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PETITIONER: STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SARDAR D.K. JADAV

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/01/1968

BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1968 AIR 1186            1968 SCR  (2) 823  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1972 SC1530  (1,7,8)

ACT:     Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagir Act Samvat 2008 (Act 28 of  1951), ss. 2(i)(ix), 3, 4. 5(c) and 17--Tanks and  wells claimed to be situated on ’occupied land’--Question  whether exemption under s. 5(c) applies-Issue whether can be decided by Jagir Commissioner under s. 17--High Court’s duty in writ proceedings  to  decide  jurisdictional fact  on  which  the competency of administrative authority depends.

HEADNOTE:     On the. issue of a notification under s. 3 Of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act Samvat 2008 (Act 28 of  1951) all  the  property in jagirs including  Jagir  lands.  trees tanks etc. stood vested in the State under s. 4 of the  Act. Under s. 5(c) of the Act all tanks, private wells etc. in or on  ’occupied  land’ as defined. in s. 2(i)(ix) of  the  Act were excluded from vesting.  The Madhya Pradesh and  Revenue Code 1959 (Act 20 of 1959) in s. 251 provided that all tanks as described therein which were situated on unoccupied  land and had not already vested in the State under the  Abolition ACt  would  vest absolutely in the  State  Government   with effect  from 6th April, 1959; the section also provided  for compensation  being paid in respect of such tanks.   Certain tanks belonging to the respondent were treated as vested  in the State! Government.  At first he claimed compensation for them.   but  later  he  also  claimed  before  the   Revenue authorities that the tanks were situated on ’occupied  land’ and  therefore under s. 5(c) of the Abolition Act they  were exempt from the vesting provisions.  The Revenue authorities having  decided  against him, the respondent  filed  a  writ petition  before. the High Court.  The High Court held  that the  question raised by the respondent under s. 5(c)  should be  decided  by the Jagir Commissioner under s.  17  of  the Abolition Act and on this view quashed the orders of Revenue authorities.    The   State  appealed,  along   with   other appellants.     HELD: (i) The High Court was in error in holding that s. 17 of the Abolition Act was applicable to the case.     Section  17 is included in Chapter Il1 which deals  with compensation  which  Government is liable to  pay  to  every

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jagirdar whose jagir land has been resumed under s. 3 of the Abolition  Act.  It follows therefore that the inquiry  made by  the  Jagir Commissioner under s. 17 on the  question  of title  is  only  for  the purpose of  enabling  him  to  pay compensation to the persons who in his opinion are  entitled to  receive  it.  In other words the inquiry  by  the  Jagir Commissioner  or the decision of the State Government  under s.  17 does not embrace within its scope any dispute  as  to whether any particular property falls within s. 4(1)(a) read with s. 5 of the Abolition Act and whether it has or has not in   consequence   vested  in  the   State   Government   by notification issued under s. 3 of the Abolition Act. [829 D- G]     (ii)  However,  if  the  respondent  was  right  in  his contention  that  the tanks and wells were  constructed  on. ’occupied land’ belonging to the jagirdar within the meaning of  s. 5(c) of the Abolition Act, it was manifest  that  the appellants  had  no authority to take  possession  of  those tanks  and wells because the title therein did not  vest  in the  State  Government  in  view of s.  5(c)  which  has  an overriding effect on s. 4 of the Abolition Act.’- 824 It  was therefore the duty of the High Court in the  present case  to decide the jurisdictional ’fact as to  whether  the tanks  and wells claimed by the respondent belonged  to  the Jagirdar within the meaning of s. 5(c) of the Abolition Act, and if the High Court reached the conclusion that the  claim of the respondent was substantiated it would be open to  the High   Court  to  grant  a  writ  under  Art.  226  of   the Constitution   directing   the  appellants  to   hand   over possession   of  the  aforesaid  tanks  and  wells  to   the respondent. [830 B-C] [Case remanded to the High Court accordingly.] Rex v. Shorediteh assessment Committee [1910] 2 K.B. 859 and White  & Collins v. Minister of Health [1939]  2  K.B.  838, applied.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1244 and 1245 of 1967. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and orders  dated November 30, 1966 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in  Misc. Petition Nos. 184 and 183 of 1965 respectively. B.   Sen  and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant (in  both  the appeals). S.   K.  Mehta, K. L. Mehta and A. G. Ratnaparkhi,  for  the respondents (in both the appeals). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Civil Appeal No. 1245 of 1967 Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated November 30,  1966 in Miscellaneous Petition No. 183 of 1965  whereby the  High Court allowed the writ petition of the  respondent and  quashed two orders dated November 4, 1963 and June  11, 1964  of  the Collector of Gwalior (Annexures VIII  and  XII respectively) and two orders of the Additional Commissioner, Gwalior  Division dated February 19, 1964 and  November  16, 1964  (Annexures X and XIV respectively) in so far  as  they purported  to decide any question raised by  the  respondent under S. 5 (c) of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, Samvat  2008 (Act No. 28 of 1951 ), hereinafter referred  to as "the Abolition Act". In  Samvat  1885, the Ruler of the erstwhile  Gwalior  State

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conferred on Shri Bhavdeo Mishra-the predecessor-in-title of the  respondent-the  jagir  of  Mauza  Siroli,  situated  in Pargana Gwalior.  After the issue of the notification  under s.  3  of the Abolition Act, all the property in  the  jagir including  jagir  lands, forests, trees,  fisheries,  wells, tanks,  ponds etc. stood vested in the State under s.  4  of the Abolition Act.  Under S. 5 (c) of the Abolition Act, all tanks, trees, private wells and buildings in or on  occupied land  belonging  to  or held by the Jagirdar  or  any  other person  were excluded from vesting.  Section 2 (1 ) (ix)  of the Abolition Act defines "occupied land" as follows: 825 "(ix)     ’Occupied land’ means land held immediately before the  commencement  of  this  Act on  any  of  the  following tenures, namely: (a)  Ex-proprietary; (b)  Pukhta Maurusi; (c)  Mamuli Maurusi; (d)  Gair Maurusi; and includes land held as Khud Kasht and land comprised in a homestead;" Section  3, 4 ( I ) (a) and 5 (c) of the Abolition  Act  are reproduced below : 3.   Resumption of Jagir-lands by the Government.- (1)  As  soon as may be after the commencement of this  Act, the Government shall by notification in the Gazette, appoint a date for the resumption of all Jagirlands in the State. (2)  The  Government may, by notification published  in  the Gazette,  vary the date specified under sub-section (I )  at any time before such date. (3)  The  date finally appointed under this section  as  the date  for  the  resumption  of  Jagir-lands  is  hereinafter referred to as ’the date of resumption’. 4.   Consequences of the resumption of Jagir-lands.- (1)  As from the date of resumption notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, grant or document or in any other law,  rule, regulation or order for the time being in  force but save as otherwise provided in this Act- (a)  the right, title and interest of every Jagirdar and  of every  other  person  claiming  through  him  (including   a Zamindar)  in  his Jagir-lands,  including  forests,  trees, fisheries,  wells,  tanks, ponds,  water-channels,  ferries, pathways,  village-sites, hats, bazars and  melagrounds  and mines and minerals whether being worked or not, shall  stand resumed to the State free from all encumbrances; 5.   Private   wells,  trees,  buildings,  house-sites   and enclosures.-Notwithstanding  anything contained in the  last preceding section, 8 2 6 (c)  all tanks, trees, private wells and buildings in or  on occupied  land belonging to or held by the Jagirdar  or  any other person shall continue to belong to or, be held by such Jagirdar or other person." After the abolition of jagirs tinder the Abolition Act, pro- ceedings  were  initiated for determining  the  compensation payable  to the respondent and the same was determined at  a sum of Rs. 22,293/- and odd out of which certain loans  were deducted  and the amount of Rs. 3,586,/- and odd  was  paid. The Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (M.P. Act No.  20 of  1959)  came  into force on October 2, 1959  and  s.  251 thereof reads as follows: "Vesting  of  tanks  in  State  Government.-(1)  All   tanks situated on unoccupied land on or before the date of  coming into  force of the Act, providing for the abolition  of  the rights  of intermediaries in tile areas concerned  and  over

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which  members  of the village community  were,  immediately before such date, exercising rights of irrigation or nistar, shall,  if not already vested in the State Government,  vest absolutely in the State Government with effect from the  6th April, 1959 : Provided  that  nothing in this section shall be  deemed  to affect  any  right  of a lessee in the tank  under  a  lease subsisting on the date of vesting of the tank which shall be exercisable  to,  the extent and subject to  the  terms  and conditions specified in the lease : Provided  further  that  no tank shall  vest  in  the  State Government, unless- (a)  after  making  such  enquiry  as  he  deems  fit,   the Collector is satisfied that the tank fulfils the  conditions laid down in this sub-section; and (b)  notice  has been served on the parties  interested  and opportunity given to them for being beard. L1 (2)  Any person claiming in any such tank any interest other than the right of irrigation or nistar, may, within a period of four years from the date of vesting under sub-section ( I ),  make  an  application  in the  prescribed  form  to  the Collector for compensation in respect of his interest. (3)  Such compensation shall be 15 times the land revenue   assessable on the land covered by the tank and 8 2 7 for  purposes  of assessment such land shall be  treated  as irrigated land on the same quality as the adjoining land. (4)  The  compensation  as determined under  subsection  (3) shall  be  paid by the Collector to the  person  or  persons proved to his satisfaction to be owning interest in the tank concerned. On April 5, 1961, the respondent made an application to  the Collector,  Gwalior  under s. 251 of the M.P.  Land  Revenue Code,  1959,  claiming  compensation for  the  tanks  which, according  to the respondent, were built by  the  respondent and  his predecessor-in-title over an area of  1,679  bighas and  18 biswas of land.  By his order dated April 24,  1963, the   Sub-Divisional  Officer  determined  the   amount   of compensation  at Rs. 11,512/- and odd but by his  subsequent order  dated  May 28, 1963, the Sub-Divisional  Officer  suo motu cancelled his previous order dated April 24, 1963.  The respondent  preferred  an  appeal before  the  Collector  of Gwalior  who, by his order dated November 4, 1963  dismissed the  appeal  of  the respondent holding  that  the  property claimed  as tanks was really not of that description as  all that was done was to cause temporary obstruction to the flow of waters by creating bunds and the case did not fall within the  purview  of s. 251 (I) of the M.P. Land  Revenue  Code, 1959  and  no  compensation  was  payable.   The  respondent preferred  a second appeal before the Commissioner,  Gwalior Division who dismissed the appeal, holding that under s. 251 compensation  could  not be claimed with regard to  the  so- called  tanks  which were situated on ’occupied  land’.   On July  4,  1963, the respondent made an  application  to  the Collector  of  Gwalior  stating that  lie  was  entitled  to payment of compensation if the tanks had vested in the State Government.  The application was dismissed by the  Collector on  June 11, 1964.  Thereupon the respondent moved the  High Court  of Madhya Pradesh for grant of a writ under Art.  226 of the, Constitution to quash the two orders dated  November 4,  1963  and  June 11, 1964 of  the  Collector  of  Gwalior (Annexures  VIII and XII) and the two orders  dated  Febuary 19,   1964   and  November  16,  1964  of   the   Additional Commissioner,  Gwalior Division (Annexures X and XIV).   The

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writ  petition was opposed by the appellants on  the  ground that  the  tanks claimed by the respondent  were  really  no tanks  at all and, in any case, were not on ’occupied  land’ within  the meaning of s. 5(c) of the Abolition Act and  the tanks  and wells had vested in the State under S. 4 (I)  (a) of  the Abolition Act.  By its judgment dated  November  30, 1966,  the High Court allowed the writ petition and  quashed the  four orders aforesaid on the (,round that the  question raised by the respondent under s. 5(c) 828 of  the  Abolition  Act  should  be  decided  by  the  Jagir Commissioner  in  the  manner  required  by  s.  17  of  the Abolition Act. It is necessary at this stage to reproduce ss. 8, 15, 17 and 18 of the Abolition Act which are to the following effect :               "8.  Duty to pay compensation.-(I) Subject  to               other  provisions of this Act  the  Government               shall be liable to pay to every Jagirdar whose               Jagir-land has been resumed under Sec. 3, such               compensation   as  shall  be   determined   in               accordance  with the principles laid  down  in               Schedule 1.               (2)   Compensation payable under this  section               shall  be due as from the date  of  resumption               and shall carry simple interest at the rate of               2 1/2 per cent per annum from that date up  to               the date of payment :               Provided that no interest shall be payable  on               any  amount  of  compensation  which   remains               unpaid  for any default of the  Jagirdar,  his               Agent or his representative-in-interest."               "15.  Payment of compensation money.-(1) After               the   amount-of  compensation  payable  to   a               Jagirdar  under  Sec. 8  is  determined  under               clause (a) of Sec. 13 and the amount  deducted               from  it under Sec. 14, the balance  shall  be               payable in maximum ten annual instalments.               (2)   The  amounts  determined  under  clauses               (c),               (d)   and (e) of Sec. 13 shall be deducted and               paid annually to the persons entitled thereto,               out  of the annual instalments referred to  in               sub-section  (1) and the remaining  amount  of               the   instalment  shall  be  payable  by   the               Government to the Jagirdar.                  ........................................               "17.   Questions  of  title.-If,  during   the               course   of   an   inquiry   by   the    Jagir               Commissioner,  any  question  is  raised,   in               respect of a Jagirdari title to, or right  in,               Jagir-lands  resumed  under Sec. 3,  and  such               question  has not already been  determined  by               the  Government, the Jagir Commissioner  shall               proceed  to  enquire into the merits  of  such               question and refer the matter for decision  to               the Government whose orders shall be final."               "18.   To whom compensation shall  be  payable               after  the  death  of  a  Jagirdar.   If   any               Jagirdar to whom compensation money is payable               under this Act dies before the full payment of               such compensation money to               829               him,  such  compensation money as  may  remain               payable  to  him  under  this  Act,  shall  be               payable to such of his heirs or successors  as

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             may be declared by a competent Court  entitled               to receive the same, according to the personal               law by which the Jagirdar is governed." On behalf of the appellants learned Counsel put forward  the argument that the High Court was in error in holding that s. 17  of the Abolition Act was applicable to the present  case and that it was the function of the Jagir Commissioner alone to inquire whether the claim of the respondent under s. 5(c) was  well-founded  on merits and refer the  matter  for  the final  decision  of  the  Government under  s.  17  of’  the Abolition  Act.  In our opinion the argument put forward  on behalf  of  the  appellants  is  well-founded  and  must  be accepted as correct.  It is manifest that under s. 17 of the Abolition  Act  only  those disputes which  pertain  to  the Jagirdari  title  or right in Jagir  lands  already  resumed under s. 3 of the Abolition Act, can be raised.  The section also  contemplates that the disputes must be  raised  during the  course of an inquiry for assessment of compensation  by the Jagir Commissioner.  It should be noticed that s. 17  is included in Ch.  III which deals with compensation which the Government  is liable to pay to every jagirdar  whose  jagir land has been resumed under S. 3. It follows therefore  that the  inquiry made by the Jagir Commissioner under s.  17  on the  question of title is only for the purpose  of  enabling him to pay compensation to the person who in his opinion  is entitled  to receive it.  In our opinion, the scope  of  the inquiry under s. 17 only relates to disputes with regard  to rival  claimants  to jagirdari title or right  in  jagirdari lands  already resumed under s. 3 of the Abolition Act.   In other  words, the inquiry by the Jagir Commissioner  or  the decision  of  the  State Government under  s.  17  does  not embrace  within  its  scope any dispute as  to  whether  any particular property falls within s. 4 (I) (a) read with s. 5 of  the  Abolition  Act and whether it has  or  has  not  in consequence   vested   in  the  State  Government   by   the notification issued under s. 3 of the Abolition Act.  It  is also necessary to add that the inquiry contemplated under s. 17  by the Jagir Commissioner relates to compensation to  be paid  to  the jagirdar whose jagir is vested  in  the  State Government and once the compensation is determined and paid, no  further  inquiry under s. 17 is  contemplated.   We  are accordingly of the opinion that the High Court was in  error in holding that s. 17 of the Abolition Act is applicable  to the  case  and  that the dispute raised  by  the  respondent should have been determined in accordance with the procedure envisaged in s. 17 of the Abolition Act. But  this does not necessarily mean that the  respondent  is left  without any remedy for the redress of  his  grievance. If the L3 Sup.  CI/68-9 830 respondent  is  right in his contention that the  tanks  and wells were, constructed on ’occupied land’ belonging to  the jagirdar  within  the meaning of s. 5 (c) of the Act  it  is manifest  that  the  appellants have no  authority  to  take possession  of  those  tanks and  wells  because  the  title therein does not vest in the State Government in view of  s. 5  (c)  which  has  an over-riding effect on  s.  4  of  the Abolition  Act. lt was therefore the duty of the High  Court in the present case to decide the jurisdictional fact as  to whether  the  tanks  and wells  claimed  by  the  respondent belonged  to the Jagirdar within the meaning of s.  5(c)  of the  Abolition  Act  and  if  the  High  Court  reached  the conclusion   that   the   claim  of   the   respondent   was substantiated it would be open to the High Court to grant  a writ  under  Art.  226 of  the  Constitution  directing  the

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appellants  to hand over possession of the  aforesaid  tanks and wells to the respondents. It  is  well-established that where the jurisdiction  of  an administrative authority depends upon a preliminary  finding of  fact the High Court is entitled, in a proceeding  for  a writ, to determine upon its own independent judgment whether or  not that finding is correct.  The matter has  been  very put  by  Farwell,  L. J. in  Rex  v.  Shoreditch  Assessment Committee(1) as follows:               "The  existence of the provisional list  is  a               condition  precedent to their jurisdiction  to               hear  and  determine and as  the  claimant  is               entitled   to   require  them  to   hear   and               determine,  they  cannot refuse  to  take  the               steps   necessary   to  give  rise   to   such               jurisdiction; if they do, their refusal may be               called  in  question in the  High  Court.   No               tribunal  of inferior jurisdiction can by  its               own decision finally decide on the question of               the existence or extent of such jurisdiction :               such  question is always subject to review  by               the  High  Court, which does  not  permit  the               inferior   tribunal   either   to   usurp    a               jurisdiction   which  it  does  not   possess,               whether at all or to the extent claimed, or to               refuse to exercise a jurisdiction which it has               and  ought  to exercise.  Subjection  in  this               respect  to the High Court is a necessary  and               inseparable  incident  to  all  tribunals   of               limited jurisdiction; for the existence of the               limit  necessitates an authority to  determine               and  enforce  it : it is  a  contradiction  in               terms  to  create  a  tribunal  with   limited               jurisdiction and unlimited power to  determine               such limit at its own will and pleasuresuch  a               tribunal would be autocratic, not  limited-and               it  is immaterial whether the decision of  the               inferior  tribunal  on  the  question  of  the               existence   or   non-existence  of   its   own               jurisdiction  is  founded on law or  fact.;  a               Court               (1)   [1910] 2 K. B. 859, 879.               831               with  jurisdiction  confined to  the  city  of               London  cannot  extend  such  jurisdiction  by               finding as a fact that Piccadilly Circus is in               the ward of Chepe." The same principle was enunciated by the Court of Appeal  in White  &  Collins v. Minister of  Health(1).   The  question debated  in  that  case  was  whether  the  High  Court  had jurisdiction  to  review the finding of  the  administrative authority on a question of fact.  It appears that Part V  of the  Housing  Act,  1936, enabled  the  local  authority  to acquire  land compulsorily for the provision of  houses  for the  working  classes, but s. 75 of the  Act  provided  that nothing   in  the  Act  was  to  authorise  the   compulsory acquisition  of  land "which at the date of  the  compulsory purchase  forms part of any part, garden or pleasure  ground or  is otherwise required for the amenity or convenience  of any  house".  In accordance with the provision of this  part of the Act, the Ripon Borough Council made an order for  the compulsory purchase of 23 acres of land, it being part of an estate in Yorkshire called Highfield, consisting of a  large house  and  35  acres of land surrounding  it.   The  owners served notice of objection to the order as being contrary to

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s.  75  and the, ground of objection was that the  land  was part  of  a  park  and  was  required  for  the  amenity  or convenience of the house.  The Minister of Health directed a public  inquiry,  and after holding the inquiry  and  taking evidence, the Chairman duly made his report to the Minister, who thereupon confirmed the order.  It was held by the Court of Appeal that the High Court had jurisdiction to review the Minister’s  finding and since the land in question was  part of  the park of Highfield, the order of compulsory  purchase was quashed.  At page 855 Luxmoore L.J. stated:               "The  first and the most important  matter  to               bear in mind is that the jurisdiction to  make               the  order is dependent on a finding of  fact;               for,  unless  the land can be held not  to  be               part  of  a park or not to,  be  required  for               amenity   or   convenience,   there,   is   no               jurisdiction  in the borough council to  make,               or in the Minister to confirm, the order.   In               such  a case it seems almost selfevident  that               the Court which has to consider whether  there               is  jurisdiction to make or confirm the  order               must  be entitled to review the vital  finding               on  which  the existence of  the  jurisdiction               relied upon depends.  If this were not so, the               right   to  apply  to  the  Court   would   be               illusory." For these reasons we allow this appeal, set aside the  judg- ment  of  the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated  November  30, 1966 in Miscellaneous Petition No. 183 of 1965 and the  case is (1)  [1939] 2 K.B. 838. 832 remanded  to  the  High  Court for  deciding  it  afresh  in accordance  with the directions given.  It will be  open  to the  High  Court  to take  such  further  evidence-oral  and documentary-as the parties may decide to give on the  points at  issue.  The parties will bear their own costs upto  this stage. Civil Appeal No. 1244 of 1967 The material facts of this case are almost similar to  those in  Civil Appeal No. 1245 of 1967 and for the reasons  given in that judgment, we hold that this appeal should be allowed and the case should be remanded to the High Court for  being decided  afresh in accordance with the directions  given  in that  judgment.  The parties will bear their own costs  upto this stage. G.C.                          Appeals  allowed   and   cases remanded. 833