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PETITIONER: STATE OF PUNJAB

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KESAR SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       22/07/1996

BENCH: ANAND, A.S. (J) BENCH: ANAND, A.S. (J) MAJMUDAR S.B. (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCALE  (5)444

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Special leave granted.      The respondent  was  convicted  for  an  offence  under Section  3022/34   IPC  and   sentenced  to   undergo   life imprisonment by  the judgment  and order dated May 28, 1987. After he  had undergone  a  little  more  than  8  years  of sentence he  filed a  petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure in the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh  seeking premature  release. The High Court by the impugned  order dated  January 18,  1986 considered  the case on  its merits  and allowed  the petition directing the release of  the respondent forthwith. The State is aggrieved of the order dated January 18, 1986, hence this appeal.      We have  heard learned  counsel for the parties. In our opinion the direction given by the High Court was not at all appropriate or  permissible in  law. The  mandate of Section 433 Cr.P.C. enables the Government in an appropriate case to commute the  sentence of  a convict and to prematurely order his release  before expiry of the sentence as imposed by the courts. Clause (b) of Section 433, Cr.P.C. provides that the sentence of  imprisonment  for  life  may  be  commuted  for imprisonment for  a term  not exceeding  14 years  or  fine. Undisputedly, the  respondent had  not  completed  14  years sentence when  he  filed  the  petition  under  Section  482 Cr.P.C. seeking premature release. The direction of the High Court therefore  to prematurely  release the  respondent and set him  at liberty forthwith could not have been made. That apart, even  if the  High Court could give such a direction, it could  only direct cunsideration of the case of premature release by  the Government  and could  not have  ordered the premature release  of the  respondent itself.  The right  to exercise the  power under  Section 433  Cr.P.C. vests in the Government and  has to  be exercised  by the  Government  in accordance with  the rules  and established  principles. The impugned order  of  the  High  Court  cannot,  therefore  be sustained and is hereby set aside.

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    This order  shall however,  not come in the way of  the respondent for  approaching the  Government for  term of the order issued  by the Governor of Punjab on March 6, 1985. As and when  such an  application is  made the State Government shall decide that application on merits uninfluenced by this order or by the observations made by the impugned order.