26 August 1996
Supreme Court
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STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs D.C. NANJUNDAIAH

Bench: RAMASWAMY,K.
Case number: C.A. No.-011874-011875 / 1996
Diary number: 78499 / 1991
Advocates: M. VEERAPPA Vs


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PETITIONER: STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: D.C. NANJUDAIAH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       26/08/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. G.B. PATTANAIK (J)

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Though the  respondents have  been served,  no  one  is appearing either in person or through counsel.      Leave granted.      We have heard learned counsel for the appellant.      The controversy  raised in  this case is covered by the judgment of  this Court  in N.  Narasimhaiah  vs.  State  of Karnataka [(1996)  3 SCC  88]. The  admitted facts  are that notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was  published on  August 26,  1982 and  enquiry  under Section 5-A was conducted thereafter. But before the receipt of  the  report  from  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer,  the declaration under  Section 6  was published on June 24, 1985 within  three  years.  Two  writ  petitions  were  filed  on December 10, 1985 challenging the notification under Section 4(1) and  the declaration  under Section  6. The  High Court allowed the  writ petitions  and  quashed  the  notification under Section  4(1) and  declaration under  Section 6 by the impugned judgment  dated February  26,  1991  made  in  Writ petition Nos.  19348 and  19349 of 1985. Thus, these appeals by special leave.      It is  seen that  the declaration  under Section  6 was published  within   three  years   from  the   date  of  the notification under Section 4(1) as upheld by the High Court. But the  High Court noted that the enquiry under Section 5-A was not  properly conducted. The declaration under Section 6 dated June  24, 1985  quashed since  the notification  under Section 4(1)  was dated  August 26, 1982 and the declaration could  not  be  published  within  three  years  even  after excluding the period of pendency of the writ petitions under proviso to  Section 6  of the  Act. Thus,  the  notification under Section 4(1) was quashed. We find no justification for the  view   taken  by  the  High  Court.  It  is  seen  that declaration under  Section 6  was published,  as held by the High Court,  within three  years, but  the  conduct  of  the enquiry under  Section 5-A  was  found  fault  with  and  it requires to  be quashed.  If it  is quashed,  necessarily an

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enquiry  under   Section  5-A   has  to  be  conducted.  The limitation,  therefore,   of  conducting   the  enquiry  and publication of  the declaration  within  three  years  would start running  from the  date of the receipt of the order of the High  Court and  not from the date on which the original publication of  the declaration  within  three  years  would start running  from the  date of the receipt of the order of the High  Court and  not from the date on which the original publication under  Section 4(1)  came to  be made. This view was laid by this Court in Narasimiah’s case (supra). For the same  ratio,   the  appeals   are  to  be  allowed  and  the declaration has  to be quashed. Accordingly, the declaration is quashed. The appellant is permitted to conduct an enquiry within a  period of four months from the date of the receipt of this  order and have the declaration published within one month thereafter.      The appeals are accordingly allowed. No costs.