REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 195 OF 2002

State of Haryana         ….Appellant  

Versus

Surjit Singh ….Respondent

J U D G M E N T

DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of

the Punjab and Haryana High Court summarily dismissing the application

under Section 378(3)  of  the Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973 (in  short

‘Code’).   Respondent  faced  trial  for  alleged  commission  of  offence

punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988 (in short the ‘Act’). The allegation was that the respondent-accused

demanded Rs. 1500/- by way of illegal gratification for recording mutation

on the basis of purchase made by the complainant by a registered sale-deed.

On conclusions  of  Trial  Court  in  Sessions  Case  No.49  of  1996,  learned

Special Judge, Jagadhri, held that the prosecution has succeeded in bringing

home the guilt of the accused for offence punishable under Section 7 of the

Act, but has failed to prove offence punishable under Section 13 of the Act.

Appellant moved the High Court in terms of Section 378(3) of the Code

questioning  correctness  of  the  conclusions  in  the  judgment  of  the  Trial

Court that the prosecution failed to prove offence punishable under Section

13 of the Act.  As noted above,  the High Court  summarily dismissed the

application by observing as follows:

“Leave to appeal declined”

2. Though various points were urged in support of the appeal, primarily

it  was  contended  that  the  manner  of  disposal  of  the  application  under

Section 378(3) of the Code is indefensible.

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3. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, supported the

impugned order.

4. Section 378 (3) of the Cr.P.C. deals with the power of the High Court

to grant leave in case of acquittal. Section 378 (1) and (3) of the Cr.P.C. as

it stood then, read as follows:

“378(1)  Save  as  otherwise  provided  in  sub- section (2) and subject to the provisions of sub-section (3)  and  (5),  the  State  Government  may,  in  any  case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High  Court  from  an  original  or  appellate  order  of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.

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(3)   No appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)  shall  be  entertained  except  with  the  leave  of  the High Court”.

5. The Trial Court was required to carefully appraise the entire evidence

and  then  come  to  a  conclusion  regarding  applicability  of  a  particular

provision. If the Trial Court was at lapse in this regard the High Court was

obliged to undertake such an exercise by entertaining the appeal. The High

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Court ought to have in such circumstances granted leave and thereafter as a

first court of appeal, analysed entire evidence on the record independently

and returned its  findings  objectively as  regards  guilt  or  otherwise  of  the

accused and applicability of a particular provision. It has failed to do so.

The questions involved were not trivial. The High Court has not given any

reasons for refusing to grant leave to file appeal against acquittal, and seems

to have been completely oblivious to the fact that by such refusal, a close

scrutiny of the order of acquittal, by the appellate forum, has been lost once

and for all.  The manner in which appeal  against  acquittal  has been dealt

with by the High Court leaves much to be desired. Reasons introduce clarity

in an order. On the plainest consideration of justice, the High Court ought to

have  set  forth  its  reasons,  howsoever  brief,  in  its  order  indicative  of  an

application of its mind, all the more when its order is amenable to further

avenue of challenge. The absence of reasons has rendered the High Court

order not sustainable. Similar view was expressed in State of U.P. v. Battan

and  Ors (2001  (10)  SCC  607).  About  two  decades  back  in  State  of

Maharashtra v.  Vithal  Rao  Pritirao  Chawan (AIR  1982  SC  1215)  the

desirability of a speaking order while dealing with an application for grant

of  leave  was  highlighted.  The  requirement  of  indicating  reasons  in  such

cases has been judicially recognized as imperative. The view was re-iterated

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in  Jawahar  Lal  Singh v.  Naresh  Singh  and  Ors. (1987  (2)  SCC  222).

Judicial discipline to abide by declaration of law by this Court, cannot be

forsaken, under any pretext by any authority or Court, be it even the Highest

Court in a State, oblivious to Article 141 of the Constitution of India, 1950

(in short the ‘Constitution’).    

6. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning M.R. in Breen

v.  Amalgamated  Engineering  Union (1971  (1)  All  E.R.  1148)  observed

“The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration”.

In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v.  Crabtree (1974 LCR 120) it was

observed: “Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice”. Reasons

are live links between the mind of the decision taker to the controversy in

question  and  the  decision  or  conclusion  arrived  at”.  Reasons  substitute

subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the

decision reveals the “inscrutable face of the sphinx”, it can, by its silence,

render  it  virtually  impossible  for  the  Courts  to  perform  their  appellate

function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of

the decision. Right  to reason is  an indispensable  part  of a sound judicial

system, reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the

matter before Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know

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why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of

natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a

speaking out. The “inscrutable face of a sphinx” is ordinarily incongruous

with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.  

7. These  aspects  were  highlighted  in  State  of  Himachal  Pradesh v.

Sardara Singh (Crl.A. @ SLP(Crl.) 4503 of 2006).

8. In view of the principles  set out  above, it  would be appropriate to

direct  the  High  Court  to  grant  leave  as  grounds  raised  are  not  without

substance.   We, however,  make it  clear  that  we have  not  expressed  any

opinion on the merits of the case.  

9. Appeal is allowed.

………….....................................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)              

………….……….........................J.          (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)

New Delhi, November 28, 2008

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