, information was lodged.  The victim-girl was sent for medical  examination and she was examined by PW-2. After completion of  investigation, charge sheet was placed and accused faced trial.  He  denied the accusations and pleaded false implication. It was stated that  the mother of the victim had taken some money as advance for serving as  maid servant and as she did not work and refused to refund the money, a  suit was filed for recovery of the amount and, therefore, with a view to  avoid payment false accusation has been made.  The trial Court placed  reliance on the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and convicted the  accused of the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC and sentenced  him to 7 years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1,000/- with  default stipulation.  Being aggrieved by the judgment, accused filed  Crl. A. No. 432-SB/86 in the Punjab and Haryana High Court.  By the  impugned judgment dated 2.12.1994 the High Court allowed the appeal and  set aside the conviction and consequently the sentence.

       According to High Court primarily four factors render the  prosecution version vulnerable. Firstly, there was unexplained delay in  lodging FIR. Secondly, the victim’s evidence did not inspire confidence  as there were exaggerations, and a friend to whom she claimed to have  told about the incidence was not examined. Thirdly, the medical evidence  indicated that the victim was habituated to sexual intercourse and,  therefore, her version that she was raped by the accused is not  believable.  Fourthly, there was no evidence to show that the victim was  employed as a maid servant in the house of the accused.   

       In support of the appeal learned counsel for the State submitted  that approach of the High Court is totally erroneous. In case of sexual  assaults the Court has to take note of the realities of life and should  not enter into hyper technicalities. The delay was properly explained  and nothing was brought on record to raise any doubt about the reason  indicated by PWs.-4 and 5. Merely because respectable persons in the  locality and police were not informed the prosecution should not have  been doubted. Had they informed police earlier there was no question of  explaining the delay. The reasons for which there was delay have been  properly explained.   The hypothetical medical evidence has been given  primacy to cast doubt over the victim’s version.  When the defence  itself suggested that victim was engaged as maid servant, the High  Court’s conclusion that there was no material to show about her  employment as a maid servant is based on total misreading of the  evidence.   

       Merely because of doctor’s hypothetical and opinionative evidence  that the victim was accustomed to sexual intercourse, prosecution  version of rape was not to be discarded.  

       In response, learned counsel for the accused supported the  judgment submitting that reasonings indicated by the High Court are on  terra firma, more particularly when the victim’s testimony is completely  unreliable because it is at great variance with the medical evidence.  Residually, it is submitted that the judgment is one of acquittal and  after a long lapse of time the jurisdiction under Article 136 should not  be exercised.

       Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula  for doubting the prosecution case and discarding the same solely on the  ground of delay in lodging the first information report.  Delay has the

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effect of putting the Court in its guard to search if any explanation  has been offered for the delay, and if offered, whether it is  satisfactory or not.  If the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain  the delay and there is possibility of embellishment in prosecution  version on account of such delay, the same would be fatal to the  prosecution.  However, if the delay is explained to the satisfaction of  the Court, same cannot by itself be a ground for disbelieving and  discarding the entire prosecution version, as done by the High Court in  the present case.

       The evidence of PWs-4 and 5 read with that of the victim clearly  explained as to why the first information report was lodged after 17-18  days.  The evidence of the aforesaid three witnesses clearly show that  PW-5 was seriously ill and the family members did not want to create  tension in his mind when he was not physically well and waited for his  recovery.  In spite of the lengthy cross-examination this aspect has not  been shaken by the defence. The view of the High Court that PW-4 should  have told some respectable person or the father earlier to say least is  a view which has no foundation and overlooks the very reason to shun or  openly publicise it to avoid the ignominy involved in it. In a tradition  bound and conservative society, more particularly in a rural area, the  shame of sexual assault on a girl of about 14 years cannot be lost sight  of.  This down to earth reality has been lost sight of by the High  Court.  The trial Court had rightly emphasized this aspect, but  unfortunately, the High Court took a contrary view irrationally.   

       Further, the victim’s evidence has been discarded by holding that  it is at variance with the medical evidence.  The High Court has not  indicated as to in what way it is at variance with the medical evidence.   Mere statement that according to doctor, victim’s vagina admitted two  fingers and she could on earlier occasions have had sexual intercourse  five, ten or fifteen times rules out rape by accused once as alleged in  no way casts doubt on victim’s evidence.  

       Learned counsel for the respondent-accused pointed out that rape  as claimed by the victim was discounted by the evidence of PW-2, who did  not find visible injury when she medically examined the victim.  In our  opinion the same is of no consequence.  The doctor examined the victim  after about 3 weeks. That being so, the effect of the act on the  physical form was practically obliterated. That is not denied by the  doctor.  Merely because the friend of the victim was not examined that  also cannot be a suspicious circumstance to throw suspicion on the  victim’s evidence.   

       Another factor which seems to have weighed with the High Court is  the evidence of doctor PW-4 that there were signs of previous sexual  intercourse on the victim.   That cannot, by stretch of imagination, as  noted above, be a ground to acquit an alleged rapist. Even assuming that  the victim was previously accustomed sexual intercourse, that is not a  determinative question.  On the contrary, the question which was  required to be adjudicated was did the accused commit rape on the victim  on the occasion complained of. Even if it is hypothetically accepted  that the victim had lost her virginity earlier, it did not and cannot in  law give license to any person to rape her.  It is the accused who was  on trial and not the victim. Even if the victim in a given case has been  promiscuous in her sexual behaviour earlier, she has a right to refuse  to submit herself to sexual intercourse to anyone and everyone because  she is not a vulnerable object or prey for being sexually assaulted by  anyone and everyone. Finally, if we may say as a last straw, is the  fallacy in High Court’s reasoning about lack of evidence relating to the  employment of the victim as a maid servant.  The High Court completely  overlooked the fact that the suggestions given to witnesses, more  particularly PWs-4, 5 and 7 that the accused or his wife had threatened  to put an end to the victim’s service as a maid servant because of her  immoral character, or refusal to refund the amount taken as advance for

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her employment as a maid servant.         It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a  victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime.  There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without  corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal  than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the  physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as  psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it  difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it  may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend  assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as  understood in the context of an accomplice would do.          As was noted by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Noore Khan  (2000 (3) Supreme 70)                              

"Absence of injuries on the person of the  prosecutrix has weighed with the High Court for  inferring consent on the part of the prosecutrix. We  are not at all convinced. We have already noticed  that the delay in medical examination of the  prosecutrix was occasioned by the factum of the  lodging of the FIR having been delayed for the  reasons which we have already discussed. The  prosecutrix was in her teens. The perpetrator of the  crime was an able-bodied youth bustling with energy  and determined to fulfil his lust armed with a knife  in his hand and having succeeded in forcefully  removing the victim to a secluded place where there  was none around to help the prosecutrix in her  defence. The injuries which the prosecutrix suffered  or might have suffered in defending herself and  offering resistance to the accused were abrasions or  bruises which would heal up in the ordinary course of  nature within 2 to 3 days of the incident. The  absence of visible marks of injuries on the person of  the prosecutrix on the date of her medical  examination would not necessarily mean that she had  not suffered any injuries or that she had offered no  resistance at the time of commission of the crime.  Absence of injuries on the person of the prosecutrix  is not necessarily an evidence of falsity of the  allegation or an evidence of consent on the part of  the prosecutrix. It will all depend on the facts and  circumstances of each case."

The High Court was not justified in reversing the conviction of  the respondent and recording the order of acquittal. An unmerited  acquittal does no good to the society. If the prosecution has succeeded  in making out a convincing case for recording a finding as to the  accused being guilty, the court should not lean in favour of acquittal  by giving weight to irrelevant or insignificant circumstances or by  resorting to technicalities or by assuming doubts and giving benefit  thereof where none reasonably exists. A doubt, as understood in criminal  jurisprudence, has to be a reasonable doubt and not an excuse for a  finding in favour of acquittal. An unmerited acquittal encourages wolves  in the society being on the prowl for easy prey, more so when the  victims of crime are helpless females or minor children. The courts have  to display a greater sense of responsibility and to be more sensitive  while dealing with charges of sexual assault on women, particularly of  tender age and children.  

Looked from any angle the High Court’s judgment does not stand  scrutiny and deserves to be set aside which we direct. The conviction as  recorded by the trial Court and the sentence imposed by it are restored.

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The accused shall surrender forthwith to serve remainder of sentence, if  any.  The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated.