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PETITIONER: STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BHAI ARDAMAN SINGH & ORS.  ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/05/1968

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA

CITATION:  1969 AIR   13            1969 SCR  (1) 283

ACT: Pepsu  Tenancy and Agricultural Act 8 of 1953, s.  43(1)(b)- scope of-if has retrospective operation conditions precedent for exercise of jurisdiction by  collector-whether order can be   passed  on  subjective  satisfaction  or  on   judicial determination.

HEADNOTE: Certain  tenants of land applied to the  Collector,  Sangrur and Bhatinda, alleging that they had been forcibly  deprived of  the  lands  in May/June, 1943 and sought  an  order  for restoration  of possession under s. 43 of the Pepsu  Tenancy and  Agricultural Act 8 of 1953.  The Collector granted  the applications  and ordered possession to be restored  to  the tenants.  His orders were confirmed by the Commissioner  who was of the view that an order under s. 43 could be passed by the  Collector on his subjective satisfaction that a  person was  in  wrongful or unauthorised possession of  land.   The Financial  Commissioner  also confirmed the  orders  on  the ground  that  substantial  justice  had  been  done  by  the subordinate revenue authorities. The  first  respondent  challenged these orders  by  a  writ petition  but this was dismissed by a Single  Bench  holding that the Act 8 of 1953 was a code in itself and provided for a  complete machinery for the decision of disputes like  the resent  one.   But a Division Bench in  appeal  allowed  the petition  and held that Act 8 of 1953 which came into  force on December 13, 1953, had no retrospective operation. On appeal to this Court HELD, dismissing the appeals (i)  Apart from the allegation of the tenants that the first respondent was in wrongful or unauthorised possession of the lands previously occupied by them, it was further  necessary to  establish that under cl. (b) of s. 43(1) the  person  in wrongful or unauthorised possession was not entitled to  the use and occupation of the lands under the provisions of  the Act.   There  was no provision which disentitled  the  first respondent to the use and occupation of the lands.   Section 43 (1) (b) therefore had no application in the present case. The condition precedent to the investment of jurisdiction in the  Collector being absent, the revenue authorities had  no power to pass the order in ejectment which they purported to

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pass. (ii) The  proceedings  of  the  Collector  are  judicial  in character  and although the trial is summary, the  Collector is bound to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him not on a subjective satisfaction, as the Commissioner assumed, but on a  judicial  determination of facts which  invest  him  with jurisdiction  to  pass  an order  in  ejectment.   When  the condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction does not exist the Collector cannot clothe himself with authority  to pass  the impugned orders.  Furthermore, the High Court  had rightly  held  the  terms  of  cl.  (b),  s.  43(1)  had  no retrospective operation. (iii)     If the Collector had no jurisdiction except in the special  condition prescribed by s. 43, his order could  not be sustained merely because 284 another  authority may, if the proceeding were  before  that authority, on the findings recorded, have granted relief  to the tenants of restoration to possession of their respective lands.  Authorities which are vested with powers-judicial or quasi-judicial--can  exercise their power within the  limits of their jurisdiction and their actions without jurisdiction cannot   be  sustained  merely  because  another   body   or authority,   which   if  lawfully   approached,   may   have jurisdiction to pass the order complained of.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos.  1016  to 1050, 1052 to 1075 and 1077 to 1084 of 1964. Appeals  by special leave from the judgment and order  dated May  14, 1959 of the Punjab High Court in L. P.  Appeal  No. 148 of 1 9 6 8 etc. N.   S. Bindra and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant. M.   C. Chagla and R. V. Pillai, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah,  J.  In this group of appeals the dispute  relates  to agricultural  lands  situate  in  village   Dialpura-Bhaika, District  Bhatinda in the former State of Pepsu and  now  in the State of Punjab.  The lands originally belonged to  Bhai Arjan  Singh.  On his death in 1946 the lands devolved  upon his  son Bhai Ardaman Singh, the first respondent  in  these appeals.   Alleging that Bhai Arjan Singh forcibly  deprived them  of  the  lands some time  in  May-June  1943,  seventy tenants applied to the Collector Sangrur and Bhatinda for an order  for  restoration of possession tinder s.  43  of  the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Act 8 of 1953.  The Collector granted  the  applications and ordered  that  possession  be restored  to  the  tenants.  The orders  were  confirmed  in appeal  by  the Commissioner.  The Commissioner was  of  the view  that  the  order under S. 43 could be  passed  by  the Collector  on his subjective satisfaction that a person  was in  wrongful  or  unauthorised  possession  of  lands.   The Financial   Commissioner   confirmed  the   order   of   the Commissioner on the ground that substantial justice had been done  by the subordinate revenue authorities, and no  inter- ference with the. orders was called for. Bhai  Ardaman, Singh then filed writ petitions in  the  High Court  of  Punjab  challenging  the  orders  passed  by  the Financial Commissioner.  The petitions were heard by Gosain, J.  In  the view of the learned Judge Act 8 of  1953  was  a complete  code  in  itself  and  provided  for  a   complete machinery  for  the decision of disputes  like  the  dispute before him.  He observed :

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             "Under   this   law   Tribunals   of   special               jurisdiction  have been created  and  invested               with  powers  which  should  enable  them   to                             effectively  deal with disputes not on ly  those               which  arise  between  the  landlord  and  the               tenant,  but  also those which  arise  between               persons               285               entitled  to  possession and  persons  wrongly               dispossessing  them.   It may be that  in  the               latter  case  the enquiry contemplated  to  be               made by the Collector is only summary and that               the  aggrieved party may be able to  have  re-               course  finally  to the civil  court  but  the               jurisdiction  to  make, enquiry and  to  order               eviction  has  been given by the  law  to  the               Collector." In appeals under the Letters Patent the High Court  reversed the  order  passed by Gosain, J. The High Court was  of  the opinion that Act 8 of 1953 which came into force on December 13,  1953, had no retrospective operation and  that  Gosain, J.,  was in error in making an order for possession  of  the lands when dispossession had taken place before the Act  was brought  into  force.   The High Court also  held  that  the proceedings  of  the  Collector were  vitiated  because  the Collector   declined  to  give  to  the   first   respondent opportunity to lead evidence which he desired to lead.  With certificate  granted by the High Court, these  appeals  have been preferred by the State of Punjab.               Section 43 of the Pepsu Act 8 of 1953 provides               "(1)   Any  person  who  is  in  wrongful   or               unauthorised possession of any land               (a)   the transfer of which either by the  act               of  parties  or  by the operation  of  law  is               invalid under the provisions of this Act, or               (b)   to the use and occupation of which be is               not entitled under the provisions of this Act,               may, after summary enquiry, be ejected by  the               Collector who may also impose on such person a               penalty not exceeding five hundred rupees. Clause (a) has evidently no application.  It is not the case of any party that there was any transfer of the lands  which was  invalid  by virtue of the provisions of the  Act.   The tenants alleged that the first respondent was in wrongful or unauthorised possession of the lands previously occupied  by them.   But in order that the jurisdiction of the  Collector to  hold a summary enquiry and to pass the order  complained of  may be attracted, it was further necessary to  establish that  under  el. (b) of S. 43(1) the person in  wrongful  or unauthorised  possession  was not entitled to  the  use  and occupation  of  the lands under the provisions of  the  Act. Counsel  for  the State of Punjab is unable  to  invite  our attention   to  any  provision  which  renders   the   first respondent  disentitled by virtue of the provisions  of  the Act to the use and occupation of the lands.  Section 43  (1) (b) has, therefore, no application.  The condition precedent to  the  investment of jurisdiction in the  Collector  being absent,  the  revenue authorities had no power to  pass  the order in ejectment which they purported to pass. LI 2 Sup.  CI/68-4 286 We must point out that the proceedings of the Collector  are judicial  in  character.   The trial  is  summary,  but  the Collector  is bound to exercise the jurisdiction  vested  in

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him  not on a subjective satisfaction, as  the  Commissioner assumed,  but  on a judicial determination  of  facts  which invest him with jurisdiction to pass an order in  ejectment. When the condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction does  not  exist the Collector can not clothe  himself  with authority  to pass the impugned orders.  We also agree  with the  High Court that in view of the terms of cl. (b), S.  43 had no retrospective operation.  On the view we take, it  is unnecessary to consider the argument advanced by Mr.  Chagla on  behalf  of  the  first respondent  that  S.  43  has  no application to cases in which a dispute relating to  tenancy of land arises between the landlord and his tenant. It  is  also  not necessary to consider  in  this  group  of appeals  whether  the  proceedings  of  the  Collector  were vitiated,  because  as alleged by the first  respondent  the Collector  did  not afford sufficient  opportunity  to  lead evidence on the first respondent’s plea that there had  been no wrongful dispossession of the tenants. Mr.  Bindra  on behalf of the State contended  that  in  any event  this Court should not countenance  interference  with the  impugned  orders of the revenue  authorities,  even  if erroneous,  because  those authorities have in  passing  the orders done substantial justice.  Counsel contended that the tenants  had been wrongfully deprived of possession  of  the lands  by the use of force by the first respondent  and  the order passed by the Collector though not strictly  warranted by  law was not liable to be disturbed by the High Court  in exercise   of  their  jurisdiction  to  issue  a   writ   of certiorari.   We are unable to agree with  that  contention. If  the Collector had no Jurisdiction except in the  special conditions  prescribed  by  S. 43, his order  could  not  be sustained  merely  because  another authority  may,  if  the proceeding  were  before  that authority,  on  the  findings recorded, have granted relief to the tenants of  restoration to possession of their respective lands.  Authorities  which are  vested  with  powers--judicial  or   quasi-judicial-can exercise their power within the limits of their jurisdiction and their actions without _jurisdiction cannot be  sustained merely  because another body or authority which if  lawfully approached,   may  have  jurisdiction  to  pass  the   order complained of. The appeals are therefore dismissed with costs.  One hearing fee. R.K.P.S.                                             Appeals dismissed. 287