REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 815 OF 2003

State of A.P. …..Appellant

Versus

V.V. Panduranga Rao …..Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the  

Andhra  Pradesh High Court directing acquittal of the respondent who faced  

trial  for  having   allegedly  committed   the  murder  of  his  wife  Veeranki  

Bhulaxmi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘deceased’). It was the prosecution

case that after committing the murder of his wife, the accused had tried to  

commit  suicide  by  cutting  his  throat  with  knife.  He  was  charged  for  

commission  of  offences  punishable  under  Sections  302  and  309  of  the  

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the ‘IPC’).   He was tried for both the  

offences, but he was sentenced only in respect of offence punishable under  

Section 302 IPC.  

2. Prosecution version, in a nutshell, is as follows:

The accused,  the  deceased  and the  prosecution  witnesses  were  the  

residents of Venkuru village of Vijayawada, Krishna district. The deceased  

was the  wife  of  the  accused.  PW-1 was the  mother,  PWs 2 and 3 were  

daughters and PW-4 was brother of the deceased. The deceased and PW-2  

were attending cooli work and were maintaining the family. They shifted  

their residence to Venkuru village for their livelihood and were staying in  

the house of PW-1. On the intervening night of 2/3-3-2000 at about 3.45  

a.m. the deceased was sleeping on her cot in their house in Venkuru. The  

accused hacked her with a knife on her neck and caused her instantaneous  

death and later he attempted to commit suicide by cutting his throat partially  

with a knife. PW-1 woke up in the early hours and noticed that the deceased  

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was lying with bleeding injury on her neck and the knife with blood was in  

the hands of the accused. Then on seeing PW-1 the accused fled away. A  

complaint  was  lodged  and  it  was  registered  in  Cr.No.48  of  2000  of  

Penamluru  police  station.  Inquest  was  held  over  the  dead  body  of  the  

deceased and the same was sent for post mortem examination. PW-8, the  

Medical Officer conducted autopsy and issued post mortem certificate. The  

statements of the witnesses were recorded and investigation was undertaken.  

On  completion  of  investigation  charge  sheet  was  filed.  As  the  accused  

person pleaded innocence trial  was held.  As noted above,  the trial  Court  

placed reliance on the evidence  of mother (PW-1)  of the deceased  and  

recorded conviction. The High Court found that the evidence of PW-1 on  

whose evidence the conviction was recorded does not inspire confidence.  It  

was also noted that the report was given to the police officer on telephone as  

admitted  by the brother of the  deceased at about 4.00 a.m.  The same does  

not appear to have been recorded in writing and on the other hand  the police  

officer claimed to have  come to  the place of occurrence and recorded the  

statement of the mother and converted it into the FIR. The High Court noted  

that it was not explained by the investigating officer as to why the telephonic  

message was not reduced into writing.  

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With reference to the evidence of PW-1 the High Court noted that she  

stated that her son had informed the police. It is not known as to what the  

son of PW-1  told the police  i.e. whether he told about  the details of the  

crime or  that some crime had taken place. If it is former then the message  

was required to be reduced in writing. The police officer who received the  

telephonic message is  PW-10. According to him he received a telephonic  

message that some murder had taken place. He categorically admitted that  

he did not  reduce the information into writing. Added to that  the High  

Court noted that  the FIR reached the police station after about 7 hours. In  

the FIR it was  noted the injuries which were of very serious nature  on the  

person of the accused were not explained.  It did not accept the stand taken  

that the accused tried to commit suicide.  

3. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant-State  submitted  that  the  reasons  

recorded by the High Court to direct acquittal are not sustainable in law. It is  

stated that the message purported to have been given over telephone was a  

cryptic one and, therefore, cannot be treated as a FIR.  

4. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  supported  the  judgment  of  the  

High Court.  

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5. Certain facts have been rightly noted by the High Court. Where the  

information is only one which required the police to move to the place of  

occurrence and as a matter of fact the detailed statement was  recorded after  

going to the place of occurrence, the said statement  is to be treated  as FIR.  

But where   some cryptic or anonymous oral message  which did not  in  

terms clearly specify a cognizable offence cannot be treated as FIR. The  

mere fact that the information  was the first in point of time does  not by  

itself clothe it with the character of FIR. The matter has to be considered in  

the background of Sections 154 and 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,  

1973 (in short the ‘Code’). A cryptic telephonic message of a cognizable  

offence received by the police agency would not constitute a FIR.  

6. The object and purpose of  giving a telephonic message is not to lodge  

the FIR but to request the officer incharge  of the police station to reach the  

place  of  occurrence.  On  the  other  hand   if  the  information  given  on  

telephone is not cryptic and on the basis of that information the officer in  

charge  is prima facie satisfied about the commission of a cognizable offence  

and proceeds from the police station after recording such information  to  

investigate such offence then  any statement made by any person  in respect  

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of the said offence including details about the participants  shall be deemed  

to be a statement made by a person  to the police officer in the course of  

investigation  covered by Section 162 of Code. That statement cannot be  

treated  as FIR.    To put it differently any telephonic information  about the  

commission of  cognizable offence irrespective  of  the nature of  details  of  

such information   cannot  be  treated  as  FIR.  If  in  the  instant  case  PW-6  

proceeded on the basis of  what has been told by PW-1 to  him about the  

murder of the deceased  it was but natural that PW-1 would have told him  

who  the author  of the crime was.  That is not the case of the prosecution.  

There has been lots of improvements in the evidence of PW-1 i.e. what she  

had made during investigation when compared with that recorded in Court.

7. During investigation PW-1 had not stated that he had seen the accused  

standing  near the dead body of the deceased or that on hearing her cries  her  

son Venkanna who has not  been examined came there and informed the  

incident to the police by phone. She had also not stated  that the accused had  

told her that he  had cut the throat of the deceased with a knife which is  

available in the house.  Interestingly, there was no effort made to match the  

blood group of  the  deceased  with  the  blood found on the  M.O.1.  If  the  

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aforesaid aspects are considered, the inevitable conclusion is that the  appeal  

is without merit, deserves dismissal which we direct.    

………………………………….J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

………………………………….J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi, May 04, 2009

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