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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  5847 of 2005

PETITIONER: State of Punjab & Anr

RESPONDENT: Balkaran Singh

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/10/2006

BENCH: H.K. SEMA & P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  [With C.A. No. 5854 of 2005 and C.A. No. 5853 of 2005]

P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.

        1.              These appeals by special leave are by the State of  Punjab and its Director of Agriculture.  They challenge the  judgments and decrees in three different suits filed by three  officers of the Agricultural Department of the State,  essentially claiming pay at enhanced scale in two of the  suits and seniority over certain others in the third suit.  Civil  Appeal Nos. 5847 of 2005 and 5854 of 2005 go together and  the issue involved in C.A. No. 5853 of 2005 is slightly  different though based on the same claim.  The suits were  decreed by the trial court.  The decrees were affirmed in  appeal.   The Second Appellate Court declined to interfere.   Hence these appeals.   

C.A. NO. 5847 OF 2005 2.              The respondent herein, hereinafter referred to as  the plaintiff, filed Civil Suit No. 665 of 1993 on 20.12.1993  in the Court of Senior Subordinate Judge, Chandigarh  praying for a declaration that the Office Order dated  13.3.1980 passed by the Director of Agriculture, Punjab in  fixing the pay of the plaintiff in the scale of Rs. 940-1850/-  instead of in the scale of Rs.1200-1850/- is illegal, null,  void, arbitrary, without jurisdiction and against the  principles of natural justice and equity, for a declaration  that the plaintiff is entitled for the pay scale of Rs.1200- 1850/- as against Rs. 940-1850/-with effect from 1.1.1978  applicable to the post of Deputy Director of Agriculture and  entitled to the payment of all other service benefits including  yearly increments, arrears and interest thereon at the rate of  18 per cent per annum with effect from 1.1.1978 till the date  of payment with costs of the suit.   At the time of the suit,  the plaintiff was working as a Joint Director, Agriculture and  was on deputation in The Punjab Land Development and  Reclamation Corporation Limited.  The plaintiff was selected,  according to him, to the post of Deputy Director of  Agriculture.  But the order of appointment produced by him  and marked as Exhibit P-1 shows that the plaintiff was  appointed to Punjab Agricultural Services Class-I  temporarily by direct recruitment in the time scale of  Rs.400-30-550/40-750/50-1250 and was posted as Deputy  Director of Agriculture (Pulses), Bhatinda.   The plaint  proceeds on the basis that on the recommendations of the  Third Pay Commission, the Government of Punjab revised

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the pay-scales of its employees from 1.1.1978.  The pay- scale of Deputy Directors in all services was given as  Rs.1200-1850/- from the old scale of Rs.400-1250/-.  When  this decision to revise the pay-scale was brought to the  notice of the Director of Agriculture, he found that in the  Agricultural Department there was no post of Deputy  Director as such and that the appointment of all those  working as Deputy Directors was only to Punjab Agricultural  Service Class-I and that the scale of pay of Class-I officers in  the original scale of Rs.400-1250/- had been enhanced only  to Rs. 940-1850/-.  He therefore made an endorsement that  the revised scale of pay of Deputy Directors in the  Agricultural Department, they being officers of Class-I was  only Rs. 940-1850/- and consequently that amount alone  was payable.  It may be noted that this endorsement was  made as early as on 13.3.1980.  The plaintiff was being paid  salary only at that scale from 1.1.1978. The plaintiff came to  Court challenging that order only on 20.12.1993, more than  12 years after the order or endorsement.  The case of the  plaintiff was that in the case of one Mewa Singh, who was  also a Deputy Director, the Court had passed a decree in the  year 1991 declaring him entitled to the pay-scale of  Rs.1200-1850/- and when that was done and the State  accepted the said decision and paid Mewa Singh, the  plaintiff issued a notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil  Procedure and that notice not having been responded to by  the defendants, he was filing the suit.  It is appropriate to  refer to paragraph 9 of the plaint in this connection.  The  plaintiff pleaded: "That cause of action firstly arose in 1980  when the plaintiff became eligible for the  revised pay scale of Rs.1200-1850/- with  effect from 1.1.1978 as per Annexure P-2,  thereafter the cause of action arose on  23.10.1992, when the pay of Shri Mewa  Singh Sonar was fixed in the scale of  Rs.1200-1850/- by Defendant No.2, but the  plaintiff was not given the same scale and  finally on 16.6.1993, when legal notice  under Section 80 of the Code of Civil  Procedure was served upon the defendants."

3.              As noticed, the claim of plaintiff was that he had  been appointed as a Deputy Director even initially and the  revised scale of pay of Deputy Directors had been shown in  the concerned Order as Rs.1200-1850/- and consequently,  he is entitled to salary at that scale from 1.1.1978 as per the  recommendations of the Third Pay Commission accepted by  the State of Punjab and brought into effect.   

4.              The defendants filed a written statement denying  the claim of the plaintiff that he was appointed as a Deputy  Director.  It was pointed out with reference to the Order of  appointment relied on by the plaintiff himself, that he was  temporarily appointed to the post of Punjab Agricultural  Service Class-I officer, on a scale of pay of Rs.400-1250/-  and that scale had been revised with effect from 1.1.1978  only to Rs. 940-1850/- and hence the plaintiff was not  entitled to the higher scale of pay as claimed by him.   It was  further pleaded that the post of Deputy Director in which  the plaintiff was intermittently working was only an  interchangeable post manned by Class-I officers in the  Punjab Agricultural Service.  It was also pleaded that going

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by Rule 11 of the Punjab Agricultural Service (Class-I) Rules,  1974, the position of Deputy Director was not a promotion  post for a Class-I Officer and consequently the claim of the  appellant that he was holding a post higher than that of a  Class-I officer, was untenable.  It was an interchangeable  post that he was holding and he had himself worked as  Class-I officer during his career and had also occasionally  worked as Deputy Director.  It was pleaded that the decision  in Mewa Singh’s case had no application and could not be  made use of for grant reliefs to the plaintiff.   It was also  specifically pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation,  the cause of action for the relief of declaration having arisen  as early as on 13.3.1980 and the suit having been filed only  on 20.12.1993.  It was also pleaded that no decree could be  granted for so-called arrears from 1.1.1978 as claimed in the  plaint.  We may incidentally notice that the plaintiff has not  quantified or valued any arrears as due to him.   

C.A. NO. 5854 OF 2005 5.              The facts of this case are also on a par with the  litigation giving rise to C.A. No. 5847 of 2005.  Here, the  plaintiff, who was appointed as a Class-II officer was  promoted as Class-I Officer on a scale of pay of Rs.400- 1250/- by Order dated 10.6.1977 and was posted as Deputy  Director, Agriculture (I.C.D.P.), Mukhtasar.  The Civil Suit  No. 894 of 1993 was filed on 25.11.1993.  The prayers in the  plaint are identical with the ones in Civil Suit No. 665 of  1993 giving rise to C.A. No. 5847 of 2005.  The claim is also  made on the same basis.  The suit was resisted on the same  lines by the defendants. The question that has to be tackled  herein is the same as the one arising in C.A. No. 5847 of  2005 including the question of limitation and hence no  separate discussion is needed.  

C.A. NO. 5853 OF 2005

6.              The respondent- plaintiff filed  Civil Suit No. 82 of  1993 on 6.5.1993 praying for a declaration that he was  legally entitled to be placed at Serial No. 12 instead of at  Serial No. 20 in the seniority list prepared in the year 1980  of the Punjab Agricultural Service Class-I (Administrative)  officers of the Agricultural Department issued by the Punjab  Government on 26.2.1980 and for a mandatory injunction  directing the defendant \026 State of Punjab, to fix the seniority  of the plaintiff at Serial No. 12 in the Seniority List of Class-I  Officers of the Agricultural Department prepared in the year  1980 and granting the plaintiff proforma promotions in  accordance with his actual seniority in the Department with  retrospective effect after placing him at Serial No. 12 in the  Seniority List.  He also prayed for a mandatory injunction  directing the defendant to release the arrears of his pay and  emoluments along with interest at the rate of 18 per cent per  annum from the dates when they became due till their  actual recovery in view of his denied promotions to which he  was legally entitled to and also to grant him all the service  benefits and arrears from the back date to which he was  found legally entitled to in the facts and circumstances of  the case.   

7.              Subsequently, the plaint was amended and the  State of Punjab, the original Defendant was ranked as  Defendant No.1 and four other officers in the Agricultural

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Department were impleaded as Defendants 2 to 5.  One  officer Sukhdev Singh, who was shown as senior and  promoted earlier and with reference to whom a specific relief  was claimed was not impleaded apparently on the basis that  he had since retired.  The plaintiff also included in the  amended plaint a further prayer as regards the seniority list  of the years 1984 and 1985 and seeking the placing of the  plaintiff at Serial No. 15 instead of at Serial No. 21.   

8.              In addition to the factual position that was  identical with the other two suits, in that the plaintiff was  also recruited initially only as a Class-I officer in the Punjab  Agricultural Service, one further fact that was relied on by  the plaintiff was that though he had been placed in the  revised scale of pay at Rs.940-1850/-, he had filed a suit  being Civil Suit No.461 of 1991 challenging the order fixing  his revised scale of pay of Rs.940-1850/- and claiming that  he was entitled to arrears of pay at the scale of Rs. 1200- 1850/- and the same was decreed in his favour, upholding  his prayer and directing that payment of salary including  arrears be paid to him in the scale of Rs.1200-1850/- and  that the said decision had become final.  In view of the said  decision, it was the contention of the plaintiff that the first  defendant could not deny the seniority that would be due to  him based on the higher pay thus drawn by him as against  the officers who were placed in a lower scale of pay.   

9.              It may be noted that the plaintiff had pleaded that  the cause of action arose in his favour on the refusal of the  defendant-State to grant the relief claimed by him in the  plaint by sending a notice under Section 80 of the Code of  Civil Procedure and that the cause of action had also arisen  earlier on 3.10.1991 as the plaintiff’s previous suit was  decreed by the trial court.   

10.             The suit was resisted by the first defendant-State  by contending that the plaintiff was recruited temporarily  only as an officer in Punjab Agricultural Service Class-I on a  scale of pay of Rs.400-1250/- and he could be fitted only in  the revised scale of pay of Rs.940-1850/-  and that his  seniority cannot be re-fixed as claimed by him since even in  the recruitment he was placed junior to those officers.  The  State, no doubt, had to concede that the decree in Civil Suit  No. 461 of 1991 had become final.  It was pleaded that the  present suit was barred by limitation and that the seniority  that was fixed in the year 1980 and in the years 1984 and  1985 could not be upset or revised in the suit filed in the  year 1993 and that merely because the State has been  forced to give the plaintiff a higher scale of pay, the plaintiff  could not claim seniority over other officers.  All the  necessary parties have not been impleaded.  The suit was  liable to be dismissed.  Defendant No.2 was removed from  the array of parties.  Two of the other defendants filed a  written statement, more or less, along the same lines as that  of the  State.   

11.             In all the three suits, the trial court raised issues  as to whether the respective plaintiff would be entitled to the  revised scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/- instead of at Rs.940- 1850/- and whether the suits were barred by limitation.  In  the suits giving rise to C.A. No. 5847 of 2005 and C.A. No.  5454 of 2005, the trial court held that in view of the letter

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sanctioning the revised pay scale indicating the scale of pay  of Deputy Directors as Rs.1200-1850/-, the endorsement of  the Director of Agriculture that the revised scale of pay of  Rs.940-1850/- alone was payable was wrong.  The court  shut its eyes to the contention that the plaintiffs were only  recruited as Punjab Agricultural Service Class-I officers on a  scale of pay of Rs.400-1250/- and the revised scale for that  pay was only Rs.940-1850/- and that the post of Deputy  Director held by the plaintiffs was an interchangeable post  and the plaintiffs themselves had held the post of Class-I  officers during all these years alternately and that in the  light of Rule 11 of the relevant rules, the plaintiffs could not  be considered to be holding any promotional post.  The trial  court purported to rely upon the decision in Civil Suit No.  461 of 1991 and the fact that the State was forced to  concede the scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/- to Mewa Singh,  the plaintiff therein, to hold that all those officers of Class-I  who at one time or the other worked as Deputy Directors,  would be entitled to the scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/-.  It  was not borne in mind that Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 was  not a representative action, though of course it related to an  officer similarly situated and the decision in that suit might  have evidentiary value but could not be understood as  barring a proper enquiry into the contentions by the trial  court.   On the issue of limitation, the trial court stated that  the relief of declaration was not barred by limitation because  the right to seek the fixation of pay as per rules could not be  held to be barred by limitation presumably on the ground  that it was a recurring cause of action.  The issue was  disposed of in a most unsatisfactory and cursory fashion by  the trial court even without advertence to the relevant article  of the Limitation Act.   In the third suit, the trial court relied  entirely on the earlier decree in Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991  and proceeded to upset the seniority list of 1980 in the suit  of the year 1993 by a judgment dated 7.8.1997 and granted  a declaration that Mewa Singh, the plaintiff therein, is  entitled to be placed at Serial No.12 instead of at Serial No.  20 in the seniority list issued on 26.2.1980 and at Serial No.  15 instead of at Serial No. 21 in the seniority list prepared in  the year 1984-85.  The State was directed to consider the  case of the plaintiff for fixation of seniority as claimed by the  plaintiff.  In the event of grant of the said seniority, it was  directed that the plaintiff would be entitled to all the benefits  of service.   He shall be posted as per the seniority.  An order  was to be passed within two months from the date of the  decree.   

12.             The State appealed against these decrees.  The  appellate court simply followed the line adopted by the trial  court without a proper and independent application of mind  and confirmed the decrees.  It noticed that the seniority list  was issued in the year 1980 and in the year 1984, but  stated that at that stage it was not established that the post  of Deputy Director enjoys higher rank and status as  compared to the other officers and since a finding in that  regard was recorded only on 3.10.1993 in the prior suit, the  present suits could be held to be within time.  Thus the  appeals were dismissed.  

13.             The State filed Second Appeals before the High  Court of Punjab and Haryana.  The High Court, we are  constrained to point out, without a proper application of  mind, simply dismissed the Second Appeals, without even

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considering or attempting to answer properly the issues that  arose for decision in the case.   It appears to us that in  matters relating to service, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court  cannot be considered to be so wide that it would enable it to  sit in appeal over disciplinary proceedings, over the  quantum of punishment imposed, over the entries in  confidential records, and so on, in respect of which reliefs  are seen to be freely granted by the courts in the States of  Punjab and Haryana.  In the case of grant of reliefs in  matters relating to services, we feel that the High Court  ought to make a deeper scrutiny of the decrees to see  whether the Civil Court has overstepped its jurisdiction in  granting the reliefs instead of simply rejecting the Second  appeals on the basis that concurrent findings have been  rendered by the trial court and the first appellate court.  In  the case on hand, the High Court made no attempt to see for  itself whether on the basis of the rules and the arguments  put forward on behalf of the State, the respective plaintiffs  could be fitted in the scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/- and in  the third suit where the earlier decree became final, whether  the reliefs claimed could be granted merely on the ground  that there was an earlier decree in favour of the plaintiff  therein granting him a higher scale of pay.  Similarly, the  question of limitation was disposed of even without referring  to the relevant article in the schedule to the Limitation Act  that had application and without considering whether it was  open to any court to upset a seniority list of the year 1980 in  a suit of the year 1993 even when all the affected parties  were not impleaded or were not before the Court.  It is for  these reasons that we are constrained to observe that the  Second Appeals were dismissed in a cursory and most  unsatisfactory manner by the High Court.  The State has  challenged these decisions by way of these Civil Appeals.   

14.             The respondent in Civil Appeal No.5853 of 2005  died pending the appeal in this Court and his legal  representatives were brought on record.  Their counsel was  also heard.   

15.             We shall first deal with the first two suits relating  to the declaration that the plaintiffs therein are entitled to be  placed in the revised scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/-.  The  suits filed are for declaration that the order or endorsement  dated 13.3.1980 was illegal and void.  The suits were filed  more than 12 years after the order fixing the revised scale of  pay at Rs.940-1850/-.  A suit for declaration is governed by  Article 58 of the Limitation Act and the period is three years  and the terminus au quo is "when the right to sue first  accrues".(emphasis supplied) Clearly, the right to seek the  relief of declaration that they are entitled to revised scale of  pay of Rs.1200-1850/-, accrued to the plaintiffs on  13.3.1980, when the endorsement in that behalf was made  by the Director of Agricultural Services and the plaintiffs  were denied revised pay at Rs.1200-1850/- and were paid  only at Rs.940-1850/-.  It was not the mere making of an  order, but an action that had immediate impact on the right  of the plaintiffs to recover a higher salary as per their claim.   The cause of action thus clearly arose for the first time.   Thus the suit for declaration was clearly barred by limitation  going by Article 58 of the Limitation Act.  The fact that some  other officer had been given a decree for the enhanced  revised scale, does not furnish the plaintiffs in the first two  suits with a fresh cause of action.  It is well settled that the  time does not stop to run once it has started to run.   Therefore, the reliance placed on the decree in Civil Suit No.

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461 of 1991 had absolutely no relevance on this question.  Strictly speaking, Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 also ought not  to have been decreed since that suit was clearly barred by  limitation, since the order sought to be challenged in that  suit of 1991 was also the order dated 13.3.1980.  But in  view of the decree passed therein, it is not for us now to go  into the correctness or otherwise of the decision rendered  therein.  Suffice it to say that the said decision cannot give  the plaintiffs a fresh cause of action.   The time started to  run when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff and  that first accrual was clearly on 13.3.1980 and on expiry of  3 years therefrom, the suit for declaration became barred.    

16.             It was argued on behalf of the plaintiffs, as was  done in trial court, that the cause of action must be held to  be a recurring one and hence the suit must be held to be not  barred by limitation.   Reliance was placed on the decision in  Amrit Lal Berry Vs. Collector of Central Excise, New  Delhi & Others [(1975) 4 SCC 714].  That decision arose  from a proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution of  India.   It was not a suit.  There was no occasion for this  Court to consider the scope of Article 58 of the Limitation  Act in that Writ Petition.  It was only stated that when a  citizen aggrieved by the action of the government  department had approached the Court and obtained  declaration of law in his favour, others, in like  circumstances, should be able to rely on the sense of  responsibility of the department concerned and to expect  that they will be given the benefit of this declaration without  the need to take their grievance to the court.  This is hardly  a defence to a plea based on Article 58 of the Limitation Act  in respect of the relief of declaration with respect to an order  which was issued twelve years prior to the suit and which  immediately affected the pay receivable by them.  In fact this  Court in S.S. Rathore vs. State of Madhya Pradesh              (1989(4) SCC 582), a decision rendered by seven Hon’ble  Judges, has clearly held in suits relating to service matters,  that "yet, suits out side the purview of the Administrative  Tribunals Act shall continue to be governed by Article 58".    In a series of subsequent decisions, this Court has held that  a suit for declaration in matters relating to a service is  governed by Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963.  { See for  instance, Mohd. Quaramuddin (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. State of  A.P. [(1994) 5 S.C.C. 118], Vasant Ramchandara  Deshpande Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [(1997) 11  S.C.C. 305], Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation  & Ors. Vs. Nand Lal [1999 S.C.C. (L & S) 658] }.  In State of  Punjab & Ors. Vs. Gurdev Singh [(1991) 4 S.C.C. 1], a three  judge Bench of this Court held that a party aggrieved by the  order, even if it is found to be void, has to approach the  court for relief of declaration that the order against him is  inoperative and void within three years of the order.  It is  one thing to say that the plaintiffs might make a claim that  they must also be paid in future at the revised scale of pay  of Rs.1200-1850/- in view of the decision rendered in favour  of another officer of the same department.  But that does not  enable them to revive a claim for the relief of declaration  which had become long ago barred.   A cause of action once  barred does not get revived in such a case.   Moreover, the  decree that was granted in that case was only to the effect  that the plaintiff therein was entitled to the scale of pay of  Rs.1200-1850/- with effect from 1.1.1978, which was  attached to the post of Deputy Director of Agriculture  instead of at Rs.940-1850/-.  As we have indicated that was

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not a suit in which Order I Rule 8 of Code of Civil Procedure  was invoked and there was no declaration granted that the  endorsement or order dated 13.3.1980 was illegal and void,  the prayer for which is made in the first two suits.  It may be  noticed that Suit No.461 of 1991 was concerned more with  the effect of various disciplinary proceedings initiated  against the plaintiff therein on the claim made by him in  that suit.  We are therefore constrained to hold that the  relief of declaration sought for by the plaintiffs in the first  two suits is clearly barred by limitation.   

17.             Once the prayer for declaration sought for in the  suits is found to be barred by limitation, it has to be noticed  that the prayer that follows is only consequential on the  relief of declaration.  That prayer is to the effect that the  plaintiff is entitled to the pay scale of Rs.1200-1850/- as  against the scale of pay of Rs.940-1850/- with effect from  1.1.1978 and entitled for payment of all other service  benefits including yearly increments, arrears and interest  thereon at the rate of 18 per cent per annum up to the date  of payment with effect from 1.1.1978.  It must be noticed  that there is no independent prayer for recovery of arrears of  pay and the prayer is couched in such a manner that it can  be understood only as consequential on the grant of the first  relief.  In other words, it is not an independent relief that  could be granted even if the main prayer is declined.  In that  view, it has to be held that a consequential relief could not  be granted in view of the fact that the main relief of  declaration sought for has been held to be barred by  limitation.   

18.             Now coming to the merits of the contention  regarding the revised scale of pay, it has to be seen that the  plaintiffs are governed by the Punjab Agricultural Service  Rules, 1974.  Going by the rules, under Rule 11, the post of  Deputy Director is not a promotional post for Punjab  Agricultural Service Officers Class-I.  The orders of  appointment relied on by the two plaintiffs also clearly show  that one was temporarily appointed to Punjab Agricultural  Service Class-I, and the other was promoted as Officer  Class-I, but were posted as Deputy Directors. Therefore, the  appointment in one and the promotion in the other of the  plaintiffs are as Agricultural Officers Class-I.   Their scale of  pay was Rs.400-1250/-.  The said scale of pay has been  revised to Rs.940-1850/-.  Therefore, they are entitled to  revised pay only at the scale of pay of Rs.940-1850/- and  not to any other higher pay.  It is a fact that in the  communication of the Government, the cadre of Deputy  Directors are shown to be fitted in the revised scale of pay of  Rs.1200-1850/-.  But, the Director of Agriculture, obviously  considering the nature of the service in the Agricultural  Department, rightly noting there was no cadre post of  Deputy Director in the department and some Agricultural  Officers, Class-I were posted as Deputy Directors and some  others as Chief Agricultural Officers, etc. only for  administrative reasons and the posts were interchangeable  and the concerned officer remained an officer of Class-I,  endorsed that the scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/- does not  apply to those working as Deputy Directors in the  Agricultural Department.  We find that the correct position  was adopted by the Director of Agriculture and the order or  endorsement made by him on 13.3.1980 was clearly correct  and legal and in the face of the orders of appointment  Exhibit P-1 produced by the plaintiffs, they cannot be heard  to say that they were appointed to a post other than that of

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a Class-I officer in the Punjab Agricultural Service.  The  courts below have not considered the rules and the position  emerging therefrom and the position obtaining in the service  while considering this question and thereby they have gone  wrong in their conclusion.   

19.             It is argued that since in Civil Suit No. 461 of  1991 one other officer who was working as Deputy Director  was found entitled to the revised scale of pay of Rs.1200- 1850/-, all Class-I officers must be given the same pay  cannot be accepted.  If such a plea is accepted, it will result  in equals being treated unequals in that those appointed  with the plaintiffs but who have been posted as Agricultural  Officers Class-I or as Chief Agricultural Officers holding  interchangeable posts would only be entitled to the scale of  pay of Rs.940-1850/- and certain persons among Class-I  officers who were fortuitously working as Deputy Directors,  would be getting the higher scale of pay at Rs.1200-1850.   Surely, such a situation cannot be brought about and the  result of the acceptance of the plea based on the decree in  Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 would be that.  Moreover, this  Court cannot be controlled by a wrong decision of a trial  court, unless of course, it operates as res judicata.   Therefore, the plea based on the decree in Civil Suit No. 461  of 1991 is overruled.  We have already pointed out that the  said suit was not a representative action.  No doubt, the  Government cannot treat different officers of same cadre  differently.  But, merely because a decree was passed in  favour of one of them \026 according to us wrongly \026 would not  mean that all others should be given the same relief, when  going by the relevant rules and orders of appointment it is  clear that the plaintiffs are only Class-I officers appointed in  the scale of pay of Rs.400-1250/-, whose pay has been  revised to the scale of pay of Rs.940-1850/-.

20.             In the view we have taken, the argument of the  plaintiff based on the Punjab Horticultural Service (Class-I)  Rules, 1990, has no substance.  Those rules cannot have  any application to the question involved here.  The result of  this discussion would be that the decrees granted by the  courts below in the two suits, i.e., Civil Suit No. 665 of 1993  and Civil Suit No. 894 of 1993 are unsustainable in law and  the decrees deserve to be reversed.  

21.             Coming to the third suit, Civil Suit No. 82 of  2003, we have found that the prayer in the suit filed on  6.5.1993 is to set at naught the seniority lists published in  the year 1980 and in the year 1984.  On the face of it, the  prayer for declaration is barred by limitation.  The suit is  governed by Article 58 of the Limitation Act and the impact  of the publication of the seniority list was felt by the plaintiff  on the issue of that list and when others were placed above  him.  The cause of action therefore arose in 1980 and in  1984.      

22.             According to us, the suit is also barred by  acquiescence and estoppel.  No one in a service can sleep  over the question of seniority for more than 12 years and  then come to court seeking a relief which will upset the  seniority of a number of persons who had been shown as  seniors in the respective seniority lists.  Therefore, on the  face of it, a declaratory relief that will have the effect of

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altering a twelve year old and a nine year old seniority list  could not have been granted by the courts below.   

23.             Then the only question is whether in view of the  earlier decree in Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 obtained by the  present plaintiff, he would be placed in a better position  regarding his entitlement to have the seniority list upset at  this distance of time.  We have already indicated the scope  of the decree granted in the earlier suit.  It merely found that  the disciplinary actions initiated against the plaintiff did not  affect his claim to be given the revised scale of pay of  Rs.1200-1850/- and that he was entitled to it  notwithstanding the endorsement made otherwise by the  Director of Agricultural Services.  The fact that he had  obtained such a relief and that relief had become final would  not entitle him or enable him to seek the setting aside of the  seniority list merely on the ground that he had been put on  a higher pay scale than his colleagues who were otherwise  senior to him in service.   All those, who will be affected have  also not been impleaded.

24.             We do not think it necessary for the purposes of  these appeals to consider how far a Civil Court can enter  into the arena to decide upon the question of inter se  seniority in Government service.  We also do not think it  necessary to go into the question of the extent of the  jurisdiction of the civil court, when they entertain suits  relating to matters of service, especially government service,  seeking the expunction of adverse entries, striking down of  punishments imposed by the authority after holding a  proper enquiry, as if the court was sitting in appeal, as to  which scale of pay a person should be fitted in, and so on.   Anyway, these questions will have to be examined as and  when the occasion for it arises.   But, we may say that the  civil court cannot assume that it can freely enter the arena  as if it is sitting in appeal over the action of the authorities.   

25.             Other reliefs claimed in Civil Suit No. 82 of 1993  are consequential to the relief of redrawing of the seniority  list and since we have found that no relief of altering the  seniority list can be given to the plaintiff therein, those  reliefs also cannot be granted.  Of course, the decree  obtained by the plaintiff in Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 which  has become final would not be affected by whatever we have  said in this judgment.  But the decree granted in Civil Suit  No. 82 of 1993 has to be reversed.   

26.             In the result, these appeals are allowed; the  judgments and decrees granted by the courts below are set  aside and all the three suits are dismissed with costs in the  trial court.  In the circumstances, the parties are directed to  suffer their respective costs in the first appellate court, in  the second appellate court and in this Court.