STATE OF A.P. Vs HYDERABAD POTTERIES P.LTD.
Case number: C.A. No.-003413-003413 / 2010
Diary number: 36085 / 2007
Advocates: C. K. SUCHARITA Vs
K. RAMKUMAR & ASSOCIATES
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3413 of 2010 [arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.24345 of 2007]
State of A.P. …....……Appellant
Versus
Hyderabad Potteries Pvt. Ltd & Anr. ….……...Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Deepak Verma, J
1. Leave granted. Arguments heard. Record
perused.
2. On account of illegal and unauthorized grabbing of
Urban and Urbanized land in various metropolitan cities,
State of Andhra Pradesh in its wisdom thought it fit and
appropriate to bring an Act to curb this menace. The Act is
known as Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982
[hereinafter shall be referred to as the ‘Act’].
3. Statement of Objects and Reasons discloses
that it had come to the notice of Government that there are
organised attempts on the part of certain lawless persons
operating individually and in groups to grab either by force,
or by deceit or otherwise lands belonging to the Government,
a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or
endowment, including wakf or any other private person. The
Government was further of the view that such land grabbers
are forming bogus co-operative housing societies or setting
up fictitious claims and are indulging in large scale and
unprecedented and fraudulent sales of land through
unscrupulous real estate dealers or otherwise in favour of
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certain section of people, resulting in large scale
accumulation of unaccounted wealth. It was felt that public
order is likely to be adversely affected. Such unlawful
activities of land grabbers had to be arrested and curbed by
enacting a special law in that regard.
4. Keeping the aforesaid objects and reasons,
initially, Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition)
Ordinance, 1982, was promulgated by the Governor on 29.6.1982
as at that time State Legislature was not in session. But
subsequently, the aforesaid Act came to be passed by the
State Legislature.
5. Section 8 of the said Act deals with procedure and
powers of the Special Courts which are to be constituted as
required under Section 7 of the Act. A Special Court
generally consists of a Chairman and four other members to be
appointed by the Government.
6. Section 10 of the Act which deals with burden of
proof, which is required to be considered primarily by us in
this appeal, is reproduced hereinbelow:-
“Where in any proceedings under this Act, a land is alleged to have been grabbed, and such land is prima facie proved to be the land owned by the Government or by a private person the Special Court or as the case may be the Special Tribunal shall presume that the person who is alleged to have grabbed the land is a land grabber and the burden of proving that the land has not been grabbed by him shall be on such person”.
7. Plain and simple reading of the aforesaid
provision would make it abundantly clear that an aggrieved
person as contemplated under Section 10 of the Act is prima
facie required to prove before the Special Court that the
land is owned by such person and presumption that such person
had grabbed the land would be against him and burden of
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proving that the land has not been grabbed by him shall be on
such person. In the light of aforesaid provisions existing in
the Act, we are called upon to examine the correctness,
legality and propriety of the judgment and order passed by
Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature, Andhra
Pradesh at Hyderabad passed in W.P. No. 4432 of 2005 on
11.10.2007, titled State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Hyderabad
Potteries Pvt. Ltd. and Another.
Factual matrix of the case lies as under:-
8. State of A.P had filed an application under
Section 8(1) of the Act before the Special Court, against the
Respondents seeking a declaration that they be declared land
grabbers in respect of schedule property and consequently to
evict them and deliver vacant possession and to further award
compensation to the State. The property in question is
admeasuring 17,786.56 square meters of land in T.S. 4/2,
Block-B, Ward No. 66 of Bakaram Village, Musheerabad Mandal,
Hyderabad District, now said to be in the heart of the city.
The case of the Appellant before the Special Court was that
in the town survey conducted in respect of Bakaram and
Gaganmahal villages in the years 1355 and 1357 faslis
equivalent to 1945-1947 respectively and further in the year
1965 and 1971 and on verification of the maps of both
villages, it was found that certain extent of area existing
between these two villages was left un-surveyed and was not
accounted for. Consequently, it remained as a gap area. Gap
area means un-surveyed land and would be deemed to be
Government land.
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9. According to Appellant, town survey was
conducted by following due procedure as contemplated under
A.P. Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923; accordingly a
notification was published for fixing up the boundaries.
Thereafter, the schedule property admeasuring 19214 sq.
meters of land was recorded as Government land in Column No.
20 of the Town Survey Land Register (for short ‘T.S.L.R.’).
Later on, a gazette notification dated 17.07.1976 was issued
in this regard which remained unchallenged by anyone by way
of proceedings under Section 14 of A.P. Survey & Boundaries
Act, 1923. Thus, the said survey having attained finality and
the lands having been found in possession of the Respondents,
they would be deemed to be land grabbers.
10. Appellant further contended that sometime in
the month of December 1998, Respondents without having any
right, title or interest on the said land, yet illegally
grabbed the schedule property to the extent mentioned above
and started construction of multi-storeyed complexes thereon.
It was further submitted that by creating fictitious and
fabricated documents and obtaining permission from the
Municipality, which was earlier rejected but having
challenged the same by the Respondents in the High Court by
filing Writ Petition No. 25727 of 2000, the same was granted.
The Appellant-State, therefore, contended that Respondents
are the land grabbers; they should be directed to deliver
possession to the Appellant and pay compensation accordingly.
11. On notices being issued to the Respondents on
the application filed by the Appellant, they filed counter
affidavits denying each and every allegation levelled against
them. They contended that first Respondent is a Company duly
registered under the Companies Act as on 27.04.1946 and later
on, the nomenclature was changed to that of Hyderabad
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Potteries Pvt. Ltd. Initially, Shri S. Rajeshwar Rao and M.K.
Mudaliar had purchased an extent of Acs. 4-32 guntas of land
in Survey Nos. 118 to 133 of Nampally Village by registered
deed of sale executed in their favour on 09.04.1944 by
previous original owner and pattedar Shri Haji Mohd Abdul
Azeez. Later on, the said two purchasers sold the said land
in favour of Respondent No. 1, Hyderabad Potteries Pvt. Ltd.
by registered deed of sale executed on 31.03.1946 showing
clear identity of land with boundaries.
12. Out of the said property purchased, certain
portions were acquired by erstwhile Hyderabad Government in
two spells for the purpose of construction of houses known as
“Labour Quarters”. In the land acquisition proceedings, the
award was passed determining the amount of compensation which
was carried to civil court for proper determination and
further appeals to the High Court but the property purchased
by Respondent No. 1 Company was not acquired. Thereafter,
Municipality assigned house numbers for the factory and
adjoining premises as 1-1-365 and 1-1-365/A. Later on, the
said property was converted for industrial use as per the
orders of the Government. On coming into force of A.P. Urban
Land Ceiling Act, 1976, Respondent No. 1 had filed a
declaration. After due enquiry, an area admeasuring 1427.44
sq. meters of the said land of Respondent No. 1 was declared
as surplus land, which was handed over to Government and
possession thereof, was also taken by it. Later, under
Section 20(1) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976, the State
Government on the application of the Respondents, granted
exemption on 11.06.1980. However, since the land was not
being used for purposes for which exemption was sought and
granted, the Government in its wisdom withdrew the said
exemption.
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13. Out of the said extent of land, Respondents
have constructed a multi-storeyed complex on a part thereof,
after obtaining prior approval and sanction from Municipal
Corporation Hyderabad and third party rights have been
created in favour of people, who are occupying the flats,
plots and living with their families. The Municipality had
also assessed the constructions for the purpose of tax, which
is being paid regularly apart from payment of electricity and
other charges etc.
14. For purposes of construction of another multi-
storeyed complex, they applied for permission on payment of
Rs. 50,00,000/-(Rupees fifty lakhs) towards permission fee
and other charges. The said permission was refused on
26.08.2000 stating therein that the land is a Government
land. Respondents were, therefore, constrained to challenge
the same by filing W.P. No. 25727 of 2000 in the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh, which came to be allowed on 25.04.2001
directing the Municipality to grant permission for
construction of such multi-storeyed complex. In the light of
the aforesaid factual scenario, Respondents contended that
the stand of the Appellant-State is unsustainable and
Respondents are in possession of the said land for more than
60 years, in their own rights as owners thereof, thus, they
cannot be declared land grabbers at all.
15. On the strength of the pleadings of parties,
Special Court was pleased to frame issues, which have been
reproduced in the impugned order.
16. Here, it is pertinent to point out that Section
9 of the Act, gives powers of the Civil Court and Court of
Sessions to Special Courts constituted under the Act, in so
far as, the same may not be inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act. This Section further shows that the Special
Court shall be deemed to be a Civil Court and shall have all
the powers of a Civil Court.
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17. The parties then went to trial and led
evidence. Appellant examined P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.3 on its
behalf and proved documents A.1 to A.41. Respondents examined
R.W.1 on their behalf and proved documents B.1 to B.33.
18. On consideration of the entire evidence and the
material on record produced by both sides, the Special Court
by majority view dismissed the application filed by the
Appellant-State whereas one of its revenue members gave a
differing judgment upholding the claim of the Appellant only
on the basis of entries available in T.S.L.R. Due to majority
opinion, the suit filed by Appellant came to be dismissed.
Appellant-State was thus, constrained to file the aforesaid
writ petition being W.P. No.4432 of 2005, under Article 226
of the Constitution of India in the High Court. The Division
Bench considered the matter from all angles and came to the
conclusion that Appellant had miserably failed to prove that
Respondents are land grabbers as contemplated under the
provisions of the Act and, therefore, it put its seal of
approval on the majority view of the Special Court and
dismissed the Appellant's writ petition.
19. Feeling aggrieved therefrom, this appeal
is preferred before us. We have accordingly heard Shri I.
Venkatnarayana, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant and
Shri V.A. Bobde with Shri V. Sekhar, learned Senior Counsel
for Respondents, at length and perused the record.
20. The sole basis of the Appellant to claim the
land was on the strength of entries made in survey records
showing that the schedule property was surveyed as T.S. No. 4
/2, Ward No. 66 of Bakaram village having an area of 19214
sq. meters showing it as a gap area i.e. un-surveyed area as
per the old survey records and as such it could only be
declared to be Government land as has been recorded in Column
No. 20 of the T.S.L.R. Apart from the said revenue record and
issuance of gazette notification as mentioned hereinabove, no
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other material document was filed by the Appellant to show
that the said land belonged only to Government. It is trite
that entry in the revenue record alone may not be sufficient
as conclusive proof of title nor can be relied on for proof
of establishing the title as such.
21. Special Court had considered the admission
of P.W.1, one of the witnesses of the Appellant-State, who
admitted that the schedule land was given Municipal No. 1-1-
365 and NALA tax was being collected from Respondent No. 1
and pleaded total ignorance of the various sale deeds filed
by Respondents. This witness also admitted with regard to
acquisition of lands for construction of labour colonies and
passing of the awards.
22. Considering the evidence of other two
witnesses; P.W.2 and P.W.3, Special Court recorded a
categorical finding that they had admitted that at the time
of conducting the survey in the year 1965-1971 and making of
entries in T.S.L.R., no notice was ever served on the
Respondents and further admitted that it appears that all
through the possession of the land continued with Respondents
only. P.W.2 also admitted about grant of municipal number to
its owner i.e. Respondent No. 1.
23. In the light of the same, the majority
members of the Special Court came to the conclusion that
certain entries in the T.S.L.R. may not be sufficient proof
of possession of the Appellant-State as owner thereof. Copy
of the T.S.L.R. has been filed showing the details thereof.
In Column No. 20 “G” is mentioned meaning thereby Government,
but in Column No. 23 which is Remarks Column, the possession
of Respondent No. 1, Hyderabad Potteries Pvt. Ltd. is clearly
shown which is in consonance with the stand taken by the
Respondents. It is also pertinent to mention here that ‘G’
was encircled raising doubts about it and then in Column No.
23 name of Respondent no.1 is clearly stated.
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24. Looking to the matter in totality and from all
angles it can safely be construed that prima facie Appellant-
State failed to establish that Respondents are land grabbers
of its land or the title of the land vested with the State.
Thus, the Special Court committed no error in drawing
presumption in favour of the Respondents that they cannot be
declared as land grabbers as contemplated under Section 10 of
the Act and the prima facie burden which lay on the Appellant
that its land has been grabbed by them has not at all been
discharged. On the other hand, on account of various sale
deeds, mutation of their names in the T.S.L.R., Payment of
Taxes and other documents, it was fully established that
Respondents are the exclusive owner therof. Thus, the burden
which lay on the Respondents as contemplated under Section 10
of the Act has fully been discharged.
25. The narration of the aforesaid facts would
clearly establish that Respondent No.1 had purchased the said
land from its previous owners whose names were already
mutated in the land records and after purchase, Respondent
No.1’s name came to be mutated in the records. Corporation
number was allotted to it. It had started paying Corporation
Taxes as well as NALA Tax and electricity dues. Its
possession for last more than 60 years had never been
disturbed. It had constructed multi-storeyed building only
after obtaining sanction and permission from Municipal
Corporation. In the earlier Writ Petition filed by them in
the High Court, Municipal Corporation and Appellant-State
both were parties, which ultimately resulted in favour of the
Respondents, no such ground was raised. Thus, it could not be
established even in earlier litigation that the land belonged
to the State.
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26. In fact, second proceedings initiated by
the Appellant under Section 8 of the Act, would be barred by
constructive res judicata as envisaged under Section 11 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, even though such a ground was
neither taken nor raised before us by the Respondents. Thus,
it is no more necessary to further deal with this issue.
27. Thus, in our considered opinion, no fault
can be found either in the judgment and decree of the Special
Court or in the judgment and order passed by Division Bench
of the High Court, in Appellant's writ petition.
28. Keeping the aforesaid facts in mind, we are of
the opinion that there is no merit or substance in this
appeal. It is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.
........................J. [P.SATHASIVAM]
.......................J. [DEEPAK VERMA]
New Delhi. April 19, 2010