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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  234 of 2005

PETITIONER: State of Haryana                                                 

RESPONDENT: Ram Pal and Ors.                                                 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/02/2005

BENCH: ARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H. KAPADIA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 3370 of 2003  

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

       Leave granted.

       The State of Haryana questions legality of the order passed by  the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing its  application under Section 378(3) of the  Criminal Procedure Code, 1973  (in short the ’Code’).   

       Respondents faced trial for alleged commission of the offences  punishable under Sections 148, 302, 452, 506, 323 read with Section 149  of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the ’IPC’). The accusations  against the accused persons were that they formed an unlawful assembly  and being members of such unlawful assembly, they trespassed into the  house of one Dalel Singh (hereinafter referred to as the ’deceased’)  and inflicted injuries on him and his son Nafe Singh (PW-5) by deadly  weapons which they were carrying.  The date and time of occurrence was  stated to be 23.2.1999 at about 6.00 a.m.  There were two eyewitnesses  to the occurrence namely Parma Nand (PW-4), the informant and Nafe  Singh, the injured (PW-5).  Accused persons took the plea of false  implication and attributed assaults on the accused persons by the  deceased and Nefa Singh (PW-5). Three witnesses were examined to  further the defence version of false implication.

       The trial Court found the evidence of witnesses to be credible  and cogent and found that some of the accused persons were responsible  for the injuries on the deceased and the injured PW-5. It held that  some of the accused persons did not inflict any injury and the assault  made by accused Ram Chander was an individual act and the other two  accused persons, namely, Ram Pal and Palla Ram were to be convicted for  offence punishable under Sections 452 and 323 read with Section 34 IPC.  It was held that since the total number of persons proved to have  committed the offences was only three, provisions of Section 149 were  not attracted.  Ultimately, accused Ram Chander was found guilty of  offence punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC and other two accused  persons named above for the offences punishable under Sections 452 and  323 read with Section 34 IPC.  Other accused persons were acquitted of  the charges.  

       The State of Haryana filed an application in terms of Section  378(3) of the Code taking the stand that for attracting Section 149 IPC  it is not necessary to attribute any particular overt act. Further,  merely because the accused Ram Chander had assaulted by the blunt side

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of the Gandasa, it cannot mean that he did not have the requisite  intention to commit the offence of murder. The trial Court having  noticed that the blow was given with such great force that it caused  multiple fractures and laceration of the brain, the alteration of the  conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II was not correct.   

The High Court dismissed the application with the following  order:

       "We find no good ground to interfere with the  reasoned judgment of the trial Court. Dismissed."

       Learned counsel for the appellant-State submitted that the manner  of disposal of the application as done by the High Court is  unsustainable.   

       In response, learned counsel for the accused persons submitted  that the High Court was justified in not interfering with the elaborate  judgment of the trial Court, by refusing grant of leave.

The trial Court was required to carefully appraise the entire  evidence and then come to a conclusion. If the trial Court was at lapse  in this regard the High Court was obliged to undertake such an exercise  by entertaining the appeal. The trial Court on the facts of this case  did not perform its duties, as was enjoined on it by law. The High  Court ought to have in such circumstances granted leave and thereafter  as a first court of appeal, re-appreciated the entire evidence on the  record independently and returned its findings objectively as regards  guilt or otherwise of the accused. It has failed to do so. The  questions involved were not trivial. The question regarding application  of Sections 302 and 149 IPC as raised does require consideration,  keeping in view the evidence adduced and conclusions of trial Court.  The High Court has not given any reasons for refusing to grant leave to  file appeal against acquittal, and seems to have been completely  oblivious to the fact that by such refusal, a close scrutiny of the  order of acquittal, by the appellate forum, has been lost once and for  all. The manner in which appeal against acquittal has been dealt with  by the High Court leaves much to be desired. Reasons introduce clarity  in an order. On plainest consideration of justice, the High Court ought  to have set forth its reasons, howsoever brief, in its order,  indicative of an application of its mind; all the more when its order  is amenable to further avenue of challenge. The absence of reasons has  rendered the High Court order not sustainable. Similar view has been  expressed in State of U.P. v. Battan and Ors (2001 (10) SCC 607). About  two decades back in State of Maharashtra v. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan  (AIR 1982 SC 1215) the desirability of a speaking order while dealing  with an application for grant of leave was highlighted. The requirement  of indicating reasons in such cases has been judicially recognized as  imperative. The view was re-iterated in Jawahar Lal Singh v. Naresh  Singh and Ors. (1987 (2) SCC 222). Judicial discipline to abide by  declaration of law by this Court, cannot be forsaken, under any pretext  by any authority or Court, be it even the highest Court in a State,  oblivious to Article 141 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short  the ’Constitution’).    

Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion, and without the same  it becomes lifeless.  (See Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar and Ors.  (2003 (7) Supreme 152).

Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning M.R. in  Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971 (1) All E.R. 1148)  observed "The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good  administration". In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree (1974  ICR 120)(NIRC) it was observed: "Failure to give reasons amounts to  denial of justice". Reasons are live links between the mind of the

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decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision or  conclusion arrived at". Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity.  The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the  "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, by its silence, render it  virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function  or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of  the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound  judicial system; reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application  of mind to the matter before Court. Another rationale is that the  affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of  the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons  for the order made; in other words, a speaking out. The "inscrutable  face of a sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi- judicial performance.  

The above position was highlighted in State of Punjab v. Bhag  Singh (2004 (1) SCC 547).

In view of the aforesaid legal position, the impugned judgment of  the High Court is unsustainable and is set aside. We grant leave to the  State to file the appeal. The High Court shall entertain the appeal and  after requisite notice to the respondents hear the appeal and dispose  of it in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observation made in  the present appeal. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated.