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CASE NO.: Special Leave Petition (crl.)  1102 of 2007

PETITIONER: State of H.P

RESPONDENT: Mushtaq Ahmad

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/03/2007

BENCH: Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

       Challenge in this special leave petition is to the order  passed by a Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High  Court dismissing the application filed by the petitioner- State under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal  Procedure, 1973 (in short the ’Code’).  

       Grievance of the petitioner is that the application was  dismissed summarily without indicating any reason. It is  stated by learned counsel for the petitioner that this Court  has in many cases deprecated the practice of such  dismissal.

The High Court has not given any reasons for  refusing to grant leave to file appeal against acquittal, and  seems to have been completely oblivious to the fact that by  such refusal, a close scrutiny of the order of acquittal, by  the appellate forum, has been lost once and for all. The  manner in which appeal against acquittal has been dealt  with by the High Court leaves much to be desired.  Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On plainest  consideration of justice, the High Court ought to have set  forth its reasons, howsoever brief, in its order indicative of  an application of its mind, all the more when its order is  amenable to further avenue of challenge. The absence of  reasons has rendered the High Court order not  sustainable. Similar view was expressed in State of U.P. v.  Battan and Ors (2001 (10) SCC 607). About two decades  back in State of Maharashtra v. Vithal Rao Pritirao  Chawan (AIR 1982 SC 1215) the desirability of a speaking  order while dealing with an application for grant of leave  was highlighted. The requirement of indicating reasons in  such cases has been judicially recognized as imperative.  The view was re-iterated in Jawahar Lal Singh v. Naresh  Singh and Ors. (1987 (2) SCC 222).  Judicial discipline to  abide by declaration of law by this Court, cannot be  forsaken, under any pretext by any authority or Court, be  it even the Highest Court in a State, oblivious to Article  141 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the  ’Constitution’).    

Even in respect of administrative orders Lord  Denning M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering  Union (1971 (1) All E.R. 1148) observed "The giving of  reasons is one of the fundamentals of good  administration". In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v.

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Crabtree (1974 LCR 120) it was observed: "Failure to give  reasons amounts to denial of justice". Reasons are live  links between the mind of the decision taker to the  controversy in question and the decision or conclusion  arrived at". Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity.  The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision  reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, by its  silence, render it virtually impossible for the Courts to  perform their appellate function or exercise the power of  judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision.  Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound  judicial system, reasons at least sufficient to indicate an  application of mind to the matter before Court. Another  rationale is that the affected party can know why the  decision has gone against him. One of the salutary  requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for  the order made, in other words, a speaking out. The  "inscrutable face of a sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous  with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. (See State of  Punjab v. Bhag Singh (2004 (1) SCC 547).                  In the background of what has been stated in Bhag  Singh’s case (supra) the grievance of learned counsel for  the petitioner-State about the manner in which the  petition has been dismissed is unexceptionable.  But we  have perused the judgment of the trial Court. Considering  the nature of the findings recorded we do not consider this  to be a fit case where exercise of jurisdiction under Article  136 of the Constitution is called for. The petition is  accordingly dismissed.