http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 15  

CASE NO.: Appeal (Civil) 3017 of 1997

PETITIONER: State of Punjab & Anr.                                   

RESPONDENT: M/s Devans Modern Brewaries Ltd. & Anr.                  

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/11/2003

BENCH: CJI., R.C. Lahoti & Dr. AR. Lakshmanan.

JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT

Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN, J.

I have had the privilege of perusing the judgment proposed by my  learned Brother Justice B.N. Agrawal.  However, with respect, I express my  inability to agree with the same and I propose to write a separate judgment in  the following terms.

As facts and provisions of the relevant law have been set out in the  judgment of my learned Brother Justice B.N. Agrawal, I do not propose to  extract them again.   

Civil Appeal No. 3017 of 1997 was filed by the State of Punjab against  the judgment of the Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court dated  17.01.1997 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 5358 of 1996.  The said writ petition  was filed by Respondent No.1 in this appeal, namely, M/s. Devans Modern  Brewaries Ltd., Ludhiana praying for issuance of a writ in the nature of  Certiorari quashing the imposition of import fee on Beer vide Order 1-D (iii) of  the Punjab Excise Fiscal Orders, 1932, amended from time to time, latest  being notification dated 27.03.1996 which is impugned in the writ petition and  for other consequential prayers.

Civil Appeal Nos. 2696 and 2697 of 2003 were filed by Penguin  Alcohols (P) Ltd. and Another etc. against the State of Kerala and Others  against the common judgment of the High Court of Kerala dated 06.04.2001  in Writ Appeal Nos. 3 and 10 of 2001 dismissing the appeal filed by them.   

The original petitions were filed by appellants herein against Exhibit P1  notification issued by the State of Kerala enhancing the rate of import fee  from Rs. 2/- per proof litre to Rs.5/- on Indian Made Foreign Liquor  (hereinafter referred to as "IMFL").  The import fee was initially levied under  Government Order, G.O.(MS) No. 57/92/TD dated 31.12.1992.  The learned  Single Judge upheld the levy holding that it is a fee and regulatory in nature.   The appellants preferred writ appeals, which were dismissed by the Division  Bench by the impugned common order in Writ Appeal Nos. 3 and 10 of 2001.   

In both the appeals, common questions arise for consideration and  hence they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this  common judgment.

The points for consideration in both the appeals are: a)      Whether the import fee levied is the price for parting with the  privilege given to the respondent to import liquor into the State  and, therefore, the same is within the competence of the State  to impose import fee; b)      Whether the imposition of import fee does not, in any way,  restrict trade, commerce and intercourse among the States.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 15  

It is well settled by a catena of decisions that the trade in liquor is not a  fundamental right.  It is a privilege of the State.  The State parts with this  privilege for revenue consideration.  In Punjab, the Excise Policy of the State  is formulated every year.  It is also made known to the licensees much before  their licenses for the year comes to an end.  It is also a matter of fact that the  licensees have paid the fee on demand.  The fee was first levied in the year  1992.  The licensee, in the Punjab case, had been holding the licence all  through this period and never challenged or protested against levy of the fee.   The licensees having paid the fee without any protest all through is not  entitled to challenge the same, which does not suit them.  The licensee  cannot aprobate and reprobate.  In Punjab, the grant of licences are governed  by the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (for short "the Act") and various rules and  orders framed under it.  In the Punjab case, the challenge of the appellant is  limited to the imposition of import fee in addition to the countervailing duty on  Beer.  It is not disputed by the appellant that the State is competent and is  entitled to impose excise duty or countervailing duty besides there is no bar  on the State to charge any other fee on account of consideration of the  privilege provided to the licensee to provide them the right to trade in liquor.   A perusal of the impugned notification shows that the State Government  substituted the existing provision with regard to import fee and increased the  rate of this fee.  It is part of the privilege price i.e. consideration amount on  account of which the licence was granted to the licensee.  Further, the  licensee had an option to opt out of the business field if such levies were  detrimental to their interest or were to their disadvantage.

The respondent in Civil Appeal No. 3017 of 1997 carries on wholesale  trade in the State of Punjab.  Under the rules, the licensee is required to  obtain a licence in Form L-1, which is valid for one year.  In addition to this  under the Punjab Excise Fiscal Orders, 1932, the respondent is liable to pay  duty/fee at the rates mentioned therein.  As a result of this, the respondent  has to pay excise duty/import fee as the case may be.  Over and above this,  there is an import fee which is levied by the State Government in exercise of  its powers under Section 58 of the Act.  According to learned counsel for the  State of Punjab all these charges and levies are really a price for the privilege  of carrying on the trade under the L-1 license as far as the privilege of  importing alcohol into the State of Punjab.  The impugned levy is under the  Punjab Excise act, 1914, which is a pre-Constitution Act.  It is this Act which  provides that no intoxicant shall be imported, exported or transported except  after the payment of duty to which it may be liable under the Act.  The words  "duty to which it may be liable under this Act" were substituted by the words  "duty of customs or excise to which it may be liable".  This change was also  brought about by the Government of India on adaptation of Indian Laws Order  1937.  It was, therefore, argued by the State that the power is conferred under  Section 58(2)(b) to regulate the import, export, transport and possession of  any intoxicant.  Therefore, the different imposts have to be construed in this  background.  There is, therefore, an excise duty so-called which is provided  for under Rule 5 of the Punjab Excise Fiscal Orders, 1932, not only on locally  produced beer but also on imported beer.  The Statutory Authority for this  imposition can be found from the provisions including Section 16 read with  Section 32 of the Act.  In addition to the excise duty under Rule 5, there is  also a provision for grant of licence for sale of intoxicants.  To carry on the  trade in wholesale, a person has to obtain a L-1 licence for which an annual  pre-determined sum is payable.  Similarly, in addition there are licences for  production and for manufacture each of which licence has its own pre- determined fee which has to be paid for obtaining such a licence.  The  modalities of the levy of fees or the quantum of the fees has no bearing on its  legal pedigree which is that of consideration for the permission to carry on an  activity in the noxious articles.  Thus, if a person wants to carry on a  wholesale trade in liquor in Punjab, he will have to (a) obtain a L-1 licence for  which he would pay the fees in accordance with the policy carried on for the  period; (b) On the liquor purchased by him, he will have to pay duty on all  purchases irrespective of the source of the product.  This duty is the duty  under Rule 5 of the Punjab Excise Fiscal Orders, 1932, in relation to beer  read with Rule 1 of the said Orders in case of IMFL.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 15  

In case, the licensee seeks a permit to bring in imported alcohol, he  would have to pay as a condition of the permission to import under Section  16(b) read with Section 19 an import pass fee at such sum fixed by the  Government.  The respondent in this case/writ petitioner has mixed up these  different imposts and has referred to the duty paid under Rule 5 which is an  amount equivalent to the excise duty and the fee under Rule 1 (d) of Punjab  Excise Fiscal Orders, 1932.  As already noticed, on imported goods there are  two independent imposts, namely, duty equal to the local excise duty under  Rule 5 and an import fee under Rule 1(d) of the Punjab Excise Fiscal Orders,  1932.   On 31.01.2002, this Court passed an order which read as under: "In the course of the argument, it was noticed that the principal  argument on behalf of the respondents before the High Court, which  was upheld by the High Court, was that the import fee, which is the  subject matter of these proceedings, had been imposed by the State  of Punjab without authority of law.  The response on behalf of the  State of Punjab before the High Court was that the right of the  respondents to import beer into the State was privilege conferred by  the State upon the respondents to which Article 301 had no  application because the respondents had no right to trade in liquor  de hors that privilege and that the import fee was the price for the  privilege.  In the course of the argument before us, we asked Mr.  K.K. Venugopal, learned counsel for the State, to tell us what the  source of power for the imposition of the import fee was.  Mr.  Venugopal referred in reply to Sections 18, 19, 34, 58 and 59 of the  Punjab Excise Act, 1914.  In other words, the contention of the State  before us is that the import fee is a fee and the respondents are  required to pay such fee to bring beer into the State."     

In compliance with the aforesaid order, a detailed additional affidavit was filed  on behalf of the State of Punjab by quoting the relevant provisions of the  Punjab Excise Act, 1914, namely, Section 3(9) - "Excise Revenue", Section  3(10) - "Export", Section 3(12) - "Import", Section 16 - "Import, export and  transport of intoxicant", Section 17 - "Power of State Government to prohibit  import, export and transport of intoxicant", Section 18 - Passes necessary for  import, export and transport, Section 19 - Grant of passes for import, export  and transport, Section 31 - Duty on excisable articles, Section 32 - Manner in  which duty may be levied, Section 33 - Payment for grant of leases, Section  34 - Fees for terms, conditions and form of, and duration of licences, permits  and passes, Section 35 - Grant of lincense for sale, Section 58 - Power of  State Government to make Rules, Section 59 - Powers of Financial  Commissioner to make rules.  Along with the additional affidavit, a copy of the  Notification No. 5998 called the Punjab Excise Fiscal Orders and prescribed  levy of rates of duty etc. was filed and marked as Annexure-A-1.  It is seen  from the additional affidavit that this notification was republished by the State  of Punjab in the year 1965.  The State vide notification dated 24.03.1986  introduced amendment to the Punjab Excise Fiscal Orders, 1986 and as per  Clause 5 of the notification, Order 1-D was added after Order 1-C levying an  import fee of Rs. 3.20 per proof litre on all imports of IMFL and rectified spirit  into the State of Punjab.

Vide notification dated 31.03.1992, the Government of Punjab made  further amendment in the Fiscal Order and issued Punjab Excise Fiscal (10th  amendment) Orders, 1992 and substituted Order 1-D stating that "All imports  of liquor and spirit shall be subject to the levy of an import fee as prescribed."   By further amendment vide notification dated 27.03.1996, the Punjab Excise  Fiscal Orders, 1932 was amended and the Order 1-D item (iii) was  substituted.  In exercise of powers conferred under the Act, the State  Government framed rules which have been marked as Annexure P-2.

Thus, it is seen from the Punjab Liquor Import, Export Order, 1932, the  State Government is competent and empowered to regulate the import and  export of liquor.  Under the Punjab Liquor Licence Rules, 1956, there are 21  types of licences which are prescribed and are given.  The respondent in this  appeal is holding L-1 licence i.e. Wholesale and retail vend of foreign liquor to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 15  

trade only.  The said licence is given on fixed licence fee, which is subject to  variation as per excise policy of the Government based on year to year.  The  State Government has incorporated as one of the terms and conditions on the  L-1 holders to pay import fees also at the prescribed rate as per the Punjab  Excise Fiscal Order, 1996.  The respondent has been accepting the terms  and conditions from 1992 onwards and acted on the same, the licence was  renewed on yearly basis.

Similarly, under the provisions of the Punjab Liquor Permit & Pass  Rules, 1932, the State Government issued permit in form L-32, in the case of  import and the licensees are liable to pay permit fee at the prescribed rate.   As already stated, the respondent has mixed up two different imposts.  The  respondent has referred to the duty paid under Rule 5 i.e. equivalent to  Excise duty and fees under Order (1) (D) of the Punjab Fiscal Orders, 1932.   As stated above, on imported goods by L-1 holder, there are two different and  independent imposts in the shape of Excise duty under Rule 5 and import fee  under Rule (1) (D) of Punjab Excise Fiscal Orders, 1932.  In addition he has  to pay licence fee under the Punjab Liquor Licence Rules, 1956, which is  fixed on yearly basis.  Thus, it is seen that as per provisions of Section 58 (D)  as well as Section 59 (D) the State Government, in my opinion, has power to  regulate the import and price of any description of bottle and the scale of the  fee and the manner of the fee payable by any licensee.  

It is stated in the additional affidavit that the word "fee" is not used in  the strict sense to attract the doctrine of quid pro quo.  This is the price or  consideration which the State Government charges for parting with this  privilege and granting the same to the vendors.  Therefore, in my opinion, the  amount charged is not a fee nor a tax but it is in the nature of price of a  privilege which the purchaser has to pay in any trading and business in  noxious article/goods.  The collection of such amount in the shape of import  fee does not form part of the general revenue of the State.  As stated above,  it is one of the terms and conditions of the Excise Policy applicable to all L-1  holders including the respondents herein.  In my view, respondents cannot be  permitted to challenge the terms and conditions of the policy if they want to  avail the benefit of the same.

This Court, in a number of judgments, has held that the State  Government has unfettered powers to regulate the Export/Import sale of  intoxicants and in exercise of its regulatory powers, the import fee has been  incorporated as one of the terms of the Excise Policy on yearly basis.  We will  refer to the relevant judgments in the later part of this judgment.       

The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there is no  source of power for imposition of import fee over and above the countervailing  duty and that the appellant-State was not able to show that under which  Authority or provision of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, they can impose the  import fee over and above the countervailing duty.  It is further submitted that  a combined reading of Section 33A of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, Articles  301 and 304 of the Constitution and Entry 51 of List II of Seventh Schedule to  the Constitution makes it clear that the State of Punjab has no authority to  impose the import fee over and above the countervailing duty.  This  contention, in my opinion, has no force for the reasons stated and the  discussions made in paragraphs supra.

In my opinion, Articles 302 and 304A of the Constitution of India are  not attracted to the present case as the imposition of import fee does not, in  any way, restrict trade commerce and intercourse among the States.  In my  opinion, the permissive privilege to deal in liquor is not a "right" at all.  The  levy charged for parting with that privilege is neither a tax nor a fee.  It is  simply a levy for the act of granting permission or for the exercise of power to  part with the privilege.  In this context, we can usefully refer to Har Shankar  and Others etc. etc. vs. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner  and Others etc. AIR 1975 SC 1121 and Panna Lal and Others vs. State of  Rajasthan and Others (1975) 2 SCC 633.  As noticed earlier, dealing in  liquor is neither a right nor is the levy a tax or a fee.  Articles 301-304 will be

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 15  

rendered inapplicable at the threshold to the activity in question.  Further,  there is not even a single judgment which upholds the applicability of Articles  301-304 to the liquor trade.  On the contrary, numerous judgments expressly  hold these Articles to be inapplicable to trade, commerce and intercourse in  liquor.  We can beneficially refer to the judgments in The State of Bombay  vs. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala [1957] SCR 874, Har Shankar’s case (supra),  M/s. Sat Pal and Co. and Others vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Others  (1979) 4 SCC 232 and Khoday’s case.  The learned counsel for the  respondent submitted that Articles 301-304 are violated or transgressed.  In  view of discussions in paragraphs above, it is clearly demonstrated as to how  and why Articles 301-304 are inapplicable to liquor trade in any form.

We shall now deal with the Kerala matter in Civil Appeal Nos. 2696  and 2697 of 2003.

The learned counsel for the licensee/appellant in this case also  contended that Part XIII of the Constitution interdicts Parliament and State  Legislatures from enacting laws containing discriminatory measures/taxation  in respect of inter-state trade and commerce and that the said articles in Part  XIII impose a constitutional limitation on the power of the Parliament and the  Legislatures of the States and that the said Part XIII of the Constitution  enshrines a principle of paramount importance that the economic unity of the  country cannot be interfered with by economic protectionism and creation of  trade barriers, fiscal or otherwise.  He would further submit the restriction in  Part XIII of the Constitution also apply to Taxation Laws and the provisions of  Part XII of the Constitution are subject to the limitations set out in Part XIII  and such regulatory measures also do not impede the freedom of trade,  commerce and intercourse and compensatory taxes for the use of trading  facilities are not hit by the freedom declared by Article 301.  He would also  urge that Article 303(1) prohibits Parliament and the Legislature of a State  from enacting any law giving preference to one State over another or from  making any discrimination between one State and another by virtue of any  entry relating to trade and commerce in any of the lists in the Seventh  Schedule and that the obstructions or impediments to the free flow of trade  would be violative of the freedom declared by Article 301.  In this context, he  referred to the case in The Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. vs. The  State of Rajasthan and Others [1963] 1 SCR 491.  It is further submitted  that the limitation upon the Legislative power stipulated in Article 303(1) and  Article 304A will apply to trade in liquor.  It is further contended that the  discriminatory levy of import fee is violative of Articles 303(1) and 304A of the  Constitution.  According to the learned counsel for the appellant/licensee, the  power of the State to levy a tax or a fee should be traceable to the entries in  the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.  Entry 51 of List II provides for a  levy of duty of excise on alcoholic liquor for human consumption  manufactured or produced in the State and countervailing duties at the same  or lower rates of similar goods manufactured or produced elsewhere in India  and, therefore, the State Legislature has no power to levy any countervailing  duty on imported liquor in excess of the excise duty on liquor manufactured  within the State.  The State of Kerala imposes a countervailing duty on  imported liquor which is equivalent to the excise duty paid by the  manufacturers within the State.  The State imposes an import fee in addition  to the countervailing duty and the direct and immediate effect of the import  fee is to favour local manufacturers by making the imported liquor costlier.   He would further contend that Article 303(1) prohibits the State Legislature  from taking discriminatory measures and Article 304A also prohibits the State  from imposing such discriminatory levies.  It is also submitted that the State  Legislature has no competence to levy an import fee in addition to  countervailing duty.

The argument advanced by learned counsel for the licensee was  countered by learned senior counsel appearing for the State of Kerala.  The  learned counsel submitted that the import of liquor into the State of Kerala is  prohibited under Section 6 of the Abkari Act and, therefore, liquor can be  imported only after obtaining permission from the Government in the form of  permit issued under Section 24 of the Abkari Act.  As a matter of fact, it was

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 15  

submitted that the State has not issued any licence to anybody including the  Kerala State Beverages Corporation to import liquor.  The Kerala State  Beverages Corporation has licence only for wholesale and retail of liquor  which will not authorise them to import liquor and that the only licence issued  to import liquor into the State is the permit issued on payment of the import  fee and, therefore, it is seen that the levy of import fee is authorized by  Sections 6 and 24 of the Abkari Act, 1977.  It is not excise duty or  countervailing duty referable to Entry 51 of List II.  It is a collection falling  under Entry 8 of List II.  It is the price paid to the State for parting with its  exclusive privilege of dealing in liquor which includes every fact of it including  its import.  In my view, the State has the right to prohibit every form of activity  in relation to intoxicants including its import.  Though it is alleged by the  appellant that the State has discriminated against, the same has not been  substantiated or established by any material.  The State, in this case, has  granted such permit to the Beverages Corporation on their paying the fee  fixed for the purpose as per notification enabling the Corporation to import  liquor from the petitioners/licensees and others.  The import fee so paid is  passed on to the consumers.  Even in the Punjab case, we have already  noticed, that the right to import liquor is dependant on the issue of the import  permit on payment of the import fee as consideration for parting with the  State’s exclusive privilege to import the liquor.  It is purely a contractual  dealing between the State and the importer and, therefore, no question of  violation of Article 301 can arise.  The importer had no anterior right to import  liquor and hence cannot complain of any violation of Article 301 at that stage  as right to trade in liquor is not a fundamental right.  His right to import is  referable to the import permit which he acquired on payment of the import fee.  No further impediment has been created in the import of the liquor so that  Article 301 is not attracted in relation to the payment of the import fee which  was prior to getting his privilege of importing.  The appellant/licensee having  entered into a contractual relationship with the State obtained the privilege  and enjoyed the benefit of it.  It is not open to the petitioners to turn round  subsequently and repudiate the obligations subject to which they obtained the  privilege.  Regulation in the interest of public health and order takes the case  out of Article 301 and regulation for purpose of Article 301 is not confined to  such regulations alone which will facilitate the trade.

       An affidavit was also filed on behalf of the State of Kerala dated  16.04.2003 stating that the collection of import fee in the State of Kerala while  issuing permit to import IMFL is referable to Sections 6 and 24 of the Abkari  Act, 1977, and that it is the price payable by the grantee to the State for  parting with the privilege of importing IMFL which is exclusively that of the  State.  Along with the affidavit, Annexure R1 (photocopy of permit issued) and  Annexure R2 (year-wise statement showing the amount of import fee  collected by the State) was filed.  It is not in dispute that the Kerala State  Beverages Corporation is the exclusive wholesale distributor of IMFL within  the State of Kerala.  Previously, the retail distribution of IMFL in the State was  done by 14 shops of the Kerala State Bevereages Corporation and 231 shops  by private individuals to whom licences were granted by auction conducted  every year.  However, the scheme has been changed and the retail  distribution of IMFL in the State is now being carried on by a few shops of the  Kerala State Consumer Federation and the rest of the shops by the Kerala  State Beverages Corporation.  This is apart from the sales in bars, clubs, etc.  under licences issued in relevant Forms under the Foreign Liquor Rules.  The  Kerala State Beverages Corporation gets its supply of IMFL from distributors  within the State as also from manufacturers and distributors outside the State.   The Kerala State Beverages Corporation calls for tenders fixing a floor price  for the supply with a view to ensure quality as also to prevent unhealthy  competition and loss of revenue.  Based on these tenders, the Kerala State  Beverages Corporation enters into contracts with the  manufacturers/distributors.  After entering into contracts with the  manufacturers/distributors, to enable the import of IMFL to the State, the  Kerala State Beverages Corporation applies to the authorized officer for grant  of permit for import of specified quantity of IMFL after depositing in advance,  the countervailing duty and the import fee payable on the quantity of IMFL  sought to be imported.  Details of the payments so made are entered in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 15  

Column No. 6 of the import permit issued.  The name of the outside  manufacturer/distributor from whom the IMFL is being procured is also  mentioned in the permit for identification of the product.  The import fee paid  by the Kerala State Beverages Corporation is ultimately passed on to the  consumers by adding to the final selling price of the product.  The State has  to deploy its officers at all the check-posts to monitor import of IMFL.  Every  consignment, on crossing the border has to be escorted till it reaches the  warehouse of the Kerala State Beverages Corporation to check diversion and  misuse and the State is incurring heavy expenses for regulating import of  liquor into the State.  Therefore, the import fee was increased from Rs.2/- per  proof litre to Rs.5/- per proof litre in 1995.  Even after the increase in the  import fee, the import of liquor to the State was steadily increasing till 1999- 2000.  The affidavit now filed along with the Annexures gives us a clear  picture of the levy of import fee while issuing permit to import IMFL.  Before  the High Court, the learned counsel for the appellants therein have raised  only one contention that the imposition of import fee is not in the nature of  regulatory fee.  It was contended on behalf of the State that the levy is  permissible and authorized under Sections 6, 7, 17 and 18 of the Act and that  the import fee is the only fee realized from a firm which supplies liquor to the  Kerala State Beverages Corporation to be supplied to other licensees in the  State and that the levy of import fee is also well founded under the Act  basically referable to the legislative Entries 8 and 66 of List III of the Seventh  Schedule to the Constitution.  The learned Single Judge and also the learned  Judges of the Division Bench rejected the contention of the licensee and  upheld the levy on import.     

       At the time of hearing, many judgments were cited by both sides in  regard of their respective contentions.  I feel it is not necessary to deal with or  refer to all the judgments cited, as in my opinion, the real questions in this  case as contended by the licensees are that the State has no authority to  impose the import fee and that it is violative of Articles 301 and 304 of the  Constitution.  The real question, in my opinion, is whether Articles 301 and  304 at all apply.  In the alternative, it was submitted by learned senior counsel  for the State of Punjab that compensatory or regulatory levies have always  been held to be valid and permissible under Articles 301 and 304.  In this  context, he referred to the decisions in the cases of Atiabari Tea Co., Ltd.  Vs. The State of Assam and Others, [1961] 1 SCR 809; The Automobile  Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. case (supra), State of Bihar vs. Chambers of  Commerce (1996) (103) STC 1, Godfrey Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan (2001)  (121) STC 54, Jindal Strips Limited and Others vs. State of Haryana  (2002) 19 PHT 299.  If that be so, it is undeniable that regulations deemed  necessary and apposite are liable to be imposed on liquor trade more than  any other activity since the former is considered inherent are noxious,  pernicious and res extra commercium.  Regulation is thus the hall-mark of the  State action in respect of liquor and that regulation can be and indeed  normally is through the mode of imposition of levies which levy is also  necessary to regulate by keeping out and excluding persons entering the  liquor trade.  We have already extracted the provisions of 1914 Act.  The  contention of the licensee is that once a L-1 wholesale liquor licence is issued  to him, the State’s permissive privilege in respect of liquor stands  permanently parted with and thereafter no additional or further levy of any  kind even in respect of activities other than wholesale selling under L-1  licence can be raised.

       This argument, in my opinion, is completely fallacious and ex-facie  unsustainable.  This contention ignores the well-established legal statutory  and operational distinction demarcating and dealing separately with several  distinct activities in relation to liquor, namely, manufacture, possession, sale,  transport, import, export consumption on premises of hotel/restaurant etc.   Each activity is separately defined and separately itemized and separately  dealt with in statute as also in the rules and involves a diverse range of  separate licences, passes, permits and applications each of differing  contained format and ambit.  The import fee levied in the instant case is fully  authorized by the 1914 Act and delegated legislation thereunder and is clearly  intra vires.  I have already listed in paragraphs above all the provisions

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 15  

authorizing the levy in question in the instant case which is mentioned in the  additional affidavit of the State of Punjab.  The provisions summarized above  confer ample regulatory power upon the excise authority to regulate several  activities related with liquor in any reasonable manner and in particular to  regulate its import.  The regulatory power includes power to levy a monthly  fee in that regard such as the impugned import fee.  Indeed levy for such fee  to exclude and to keep out certain people from the liquor trade and to keep  the number of persons participating in this trade within reasonable limits has  been recognized by this Court in Har Shankar’s case (supra) relying upon  and quoting American decisions.                 

The statutory provision in question must be interpreted and read  broadly and not narrowly.  The approach must be to uphold the validity of the  impugned delegated legislation by a process of fair and broad reading of the  statutory mandate.  Even if the Act does not specifically provide for the levy in  question by name to provide statutory authority for its imposition by delegated  legislation and the levy is actually imposed by the delegated legislation made  under that Statute, the same would be valid and not ultra vires.  In the instant  case, the levy has been imposed by the Punjab Fiscal Orders as amended  from time to time under specific statutory authority to issue such orders under  Sections 58 and 59 of the Act, in particular, and other provisions of the Act as  itemized in paragraphs supra.  Since the rule making power has not been  shown to be bad, the Punjab Fiscal Orders, once made have the effect of the  Statute itself and become part of the Statute since they have been made  under valid rule making power.  The statutory provisions of the Punjab Act  and the Rules itemized in paragraphs above amply delineate that regulatory  power and the impugned import fee is nothing but a facet and manifestation  of that regulation by the State.  Hence, in my view, the levy in question is valid  as a regulatory levy which has consistently been held on the touchstone of  Article 304.

The conduct of the respondent/licensee in attempting to wriggle out of  his contractual obligations is contrary to the clear and unequivocal principle  laid down in Har Shankar’s case (supra).  The issuance of liquor licence  constitutes a contract between the parties i.e. between Excise Authorities on  the one hand and the individual applicant contractor on the other.  The  respondent having accepted the contracts/licences, having fully exploited the  advantage flowing from the contract to the exclusion of others and having  reaped rich commercial benefits from that activity, it is not open to the  contractor to wriggle out from the contract by challenging, inter alia, any  particular condition of that contract/licence.  The respondent herein seeks to  do exactly that by challenging the condition requiring him to pay import fee.   Har Shankar’s case (supra) clearly disentitle the liquor contractor from  wriggling out of contractual obligations solemnly undertaken.  Likewise, in  Panna Lal’s case (supra), this Court in the specific context of liquor licence  had this to say.   "The licenses in the present case are contracts between the parties.   The licensees voluntarily accepted the contracts.  They fully  exploited to their advantage the contracts to the exclusion of others.   The High Court rightly said that it was not open to the appellants to  resile from the contracts on the ground that the terms of payment  were onerous.  The reasons given by the High Court were that the  licensees accepted the license by excluding their competitors and it  would not be open to the licensees to challenge the terms either on  the ground of inconvenient consequence of terms or of harshness of  terms."

As a matter of fact, the respondent is the only and the sole challenger of the  instant levy of import fee.  It is stated that no other liquor contractor or beer  manufacturer or importer has challenged the import fee in Punjab at any point  of time at any forum.  The import fee on IMFL on rectified spirit was levied  from the Year 1986 and at no time the respondent challenged the levy of  import fee from 1986 onwards on IMFL and continued to import large  quantities of beer and paid large sums of fee as per the prescribed rates.  The  writ petition was filed only in April, 1996.  The respondent accepted the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 15  

burden of this contract and obviously did so because he enjoyed the benefits  flowing from this contract.  Having done so, in my view, he cannot and should  not be allowed to wriggle out of his contractual and licence obligation.

In the case of Government of Maharashtra & Ors. vs. M/s. Deokar’s  Distillery (V.N. Khare, CJI and Dr. AR. Lakshmanan,J  concurring) reported  in (2003) 5 SCC 669, this Court, in para 32, observed thus: "The order of the High Court is bad in law.  The High Court, in our  view, has erred in not appreciating that the impugned demand notice  was also in the nature of demanding balance of the price of the  exclusive privilege which would become final only on issue of the  notification, order under Article 309, the bulk of which has already  been recovered in advance, which privilege exclusively vests with  the Government considering the effect of provisions especially  Section 49 and Section 143 (2)(u) of the Prohibition Act.  In our  opinion, the establishment charges demanded are in the nature of  price for parting with the privilege to permit manufacture and sale or  liquor, and the privilege exclusively vests with the Government."

Again in para 40, this Court observed thus: "As pointed out by Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J., as he then was, what  the respondents agreed to pay was the price of an exclusive  privilege which the State parted with in their favour.  They cannot,  therefore, avoid their liability by contending that the payment which  they were called upon to make is truly in the nature of excise duty  and no such duty can be imposed on liquor not lifted or purchased  by them.  The respondents, in our view, must fail in their contention  both on account of the objection to the maintainability of the appeals  and on merits concerning the nature of the payment which they are  liable to make."

In the above case, the power of the State Government under Section  58 A to recover cost of supervision was challenged.  Per majority, this Court  held that the power of the State Government extends to recovering the  differential amount consequent to upward revision of pay-scales and  allowances with retrospective effect and that such differential amount can be  demanded even in exercise of residuary powers of the State Government and  that the liquor licensees having given undertaking in the application in Form  PLA prescribed under the Rules to abide by the orders made under the Act  and the rules could not escape their contractual liability.  This Court also  further held that the establishment charges demanded are in the nature of  price for parting with the privilege to permit manufacture and sale of liquor  and the privilege exclusively rests with the Government.   

The same effect is the judgment of this Court in the case of Assistant  Excise Commissioner & Ors. Vs. Issac Peter & Ors. (1994) 4 SCC 104.  In  the context of a liquor contract, this Court held as under: "....... We are, therefore, of the opinion that in case of contracts  freely entered into with the State, like the present ones, there is  no room for invoking the doctrine of fairness and  reasonableness against one party to the contract (State), for  the purpose of altering or adding to the terms and conditions of  the contract, merely because it happens to be the State.  In  such cases, the mutual rights and liabilities of the parties are  governed by the terms of the contracts (which may be statutory  in some contracts are entered into pursuant to public auction,  floating of tenders or by negotiation.  There is no compulsion on  anyone to enter into these contracts.  It is voluntary on both  sides.  There can be no question of the State power being  involved in such contracts.  It bears repetition to say that the  State does not guarantee profit to the licensees in such  contracts.  There is no warranty against incurring losses.  It is a  business for the licensees.  Whether they make profit or incur  loss is no concern of the State.  In law, it is entitled to its money  under the contract.  It is not as if the licensees are going to pay

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 15  

more to the State in case they make substantial profits.  We  reiterate that what we have said hereinabove is in the context  of contracts entered into between the State and its citizens  pursuant to public auction, floating of tenders or by negotiation.   It is not necessary to say more than this for the purpose of  these otherwise than by public auction, floating of tenders or  negotiation, we need not express any opinion herein."

Kalyani Stores vs. The State of Orissa and Others [1966] 1 SCR  865 case was heavily relied on by the respondent/licensee.  The Constitution  Bench has not in that cases adverted to the issue of liquor trade being res  extra commercium and has simply considered whether Articles 301/304 are  violated or not.  The case, in my opinion, would have no relevance to the  instant case.             

The following judgments can be usefully referred for the proposition  that the rights are vested in the State which it may part with for a  consideration.

In the case of Har Shankar and Others etc. etc. vs. The Deputy  Excise and Taxation Commissioner and Others etc. AIR 1975 SC 1121  (paras 44, 46, 47, 50, 51, 53, 55, 57 and 58 dealt with the rights of the State  in this regard). In the case of Nashirwar and Others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh  and Others, 1975 (1) SCC 29, this Court held that by virtue of Entry 8 of List  II, the Government can hold a public auction to grant lease, the amount  representing the consideration for the grant of such right or privilege.   

In the case of State of Orissa and Others vs. Harinarayan Jaiswal  and Others (1972) 2 SCC 36, this Court held that the Government is the  exclusive owner of the privilege to sell the right to sell liquor, reliance on  Article 19(1)(g) or Article 14 of the Constitution becomes irrelevant.

In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Prabhakara Reddy AIR  1987 SC 933 held that all rights in regard to manufacture and sale of  intoxicants vest in the State and it is open to the State to part with those rights  for a consideration and that the consideration for parting with the privilege of  the State is neither excise duty nor licence fee but it is the price of the  privilege.  

In the case of State of U.P. and Others vs. Sheopat Rai and Others  1994 Supp (1) SCC 8 held that the term ’licence fee’ in the context of the U.P.  Excise Law connotes the idea of it being the consideration in money received  by the Government from a private person by grant of a licence (contract) for  parting in such person’s favour, its exclusive privilege or right of carrying on  certain activities in respect of country liquor or drugs under ’auction system’ in  public auctions.    

       In the case of State of Haryana and Others vs. Lal Chand and  Others, AIR 1984 SC 1326, this Court has held that the licence fee is a price  for acquiring such privilege and one who makes a bid for the grant of such  privilege with a full knowledge of the terms and conditions attaching to the  auction cannot be permitted to wriggle out of the contractual obligations  arising out of the acceptance of his bid, by a petition under Article 226.  

       State of Punjab vs. M/s. Dial Chand Gian Chand & Co. AIR 1983  SC 743 is also a case arising under the Punjab Intoxicants Licence and Sale  Order, 1956.  This Court held that the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts  under Article 226 of the Constitution is not intended to facilitate avoidance of  obligations voluntarily incurred.

       In the case of Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and Others vs. State of  Karnataka and Others, (1995) 1 SCC 574.  The Constitution Bench of this  Court held that a citizen has no fundamental right to trade or business in  liquor as a beverage and that the activities which are res extra commercium

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 15  

cannot be carried on by any citizen and the State can prohibit completely  trade or business in potable liquor since trade or business in liquor as a  beverage is res extra commercium and that the State may also create  monopoly in itself for trade or business in such liquor.  It is further held that  the State can further place restrictions and limitations on such trade or  business and such restrictions and limitations can be placed by subordinate  legislation as well.  It is also further held that the State is not precluded from  regulating the trade and business in potable liquor merely because it imposes  tax or fee on purchase or sale and income is derived from such liquor.     

In the case of Solomon Antony and Others vs. State of Kerala and  Others, (2001) 3 SCC 694, the contractors are required to pay the  consideration payable to the State for sale of liquor for importing designated  quantity of rectified spirit in respect of which the consideration payable is  equivalent to excise duty.  This Court justified the order passed by the High  Court in holding that the contractors are bound to pay the amount which is a  measured excise duty payable on the designated quantum of rectified spirit in  terms of Rule 8 of the Rules and which the contractors had undertaken in the  agreements executed by them to pay.  This Court further held that the power  of the Government to enhance the rate of excise duty from Rs.5/- per bulk  litre to Rs.10/- per bulk of arrack could not be assailed.             The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court to which I was a member  has also taken the same view in Kerala Distilleries and Allied Products  Limited vs. Assistant Commissioner (Assessment) (I), Commercial Tax,  Special Circle, Palakkad and Others reported in 2000 (Vol. 117) STC page  553) in the following terms: "The manufacture and sale of liquor are the exclusive privilege of the  State and the State, by the process of licensing, is parting with the  said privilege and what is charged by the State is only the privilege  price through the process of licensing and it is not excise duty."  

"The concept of excise duty on production and manufacture as  understood in the Central Excise Act cannot be equated in the case  of excise duty under the Abkari Act since the manufacture and the  sale of liquor are the exclusive privilege of the State and the State,  by the process of licensing, is parting with the said privilege and  what is charged by the State is only the privilege price through the  process of licensing the price and it is not excise duty."

The above rulings are amongst the catena of cases on the point that  the rights are vested in the State which it may part with for consideration.  

I have already dealt with the concept of contractual relationship  between the State and the licensee whereunder the licensee having obtained  a privilege and enjoyed the benefit of it, it is not open to the licensees to turn  round subsequently and repudiate the obligations attaching with the obtained  privilege.  The following are the cases on the point.    

In the case of State of Haryana and Others vs. Jage Ram and  Others AIR 1980 SC 2018, this Court held that the bids in respect of country  liquor vends at an annual auctions and the amounts which bidders agree to  pay to State Government under auction terms is neither fee nor excise duty  on undrawn liquor but price of privilege which State parted in their favour.

In the case of State of Haryana and Others vs. Lal Chand and  Others, (1984) 3 SCC 634, this Court held that after making bid for grant of  exclusive privilege of liquor vend with full knowledge of terms and conditions  of auction, the bidder cannot wriggle out of the contractual obligations arising  out of acceptance of his bid by filing writ petition.  

In the case of State of Punjab vs. M/s Dial Chand Gian Chand and  Company (1983) 2 SCC 503, this Court held that a licensee who participates  in the auction voluntarily and with full knowledge is bound by the bargain and  the writ petition filed under Article 226 by such licensee in an attempt to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 15  

dictate terms of the licence without paying the licence fee must fail.  The  highest bidder after acceptance of his bid cannot challenge the second  auction on ground of adverse effect on his business.

We shall now consider the cases on the freedom guaranteed by Article  301 which is not available to liquor because it is a noxious substance injurious  to public health order and morality.  The following cases can be usefully  referred:  In the case of M/s Sat Pal and Co. and Others vs. Lt. Governor of  Delhi and Others (1979) 4 SCC 232, this Court held that the Ordinance does  not infringe any right under Article 19 (1)(g) or Article 301 there being no  fundamental right to trade in liquor and that the ordinance was both a fiscal  measure and one for safeguarding public health and public morals and hence  it could validly be made retrospective and that the test of reasonable  restrictions has to be judged in the light of the purpose for which the  restriction is imposed, that is, as may be required in the public interest and  restrictions that may validly be imposed under Article 304(b) are those which  seek to protect public health, safety, morals and property within the territory  and the present levy under the amended provisions of the Act in its  application to Delhi could certainly be said to be one enacted both with the  object of regulating the trade or business in intoxicants and with a view to  realising the goal fixed in Article 47 of the Constitution.        

In the case of The State of Bombay vs. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala  [1957] SCR  874, this Court held as under: "Gambling activities were in their very nature and essence extra- commercium although they might appear in the trappings of trade.   They were considered to be a sinful and pernicious vice by the  ancient seers and law-givers of India and have been deprecated by  the laws of England, Scotland, United States of America and  Australia.  The Constitution-makers of India, out to create a welfare  State, could never have intended to raise betting and gambling to  the status of trade, business, commerce or intercourse. The petitioners, therefore, had no fundamental right under  Art. 19(1)(g) or freedom under Art. 301 of the Constitution in respect  of their prize competitions that could be violated and the validity of  the impugned act, in pith and substance an Act relating to gambling,  did not fall to be tested by Arts. 19(6) and 304 of the Constitution"

In the case of M/s Fatehchand Himmatlal and Others etc.  vs. State  of Maharashtra (1977) 2 SCC 670, this Court held as follows: "A meaningful, yet minimal analysis of the Debt Act, read in the light  of the times and circumstances which compelled its enactment, will  bring out the human setting of the statute.  The bulk of the  beneficiaries are rural indigents and the rest urban workers.  These  are weaker sections for whom constitutional concern is shown  because institutional credit instrumentalities have ignored them.   Money lending may be ancillary to commercial activity and  benignant in its effects, but money-lending may also be ghastly  when it facilitates no flow of trade, no movement of commerce, no  promotion of intercourse, no servicing of business, but merely  stagnates rural economy, strangulates the borrowing community and  turns malignant in its repercussions.  The former may surely be  trade, but the latter - the law may well say - is not trade.  This  narrow, deleterious pattern of money-lending cannot be classed as  ’trade’.  Hence Article 301 does not apply."   In the case of B.R. Enterprises etc. vs. State of U.P. and Others etc.   (1999) 9 SCC 700, this Court held that this case relates to lottery which is  gambling in nature.  This Court held that merely because a lottery transaction  is run by State itself will not change its character as res extra commercium  and that merely because lottery tickets are goods, transaction of sale thereof  cannot constitute trade and while trade contains skill with no chance,  gambling contains the element of chance with no skill and, therefore, ban by  any State on the sale of lotteries of other States within its territory does not

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 15  

violate Articles 301 and 303.    

We have already noticed that the regulation in the interest of public  health and order takes the case out of Article 301, and Regulation for the  purpose of Article 301 is not confined to regulations which will facilitate the  trade.     In the case of M/s. Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan etc. etc. vs.  State of U.P. and Others etc. etc., AIR 1982 SC 33, this Court in paras 36  and 37 observed as under : "The word ‘free’ in Art. 301 does not mean freedom from laws or  from regulations.  Art. 301 guarantees freedom of trade, commerce  and intercourse throughout the country from any State barriers.  It  declares that subject to the other provisions of Part XIII, trade,  commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be  free.  The whole object was to bring about the economic unity of the  country under a federal structure, so that the people may feel that  they are members of one nation is to guarantee to every citizen the  freedom of movement and residence throughout the country.     That  is achieved by Art. 19(1)(d) and (e).  No less important is the  freedom of movement or passage of commodities from one part of  the country to another.  The progress of the country as a whole also  requires free flow of commerce and  intercourse as between  different parts, without any barrier.  This freedom of trade,  commerce and intercourse throughout the country without any  ‘State barriers’ is not confined to inter-State trade as well.  In other  words, subject to the provisions of Part XIII, no restrictions can be  imposed upon the flow of trade, commerce and intercourse, not only  between one State and another, but between any two points within  the territory of India whether any State border has to be cross or not.

It is now well settled that the regulatory measures or  measures imposing compensatory  taxes do not come within the  purview of the restrictions contemplated by Art. 301.  The regulatory  measures should, however, be such as do not impede the freedom  of trade, commerce and intercourse.  It cannot be said that the  instructions conveyed by the State Government by the impugned  teleprinter message imposing the requirement for the making of an  endorsement by the Deputy Marketing Officer or the Senior  Marketing Officer or the physical verification of stocks of wheat  during the course of transit, are a ‘restriction’  on the freedom of  trade, commerce and intercourse within the country, i.e., across the  State or from one part of the State to another.  These are nothing  but regulatory measures to ensure that the excess stock of wheat  held by a wholesale dealer, commission agent or a retailer is not  transported to a place outside the State or from one district to  another.  Even if these requirements are construed to be a  ‘restriction’ on the inter-State or intra-State trade the limitation so  imposed on the enjoyment of the right cannot be considered to be  arbitrary or of an excessive nature.  Nor can it be said that such  restrictions do not satisfy the test of reasonableness."

       The case of State of Tamil Nadu vs. M/s. Hind Stone etc. etc.  reported in AIR 1981 SC 711 relates to non-renewal of mining lease for black  granite.  It was submitted by the counsel in this case, that the impugned rule  offends Articles 301 and 303 of the Constitution.  This Court rejected the  same as without force.  This Court held as under: ".......The Mines & Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act is,  without doubt a regulatory measure.  Parliament having enacted it for  the express purpose of "the regulation of mines and the development  of minerals".  The Act and the rules properly made thereunder are,  therefore, outside the purview of Article 301.  Even otherwise, Article  302 which enables Parliament, by law, to impose such restrictions on  the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse between one State and  another or within any part of the territory of India as may be required in  the public interest also furnishes an answer to the claim based on the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 15  

alleged contravention of Article 301.........."          The case of State of Tamil Nadu & Others vs. M/s. Sanjeetha  Trading Co. & Others (1993) 1 SCC 236 relates to prohibition of export of  timber outside the State to prevent illicit felling.  This Court held that where  goods are declared to be essential commodities/articles and export thereof  prohibited with a view to effect equitable distribution at a fair price the  prohibition in the circumstances would not be an unreasonable restriction.   This Court further held as follows: "The power to impose restrictions conferred on the Parliament under  Art. 302 is not qualified by the word ‘reasonable’  while in Art. 304  (1)(b) which confers such power on the State legislature the  expression ‘reasonable’ precedes ‘restrictions’ and a further check  is provided by the proviso thereto.  Therefore, before Art. 304 comes  into play, it has to be held that the prohibition introduced by the  amendment on movement and transport of any particular item  amounts to a restriction.  Any prohibition  on movement of any  article from one State to another has to be examined with reference  to the facts and circumstances of that particular case - whether it  amounts to regulation only, taking into consideration the local  conditions prevailing, the necessity for such prohibition and what  public interest is sought to be served by imposition thereof."  

In the case of State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Harihar Prasad Debuka etc.  AIR 1989 SC 1119, this Court observed thus: "In the instant case what is being insisted is a permit disclosing  particulars of the goods to be transported.  Art. 304(b) clearly  permits the State legislature to impose such a reasonable restriction  on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse with or within  that State as may be required in the public interest.  The word ‘with’  involves an element having its sit us in another State.  It cannot be  therefore said that the insistence on the disclosure in respect of  goods entering Bihar from another State if otherwise legitimate  would not be protected by Art. 304(b)."   The High Court of Punjab proceeded to decide the case on a total  wrong assumption that the import fee levied is in the nature of duty which  cannot be imposed under the Excise Act, 1984 when, in fact, the import fee  levied is the price for parting with the privilege given to the licensee to import  beer into the State and, therefore, the same is within the competence of the  State to impose import fee.  I am of the view that the licensee besides the  payment of duty etc. is to comply with such conditions as the State  Government may impose while formulating the excise policy for the  concerned year.  The State, in my view, is competent and entitled to impose  excise duty or countervailing duty.   Besides there is no bar on the State to  charge any other fees on account of consideration for the privilege provided  to the licensee to trade in liquor which privilege he did not otherwise have.   Therefore, the licensee is liable to comply with the other conditions imposed  by the State Government from time to time.  As held in many cases referred  to supra the levy in dispute under challenge is an import levy.  It is neither  duty nor countervailing duty.  It is part of the consideration money i.e. the  price of the privilege given to the licensees for dealing in liquor.  The decision  of this Court in the case of Kalyani Stores (supra) is not applicable to the  facts of the present case and that the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 is an existing  law under Clause 10 of Article 366 of the Constitution of India and its  continued application is saved by Article 372 of the Constitution of India.  It is  also saved by Article 305 of the Constitution from attack under Articles 301  and 303 of the Constitution.  It is well within the legislative competence of the  State.  In the result, Civil Appeal No. 3017 of 1997 filed by the State of Punjab  is allowed and the judgment of the High Court which is impugned in this Civil  Appeal stands set aside.  Likewise, the appeals filed by the appellants in Civil  Appeal Nos. 2696 and 2697 are dismissed and the common judgment of the  High Court in Writ Appeal Nos. 3 and 10 of 2001 is affirmed.  However, there  shall be no order as to costs.     

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 15