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CASE NO.: Special Leave Petition (crl.) 1295  of  1997 Special Leave Petition (crl.)   1603     of  1997

PETITIONER: STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI RAM SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       01/02/2000

BENCH: K.T. Thomas & R.P. Sethi.

JUDGMENT:

SETHI,J. L...I...T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J Heard.  Leave granted.

   Relying  upon  the  judgment of this Court in  State  of Haryana  &  Ors.  vs.  Bhajan Lal & Ors.  [1992  (1)  Suppl. SCC  335]  and  exercising powers under Section 482  of  the Criminal  Procedure  Code, the High Court of Madhya  Pradesh vide  the  judgment  impugned in these appeals  quashed  the investigations   and  consequent   proceedings  against  the respondents initiated, conducted and concluded by the police under  Sections 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of  Corruption  Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to  as  the Act).   The  Court  found that for the  offence  punishable under  Section 13(1)(e) of the Act the investigation had not been  conducted by an authorised officer in terms of Section 17  of  the  Act.   It  was  observed:   It  is  of  utmost importance  that  investigation into criminal  offence  must always   be   free  from   any  objectionable  features   or infirmities  which may legitimately lead to the grievance of the  accused  that the work of investigation is  carried  on unfairly  and with any ulterior motive.  The prosecution  of the  accused  on the basis of investigation by a person  who had no legal authority to investigate cannot be allowed:

   In  order  to  appreciate the legal controversy,  it  is proper  to refer to some of the facts regarding which  there does  not  appear to be any dispute at this stage  in  these appeals.

   Regarding  Ram Singh respondent, a secret information is stated  to have been received on 4.7.1992 alleging that when he  was a Sub Inspector, Excise and District Excise Officer, he  had  acquired properties disproportionate to  his  known sources of income.  On verification it was found that he had earned  movable and immovable properties allegedly much more disproportionate  to his known sources of income during  the check   period  commencing  from   1.1.1982   to   4.8.1992. Resultantly  Crime  No.103/92  under Sections  13(1)(e)  and

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13(2)  of the Act was registered against him.  On 4.8.1992 a raid  was conducted by Shri B.N.  Bhatia,  Dy.Superintendent of  Police, SPE, Lokayukt Office, Gwalior after obtaining  a search  warrant from the Chief Judicial Magistrate,  Gwalior and  a seizure memo was prepared with respect to recovery of movable  articles  from the possession of his  son,  namely, Pratap  Singh,  Advocate.   On  7.8.1992  another  raid  was conducted  by Shri C.P.S.  Chaturvedi, Dy.Supdt.  of Police, Lokayukt  Office, Gwalior at the Government Quarter allotted to the said respondent at Vikas Nagar, Betul, under a search warrant dated 3.8.1992.  Some documents, one transistor, one pistol  and  diaries  were  recovered   in  the  raid.   The respondent Shri Ram Singh moved Criminal Misc.No.143 of 1993 before  the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior  praying for  anticipatory bail which was allowed.  Vide letter dated 14.12.1993,  the  Additional   Excise  Commissioner,  Madhya Pradesh,  Gwalior  directed  the respondent  to  submit  the statement  on  the  prescribed form Nos.1, 2 and  3  to  the Lokayukt  Gwalior.   The statements were submitted  to  Shri P.S.   Sisodia,  Deputy Superintendent of  Police,  Lokayukt Office,  Moti Mahal, Gwalior on 16.5.1994.  It was mentioned in  the  statement that the total income of  the  respondent from  all  sources  was Rs.4,19,000/-  and  expenditure  was Rs.2,58,700/-  which show the savings of Rs.1,60,300/-.   He declared  that  his assets were not disproportionate to  the known  sources of his income.  After further information was submitted  by the respondent, a further enquiry was made  on 5.6.1995 with respect to his bank account.  In May, 1996 the respondent  filed the Petition No.2481/96 under Section  482 of  the  Criminal  Procedure Code praying for  quashing  the proceedings  relating  to Crime No.143/93  and  charge-sheet thereof  filed  against him.  He contended that  the  entire search  and seizure made by Special Police Establishment was illegal,  malafide  and without any basis.  It  was  further contended that the search was conducted without jurisdiction and  was in contravention of the provisions of Section 17 of the  Act.   He alleged that the investigation was  malicious inasmuch as the accounts of his family members had illegally been  freezed.   The  State in its reply filed in  the  High Court  alleged  that after investigation it  had  transpired that  during  the check period, the respondent had  a  total income  of  Rs.3,13,470.68  from all known sources  and  his expenditure    being     Rs.16,25,723.49.       Thus     the disproportionate  amount  came to Rs.13,12,252.81 which  was stated  to  be 350 times more than the known sources of  his income.   After  investigation  sanction  was  obtained  and charge-sheet  was  filed.   The  initial  investigation  was conducted by Shri B.N.  Bhatia, Dy.Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment, Gwalior and thereafter by Shri D.S.   Rana,  Inspector SPE, Gwalior who was stated to  have been  duly authorised by the Superintendent of Police,  SPE, Gwalior  vide  order No.SPE/2766/94 dated  12.12.1994.   The order  of  the  Supteintendent of Police was claimed  to  be strictly  under  Section 17 of the Act.  Respondent  Jagdish Prasad was appointed as a Sub-Inspector and was also holding the  post  of  A.D.E.O.  On 16.11.1984  Preliminary  Enquiry No.120/84  was registered against him.  On 7.5.1985 one Shri Tara Chand, resident of Dahimandi, Gwalior filed a complaint against  the  said respondent whereupon another  Preliminary Enquiry   No.5/85  was  registered   which  was  taken   for investigation.   On the basis of Preliminary Enquiry No.5/85 Crime No.132/92 under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Act was   registered   against   him    on   7.10.1992.    After investigation  it  transpired  that   during  check   period commencing  from  1.2.1964 to 31.1.1984 the  respondent  had

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earned  a  sum of Rs.1,12,380.54 from his known  sources  of income  and incurred an expenses of Rs.2,14,608.84.  In this way  he was found to be possessing disproportionate property worth  Rs.1,02,228.30.   After  obtaining the  sanction  for prosecution  by  the competent authority a charge-sheet  was submitted  in  the Court on 5.8.1986.  The respondent  moved the  High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal  Procedure Code  praying for quashing the investigation and  consequent proceedings  against  him  in the light of the  judgment  in Bhajan  Lals case (supra) which was allowed vide the  order impugned.   Respondent  Kedarilal  Vaishya  had  joined  the service  in the Government on 15.7.1978 as Sub-Engineer  and was  promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer on 8.3.1990. An   information  was  received  in   the  office   of   the Superintendent  of Police, SPE Regional Lokayukta Karyalaya, Gwalior   that  the  aforesaid   respondent  had   immovable properties  much  more disproportionate to known sources  of his   income.   After  verification   Crime   No.17/94   was registered  under  Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(1)(d) read  with Section  13(2) of the Act.  A search warrant was received by Inspector  Ram Lakhan Singh Bhadhouria from the Court of the Chief  Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior.  The Superintendent  of Police  SPE  Regional  Lokayukta Karyalaya,  Gwalior  issued order No.454 dated 8.2.1994 authorising the investigation of the   case  by  Shri  Ram   Lakhan  Singh  Bhadhouria.    On investigation it was found that during the check period from 7.7.1978  to  2.9.1994  the respondent had  earned  a  total amount  of  Rs.3,86,966.75  and incurred an  expenditure  of Rs.7,95,243.98.   In this way he was found to be  possessing Rs.4,08,277.23  more than his earnings which was found to be disproportionate  to his known sources of income, punishable under  Section 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Act.  The  sanction for   prosecution  was  obtained  on  26th   October,   1996 whereafter  a charge-sheet was filed against the  respondent in  the Court of Sub-Judge Shivpuri which was registered  as Special  Session  Case  No.4/1996.  Not satisfied  with  the investigation  the respondent filed a petition under Section 482  of the Criminal Procedure Code praying for quashing  of the  investigation  and  consequent   proceedings  in  Crime No.17/94  which was allowed vide the order impugned in these appeals.   Corruption  in a civilised society is  a  disease like  cancer,  which  if  not detected in time  is  sure  to maliganise  the  polity  of country  leading  to  disastrous consequences.   It  is  termed as plague which is  not  only contagious  but  if not controlled spreads like a fire in  a jungle.   Its  virus is compared with HIV leading  to  AIDS, being incurable.  It has also been termed as Royal thievery. The  socio-political  system  exposed  to  such  a   dreaded communicable  disease  is  likely to crumble under  its  own weight.   Corruption  is  opposed to  democracy  and  social order,  being  not only anti people, but aimed and  targeted against  them.   It  affects the economy  and  destroys  the cultural  heritage.   Unless  nipped  in   the  bud  at  the earliest,  it  is likely to cause turbulence shaking of  the socio-economic-political  system  in an  otherwise  healthy, wealthy,  effective  and vibrating society.  The  menace  of corruption  was found to have enormously increased by  first and  second  world war conditions.  The corruption,  at  the initial  stages, was considered confined to the  bureaucracy who  had  the opportunities to deal with a variety of  State largesse  in  the  form of contracts, licences  and  grants. Even   after  the  war   the  opportunities  for  corruption continued as large amounts of Government surplus stores were required  to  be  disposed of by the  public  servants.   As consequence  of  the  wars  the shortage  of  various  goods

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necessitated  the  imposition  of   controls  and  extensive schemes   of   post-war     reconstruction   involving   the disbursement  of huge sums of money which lay in the control of  the public servants giving them wide discretion with the result  of luring them to the glittering shine of the wealth and  property.   In order to consolidate and amend the  laws relating  to prevention of corruption and matters  connected thereto,  the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was enacted which was amended from time to time.  In the year 1988 a new Act  on the subject being Act No.49 of 1988 was enacted with the  object of dealing with the circumstances, contingencies and  shortcomings  which  were noticed in  the  working  and implementation  of 1947 Act.  The law relating to prevention of  corruption was essentially made to deal with the  public servants,   as  understood  in   the  common  parlance   but specifically  defined  in the Act.  The Act was intended  to make  effective  provision for the prevention of  bribe  and corruption  rampant  amongst the public servants.  It  is  a social legislation defined to curb illegal activities of the public servants and is designed to be liberally construed so as  to  advance  its  object.    Dealing  with  the   object underlying  the  Act  this Court in R.S.   Nayak  vs.   A.R. Antulay [1984 (2) SCC 183] held:  The 1947 Act was enacted, as  its long ltitle shows, to make more effective  provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption.  Indisputably, therefore,  the  provisions  of the Act  must  receive  such construction  at the hands of the Court as would advance the object  and  purpose underlying the Act and at any rate  not defeat  it.   If  the  words of the Statute  are  clear  and unambiguous,  it  is the plainest duty of the court to  give effect  to  the  natural meaning of the words  used  in  the provision.   The question of construction arises only in the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used in  the  statute  would  be self-defeating.   The  court  is entitled  to  ascertain the intention of the Legislature  to remove  the  ambiguity  by construing the provision  of  the Statute  as  a whole keeping in view what was  the  mischief when  the  Statute  was  enacted and  to  remove  which  the Legislature  enacted the Statute.  The rule of  construction is  so universally accepted that it need not be supported by precedents.   Adopting this rule of construction, whenever a question  of construction arises upon ambiguity or where two views  are possible of a provision, it would be the duty  of the Court to adopt that construction which would advance the object  underlying  the  Act,   namely,  to  make  effective provision  for the prevention of bribery and corruption  and at any rate not defeat it.

   Procedural  delays and technicalities of law should  not be  permitted to defeat the object sought to be achieved  by the  Act.  The overall public interest and the social object is  required  to be kept in mind while interpreting  various provisions of the Act and decided cases under it.

   For  the purposes of deciding these appeals reference to Sections  13  and  17 of the Act is necessary.   Section  13 deals  with  the criminal misconduct of the public  servants and  prescribes the punishment for the commission of offence of  criminal misconduct.  A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct:

   (a)  if  he habitually accepts or obtains or  agrees  to accept  or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for  any  other  person any gratification other  than  legal remuneration  as a motive or reward such as is mentioned  in

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section 7;  or

   (b)  if  he habitually accepts or obtains or  agrees  to accept  or  attempts to obtain for himself or for any  other person,  any  valuable thing without consideration or for  a consideration  which  he  knows to be  inadequate  from  any person whom he knows to have been, or to be, or to be likely to  be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted by him, or having any connection with the  official functions of himself or of any public  servant to  whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows to  be interested in or related to the person so  concerned; or

   (c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to@@           JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ him  or under his control as a public servant or allows  any@@ JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ other person so to do;  or

   (d) if he,--

   (i)  by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for  any  other  person  any  valuable  thing  or  pecuniary advantage;  or

   (ii)  by  abusing  his  position as  a  public  servant, obtains  for  himself or for any other person  any  valuable thing or pecuniary advantage;  or

   (iii)  while holding office as a public servant, obtains for  any  person any valuable thing or  pecuniary  advantage without any public interest;  or

   (e)  if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in@@            JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ possession   for   which    the    public   servant   cannot@@ JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ satisfactorily  account, of pecuniary resources or  property disproportionate to his known sources of income.

   ExplanationFor  the  purposes of this  section,  known sources  of  income means income received from  any  lawful source  and  such receipt has been intimated  in  accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant

   (2)  Any public servant who commits criminal  misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be  not  less  than one year but which may extend  to  seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

   Section 17 deals with investigation into cases under the Act and provides:

   17.   Persons authorised to  investigateNotwithstanding anything  contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,  1973 (2 of 1974), no police officer below the rank,--

   (a)   in   the  case  of   the  Delhi   Special   Police Establishment, of an Inspector of Police;

   (b) in the metropolitan area of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras

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and Ahmedabad and in any other metropolitan area notified as such  under  sub-section  (1) of Section 8 of  the  Code  of Criminal  Procedure,  1973  (2  of 1974),  of  an  Assistant Commissioner of Police;

   (c) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police officer of equivalent rank.

   shall  investigate any offence punishable under this Act without   the  order  of  a  Metropolitan  Magistrate  or  a Magistrate  of the first class, as the case may be, or  make any arrest therefore without a warrant;

   Provided  that if a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police is authorised by the State Government in  this  behalf  by general or special order, he  may  also investigate  any  such  offence  without   the  order  of  a Metropolitan  Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as  the  case  may be, or make arrest  therefore  without  a warrant;

   Provided  further that an offence referred to in  clause (e)  of  sub-  section  (1)  of  section  13  shall  not  be investigated without the order of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police.

   This  Section provides that no police officer below  the rank  of  an Inspector in the case of Delhi  Special  Police Establishment,  an  Assistant Commissioner of Police in  the metropolitan areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Ahmedabad and  any  other  metropolitan  area  notified  as  such  and Dy.Superintendent  of  Police  or a police  officer  of  the equivalent  rank  shall  investigate an  offence  punishable under  the  Act  without  prior order  of  the  metropolitan Magistrate  or a Magistrate of the First Class, as the  case may  be,  or  make  any   arrest  thereof  without  warrant. According to the first proviso if a police officer not below the  rank  of  an Inspector of Police is authorised  by  the Government  in  this behalf by general or special order,  he can  also investigate in such offences without the order  of Metropolitan Magistrate or the Magistrate of First Class, as the  case may be, or make arrest thereof without a  warrant. Regarding compliance of this part of the section there is no controversy  in  the present appeals.  However,  the  second proviso provides that where an offence referred to in clause (e)  of  sub-section  (1)  of section 13  is  sought  to  be investigated,  such an investigation shall not be  conducted without  the order of a Police Officer not below the rank of a  Superintendent  of  Police.  The interpretation  of  this proviso  is  involved  in   the  present  controversy.   The investigation  conducted and the consequent proceedings  are stated  to  have been quashed on similar grounds  in  Bhajan Lals  case(supra).  The facts of that case were, one Dharam Pal  presented a complaint against Ch.Bhajan Lal, the former Chief Minister of Haryana making certain serious allegations against  him which prima facie showed commission of  offence punishable  under  the Act.  The complaint was presented  in the Chief Ministers Secretariat on 12.1.1987 when said Shri Bhajan  Lal  had  ceased  to  be  the  Chief  Minister.   An endorsement  was made by the Officer on Special Duty in  the Chief  Ministers  Secretariat  to the effect:   C.M.   has seen.   For  appropriate  action  and  was  marked  to  the

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Director  General of Police who in turn made endorsement  on the  same  day  which read, Please look  into  this;   take necessary   action  and  report  and   marked  it  to   the Superintendent  of Police, Hissar.  The complaint  alongwith the  above endorsement of OSD and DGP was put up before  the SP  on 21.11.1987 on which date the SP made his  endorsement reading  Please  register  a case  and  investigate.   The Station  House  Officer of the Police Station  registered  a case  on the basis of the allegations in the complaint under Sections  161  and 165 of the Indian Penal Code and  Section 5(2)  of  the  Prevention of Corruption  Act,  1947.   After forwarding  the copy of the First Information Report to  the Magistrate and other officers concerned, the SHO took up the investigation  and proceeded to the spot accompanied by  his staff.   At  this stage Shri Bhajan Lal filed Writ  Petition No.9172/87 under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India  seeking quashing of the First Information Report  and issuance  of directions restraining the police from  further proceeding with the investigation.  The High Court held that allegations  made  in  the  complaint do  not  constitute  a cognizable offence for commencing a lawful investigation and granted  relief  as  prayed for by the  petitioner  therein. Aggrieved  by  the aforesaid judgment the State  of  Haryana preferred  an appeal in this Court which was disposed of  as under:-  We  set  aside  the judgment  of  the  High  Court quashing  the First Information Report as not being  legally and   factually   sustainable  in   law  for   the   reasons aforementioned;   but, however, we quash the commencement as well  as  the entire investigation, if any, so far done  for the  reasons  given  by us in the instant  judgment  on  the ground  that  the third appellant (SHO) is not clothed  with valid  legal  authority  to take up  the  investigation  and proceed with the same within the meaning of Section 5A(1) of the  Prevention  of  Corruption Act, as  indicated  in  this judgment.   Further we set aside the order of the High Court awarding  costs  with  a direction that the  said  costs  is payable  to  the  first respondent (Ch.Bhajan  Lal)  by  the second respondent (Dharam Pal).

   In the result, the appeal is disposed of accordingly but at  the same time giving liberty to the State Government  to direct  an investigation afresh, if it so desires, through a competent   Police  Officer  empowered   with  valid   legal authority  in  strict compliance with S.5A(1) of the Act  as indicated supra.  No order as to costs.

   In  the facts and circumstances of that case this  Court posed a question to itself in the following terms:

   Now  what remains for consideration is whether there is any  valid order of the S.P.  permitting the third appellant to  investigate  the  offence falling under  clause  (e)  of sub-section  (1) of Section 5.  As we have already mentioned in  the earlier part of this judgment, the S.P.  (the second appellant)  has  given the one word direction on  21.11.1987 investigate.   The  question  is   whether  the  one  word direction  investigate  would amount to an order  within the meaning of second proviso of Section 5A(1).

   The Court found on facts that as there was absolutely no reason  given by the SP in directing the SHO to investigate, the  order of the SP was directly in violation of the dictum of  law.  The SHO was, therefore, found not clothed with the requisite  legal  authority  within the  meaning  of  second

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proviso  to  Section  5A(1) of 1947 Act to  investigate  the offences  under clause (e) of Section 5(1) of the Act.  This Court  held  that (1) as the salutary legal  requirement  of disclosing  the  reason for according the permission is  not complied with;  (2) as the prosecution is not satisfactorily explaining  the circumstances which impelled the SP to  pass the order directing the SHO to investigate the case;  (3) as the  said  direction manifestly seems to have  been  granted mechanically  and in a very casual manner, regardless of the principles  of  law enunciated by this Court and (4) as  the SHO  had  got  neither  any order  from  the  Magistrate  to investigate  the offences under Sections 161 and 165 IPC nor any  order  from  the SP for investigation of  the  offences under Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act in the manner known to law, the order of direction reading only investigate  suffered  from  legal infirmity.   The  Court found  that despite quashing the direction of the SP and the investigation  thereupon would not, in any manner, deter the State  of  Haryana  to  pursue the  matter  and  direct  the investigation  afresh in pursuance of the FIR, if the  State so desire.

   It may be noticed at this stage that a three Judge Bench of  this  Court in H.N.  Rishbud & Anr.vs.  State  of  Delhi [AIR  1955  SC 196] had held that a defect or illegality  in investigation,  however,  serious, has no direct bearing  on the  competence  or the procedure relating to cognizance  or trial.  Referring to the provisions of Section 190, 193, 195 to  199 and 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (1898)  in the context of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, the Court held:

   A  defect  or  illegality   in  investigation,  however serious,  has  no  direct bearing on the competence  or  the procedure  relating  to  cognizance or trial.   No  doubt  a police  report  which  results   from  an  investigation  is provided  in Section 190, Cr.P.C.  as the material on  which cognizance  is  taken.  But it cannot be maintained  that  a valid  and  legal  police report is the  foundation  of  the jurisdiction  of the Court to take cognizance.  Section 190, Cr.P.C.  is one out of a group of sections under the heading Conditions  requisite for initiation of proceedings.   The language  of this section is in marked contrast with that of the  other  sections  of the group under the  same  heading, i.e., Sections 193 and 195 to 199.

   These  latter  sections regulate the competence  of  the Court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in compliance  therewith.  But Section 190 does not.  While  no doubt,  in  one sense, clauses (a), (b) and (c)  of  Section 190(1) are conditions requisite for taking of cognizance, it is  not possible to say that cognizance on an invalid police report  is  prohibited and is therefore a nullity.  Such  an invalid report may still fall either under Clause (a) or (b) of  Section  190(1), (whether it is the one or the other  we need  not  pause to consider) and in any case cognizance  so taken  is  only  in  the nature of  error  in  a  proceeding antecedent  to the trial.  To such a situation Section  537, Cr.P.C.  which is in the following terms is attracted:

   Subject  to  the provisions hereinbefore contained,  no finding,  sentence  or order passed by a Court of  competent jurisdiction  shall  be  reversed or altered  on  appeal  or revision  on account of any error, omission or  irregularity in  the  complaint, summons, warrant, charge,  proclamation,

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order,  judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or  in  any  enquiry or other proceedings under  this  Code, unless  such  error, omission or irregularity, has  in  fact occasioned a failure of justice.

   If,  therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police report  vitiated  by  the breach of  a  mandatory  provision relating  to  investigation, there can be no doubt that  the result  of  the trial which follows it cannot be  set  aside unless  the illegality in the investigation can be shown  to have  brought  about  a  miscarriage of  justice.   That  an illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect  the competence and the jurisdiction of the court for trial is well settled as appears from the cases in  Prabhu v.   Emperor, AIR 1944 PC 73 (C) and  Lumbhardar Zutshi v. The King, AIR 1950 PC 26(D).

   It further held:

   In  our  opinion,  therefore,  when such  a  breach  is brought  to the notice of the Court at an early stage of the trial, the court will have to consider the nature and extent of  the  violation  and  pass appropriate  orders  for  such investigation as may be called for, wholly or partly, and by such  officer as it considers appropriate with reference  to the  requirements  of Section 5-A of the Act.  It is in  the light  of  the  above considerations that  the  validity  or otherwise  of  the objection as to the violation of  Section 5(4)  of  the  Act has to be decided and the  course  to  be adopted in these proceedings, determined.

   In  Bhajan Lals case this Court had found on facts that the  SP  had  passed the order mechanically and  in  a  very casual  manner regardless of the settled principles of  law. The  provisions  of  Section  17 of the  Act  had  not  been complied  with.  As earlier noticed the SP while authorising the  SHO  to  investigate had made only endorsement  to  the effect  please register the case and investigate.  The  SP was  shown  to  be not aware either of  allegations  or  the nature  of  the  offences  and  the  pressure  of  work-load requiring investigation by an Inspector.  There is no denial of  the fact that in cases against the respondents in  these appeals,  even in the absence of the authority of the SP the Investigating  Officer was in law authorised to  investigate the  offence  falling under Section 13 of the Act  with  the exception of one as is described under sub-section (1)(e) of the  Act.  After registration of the FIR the  Superintendent of  Police  in the instant appeals is shown to be aware  and conscious  of the allegations made against the  respondents, the  FIR registered against them and pending investigations. The  order  passed  by  the  SP in  case  of  Ram  Singh  on 12.12.1994 with respect to a Crime registered in 1992 was to the  effect:   In  exercise  of  powers  conferred  by  the provisions  on  me,  under Section 17 of the  Prevention  of Corruption  Act,  1988,  I P.K.  RUNWAL,  Superintendent  of Police,  Special  Police Establishment, Division-I  Lokayukt Karyalaya,  Gwalior Division Gwalior (M.P.), authorised Shri D.S.   RANA  INSP-(SPE) LAK-GWL (M.P.) to investigate  Crime No.103/92   U/s  13(1)(E),  23(2)  of  the   Prevention   of Corruption  Act, 1988 against Shri RAM SINGH  D.O.   EXCISE BATUL (M.P.).

   Similar  orders have been passed in the other two  cases

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as  well.   The reasons for entrustment of investigation  to the  Inspector can be discerned from the order itself.   The appellant-State  is, therefore, justified in submitting that the  facts  of Bhajan Lals case were distinguishable as  in the  instant  case the Superintendent of Police  appears  to have  applied his mind and passed the order authorising  the investigation   by   an  Inspector    under   the   peculiar circumstances  of  the case.  The reason for entrustment  of investigation  were obvious.  The High Court should not have liberally  construed the provisions of the Act in favour  of the accused resulting in closure of the trial of the serious charges   made  against  the   respondents  in  relation  to commission of offences punishable under an Act legislated to curb  the  illegal  and  corrupt  practices  of  the  public officers.   It  is brought to our notice that under  similar circumstances  the High Court had quashed the  investigation and consequent proceedings in a case registered against Shri Ram Babu Gupta against which Criminal Appeal No.1754 of 1986 was filed in this Court which was allowed on 27th September, 1986  by  setting aside the order of the High Court  with  a direction  to  the trial court to proceed with the  case  in accordance  with  law and in the light of  the  observations made therein.

   We  are not satisfied with the finding of the High Court that  merely  because  the order of  the  Superintendent  of Police   was   in   typed    proforma,   that   showed   the non-application  of  the mind or could be held to have  been passed  in  a  mechanical  and casual  manner.   As  noticed earlier the order clearly indicates the name of the accused, the  number  of  FIR,  nature of the offence  and  power  of Superintendent  of  Police  permitting him  to  authorise  a junior  officer  to  investigate.    The  time  between  the registration of the FIR and authorisation in terms of second proviso  to Section 17 shows further the application of mind and  the circumstances which weighed with the Superintendent of   Police   to   direct   authorisation   to   order   the investigation.

   Under  these  circumstances the appeals are allowed  and the  judgments  of the High Court impugned in these  appeals regarding  the interpretation of Section 17 and holding  the investigation to have not been investigated by an authorised officer  being  not sustainable in law are hereby set  aside with  the  direction to the Trial Court to proceed with  the trial  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  law.   The respondents would be at liberty to defend their cases on all such  contentions on facts and law as are available to  them which  have  not been adjudicated upon against them  by  the High Court and this Court.