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PETITIONER: THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI PRABHAKAR BHIKAJI INGLE.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       11/03/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. G.B. PATTANAIK (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCC  (3) 463        JT 1996 (3)   567  1996 SCALE  (3)7

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Leave granted.      We have  heard the  counsel on  both sides. Admittedly, the respondent  had filed O.A. No.1169/93 in the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal,  Bombay  Bench  against  the  order passed by  the Commissioner  of Police,  Bombay removing him from service. The Commissioner had exercised his power under Art.311(2)(b)  of  the  Constitution  holding  that  in  the circumstances it  was not  practicable to conduct an enquiry against the  respondent. That  order came to be confirmed by the Tribunal  dismissing the  O.A. on March 6, 1995. Against that, the  respondent filed  SLP (C)  No.11433/95 which  was dismissed by  this Court  on 25.8.95.  Pending the  SLP, the respondent filed  a review  application in the Tribunal. The Tribunal after  receipt of  the order  passed by  this Court dismissing the  SLP, by  the impugned  order  dated  2.11.95 reviewed the  order and  set aside  the order  of dismissal. Thus this appeal by special leave.      It is  contended for  the respondent that the dismissal of the SLP does not preclude the Tribunal from reviewing the order since  the dismissal was a non-speaking order. We fail to appreciate  the contention  of the respondent. It is true that this  Court has  held that the dismissal of SLP without speaking  order   does  not  constitute  res  judicata.  The principle of  res judicata  is founded on public policy that the parties  cannot be  permitted to  have  the  controversy directly or  substantially in issue between the same parties or those  claiming under  the parties in the subsequent suit in the  same proceedings  in the subsequent stages cannot be raised once  over. It  is a sound principle of public policy to prevent vexation.      But in  this case,  when the  self-same main  order was confirmed by  this Court,  the question  arises whether  the Tribunal has  had power  under Order  47, Rule  1 CPC or any other appropriate  provision  under  the  Tribunals  Act  to

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review the  orders passed  by it and confirmed by this Court by refusing to grant leave. We find that the exercise of the review power is deleterious to the judicial discipline. Once this Court  has confirmed  the order passed by the Tribunal, that becomes  final. Therefore, the Tribunal cannot have any power to  review the previous order which stands merged with the order passed by this Court.      It is  next contended  by the  learned counsel  for the respondent that  though the  Tribunal was  communicated with the order  of this  Court dated  25.8.95, it  has thereafter passed the  order. It  would mean  that though  it  had  the knowledge of  dismissal of  the order  passed by this Court, the Tribunal  has exercised  the power  of review  and that, therefore, it  cannot be  said to  be illegal. We are wholly unable to  appreciate the contention of the learned counsel. We could appreciate that if the Tribunal had no knowledge of dismissal of  the SLP  it might,  in certain  circumstances, review its  earlier order,  e.g., if  it was  found that the order was  vitiated by any manifest error of law apparent on the  face   of  the   record.  But   having   received   the communication that  this Court has already upheld its order, the Tribunal’s exercise of power can be said to be audacious and   without   any   judicial   discipline.   Under   those circumstances, we donot think that the Tribunal is justified in reviewing its own order when this Court had confirmed the order passed earlier.      The appeal  is accordingly allowed. The review order is set aside. But in the circumstances without costs.