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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  2519 of 2007

PETITIONER: State of Bihar & Ors

RESPONDENT: Bihar State +2 Lecturers Associations & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/05/2007

BENCH: C.K. Thakker & Tarun Chatterjee

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   2519          OF 2007 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 1397 of 2005)

C.K. THAKKER, J.

1.              Leave granted. 2.              This appeal by special leave arises from the  judgment and order dated March 22, 2004 passed by the  Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna  in Letters Patent Appeal No. 323 of 2004.  By the said  order, the Division Bench allowed the appeal filed by the  Association of Untrained Lecturers and set aside the  order dated January 28, 2004 passed by a single Judge  of that Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 7224 of  1999. 3.              To appreciate the controversy raised in the  present appeal, few relevant facts may be noted: 4.              Advertisement No. 1 of 1987 was issued by the  appellants, inviting applications for appointment of +2  Lecturers in Secondary Schools in the pay scales of  Rs.940-1660 in Government Schools as well as in  Nationalized Schools.  The qualification prescribed in the  Advertisement for the post was Post-Graduate Degree in  II Class.  There was no requirement of having training for  appointment to the said post.  In 1989, Members of the  Respondent-Association who had Post-Graduate Degree  in II Class but who were untrained, were selected and  appointed as Lecturers in Nationalized Schools in the pay  scales of Rs.940-1660.  After Vth Pay Commission, pay  scales of Rs.940-1660 were revised to Rs.1640-2900 with  effect from January 1, 1996.  It appears that initially,  there was difference in pay scales of +2 Lecturers serving  in Government Schools and serving in Nationalized  Schools other than Government Schools.  After a decision  of the High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 2445  of 1994, all +2 Lecturers were granted uniform pay scales  irrespective of their posting.  The controversy raised in  the present matter relates to difference of pay scales  between lecturers who are trained and lecturers who are  untrained.  A Fitment Committee was appointed by the  Government to consider the pay scales of trained and  untrained lecturers.  The Fitment Committee considered  the question and recommended different pay scales for  trained and untrained lecturers.  The State Government  accepted the recommendation of the Fitment Committee

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and fixed pay scales of Rs.5000-8000 for untrained  lecturers and Rs.6500-10500 for trained lecturers.   Government Resolution was passed on February 8, 1999  and a notification was issued on June 10, 1999. 5.              There was resentment amongst the employees  against fixation of two different pay scales of +2 Lecturers  on the basis of training.  A writ petition was, therefore,  filed by the Association challenging classification made  on the basis of training.  A Fitment Appellate Committee  was, therefore, constituted by the State Government  presided over by a sitting Judge of the High Court by an  order dated January 15, 2000 to go into the anomalies in  pay scales of trained lecturers and untrained lecturers.   The Fitment Appellate Committee submitted its report,  recommending payment of uniform pay scales to trained  as well as untrained lecturers observing that different  pay scales to trained and untrained lecturers would be  arbitrary and unreasonable.  The State Government,  however, maintained that there is difference between  trained lecturers and untrained lecturers and difference  in pay scales would not violate Article 14 of the  Constitution.   6.              The learned single Judge who heard the writ  petition upheld the contention of the State Government  and dismissed the petition filed by the Association  holding that in making distinction between trained  lecturers and untrained lecturers and in fixing different  pay scales, State Government had not violated any  provision of the Constitution and the petition was liable  to be dismissed.  The Division Bench, however, as  observed earlier, allowed the appeal, set aside the order  passed by the single Judge and directed the State  Authorities to grant uniform pay scales to trained and  untrained lecturers.  The order passed by the Division  Bench is challenged by the State Authorities in the  present Appeal by Special Leave.     7.              On January 6, 2005, notice was issued by this  Court and the party-respondents were directed to file  affidavit-in-reply.  Counter-affidavit as also affidavit-in- rejoinder were thereafter filed.  The Court directed the  Registry to place the matter for final disposal and that is  how the matter is before us.  We have heard learned  counsel for the parties. 8.              The learned counsel for the State contended  that the Division Bench of the High Court was wholly  wrong in holding that there can be no difference between  trained lecturers and untrained lecturers and that  difference in pay scales would be arbitrary, unreasonable  and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.  It was  submitted that trained and untrained lecturers form  different class and such classification is rational and  reasonable.  Fixation of different pay scales, therefore,  cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational.  It was also  submitted that though the Fitment Appellate Committee  recommended payment of uniform pay scales to trained  and untrained lecturers, the said decision was not in  consonance with law.  It was submitted that the learned  single Judge was right in dismissing the writ petition and  the Division Bench ought to have confirmed that order.   Regarding advertisement issued by the Authorities for  making appointment of +2 Lecturers and non-mention  about training, it was submitted that it related to  eligibility for appointment and had nothing to do with pay  scales.  The Appellate Committee was, therefore, wrong in  relying on the said fact and in recommending uniform

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pay scales to all lecturers.  It was, therefore, submitted  that the order passed by the Division Bench may be set  aside by restoring the order of the single Judge. 9.              The learned counsel for the Association, on the  other hand, supported the order passed by the Division  Bench.  He submitted that classification sought to be  made on the basis of training is totally artificial,  irrational and arbitrary.  Untrained lecturers cannot be  deprived of legitimate pay scales to which their  counterparts (trained lecturers) were held entitled.  It was  because of the legitimate grievance by untrained  lecturers that a Fitment Appellate Committee presided  over by a sitting Judge of the High Court was constituted  by the State Government.  In terms of reference, it was  expressly stated that the State Government will accept  the recommendation of the Committee and when the said  Committee recommended to grant uniform pay scales to  trained and untrained lecturers, it was not open to the  State Government not to accept and implement the said  recommendation.  The learned single Judge was not right  in dismissing the petition filed by the Association of  untrained lecturers.  It was further submitted that  untrained lecturers were performing similar functions  and discharging similar duties.  Moreover, after the  report of the Appellate Committee, the State Government  withdrew the order sending untrained lecturers for taking  training on the ground that no such training was  necessary in view of the report submitted and  recommendation made by the Committee and payment of  uniform pay scales to trained and untrained lecturers.  It  was, therefore, submitted that even State Authorities  have also proceeded on the footing that there is no  distinction between trained and untrained lecturers so  far as pay scales are concerned.  The Division Bench was,  therefore, right in allowing the appeal and no grievance  can be made against the directions issued by the Court. 10.             Having considered the rival contentions of the  parties, in our opinion, the Division Bench was not right  in holding that distinction between trained lecturers and  untrained lecturers is arbitrary, irrational or otherwise  objectionable.   11.             Now, it is well settled and cannot be disputed  that Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality  before the law and confers equal protection of laws.  It  prohibits the State from denying persons or class of  persons equal treatment; provided they are equals and  are similarly situated.  It, however, does not forbid  classification.  In other words, what Article 14 prohibits  is discrimination and not classification if otherwise such  classification is legal, valid and reasonable. 12.             Before more than half a century, a  Constitution Bench of this Court was called upon to  consider ambit and scope of Article 14 of the Constitution  in a celebrated decision in State of West Bengal v. Anwar  Ali Sarkar, 1952 SCR 284.  There, constitutional validity  of certain provisions of the West Bengal Special Courts  Act, 1950 was challenged on the ground that they were  discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the  Constitution.   13.             Dealing with the contention, S.R. Das, J. (as  his Lordship then was) made the following instructive  observations which were cited with approval in several  subsequent cases; "It is now well established that while Article  14 is designed to prevent a person or class of

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persons from being singled out from others  similarly situated for the purpose of being  specially subjected to discriminating and  hostile legislation, it does not insist on an  ‘abstract symmetry’ in the sense that every  piece of legislation must have universal  application.  All persons are not, by nature,  attainment or circumstances, equal and the  varying needs of different classes of persons  often require separate treatment and,  therefore, the protecting clause has been  construed as a guarantee against  discrimination amongst equals only and not  as taking away from the State the power to  classify persons for the purpose of legislation.   This classification may be on different bases.   It may be geographical or according to objects  or occupations or the like.  Mere  classification, however, is not enough to get  over the inhibition of the article.  The  classification must not be arbitrary but must  be rational, that is to say, it must not only be  based on some qualities or characteristics  which are to be found in all the persons  grouped together and not in others who are  left out but those qualities or characteristics  must have a reasonable relation to the object  of the legislation.  In order to pass the test,  two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1)  that the classification must be founded on an  intelligible differentia which distinguishes  those that are grouped together from others,  and (2 that that differentia must have a  rational relation to the object sought to be  achieved by the Act.  The differentia which is  the basis of the classification and the object  of the Act are distinct things and what is  necessary is that there must be a nexus  between them.  In short, while the article  forbids class legislation in the sense of making  improper discrimination by conferring  privileges or imposing liabilities upon persons  arbitrarily selected out of a large number of  other persons similarly situated in relation to  the privileges sought to be conferred or the  liability proposed to be imposed, it does not  forbid classification for the purpose of  legislation, provided such classification is not  arbitrary in the sense I have just explained."                                         (emphasis supplied)            14.             Recently, in Confederation of Ex-Servicemen &  Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2006) 8 SCC 399, it was  contended by the petitioners that the classification  between in-service and retired employees was invalid,  illegal and unreasonable.  Likewise, differentiation  between defence personnel and civil personnel was  arbitrary and irrational.  The contention was, however,  rejected by this Court holding that they form different  class and Article 14 of the Constitution could not be said  to have been violated. 15.             Again, in Arun Kumar & Ors. v. Union of India  & Ors., (2007) 1 SCC 732, it was argued that  classification between Government employees and  employees of Companies, Corporations and other Public

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Sector Undertakings which can be said to be ‘State’  within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution  would be arbitrary, fanciful and capricious.  But  argument was negatived by this Court observing that  distinction between employees of Central Government  and State Governments (Civil Servants) on the one hand  and other employees i.e. employees of Companies,  Corporations or other Public Sector Undertakings on the  other hand, is well founded and well defined.   16.             In Confederation of Ex-Servicemen, after  considering leading cases on equal protection clause  enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution, speaking for a  five-Judge Bench, one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) stated: "In our judgment, therefore, it is clear  that every classification to be legal, valid  and permissible, must fulfil the twin test,  namely,  

(i) the classification must be founded on  an intelligible differentia which must  distinguish persons or things that are  grouped together from others leaving out  or left out; and

(ii) such a differentia must have rational  nexus to the object sought to be achieved  by the statute or legislation in question."

17.             A legal and valid classification may be based  on educational qualifications. 18.             In State of Mysore & Anr. v. P. Narsinga Rao,  (1968) 1 SCR 407 : AIR 1968 SC 349, different pay scales  were prescribed for tracers; one for matriculate tracers  which was higher than the other for non-matriculate  tracers which was lower.  The action was held legal,  lawful and not violative of Article 14 or 16 of the  Constitution.   19.             The Constitution Bench of this Court stated:-          "\005It is well settled that though Article 14  forbids class legislation, it does not forbid  reasonable classification for the purposes  of legislation.  When any impugned rule  or statutory provision is assailed on the  ground that it contravenes Article 14, its  validity can be sustained if two tests are  satisfied.  The first test is that the  classification on which it is founded must  be based on an intelligible differentia  which distinguishes persons or things  grouped together from others left out of  the group, and the second test is that the  differentia in question must have a  reasonable relation to the object sought  to be achieved by the rule or statutory  provision in question.  In other words,  there must be some rational nexus  between the basis of classification and the  object intended to be achieved by the  statute or the rule."                     (emphasis supplied)        20.             In State of Jammu & Kashimir v. Triloki Nath  Khosla & Ors., (1974) 1 SCC 19, this Court upheld the  classification for promotion on the basis of academic and  technical qualifications.  It was contended on behalf of

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the diploma-holders that classification sought to be made  by the State between ‘degree-holders’ and ‘diploma- holders’, was illegal and artificial and denial of promotion  to diploma-holders while granting such benefit to degree- holders had violated Article 14 of the Constitution.  But  the argument was negatived.   21.             Chandrachud, J. (as His Lordship then was)  stated: "On the facts of the case, classification on the  basis of educational qualifications made with  a view to achieving administrative efficiency  cannot be said to rest on any fortuitous  circumstance and one has always to bear in  mind the facts and circumstances of the case  in order to judge the validity of a  classification.  The provision in the 1939  Rules restricting direct recruitment of  Assistant Engineers to Engineering  graduates, the dearth of graduates in times  past and their copious flow in times present  are all matters which can legitimately enter  the judgment of the rule-making authority.   In the light of these facts, that judgment  cannot be assailed as capricious or fanciful.   Efficiency which comes in the trail of higher  mental equipment can reasonably be  attempted to be achieved by restricting  promotional opportunities to these  possessing higher educational qualifications.   And we are concerned with the  reasonableness of the classification, not with  the precise accuracy of the decision to  classify nor with the question whether the  classification is scientific.  Such tests have  long since been discarded.  In fact, American  decisions have gone as far as saying that  classification would offend against the 14th  Amendment of the American Constitution  only if it is "purely arbitrary, oppressive or  capricious" and the inequality produced in  order to encounter the challenge of the  Constitution must be "actually and palpably  unreasonably and arbitrary". We need not go  that far as the differences between the two  classes \026 graduates and diploma-holders \026  furnish a reasonable basis for separate  treatment and bear a just relation to the  purpose of the impugned provision."                                       (emphasis supplied) 22.             In Shyam Babu Verma & Ors. v. Union of India  & Ors., (1994) 2 SCC 521, different pay scales were  prescribed for Pharmacists on the consideration of  qualifications and experience.  Whereas higher pay scales  were fixed for qualified Pharmacists, unqualified  Pharmacists were paid lower pay scales.  It was ruled  that it was open to the Government to prescribe different  pay scales for different categories of Pharmacists on the  basis of qualifications and experience.  The Court held  that doctrine of ‘equal pay for equal work’ should not be  applied in a mechanical or casual manner. 23.             In U.P. State Sugar Corporation & Anr. v. Sant  Raj Singh, (2006) 9 SCC 82, this Court held that  educational qualification can be a criterion for  differentiation in pay scales.  Possession of higher  qualification can be treated a valid base for classification

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of two categories of employees, even if no such  requirement is prescribed at the time of recruitment.  If  such a distinction is drawn, no complaint can be made  that it would violate Article 14 of the Constitution or  would be contrary to Article 39(d) of the Constitution.   24.             It is true that ‘equal pay for equal work’ is a  doctrine well established in service jurisprudence and is  also a concomitant of Article 14 of the Constitution.  But  as observed by this Court in State of Orissa & Ors. v.  Balram Sahoo, (2000) 3 SCC 250, equal pay would  depend upon not only on the nature or volume of work  but also on quality of work as regards reliability and  responsibility as well and different pay scales may be  prescribed on the basis of such reliability and  responsibility. 25.             It was contended on behalf of untrained  lecturers Association before the High Court as well as  before us that trained lecturers and untrained lecturers  were performing similar functions and discharging  similar duties.  It was, therefore, not open to the State  Authorities to pay different pay scales to them.  The  learned single Judge negatived the contention observing  and, in our opinion, rightly, that training was one of the  most important factors for determining pay scales.  A  distinction between trained and untrained lecturers for  the purpose of prescribing pay scales is, therefore, valid  and reasonable.  Importance of training, in our judgment,  cannot be ignored or under-estimated.  Unfortunately,  the Division Bench set aside the order passed by the  learned single Judge upholding the argument of  untrained lecturers Association and by granting them  pay scales prescribed for trained lecturers.   26.             Now, let us consider few decisions of this  Court on the need and necessity of training. 27.             In Andhra Kesari Educational Society v.  Director of School Education & Ors., (1989) 1 SCC 392,  this Court emphasized the need and importance of  trained teachers in schools.  Speaking for the Court,  Jagannatha Shetty, J., made the following illuminating  observations: "Before parting with the case, we should like to  add a word more.  Though teaching is the last  choice in the job market, the role of teachers is  central to all processes of formal education.   The teacher alone could bring out the skills  and intellectual capabilities of students.  He is  the ‘engine’ of the educational system.  He is a  principal instrument in awakening the child to  cultural values.  He needs to be endowed and  energized with needed potential to deliver  enlightened service expected of him.  His  quality should be such as would inspire and  motivate into action the benefiter.  He must  keep himself abreast of everchanging  conditions.  He is not to perform in a wooden  and unimaginative way.  He must eliminate  fissiparous tendencies and attitudes and  infuse nobler and national ideas in younger  minds.  His involvement in national integration  is more important, indeed indispensable.  It is,  therefore, needless to state that teachers should  be subjected to rigorous training with rigid  scrutiny of efficiency.  It has greater relevance  to the needs of the day.  The ill-trained or sub- standard teachers would be detrimental to our

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educational system; if not a punishment on our  children.  The government and the University  must, therefore, take care to see that  inadequacy in the training of teachers is not  compounded by any extraneous consideration."                                      (Emphasis supplied)    

28.             In Ram Sukh & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan &  Ors., (1989) Supp (2) SCC  189, untrained teachers were  removed from service on the availability of trained  teachers.  The action was challenged on the ground that  the petitioners were also teachers and their services  could not be terminated only on the ground that trained  teachers were available.  It was also urged that even if  such training is necessary, untrained teachers should be  given an opportunity to undergo such training.  This  Court, however, rejected the contention, observing that a  Court of Law cannot direct the Government to continue  untrained teachers in service till they are trained.   29.             Referring to Andhra Kesari Educational Society,  the Court stated: "These observations are equally relevant to  primary school teachers with whom we are  concerned.  The primary school teachers are  of utmost importance in developing a child’s  personality in the formative years.  It is not  just enough to teach the child alphabets and  figures, but must more is required to  understand child psychology and aptitudes.   They need a different approach altogether.   Only trained teachers could lead them  properly.  The untrained teachers can never  be proper substitute to trained teachers.  We  are, therefore, unable to give any relief to the  petitioners."                                 (emphasis supplied) 30.             In L. Muthukumar & Anr. v. State of T.N. &  Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 618, this Court stated that mere  passing of a public examination is not enough.  It must  be coupled with proper training in a recognized  educational institution.   31.             Quoting with approval observations from  earlier cases, this Court said; "\005.We are of the considered opinion that  before teachers are allowed to teach innocent  children, they must receive appropriate and  adequate training in a recognized training  institute satisfying the prescribed norms,  otherwise the standard of education and  careers of children will be jeopardised.  In  most civilized and advanced countries, the  job of a teacher in a primary school is  considered an important and crucial one  because moulding of young minds begins in  primary schools.  Allowing ill-trained teachers  coming out of derecognized or unrecognized  institutes or licensing them to teach children  of an impressionable age, contrary to the  norms prescribed, will be detrimental to the  interest of the nation itself in the sense that  in the process of building a great nation,  teachers and educational institutions also  play a vital role.  In cases like these, interest  of individuals cannot be placed above or  preferred to the larger public interest.\005"

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                          (Emphasis supplied) 32.             In our judgment, the law appears to be well  settled.  There is a clear distinction between a trained  teacher (lecturer) and an untrained teacher (lecturer).   Such a distinction is legal, valid, rational and reasonable.   Trained lecturers and untrained lecturers, therefore, can  neither be said to be similarly circumstanced nor they  form one and the same class.  The classification is  reasonable and is based on intelligible differentia which  distinguishes one class (trained) included therein from  the other class (untrained) which is left out.  Such  classification or differentia has a rational nexus or  reasonable relation to the object intended to be achieved,  viz., imparting education to students.  It, therefore,  cannot be successfully contended that different pay  scales cannot be fixed for trained lecturers on one hand  and untrained lecturers on the other hand.  Prescribing  different pay scales, under the circumstances, cannot be  held illegal, improper or unreasonable infringing Article  14 of the Constitution.   33.             It was also argued both before the single Judge  and also before the Division Bench of the High Court that  the Appellate Fitment Committee recommended uniform  pay scales to trained and untrained lecturers.  The  submission was based on the ground that when  advertisement for appointment of +2 Lecturers was  issued, only requirement insisted upon was that a  candidate must have Post-Graduate Degree in Class II.   There was no reference as to training by the candidates.   The learned single Judge held that the requirement  mentioned in the advertisement related to ‘eligibility’ and  it had no relevance to pay scales.  The Division Bench,  however, was of the opinion that in absence of anything  regarding training by candidates, no different pay scales  could be provided by the Authorities.  To us, learned  single Judge was wholly right in holding that the  educational qualification specified in the advertisement  was limited to eligibility of candidates to be appointed  and it had nothing to do with fixing of pay scales.   34.             It was also urged before the High Court that an  Expert Committee was appointed by the State  Government which had taken a decision and normally  such a decision is not interfered with either by the  Executive or by the Judiciary.   35.             So far as the principle is concerned, there can  be no two opinions about it.  In the instant case,  however, the Division Bench was wrong in invoking the  said doctrine for granting uniform pay scales to trained  and untrained lecturers.  We have already noted that a  Fitment Committee was appointed by the State  Government which was an ‘Expert Committee’.   That  Committee made clear distinction between trained  lecturers and untrained lecturers. 36.          The Fitment Committee, in its report stated; "We recommend that for Trained Graduate  Teachers the system that is available in the  Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan or in the  National Capital Territory of Delhi  Administration should be followed.  The  system of giving promotions based on higher  educational qualification has to be stopped  and the pattern in the Centre whereby direct  recruitment is done both at the level of  Trained Graduate and Post Graduate Trained  Teachers will have to be adopted.  The Bihar

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Taken over Elementary School Teachers  Promotion Rules, 1993 which has come in  force from 1.1.1986 requires to be amended  and brought in line with what is prevailing in  the Centre.  In the Kendriya Vidyalaya  Sangathan according to an order dated  29.4.97 promotion quota from PRT to TGT  and TGT to PGT has been increased from  33.3% to 50%.  This system or the pattern in  the Delhi Administration has to be adopted in  Bihar if Central scales are to become  applicable." 37.             The Fitment Appellate Committee agreed with  the above observations and observed; "This Committee agrees with the views of the  Fitment Committee.  There is enough  deterioration in education standards in this  State.  No further downslide in be tolerated." 38.             The Appellate Committee, however, strongly  relied upon one and only one circumstance that since in  the advertisement nothing was mentioned about training,  different pay scales could not be prescribed by the State  for trained and untrained lecturers.  39.             In paragraph 31.49, the Appellate Committee  stated:- "The Fitment Committee’s mandate was to  establish equivalence with Central posts and  recommend scales accordingly.  In the case of  post-graduate +2 Lecturers a clear  equivalence was available with the post of  post graduate teachers in the Central  Schools.  Therefore, this is a case where there  can be very little doubt about the exacters of  the equivalence.  The argument that in Delhi  they also teach IX and X standard is very  tenuous.  Moreover, if training is necessary  for such teachers in Delhi which by all  standards has a better academic record than  their counterpart in Bihar- then it is all the  more necessary for teachers in Bihar.  The  Fitment Committee has gone by Central  equivalence were the scale of Rs.6500-10500  is provided to trained teachers only.  The  Committee, therefore, could not have  recommended this scale for untrained  teachers. However, this Committee feels that  the ground that the original advertisement did  not require "training" as an essential  qualification is very relevant because  imposition of such conditions on a later date is  clearly discriminatory and the present  incumbents cannot be denied the higher scale  of Rs.6500-10500, even if they are untrained."                                     (emphasis supplied) 40.             We are afraid the approach of the Fitment  Appellate Committee was not in consonance with law.  If  there is distinction between trained and untrained  lecturers and if such classification is reasonable and  rational, there is nothing wrong in prescribing different  pay scales for trained lecturers and untrained lecturers  and there was no reason for the Appellate Committee to  differ from the view taken by the Fitment Committee and  by the State Government.  The advertisement could be  read, as ruled by a single Judge as an eligibility criterion  and nothing more than that.  By reading the

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advertisement in that manner, the purpose could have  been achieved by appointing and by retaining untrained  lecturers in-service as also by fulfilling the object of fixing  different pay scales for trained and untrained lecturers.   Unfortunately, the Division Bench failed to reconcile the  advertisement and fixation of pay scales by properly  appreciating the views expressed by the Fitment  Committee and accepted by the State Government. 41.             The above discussion would normally result  into the appeal being allowed by setting aside the order  passed by the Division Bench and by restoring the order  of the learned single Judge upholding the action of the  State Government.  In the facts and circumstances of the  case, however, we are not persuaded to set aside the  order of the Division Bench in exercise of discretionary  jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 read with  Article 142 of the Constitution mainly because of two  reasons; 42.             Firstly, when the Appellate Fitment Committee  was appointed by the State Government presided over by  a sitting Judge of the High Court of Patna and the matter  was referred as regards anomaly in pay scales to trained  and untrained lecturers, the reference expressly  mentioned that the State Government will accept the  recommendation of the Committee and the Committee  recommended payment of uniform pay scales to trained  as well as untrained teachers. 43.             Secondly, it was stated in the Affidavit-in-reply  filed by the untrained lecturers Association (writ  petitioners) that after the report of the Fitment Appellate  Committee, the State Government on January 22, 2001  withdrew its earlier order dated October 19, 2000 for  sending untrained lecturers (in-service candidates) for  taking training on the ground that no such training was  mandatory in view of report of the Committee and when  uniform pay-scales were to be given to trained as well as  untrained lecturers. 44.             For the reasons aforesaid, though we are  firmly of the view that the Division Bench of the High  Court of Judicature at Patna was not right in holding  that there is no distinction between trained lecturers on  the one hand and untrained lecturers on the other hand  and no different pay scales can be prescribed for trained  and untrained lecturers and such fixation of pay scales  would violate Article 14 of the Constitution, and though  we hold that the learned single Judge was right in  upholding the classification between trained and  untrained lecturers as rational, reasonable and  intelligible, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we  do not intend to interfere with the final direction issued  by the Division Bench in the light of two circumstances  referred to above.  Appeal is accordingly disposed of.  In  the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there  shall be no order as to costs.