http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4  

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  8156 of 2001

PETITIONER: State of Punjab & Anr

RESPONDENT: Hari Singh

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/02/2008

BENCH: A.K.Mathur & Aftab Alam

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

CIVIL APPEAL NO.8156  OF 2001

AFTAB ALAM,J.

1.      This appeal is directed against the order dated  3.2.2001 passed by a Learned Single Judge of the Punjab  and Haryana High Court, dismissing in limine the second  appeal filed on behalf of the State of Punjab (the  Appellant). As a result, the concurrent judgments and  decrees passed by the trial court and the first appellate  court in favour of the plaintiff-respondent were upheld. 2.      The respondent joined the Punjab Police as a  constable and on 1.4.1999 he was promoted to the rank  of Assistant Sub-Inspector.  According to the respondent,  his promotion as Assistant Sub-Inspector was made by  an order passed by Deputy Inspector General of Police,  Ferozepur.  In 1993, the respondent was subjected to a  departmental proceeding on the charge that as in-charge,  of the escort of the Deputy Commissioner Ferozepur, he,  in league with LC Latwinder Singh, driver, stole 3339  liters of petrol by making wrong entries in the log book.  In the departmental enquiry the charge against the  respondent was established and on the basis of the  enquiry report the Senior Superintendent of Police,  Ferozepur passed the order, dated 28.2.1995 giving the  respondent the punishment of with-holding five annual  increments with cumulative effect with the further  direction for recovery of half of the cost of the stolen  amount of petrol at the price prevailing at the relevant  time. Against the order passed by the Senior  Superintendent of Police, the respondent preferred a  departmental appeal. The Deputy Inspector General of  Police, Ferozepur by order, dated 5.7.1995 dismissed the  appeal subject to reducing the period of withholding the  annual increments from five years to two years. 3.      The respondent then took the matter to the court  and filed civil suit No. 212 in the Court of Civil Judge,  Junior Division, Ferozepur seeking a declaration that the  punishment order passed by the Senior Superintendent  of Police and confirmed (subject to reduction) by the  Deputy Inspector General of Police, was illegal,  inoperative, null and void. He further sought  consequential direction for release of his annual  increments with interest at the rate of 18% per annum,  and a permanent injunction restraining the defendant  authorities from making recovery of 50% of the price of  stolen petrol. The punishment order was challenged

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 4  

primarily on the ground that the respondent’s promotion  as Sub Inspector of Police was made by the order of  Deputy Inspector General, and hence, the Senior  Superintendent of Police had no authority to pass any  punishment order against him. The order of the Senior  Superintendent of Police, dated 28.2.1995 was, therefore,  without any authority or competence. The other ground  on which the punishment order was challenged was that  copies of certain documents as asked for by the  respondents were not supplied to him in the course of  the departmental enquiry.  4.      In support of the plea that he was promoted as Asst.  Sub Inspector by an order passed by the Deputy  Inspector General the respondent produced before the  court the photocopy of an order, dated 1.4.1990 which  was issued under the signature of the Deputy Inspector  General, Ferozpur and which was marked as Ext. P-1. On  the basis of Ext. P1 the trial court accepted the  respondent’s contention that he was promoted as  Assistant Sub-Inspector by an order of the Deputy  Inspector General and the Senior Superintendent,  therefore, had no authority to pass an order of  punishment against him. The trial court also accepted  the respondent’s case that the departmental enquiry was  vitiated because documents asked for by the respondent  were not supplied to him and, therefore, the enquiry  could not form the basis for the punishment order. It  accordingly decreed the suit by judgment and order  dated 2.9.97.  5.      Against the judgment and decree passed by the trial  court the state preferred an appeal (Civil Appeal no 277)  before the District Judge, Ferozepur. The District Judge  accepted the findings arrived at by the trial court and  dismissed the appeal by judgment dated 2.6.1999. The  second appeal (RSA No. 4641 of 1999) preferred by the  State was dismissed by the High Court as noted above.  6.      On hearing counsel for the parties and on going  through the record of the case, we find that the High  Court and the Courts below took a patently wrong view of  the matter, and the decree passed by the trial court in  favour of the respondent and upheld by the first appellate  court and the High Court is plainly unsustainable. The  finding arrived at by the trial court (that remained  undisturbed up to the High Court) that the respondent  was promoted by the order of Deputy Inspector General  of Police, Ferozepur is bad both in law and on facts. The  finding is solely based on Exhibit P1 which is the  Photostat copy of the order, dated 1.4.1990 and which  was mistaken by the trial court as the order granting  promotion to the respondent as Assistant Sub Inspector  of Police. On a careful examination it would appear that  though it was indeed signed by the Deputy Inspector  General, it was an order approving the list of constables  who were recommended by the DPC for promotion to the  rank of Asst. Sub Inspector of Police. At the end of that  order, it is clearly stated that the list (from serial Nos.47  to 69) was approved for promotion and further that  necessary gazette notifications should be issued by the  concerned Senior Superintendents of Police.  It is clear  that the promotion of the respondent as Assistant Sub- Inspector was not legally formalized by the order of the  DIG, dated 1.4.1990, and the actual promotion was made  by orders passed by the concerned Senior  Superintendents of Police (in this case, of Ferozepur).   The order of the senior Superintendent of Police by which

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4  

the respondent was actually promoted was not produced  by either side.  7.      Here, it is important to bear in mind that in the  order, dated 1.4.90 the way the Deputy Inspector General  after giving approval to the select list left the actual  promotions to be made by the respective Senior  Superintendent of Police was perfectly in accordance with  the statutory rules. Rule 12.1 in chapter XII of the  Punjab Police Rules lays down that the appointing  authority for Sergeants, Sub-Inspectors and Assistant  Sub-Inspectors, is the Superintendent of Police.  8.      It may also be noted here that this question earlier  came up before this court in State of Punjab vs. Manohar  Lal (1986) Supp SCC 524.  Manohar was a Sub-Inspector  of Police, and he was given the punishment of  compulsory retirement by the Senior Superintendent of  Police, Gurdaspur. He, like the present respondent,  claimed that his promotion as Sub Inspector was made  by the DIG and, therefore, the Senior Superintendent of  Police was not competent to impose on him the penalty of  compulsory retirement. The trial court decreed the suit in  his favour, and the decree was sustained, as in the  present case, up to the High Court. In appeal, the  Supreme Court framed the question arising for  consideration as follows: "the only question that arises for consideration  in this appeal is whether the order of  compulsory retirement made by the Senior  Superintendent of Police, Gurdaspur is illegal  and invalid, being passed by an authority  lower in rank than the appointing authority  which according to the respondent is the  Deputy General of Police."

The court then examined the relevant provisions,  including rule 12.1 of Punjab Civil Service Rules and in  paragraph 6, found and held as follows.  "On considering the provisions of the aforesaid  rules it is quite clear and apparent that the  Senior Superintendent of Police, Gurdaspur  being the competent authority to make the  appointment to the non-gazetted ranks of Sub- Inspectors, is also legally competent to pass  the order of compulsory retirement of the  plaintiff-respondent in public interest in  accordance with the provisions of Rule 3(1)(a)  and (b) of the said rules.  It has been tried to  be contended by referring to the provisions of  Rule 13.9, sub-rule (2) by the respondent  herein it has been provided that substantive  promotion to the rank of Assistant Sub- Inspector is to be made by the Deputy  Inspector General of Police in accordance with  the principles prescribed in Rule 13.1 that the  Superintendent of Police is not the competent  authority to make the impugned order.  It is  only the Deputy Inspector General of Police  who is competent to make the order of  compulsory retirement in question.  This  argument cannot be sustained in view of the  specific provisions made in Rule 12.1 wherein  it has been provided that the Superintendent  of Police is competent to make the  appointment to the non-gazetted ranks of Sub- Inspectors of Police and Assistant Sub-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4  

Inspector of Police.  On a reading of both these  provisions of the Rules 12.1 and 13.9(2) it is  clear and apparent that the Senior  Superintendent of Police, Gurdaspur is legally  competent to make the impugned order of  compulsory retirement of the plaintiff- respondent from service in public interest after  his attaining 50 years of age in accordance  with the provisions of Rules 3(1)(a) of the  Punjab Civil Services (Premature Retirement)  Rules, 1975."    

The decision in Manohar Lal fully applies to the facts of  this case and it must, therefore, be held that the order of  punishment passed against the respondent by the Senior  Superintendent of Police, Ferozepur did not suffer from  any lack of authority and competence and it was perfectly  legal, valid and enforceable. 9.      We also find no substance in the subsidiary ground  on which the respondent’s suit was decreed. From the  records it appears that the respondent had asked for the  log books of different other vehicles which were not the  subject matter of the charge. Since he was unable to  show any relevance of those log books to the enquiry into  the charges against him, the log books/documents were  not brought before the enquiry. There is nothing to  indicate that the respondent suffered any prejudice on  that account. It is therefore impossible to hold that the  departmental enquiry was vitiated due to non production  of documents asked for by the respondent and on that    basis no punishment could be imposed against him. [see:   Syndicate Bank Vs. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati (2006) 3  SCC150 and U.P.State Textile Corporation Ltd. Vs.  P.C.Chaturvedi (2005) 8 SCC 211]   10.     On a careful consideration of the materials on  record, we are satisfied that the order of the High Court  and the judgments and decrees passed by the court  below are illegal and unsustainable. We accordingly set  aside the judgments and decrees and dismiss the suit  filed by the plaintiff-respondents.  11.     In the result, the appeal is allowed, but with no  order as to costs.