http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4  

CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  1057 of 1998

PETITIONER: State of A. P.

RESPONDENT: R. Jeevaratnam

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/07/2004

BENCH: S. N. VARIAVA & ARIJIT PASAYAT.

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

S. N. VARIAVA, J.

       This Appeal is against the Judgment dated 10th December, 1997  of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.           Briefly stated the facts are as follows: The Respondent was, at the relevant time, functioning as the  Secretary of Visakhapatnam Port Trust.  He was also a Member of the  Tender Committee.  He was also officiating as the Secretary of the  Board of Trustees of Visakhapatnam Port Trust.  The Visakhapatnam  Port Trust had floated a tender, in response to which one M/s Ramesh  Chandra & Company had submitted a quotation for Rs.  1,33,84,702.80.  The tender of M/s. Ramesh Chandra & Company was  the lowest.   The complainant one Mr. G. Subrahmanyam was the  Manager and General Power of Attorney holder of M/s. Ramesh  Chandra & Company.  According to the prosecution, on 23rd December,  1991 the Complainant was called to the house of the Respondent.  He  was there informed that there were many complications in the tender  and that in order to clear those complications a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/-  would have to be paid to the Respondent as bribe.   According to the  prosecution, the Complainant expressed financial disability in paying  the amount and was told by the Respondent that the amount could be  paid in 5 installments.   According to the prosecution, the Respondent  told the Complainant that if the amount was not paid the file would not  be cleared.  According to the prosecution, on 30th December, 1991,  the Complainant again met the Respondent when he was told that at  least a sum of Rs. 10,000/- had to be paid as an advance.   The said  amount of Rs. 10,000/- was to be paid on 31st December, 1991 in  Hotel Apsara in Visakhapatnam.  The Complainant then reported the  matter to the Central Bureau of Investigation, who laid a trap.  The  Respondent was caught coming out of the hotel room with marked  currency totaling Rs. 10,000/- in a briefcase which was carried by the  Respondent.           The Respondent was therefore prosecuted under Sections 7 and  13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.  The  prosecution examined 14 witnesses including the Complainant and one  Mr. M. Veerabhadrarao who was examined as P.W.2.  P.W.2 was an  absolutely independent witness who had acted as a Panch witness and  who knew neither the Complainant nor the Respondent.  P.W.2 had no  enmity with either party and it is not even alleged that he was trying  to favour either party.         On the evidence before him, the Special Judge convicted the  accused and sentenced him to R.I. for two years on each count and to  pay a fine of Rs. 3,000/- on each count.  The Appeal filed by the  Respondent has been allowed by the High Court by the impugned  Judgment.  The High Court concludes, on the basis of evidence, that  by 23rd November, 1991 the file had already been cleared to the  knowledge of the Complainant.  The High Court concludes that as the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 4  

file was already cleared the question of doing favour or not doing  favour did not arise.   The High Court concludes that it was improbable  that the Respondent would have demanded Rs. 1,00,000/-.  The High  Court concludes that the Respondent’s version that the money must  have been put into his briefcase when he had gone to the toilet was  probable.  The High Court concludes that the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and  2 does not establish that any demand was made.   On this basis the  High Court acquits the Respondent even of the offence under Section 7  of the Prevention of Corruption Act.         At this stage, it must be mentioned that on a complaint made by  the same Complainant, in respect of another incident, another officer  of Visakhapatnam Port Trust had also been prosecuted.  In that case  also the Trial Court had found the Officer guilty but the High Court had  acquitted her. This Court, in its Judgment in the case of State of  Andhra Pradesh vs. C. Uma Maheswara Rao reported in (2004) 4  SCC 399, set aside the Judgment of the High Court and convicted the  accused in that case.  While so doing, this Court noticed Section 20(1)  of the Prevention of Corruption Act which reads as follows: "20.(1) Presumption where public servant accepts  gratification other than legal remuneration.- (1) Where, in  any trial of an offence punishable under Section 7 or  Section 11 or clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of  Section 13 it is proved that an accused person has  accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted  to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any  gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any  valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed,  unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained  or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain that  gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as  a motive or reward such as is mentioned in Section 7 or,  as the case may be, without consideration or for a  consideration which he knows to be inadequate."

This Court then analyzed the law on subject and held that the term  "shall be presumed" in Section 20(1) showed that Courts had to  compulsory draw a presumption.  It held that the only condition for  drawing the presumption is that during trial it should be proved that  the accused has accepted or agreed to accept any gratification.  It is  held that the condition need not be satisfied only through direct  evidence.  It is held that proof did not mean direct proof as that would  be impossible but the proof must be one which would induce a  reasonable man to come to a particular conclusion.  It was held that  once it is proved that gratification has been accepted the presumption  automatically arose.   This Court cited with approval the observations  of a three Judge Bench in the case of Raghubir Singh vs. State of  Punjab reported in (1974) 4 SCC 560 that the very fact that the  accused was in possession of marked currency notes against an  allegation that he demanded and received the amount is "res ipsa  loquitur".  We are in full agreement with the observations made in that  Judgment.   We now set out briefly the evidence in the matter.  P.W. 1, i.e.,  the Complainant, has deposed about the demand made on 23rd  December, 1991 and it being repeated on 30th December, 1991 when  the Respondent asked him to pay at least Rs. 10,000/- on 31st  December, 1991 in a hotel room in Hotel Apsara.  He has deposed that  he made a complaint to CBI and that CBI arranged the trap.  The  Complainant deposed that he had booked the room and he and P.W. 2  went into the Room no. 202.  He deposed that on receiving a call from  the reception he went and brought the Respondent, who came to Hotel  Apsara, to Room No. 202 where P.W. 2 was waiting.  He deposed that  he introduced P.W. 2 as the Group Financial Manager who had come  from Bombay.  P.W. 1 deposed that the Respondent then asked  whether he had brought the money demanded as a bribe.  He deposed  that he opened a rexin bag and offered the marked currency

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4  

amounting to Rs. 10,000/- but that the Respondent asked him to put  the money into the briefcase and, therefore, he put the amount into  the briefcase.  P.W. 1 deposed that thereafter the Respondent took the  briefcase and was about to leave the room when he gave the  prearranged signal and CBI nabbed the Respondent.   In cross- examination this version of P.W. 1 could not be shaken at all.  This  evidence clearly established demand and acceptance of money. This version is supported by the deposition of P.W. 2.  P.W. 2  was at that time the Assistant Director of Post Office at  Visakhapatnam.    He was asked by his superior Officer to go to the  CBI Office.  He did not know the Complainant or the Respondent.  He  deposed that P.W. 1, himself and the CBI officers along with marked  currency went to Room No. 202 in Hotel Apsara.  He deposed that a  phone call was received from the reception and P.W. 1 went out and  brought the Respondent into the room.  He deposed that he was  introduced to the Respondent as a Group Finance Manager of the  company.   He deposed that P.W. 1 mentioned that as agreed earlier  money had been brought for payment of the first installment and that  the rest of the amount would be paid afterwards.  He deposed that  P.W. 1 asked the Respondent to clear the file.  He deposed that the  Respondent thereupon assured P.W. 1 not to worry about the file and  that he (the Respondent) would see to it that the file is cleared within  one month.  P.W. 2 deposed that P.W.1 offered the money to the  Respondent, but the Respondent asked him to place the money into  his briefcase.  He deposed that P.W.1 therefore placed the money into  the briefcase and the Respondent then picked up the briefcase and  was going out of the room when he was apprehended pursuant to a  pre-arranged signal.    The Respondent was thus caught red-handed with the marked  money in a briefcase carried by him.  The presumption under Section  20(1) thus arose.   The High Court unfortunately overlooks this aspect.      Faced with this situation it was submitted by Mr. Anand, on  behalf of the Respondent, that the presumption under Section 20 does  not arise in a case under Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of  Corruption Act.  He submitted that for an offence under Section  13(1)(d) the demand had also to be proved.  In support of his  submission he relied upon the case of Subash Parbat Sonvane vs.  State of Gujarat reported in (2002) 5 SCC 86.    This submission overlooks the fact that the Respondent had been  accused of an offence under Section 7 also.  His explanation that the  money must have been put into his briefcase when he had gone to the  bathroom is unbelievable.  Both P.Ws. 1 and 2 have denied that the  Respondent went to the bathroom.   There is no explanation worth its  name as to why the Respondent had gone into the hotel room.  Even  his explanation that he had gone to the hotel to book a table for the  night of 31st December is belied by the fact that there is no evidence  that any table was booked by the Respondent.  Thus it was proved  that an offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act  had been committed.         Even otherwise, in our view, the High Court was entirely wrong  in coming to a conclusion that there was no proof of demand.  The  evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2, to the effect, that when the Respondent  came into the room he was told that P.W.2 was the Group Finance  Manager, who had brought Rs. 10,000/- as demanded and the further  evidence that the Respondent assured that the file would be cleared  clearly establish that there was a demand and receipt of the money  was as a bribe.  On this evidence which has not been shaken in cross- examination, in our view, the offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with  Section 13(2) had also been made out.   The High Court erred in  acquitting the Respondent merely on the basis of conjectures and  surmises.           In this view of the matter, we set aside the Judgment of the  High Court and convict the Respondent under Section 7 and Section  13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.  In our  view, the ends of justice would be met, by sentencing the accused

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4  

under both the counts to one year’s rigorous imprisonment.  The fine  and default stipulations will be as stipulated by the trial Court.           The Appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.  The  Respondent is directed to surrender to serve out the remaining  sentence.