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PETITIONER: THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DILIPBHAI NATHJIBHAI PATEL & ANR

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       03/03/1998

BENCH: M.K. MUKHERJEE, K.T. THOMAS

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: Present:               Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.K. Mukherjee               Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.T. Thomas Yashank P.  Ahdyaru, Mr.  Ann Sawhney and Ms. H. Wahi, Advs. for the appellants.                       J U D G M E N T      The following Judgment of the Court was delivered: M.K. MUKHERJEE, J.      Leave Granted.      The appellant  no.2 a  District Co-operative Officer of Vadodara  has   lodged  a   prosecution  against   the   two respondents  under   Section  147(1)   (d)  of  the  Gujarat Coperative  Societies   Act,  1961  (‘Act’  for  short)  for committing breach  of Section  71 of the Act after obtaining sanction of the district Registrar as required under Section 149  (3)  thereof.  The  prosecution  is  also  for  certain offences under  the Indian Penal Code. Aggrieved thereby the respondents moved the High Court by filling a petition under Section 482  Cr. P.C.  In disposing of the petition the High Court observed  that a  sanction under  Section  149(3)  for prosecution under  Section 147(1)(d) cannot be given without giving  the   party  concerned   a  prior   hearing.  Since, admittedly, the respondents were not given such hearing, the High Court directed that the complaint relating to the above offence shall  not proceed  till notice  to the  respondents were given  and sanction  was accorded  after hearing  them. However, it  clarified,  the  complaint  for  the  remaining offences shall, in no way be affected by its order and shall be proceeded  with in  accordance with law. The direction of the High Court so far as it relates to the prosecution under the Act is under challenge in this appeal.      To appreciate  the reasoning  of  the  High  Court  for issuing the  impugned direction  it  will  be  necessary  to reproduce Section 149(3) of the Act. It reads as under:      "149 Cognizance of offlences -      (1)xxx  xxx  xxx  xxx      (2)xxx xxxx  xxx  xxx      (3) No  prosecution under  this Act      shall be  lodged, except  with  the      previous  sanction   of  the  State

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    Government  in   the  case   of  an      offence under  clause (c)  of  sub-      section (1)  of section 147, and of      the Registrar  in the  case of  any      other offence  under this Act. Such      sanction shall  not be given except      after hearing  the party concerned,      by an  officer authorised  in  this      behalf by the State Government by a      general or special order."      From a  plain reading  of the  first part  of the above sub-section it  is manifest that for lodging prosecution for an offence  under the  Act previous   sanction is essential. While  for   the  offence   under  Section   147(1)(c)   the sanctioning authority  is the State Government for all other offences it  is the Registrar. When the words "such sanction shall not be given" appearing at the beginning of the second part is read in juxtaposition with the words  "by an officer authorised in  this behalf  by the  State  Government  by  a general or  special order"  at the  end, it is also manifest that  hearing  is  to  be  given  only  if  a  sanction  for prosecution under Section 147(1) (c) is contemplated and not otherwise.      From the  impugned order of the High Court we find that when the  above contention was raised before it on behalf of the respondents therein (the appellants before us), the High Court observed  that the  words "such  sanction shall not be given"  are   to  be  interpreted  in  the  context  of  the provisions made  for the  sanction in  connection  with  two different categories  of offences and when so interpreted it would necessarily  mean that  sanction required  to be given either by  the Registrar or by the State must be preceded by a notice  to and  hearing of the parties concerned. The High Court, however,  did not  spell out,  either in interpreting the section  or issuing  the impugned  direction who  was to give the  notice and  hear the  parties in  respect  of  the offences  for   which  the   Registrar  is  the  sanctioning authority. If  the legislature  intended that  in respect of the offences  for which  the sanctioning  authority  is  the Registrar a  prior hearing  is also  required to be given by him then,  after the words "by an officer authorised in this behalf by  the State  Government by  a  general  or  special order", the  words "or by the Registrar, as the case may be" (or similar such words) would have been added. When there is no reference  to the  Registrar at all in the latter part of the section  such sanction appearing therein must refer to a sanction  which  is  required  to  be  given  by  the  State Government. In  interpreting a  Statute the Court cannot aid the legislature’s  defective phrasing  of an Act nor can add or amend  and, by  construction make  up deficiencies  which are left  there. In Union of India Vs. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1991) 3 S.C.R. 873], this Court observed:-      "It is  not the  duty of  the Court      either to  enlarge the scope of the      legislation or the intention of the      legislature when  the  language  of      the   provision    is   plain   and      unambiguous.   The   Court   cannot      rewrite,  recast   or  reframe  the      legislation  for   the  very   good      reason that  it  has  no  power  to      legislate. The  power to  legislate      has  not   been  conferred  on  the      Court. The  Court cannot  add words      to a  statute or read words into it

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    which are not there. Assuming there      is a  defect or  an omission in the      words used  by the  legislature the      Court could  not go  to its  aid to      correct or  make up the deficiency.      Court shall  decide what the law is      and not  what  it  should  be.  The      Court   of    course    adopts    a      construction which  will carry  out      the  obvious   intention   of   the      legislature but could not legislate      itself.  But   to  invoke  judicial      activism   to    set   at    naught      legislative judgment  is subversive      of the  constitutional harmony  and      comity of instrumentalities."           (emphasis supplied)      In view  of the  law so  laid down  the  above  section cannot be  interpreted  to  mean  that  in  respect  of  the offences  for   which  the   Registrar  is  the  sanctioning authority a prior hearing is required to be given.      The matter  can be viewed from the other angle also. If the words  "such sanction"  is to refer also to offences for which the  Registrar is  the sanctioning  authority it  will lead to  an absurd  situation, in  that  a  duly  authorised officer of the State Government will hear the parties on the question of  grant  of  sanction  on  its  behalf,  but  the decision to  grant sanction  will rest on the former. In any view of  the matter,  therefore, the interpretation given by the High  Court and  for that  matter, the  direction issued cannot be sustained.      We accordingly allow this appeal and quash the impugned direction.