08 October 2010
Supreme Court
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STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs MUNIKADIRAPPA .

Bench: MARKANDEY KATJU,T.S. THAKUR, , ,
Case number: C.A. No.-007664-007675 / 2004
Diary number: 6572 / 2002
Advocates: Vs RAJESH MAHALE


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        REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICITION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.7664-7675 OF 2004

State of Karnataka & Ors. …Appellants

Versus

Munikadirappa & Ors. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

These appeals by special  leave arise out of an order  

passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Karnataka  at  Bangalore  

whereby Writ Appeals No.3470 of 2001 and 3989-3999 of  

2001 filed by the respondents have been allowed and the  

order passed by a learned Single Judge of that Court in Writ

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Petition No.30500 of 1993 set aside to the extent the same  

directed apportionment of the compensation payable for the  

acquisition of the land in dispute. The controversy arises in  

the following backdrop:

      The respondents claimed to be in cultivating occupation  

of  certain  Inam  lands  endowed  to  the  temple  of  

Kumaraswamy situate at Hanumanthanagar, Bangalore City.  

They made applications before the Land Tribunal under the  

Karnataka Land Reforms Act for grant of occupancy rights in  

their favour. The Tribunal by an order dated 10th April, 1987  

allowed the said applications and granted occupancy rights  

to the respondents for the respective parcels of land in their  

occupation.   The  temple  which  happens  to  be  a  Muzurai  

Institution  challenged  the  said  order  before  the  Land  

Reforms Appellate Authority in appeal. During the pendency  

of the said appeal the Appellate Authority was abolished with  

the result that the records of the appeal case pending before  

the  Authority  were  transferred  to  the  High  Court  and  

registered as Writ Petition No.30500 of 1993.  While the said  

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writ  petition  was still  pending  the  lands  in  question  were  

acquired  by the  Bangalore  Development  Authority  for  the  

formation to what is known as Kumaraswamy layout.  The  

writ petition eventually came up for hearing before a Single  

Judge  of  the  High  Court  who  took  the  view  that  the  

respondents were in occupation of different parcels of land  

even prior to 1970 and that applications filed by them for  

grant of  occupancy-tenancy rights were within time.  The  

High  Court  also  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Land  

Tribunal  was  right  in  holding  that  the  respondents  were  

cultivating the land in question as tenants and in granting  

occupancy rights to them.  In the ordinary course the Court  

could have simply dismissed the writ petition upholding the  

order passed by the Land Tribunal but instead of doing so it  

went a step further.  Taking note of the fact that the lands in  

question stood acquired the learned Single Judge directed  

that compensation payable for the lands in question shall be  

apportioned between the Muzurai Institution who happened  

to be erstwhile owner of the land and the tenants-occupants  

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in  the  ratio  of  60:40.   It  is  noteworthy  that  the  Muzurai  

Institution did not question the aforementioned order passed  

by the Single Judge. The respondents, however, assailed the  

said order in writ appeals which were allowed by the Division  

Bench of the High Court in terms of the order impugned in  

the present appeals. The Division Bench held that since the  

respondents were found to be in cultivating occupation of  

the land on the appointed date on 1st March, 1974 they shall  

be deemed to be so even on the date of acquisition and that  

they shall be entitled to claim full compensation payable for  

the land acquired from them. The present appeals assail the  

said judgment as already noticed above.  

      We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The only  

question that fell for consideration before the High Court in  

the writ petition filed by the respondents was whether the  

grant  of  occupancy  rights  in  their  favour  by  the  Land  

Tribunal was justified. The Single Judge of the High Court  

answered  the  said  question  in  the  affirmative  and  in  our  

opinion rightly so. The fact that the land had been acquired  

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in the meantime could not have deterred the Single Judge  

from dismissing the writ  petition and upholding the order  

granting occupancy rights unconditionally. Instead of doing  

so,  the  Single  Judge  took  upon  himself  the  duty  of  

apportioning the compensation between the writ petitioners-

erstwhile owners of the land and the respondents. That was,  

in our opinion, wholly unnecessary and dehors the provisions  

of  the  Land  Reforms  Act.  The  question  as  to  who  was  

entitled to claim how much compensation for parcels of land  

acquired by the Government was a matter which had to be  

agitated  by  the  persons  interested  only  in  terms  of  the  

provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The Land Tribunal or  

the High Court hearing a writ petition arising out of an order  

passed by the former was not concerned with the question  

of  quantum of  compensation  or  its  apportionment  among  

different  claimants,  nor  has  any  provision  in  the  Land  

Reforms Act been brought to our notice, which required the  

Tribunal to determine the said questions in case where lands  

that are the subject matter of proceedings under the said  

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Act get acquired for a public purpose. The only question that  

fell for consideration before the High Court was whether the  

respondents  were in cultivating occupation of  the land on  

the appointed date as stipulated under the Act so as to be  

entitled to the grant of occupancy rights. Once that question  

was answered the fact that the land had been acquired and  

the cultivating tenant had gone out of possession of such  

land did not affect his entitlement to be declared as a tenant  

occupant.   

      As noticed earlier the finding that the respondents were  

entitled  to  occupancy  tenancy  rights  qua  the  lands  in  

question was not assailed by the Muzurai  Institution. This  

implied that the question regarding grant of such rights had  

gone beyond the pale of any controversy.  In the appeals  

filed by the respondents occupants of the lands the Division  

Bench was concerned only with the limited question whether  

the directions regarding apportionment of the compensation  

was  justified.   Instead  of  simply  setting  aside  the  said  

direction  on  the  ground  that  the  same  was  beyond  the  

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provisions of the Land Reforms Act the Division Bench held  

the  respondents  entitled  to  claim  full  compensation.  Now  

that may indeed be the position, in cases where the land is  

under the Land Reforms Act vested in the State and then  

granted to the persons entitled to the occupancy rights over  

the same, but the question is whether any such declaration  

ought to have been granted in the proceedings under the  

Land  Reforms  Act.   Our  answer  is  in  the  negative.   The  

Division Bench would have been justified in setting aside the  

direction given by the Single Judge regarding apportionment  

but  it  need  not  have  fallen  into  the  same  error  as  was  

committed by the Single Judge, by directing payment of the  

full compensation to the respondents.  That was a matter to  

be determined by the Collector in appropriate proceedings  

under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  and  eventually  by  the  

competent  Civil  Court  in  a  reference if  the  same became  

necessary.   In  as  much  as  the  Division  Bench  itself  

determined  the  extent  of  compensation  payable  to  the  

respondents it committed a mistake.  

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      In the result, we direct that while grant of occupancy-

tenancy rights in favour of the respondents qua the parcels  

of land in their respective possession as on the appointed  

date shall stand affirmed, the question as to who is entitled  

to what  compensation  for  the  acquisition  of  said  lands in  

question  is  left  open  to  be  determined  in  appropriate  

proceedings  under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  if  not  

already determined.  The appeals are accordingly disposed  

off, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

 

 ……………………………J. (MARKANDEY KATJU)

……………………………J. (T.S. THAKUR)

New Delhi October 8, 2010

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