REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICITON

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.               OF 2008 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.6555 of 2007)

State of Punjab …Appellant

Versus

Karnail Singh …Respondent

JUDGMENT

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the learned

Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowing

the Criminal revision petition filed by the respondent.

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3. Challenge before the High Court was to the order dated

11.5.2004 passed by learned Special Judge, Mansa, framing

charges against the respondent for offence punishable under

Sections 7 and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in

short the ‘Act’).  The respondent was working as a Manager of

Punjab  Agricultural  Development  Bank  at  Budladha.  The

stand before the High Court was that the writ petitioner was

not  covered  within the  definition  of  “public  servant”  as  the

Bank was only a Co-operative Society and not receiving aid of

any kind from the Government.  An affidavit was filed by the

Managing  Director,  Punjab  State  Co-operative  Agricultural

Development  Bank  Limited  to  the  effect  that  State

Government had invested Rs.50 lakhs as share capital in the

Bank and Bank is controlled by the State Government.  It was

also argued that the Managing Director was an official of the

State Government of the designation of Additional Registrar,

Cooperative Societies and, therefore, the writ petitioner was a

“public  servant”.  The  High  Court  wanted  to  know the  total

share capital of the Bank and as to whether it falls within the

definition of Government Company as defined under Section

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617 of the Companies Act, 1956.  After referring to sub-clause

(ix) of clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act the High Court came to

an  abrupt  conclusion  that  the  charges  had  been  framed

relying on the aforesaid clause, but on the facts it cannot be

said that the revision petitioner falls within the definition of

“public servant”.  Accordingly, it allowed the revision petition

and Special  Judge,  Mansa’s  order  dated 11.5.2004 was set

aside.

4. In  support  of  the  appeal,  learned  counsel  for  the

appellant submitted that a bare reading of sub-clause (ix) of

clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act makes the position clear that

the respondent was a “public servant”.  

5. Learned counsel  for the respondent on the other hand

submitted  that  the  essential  ingredients  to  cover  the

respondent within the definition of “Public servant” are absent

and, therefore,  the High Court  was justified in allowing the

revision petition.  Section 2(c)(ix) reads as follows:

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“Any person who is the president, secretary or other office-bearer of a registered co-operative society engaged in agriculture, industry, trade or  banking,  receiving  or  having  received  any financial aid from the Central Government or a State  Government  or  from  any  corporation established by or under a Central,  Provincial or State Act, or any authority or body owned or controlled  or  aided  by  the  Government  or  a Government  company  as  defined  in  Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1) of 1956.”

6. The High Court has not analysed the factual position.  It

is also not known whether the details asked by the High Court

like the total share capital of the Bank and as to whether it

falls  within  the  definition  of  Government  Company  were

supplied  or  not.  The  effect  of  the  affidavit  filed  by  the

Managing Director also was not considered.  Learned counsel

for the appellant has referred to the provisions of the Punjab

Cooperative  Agricultural  Development  Banks  Act,  1957  (in

short  the  ‘Punjab  Act’)  and  various  provisions  thereof  e.g.

Section 2(d), 2(f), 2(g) and Section 10 to contend that revision

petitioner  was  a  public  servant.  Needless  to  say  the  High

Court was required to consider the relevance of the aforesaid

provisions and other provisions of Punjab Act.          

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7. Therefore, we set aside the impugned order of the High

Court and remit the matter to it for fresh consideration.

8. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

……………………………………J. (DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

……………………………….……J. (J.M. PANCHAL)

New Delhi: September 22, 2008

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