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      IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.         OF 2008     (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.1166 of 2006)

 State of Madhya Pradesh …Appellant

Versus

Pappu @ Ajay …Respondent  

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Since  the  only  question  involved  in  this  appeal  is

whether  learned  Single  Judge  was justified  in reducing  the

sentence,  as imposed by the High Court on the respondent,

detailed reference to the factual aspects is unnecessary.

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3. The  respondent  faced  trial  for  offences  punishable

under  Sections  376(1)  read  with  Section  511  of  the  Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (in short `the IPC') and Sections  324  and

452 IPC. For the first offence,  he  was sentenced  to undergo

rigorous imprisonment for four years with a fine of Rs.2,000/-

with  default  stipulations.   For  the  second  offence,  he  was

sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year with

a fine of Rs.500/- with default stipulations.  Similarly, for the

last  offence,  he  was  sentenced  to  undergo  rigorous

imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- with

default stipulations.

4. He preferred an appeal before the High Court and the

High  Court,  by  the  impugned  order,  held  that  since  the

respondent  had  undergone  imprisonment  for  about  five

months and 25 days, the sentence  should be reduced to the

period already undergone in respect of the first offence.   

5. The  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  has  questioned

correctness  of  the  judgment  on the  ground that considering

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the gravity of the offence involved, the High Court ought not to

have  reduced the sentence to the period undergone which, as

noted above, was less than six months.

6. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  supported  the

judgment of the High Court.  

7. In the instant case the victim was examined as PW-3.  

It is to be noted that three persons faced trial and the

co-accused persons were acquitted of the charges.

8. As  rightly  submitted  by  learned  counsel  for  the

appellant – State,  no reason has been  indicated by the High

Court to direct reduction of sentence.

9. The  law  regulates  social  interests,  arbitrates

conflicting  claims  and  demands.   Security  of  persons  and

property of the people is an essential function of the State.  It

could  be  achieved  through  instrumentality  of  criminal  law.

Undoubtedly, there is a cross cultural conflict where living law

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must find answer to the new challenges  and the courts are

required  to  mould  the  sentencing  system  to  meet  the

challenges.   The  contagion of  lawlessness  would undermine

social  order  and  lay  it  in  ruins.   Protection  of  society  and

stamping  out  criminal  proclivity  must  be  the  object  of  law

which must  be  achieved  by  imposing appropriate  sentence.

Therefore,  law  as  a  corner-stone  of  the  edifice  of  "order"

should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman

in his "Law in Changing Society" stated that, "State of criminal

law continues  to be  as it  should be  a decisive  reflection of

social consciousness of society".  Therefore,  in operating the

sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery

or the deterrence based on factual matrix.  By deft modulation

sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered

with  mercy  where  it  warrants  to  be.  The  facts  and  given

circumstances  in  each  case,  the  nature  of  the  crime,  the

manner in which it was planned and committed,  the motive

for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the

nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances

are  relevant  facts  which  would  enter  into   the  area  of

consideration.  

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10. Therefore,  undue  sympathy  to  impose  inadequate

sentence  would  do  more  harm  to  the  justice  system  to

undermine the public confidence  in the efficacy of  law  and

society could not long endure under such serious threats.  It

is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence

having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in

which it  was  executed  or  committed  etc.  This position  was

illuminatingly stated by this Court in  Sevaka Perumal etc. v.

State of Tamil Nadu (AIR 1991 SC 1463).

11. The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of

proportionality  in  prescribing  liability  according  to  the

culpability of each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily allows

some  significant  discretion  to  the  Judge  in  arriving  at  a

sentence  in each case, presumably to permit sentences  that

reflect more subtle considerations of culpability that are raised

by the  special facts of each case.   Judges  in essence  affirm

that punishment ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice

sentences  are  determined  largely  by  other  considerations.

Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpetrator that

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are  offered  to  justify  a  sentence.   Sometimes    the

desirability of keeping him out of circulation, and sometimes

even  the  tragic  results  of  his  crime.  Inevitably  these

considerations cause a departure from just desert as the basis

of punishment and create cases of apparent injustice that are

serious and widespread.  

12. After  giving  due  consideration  to  the  facts  and

circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate

sentence  to be  awarded  for an offence,  the  aggravating and

mitigating  factors  and  circumstances  in  which  a  crime  has

been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of

really  relevant  circumstances  in a dispassionate  manner  by

the Court.  Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task.  It

has been very aptly indicated in Dennis Councle MCGDautha

v. State of Callifornia: 402 US 183: 28 L.D. 2d 711  that no

formula of a foolproof nature is possible that would provide a

reasonable  criterion  in  determining  a  just  and  appropriate

punishment in the infinite variety of circumstances that may

affect the gravity of the crime.  In the absence of any foolproof

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formula which may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to

correctly  assess  various  circumstances  germane  to  the

consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in

the facts of each case, is the only way in which such judgment

may be equitably distinguished.

13. Imposition of sentence  without considering its effect

on the  social order  in many cases may be  in reality a futile

exercise. The social impact of the crime, e.g. where it relates to

offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping, misappropriation

of  public money,  treason and other  offences  involving moral

turpitude  or moral delinquency  which have  great  impact on

social order,  and public interest, cannot be  lost sight of and

per  se  require  exemplary  treatment.  Any liberal  attitude  by

imposing  meager  sentences  or  taking  too  sympathetic  view

merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences

will  be  result-wise  counter  productive  in  the  long  run  and

against  societal  interest  which  needs  to  be  cared  for  and

strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing

system.

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14.   The Court will be  failing in its duty if appropriate

punishment  is  not  awarded  for  a  crime  which  has  been

committed  not  only  against  the  individual  victim  but  also

against the  society  to which the  criminal and victim belong.

The  punishment  to  be  awarded  for  a  crime  must  not  be

irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the

atrocity  and  brutality  with  which  the  crime  has  been

perpetrated,  the  enormity  of  the  crime  warranting  public

abhorrence  and  it  should  "respond  to  the  society's  cry  for

justice against the criminal". If for extremely heinous crime of

murder  perpetrated  in  a  very  brutal  manner  without  any

provocation, most deterrent punishment is not given, the case

of deterrent punishment will lose its relevance.

15. These aspects have been elaborated in State of M.P.

v.  Ghanshyam Singh (2003(8) SCC 13), and  State  of M.P. v.

Babbu Barkare alias Dalap Singh (2005 (5) SCC 413).

16. Considering the legal position as indicated above the

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High Court's order is clearly unsustainable and is accordingly

set aside.  The judgment of the Trial Court is restored.   The

respondent shall surrender to custody forthwith to serve  the

remainder of sentence.

17. The appeal is allowed.

                                …………...............................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)              

                  …………….…….......................J.             (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)  

New Delhi, August 4, 2008