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PETITIONER: STATE OF ASSAM & ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BIMAL KUMAR PANDIT

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/02/1963

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N. HIDAYATULLAH, M. GUPTA, K.C. DAS SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1963 AIR 1612            1964 SCR  (2)   1  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1964 SC 364  (15)  R          1964 SC 506  (7)  R          1977 SC 567  (16,17,18)

ACT: Government   Servant--suspension   enquiry   and    demotion Reasonable  Opportunity what is--Contents of  second  notice when Government accepts, rejects or partly accepts or partly rejects  the  findings  of  Enquiry  Officer--Necessity   of stating  conclusions  of Government in  notice--Function  of Enquiry Officer-Constitution of India, Art. 311 (2).

HEADNOTE: The respondent was An Extra Assistant Commissioner.  He  was charge-sheeted and lie submitted an elaborate explanation in respect  of  all the charges.  The enquiry was held  by  the Commissioner  and a report submitted by him.   After  giving his findings, the Commissioner added that the lapses  proved did not cast any serious doubt on the honesty arid integrity of  the  respondent  and  hence  the  withholding  of  three increments from his pay would meet the ends of justice.  The appellant  served a second notice on the respondent and  the latter  was asked to submit his explanation wiry penalty  of removal  from service should not be imposed upon  him.   The respondent  submitted  an explanation and  the  Governor  of Assam,  after  considering  the  explanation,  ordered   his demotion. That  order  was  challenged by the  respondent  by  a  writ petition  filed  in the High Court.  The writ  petition  was allowed by the High Court and a writ of mandamus was  issued directing  the appellant not to give effect to the order  of demotion.   The High Court held that the second  notice  did not  clearly indicate that the Government had  accepted  the findings- of Enquiry officer and as such a statement was not made  in the notice, the respondent could not have known  on what grounds the Government had provisionally decided to 2 impose upon him the penalty of removal from service.  It was also  held  that the notice must show  that  the  dismissing

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authority  had  applied  its mind to  the  findings  of  the Enquiry  officer and had accepted the said findings  against the  respondent.   The  notice should  expressly  state  the conclusions of the dismissing authority because unless those conclusions were communicated to the respondent, he was  not in   a   position   to  make  an   adequate   or   effective representation, the dismissing authority must also  indicate the  reasons on which it bad come to those conclusions.   As the impugned notice did not contain a specific averment that the  dismissing authority had accepted the findings  of  the Enquiry officer and otherwise gave no grounds or reasons for the  action proposed to be taken against the respondent,  it contravened  the provisions of Art. 311 (2).  The  appellant came to this Court by special leave. Held,  that  the High Court was in error in  coming  to  the conclusion  that  the order of demotion passed  against  the respondent was invalid on the ground that the respondent had not  been  given a reasonable opportunity of  showing  cause against  the action to be taken against him under  Art.  311 (2) of the Constitution. A  public officer against whom disciplinary proceedings  are intended to be taken is entitled to have two  opportunities. Ali enquiry must be held and it must be conducted  according to the rules prescribed in that behalf and consistently with tile  requirements  of natural justice.   When  the  Enquiry Officer submits his report, the dismissing authority has  to consider  the report and decide whether it agrees  with  the conclusions  of the report or not.  If the findings  in  the report  are  against the public officer and  the  dismissing authority agrees with them, another notice has to be  given. In  issuing the second notice, the dismissing authority  has to  come to a tentative or provisional conclusion about  the guilt of the public officer as well as about the  punishment which  would meet the ends of justice. in response  to  this notice,  the  public officer is entitled to show  cause  not only against the action proposed to be taken against him but also  against  the validity or correctness of  the  findings recorded by tile Enquiry officer and provisionally  accepted by the dismissing authority. If  the  dismissing  authority  differs  from  the  findings recorded  in  the enquiry report, it is necessary  that  its provisional  conclusions should be specified in  the  second notice.   If the -dismissing authority accepts the  findings against the delinquent officer and differs from some or  all of those recorded in his favour and proceeds to specify  the nature of the action 3 proposed to be taken on its own conclusions, it is necessary that the said conclusions should be briefly indicated in the notice. Where the dismissing authority purports to issue the notice  against the delinquent officer after  accepting  the enquiry report in its entirety, it cannot be said that it is essential that the dismissing authority must say that it has so accepted the report.  However, it is desirable that  even in such cases a statement to that effect should be made, but failure  to  make  such statement does  not  contravene  the provisions of Art. 311 (2). As regards the functions of the Enquiry officer unless there is  any rule or statutory provision to the contrary,  he  is not required to specify the punishment which may be  imposed on  the delinquent officer.  His task is merely to  hold  an enquiry  into the charges and make his report stating  forth his  con-  clusions  and findings in  respect  of  the  said charges.   Sometimes, the Enquiry officers do  indicate  the nature  of  the  action  that  may  be  taken  against   the

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delinquent officer, that ordinarily is outside the scope  of the enquiry. A.N.  D’Silva  v. Union of India, [1962] Supp.  1 S.  C.  R. 968, High Commissioner of India v. I. M. Lal, [1945] F. C.R, 103, Khem Chand v. Union of India, [1958] S. C. R. 1080, The State  of Orissa v. Govindadas Pahda, C. A. No. 412/58,  dt. 10-12-1958,  State  of Andhra v. T. Ramayya Suri, A.  1.  R. 1957 Andhra 370, Bimal Charan Mitra v. State of Orissa A. 1. R. 1957 Orissa 184, Krishan Gopal Mukherjee v. The State, A. 1.  R. 1960 Orissa 37 and State of Bombay v. Gajnan  Mahadev Baldev, A. 1. R. 1954 Bom. 351, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 832 of 1962. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and decree  dated January  22,  1962, of the Assam High Court in  Gauhati,  in Civil Rule No. 369 of 1961. M.   C. Setalvad and Naunit Lal, for ’the appellant. N. C. Chatterjee and D. N. Mukherjee, for the respondent, 4 1963.  February 12.  The judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR  J.-This  appeal by special  leave  raises  a short question about the scope and effect of the  provisions contained in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution.  The  said question  arises  in this way.  The respondent  Bimal  Kumar Pandit  was serving appellant No. 1, the State of Assam,  as an Extra-Assistant Commissioner, Shillong.  On December  11, 1959,  the  second  appellant, the Chief  Secretary  to  the Government of Assam, served on the respondent a charge-sheet containing  eleven specific charges and called upon  him  to show  cause why he should not be dismissed from  service  or otherwise  punished  under  Rule 55 of  the  Civil  Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules read with Art.  311 of  the Constitution.  The said notice further informed  the respondent  that the Governor of Assam had been  pleased  to authorise  the  Commissioner of Plains Division,  Assam,  to conduct  the. enquiry and to report to appellant No.  2.  On January  13,  1960  the respondent  submitted  an  elaborate explanation in respect of all the charges.  The Commissioner of Plains Division, Assam, then proceeded to hold an enquiry and  after considering the evidence adduced before  him,  he made  the  report  on April 12, 1960.  In  this  report  the Enquiry  officer found that out of the 11 charges  drawn  up against  the  respondent, 6 had not been proved and  of  the remaining  5  charges, two had been  fully  established-they were charges (7) and (10) ; and the other three charges Nos. (1), (2) and (4) had been partially established.  The report made  these  findings and proceeded to add that  the  lapses proved  did  not cast any serious doubt on the  honesty  and integrity  of the delinquent officer, although the  evidence led   in  respect  of  charges  (1)  and  (2)   proved   his inexperience  and that led under charges (2) and (4)  showed his irresponsibility.  The report further stated that in the circumstances, the  5 two  charges  which deserved consideration for  purposes  of punishment were charges (7) and (10); aid it ended with  the recommendation  that  in view of the limited  scope  of  the charges  proved  and  of  the  age  and  experience  of  the delinquent  officer, the with. holding of  three  increments from his pay would meet the ends of justice in this case. After  this report was received, appellant No. .2  served  a

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second  notice  on  the respondent on June  1,  1960.   This notice referred to the disciplinary proceedings held against the  respondent  and added that the respondent  was  thereby required under clause (2) of Art. 311 of the Constitution to submit  his explanation if any, why the penalty  of  removal from  service  should not be imposed upon him.   The  notice further  stated that a copy of the report of  the  Enquiring officer in the disciplinary proceedings drawn up against the respondent  was enclosed.  The respondent was told  that  he had  to submit his explanation through the  Commissioner  of Plains Division, Assam, on or before June 18, 1960. On  receiving  this  notice, the  respondent  submitted  his explanation on June 21, 1960 in respect of the charges which had  been  held  proved  by-the  Enquiring  officer.   After considering   the   explanation  thus   submitted   by   the respondent,  the Governor of Assam was pleased to reduce  in rank the respondent who was on probation in the Assam  Civil Service, Class I to the Assam Civil Service Class Il, perma- nently,  with  effect from the date he takes over  as  such. The  Governor of Assam further ordered that  the  respondent will  be on probation in the said Class 11 Service  for  two years, subject to termination, if his work and conduct  were not found satisfactory.  The respondent was to draw his  pay in the minimum of the scale of pay of A. C. S., Class 11 and his seniority in the cadre would be determined with 6 effect from the date of his joining.  This Order was made on July 8, 1961.  The  respondent then challenged the validity of this  order by a writ petition in the High Court of .Judicature at Assam on  August, 24, 1961.  One of tile points urged by  him  was that  he  had  not been given a  reasonable  opportunity  of showing cause against the action which was ultimately  taken against  him  under  Art. 311 (2); and  he  urged  that  the contravention  of Art. 311 (2) rendered the  impugned  order invalid.   He urged other contentions also, but  those  have been rejected by the High Court, while his main point  under Art.  3.11  (2) has been upheld.  In the  result,  the  High Court  has allowed the writ petition and issued  a  mandamus directing  the  appellants not to give effect to  the  order dated  8th  July, 1961.  It is against this order  that  the appellants have come to this Court by special leave. We have already referred to the second notice served on  the respondent under Art. 311 (2).  The respondent’s  contention which  has  been accepted by the High Court is that  in  the said notice, appellant No. 1 has not clearly indicated  that it accepted the findings of the Enquiring officer; and since such  a statement is not made in the notice, the  respondent could   not  have  known  on  what  ground  appellant   No.1 provisionally  decided  to impose upon  the  respondent  the penalty  of removal from service.  The High Court  has  held that the notice issued under Art. 311 (2) must show that the dismissing authority has applied its mind to the findings of the  Enquiring  officer and has accepted the  said  findings against  the delinquent officer.  In other words the  notice should  expressly  state the conclusions of  the  dismissing authority, because unless these conclusions are communicated to  the delinquent officer, he would not be able to make  an adequate or effective representation.  According to the High Court,   in  recording  such  conclusions,  the   dismissing authority must 7 also  indicate  the reasons on which it had  come  to  those conclusions  against  the delinquent officer and  since  the impugned notice did not contain a specific averment that the

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dismissing  authority  had  accepted  the  findings  of  the enquiring  officer and otherwise gave no grounds or  reasons for the action proposed to be taken against the  respondent, it  contravened the requirements of Art. 311 (2) and so,  it must  be held to be void.  Mr. Setalvad for  the  appellants contends  that in coming to this conclusion, the High  Court has misinterpreted the scope and effect of Art. 311 (2). Article 311 (1) provides, inter alia, that no person covered by the said sub-article shall be dismissed or removed by  an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.  We are  not  concerned  with this sub-Article  in  the  present appeal.   Article  311 (2) provides that no such  person  as specified in Art. 311 (1), shall be dismissed or removed  or reduced  in  rank  until  he has  been  given  a  reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed  to be  taken in regard to him.  It is now well settled  that  a public  officer  against whom disciplinary  proceedings  are intended  to be taken is entitled to have two  opportunities before disciplinary action is finally taken against him.  An enquiry  must be held and it must be conducted according  to the  rules prescribed in that behalf and  consistently  with the  requirements of natural justice.  At this enquiry,  the public  officer  concerned  would be entitled  to  test  the evidence  adduced  against him by  cross-examination,  where necessary, and to lead his own evidence.  In other words, at this  first stage of the proceedings he is entitled to  have an opportunity to defend himself.  When the enquiry is  over and the enquiring officer submits his report, the dismissing authority  has to consider the report and decide whether  it agrees  with the conclusions of the report or not.   If  the findings, in the report are against the 8 public officer and the dismissing authority agrees with  the said  findings,  a  stage  is  reached  for  giving  another opportunity to the public officer to show will  disciplinary action  should  not be taken against him.   In  issuing  the second  notice,  the dismissing authority naturally  has  to come  to  a tentative or provisional  conclusion  about  the guilt of the public officer as well as about tile punishment which  would meet the requirement., of justice in his  case, and  it  is only after reaching conclusions  in  both  these matters  provisionally that the dismissing authority  issues the  second notice.  There is no doubt that in  response  to this  notice; the public officer is entitled to  show  cause not  only  against the action proposed to be  taken  against him, but also against the validity or the correctness of the findings recorded by the enquiring officer and provisionally accepted  by the dismissing authority.  In other words,  the second  opportunity enables the public officer to cover  the whole  ground  and to plead that no case had been  made  out against  him for taking any disciplinary action and then  to urge  that if he fails in substantiating his innocence,  the action  proposed  to be taken against him is  either  unduly severe or not called for.  This position is not in dispute. The  High Court seems to have taken the view that  in  order that  the public officer may have a reasonable  opportunity, tile  dismissing authority must indicate its conclusions  on the  findings  recorded by the enquiring  officer  and  must specify  reasons  in supports of them.   According  to  this view,  the  fact  that the copy of the report  made  by  the enquiring  officer was sent to the delinquent officer  along with the notice indicating the nature of the action proposed to  be  taken  against  him,  does  not  help  to  meet  the requirement  of’ Art. 311 (2).  The argument is that  unless this  course  is  adopted, it would not be  clear  that  the

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dismissing   authority   had  applied  its  mind   and   had provisionally come to some conclusions 9 both  in regard to the guilt of ’the public officer and  the punishment  which  his  misconduct  deserved.   It  may   be conceded that it is desirable that the dismissing  authority should  indicate in the second notice its  concurrence  with the  conclusions of the enquiring officer before  it  issues the said notice under Art. 311 (2).  But the question  which calls  for our decision is if the dismissing authority  does not  expressly say that it has accepted the findings of  the enquiring officer against the delinquent officer, does  that introduce  such an infirmity in the proceedings as  to  make the final order invalid ? We are not prepared to answer this question  in the affirmative.  It seems to us that it  would be plain to the delinquent officer that the issuance of  the notice   indicating  the  provisional  conclusions  of   the dismissing  authority  as to the punishment that  should  be imposed  on  him,  obviously and clearly  implies  that  the findings recorded against him by the enquiring officer  have been  accepted by the dismissing authority; otherwise  there would be no sense and no purpose in issuing the notice under Art. 311 (2).  Besides, we may add that in the present case, the  affidavit  made by appellant No. 2 clearly  shows  that before the impugned notice was served on the respondent, the Government  had  accepted  the  findings  of  the  enquiring officer  which  means that the Government  agreed  with  the enquiring  officer  in  regard  to  both  sets  of  findings recorded  by  him.   Therefore, we do  not  think  that  the failure to state expressly that the dismissing authority has accepted  the  findings recorded in the report  against  the delinquent officer, justifies the conclusion that the notice given   in  that  behalf  does  not  afford   a   reasonable opportunity  to the delinquent officer under Art.  311  (2). On  receiving the notice in the present case, it ’must  have been  obvious to the respondent that, the findings  recorded against  him by the enquiring officer had been  accepted  by the  appellants and so, we think it would not be  reasonable to accept the 10 view  that  in  the  present  case,  he  had  no  reasonable opportunity as required by Art. 311 (2). We  ought, however, to add that if the dismissing  authority differs from the findings recorded in the enquiry report, it is necessary that its provisional conclusions in that behalf should  be specified in the second notice.  It may  be  that the  report  makes  -findings in favour  of  the  delinquent officer,  but  the dismissing authority disagrees  with  the said  findings and proceeds to issue the notice  under  Art. 311  (2).  ID such a case, it would obviously  be  necessary that the dismissing authority should expressly state that it differs from the findings recorded in the enquiry report and then indicate the nature of the action proposed to be  taken against  the  delinquent officer.  Without such  an  express statement in the notice, it would be impossible to issue the notice  at  all.  There may also may be cases in  which  the enquiry report may make findings in favour of the delinquent officer on some issues and against him on some other issues. That  is  precisely what has happened in the  present  case. It’  the dismissing authority accepts all the said  findings in  their  entirety,  it  is another matter  :  but  if  the dismissing  authority accepts the findings recorded  against the delinquent officer and differs from some or all of those recorded in his favour and proceeds to specify the nature of the  action proposed to be taken on its own conclusions,  it

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would  be  necessary  that the said  conclusions  should  be briefly indicated in the notice. In this category of  cases, the  action proposed to be taken would be based not only  on the findings recorded against the delinquent officer in  the enquiry  report,  but  also on the view  of  the  dismissing authority  that  the other charges not held  proved  by  the enquiring   officer   are,  according  to   the   dismissing authority, proved.  In order to give the delinquent  officer a  reasonable opportunity to show cause under Art. 311  (2), it is essential that the conclusions 11 provisionally  reached by the dismissing authority must,  in such  cases,  be  specified in the notice.   But  where  the dismissing authority purports to proceed to issue the notice against  the delinquent officer after accepting the  enquiry report  in  its  entirety  it cannot  be  said  that  it  is essential that the dismissing authority must say that it has so accepted the report.  As we have already indicated, it is desirable that even in such cases a statement to that effect should be made.  But we do not think that the words used  in Art. 311 (2) justify the View that the failure to make  such a  statement  amounts to contravention of Art. 311  (2).  In dealing with this point, We must bear in mind the fact  that a  copy  of the enquiry report had been  enclosed  with  the notice, and so, reading the notice in a common sense manner, the  respondent  would  not have  found  any  difficulty  in realising  that the action proposed to be taken against  him proceeded on the basis that the appellants had accepted  the conclusions of the enquiring officer in their entirety. It  has,  however,  been urged by  Mr.  Chatterjee  for  the respondent  that  in the present case, the  appellants  must have  proceeded to issue the notice against  the  respondent after  coming to the conclusion that, some of  the  findings recorded  in the enquiry report in favour of the  respondent were  not correct.  His argument is that the enquiry  report had suggested that the withholding of three increments would meet  the ends of justice in the present case,  nevertheless the  notice  issued  by the appellants  indicated  that  the action  proposed  to be taken was the  respondent’s  removal from  service.   It is true that the ultimate  action  taken against  him was not as severe; he has, been merely  demoted to Class II Service.  But it is suggested that the  severity of the punishment proposed to be inflicted on the Respondent rather  suggests that the appellants felt that some  of  the other charges which the enquiring officer had not 12 held  proved appeared to be proved to the appellants.   This argument is no doubt ingenious; but in the circumstances  of this  case,  we do not think it can be  accepted.   As  this Court  has held in A. N. D’Silva v. Union of India  (1),  in the  absence  of rules or any statutory  provisions  to  the contrary, the enquiry officer is not required to specify the punishment  which may be imposed on the delinquent  officer. His  task is merely to hold an enquiry into the charges  and make  his report setting forth his conclusions and  findings in  respect  of the said charges.  Sometimes  the  enquiring officers  do indicate the nature of the action that  may  be taken against the delinquent officer, but that ordinarily is outside  the scope of the enquiry.  That being so, not  much significance  can be attached to the recommendation made  by the  enquiring officer in the present case.  Besides, it  is absolutely   clear  that  under  the  relevant  rules,   the punishment  proposed  to be imposed on  the  respondent  was justified  even on the findings recorded against him by  the enquiring officer, and so, it would be idle to contend  that

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unless  the appellants had differed from the conclusions  of the  enquiring  officer in respect of the charges  which  he held not proved, they could not have legitimately thought of imposing  the  said punishment on him.   Therefore,  in  our -)pinion, the argument that the action proposed to be  taken itself shows that the appellants did not accept the findings recorded by the enquiring officer  favour of the  respondent must be rejected. We  will  now refer to some of the decisions  on  which  Mr, Chatterjee relied.  In the case of The High Commissioner  of India  v.   I.  M.  Lal ( 2 ) , the  Federal  Court  had  to consider the scope and effect of he provisions of s.  240(3) of  the  Constitution  Act  of  1935.   ’This  provision  is substantially  similar to the provisions contained  in  Art. 311(2) of the Constitution.  According to the majority  view of  the  Federal  Court in that case,  all  that  s.  240(3) requited ’was (1) [1962] Supp.  1 S. C. R. 968.  (2) [1945] F. C. R.  103. 136.  13 not  only  notification of the action proposed  but  of  the grounds on which the authority was proposing that the action should be taken, and that the person concerned must then  be given  reasonable time to make his  representations  against the proposed action and the grounds on which it was proposed to  be  taken.  Mr. Chatterjee contends that  this  decision shows that the notice served on the delinquent officer  must set  forth  the grounds on which the particular  action  was proposed  to be taken.  He emphasises the fact that  in  the judgment it has been specifically stated that grounds should be  stated on which the action is proposed to be taken,  and shows  that  the dismissing authority must  its  reasons  in support or the said Section.  In our opinion, this  argument is  not  justified, because the context in  which  the  said observations  were made by the Federal Court  clearly  shows that the grounds to the judgment refers are the findings  or conclusions  reached by the enquiring officer.  In fact,  in tile  subsequent  passage, it has  been  expressly  observed that.  the requirement of s. 240(3) involves "in. all  cases where  there  is an enquiry and as a  result,  thereof  some authority  definitely  proposes dismissal  or  reduction  in rank,  that the person concerned shall be told in  full,  or adequately summarised form the results of that enquiry,  and the  findings  of  the enquiring officer  and  be  given  an opportunity  of showing cause with that information why  lie should  not  suffer the proposed dismissal or  reduction  in rank." It would be noticed that this statement clearly shows that  what  the Federal Court held was that  the  dismissing authority must convey to the delinquent officer the findings of  the  enquiring  officer  either  fully,  or   adequately summarised,  and state the nature of the action proposed  to be taken against him.  In other words, the officer concerned ought  to know what findings have been recorded against  him and should be given a chance to challenge those findings and to question the propriety 14 of  the  action proposed to be taken against him.   In  this context,  therefore,  the grounds which,  according  to  the judgment,  have to be stated in the notice do  not  indicate grounds  or  reasons which would show.  why  the  dismissing authority  accepts the enquiring officer’s report,  but  the grounds,  reasons, or findings which have been  recorded  by the enquiring officer are required to be stated.  Therefore, we  do  not  think  that  Mr.  Chatterjee  is  justified  in contending  that the decision of the Federal Court in 1.  M.

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Lal’s case supports the view taken by the High Court in  the present proceedings. It  is true that in the case of Khem Chand v. The  Union  of India   (1),  this  Court  has  held  that   :   "Reasonable opportunity envisaged by Art. 311 (2) includes, internal, an opportunity  to  make  his  representation  as  to  why  the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent authority, after the enquiry is over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of  the  charges  proved  against  the  Government  servant, tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punishments and communicates the same to the Government servant."  There is  no  doubt  that  after  the  report  is  received,   the appropriate authority must apply its mind to the report  and must  provisionally decide whether the findings recorded  in the  report  should be accepted or not.  It is only  if  the findings  recorded  in  the report  against  the  Government servant  are accepted by the appropriate authority  that  it has  to  provisionally decide what action  should  be  taken against  him But this does not mean that in every case,  the appropriate  authority is under a constitutional  obligation to  state  in the notice that it has  accepted  the  adverse findings  recorded  by  the  enquiring  officer  before   it indicates  the  nature of the action proposed  to  be  taken against the delinquent officer.  Therefore, we do not  think that the decision of (1)  [1958] S. C. R. 1080, 1097,  15 this  Court in Khem Chand’s case supports  Mr.  Chatterjee’s contention. On  the other hand, the decision of this Court in The  State of  Orissa  v. Govindadas Panda (1), shows  that  a  similar order  issued  by the Orissa Government was upheld  by  this Court.   In that case, the notice issued under Art. 311  (2) did  not  expressly  state that  the  State  Government  had accepted  the  findings recorded by  the  enquiring  officer against  the Government servant in question.  In  fact  even the  nature  of  the punishment which  was  proposed  to  be inflicted on him was not specifically and clearly  indicted. The Orissa High Court had struck down the order of dismissal on  the  ground that the notice was defective  and  so,  the provisions  of  Art. :II 1 (2) had been  contravened.   This Court  in reversing the concision of the Orissa High  Court, observed that "in the context, it Must have been obvious  to the respondent that the punishment proposed was removal from service  and  the respondent was called upon to  show  cause against  that  punishment.  On a reasonable reading  of  the notice, the only conclusion at which one can arrive is  that the appellant (the State) accepted the recommendation of the Administrative  Tribunal  and asked the respondent  to  show cause  against  the  proposed punishment,  namely,  that  of removal from service." It may be added incidentally that the punishment  which  had been suggested by  the  Tribunal  was removal  from service, as distinguished from dismissal,  and this  Court held that the impugned notice must be deemed  to have  referred to that punishment as the action proposed  to be  taken against the Government servant.   Therefore,  this decision, in substance, is against the contention raised  by Mr. Chatterjee There  are,  however,  some decisions  which  seem  to  lend support  to Mr. Chatterjee’s argument and it is,  therefore, necessary to examine them.  In the (1)  Civil Appeal NO, 412/1958 decided on 10th Dec., 1958, 16 case  of  The State o Andhra v. T. Ramayya Suri  the  Andhra

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Pradesh  High  Court has held that "under Art. 311  (2)  the authority   concerned  should  necessarily  in   its   order requiring the civil servant to show cause give not only  the punishment  proposed to lie inflicted but also  the  reasons for  coming  to  that conclusion." If  this  observation  is intended  to lay down a general rule that in every case  the appropriate authority must state its own grounds or  reasons for  proposing  to  take any  specific  action  against  the delinquent  government servant, we must hold that  the  said view  is not justified by the requirements of Art. 311  (2). We  ought, however, to add that in the case with  which  the Andhra Pradesh High Court was dealing, it appeared that  the Government did not agree with the Tribunal in regard to  its finding  on the third charge and so, its conclusion  on  the said  charge which was different from that of the  Tribunal, weighed  in  its  mind in proposing to  take  the  specified action  against the Government servant.  In such a case,  it would be legitimate to hold that the public servant did  not know what was weighing in the mind of the Government and so, did  not get an adequate opportunity to challenge  the  view which the Government was inclined to take in respect of  the third charge framed against him.  On these facts, we  think, the  High  Court was justified in taking the view  that  the Government   should  have  indicated  in  the   notice   its conclusion  on the third charge.  That, however,  does  riot mean  that in the notice, the Government ought to state  its grounds or reasons in support of its conclusion.  It is  the finding  or the conclusion which is weighing in the mind  of the Government that must, in such a case, be communicated to the public servant. In  Bimal  Charan Mitra v. State of Orissa (2),  the  Orissa High  Court  has held that "the service of the copy  of  the findings of the punishing authority on the public servant is mandatory and the service (1) A. I. R. 1957 Andh. 370, (2) A. I. R. 1957 Orissa. 184,  17 of  the  report  of the enquiring officer  who  is  not  the punishing  authority, when there is no indication at all  in the  notice  that the authority competent to  punish  agrees with   those   findings,   cannot   constitute   substantial compliance  with the requirements of Art. 31 1 (2).  "  This decision  seems to suggest that in issuing the notice  under Art.  311.  (2),  the appropriate  authority  must,  besides serving  the copy of the enquiring officer’s report  on  the government servant, supply the said officer the findings  of the punishing authority and this requirement is treated as a mandatory  requirement under Art. 311(2).  In  our  opinion, this view is erroneous. The same comment falls to be made ’about another decision of the said High Court in Krishan Gopal Mukherjee v. The  State (1). The  last  decision to which reference must be made  is  the decision of the Bombay High Court in the State of Bombay  v. Gajanan  Mahadev  Badley (2) . In this case,  Chief  justice Chagla  has  observed  that under Art. 311  (2)  it  is  not sufficient  that the State should call upon the  servant  to show cause against the quantum of punishment intended to  be inflicted  upon  him;  the State must  also  call  upon  the servant  to show cause against the decision arrived at by  a departmental enquiry if that decision constitutes the ground on which the Government proposes to take, action against the servant.   This view is clearly right.  But then in  support of  this conclusion, the learned Chief justice has  observed that  the  public servant must have an opportunity  to  show

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cause  not only against the punishment but also against  the grounds  on which the State proposes to punish him; and  Mr. Chatterjee relies upon this sentence to support his argument that the grounds on which the State proposes to act must  be communicated  to the public servant.  In our  opinion,  this statement must be read along with the conclusion of the High Court (1) A.I.R. 1960 Orissa 37. (2) A.I.R. 1954 Bom. 351. 18 and  so  read,  it would clearly show that what  the  C.  J. intended  to lay down was that the findings recorded in  the enquiry  report  which constitutes the ground on  which  the Government  proposes to take action must be communicated  to the  public  servant.   Therefore, this  decision  does  not support  Mr.  Chatterjee’s argument that the  notice  issued under Art. 311(2) must expressly state that the  appropriate authority  accepts the findings of the enquiry  officer  and must  give reasons in support of the action proposed  to  be taken against him. In  the result, we hold that the High Court was in error  in coming to the conclusion that the order of demotion  ’Passed against  the respondent in the present case was  invalid  on the  ground  that  the  respondent  had  not  been  given  a reasonable  opportunity  of showing cause against  the  said action under Art. 311(2).  The appeal accordingly  succeeds, the order passed by the High Court is set aside and the writ petition  filed by the respondent is dismissed.  There  will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.  19